yalta conference

9
Yalta Conference Yalta Conference in February 1945 with (from left to right) Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin. Also present are Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (far left); Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, RN, Marshal of the RAF Sir Charles Portal, RAF, (standing behind Churchill); General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN, (standing behind Roosevelt). The Yalta Conference, sometimes called the Crimea Conference and codenamed the Argonaut Conference, held from February 4 to 11, 1945, was the World War II meeting of the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, represented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin, respectively, for the purpose of discussing Europe’s post-war reorganization. The conference convened in the Livadia Palace near Yalta in Crimea. The meeting was intended mainly to discuss the re- establishment of the nations of war-torn Europe. Within a few years, with the Cold War dividing the continent, Yalta became a subject of intense controversy. To some extent, it has remained controversial. Yalta was the second of three wartime conferences among the Big Three. It had been preceded by the Tehran Conference in 1943, and was followed by the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, which was attended by Stalin, Churchill (who was replaced halfway through by the newly elected British Prime Minister Clement Attlee) and Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt’s successor. 1 The Conference All three leaders were attempting to establish an agenda for governing post-war Europe. They wanted to keep peace between post-world war countries. On the Eastern Front, the front line at the end of December 1943 re- mained in the Soviet Union but, by August 1944, So- viet forces were inside Poland and parts of Romania as part of their drive west. [1] By the time of the Conference, Red Army Marshal Georgy Zhukov's forces were 65 km (40 mi) from Berlin. Stalin’s position at the conference was one which he felt was so strong that he could dic- tate terms. According to U.S. delegation member and future Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, "[i]t was not a question of what we would let the Russians do, but what we could get the Russians to do.” [2] Moreover, Roosevelt hoped for a commitment from Stalin to participate in the United Nations. Premier Stalin, insisting that his doctors opposed any long trips, rejected Roosevelt’s suggestion to meet at the Mediterranean. [3] He offered instead to meet at the Black Sea resort of Yalta, in the Crimea. Stalin’s fear of flying also played a contributing factor in this decision. [4] Each leader had an agenda for the Yalta Conference: Roosevelt wanted Soviet support in the U.S. Pacific War against Japan, specifically invading Japan, as well as Soviet par- ticipation in the UN; Churchill pressed for free elections and democratic governments in Eastern and Central Eu- rope (specifically Poland); and Stalin demanded a Soviet sphere of political influence in Eastern and Central Eu- rope, an essential aspect of the USSR's national security strategy. Poland was the first item on the Soviet agenda. Stalin stated that “For the Soviet government, the question of Poland was one of honor” and security because Poland had served as a historical corridor for forces attempt- ing to invade Russia. [5] In addition, Stalin stated regard- ing history that “because the Russians had greatly sinned against Poland”, “the Soviet government was trying to atone for those sins.” [5] Stalin concluded that “Poland must be strong” and that “the Soviet Union is interested in the creation of a mighty, free and independent Poland.” Accordingly, Stalin stipulated that Polish government-in- exile demands were not negotiable: the Soviet Union would keep the territory of eastern Poland they had al- ready annexed in 1939, and Poland was to be compen- sated for that by extending its western borders at the ex- pense of Germany. Comporting with his prior statement, Stalin promised free elections in Poland despite the Soviet 1

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Page 1: Yalta Conference

Yalta Conference

Yalta Conference in February 1945 with (from left to right)Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin. Alsopresent are Soviet ForeignMinister VyacheslavMolotov (far left);Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Sir AndrewCunningham, RN, Marshal of the RAF Sir Charles Portal, RAF,(standing behind Churchill); General George C. Marshall, Chiefof Staff of the United States Army, and Fleet Admiral WilliamD. Leahy, USN, (standing behind Roosevelt).

The Yalta Conference, sometimes called the CrimeaConference and codenamed the Argonaut Conference,held from February 4 to 11, 1945, was the World War IImeeting of the heads of government of the United States,theUnitedKingdom and the Soviet Union, represented byPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt, PrimeMinisterWinstonChurchill and Premier Joseph Stalin, respectively, for thepurpose of discussing Europe’s post-war reorganization.The conference convened in the Livadia Palace near Yaltain Crimea.The meeting was intended mainly to discuss the re-establishment of the nations of war-torn Europe. Withina few years, with the Cold War dividing the continent,Yalta became a subject of intense controversy. To someextent, it has remained controversial.Yalta was the second of three wartime conferences amongthe Big Three. It had been preceded by the TehranConference in 1943, and was followed by the PotsdamConference in July 1945, which was attended by Stalin,Churchill (who was replaced halfway through by thenewly elected British PrimeMinister Clement Attlee) andHarry S. Truman, Roosevelt’s successor.

1 The Conference

All three leaders were attempting to establish an agendafor governing post-war Europe. They wanted to keeppeace between post-world war countries. On the EasternFront, the front line at the end of December 1943 re-mained in the Soviet Union but, by August 1944, So-viet forces were inside Poland and parts of Romania aspart of their drive west.[1] By the time of the Conference,Red Army Marshal Georgy Zhukov's forces were 65 km(40 mi) from Berlin. Stalin’s position at the conferencewas one which he felt was so strong that he could dic-tate terms. According to U.S. delegation member andfuture Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, "[i]t was not aquestion of what we would let the Russians do, but whatwe could get the Russians to do.”[2] Moreover, Roosevelthoped for a commitment from Stalin to participate in theUnited Nations.Premier Stalin, insisting that his doctors opposed anylong trips, rejected Roosevelt’s suggestion to meet at theMediterranean.[3] He offered instead to meet at the BlackSea resort of Yalta, in the Crimea. Stalin’s fear of flyingalso played a contributing factor in this decision.[4] Eachleader had an agenda for the Yalta Conference: Rooseveltwanted Soviet support in the U.S. Pacific War againstJapan, specifically invading Japan, as well as Soviet par-ticipation in the UN; Churchill pressed for free electionsand democratic governments in Eastern and Central Eu-rope (specifically Poland); and Stalin demanded a Sovietsphere of political influence in Eastern and Central Eu-rope, an essential aspect of the USSR's national securitystrategy.Poland was the first item on the Soviet agenda. Stalinstated that “For the Soviet government, the question ofPoland was one of honor” and security because Polandhad served as a historical corridor for forces attempt-ing to invade Russia.[5] In addition, Stalin stated regard-ing history that “because the Russians had greatly sinnedagainst Poland”, “the Soviet government was trying toatone for those sins.”[5] Stalin concluded that “Polandmust be strong” and that “the Soviet Union is interested inthe creation of a mighty, free and independent Poland.”Accordingly, Stalin stipulated that Polish government-in-exile demands were not negotiable: the Soviet Unionwould keep the territory of eastern Poland they had al-ready annexed in 1939, and Poland was to be compen-sated for that by extending its western borders at the ex-pense of Germany. Comporting with his prior statement,Stalin promised free elections in Poland despite the Soviet

1

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2 1 THE CONFERENCE

sponsored provisional government recently installed byhim in Polish territories occupied by the Red Army.Roosevelt wanted the USSR to enter the PacificWar withthe Allies. One Soviet precondition for a declaration ofwar against Japan was an American official recognitionofMongolian independence fromChina (Mongolian Peo-ple’s Republic had already been the Soviet satellite state inWorld War One and World War Two), and a recognitionof Soviet interests in the Manchurian railways and PortArthur (but not asking the Chinese to lease), as well asdeprivation of Japanese soil (such as Sakhalin and KurilIslands) to return to Russian custody since the Treaty ofPortsmouth; these were agreed without Chinese represen-tation, consultation or consent, with the American desireto end war early by reducing American casualties. Stalinagreed that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific Warthree months after the defeat of Germany. Stalin pledgedto Roosevelt to keep the nationality of the Korean Penin-sula intact as Soviet Union entered the war against Japan.

A Big Three meeting room

Furthermore, the Soviets had agreed to join the UnitedNations, given the secret understanding of a voting for-mula with a veto power for permanent members of theSecurity Council, thus ensuring that each country couldblock unwanted decisions.At the time, the Red Army had occupied Poland com-pletely and held much of Eastern Europe with a militarypower three times greater than Allied forces in the West.The Declaration of Liberated Europe did little to dispelthe sphere of influence agreements that had been incor-porated into armistice agreements.All three leaders ratified previous agreements about thepost-war occupation zones for Germany: three zones ofoccupation, one for each of the three principal Allies: TheSoviet Union, theUnitedKingdom, and theUnited States.They also agreed to give France a zone of occupation,carved out of the U.S. and UK zones.Also, the Big Three agreed that all original governmentswould be restored to the invaded countries (with the ex-ception of France, whose government was regarded ascollaborationist; Romania and Bulgaria, where the Sovi-

ets had already liquidated most of the governments; andPoland whose government-in-exile was also excluded byStalin) and that all civilians would be repatriated.

1.1 Key points

The key points of the meeting are as follows:

• Agreement to the priority of the unconditional sur-render of Nazi Germany. After the war, Germanyand Berlin would be split into four occupied zones.

• Stalin agreed that France would have a fourth oc-cupation zone in Germany, but it would have to beformed out of the American and British zones.

• Germany would undergo demilitarization anddenazification.

• German reparations were partly to be in the form offorced labour. (see also Forced labor of Germansafter World War II and Forced labour of Germansin the Soviet Union). The forced labour was to beused to repair damage that Germany inflicted on itsvictims.[6]

• Creation of a reparation council which would be lo-cated in the Soviet Union.

• The status of Poland was discussed. It was agreed toreorganize the communist Provisional Governmentof the Republic of Poland that had been installed bythe Soviet Union “on a broader democratic basis.”

• The Polish eastern border would follow the CurzonLine, and Poland would receive territorial compen-sation in the West from Germany.

• Stalin pledged to permit free elections in Poland, butforestalled ever honouring his promise.

• Citizens of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia wereto be handed over to their respective countries, re-gardless of their consent.

• Roosevelt obtained a commitment by Stalin to par-ticipate in the UN.

• Stalin requested that all of the 16 Soviet Social-ist Republics would be granted UN membership.This was taken into consideration, but 14 republicswere denied; Roosevelt agreed to membership forUkraine and Byelorussia while reserving the right,which was never exercised, to seek two more votesfor the United States.[7]

• Stalin agreed to enter the fight against the Empireof Japan “in two or three months after Germany hassurrendered and the war in Europe is terminated,”and that as a result, the Soviets would take pos-session of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands,

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3

the port of Darien would be internationalized, andthe Soviet lease of Port Arthur would be restored,among other concessions.[8]

• Nazi war criminals were to be hunted down andbrought to justice.

• A “Committee on Dismemberment of Germany”was to be set up. Its purpose was to decide whetherGermany was to be divided into six nations. Someexamples of partition plans are shown below:

• The eventual partition of Germany into AlliedOccupation Zones:British zoneFrench zone (two exclaves) and from 1947 the SaarprotectorateAmerican zoneSoviet zone, later the DDRPolish and Soviet annexed territory

• Partition plan from Winston Churchill:North German stateSouth German state, including modern Austria andHungaryWest German state

• Partition plan from Franklin D. Roosevelt:HanoverPrussiaHesseSaxonyBavariaInternational zone (two exclaves)Allied-administered Austria

• Morgenthau Plan:North German stateSouth German stateInternational zoneTerritory lost from Germany (Saarland to France,Upper Silesia to Poland, East Prussia partitionedbetween Poland and the Soviet Union)

1.2 Democratic elections

The Big Three further agreed that democracies wouldbe established, all liberated European and former Axissatellite countries would hold free elections and that or-der would be restored.[9] In that regard, they promisedto rebuild occupied countries by processes that will al-low them “to create democratic institutions of their ownchoice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – theright of all peoples to choose the form of government un-der which they will live”.[9] The resulting report stated

that the three would assist occupied countries to form in-terim government that “pledged to the earliest possibleestablishment through free elections of the Governmentsresponsive to the will of the people” and to “facilitatewhere necessary the holding of such elections.”[9]

The agreement called on signatories to “consult togetheron the measures necessary to discharge the joint respon-sibilities set forth in this declaration.” During the Yaltadiscussions, Molotov inserted language that weakened theimplication of enforcement of the declaration.[10]

Regarding Poland, the Yalta report further stated that theprovisional government should “be pledged to the hold-ing of free and unfettered elections as soon as possibleon the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.”[9]The agreement could not conceal the importance of ac-ceding to pro-Soviet short-term Lublin government con-trol and of eliminating language calling for supervisedelections.[10]

According to President Roosevelt, “if we attempt to evadethe fact that we placed somewhat more emphasis on theLublin Poles than on the other two groups from whichthe new government is to be drawn I feel we will ex-pose ourselves to the charges that we are attempting to goback on the Crimea decision.” Roosevelt conceded that,in the words of Admiral William D. Leahy, the languageof Yalta was so vague that the Soviets would be able to“stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington withoutever technically breaking it.”[11]

The final agreement stipulated that “the Provisional Gov-ernment which is now functioning in Poland should there-fore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis withthe inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland and fromPoles abroad.”[9] The language of Yalta conceded pre-dominance of the pro-Soviet Lublin Government in a pro-visional government, albeit a reorganized one.[10]

2 Aftermath

2.1 Poland and the Eastern Bloc

Further information: History of Poland (1939–1945) andEastern BlocBecause of Stalin’s strong promises and admission ofguilt over Poland, Churchill believed that he would keephis word regarding Poland, remarking “Poor NevilleChamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He waswrong. But I don't think I am wrong about Stalin.”[12]

At that time, over 200,000 soldiers of the Polish ArmedForces in theWest were serving under the high commandof the British Army. Many of these men and women wereoriginally from the Kresy region of eastern Poland includ-ing cities such as Lwow and Wilno. They had been de-ported from Kresy to the eastern regions of Russia, orsent to Gulags when the USSR occupied this region of

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4 2 AFTERMATH

The military situation at the end of the conference

Poland’s old and new borders, 1945

Poland in 1939. Two years later, when Churchill andStalin formed an alliance against Hitler, the Kresy Poleswere released from the Gulags in Siberia, formed theAnders Army andmarched to Persia to create the II Corps(Poland) under British high command.These Polish troops were instrumental to the Allied de-feat of the Germans in North Africa and Italy, and hopedto return to their homes in Kresy in an independent anddemocratic Poland at the end of the War. But at Yalta,Roosevelt and Churchill largely acceded to Stalin’s de-mands to annex[13] the territory which in the Nazi-SovietPact he and Hitler had agreed to the Soviet Union con-trolling, including Kresy, and to carry out Polish popula-tion transfers (1944–1946). Consequently, they in effectagreed that tens of thousands of veteran Polish troops un-der British command should lose their Kresy homes to theSoviet Union. In reaction, thirty officers and men fromthe II Corps (Poland) committed suicide.[14]

Churchill defended his actions at Yalta in a three-day

Parliament army debate starting on February 27, whichended in a vote of confidence. During the debatemany MPs openly criticised Churchill and passionatelyvoiced loyalty to Britain’s Polish allies and expresseddeep reservations about Yalta.[14] Moreover, 25 of theseMPs risked their careers to draft an amendment protest-ing against Britain’s tacit acceptance of Poland’s domi-nation by the Soviet Union. These members included:Arthur Greenwood; Sir Archibald Southby, 1st Baronet;Sir Alec Douglas-Home; James Heathcote-Drummond-Willoughby, 3rd Earl of Ancaster and Victor Raikes.[14]After the failure of the amendment, Henry Strauss,1st Baron Conesford, the Member of Parliament forNorwich, resigned his seat in protest at the British treat-ment of Poland.[14]

When the Second World War ended, a Communist gov-ernment was installed in Poland. Most Poles felt betrayedby their wartime allies. Many Polish soldiers refused toreturn to Poland, because of the Soviet repressions of Pol-ish citizens (1939–1946), the Trial of the Sixteen andother executions of pro-Western Poles, particularly theformer members of the AK (Armia Krajowa). The resultwas the Polish Resettlement Act 1947, Britain’s first massimmigration law.On March 1, Roosevelt assured Congress that “I comefrom the Crimea with a firm belief that we have madea start on the road to a world of peace.”[15] However theWestern Powers soon realized that Stalin would not honorhis free elections promise regarding Poland. After re-ceiving considerable criticism in London following Yaltaregarding the atrocities committed in Poland by Soviettroops, Churchill wrote Roosevelt a desperate letter refer-encing the wholesale deportations and liquidations of op-position Poles by the Soviets.[15] OnMarch 11, Rooseveltresponded to Churchill, writing, “I most certainly agreethat we must stand firm on a correct interpretation of theCrimean decision. You are quite correct in assuming thatneither the Government nor the people of this countrywill support participation in a fraud or a mere whitewashof the Lublin government and the solution must be as weenvisaged it in Yalta.” [16]

By March 21, Roosevelt’s Ambassador to the USSRAverell Harriman cabled Roosevelt that “we must comeclearly to realize that the Soviet program is the estab-lishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty anddemocracy as we know it.”[17] Two days later, Rooseveltbegan to admit that his view of Stalin had been exces-sively optimistic and that “Averell is right.”[17]

Four days later, on March 27, the Soviet Peoples Com-missariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) arrested 16 Polishopposition political leaders that had been invited to par-ticipate in provisional government negotiations.[17] Thearrests were part of a trick employed by the NKVD,which flew the leaders to Moscow for a later show trialfollowed by sentencing to a gulag.[17][18] Churchill there-after argued to Roosevelt that it was “as plain as a pike

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staff” that Moscow’s tactics were to drag out the periodfor holding free elections “while the Lublin Committeeconsolidate their power.”[17] The Polish elections, held onJanuary 16, 1947, resulted in Poland’s official transfor-mation to a communist state by 1949.Following Yalta, in Russia, when Soviet Foreign Minis-ter Vyacheslav Molotov expressed worry that the YaltaAgreement’s wording might impede Stalin’s plans, Stalinresponded “Never mind. We'll do it our own waylater.”[12] While the Soviet Union had already annexedseveral occupied countries as (or into) Soviet SocialistRepublics,[19][20][21] other countries in eastern Europethat it occupied were converted into Soviet-controlledsatellite states, such as the People’s Republic of Poland,the People’s Republic of Hungary,[22] the CzechoslovakSocialist Republic,[23] the People’s Republic of Romania,the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the People’s Republicof Albania,[24] and later East Germany from the Sovietzone of German occupation.[25] Eventually the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom made concessions in rec-ognizing the then Communist-dominated regions, sacri-ficing the substance of the Yalta Declaration, while it re-mained in form.[26]

2.2 Potsdam and the atomic bomb

Further information: Potsdam Conference and PotsdamAgreement

The Potsdam Conference was held from July to August1945, which included the participation of Clement Attlee(who had replaced Churchill as Prime Minister)[27][28]and President Harry S Truman (representing the UnitedStates after Roosevelt’s death).[29] At Potsdam, the Sovi-ets denied claims that they were interfering in the affairsof Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.[26] The conferenceresulted in (1) the PotsdamDeclaration regarding the sur-render of Japan,[30] and (2) the Potsdam Agreement re-garding the Soviet annexation of former Polish territoryeast of the Curzon Line, and, provisions, to be addressedin an eventual Final Treaty ending World War II, for theannexation of parts of Germany east of the Oder-Neisseline into Poland, and northern East Prussia into the SovietUnion.Four months after the death of Roosevelt, President Tru-man ordered the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hi-roshima on August 6, 1945.

3 Cultural significance

• The musical Jalta, Jalta was produced in Yugoslaviaabout this conference.

• The movie Yalta by Yves-André Hubert was pro-duced in France about this conference.

• The theatre play O xogo de Yalta by the “Teatro doAtlántico” was produced in Spain.

• The Yalta Club nightclub was opened in Bulgaria.

• Victims of Yalta (British title), The Secret Betrayal(American title) — a book by Nikolai Tolstoy.

4 Gallery• Taken by War Office official photographer, UnitedKingdom

• From U.S. National Archives.

5 See also• The Betrayal of Cossacks

• Eastern Bloc

• Iron Curtain

• List of World War II conferences

• List of Soviet Union–United States summits

• Operation Keelhaul

• Percentages agreement

• Plan Totality

• Western betrayal

• World War II Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazisand the West

6 Notes[1] Traktuyev, Michael Ivanovich, The Red Army’s Drive into

Poland in Purnell’s History of the Second World War, ed-itor Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Hatfield, UK, 1981, vol.18,pp.1920–1929

[2] Black et al. 2000, p. 61

[3] Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Foundingof the United Nations, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).ISBN 0-8133-3324-5

[4] Beevor, Antony (2012). The Second World War. NewYork: Little, Brown and Company. p. 709. ISBN9780316023740.

[5] Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 285

[6] Pavel Polian-Against TheirWill: TheHistory andGeogra-phy of Forced Migrations in the USSR Central EuropeanUniversity Press 2003 ISBN 963-9241-68-7 P.244-249

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6 8 FURTHER READING

[7] “United Nations”. U.S. Department of State. Archivedfrom the original on 2003-03-03. Retrieved 2014-09-22.Voting procedures and the veto power of permanentmem-bers of the Security Council were finalized at the YaltaConference in 1945 when Roosevelt and Stalin agreed thatthe veto would not prevent discussions by the SecurityCouncil. Roosevelt agreed to General Assembly mem-bership for Ukraine and Byelorussia while reserving theright, which was never exercised, to seek two more votesfor the United States.

[8] “Agreement Regarding Japan,” Protocol Proceedings ofthe Crimea Conference (February 11, 1945). [On-line at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp).

[9] February 11, 1945Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Con-ference, reprinted in Grenville, John Ashley Soames andBernard Wasserstein, The Major International Treaties ofthe Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts,Taylor and Francis, 2001 ISBN 0-415-23798-X, pages267–277

[10] Leffler, Melvyn P. (1986). “Adherence to Agreements:Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War”.International Security 11 (1): 88–123. JSTOR 2538877.

[11] {The American People in World War II: Freedom fromFear, Part Two By David M. Kennedy page 377

[12] Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 289

[13] “WWII Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis and theWest. In Depth. Uneasy Allies”. PBS. 1941-12-07. Re-trieved 2011-12-19.

[14] pp.374–383 Olson and Cloud 2003

[15] Berthon & Potts 2007, pp. 290–94

[16] Telegram, President Roosevelt to the British Prime Min-ister, Washington, 11 March 1945, in United States De-partment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,Diplomatic Papers: 1945 Volume V, Europe (Washington:Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 509-510.

[17] Berthon & Potts 2007, pp. 296–97

[18] Wettig 2008, pp. 47–8

[19] Senn, Alfred Erich (2007). Lithuania 1940: revolutionfrom above. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi. ISBN 978-90-420-2225-6.

[20] Roberts 2006, p. 43

[21] Wettig 2008, pp. 20–1

[22] Granville, Johanna (2004). The First Domino: Interna-tional Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of1956. Texas A&MUniversity Press. ISBN 1-58544-298-4.

[23] Grenville 2005, pp. 370–71

[24] Cook 2001, p. 17

[25] Wettig 2008, pp. 96–100

[26] Black et al. 2000, p. 63

[27] Roberts 2006, pp. 274–5

[28] “Clement Richard Attlee”. Archontology.org. Retrieved2011-12-19.

[29] Truman 1973, p. 208

[30] “Potsdam Declaration”. Ndl.go.jp. 1945-07-26. Re-trieved 2011-12-19.

7 References• Berthon, Simon; Potts, Joanna (2007), Warlords:An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War IIThrough the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill,Roosevelt, and Stalin, Da Capo Press, ISBN 0-306-81538-9

• Black, Cyril E.; English, Robert D.; Helmreich,Jonathan E.; McAdams, James A. (2000), Rebirth:A Political History of Europe since World War II,Westview Press, ISBN 0-8133-3664-3

• Grenville, John Ashley Soames (2005), AHistory ofthe World from the 20th to the 21st Century, Rout-ledge, ISBN 0-415-28954-8

• LaFeber, Walter (1972), America, Russia, and theCold War, John Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0-471-51137-4

• Miscamble, Wilson D. (2007), From Roosevelt toTruman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War,Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-86244-2

• Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin’s Wars: FromWorld War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale Univer-sity Press, ISBN 0-300-11204-1

• Truman, Margaret (1973), Harry S. Truman,William Morrow & Co., ISBN 0-688-00005-3

• Wettig, Gerhard (2008), Stalin and the Cold War inEurope, Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0-7425-5542-9

• Kennedy, David M. (2003), The American People inWorldWar II Freedom from Fear, Part Two, OxfordUniversity Press, ISBN 0-19-516893-3

8 Further reading• Fraser J. Harbutt, Yalta 1945: Europe and Americaat the Crossroads (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2010).

• Geoffery Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: FromWorldWar toCold War, 1939-1953 (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 2008).

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• Geoffery Roberts, “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, andPotsdam Conferences,” Journal of Cold War Studies9:4 (Fall 2007): 6-40.

• Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why we always fightthe last battle, a history of American interventionfrom World War I to Afghanistan (New York: Si-mon & Schuster, 2010). Especially ch. 3.

• O'Neil, William L. World War II: a Student Com-panion. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

• Persico E. JosephRoosevelt’s SecretWar. NewYork:Random House, 2001.

• Plokhii, Serhii (2010). Yalta: The Price of Peace.New York, NY: Viking Press. ISBN 978-0-670-02141-3.

• “Portraits of Presidents: Franklin D. Roosevelt.”School Arts Magazine February 1999: 37. Stu-dent Research Center. EBSCO Host. Philadelphia.April 2, 2006. Keyword: FDR.

• Snyder, Louis L. (1981), World War II, New York:Grolier Company

• Sulzberger, C. L. (1998), Stephen E. Ambrose, ed.,American Heritage New History of World War II,New York: Viking Penguin

• Waring, J. G. A student’s experience of Yalta

• “Yalta Conference.” Funk and Wagnalls New Ency-clopedia. World Almanac Education Group, 2003.Sirs Discover. Philadelphia. April 2, 2006. Key-word: Yalta Conference.

• Yalta Conference, 1945: actual issues of history,law studies, political science, culture studies andphilosophy / materials of the international scientificconference Yalta-45/13 (Simferopol, Ukraine 23-27 April, 2013 ) / edited by Oleg K. Shevchenko.– Simferopol: publishing house К.О.Ш., 2013. –152 р.

• Shevchenko O. Yalta-45: Ukrainian science histori-ographic realia in globalization and universalism era

9 External links• Minutes of the conference Combined Arms Re-search Library

• Foreign relations of the United States. Conferencesat Malta and Yalta, 1945

• Protocol of proceedings of Crimea Conference

• MilitaryHistoryOnline Yalta Conference

• How good was the Good War?

• The Division of Europe Online Documents Collec-tion

• Special German series 2. The Committee on Dis-memberment of Germany Allied discussions on thedismemberment of Germany into separate states,March 29, 1945. The committee was ordained atYalta.

• Yalta casts its shadow 60 years on, BBC, February7, 2005

• Scientific conferences devoted Yalta 2004-2010;Yalta-45|13 Yalta-45/15

• EDSITEment lesson plan Sources of Discord, 1945-1946

Coordinates: 44°28′04″N 34°08′36″E / 44.46778°N34.14333°E

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8 10 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

10 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

10.1 Text• Yalta Conference Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yalta_Conference?oldid=674863309 Contributors: Youssefsan, JeLuF, SimonP,Ellmist, Zoe, R Lowry, Olivier, Leandrod, Stevertigo, Mrwojo, Dominus, Ixfd64, Paul Benjamin Austin, TakuyaMurata, Delirium, Ge-offrey~enwiki, Ahoerstemeier, Kingturtle, Ijon, Marteau, David Stewart, Ruhrjung, Hashar, Boson, JCarriker, Peregrine981, MaximusRex, Morwen, Sben, Joy, Raul654, Capbat, Jhobson1, Robbot, PBS, Altenmann, Romanm, Enceladus, Mirv, Kday~enwiki, Halibutt,Mervyn, Hadal, Mushroom, Lysy, Stirling Newberry, DocWatson42, MaGioZal, Laudaka, Oberiko, Mintleaf~enwiki, Meursault2004,Karn, Braaropolis, Everyking, Fleminra, Bsparks, Mboverload, Sesel, Cam, Junkyardprince, LiDaobing, DCrazy, Antandrus, Beland,OverlordQ, Piotrus, Rdsmith4, Mzajac, OwenBlacker, C4~enwiki, Neutrality, Mschlindwein, Adashiel, Esperant, Sparky the SeventhChaos, Moverton, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Michal Jurosz, Vsmith, Pavel Vozenilek, Trey Stone, Bender235, Petersam, Oniows,Zscout370, El C, Art LaPella, Svdmolen, Thuresson, Bobo192, J44xm, Mababa, Nk, Alansohn, Gary, Duffman~enwiki, 119, Lordthees,Ricky81682, Andrew Gray, Zippanova, T-1000, !melquiades, Lee S. Svoboda, Hohum, Noosphere, Kade, Ghirlandajo, Tariqabjotu, Sk4p,Hyperfusion, Oliphaunt, Ekem, Ilario, Briangotts, Lapsed Pacifist, GregorB, Mb1000, Palica, Jbarta, Dysepsion, Magister Mathemati-cae, Island, Tim!, Koavf, Cuenca, JHMM13, Bhadani, Allicat9, Yamamoto Ichiro, Austrian, FlaBot, Ground Zero, Rune.welsh, Gurch,AdamantlyMike, TeaDrinker, Russavia, Chobot, Nicwolff, Gginesta, YurikBot, Wfried, Nobs01, Anders.Warga, RadioFan, Rsrikanth05,Astral, Howcheng, Cruise, DGJM, Roche-Kerr, Bota47, Mikeroetto, TheKoG, Theda, Mike Selinker, Fang Aili, Redefining form, Jon-Roma, Petri Krohn, GraemeL, Tobixen, Chriswaterguy, Giantcn, Curpsbot-unicodify, Ybbor, Katieh5584, Appleseed, DVD R W, ER,Phinnaeus, SmackBot, Elonka, Historian932, Mangoe, Midway, Nickst, Eskimbot, Jab843, The Ronin, Aivazovsky, Mauls, PeterSymonds,Gilliam, Ohnoitsjamie, Hmains, Skizzik, Chris the speller, MK8, Jfsamper, DHN-bot~enwiki, Colonies Chris, Jahiegel, Scalpy, Cripipper,MJCdetroit, Wikipedia brown, Greenshed, Amazins490, Nakon, Valenciano, Ultraexactzz, Smerus, Stor stark7, DDima, Ohconfucius,Byelf2007, ArglebargleIV, AThing, Petsco, John, KenFehling, Microchip08, Mathiasrex, Apurins, MickPurcell, Jaywubba1887, Filip-powiki, Cwiki, Ckatz, CyrilB, Speedboy Salesman, A. Parrot, Mrhurtin, Wikster72, Don Alessandro, Tobyw87, Anonymous anonymous,Pauric, Levineps, Nehrams2020, ILovePlankton, Sombrero, Tikai, CapitalR, DEddy, Marysunshine, Ewulp, Tawkerbot2, Blacksham-rock, Kamaal 1989, Mattbr, Unionhawk, Vints, Aherunar, Gbrading, ObiterDicta, Themightyquill, Cydebot, Kanags, Poeticbent, GogoDodo, Lullabelle, R-41, Tec15, Dusty relic, Kiske, DumbBOT, Gimmetrow, Sosomk, Epbr123, CaliforniaWIkiGuy, John254, James086,RichardVeryard, Dgies, AntiVandalBot, Luna Santin, Atavi, Jj137, Mack2, Lupusrex, KMeyer, Zedla, Turgidson, MER-C, PhilKnight,Murphy11, Beaumont, Casvelyn, Slipdigit, Lukewagoneer, VoABot II, Cville Gamer, Fordsfords, JiaJun, Foochar, The Anomebot2, Cgin-gold, Jcdams, Gomm, JaGa, Lvovsky, MartinBot, Eternal Pink, Xumm1du, BeadleB, Rettetast, CommonsDelinker, Billos, NinjaLore,J.delanoy, Uncle Dick, TCB007, Extransit, Katalaveno, McSly, Garret Beaumain, Mrg3105, BoredTerry, Belovedfreak, NewEnglandYan-kee, Babedacus, Sunderland06, STBotD, Tygrrr, Gtg204y, David Lauder, Alex:D, Random Passer-by, Thismightbezach, Jao829, Ttk371,VolkovBot, Seattle Skier, Harfarhs, Nroscha, Ian Struan, Chienlit, Philip Trueman, TXiKiBoT, Oshwah, Sandman09, Dojarca, Nono le pe-tit robot~enwiki, ThinkMedical, Sean D Martin, Arnon Chaffin, Dime2, Ferengi, Commuood, Rjm at sleepers, Imbris, Roland Kaufmann,Coching, Jjucovy, Naravorgaara, Swtiedeman, Falcon8765, Enviroboy, BaronGrackle, Koalorka, Ajrocke, Tboden, DVoit, Wikkiwikki-wowwow, EmxBot, Bcboatfloater, Deconstructhis, Sharecropper, Jocelinmorant, SieBot, Twopenguins, YonaBot, Work permit, Smsar-mad, Revent, Rpm698, Digwuren, Joedog91, Xostrlite93, Agarcialw, Dangerousnerd, Oxymoron83, BenoniBot~enwiki, S210146, Pres-identman, Lesomers, Nickomargolies, Randy Kryn, Atif.t2, Loren.wilton, ClueBot, Panoptik, Fyyer, Ppearson, The Thing That ShouldNot Be, Nnemo, Der Golem, Jacurek, Trivialist, SamuelTheGhost, Pernambuko, Excirial, Wikiscribe, Grey Matter, MrWhich, Versus22,Alexander Tendler, Bellwether BC, SoxBot III, DumZiBoT, Herby909, Redtrog, Elwrucko, Patbreen, Good Olfactory, RyanCross, Zir-guezi, Addbot, Bagori, Jojhutton, AkhtaBot, Ronhjones, Laurinavicius, Damiens.rf, Rejectwater, Morning277, Mosedschurte, AndersBot,Favonian, Lucian Sunday, LinkFA-Bot, Brufnus, West.andrew.g, William (The Bill) Blackstone, Stiaand, Tide rolls, Mtminchi08, Jarble,Luckas-bot, Ajh1492, DisillusionedBitterAndKnackered, Nallimbot, Paul Siebert, AnomieBOT, SalvoJ, Piano non troppo, AdjustShift,Kingpin13, Vicki Reitta, 90 Auto, Citation bot, Xqbot, DSisyphBot, Xtboris, RibotBOT, Operdyne7, Nick2x, Surv1v4l1st, Kupredu,Tobby72, Pencil13, Michael93555, Jamesoe, Jack Daniel Adams, Programmer13, Cherry berry dude, LittleWink, Rushbugled13, Chum-chum7, Grover132, TobeBot, Mercy11, Lotje, Piotr Herod, Varsovian, 564dude, AutumnWeikal, Bento00, Yaush, Antidiskriminator,Alltheothernameshavegone, John of Reading, Orphan Wiki, Immunize, Mashaunix, The Madras, ZéroBot, Scrubysteve, Min79, AMan-WithNoPlan, Gz33, Pengkeu, CN3777, L Kensington, Donner60, Puffin, Peter Karlsen, Sven Manguard, ClueBot NG, Silv the Something,Cupdawg1, YaltaExpert1945, Frognosticator, Raven Rashal, AdamWimborne, Helpful Pixie Bot, HMSSolent, Smudge703, Newyork1501,KiteRunner98203, Anubus2GoPlease, BG19bot, 64ryj0ns7on, 15lopop, CarnivorousGnomeCatuse, BattyBot, Vanobamo, ChrisGualtieri,GoShow, Veroveritas, Laggan Boy, Dexbot, Mogism, XXzoonamiXX, Lugia2453, Builtiger, SFK2, Jamesx12345, ColaXtra, Njk345,

, Docents, Epicgenius, S2pindia, Boomtahn, Шеудженико, Cumbrianladjames, Khanate General, Aaxxellssccooppaa., Quenhitran,JaconaFrere, Умник2013, SantiLak, Asabasapin, Doowrahyrahcaz, SWillamLarsen, EoRdE6, Iwilsonp, Pyrotle, Jacobdaun, KasparBot,CrimeaConference and Anonymous: 754

10.2 Images• File:1945-02-15GerWW2BattlefrontAtlas.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/84/1945-02-15GerWW2BattlefrontAtlas.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Document “Atlas of the World Battle Fronts inSemimonthly Phases to August 15th 1945: Supplement to The Biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943to June 30 1945 To the Secretary of War” Original artist: Army Map Service

• File:Churchill_portrait_NYP_45063.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/Churchill_portrait_NYP_45063.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This is photograph NYP 45063 from the collections of the Imperial War Museums.Original artist: British Government

• File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Originalartist: ?

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• File:JStalin_Secretary_general_CCCP_1942_flipped.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/JStalin_Secretary_general_CCCP_1942_flipped.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:

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