wwii counter intelligence corps

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WCSCICU.S. AR MY MILITARY HISTORY ll$VVUTECARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5008

Wwt!OUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPSH ISTOR Y AND MISSIO N

IN . WOR LD WAR II

4-E COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS SCHOOL

FORT HOLABIRD BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND


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Special Text

HI sTaY AHI NISSIO N

IN W oRlDWAR I

CIC School Counter Intelligence Corps Center

LhU, t,.. ,ARMY WAR COLLEGE _cARu%E BARFiACW, PA,


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TABLEOF CONTENTS

PART CNETHE CORPSOF INTELLIGENCE OLEE

CHAPTER1. FROM 917 TO WORLDWAR I Paragraph PagePurpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 The Corps of Intelligence Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 CHAPTER2. FOR WARRGANIZATION

The Corps of Intelligence Police is Geared for Action ....... 3 5 The Counter Intelligence Corps .............................. 4 5 Personnel Procurement ....................................... 5 The Problem of Rank......................................... 6 1: CHAPlER . THE CODNTER TELLIGENCE CORPS m THE ZONEOF TIE INTERIOR, 1941-1943

The blilitary Intelligence Division .......................... 7 13 PARTTWO

OPERATIONSOF TIE COIMER INTELLIGENCE ORPS IN THE PRINCIPALTBEATERS CHAPTER . OPERATIONS& NORTHAFRICA

The Mission . . ..*.*..............................*........... 8 The Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*..............*............. 9 Organization for Operation with Combat Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Operations in Liberated Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Liaison with United States Intelligence Organizations....... 12 Liaison with Allied Intelligence Organizations.............. 13 Lessons Learned Through Experience . . ..*....*.........*...... 14 Counterintelligence During the Tactical Planning Phases...., 15 Counterintelligence During Mounting Phase of Tactical Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*......*.**........*..... 17

CBAPIER5. OPERATIONSM SICILYPre-Invasion Program ........................................ Staging Area Preparations and Duties ........................ Operation with Combat Troops ................................ 20 22 Operation in the Static Situation ........................... Occupational Phase Begins ...................................


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Paragraph WeCaptured Documents .......................................... 23 25 Lessons Learned Through Field Experience .................... 24 26

CHAPTER 6.

Counter Intelligence Corps During the Invasion .............. 26 2829....... 28 313230

From the Volturno River to Rome.......... ..? ................ 27Administrative Procedures During the Italian CampaignFrom Rome to the Arno River ................................. 2931 ::The German Espionage Roblem ................................ The Final Breakthrough ......................................

OPERATIONS IN IIALYPre-Invasion Planning ....................................... 25 28

Lessons Learned on the Basis of Field Fhcperience ............ 32 34 CBAPIER 7. OPERATICNS IN THE DNIIED KINGDOM

Organization ................................................ 33 36 Liaison with British Intelligence ........................... 34 36 .CHAPIER 8. OPERATIm IN FRANCEAND TIE LWLANDS

Re-Invasion Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 38 Operations with Combat Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 39 Operations in Normandy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 41 Operations in Northeastern France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 42 Operations in Southern France e.............................. 39 44 CHAPTER 9. OPERATIONS IN GERMANY

Operations During the Advance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 46 Operations in the Static Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...* 2 48

CHAPIER 10. OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEANAREAS North Atlantic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 50

CHAPTER 11. OPERATIONS IN THE CARIBBEANAREAS Background .................................................. 44 53 Operations in the Canal Zone ................................ 45 53 Operations in the Department of the Antilles ................ 46 54

CBAPTER 12. OPERATICNS IN THE SODIH ATLANTIC THEATER Organization and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 56

CHAPTER 13. OPERATIONS M THE MIDDLE EAST . CHitions Existing in the Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 58


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ParagraphOrganization and Administration ............................. Activities in an Area of Multiple Jurisdictions ............. ZZ Lessons Learned ............................................. 51

CI-IAFTER14.Activities in India and Burma ............................... 52 60......................................... 61..................................... 2: 62Activities in ChinaSoutheast China Project

CHAETER 15.Introduction ................................................ 64................................................ !Z 64....................... 57 64Organization Operation and Investigative Procedure

CHAPTER 16.Introduction ................................................ 58 66

................................................ 59 66rganization

OPERATIONS IN THE CHINA-BLEZWA-IMU TBEATER

OPERATIONS IN ALASKA

OPERATIDNS lN THE HAWAIIAN RXANBS

........ 60 67ounter Intelligence Corps Controls in Insular AreasCHAPrER 17. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUlHWEST ACIFIC

Early Organization .......................................... Reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps ............ Counter Counter Operations in the Solomon Islands ........................... 65.................................. 66Operations Lessons Operations in New Hebrides

CHAPTER 18.

Intelligence Corps in Combat in the AdmiraltyIntelligence Corps in the New Guinea Operations

in the Fiji Islands ..............................Learned from These Island Activities ................OPERATIONS IN TBE PHILIPPINE ISUNDS

Pre-Invasion Planning ....................................... 69 70he Landing Phase ........................................... Lessons Operations The Entry into Manila ....................................... 73 ............................................. 74he Final PhaseCBAPTER 19.

Conclusion .................................................. 75 82

Learned ............................................. in Luzon ..........................................

COIXLuSIOn

::Islands63..... 64

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Part OneTBE COBPS F IIVYELLIGENCEOLICE

CHAPTER 1FEOM 917 to !alBLDWAB I

1. PDEPOSEANDSCOPE. The material in this manual is designed tofurnish information on the historical development of the Counter Intelli-gence Corps. It covers the period from 1917 to 1945, with specialemphasis on t h e war years. An attempt has been made, from the documentsavailable, to describe the history and mission o f the Counter Intelli-gence Corps in the various theaters of operations.2. TBE COBPSOF INTELLIGENCE World War I the In-OLICE. Duringtelligence Section, American Expeditionary Force, recoaaaended and theWar College Division sanctioned the establishment of the Corps of In-telligence Police. Authority for such action was contained in the provi-sions of Section II of an Act of Congress (approved 18 May 19171 givingthe President the power to increase the Army to meet the national emer-gency. . This Corps of fifty men in the rank of sergeant of infantry wasto report for counterespionage duty under the CoavnandingGeneral, Ameri-can Expeditionary Force. On 13 August 1917, the Corps of IntelligencePolice was officially established by War Department General Orders.

a. A French-speaking officer with experience in police workwas given the mission of recruiting the men. He traveled to New Orleansand New York City where he advertised in the local newspapers for menwho could speak French to do intelligence work in France. Ae acceptedall candidates who could pass the Army physical examination and answer afew simple questions in French.b. On 25 November 1917, the Corps of Intelligence Police,fifty strong, arrived in St. Nazaire, France. Some were sent to BritishIntelligence at Le Havre f o r further training. The others were assignedto the rear area under the control of General Headquarters or were mergedwith divisional intelligence sections. The Le Bavfe Detachment workedet copying British suspect lists and counterespionage sumnerits and bt-gan indexing these lists, This training continued until a short whilebefore the Armistice.c. In January, 1918, the Corps opened its office in Paris andbegan work on its central card file, securing names from British, French,and Americas sources. At the end of the war this file contained some50,000 names.d. The first. actual counterespionage work was done at St.Nazaire where enemy agents were reported to be active. Agents apprt-hended by the Corps of Intelligence Police were iav#Iediately turned overto French authorities for disposition. Civilians were screened, travelers

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checked, and passports examined. In addition to work of a eounttr-espionage and security nature, the Corps of Intelligence Police also didinvestigative work for the Department of Criminal Investigation by con-ducting fraud and graft investigations. Wlembers of the Corps of Intelli-gence Police were assigned to the American Peace Delegation in Paris.One detachment was assigned to guard President Wilsons residence whilehe was in France.e. In January, 1918, authorization was granted to increase theCorps gradually to an eventual strength of 750 men. One year later,there were 405 agents on duty with the American Expeditionary Force.However, the allotted 750 vacancies were never filled because of theArmistice and demobilization of the Corps.

_^._ .^.... Heaawhiie, during the years 191I-1910, the work of theCorps of intelligence Police in the continental United States was carriedout under the Chief of the War College Division, General Staff. On 28November 1917, the Corps was increased to 300 men, 250 of whom mere towork within the United States. In Warch, 1918, with the abolition ofthe War College Division of the General Staff, the Corps of IntelligencePolice was transferred to the control of the Military Intelligence Branchof the Executive Division of the General Staff.g* The next increase in strength came in an order from TheAdjutant General dated 4 September,. 1918. This was deemed necessary be-cause of the rapid increase in the number of investigations being con-ducted throughout the United States and the territorial departments.h. However, these goals were never reached, for by January,1920, of a total of @Cl men who bad been on ---, i a th e Cocoa of-- -___----u t v Intelli---- r-gence Police, only 18 remained. This caused serious concern among thosewho saw the menace of failing to provide a permanent place for the Corpsof Intelligence Police in the organization of the Army. Many saw thenecessity for such personnel in New York, Washington, and the Westernand Southern Departments for investigation and guard duties of a strictlyconfidential nature. Therefore, authority was requested to detail notmore than 24 sergeants of the duly authorized organizations of the Armyfor intelligence service. These were to be evenly divided among theEastern, Western, and Southern Departments, and the District of Columbia.The Adjutant General granted the authority for such action on 7 February1920. These men were to be subject to the orders of the Department Com-mander in whose territory they were assigned, except for the six men onduty with the Western Department who were to be subject to the orders ofthe Director of Uilitary Intelligence, However, this order did not createa permanent status for the Corps of Intelligence Police in the organira-tion of the Army.I, A series of memoranda, prepared by the Director of Intelli-

gence, pointed out the necessity for such a body of men, requested apermanent organization for the Corps of Intelligence Police, and setforth the quotas for the Corps Areas and Departments. The quota of 45sergeants allotted by the resultant order was not as great as had been

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desired by the various Corps Areas and Departments, but it did give theCorps of Intelligence Police a penaseat foothold la the o r g a n i z a t i o nof t h e A r my .j . Du t i e s of the Corpsof Intelligence Police were outlined bythe War Department in the spring of 1921. All individuals who might besuspected of operating against the Xilitary Establishment were to beclosely observed. In addition, the Corps of Intelligence Police was

directed to report on radical activities is political and industrialfields. This was a tremendous assigment for a handful of men whosenumber was reduced to a mere 30 in 1922 wben the Army was cut to 125,000men.k. The policy of isolationism that swept the country at thattime made it impossible to increase the Army in general and the Corpsof Intelligence Police in particular. Although there was important workfor the Corps, the palicy of the Army prohibited the Corps of Intelli-gence Police from growing large enough to control subversive activity in,or directly affecting, the Willtary Establishment. Dowever, jn 1926.when it became clear that the Corps of Intelligence Police would haveto expand rapidly in an emergency, a Mobilization Plan for the Corps

was drawn up. The Initial strength of the Corps was set at 250 men withprovision for increments as the mobilization progressed. The functionsof the personnel were outlined more clearly, and a promotion plan wasformulated.1. Despite the best intentions of men who were aware of thereal value of the Corps of Intelligence Police, a further decreaseoccured in 1926, which brought the total to 28; and in Worember, 1933,strength was decreased to 15. This curtailment of essential personnelwas effected as an economy move in the days of the depression. It wasargued that the grades held by the men were too high for the clericalduties they were performing. It was even suggested that other militarypersonnel or civilian employees replace the Corps of Intelligence Policein certain localities. To this, the Philippine Department answered:

This Department presents a special case in that itsdistance from the homeland, its close proximity toWorld Powers, its heterogeneous mixture of foreigners,and the uncertainty of the future, all tend toemphasize the importance of keeping the CommandingGeneral fully informed at all times. In order to per-form this important duty, the scope of the organiza-tion charged with its execution is wide and varied...All of the present members of the Corps of Intelli-gence Police are men of proven ability, loyalty, andexperience... Were any of these agents replaced bycivilians or military personnel, it would confrontthis office with the necessity of building a neworganization and discarding one which has reached itspresent state of efficiency after years of intelli-gence effort and experience. *

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w. From 1934 to 1939, with but a single increase of one manauthorized for work in the Philippine Department, the Corps of Intelli-gence Police existed precariously with its small quota. Meanwhile, con-tinued reports indicated that Japanese and Nazi activity were on the up-swing in the Panama, Hawaiian, and Philippine Departments. Finally, inJune, 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a proclamation whichstated that the control of all matters of an espionage, counterespionage,and sabotage nature would be handled by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-tion of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division ofthe War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the NavyDepartment. The Directors of these three agencies were ordered tofunction as a coavaittee to coordinate their activities.

. n. One year later, the chiefs of the three agencies involveddrew up an agreement as to jurisdiction, with particular emphasis given to foreign operations. Further revision of this agreement, definingclearly the work to be handled by each agency, was made in February,1942. This has become known as the Delimitations Agreement of 1942.o. Expansion of the Corps began almost iavaediately. In June,1940, authorization was granted to bring in an additional 26 men. In

December, 1940, the allotment was increased to 188 men. Although somedifficulty was experienced in recruiting, because of a lack of definitestandards of qualifications, it was soon established that only men ofthe highest integrity with a high school education or better would beselected. On 20 February 1941 a total of 288 men was reached. A totalof 18 agents was allotted to the important Panama Canal Department. By31 May the over-all total swelled to 513, and by 17 February 1942 thePanama Canal Department alone could count 59 men on duty there.P* In January, 1941, the office of the Chief of the Corps ofIntelligence Police-Sub-Section, Investigating Section, Counter Intelli-gence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, was established. On 24February 1941, the Corps of Intelligence Police Investigators School be-

came operational in the Army War College and, after two classes, wasmoved to Chicago. By April, Technical Manual 30-215 (Tentative) waspublished, thereby creating a definite and consistent procedure oftraining for all personnel in the Corps.On 6 December 1941, the eve of Pearl Harbor, the Corps ofIntelligezle Police was a permanent organization of the Army, organizedunder the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Staff.It had authorization for 513 enlisted men, and had begun the task ofexpanding its work under the policies set forth in the DelimitationsAgreement. Suddenly the days of begging for men and money had come toan end. The problem was now to grow as rapidly as possible, procureand train men, and do a professional job simultaneously.


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CHAPTER 2-ORGANIZATIONOR WAR

3. THE CORPSOF INTELLIGENCE FOR ACTION.OLICE IS GEARED The out -break of World War II called for an immedia te increas e in the au th orizedstr ength of th e Corps of Int elligence Police. The tota l str ength of th eCorps was set at 1,026 non-commissioned officers, an d all its m embers.then in th e En listed Reserve Corps were ordered to active dut y withth e least practical delay. The War Departmen t th en set out to producea well-sta ffed an d well-tr ained organizat ion for th is bra nch of int elli-gence work.

4. TH ECOWTER INTE LLXEWCE ORPS. On 13 December 1941, a lett erfrom th e office of The Adjut an t Genera l officially chan ged th e name ofth e Corps of Int elligence Police to th e Coun ter Intelligence Corps, tobe effective 1 J an ua ry 1942. This was a chan ge in na me only. However,man y organizational cha nges were made during the first two years ofexistence of th e Count er Int elligence Corps on th e basis of lessonslearn ed from field experience.a. At th e outset of the war, t here were ma ny Militar y Intelli-gence Division officer s su per vising th e Corps of In te lligence Policewho were not experienced in th eir dut ies. This deficiency was ear lyrecognized by the War Departmen t, and const ructive steps were tak eninssediat ely. All officers selected for dut y with th e Coun ter Int elli-gence Corps ha d to be clear ed by th e Assista nt Chief of Sta ff, G-2,before serving with th e Corps. Fu rt her more, conssa nder s of all CorpsAreas, Department s (except th e Philippine and Hawaiian Departm ents),and Base Defense Comma ndswere directed to submit without delay to theAssista nt Chief of Sta ff, G-2, a roster of all ccum sissioned personnelon dut y with the Corps of Int elligence Police.b. In order to provide th e most proficient an d experiencedcoun ter int elligence comm issioned personnel to super vise th e activitiesof th e Count er Int elligence Corps, it was recoassen ded th at a complem entof cosvsissioned officers be specifically au th orized for th e Count er In -telligence Corps. It was also deemed advisable to increase th e com-missioned str ength of th e Corps to 543 in field an d compa ny grades an dto bring the tota l non-cam nissioned str ength to 4,431.c. A ten ta tive plan of organ ization for Count er Int elligenceCorps detachmentst o serve with ta ctical and headquar ters units down toand includingwere to be co divisionsmposed in was alsothe followingdrawn up.manner : In out line, the detachments

Division 1 Officer5 Enlisted menArm y Corps 2 Officers11 Enlisted men

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Field Army 6 Officers49 Enlisted menAir Forces 5 Officers17 Enlisted menDefense Co-and

In addition, Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters, the TrainingSchool, the Washington Field Office, and the Replacement Pool were au-thorized officer and enlisted vacancies.d. At this time, each service cotmnandwas given a temporaryand permanent allotment by The Adjutant General. The temporary allot-ment was to cover procurement when an overseas detachment was to be acti-vated, the men therein to be transferred from the service cossnands.When men were transferred from the service commands for this purpose,the temporary allotment for the new detachment was reduced by TheAdjutant General and the new detachment simultaneously set up.8. In October, 1942, the system of temporary allotments to the

service comands was discontinued, and all such allotments were trans-ferred to the War Department Reserve Pool. This Reserve Pool was thenapportioned among the service comands for procurement purposes. Whena tactical detachment was activated, an allotment was provided from theservice commandaas before: and the apportionment of the War DepartmentReserve Pool decreased by the grades of the men transferred.f. It was anticipated early in 1942 that the constant loss of

men in service coauuands, because of the demands of overseas units,would seriously hamper operations. Consequently, on 14 Way, the Corpsareas (service commands) were directed by Military Intelligence SeCtiOntn " " _ . I..hnit 1 1 4 - t r s f . n . T wi r l" L a n - n t r " " . . _ _ " " _ W " k e y p e f t " " " P 1 " * i t ! !1 " w. * * . v . s y r v r u r " I _ " . . # . n l r n i r l o r d nbrief explanation of t h e positions these men held. Because of a tend-ency on the part of the corps areas to include a large number of men onsuch listings, it soon became necessary to limit key personnel in thecorps areas to 10% of the total personnel in each comand.

In April, 1943, it was determined tkat since all CounterIutellige%e Corps personnel were chargeable to War Department overhead,they should be assigned to the War Department and attached to thevarious service conssaads for atiiniatrative purposes. Consequently, theallotments to the service colaands were rescinded, and two months laterthe allotments to the theaters of operations were rescinded. InSeptember, 1943, TW30-215, Counter Intelligence Corps, set forth aT/O basis for assignment of personnel to the theaters of operations.The balance of the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel was to beassigned to ArmyGround Forces, Army Service Forces, and other utilizingunits.

h. The increase in personnel made it necessary to expand theCounter Intelligence Corps acbiaiatratire machinery to meet the new

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demandr. In December, 1942, the office of th e Chief, Count er Int elli-gence Corps, was divided int o six sections: Sup ply, Opera tions, Fiscal,Plan s and Tra ining, Per sonnel, an d Army Air Forces Liaison.i. The procurem ent an d tra ining of Count er Intelligence COrPspersonnel for overseas dut y becam e th e prim ar y mission of th e office ofth e Chief, Counter Int elligence Corps& Demands for assignment ofCount er Intelligence Corps detachments, both to un its scheduled for ilane-diate departu re to overseas duty and for units already in combat in

th e th eat ers of opera tions, were stea dily increasing. To meet th esedemands and to facilitate tr aining, the War Department , on 29 October,1942. inst ru cted all Dases, Depart ment s, an d Service Comm an ds (except th eNinth ) to establish preliminary Count er Intelligence Corps tr ainingschools in th eir respective cotm na nds.J o In an att empt to make the administr ation of the Count er In-telligence Corps more definitive, th e Deput y Ch ief of St aff, on 25November, 1943, directed th at certa in reconvnen dat ions made by th e In-spector Genera l be carr ied out . These included th e following:

(11 Two chan ges in basic policy:(al The Coun ter In telligence Corps was to beut ilized, with certa in limit ed exceptions,in th eat ers of opera tions.(bl Per sonnel of t he Corps were to be releasedfrom War Department overhead assignments,distribut ed on a T/O basis, with G-2exercising no comm an d fun ction over t heCorps.

(21 Thr ee specific cont inuin g responsibilities relat iveto th e Coun ter Int elligence Corps char ged to th eAssista nt Chief of Sta ff, G-2, War Depart ment :(a ) The esta blishment of policies an d over-allsuper vision of coun ter int elligence activities.(bl Coordina tion of th e procur emen t and shipmen tof Coun ter Int elligence Corps unit s.(cl The adm inistr at ion of specialized tr ain ingprior to assignm ent of Counter Int elligenceCorps personnel to th eat ers of opera tions.

(31 Cert ain specific actions r elat ive to th e Coun terIntelligence Corps:(al The Count er Intelligence Corps Headquar tersin Baltimore, Maryland, a nd the Count er Ln-telligence Corps Sta ging Area were to beeliminated.

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(bl G-2, Uar Department, in collaboration riththe three major consands, and 6-3, WarDepartment, were to submit for approval aplan for procurement of Counter Intelli-gence Corps personnel.

(cl Counter Intelligence Corps units were tobe organized on a T/O basis included introop quotas.

(d) Coassand channels were to be used and com-mand responsibility emphasized.(e) Shipment of Counter Intelligence Corpspersonnel overseas was to be in accordancewith approved requests of theater com-manders.(f ) Basic training of counterintelligencepersonnel was to be provided by AnayService Forces.(g) Counter Intelligence Carps specializedtraining was to be given by Military In-telligence Division at CampRitchie,Maryland.t a) Counter Intelligence Corps personnel inpermanent detachments of Service Conssandswere to be transferred for assignment tothose Service Commandsby 31 December 1943.

k. On 14 December, 1943. War Department Circular No. 324 trans-ferred the counterintelligence functions within the zone of the interiorto the Provost Marshal General. The investigative functions hithertoperformed by the Counter Intelligence Corps and those of the ProvostMarshal General were consolidated, and it was directed that these func-tions be performed by a single staff agency under each Service Coaaaand.This agency was later designated the Security and Intelligence Division.

1. Since the Counter Intelligence Corps was no longer to bethe organization conducting investigations of espionage and sabotagecases for the Military Intelligence Division in the continental UnitedStates, it was necessary that the responsibility for discharging thesefunctions be placed with the Coavaanding General, Army Service Forces,and designated areas. The assignment of Counter Intelligence Corpspersonnel to the Service Commands,where they became part of the newlyformed Security and Intelligence Division under the jurisdiction of theProvost larshai General. was aiso provided in War Department Citeuiar324. The assignment of personnel from War Department overhead to theusing commandswith instructions to activate under T/06& 30-500 was anentirely new concept for the Counter Intelligence Corps, and greatadministrative difficulties attended this change of activity.


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On 22 Hay 1944 a reorganization within the Yilitary In-telligence Section replaced the office formerly known as the Counter In-telligence Corps Branch of the Military Intelligence Section with thetitle of the Counter Intelligenoe Corps Section. A G-2, War Departmentpolicy Staff was created. This staff was responsible for policy de-cisions on intelligence functions, including the Counter IntelligenceCorps. No important alterations in policy or duties accompanied thisredesignation. However, since the function of the Counter IntelligenceCorps Section was considered to be of an administrative and operationalnature rather than a true staff function, on 1 August 1944 the Sectionwas transferred from the control of the General Staff, War Department,to the Army Service Forces.

II. By this time the Counter Intelligence Corps had operatedsuccessfully overseas in e v e r y combat area and had obtained a troopbasis of 4,300. These were allocated in the following manner:Theaters of Operation, Dase Commands, andother overseas installations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,OODArmy Ground Forces in United States.............. 405 Army Air Forces in United States and AirTransport Cosrsand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

TCYIAL 4,308. . . . . . .The overseas allotments increased as additional Army Ground Forces units *were trained and shipped to combat. Counter Intelligence Corps detach-ments were assigned to their respective units and became an integralpart of divisions, corps, armies, overseas administrative cosssandsftheater headquarters, and of the A-2 Sections of the Air Force colaandsand installations.

o. On 1 December 1944 the Counter Intelligence Corps became aseparate branch of the Intelligence Division of the Army Service Forces.Under the Army Service Forces the policy of assigning all Counter Intelli-gence Corps detachments to using units was continued. The only CounterIntelligence Corps detachments working within the zone of the interiorwere those units specifically allowed to do so by the War Department.PWOCDWEWENT.

were met in the early days of the Counter Intelligence Corps wereparalleled by am equally difficult task of procuring desired personnel.On 21 October 1942 the power to initiate Counter Intelligence Corps per-sonnel investigations was placed within the Service CePurnds. The com-mands were also empowered to assign aad transfer personnel as CounterIntelligence Carps agents i n the grade of corporal, and as Counter In-telligence Corps clerks i n the grade of private first class. Controlover the asrigament and transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps specialagents, the p r o mo t i o n of personnel from the rank of agent to specialagent, and all matters concerning the assignment or transfer of

5. PEWSONNIZ The administrative difficulties that

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CMi~Sioned ~rSQIllld tamShed with the Assistaat Chief Of Staff, 6-2,War Departmat.a. A backlog of iavestigatioas to ba coaductad oa prospectiveCounter Iatelligeaoe Corps persoaael developed during this period.Until J uae, 1943, Counter Intelligence Corps ageats sad clerks had beearecruited by the theater comaaders in overseas areas on the same basisas ia the Service Comaads. However, oa 26 &at, the alloWnts totheaters were discontiaued. TU 30-215, Touater Iotelligenoe Corps,

published 22 September 1943, limited the responsibility for procuremeatand assignment of officers and special agents to the Assistant Chief ofStaff, G-2, Wa r Depar tment, sad of agents and clerks to the Directorof Iatelligesoe is the Service Colrands within the zone of the iaterior.All Counter Intelligence Corps personnel procured ia theaters of opera-tions were to be appr oved by the Assistsat Chief of Staff, G-2, WarDepartmeat.b. As an aid in spotting poteatial Counter Iatelligeace Corpspersoaael, the classification YKU Iavestigator was iatroduoed intothe Army classification system early in 1942. The aames of all meaunder this classification were referred to the office of the Chief,Couater Iatelligeaae Corps, for revierr sad selection of prospective

personnel. Yen who were given the classification of 213 Stenographerswere also brought to the attention of this office so that from thisgroup suitable clerks might be procured. When the proeuremeat ofCounter Iatelligeace Corps personnel was decentralized to the ServioeCoraands ia October, 1942, the names of men in the 301 and 213 classifi-. cation were reported directly to the Service Comands by the receptioncenters. During 1942aod 1943, the office of The Adjutaot General fur-nished the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, extractsfrom qualification cards on all linguists inducted into the Army.c. The largest percentage of Counter Intelligence Corps agentswas obtained from personnel already in the Army. At the receptioncenters nearly inducted peraonael with basic Counter Intelligence Corps

qualifications were interviewed by Counter Intelligence Corps agents todetermine their suitability for assignment to Counter IntelligenceCorps duty. Civilian and government organizations which employed in-vestigators were requested to submit information concerning former in-vestigators in their employ who had been inducted into the militaryservice. In the early days of the organization of the Counter Intelli-gence Corps, men oocasionally applied for admission to the Corps priorto their induction into the Army. If application was approved, theywere innediately tabbed and shortly thereafter transferred to theCounter Intelligence Corps. This method was not widely used because itresulted in personnel being transferred into the Corps without basicmilitary training. Lack of basic training later proved to be a handi-cap to these agents when they were assigned to tactical detachments.d. To meet the demands for qualified men, recossveadationswere accepted from st intelligence officers, Counter XntelligenoeCorps personnel, ank any other military personnel who knew of mea with

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basic Counter Intelligence Corps qualifications. All conssanding officersthroughout the Army were encouraged to submit names of men with thebasic qualifications for Counter Intelligence Corps duty.e. In the early recruitment, emphasis was placed on inresti-gative or legal experience. Later, men with adequate education, goodcharacter, and loyalty were accepted even though they had neither legalnor investigative experience. Some linguists were procured, but thisqualification was not an exclusive one. Men were drawn from all types

of civilian occupations, and the Counter Intelligence Corps became anorganization which included representatives of virtually every professionand nationality. In spite of the fact that most of these men worked as .corporals or sergeants, the organization obtained outstanding men. Thelure of the word intelligence and the prospect of working in civilianclothes was tempting bait; but if the men of the Corps had not beencarefully selected, their records in the war would have been lessimpressive. Counter Intelligence Corps men have always relied upontheir own initiative. This has been borne out by the nature of theirwork in the United States and, to an even greater extent, by the recordthey have made in overseas operations.f. For the most part, men selected for the Counter Intelli-gence Corps were well suited for their tasks, but one major weakness inthe recruiting prograa was very noticeable. Not enough emphasis wasgiven to procuring and training linguists. The problem of obtaining menfluent in French, German, Italian, Japanese, and other foreign languageswas made more difficult because of Nar Department policy which directedthat no persons of close foreign background would be assigned to or re-tained in the Counter Intelligence Corps. Many naturalized Americans,both in and out of the Army, were fluent in several languages, but theCounter Intelligence Corps was unable to use this source of language per-sonnel because of this strict policy. When the war in Europe came to anend, the Army was faced with the overwhelming task of procuring a largenumber of men fluent in foreign languages. This necessity brought aquick reversal of policy and, thereafter, close foreign relations aloneceased to be considered sufficient to disqualify a man for the Corps.

6. THE PROBLEM The rank of the agent was at best aF RANK. par-tial secret within the Army. Counter Intelligence Corps men were in-structed to conceal their actual rank by using the term agent orspecial agent. Concealment of rank in the zone of the interior was nottoo great a problem since agents worked in civilian clothes. The aver-age civilian respected Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and wasnot concerned with the actual rank of the bearer.a. When his mission was changed from the zone of the interiorto foreign theaters of operations, the Counter Intelligence Corps agent,

in some cases, wore the military uniform indicating his status. Thisfactor was a disadvantage in dealing with officers of the United StatesArmy and officers of the Allied Forces. The low rank of the leaders ofsome detachments often had a hampering effect, especially in their re-lationships with allied services in the theaters and with coordinate

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agencies in the United States. Ia urng theaters this difficulty ofrank uas overcome by the adoption of a uniform similar to that of warcorrespondent which showed no raak.

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CHAPIER3 THE CODNTERNTELLIGENCECORPSIN THE ZONEOF THE INTERIOR, 1941-1943

7. THE MILITARY WIELLIGENCEDIVISION. As a result of the De-limitations Agreement of 1939, the counterintelligence system was cen-tralized under three agencies. The task assigned to the United StatesAmy covered both the Military Establishment and a large percentage ofthe munitions industry. The primary counterintelligence effort was theorganization of a security system which would prevent access of hostileagents to our facilities.a. Countless security surveys were made. Safeguards were de-veloped, and identification systems were established. Thousands of per-sonnel investigations were conducted; and, as these proceeded, stepswere taken to plaee persons whose loyalty was in question on work wherethey could not injure our war effort.b. There were individual cases of sabotage and these, of

course, became the innediate subject of intensive investigation. A fewsaboteurs and spies were captured and convicted. Even in cases whereinvestigation failed to uncover the perpetrator, exhaustive investi-gation resulted in the development of better security measures.c. A special effort was made to safeguard military information.Counter Intelligence Corps personnel operated the security system forthe headquarters that planned the North African campaign. In many caseswhere the Counter Intelligence Corps found improper safeguarding of mili-tary information, strategic plans were changed or revoked.d. During the years 1942-1943, agents of the Counter Intelli-gence Corps made thousands of loyalty investigations on military per-

sonnel and civilians assigned to duties requiring access to classifiedmaterial. The transfer of certain investigative functions from the Yili-tary Intelligence Division to the Provost Marshal General in October.1941. did not relieve the Corps of the duty of investigating personnelalready in military service who were working with classified material.Typical examples of such personnel were cryptographers; certain SignalCorps personnel in other types of work: Military Intelligence personnel(civilian and military); and, of course, as a large part of the lastmentioned category, potential Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.e. The forms used and the extent of the investigations variedin accordance with War Department and Service Cowand policy. Investi-gations of prospective Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were always

exhaustive.f. Loyalty investigations which involved no suspicion of dis-loyalty consisted of an examination of personal history, education,employment, and associations. Each subject of a personnel invertigation

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was required to complete a Personal History Statement. In each per-sonnel investigation, a check was ma de of th e local police, th e Feder alBur eau of Investigat ion, th e Office of Naval Int elligence,, an d th eMilita ry In telligen ce Division files. Copies of each mem oran dum e-port were sent to the Service Couun ands nterested, the Military In-telligence Division, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.g* Investigat ions of militar y personnel su spected of disaffec-

tion, espiona ge, tr eason, sedition, sabota ge, or of violat ions ofAR 380-5, Safeguar ding Milita ry Informat ion, were report ed on War De-par tm ent Form CIR 1 (Count er I nt elligence Report No. 11. This formcontain ed a sum ma rization by th e investigating agent , a detailed out-line of th e subjects personal background, and a recomm enda tion fordisposition of th e subject in accordan ce with th e pur pose of th e in-vestigation.h . The Service Comm an dCoun ter Int elligence Corps detachm ents. .a ._ r l:.,:Az%AI.+.\ rn.,a r ..l #:,?.,A ..CP*..ac .Y.nr lr n ..inr . :n.,sr +:+i.X cm-V&G ULI.z;u AIIC J =IzLm* Zl.zi+ULI+ti,sJ , =.a lar rr r~ lur .zui,ly~~sr r CT-sponsibility for a cert ain geograp hic ar ea of th e Service Comma nd. Incert ain less populated ar eas, single repr esenta tives were used an d de-signat ed as resident agents. In metr opolitan field offices with ma ny

agents, the personnel operated in separate sections and squads underth e direct ion of special agen ts of pr oved experien ce an d ability.These sections per form ed specific types of invest igat ions . Agent s be-came specialists in one type of invest igat ion, developed local cont actsof value in th eir par ticular field, and accum ulat ed a genera l knowledgeof organ izations an d individuals in th e ar ea considered subversive orof quest ionable loyalt y.i. Exclusive of background investigations, th e largest volumeof invest igat ions cons isted of disa ffection cases. Disaffection ha sbeen defined as a stat e of mind indicat ing a lack of affection for th eUnited Stat es Government. Such cases usu ally concerned persons withGerman, Italian, or J apanese backgrounds.j= In th e field of suspected sabotage a nd espiona ge, th eCoun ter Int elligence Corps perform ed investigations which often employedth e use of technical investigative equipment . The Coun ter IntelligenceCorps mission in th e zone of the inter ior was not as dra ma tic a s th atof federa l agencies which appr ehended espiona ge agents. The efforts ofth e Coun ter Int elligence Corps, however, denied access to vital indus-trial plants and to highly secret militar y installations to man ypersons whose loyalty to th e Unit ed Sta tes was dubious. What dam agethese persons might have wrought on the war effort is only a mat ter ofconjecture.k. In th e fall of 1943, th e Inspector Genera l condu cted anextensive examina tion of Coun ter Int elligence Corps activities in th eC.-.r.r :r+. P^ ......_.1_ ml.,. --_..1*-_. -^_--^_~_*1~._~ La_..-LI _L_...a=:LYIt iv ~u luldILl>. 111e Le*ulLa llL Ll;ljUYIIe:ILU aL 1LLI auL re-ryrlL aorgan ization of th e Corps both in its activity in th e Service Comm an ds,and in foreign theat ers. Of special import was. th e suggestion th atCoun ter Xnt elligence Corps personnel

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. . . be specifically procured and trained forutilization in theaters of operation; that theybe so utilized that Counter Intelligence Corpsactivities within the Zone of Interior be per-formed by the Security Intelligence Corps ofthe Provost Marshal Generals Department.1. Since the future Counter Intelligence Corps mission wouldbe entirely overseas, it was necessary to administer the program of the

Counter Intelligence Corps and train and procure the personnel especiallyfor that purpose. The largest source of personnel, the Service Commsnddetachments, was no longer available, thereby necessitating a new methodof procurement. The office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, inBaltimore, Maryland, was discontinued, and all administration was hand-led by the Counter Intelligence Section of the Counter Intelligence Group,Military Intelligence Service. The staff of this office was muchsmaller than it had been in the office of the Chief, Counter Intelli-gence Corps.m. After a period of training and reorganization, the CounterIntelligence Corps was sent to the combat zones. It was here that thereal value and meaning of the Corps became known to combat conssanders.

The record and achievements of Counter Intelligence Corps personnelbrought added prestige to the Corps and to the Armed Forces of theUnited States.

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CEAITEROPEWATIDNS AFRICAN NCETW

8. THEMISSION. The Coun ter I nt elligence Corps mission in comba twas to protect tr oops, equipment , an d insta llations fra a en emy espiona gean d sabotage. North Africa was th e scene of th e first ta ctical use ofth e Coun ter Int elligence Corps.9. THELANDINGS.After a period of several mont hs int ensivetr aining an d orienta tion, th e Coun ter Int elligence Section, G-2, WesternTask Force, began its activities on 8 November 1942 by ma king th e land-ing in F rench Morocco with th e assa ult tr oops. The landing was ma de atFeda la with element s of th e 3rd Division. Coun ter Int elligence Corpspersonnel were successful in th e captu re of a ma ss of documen ts in ahotel tha t was used as h eadquarters by membersof the GermanArmistice

Carm ission. Brigadier General Art hu r R. Wilson appr opriat ely evaluat edth e captu red ma ter ial in one sent ence: Hit lers (Arm istice) Cam nissionha s saved th e American Army a grea t deal of work. In addition, th eCount er Int elligence Corps capt ur ed a group of It alian na tiona ls atFedala whose presence th ere was a source of da nger to th e secur ity ofth e American Arm y during t he initial assa ult.a. A Coun ter Int elligence Corps cont ingent accompan ied th e9th In fan tr y Division when it landed at Port Lyau tey. The 11th Arm oredDivision with its Coun ter Int elligence Corps componen t an d element s ofth e 9th Infant ry Division ma de th e lan ding at Safi under heavy fire.In Algiers, th e Count er Int elligence Corps landed with the first boat san d seized a num ber of Na zi suspects as well as import an t docum ents.At th e close of th e first da y of operat ions, th e Coun ter Int elligenceCorps ha d established positions str etched over sa me seven hundr ed milesof coastline.b. On 11 November he Coun ter I nt elligence Corps, with ele-ment s of the 3rd Division, took par t in the encirclement of Casa blanca.At Casablan ca, am ong he docum ents seized were Germa n ists of Fr enchAxis sympa th izers as well as a complet e Italia n Secret Service list ofFr ench Int elligence Service mem bers. Consequently, these compromisedFren ch agents were replaced by men unk nown o th e en emy.c. In th ese early operat ions against th e enemy, th e Coun terInt elligence Corps ma de a favora ble impression with th e tr oop cam san ders.The Corps proved th at it was not just a rear echelon organ izat ion.For th eir heroism under fire, ma ny of its members received decorationswhich included th e Soldiers Medal, th e Silver Sta r, an d th e Legion ofMerit award.

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10. ORGANIZATION WITHCOMBAT th e land-OR OFE XATION TROOPS. Afte ring, Coun ter Intelligence Corps personnel were relieved from at ta chmentto divisions an d were at ta ched to Western Task Force Hea dquar ter s. Theywere th en deployed on a ter rit orial basis in various cities along th eMoroccan seaboard. Shortly ther eafter, the Western Task Force was dis-solved an d its Coun ter Intelligence Corps personnel briefly joined th eFirst Armored Corps. On 9 Februar y, they were at tached to Headquart ers,Fifth Arm y, a new ar my which had been organ ized in North Africa-only th eprevious month.

a. The Coun ter In telligence Corps th en assu med coun ter int elli-gence jur isdiction over all F ren ch Morocco except th ose portions coveredby the Atlant ic and Mediterra nean Base Sections. Eventua lly, a part ofAlgeria was included a s well. Fr eedom of action wa s curta iled, however,because under the terms of the Armistice Agreement the Fr ench reta inedth e powers of ar rest an d sear ch. As a resu lt, Counter In telligence Corpsopera tions in North Africa after th e Arm istice were condu cted un der th eclosest advisement of th e Fr ench intelligence agencies t here.b. Durin g th e occupat iona l phas e in North Africa, th e missionof th e Coun ter Int elligence Corps slowly began to crystalize. Every

precaut ion was ta ken to prevent enemy comm un icat ions in th e occupiedar ea. As a mea ns of neu tr alizing th e effort s of Axis sympat hizers, adiligent sear ch was carr ied out for a ll caches of ar ms, am mu nition, orother contraband. Investigat ions were carr ied out on all suspiciouspersons an d intident s reported by unit s. By int err ogation an d fromrelevant document s, a great deal of security inform at ion was am assed.Fr om th e intelligence th us collected, th e Coun ter Intelligence Corps wasable t o give as sistan ce and advice to th e combat tr oops in th e applica-tion of security precaut ions to vital insta llations such as port s,ut ilities, dumps, comm un icat ions, an d other ar eas.c. One of th e tasks perform ed by th e Coun ter Int elligenceCorps in forward areas was the sea rch of enemy headquar ters and local

adm inistr at ive an d police offices. This ma de it necessar y for Count erInt elligence Corps personnel to ar rive on th e scene in time to protectdocument s from destr uction an d dissipation. In th e perform an ce of th esedut ies Coun ter Intelligence Corps sections were sent well forwa rd, a ndin some insta nces were th e first tr oops to ent er towns an d villages.They perform ed fun ctions varyiny from th ose of th e ma yor of a town tothose of the infantryman.11. OPE RATIONSN LIBERATED REAS. The Counter Int elligence CorpsNorth African opera tions were difficult in th e libera ted ar eas due toth e fluid political situa tion. Precautions had to be ta ken to preventenemy communications. Civilian telephone calls were subject to spotmonitoring; and when certa in telephone users incurred suspicion, thetelephones were monitored cont inuously. At Fedala, Coun ter Int elligenceCorps personnel discovered th at Axis-paid agent s had inst alled a moni-toring boar d to cover Amer ican Hea dquar ter s. This boar d was neut ra lizedbefore it h ad beGun to opera te. Coopera tion was also given to th eSignal In telligence Service in th e inter ception of short-wave radio

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Offices of th e Secur ite Militair e, Police Administ ra tion, Bur eau deSur veillan ce du Territ oire, an d others. However, in ma ny insta nces inth e inter ior of Fr ench Morocco, th ese Fr ench agencies did not ma keavailable to th e Coun ter Int elligence Corps all th e inform at ion at th eirdisposal. This was not tr ue in th e frontier regions where close coopera-tion continu ed to exist am ong th e Amer ican , Brit ish an d Fr ench agencies.In the interior, all coun terintelligence mat ters were left in the han dsof th e Fr ench. Fr eedom of activity was exercised by th e British an dAmer ican s only over th eir own insta llations an d personn el. This difficultycontinu ed to be a th orn in t he side of m any detachment conma nders whosought to elimina te duplicat ions of effort .

14. LESSON SLEARNE DHROKH EXPERIE NCE. Operat ions in liberatedar eas pr oved th at t he most successful personn el device was a linguistagent and a non-linguist agent working as a team in surveillances andinter rogations. In th e ma tt er of wearin g civilian clothes, it was foun dth at t he best r esults were accomplished by consistency on th e par t ofthe individual agent. Dur ing th is ph ase of opera tions, some experiencewas gained in the use of techn ical equipment which included camera s,typewriter s, fingerpr int sets, and telephone tap s. Monitorin g cont rolboar ds came to be used with increased frequency in the ma inten an ce ofsecurity controls.a. It was impossible to build a defense so perfect th at th eenemy could be completely prevent ed from gaining an y intelligence.There are two reasons for this: First, no hum an arr angements can beperfect: second, a perfect defense would resu lt in ha lting all opera -tions. The end to be achieved was th e concealment of opera tions.b. It became apparent , however, tha t a barbed wire barricadedid not necessarily net an enemy agent in every instan ce and tha t thecoun ter int elligence officer spen t 99 per cent of his tim e devising,building, ar ra nging, an d inspecting ways an d mean s of forcing th e enemyto expose himself. Secur ity had to be devised in a man ner tha t wouldnot int erfere with opera tions, The more difficult it was to penetr at ethe defense system, the more effort the enemy agent h ad to make: andth e more activity indu lged in, th e more he exposed himself. Sooner orlater th e alarm system had to go off.

15. CODNIEBIN TEUIGE NCE PH ASES. TheLsIffi THE TACTICALPLANNINGplann ing of a new opera tion, par ticularly a water -born e assa ult, tookseveral months. The first task was the secur ity of the perimeter anda rigidly cont rolled pass system for visitors. In addition, a seriesof lectu res to officers an d clerical per sonn el was of valu e in oafe-guar ding docum ent s an d telephone conversat ions. A list of officers,nominated to discuss the plan with other sections or headquar ters, wasof prime importance. It ten ded to prohibit leaks from doubtful personn el.a. Dur ing th e plann ing period, th e coun ter intelligence officerwas required to produce detailed plans and arr angements for the securityof training, concentr at ion, sta ging, an d moun ting of tr oops. The mostdifficult tas k encoun ter ed wa s th e production of a plan for

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transmitters. The Counter Intelligence Corps furnished leads to SignalIntelligence which located the transmitters, and the stations werepromptly raided. Continuous monitoring was necessary because enemytransmitters changed frequencies and often would broadcast no more thanfifteen minutes a day, and then at irregular intervals.a. The enemy attempted to infiltrate agents through SpanishMorocco in an effort to gain information concerning the movement of

troops and troop concentrations. These agents were intercepted by afrontier control system established soon after the landing phase.Similar attempts were made at the French Border Control Stations.Counter Intelligence Corps agents worked with the French in checkingapplications for border passage. In one instance, the border agentswere informed that an Arab woman, employed by a German agent, wouldattempt to cross the border with short-wave equipment concealed in hervoluminous dress. The tip was correct and the equipment was seized.

V%m .,.-...*a+.T*~ll:rX.....n I-,.-,%- .?.C nl en . .ceinazi +ka . te,-! :b. A..5 YI CSL A8nb.zrrryouu.s vvry.7 n-0 -*a arurynru L. l.2of providing protection of supplies, installations, and personnel. Tocarry out this function, Counter Intelligence Corps agents installedand supervised pass systems at ports, conducted security surveys, andinvestigated port personnel. Working with the Navy at one port, theCounter Intelligence Corps established a pass system which cleared morethan 3,000 French and native workers daily without incident. Informantnets facilitated this work. Many of the native informants worked withlabor gangs.

c. In conjunction with these duties, the Counter IntelligenceCorps gathered information concerning the-trend of political thinkingin occupied and friendly territories. This was carried on by CounterIntelligence Corps agents in plain clothes. In addition, because ofthe exigencies of war, United States censorship in French Morocco wasfor a time placed in the hands of the Corps. Perhaps the most impor-tant duty assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps in this Theater wasthe security preparation and supervision of the Roosevelt-ChurchillCasablanca Conference. The bodyguard was provided by the Secret Service.Security for the area was a duty assigned to Counter Intelligence Corpsagents in plain clothes aided by a battalion of Military Police. Thesuccess of these multitudinous tasks was achieved only by close coop-eration with other agencies.

12. LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCEORGANIZATIONS. TheCounter Intelligence Corps North African experience proved that Americanforces could operate successfully as a team. There was close coop-eration between the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Psychological War-fare Board, Signal Intelligence, Office of Naval Intelligence, theAllied Force Headquarters Documents Section, Allied Military Government,Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams, and the Office of StrategicServices.

13. LIAISON WITH ALLIED INTELLIGENCEORGANIZATIONS. Liaison wassought with the French Service de Renseignements, Contre-Espionage,

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CHAPTEROPERATIONS N SICILY

18. PRE-INVASION PROGRAM. By April, 1943, a central TheaterCounter Intelligence Corps Headquarters to handle the administration ofthe Counter Intelligence Corps had been established at Allied ForceHeadquarters. The only drawback-in this new set-up was the absence ofa Table of Organization. This created many problems, chief among whichwas a lack of adequate technical supplies. In May a Counter Intelli-gence Corps field training school was established near Oran in anticipa-tion of the coming Sicilian and Italian campaigns. With few exceptions,every officer and enlisted man coming over from the United States afterthe capture of Tunisia attended the school. Instructors were chosenfrom among those Counter Intelligence Corps and other intelligenceofficers who had combat and actual field experience. British Intelli-gence loaned an officer who had been through the campaigns in France,Greece, Crete, and Libya.

19. STAGINGAREA PREPARATIONS ND DUTIES. Agents were dispatchedto division, corps, and army headquarters to live with troops with whichthey would be working. They were attached to a company (usually aservice company) for rations and quarters, and their detachment com-mander was attached to the headquarters of the organization. EachCounter Intelligence Corps officer prepared an operational plan for thetroop unit to which his detachment was attached. Operational plans wereprepared for each province in Sicily, and target areas were mapped outfor each city of consequence.

a. Securitysurveys were conducted for the staging area,embarkation points, and areas adjacent to the mounting areas. The CounterIntelligence Corps also assisted in maintaining security in the stagingareas. All officers and agents began to educate troops in security, andtroops were instructed to bring any seized documents and maps to CounterIntelligence Corps Headquarters. Moreover, they were warned to observecensorship rules. The dangers of souvenier hunting and methods ofdealing with booby traps were also discussed.

b. Counter Intelligence Corps teams continued their own train-ing which consisted of physical exercise, handling special equipment,and a detailed study of the Counter Intelligence Corps operational plan.All agents were given specific instructions as to their conduct ifcaptured. In addition, operational plans were expanded into a StandingOperating Rooedure by each detachment. This document included specificduties for each man.G. these Counter Intelligence Corps teams were attached to thefield army, corps, divisions, and an Army group, by Headquarters, CounterIntelligence Corps, Allied Force iieadquarters. A total of 16 CounterIntelliaence Corps officers and 76 Counter Intelligence Corps agents weredistributed =ong Seventh Army (Headquarters and Field Amy- Section1 ,

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count erint elligence and security procedure dur ing th e coming cam paign.All details were sett led at th is time and th e tosssanders inst ructionsdisseminat ed to tr oops. Al l staff sections and troousm-. concerned studiedinstr uctions; consequent ly, later misun dersta ndings were avoided. Byconst an t inter view, conference, and corr espondence with all concerned,th e coun ter intelligence officer produced his plan and instr uctions.16. COUNTERINTELLIGEN CE PBASEOF TACTICALDBINGMDUNTINGOPERATIONS. Durin g th e mount ing phase, tr oop cosmt an ders required assist-

ance in their staging and mounting areas. It becam e th e duty of th eCount er Int elligence Corps dur ing th is phase to assist th e appropriat eheadqua rt ers in soch capa city as th e cowander deemed appropriat e. Alist of s uggestions was made up as an aid to t he various comm ander s inth e inter est of complete security of movement . It was required tha t allpossible compr omises of secur ity be report ed prompt ly. Tactical orstr at egic sur prise was th e par am ount considera tion of all comm ander s.Car e was ta ken also to avoid all indications am ong th e civilian popula-tion th at a n operat ion was pending.17. CONCWSIONS. In th e North African Operat ion, th e Count er In-telligence Corps learn ed m an y lessons, but this was only a test ingground for the real work tha t lay ahead in Italy and later in France

and Germany. In Ita ly, th e mission of th e Coun ter Int elligence Corpsan d th e value of t he Corps cam e to be more fully recognized by division,corps, an d ar my conssanders.

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Count er Int elligence Corps ceased t o be a th eory after th e landing onthe beaches of Sicily. It had crystalized into a working principleeasily adapt able in th is type of warfar e wher e ar mies depend almostexciusiveiy on int eiligence for successfui operat ions.f. The effectiveness of th e secur ity provided by th e Count erInt elligence Corps was at tested to by th e captur e, in November, of agroup of admit ted pro-Fa scists an d saboteurs. Agents of th e Coun terInt elligence Corps-in Trapa ni, Sicily, un covered th is organ ization

which was founded to reorganize th e Fa scist Pa rt y in Sicily and Ita lyan d to sabotage Allied insta llations. The group, financed by a wealthygirl, consist ed of twen ty-eight persons. Two of th e original foun dersrea dily a dmitt ed sabotaging a comm unications line nea r Trapa ni. TheCoun ter Int elligence Corps agents ha d known of th e activities of th isgroup since ea rly October. They were closely wat ched un til all of th emcould be ta ken into custody at one time.9. Upon ent ry the Count er Int elligence Corps section imme-diately took over cont rol of th e city pending th e ar rival of either acont rol group from Division or from AMGOT. Immediate steps were takento cont rol th e mu nicipality, th e Cara binieri, th e police and prisons,business activities, public ut ilities, an d militar y and political or-

ganizations and th eir headqua rt ers. The Chur ch was asked to coopera te:and after necessary conferences with th e leading milita ry, civil,and religious au th orities, a proclama tion was issued imposing th enecessary r estr ictions on th e civil an d political life of th e cosrn unit y.Everyth ing was done to assist th e local reepresent at ive of th e DivisionCosnna nder, and later of AMGOT, in bringing th e comm un ity back to norma lwithout inter fering or delaying th e accomplishmen t of th e combat missionof the Division. The work of t he section was completed when it tu rnedover its responsibilities to either th e Corps Coun ter Int elligence Corpssection, or th e repr esen ta tive of AMGOT.h. By th e end of J uly every large town in th e Seventh Armysector had been ent ered and was un der investigation by Count er Int elli-

gence Corps personnel. Sma ller towns in out lying regions were placedun der investigation as time permit ted. With th e conclusion of Opera-tion Hu sky, th e Coun ter In telligence Corps was exercising count erin-telligence cont rol over th e ent ire conquer ed ter rit ory. Operat ion out-side of towns was rest ricted to sear ching th e known or suspected loca-tions of enemy headqua rt ers..1. By th e t ime Operation Hu sky cam e to an end, it was evidentth at th e var ious G-2s ha d come to rely very heavily upon Count er In-telligence Corps personnel and th at t her e very definitely was a Coun terInt elligence Corps mission with ta ctical unit s in such operat ions.This was a tr ibute to an organ ization th at learn ed it s lesson quicklyon the battlefield.

21. OPE RATIONN TBE STATIC SITDATICN. The ra pid adva nce ofUnit ed Sta tes forces in Sicily ma de th e change-over of coun ter intel-ligence control of tan s and areas from one team to another extrem elydifficult. It was th e procedure of division sections to rema in with

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_ __th eir divisions even th ough th e division pa ssed quickly th rough a town.This gave th e section little opport un ity t o do effective work in th etmm. Often element s of the corps section were lat e in ar riving orfailed to ar rive Un tii after th e division section ha d left. Even atbest, th ere existed a continu al chan ge-over fron division to corps toar my sections, which caused consider able confusion to all concern edan d much duplicat ion of work on th e pa rt of th e detachment s.

a. With th e cessation of hostilities an d th e definit ion ofdefense areas, Counter Int elligence Corps sections reverted to th esta tic type of Coun ter Int elligence Corps work , involving civil asWell as milita ry coun ter int elligence. Lat er, however, four Port De-ta chm ents were combined to form a perm an ent sta tic group for th eAmer ican ha lf of Sicily. Coun ter Int elligence Corps detachment s withta ctical unit s ther eupon tu rn ed over th eir civilian files an d civilsecur ity responsibility to t he new group an d devoted t hemselvesexclusively to military secur ity m at ters.

b. The sta tic group under took more elabora te secur ity precau-tions a nd surveys th an th e ta ctical sections ha d. Personnel weredivided on a ter rit orial basis with in the four Western provinces. Ineach of these provinces, a Coun ter Int elligence Corps office was esta b-lished with th e responsibility for all Coun ter Int elligence Corpsactivity in th e province. For conven ience th e offices were loca ted a tth e provincial capita ls, with sma ll sub-offices at sma ller cities.This adm inist ra tive set-up pr ovided a firm basis for effective coun ter -intelligence coverage of the ar eas an d expedited th e tr an smission toTheat er Hea dquar ter s of t he inform at ion obtained.

c. In add ition, sur veys of vital milita ry a nd civilian in-sta llations were ma de for orga nizat ions responsible for t heir secur ity.Liaison was esta blished with th e int elligence officers an d Coun ter In-telligence Corps section of th e ta ctical un its located in th e ar eas,with a view towar d coordina tin g activities, effecting a mu tu al excha ngeof inform at ion, an d providing for comm on ssista nce. Coordina tion ofactivities with those of A& was ma inta ined. Invest igations of pur elypolitical ma tt ers or oth er ma tt ers falling within th e jurisdiction ofA)M;were under ta ken only upon th e request of tha t organ izat ion. Ingenera l, close lia ison with th e Milita ry Police, local p olice, an doth er enforcement agencies wa s established; an d informa nt s weredeveloped an d cultivated.

PHASE of SicilyCoun ter Intelligence Corps ha d complet e freedom of action within itsjurisdiction. It was foun d necessar y to ha ve agen ts in every ma jortown secur e inform at ion on political activity of every description.Ever y effort was ma de to effect complet e liaison of th e Seventh ArmyCount er Int elligence Corps with all oth er detachment s at all times; an dcar e was ta ken to provide for immediat e reversion to t he t acticalsitua tion, should such a cont ingency arise. Fur th ermore, Coun ter In-telligence Corps personn el of port deta chmen ts were placed within easyrea ch of each oth er an d in cont inu al opera tion. Complet e covera ge ofth e occupied ar eas followed a definit e pat ter n.

22. CCCUPATKNAL BEGIN S. In th e occupa tion th e

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a. In th e cities of Sicily th e Coun ter Intelligence Corps setup local Coun ter Int elligence Corps headqu ar ters , if only for a tem -porary period, where friendly persons could come to give inform at ion.Usua lly th ese offices were plainly ma rked COMTER INTELLIGENCE COWLan d officials were advised where to direct th ose desiring to ta lk toits personnel. Cont acts am ong th e friendly elements of th e populat ionwere esta blished for possible use as inform an ts, an d th e na mes ofsuspects th us received were checked an d double-checked against oth erinformants. Persons foun d to be dan gerous were confined. In ma ny in-sta nces th e Pa rish Pr iest was found to be th e most valuable source ofinformation.

b. The ma jor effort of th e Coun ter In telligence Corps wasmade in captu red towns. Coun ter Int elligence Corps personnel rest oredorder ; secured document s, critical insta llations, and supplies: a rr estedleading Fa scists; and investigated th e civil administ ra tors. AMGOTofficers were kept inform ed of th e political situa tion, an d replace-ment s were reconr aen ded for officials ar rest ed. Dur ing th e inter im be-tween captu re by combat troops an d th e tak ing over of the comm un itiesby AMGOT ersonnel, ma ny civil problems r elated to security were met .

c. By 1 August , The Coun ter Int elligence Corps ha d ta ken moreth an 500 political prisoners, am ong whomwere member s of th e OVRA(Opera Volun at ria Repressioni Ant i-Fa scismol, th e Squadr a Diazione (thestr ong-arm m en of th e Fa scist Pa rt y notorious for t heir castor-oiltr eat men t of an ti-Fascists), an d mem bers of th e other n um erous Fa scistorganizations. Fa scist officers an d leaders who had fled from th elar ger cities ret ur ned, an d ma ny of th ese retur nees were recognizedfrom captur ed docum ents . Arrests cont inued da ily.23. CAtTlJRED DOCUMENTS.Division Counter Intelligence Corpssections were char ged with the securing of captur ed docum ents . Dailyreports of iunn ediate value to th e division Assistan t Chief of Sta ff,G-2, were submitted. These cont ained descriptions of roads beyond th e

enemy lines, inform at ion on enem y concentr at ions, sta te of enemy morale,locations of enemy mine fields an d road blocks, an d deta iled data con-cerning enemy str ength , disposition, an d movement .a. Included in th e inform at ion culled from th e docum ent scaptur ed were copies of th e order of batt le of enemy unit s opera ting inSicily and in the Balkans. Complete records of the prison system con-trolled by the Ita lian Prisoner of War Group and th eir informa nt systemwere un covered, as well as th e location of all prisoner of war cam psin Sicily an d Ita ly. Invalua ble inform at ion was obta ined also fromimpounded ma ils by t he Seventh Army G-2.b. Docum ent collection was left lar gely t oother int elligence

agencies due to lack of tr an sport at ion for t he Coun ter In telligenceCorps detachments. Only th e 1st Division, which had additional G-2personnel to use for th e purpose of securing th ese document s, producedoutstanding results. In somd instances, the II Corps Detachment wasable to secure valua ble m at erial left by th e ha stily withdr awn enemy.

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24. LES (rys THROU GH One of th e gravestEARNED FIE U) EXPERIiNE.problems was a lack o f sufficient Ita lian-speaking Coun ter Int elligenceCorps personn el; an d th ough ma ny at tempt s were made to adjust it, nonewas satisfactory. In sme cases local civilians were pressed intoservice as interpreters with th e help of th e Car abinieri. In othercases soldier inter pret ers were secured from replacement depots, andsince th e linguistic an d intellectual sta ndar ds of th e latt er groupwere unsat isfactory, man y had to be retur ned.a. A lack of proper t ra nsporta tion and equipment was also

noted. Without tr ansportation on hand when needed, a detachment washa ndicapped in accomplishing its mission, and ma ny regions rema inedwithout proper Coun ter Int elligence Corps coverage. Some provisionwas foun d to be necessary whereby th is equipment could be procur ediuuvediately after the initial assault.b. Often, mu ch time was ta ken in doing AMGwork prior to theappea ra nce of AMG epresent at ives in cities an d towns, This was highlynecessary, but was perform ed by th e Count er Int elligence Corps inemergency situa tions and at the expense of its own work. Fur th er,th ere was th e tend ency of some G-2s to employ Count er Int elligenceCorps personnel on combat intelligence missions ha ving no bearin g onsecur ity. Becaus e of th e short age of specially qua lified pers onnel,. G-2s should ha ve allowed t heir Counter In telligence Corps sections toconcentr at e on th eir security fun ctions and not hinder t hem withmissions which ha d no conn ection with th eir specialized field. Thiscondition was fur th er aggravat ed by th e nebulous line of demar kat ionbetween th e resp onsibilities of AMGOT nd our Milita ry Police, localmilitar y comm an ders, an d th e Coun ter Int elligence Corps. To offsetsome of th ese pr oblems, it was recommen ded th at a liaison officer ofAYK; ccompa ny th e Coun ter Int elligence Corps deta chment in the initia loccupation.c. A recomm enda tion was ma de to the effect th at th e comm an d-ing officer of th e highes t Count er Int elligence Corps echelon enga gedin an opera tion coordinat e th e activities of all sections at ta ched t olower echelons. He should supply lower sections with personn el from hissection who would ent er towns in the process of captur e an d rema in th eresemi-perman ent ly t o afford Count er Int elligence Corps coverage. Such aplan would ha ve eliminat ed to a large exten t th e mu ltiple tr an sfer ofCount er Int elligence Corps cont rol an d dup licat ion of effort.d. It was recomm ended th at a large pool of Coun ter Int elli-gence Corps operat ives be ret ained under th e cont rol of th e th eat ercomm an der, with a sma ll deta chm ent in each division. In some cases nooth er opera tives were available when division Coun ter Int elligenceCorps left an ar ea, an d it becam e necessary for la ter ar rivals to doagain m uch of th e work of gaining cont act with inform an ts.e. An out sta nding cont ribut ion to Coun ter Int elligence Corpsactivities in Sicily was th e employment of United Sta tes butt ons ra th erth an insignia of ra nk by Count er Int elligence Corps personnel. This

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was a decided step forward from the North African campaign where agentswore the insignia of rank and, as a result, the task of enlisted per-sonnel in dealing with Allied officers was rendered difficult.

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OPERATIWS N ITALY

25. PRE-INVASI@JLANNING. By July, 1943, Operation Avalanche(Italian) was in the planning stage, and Fifth Army Counter IntelligenceCorps was assigned the operational counterintelligence phase. This wasa notable departure from the situation prior to the North African land-ings nhere the Counter Intelligence Corps was completely in the darkeven as to where it was going. A heavy cut in supply personnel forFifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps during the Sicilian operation wasnecessitated by the demands of Fifth Army for personnel to do bordercontrol work after Fifth Army left North Africa. The Counter Intelli-gence Corps detachment that accompanied the Fifth Army to Italy had astrength of 27: 5 officers and 22 enlisted men.

26. COINTER CORPSDDRlNGTBE INVASICW The 36thNTELLIGENCE Divi-sion Counter Intelligence Corps and VI Corps Counter Intelligence Corpslanded in Italy on D-Day. The bulk of the Fifth Army Detachment em-barked for Italy at Oran on 1 September, leaving a small rear echelonbehind to bring on transportation and other equipment which could notbe lifted in the early convoys. The Detachment landed on 11 September@ plus 21 near Paestum on the Salerno Beachhead under heavy enemy fire.

a. For the first week after the landing, the tactical situa-tion was very fluid. At one point there was serious danger that theFifth Army would be thrown off the beachhead by vigorous Gewan counter-attacks. The area covered was very small and sparsely settled, furtherlimiting Counter Intelligence Corps operations during this phase. TheArmy Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment lived in foxholes duringthis period. Shortly after the landing, detachments of the 3rd Divi-sion, 34th Division, and the 45th Division received indoctrinationfrom the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps.b. The general atmosphere at this time was one of uncertainty.On one occasion 8 German attack almost captured the Army Advance CommandPost, and Army Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were placed in theline to defend it. On another occasion a group of Amy Counter Intelli-gence Corps personnel were surrounded and cut off by German tanks whileattempting to enter the town of Battipaglia to conduct preliminarysecurity work there. They escaped and ultimately reached the town onlyto find it completely evacuated and destroyed.co On 14 September a group of Army Counter Intelligence Corpsand British Counter Intelligence Section (FSSl personnel went to theSorrento Peninsula to handle counterintelligence work with the Rangersthere. A number of arrests of consequence were made, including prom-

inent Fascists who had been signaling information to the enemy. A smalldetachment was also sent to cover the adjacent islands of Capri, Ischia,and Procida, from which enemy agents were infiltrating Allied territory.During this entire period the Counter Intelligence Corps supplied the

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Army G-2 with combat int elligence since th e Office of Str at egic Servicesespiona ge services were not yet opera ting.

d. On 1 October Naples fell, an d th e Arm y Coun ter Int elligenceCorps moved in with advan ce element s of th e 82nd Airborne Division. Forthr ee weeks the 305th Count er Int elligence Corps Detachment (Fifth ArmyDetachm ent 1 was in char ge of coun ter int elligence in th at city. Napleswas the largest which ha d ever been han dled by a Count er IntelligenceCorps detachment anywhere in the world up to that time.. Importa ntdocument s and mat erial were obtained from German espionage agents andtheir headquarters. A num ber of important securit y arr ests were made,including several Ita lian genera ls who ha d gone un derground . On 24October, counter intelligence jurisdiction over Naples was tu rn ed overto th e Coun ter Int elligence Corps (Pen insula r Base Section), an d th eFifth Army Detachment moved to Caserta .27. FROM HE VOLTURNO After th e fall of NaplesIVER TO K&E. th elong sta tic period began, center ing ar ound th e seige of Cassino whichwas highlighted by th e lan ding at Anzio in J an ua ry, 1944. Dur ing th isperiod th e Army Coun ter Int elligence Corps began th e work of securitycoverage. The Army ar ea was divided into zones with a squad of Coun terInt elligence Corps ayent s responsible for each zone. Securit y sur veys

of every town of consequen ce were prepa red, an d importa nt Fa scists an dother security suspects were arr ested and interned.a . At th is tim e th e work of th e Coun ter Int elligence Corpswas of a coun ter subversive na tu re directed ayains t post-occupa tionalenemy ayents. From this stan dpoint this work was carried on success-fully, since th e ar rest an d inter nm ent of key Fa scist figures rem ovedpoint s ar oun d which subversive groups might form . The absence of sub-versive activity during the campa ign was att ributable to the Count erIntelligence Corps.b. Dur ing th e period October t oInt elligence Corps was reinforced by th e

Corps an d 1st Armored Division Coun ter Into Fr ench and English count erintelligence

December,II Corps Cotelligencepersonnel.

1943,unterCorps

Army Count erIntelligencein addition

C. In December, 1943, an event occurr ed to ease t he personnelsituation. An Ita lian coun ter espiona ge organ ization Sib! CS (SicurezzaInform azione Milita re, Contro-Spionaggio) was at ta ched t o th e FifthArmy an d placed u nder th e opera tional direction of th e Fifth ArmyCoun ter Int elligence Corps. This un it proved itself invalua ble in th econdu ct of un dercover counter int elligence missions wh ich would ha vebeen pra ctically impossible for th e Coun ter Intelligence Corps toaccomplish. This unit averaged about 50 rtjeil, of wlrom30 opera ted withArmy Counter Int elligence Corps. The oth ers were deployed with t heCorps an d Division Counter Int elligence Corps deta chment s.d. A ma jor developmen t in th e opera tions of th e Coun ter In-telligence Corps was th e esta blishment in December of th e Fifth. ArmyRefugee Int err ogat ion Post. The principal ta sk of th is new organizat ion

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Int elligence Corps personnel with th is Force received writt en corm nend a-tion from th e S Force comm an der for th eir work. On 17 J une, theCounter In telligence Corps, Fifth Arm y, left S Force, moving toTuscania where it resumed its normal functions.28. ADMINISTRATIVE DURIN GTHE ITALIANCAMPAIGN. TheROCEXJURESsuccess of th e Coun ter Int elligence Corps was due in par t to adm inistr a-tive chan ges tha t had tak en place as a result of recommenda tions madeby conscientious deta chment comm an ders. As th e Fifth Army extended its

lines, Coun ter Int elligence Corps jurisdictions in th e occupied ar easwere expanded to meet th e exigencies of th e new situa tions. With th eArmy north of Naples in November, 1943, were t he Coun ter Int elligenceCorps sections at ta ched to Fifth Army, II Corps, VI Corps, 3rd Infant ryDivision, 34th Infant ry Division, 36th Infant ry Division, 45th Infant ryDivision, an d 1st Armored Division. In Sicily, Coun ter Int elligenceCorps deta chment s were att ached to th e Seventh Army, 9th Infantr y Divi-sion, and 2nd Armored Division. These units were expected to departfrom this thea ter for the Eur opean Theater of Operations at any time.The 1st Infan tr y Division ha d alrea dy depart ed. Coun ter IntelligenceCorps personnel form erly at ta ched to the Fifteenth Army Group were nowpar t of th e Coun ter Int elligence Corps Section, Insu lar Ba se Section.They afforded Coun ter Int elligence Corps sta tic coverage for th e fourWestern provinces in Sicily which Gere un der American cont rol. TheFifth Army Base Section was redesignat ed Pen insula r Base Section withjurisdiction extendihg southea st from th e rea r boun dar y of th e FifthArmy an d covering th e Western portion of South ern Ita ly. With th eadvan ce of th e Fifth Army Coun ter Int elligence Corps, cont rol of th eNaples area was ta ken over by th e Coun ter Int elligence Corps Section,Peninsular Base Section.

a. The Coun ter Int elligence Corps Pen insula r Base Section wasorgan ized to cover th e largest am ount of ter rit ory of an y deta chment inItaly. Terr itorial jurisdiction extended from Naples to Pisa with th eexclusion of th e City of Rome. Count er Int elligence Corps Pen insula rBase Section maint ained a sub-section at Rome to han dle Peninsular BaseSection ter rit ory immedia tely n ort h and south of Rome province.Alth ough th e ar ea exten ded inlan d only to an avera ge of 25 miles, th esecurity responsibility was actu ally doubled, for in addition to landside th ere were 300 miles of coast line which present ed a const an tthr eat to security. In emer gencies Coun ter Intelligence Corps Pen insula rBase Section was set up to relieve th e Fifth Army Counter Int elligenceCorps in case new ta ctical situa tions creat ed new coun ter int elligenceobligat ions for th em. Close coopera tion an d liaison was ma inta ined atall times between th e two sections.

b. In May, 1944, under au th ority of T/M 30-500, th e FifthAr my Count er Intelligence Corps was reorganized into three separat ePr ovisiona l Detac&nent s which cont inued to opera te as a single un it,since th e senior deta chment colPma nder of the Fifth Ar my Counter Intelli-gence Corps Detachment had administra tive supervision over all thr eedetachments. In addition, it provided for compisjion vacancies an dopportun ities for grade promotions.

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29. FRW ROblE TO THE ARNO RIVER. On 19 July, one provisional de-tachment entered the city of Leghorn (Livorno) as part of an 5 Forcesimilar to that which entered Rome. This S Force was small and com-pact. Little of counterintelligence interest developed, since the townwas a virtual ghost-town, largely evacuated, and heavily mined through-out the center. At the end of August, Army Counter Intelligence CorpsHeadquarters moved to Tavernelle where it was to remain until the endof December. Early in September, Army Counter Intelligence sub-detachments entered Pisa and later Lucca with the assault troops whichtook those cities. Neither city was considered large enough for aregular S Force, but Army Counter Intelligence Corps performed thesame function as an S Force would have done, in addition to estab-lishing regular security coverage of these cities.

30. THE GERMAN SPIONAGE PROBLEM. The drive from Rome to theArno River was too rapid to permit effective counterintelligence. Itwas possible only to skim the surface in order to move along with thetroops. Because of the few captures of enemy agents, there was actuallya dearth of information about the German Intelligence Service (GIS) inItaly. Little was learned concerning its methods and techniques, andwithout this information it was extremely difficult to capture Germanagents. However, the enemy also was hungry for some intelligenceconcerning Allied plans and operations, since it was evident to himthat the Allied advance would steam roller through the Italian peninsula.To obtain this information he decided to dispatch trained agents behindthe Allied lines.a. Beginning October, 1944, a mass assault of German espionageand sabotage agents on the Fifth Army area began. Some were parachutedin, some landed by boat on the coast, but the majority were line-crossers, most of whom entered the Fifth Army area in the thinly heldWestern sector.b. Fortunately, by this time the Counter Intelligence Corpshad tightened its system of controls and was constantly i