history of the u.s. marine corps in wwii vol ii ... of the u.s. marine corps in wwii...isolation of...

$: History of the U.S. Marine Corps in WWII Vol II ... of the U.S. Marine Corps in WWII...Isolation of Rabaul HISTORY OF U.S. MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS IN WORLI) WAR 11 VOLUME II by s ?8\i\c$
ISOLATION OF RABAUL

History of U.S. Marine Corps

Operations in World War II

VOLUME II

HISTORICAL BRANCH, G-3 DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

PCN 19000262500

Isolation of

RabaulHISTORY OF U.S. MARINE CORPS

OPERATIONS IN WORLI) WAR 11

VOLUME II

by() s ?8\i\c..

HENRY I. SHAW, JR.

MAJOR DOUGLAS T. KANE, USMC

Historical Branch, G–3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

1963

Other Volumes in this Series

I

LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.

Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 58-60002

ForsalebytheSuperintendentofDocuments,L-.5.GovernmentPrintingOfficeWashington,D.C.,w02- Price$5.50

Foreword

This book, the second in a projected five-volume series, continues the com-prehensive history of Marine Corps operations in World War II. The story

of individual campaigns, once told in separate detail in preliminary mono-graphs, has been largely rewritten and woven together to show events in properproportion to each other and in correct perspective to the war as a whole. Newmaterial, part icularl y from .Japanese sources, which has become available inprofusion since the writing of the monographs, has been included to providefresh insight into the Marine Corps’ contribution to the final victory in thePacific.

The period covered in these pages was a time of transition in the fightingwhen the Allied offensive gradually shifted into high gear after a grindingstart at Guadalcanal. As the situation changed, the make-up of the FleetMarine Force changed, too. We passed through the era of hit and run andthrough the time for defensive stratebg. Our raider and parachute battalionswere absorbed in regular infantry units, the seacoast batteries of our defensebattalions became field artillery, and our air squadrons were re-equipped withnewer and deadlier planes.

In the converging drives that made the ,Tapanese fortress Rabaul theirgoal-one under Navy command and the other under Army leadership—Marines played a sibmificant part well out of proportion to their numbers. Inthose days, as in these, the use of trained amphibious troops in a naval campaignoverloaded the scale in our favor.

As one hard-won success followed another in the Solomons and on NewGuinea, a progression of airfields wrested from island jungles gave us themeans to emasculate Rabaul. Mrhile the enemy garrison waited helplessly foran assault that never came, we seized encircling bases that choked the life outof a once-potent stronghold.

once the front lines passed by Rabaul, other island battles seized the head-lines—battles of the great two-pronged advance on Japan, which was madepossible in large part by the victories of 1943 in the Southwest Pacific. Forthousands of Americans, .4ustralians, and New Zealanders, however, the cam-paign against Rabaul never ended until the last day of the war. In thisunheralded epilogue of blockade and harassment, Marine air units took thelead just as they had in the all-out aerial battle that preceded.

The outstanding aspect of all the operations covered in this volume, oneevident in every section of the narrative, was the spirit of cooperation between

IV FOREWORD

ditl’erent services and national forces. No finer example exists in recent historyof the awesome combined power of distinct military forces pursuing a commongoal.

DAVID M. SHOUPGENERAL,U.S. MARINECORPS

COMMANDANTOF THE MARIhTECORPS

Reviewed and approved16 ~fay 1963

Preface

The Allied campaign to reduce Rabaul was not an uninterrupted seriesof flawless operations. It had, like most human enterprises, a share of mistakesto match its successes. Since we learn by both errors and accomplishments, thelessons, good and bad, absorbed during the fighting on New Georgia, Bougain-villea, and hTew Britain were priceless in value. They undoubtedly saved thelives of many Marines who went on to take part in the Central Pacific drivethat culminated in the battle for Okinawa.

Our purpose in publishing this operational history in durable form is tomake the Marine Corps record permanently fivailable for study by militarypersonnel and the general public as well as by serious scholars of militaryhistory. We have macle a conscious effort to be objective in our treatment ofthe actions of Marines and of the men of other services who fought at theirside. We have tried to write with understanding about our former enemies andin this eflort have received invaluable help from the Japanese themselves. Fewpeoples so militant and unyielding in war have been as dispassionate andanalytical about their actions in peace.

This volume was planned and outlined by Colonel Charles W. Harrison,former Head, Historical Branch, G–3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. MarineCorps, working in conjunction with Mr. Henry I. Shaw, tJr., the senior historianon the World Tlrar II historical project. Major Douglas T. Kane wrote thenarratives of the New Georgia and Bougainvillea operations, using much of theresearch material gathered for the monographs prepared by Major John N.Rentz, illarine~ in the Central 8oZom.on,s and Bouqainville and the NorthernSolomon.y. The remainder of the narrative was written by Mr. Shaw, who intreating the story of operations at Cape Gloucester and Talasea drew uponthe research data assembled for the monograph, The Campaign on New Britain,by Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hou@l and Major John .4. Crown. Theappendices concerning casualties, command and staff, and chronology wereprepared by Mr. Benis M. Frank. Colonel Harrison, Major Gerald Fink,Colonel William M. Miller, Major Jolm H. ,Johnstone, and Colonel Thomas G.Roe, successive heacls of the Historical Branch, did most of the final editing ofthe manuscript. The book was completed uncler the direction of Colonel ,JosephF. Wagner, Jr., present head of the branch.

A number of leading participants in the actions described have commentedon preliminary drafts of pertinent portions of the book. Their valuable assist-ance is gratefully acknowledged. Several senior officers, in particular General

VI PREFACE

Alexander A. Vandegrift., General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., and Vice AdmiralDaniel E. Barbey, made valuable additions to their written comments duringpersonal interviews. General Vandegrift, in addition, made his privatecorrespondence with senior commanders in the Pacific available for use andattribution.

Special thanks are due to the historical agencies of the other services fortheir critical readings of the draft chapters of this book. Outstanding amongthe many official historians who measurably assisted the authors were: Dr. JohnMiller, Jr., Deputy Chief Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History,Department of the Army; Mr. Dean C. Allard, Head, Operational ArchivesBranch, Naval History Division, Navy Department; and Dr. Robert F. Futrell,Historian, U.S. .4ir Force Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, AirUniversity, Maxwell Air Force Base.

Chief Warrant Officer Patrick R. Brewer and his successor as HistoricalBranch Administrative and Production Officer, Second Lieutenant D’Arty E.Grisier, ably handled the many exacting duties involved in processing thevolume from first drafts through final printed form. The many preliminarytypescripts and the painstaking task of typing the final manuscript for theprinter were done by Mrs. Miriam R. Smallwood. Much of the meticulouswork demanded by the index was done by Mrs. Smallwood, Miss Mary E.Walker, and Miss Kay P. Sue.

The maps were drafted by Chief Warrant Officer Brewer and CorporalRobert F. Stibil. Official Defense Department photographs have been usedthroughout the text.

6?. 4? ‘()’’”J.

R. E. CUSHMAN, JR.MAJORGENERAL,U.S. MARINECORPS

ASSISTAh’TCHIEFOFSTAFF,G-2

PART I STRATEGIC SITUATION—SPRING 1943

CHAPTER

l. Setting the Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. The Opening Moves.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.0rder of Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PART II TOENAILS OPERATION

l. Objective: New Georgia.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. ELKTON Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. Munda Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. The Dragons Peninsula Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . .5. Endof the Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PART III NORTHERN SOLOMONS OPERATIONS

l. Continuing the Pressure.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. Diversionary Assau1ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. Assault of Cape Torokina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. Holding the Beachhead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5. Advance to Piva Forks... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6. Endof a Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PART IV THE NEW BRITAIN CAMPAIGN

l. New Britain Prelude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. The Enemy: Terrain and Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. DEXTERITY Landings.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. Capture of the Airfields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5. The Drive to Bergen Bay.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6. Eastward to Iboki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7. Talasea and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PAGE

31832

415989

119148

167188207225247270

297319334357374391411

S. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428

VII

VIII CONTENTS

PART V MARINE AIR AGAINST RABAUL

CH.4PTER

l. Target: Rabaul, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. Approach March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. Knockout by Torokina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PART VI CONCLUSION

I. Encirclement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDICES

A. Bibliographical Notes.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B. Guide to Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C. Military Map Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .D. Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .E. Fleet Marine Force Status—30 April 1943 . . . . . . . . , . .F. Table of Organization E–100—Marine Division . . . . . . . .G. Marine Task Organization and Command List . . . . . . . .H. MarineCasualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I. LTnit Commendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ILLUSTRATIONS

Simpson Harbor and Rabaul . . . . . . . . .Marines of the 3d Raider Battalion . . . . . .Burial Ceremony at Viru Harbor . . . . . .155mm Guns of the 9th Defense Battalion . . .Gun Crew of the 9th Defense Battalion . . .Avenger Torpedo Bombers . . . . . . . . .Marine Light Tank on New Georgia . . .Casualties Evacuated by PBY . . . . . .Column of Marine Raiders Near Enogai . . . .New Zealand Troops Land on Vella I.avclla . .Munda Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Landing Craft Readied for Bougainvillea D-DayMarines Wading Ashore at, Bougainvillea . . .Puruata Island and Torokina Airfield . . .

PAGE

441455478

507537

543552556557562571574587588

597

22226666869696

127127159159209215215

CONTENTS.-

ILLUSTRATIONS—Continued

Mud Clings to Ammunition Carriers . . . . . .Admiral Halsey and General Geiger . . . . . .Field Telephone Lines Are Laid . . . . . . . .Numa Numa Trail Position of 2/21 . . . . . . .Marine Wounded Are Carried From Hill 1000 .Piva Airfields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Field Artillery Fires by Marine 155mm Guns .Troopers of the 112th Cavalry Land at Arawe . .Marines Move Ashore at Cape Gloucester . . . .Shore Party Marines Build a Sandbag Ramp . .105mm Howitzers of 4/11 Support the Attack . .Marine Riflemen Attack Toward the Airfield . .Medium Tank Crosses Suicide Creek . . . . .75mm Half Track and 37mm Gun at Hill 66o . .Japanese Flags Captured by Marines . . . . . .Patrol of Marines Near Borgen Bay . . . . . .Army Amphibian Engineers and Marines at IbokiCaptured Japanese Zero . . . . . . . . . . . .Japanese Val Dive Bombers . . . . . . . . . .Japanese Antiaircraft Crews During a B-25 .kttackParafrag Bombs Drop on Vunakanau Airfield . .Mechanics of VMF-21 I Repair a Corsair . . . .Marine TBFs Loaded for a Rabaul Strike . . . .Marine SBDS Headed for Vunakanau . . . . . .Seabee Equipment Unloaded on Green Island . .First Wave Ashore on Los Ncgros . . . . . . .Town of Rabaul on 22 March ] 944 . . . . . . .Corsairs at Emirau Airfield . . . . . . . . . .Leyte Invasion Fleet in Seeadler Harbor . . . .Marine Mitchells Fly Over Crater Peninsula . . .

MAPS

1. Seizure of the Russell Islands, 21 February 1943 . . . . . . . .2. Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, Showing CHRONICLE Landings3. Seizure of Viru Harbor, 28 June–1 July 1943 . . . . . . . . .4. Seizure of Wickham Anchorage, 30 June–3 July 1943 . . . . . .5. Munda Campaign, XIV Corps, 2–15 July . . . . . . . . . .6. Munda Campaign, XII’ Corps, 25–30 July . . . . . . . . .7. Munda Campaign, XIV Corps, 24 August . . . . . . . . . .8. Dragons Peninsula, Northern Landing Group, 4–I 9 July . . . .9. The Attack on Bairoko, Northern Landing Group, 20 July . . .

LA

P,\GE

231231250268268282282341341351351368368390390405405452452480480495500500513513525525534534

2561687591

109115122137

x CONTENTS

MAPS-Continued

10. Vella Lavella Bypass and Mop-up on Arundel . . . . . . . . .11. Bougainville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12. Treasury Islands Landing, I Marine Amphibious Corps, 27 October

1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13. Choiseul Diversion, 2d Parachute Battalion, 28 October–3 Novem-

ber 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14. The Landing at Cape Torokina, I Marine Amphibious Corps,

lNovember 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15. Expansion of the Beachhead, I Marine Amphibious Corps, 1 Nov-

ember–15December 1943. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16. Japanese Counterlanding, Laruma River Area, 7 November 1943 .17. Battle for Piva Trail, 2d Raider Regiment, 8–9 November . . . .18. Coconut Grove, 2d Battalion, 21st Marines, 13–14 November . .19. Battle of Piva Forks, First Phase, 19–20 N’ovember . . . . . .20. Battle of Piva Forks, Final Phase, 21–25 November . . . . . .21. Hellzapoppin Ridge, Nearing the End, 6-18 December . . . . .22. BACKHANDED Staging Area, 1st Marine Division Dispositions,

18 December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23. BACKHANDED Objective Area, Showing Japanese Dispositions,

26 December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24. Arawe Landing, 15 December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25. Sketch Map of the STOhTEFACE Trail Block, 30 December 1943 .26. Advance to Suicide Creek. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27. Capture of Aogiri Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28. Capture of Hi11660 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29. Japanese Withdrawal Routes, January-March 1944 . . . . . . .30. Volupai-Talasea Operations, 6-11 March 1944, 5th Marines Route

of Advance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31. Rabauland Kavieng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32. Seizure of the Green Islands, Showing Landing Plan at Nissan,

15 February 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33. Principal Landings in the Admiralties, 24 February-15 March

1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34. Kavieng and Emirau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PAGE

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190

196

212

227233238242258260274

302

320337347378383387396

415443

509

517520

I. Rabaul Strategic Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Map SectionII. The New Georgia Group . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . Map Section

III. Western New Britain, Showing Major Rivers and MountainRanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Map Section

IV. Seizure and Defense of the Airdrome . . . . . . . . . . Map SectionV. Rabaul and Its Airfields, November 1943 . . . . . . . . Map Section

VI. Pilots’ Strip Map, New Georgia to New Ireland . . . . . Map Section

PART I

Strategic Situation—Spring 1943

CHAPTER1

Setting the Stage

World llrar II had the dubious distinc-tion of being the first truly global conflict.The Allied and the Axis Powers clashedon a dozen widely separated fronts and athousand different battlefields. Six years,lacking only 26 days, passed between thefateful dawn when Nazi tanks rumbledacross the polish border and the solemnnmment when the Enoza Gay released itsbomb load over ground zero at Hiro-shima. Tl]e United States was in this warfrom tile beginning, perhaps not as an

active belligerent, but certainly as an openand material supporter of its friends andallies.1

(lerrnany was tagged “the predominantmember of the Axis Powers” and the At-lantic and European area “the decisivetheatre” eight months before the Japanesestruck at, Pearl Harbor. z The stark fact

of that surprise attack and its resultinghavoc did not alter the basic decision madeby the responsible American military andnaval chiefs to give priority of men, equip-ment, and supplies to the campaign

‘ See Parts I and 11 of Volume I of this seriesfor an examination of the extent to whirh theU.S. was preImred for and participating in World~var II prior to 7 December 19+1.

‘ I’ar:I 1,3, A13GI. dt{l 23M:lr41, qlloted in A-:tryBasic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, dtd 26May41.The “R:iinlmw” plans {~lltline[l possible coorsc’sof action in the event of a n]nlti-mltion war, theterm deriving from the custom of xivin~ (wlornanles ( .J:IIJmLIY:ISoran~e ) to ~rar l)l:~ns involr-ing one major enen]y, Rainb(jiv-.l ~v>~sthe bnsicAlnerivan ~v:ir I)lan :It the time of Pearl H:lrbor.

against Germany. Their analysis of thesituation boiled down to the simple con-clusion that C~ermany was more dangerousto the United States than Japan.

The “Germany-first” decision was madein terms of overall war potential, notsolely in terms of fighting men. Indeed,the sobering succession of Allied reversesin the Pacific during the early days of 1942gave ample evidence of the formidablefighting qualities of Japanese soldiers and

seamen. Japan was no pushover; her de-feat would require years of all-out effort.However slim the allotment of resources

to the Allied troops that faced the Jap-anese, constant military pressure had to bemaintained. Casualties and costs wouldsoar if ever the enemy was allowed time toconsolidate his hold on the strategic is-lands, to dig in and construct defenses indepth.

The United States had the primary re-sponsibility for halting the Japanese ad-vance south and east through the Pacific.The fact that the battleground included

thousands of open miles of the world’slargest ocean added immeasurably to thelogistic problem involved and made man-

datory the assignment of amphibious-trained troops to the fighting. In such asituation, the Marine Corps, which hadarguecl and coaxed, sweated and struggled,to develop workable amphibious tech-niques in the 20>sand 30’s, soon proved theworth of its findings and training.

3

4 ISOLATION OF RABAUL

A Marine occupied a unique positionamong American servicemen duringWorld War II. Wrhile his country battleda coalition of enemies, and most of hiscountrymen in arms were fighting halfwayacross the globe from him, the Marinetrained to meet only one enemy—Japan.As the war moved inexorably onward, themen who flocked to join the Corps in un-precedented numbers were literally andconsciously signing up to fight the Jap-anese. This orientation toward a singleenemy and towards one theater, the Pacific,colored every Marine’s life in and out ofbattle and had an incalculable but unde-niably beneficial effect on the combat effi-ciency of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF ).

A glance back over the first year high-lights of the Pacific war will set the stagefor the stirring events to follow—for thestory of the Marine Corps’ vital part inthe all-out Allied shift to the offensive.

THE FIRST YEAR OF THEPACIFIC WAE 8

The homespun philosophy of Americafurnishes an apt saying that describedtJapan’s plight in World War II: %he bitoff more than she could chew.” Not onlydid the Japanese militarists grossly under-estimate the staying power and counter-punching ability of the United States andits allies; they also failed to make a rea-

~Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : USSBS (Pat), Nav-AnalysisDiv, The Ca?npaigns of the Pacific War(Washington: GPO, 1946), hereafter USSBSCampaigns; USSBS (Pat), JapIntelSec, G–2,Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Divi-

.SiOtb (Washington: GPO, Apr46) ; The Way Re-port8 of General of the .4rmy George C. Marshall—General of the Army H. H. Arno16Fleet Ad-m.ira t Ernest J. King ( Philadelphia and NewYork : J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947).

listic appraisal of their own nation’s capa-bilities. Compounding their original errorof starting the war, the enemy leaders in-invincibility of their fleets and armies.dulged in some wishful thinking about the

Certainly the Japanese had cause toview their parade of early victories withchauvinistic pride. There were only a fewmoments during the first half year offighting when the Allies were not facedwith the alternatives of retreat or defeat.But even then, for every outpost like Guamor Hong Kong where token garrisons hadno choice but to lay down their arms, therewas a Wake or Bataan where a desperatelast-ditch defense was fought. True, theJapanese prevailed on all fronts, but thebitter nature of the fighting should havefurnished a clue to the spirit of the de-fenders and the certainty of retaliation.

In Tokyo, the staff members of ImperialGeneral Headquarters ignored or misreadthe warning signs. Japan had caught theAllies off balance and ill-prepared; shehad taken all of her original objectivesand held the “Southern Resources Area,”the Netherlands Indies and Malaya, in atight grip. Ostensibly, she now had themeans to make herself self-sufficient, andshe needed every bit of time and everyman she could muster to consolidate herhold on her prize. Her next logical move,and the one called for in original warplans, was to strengthen defenses. A linealong which she would make her stand hadbeen picked out: a long, looping arc thatran south from the Kuriles through Waketo the Marshalls and Gilberts and thenwest to include the Bismarck Archipelago,Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, andBurma. The defense of this perimeterwas probably a task beyond Japan’s re-sources, even with the help of the newlyseized territories. At the war’s end, one

SETTING THE STAGE 5

senior Japanese officer described this pe-rimeter as “just about the limit, the maxi-mum limit of our capability.>’ 4

The natural clairvoyance of hindsightsimilarly aided a number of enemy officersto recognize the fact that Japan had over-extended herself by early spring of 1942.At that time, however, the headquartersfaction that had authored the original am-bitious war plan was still in the saddleand their aggressive philosophy prevailed.Orders vvent out from Tokyo to continuethe advance, to seize further positions thatwould shield the initial perimeter. It wasthis decision more than any other taken byZrnpwia2 IZeadqua.rters during the courseof the war that hastened the downfall ofthe Japanese Empire. In less than a year’stime, enemy forces were reeling back allacross the Pacific, and the reserves thatwould have bolstered the original perime-ter were dissipated in a fruitless effort tocontinue the offensive.

The new expansionist plans called forthe occupation of strategic islands, suit-able for air and naval base development,in the North, Central, and South Pacific.The grand prize sought was Midway; itwas hoped that a thrust there would bringout the American fleet for a decisive en-

gagement. Closely linked to this projectedattack was the movement of an occupationforce into the Aleutians to seize Kiska,Attu, and Adak Islands. The two opera-tions would be conducted simultaneously,

and both enemy supporting fleets wouldbe available to combine against, the Ameri-can ships. In the south, the objective was

‘ USSBS (Pat), iXavAnalysisDiv, Zntem-oga-tions of Japanese Ojiclals, 2 VOIS ( Washington :GPO, 1946 ), Interrogation A-o. 393, FAdm OsamiNagano, LJN, II, p, 3~53,hereafter CSSBS, Inter-ro~ation with relevant number and name.

to strengthen the Japanese position in theBismarcks and on New Guinea. Planswere laid to take Port Moresby in south-eastern New Guinea and to move outpostgarrisons into the Solomons. After thesuccessful conclusion of the Midway oper-ation, the Japanese planned to moveagainst New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa,and sever Australia’s lifeline to the States.

The enemy timetable for expansionlisted the seizure of Port lMoresby for earlyMay, followed in a month’s time by the at-tack on Midway. In both cases the care-fully selected occupation troops never gota chance to set foot on their objectives.Seen in retrospect, the issue was decidedat sea, and the decision was final.

On 7–8 May in the Coral Sea, an Ameri-can carrier task force intercepted the in-vasion fleet bound for Port Moresby andwas successful in turning it back. In “thefirst major engagement in naval history inwhich surface ships did not excha~ge asingle shot,” 5 carrier aircraft inflickd allthe damage. Each side lost a carrier, eachhad one severely damaged, but the honorsof the field fell justly to the American pi-lots who forced the Japanese to withdraw.The Port Moresby operation was put off

until July, but the outcome of the Battleof Midway ensured a permanent postpone-ment. (See Map I, Map Section.)

Midway could hardly have been calleda surprise tin-get. The intelligence avail-able to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Com-mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet ( CinCPac),regarding ~Trhere and when the enemy

would strike next was conclusive. Whenthe ,Japanese carrier attack force ap-proached within launching distance of theatoll on 4 June, it ran into a whirlwind of

‘ King, M’ar Iteports, op. cit., p. 523.


American planes. Nimitz had brought upall his available carriers, had added long-range bombers staging from Hawaiianfields, and had given the Midway &%rri-son’s Marine Aircraft Group !22 ( MAG-22) new planes to meet the enemy threat.The result of these preparations was elec-trifying; all four of the ?Japanesecarrierswere sent to the bottom and the invmionforce streaked back for the relative safetyof home waters. The Battle of Miclway

was a disaster from which the ,Japanesenaval air arm never recovered. The battle

has frequently been termed the decisive en-gagement. of the war in the Pacific and itsresults were certainly far rezching. Thesevere and sudden cut in enemy carrierstrenagth put a crimp in all plans for fur-ther offensive action.’

The immediate reaction of Admiral Iso-roku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of

the (70mbineo? Fleet, to the news of hisMidway losses was to recall the Aleutianoccupation forces. Then, almost imn~edi-ately, he reversed himself and ordered theoperation to continue but with the modifi-cation that only the two westernmost tar-gets, Kiska and Attu, would be seized.I’erhaps Adak Island was too close to the1?.S. bzse at Dutch Harbor for comfort.

Although Yamamoto’s exact reasoning inordering the operation to continue is notknown, it is probable that, he gave a great

deal of weight to the. fact that more Ameri-can territory would be occupied, a definiteboost to ,Japanese morale that would beneeded if the truth of the Midway battleleaked out. On 7 June, occupation troopsIancled on tl~e two bleak islands, there to

6 See l’art J- of Volume I of this series ftmdetails of the Marine Imrticipatinn in the Mid-way Ill ttle.

stay until the Allies could spare the men,supplies, and equipment which wereneeded to drive them out. Although therewas considerable public alarm in theStates, especially the Pacific Northwest.,over the presence of Japanese in the Aleu-tians, actually the new enemy bases werenot much of a threat. Tlm rugged islandchain, cursed with more than a fair shareof the world>s miserable weather, was noavenue for conquest.

Midway’s results went far to redress thebalance of naval strength in the Pacificand to give the Allied leaders a chance to

launch a limited offensive. The logical

target area was the South Pacific, wherethe Japanese, despite their Coral Sea mis-

adventure, were still planning to take PortMoresby and were continuing their en-

croachment into the Solomons. The en-emy field headquarters for this two-

pronged approach to the Australia-UnitedStates supply route was Rabaul on NewBritain, a prize whose capture dominatedAllied planning. But Rabaul was far tooambitious an objective for the summer of1942, when almost any offensive effortseverely strained ~vaila.ble resources.

The calculated risk of the first offen-sive—a “shoe-string” operation—wasmade at Guadalcana], a hitherto obscurejungle-clad island in the lower Solomons.The Japanese first moved into the area inApril, when they occupied tiny Tulagiand set, up a seaplane base and anchoragein the fine natural harbor between that

island and neighboring Florida. A stretchof some 20 miles of open water, which wassoon to earn the grim name of “Iron Bot-tom Sound,” separated Tulagi fromGuadalcanal. The larger island was oneof the few places in the Solomons where

SETTING THE STAGE

terrain favored rapid airfield develop-ment, and the ,Japanese, soon after Mid-waY, began to clear ground and constructa fighter strip along its northern coastalplain.

Guadalcanal’s airfield and Tulagi’s har-bor became prime objectives once Wash-ington okayed the opening offensive in lateJune. In contrast to the months of metic-ulous planning that characterized lateramphibious operations, this first effort,code-named W+kTCHTOW13R, was sur-rounded by an aura of haste. The unitpicked to do the job was the one most like-ly to be successful, one which had more ofthe requisite amphibious training and in-doctrination than any other at this stageof the war—the 1st Marine Division ( Re-inforced). The division was in the proc-ess of completing a move to New Zealand,its rear echelon still at sea, when warningorders were received designating it the

WATCHTOWER asszult force. In lessthan a month, the division had changed itsorientation from routine training to prep-aration for jungle fighting, had preparedits tactical plans in light of the scanty in-formation available on enemy and terrain,and had unloaded its ships and then re-

loaded them for combat. A rendezvouswas made at sea in the Fiji rehearsal areawith the convoy of the 2d Marines, whichhad been sent out from San Diego to takethe place of the 7th Marines, one of thedivision’s regular regiments detailed toSamoa’s garrison.

On 7 August, assault elements of the lst,Division landed on Guadalcanal andmoved inland according to plan without

meeting any opposition. Simultaneously,Marines stormed ashore on Tulagi and itsneighboring islets, where the landings were

7

opposed violently. Several days of hardfighting were needed to secure Tulagi’sharbor, but when this first battle was overthe scene of ground action shifted toGuadalcanal. There, engineers workedfeverishly to put the partially completedairstrip in shape to receive friendly fight-ers. And the Marine defenders desper-ately needed aerial reinforcement, in factany kind of reinforcement that they couldget, for the Japanese reaction to theGuadalcanal landing was swift and sav-age.

For six hectic months, during which itoften seemed that WATCHTOWERwould prove a fiasco, the 1st Division andan all-too-slowly swelling number of Armyand Marine reinforcements stood off aseries of sharp enemy counterattacks. TheJapanese poured thousands of crack troopsinto the jungles that closed on the Marine

perimeter, but never were able to putashore enough men and equipment at onetime to overcome the garrison. From thecaptured airfield (Henderson Field), aweird and wonderful composite force of

Navy, Army, Marine, and New Zealandplanes fought the Japanese to a standstillin the air and immeasurably strengthenedthe Allied hand at sea by attacking enemytransport and surface bombardmentgroups as they steamed from bases in the

upper Solomons to Guadalcanal.Although Allied naval forces lost heav-

ily in the series of sea battles that werefought for control of Solomons’ waters,the American and Australian ships keptcoming back on station. The Japaneseadmirals strove mightily to seize the ad-vantage when it was theirs, but the op-portunity faded. By the end of Novem-ber, enemy losses had increased so sharply

691–360 O—63—2


that capital ships were no longer risked inIron Bottom Sound.’

When the anniversary of Pearl Harborrolled around, thd Japanese situation onGuadalcanal was desperate. A steady pa-rade of men, ships, and planes had beencommitted to drive out the Americans andevery effort had failed. Even the fire-brands in Imperial General I?eadquartemwere now convinced that, Japan had over-reached herself. By the year’s end, the

decision had been made to evacuate Gua-dalcanal and orders were sent out toconsolidate positions on the original pe-rimeters

GUADALCANAL AND PAPUA ‘

By the time of tihe Guadalcanal landingthe Japanese held effective control of allthe Pacific islands they had invaded butone-New Guinea. In March of 1942, theenemy had occupied positions along thenortheast coast of the enormous island at

‘ The story of the Navy’s bitter struggle forcontrol of the Guadalcanal waters is well told inSamuel E. Morison, Tl!v Struggle for Guadal-can.al, Augu8t 19&-F ebnLary 19~3—History ofUnited States Yaoal Operations in Warld War

11, v. V (Boston : Little, Brown and Company,1949) .

s MilHist See, G–2, FEC, Japanese MonographNo. 45, IGHQ Army High Command Record,Mid-1941-Aug45, 2d rev. 1952 ( OCMH), p. 67,hereafter IGHQ .4rm.~/ Record.

‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in thisseetion is derived from: IGHQ Army Record;Part VI of Volume I of this series; John Miller,Jr., C3uadalcanal: The Firs, Offewsiwe-The T7arin the Pacifi+United States Army in World

War 11 (Washington : HistDiv, DA, 1949) ;Samuel Milner, Victorg in Papwa—The War inthe Paoiffc-L7nited States Army in World War

IZ (Washington: OC.MH, DA, 1957) ; Morison,Struggle for Guadalcanal, op. cit.; USSBS,Campaign8.

Lae and Salamaua, and their local navalsuperiority gave them the means of mov-ing in wherever else they wished alongthis virtually undefended coast. Alliedair, operating from carriers or stagingfrom Australia tihrough Port Moresby,was the principal deterrent to furtherJapanese encroachment. When, duringthe Battle of the Coral Sea, the PortMoresby Inwxion Force was forced to turnback to Rabaul, the obvious capability ofthe enemy to attack again prompted theAllies to make a countermove to ward offthis threat. In June and July, Australianground units and fighter squadrons sup-ported by American engineers and anti-aircraft artillery moved to Milne Bay onthe eastern tip of New Guinea to build andhold an air base that would cover PortMoresby’s exposed flank.

The Japanese thwarted a further Alliedadvance planned for early August whenthey landed their own troops near BunaMission on 22 July. Buna was the north-ern terminus of the Kokoda Trail, a diffi-cult 150-mile route over the Owen Stan-ley Mountains to Port Mcwesby. The su-perior enemy landing force soon foughtits way through the light Australian de-fenses and reached Kokoda village, about30 miles inland, where it held up. Thisfirst move by the Japanese into Papua, the

Australian territory which comprisedmost of the eastern part of New Guine~was essentially a reconnaissance in force to

teet the feasibility of an overland drive onPort Moresby. Thousands of enemy re-inforcements arrived from Rabaul in Au-gust to strengthen the Buna position andadd weight to the proposed attack. 13y $26.4ugust the Japanese were ready, and they

jumped off from Kokoda in a determinedassault that quickly overpowered the few

SETTING ‘THE STAGE 9

Australians who tried to block their ad-vance. The problem of supporting thesedefending troops was a logistician’s ni~ht.-mare, but it was a nightmare that the,Japanese inherited as the distance from thefront line to their base at Buns increased.

The enemy troops attacking along theKokoda Trail were operating with mini-nlal air cover, in fact the Allied air forceswere doing their best to cut them off com-pletely from Buns and to sever Buna’ssupply 1ines from Rabaul. These Japa-

nese were now making an isolated effortsince the secon(lary operation planned tocomplement the overland drive had mis-carried.

Originally, the enemy operation planhad called for the seizure of Samarai Is-land, off the eastern tip of New Guinea,as a seaplane base and staging area for anamphibious assault on Port Moresby,timed to coincide with the Kokoda Trailapproach. N’hen reconnaissance planesdiscovered the Allied activity at MilneBay, the target was shifted to this newbase. The Japanese, in a move character-istic of their actions in this period, under-estimated their opposition and assigned agrossly inadequate landing force for theoperation. On 25 August, about a thou-sand enemy troops from Kavieng beganlanding in the bay and immediately made

contact with the Australians. A reinforce-ment of 500 men came in on the 29th, butby that time they were only enough to fillthe gaps in the ranks of the first unit. TheMilne defense force, a reinforced brigade

almost 10,000 strong, first blunted, then

smashed the Japanese attack. The dazedsurvivors were evacuated on the nights of4-5 September, victims of an Australianvictory that did much to hearten Alliedmorale.

The failure at Milne Bay, coupled withsimilar disasters on Guadalcanal, prompt-ed Imperial General Headquarters tocheck the overland advance on Port Mores-by and concentrate its efforts on achiev-ing success in the lower Solomons. The,Tapanese troops on the Kokoda Trail hadreached a point so close to Port Moresbythat “they could see the lights of thecity,” 10 but it is doubtful if they couldhave ever reached their objective. An out-pouring of Allied troops from Australiainto Port Moresby had strengthened theposition to the point that preparationswere underway to mount an offensive whenthe enemy fell back with the Australianshot on their heels. Throughout Octoberthe pressure was increased until the Japa-nese position had contracted to a perim-eter defense of Iluna and Gona (a nativevillage about seven miles north of BunaMission).

The Australian 7th Division and theAmerican 32d Infantry Division closed onthe perimeter. The Australians cameoverland for the most part, the majority

of the Americans by air and sea. Thefighting was bitter and protracted injungle terrain even worse than that en-

countered by the Marines on Guadalcanaland against, a deeply dug-in enemy who

had to be gouged out of his bunkers. Gonafell to the Australians on 9 December andBuna Mision to the Americans on 2 Janu-ary; the last organized resistance was over-come on the 22d, six months to the day

after the Japanese had landed in Papua.On the same day that the Australians

drove the Japanese out of Gona, the 1st

‘“ Interrogation of Gen Hitoshi Imarnura andI,tGen llimpei Kate, IJA, in USSBS (pat),NavAnalysisDiv, !Z’he Allied Campaign .4gain8tRabau L (Washington: GPO, 1946), P. 89.


Marine Division was officially relieved onGuadalcanal, itsmission completed. Thetide of battle had swept full course to theAllied filyor, and strong Army and Marine

forces of the XIV Corps were now capableof annihilating the remaining ,Japanese.When evacuation orders were receivedfrom Tokyo, however, the Japanese hTavyin a series of high-speed night, runs man-

aged to bring off about 13,000 men fromthe island. On 9 Februm-y, Guadalcanalwas cleared of enemy units and the cam-paign was ended. i~merican losses in deadand wounded by ground action were closeto 6,500, but more than 2.3,000 enemy laydead in the jungles around HendersonField, victims of combat and disease. Theloss of additional thousands of enemy sail-ors and pilots, hundreds of planes, andmore than a score of warships and trans-ports increased the wastage of Japanesestrength that marked the fruitless effortto retake Guadalcanal.

With the victories in Papua and onGuadalcanal, the Allies had flung down thegauntlet. The Japanese had to accept thechallenge.; they had lost the initiative.

,7.4PANE&Y 8TRA TEGY ‘1

The original impetus for the ,Japanesemove into the Solomons and Eastern NewGuinea came from enemy naval officerswho felt “that a broad area. would have to

“ Unless otherwise noted, the mat,erial in thissection is deri~-ed from : MilIIist See, CT–2, FEC,<Japanese MmlograIJh h“o. 35, SE AreaOpsRec,Seventeenth Army Ops-I’art II ( OCMH ), here-after 6“ccf,J/tcr~{th Armv OpS—II; Mil HistSec,G–2, FEC, Japanese Monograph No. 9!3, SE .kreaATavOps-–I’art II ( OCMH), hereafter SE .4rca.NaoOps-ll,- IGHQ Army Record,- IJSSBS, Cur)-

paigns.

be occupied in order to secure Rabaul.” lZAlthough the Navy promoted the advance,the Army accepted the concept readilyenough, and both services began to developoutlying bases which would cover the ap-proaches to X’ew Britain. When the Alliesstruck at, Guadalcanal, the Japanese Navy“was willing to stake everything on a de-cisive fight;’ lS to regain the island andturn back the offensive thrust. Armyleaders, interested mainly in the war on theAsian mtainland and in the spoils of theNetherlands Indies, woke up too late tothe realities of the Guadalcanal campaign.

Two months passed before realistic esti-mates of the strength of Henderson Field’sdefenders began to figure in enemy rein-forcement plans. By the time the Japa-nese were ready to commit enough men toretake Guadalcanal, the chance for themto reach the island in decisive numbers hadpassed. The Allies were able to choke offmost attempts, and the shattered units thatdid reach shore were seldom in shape tomount a sustained attack. The situationcalled for a reevaluation of Japanese stra-tegic objectives in the light of Allied capa-bilities.

At the year’s end, military planners inTokyo, acting on the discouraging reportsfrom the field, projected accurately thecourse of Allied action for the nextmonths, pointing out that:

. . . the enemy plans to attack Rabaulsince it is the operational base for Army,A“avy,and Air Forces. The enemy will tryto accomplish this task in the Solomon Is.Area by drivimg our units off GuadalcanalIs. and advancingnorthward on the SolomonIs. In the Eastern New Guinea Area, theenemy will secure the Buns Vicinity andattack the Lae and Salamaua Areas from

“ USSBS, Intwrogution No. 503, VAdm ‘shkeruI!ldiudome, IJA-, II, pp. 524-525.

“ Ibid., p. 526.

SETTING ‘THE STAGE 11

the sea. After penetrating Dampier [Vitiaz]Strait, they will attack Rabaul in joint op-erations with forces on the Solomon Is.After this, planning to attaeli the PhilippineIs., they will continue operations along thenorthern coast of New Guinea.14

On 3 January, the text of the “Army-Navy Central Agreement on South PacificArea Operations” was radioed to Rabaul;it laid down Tokyo>s newly approvedstrategy. .41though expressed in the bom-bastic language characteristic of the spiritof the offensive permeating .Japanese mili-tary documents, the “Agreement” was infact the outline of a defensive pattern.Key points, mainly airfields and anchor-ages, were to be occupied or strengthenedin the North and Central Solomons andin Eastern New Guinea after the firstorder of business, the evacuation of thetroops on Guadalcanal, had been com-pleted. Some of the names that were tofigure prominently in the war ne\vs-Lae,Salamaua, Wewak on New Guinea; NewGeorgia, Bougainvillea, and Ruka in theSolomons—were emphasized in the allot-ment of defensive sectors. The ,JapaneseArmy and Navy had divided the responsi-bility for base defense along service mwell as geographic lines, a, factor that wasto have considerable influence on the con-duct of the fighting.

The enemy naval planners, running trueto form, wanted to g-etthe main defenses inthe Solomons as far away from their ma-jor base at Rabaul as possible. The Armyauthorities, made cautious by the outcomeof the attempt to reinforce C~uadalcanalover a long, exposed supply route, were

‘4IGHQ ArmV Record, p. 71. Although thisrecord was assembled after the war, Japanesedefensive actions agreed with the quoted esti-mate and it very probably represents contempo-rary thought.

willing to move only major forces into theNorthern Solomons. As the Army alreadyhad primary responsibility for grounddefense of the Bismarcks and New Guinea,the additional task of conducting the de-fense of Bougainvillea, Buka, Choiseul, andthe Shortland-Treasury Islands was con-siderable. Since the Navy wanted the NewGeorgia Group ancl Santa Isabel includedin the defended area, it received opera-tional responsibility for these islands andtheir garrisons. Laud-based naval airsquadrons were to operate primarily in theSolomons and Bismarcks, while mostArmy air units were assigned to the de-fense of the New Guinea area. The Com-bined FZeet. its main strength concentratedat Truk, stood ready to engage any Alliedstriking force moving north through theSolornons or west from Hawaii.

One of the fundamental differences be-tween the Japanese and the Allied conductof the war in the Pacific was pointed upby the high command setup esti.blished inthe “Agreenlent .“ There was no area com-mander appointed with authority to exer-cise final control of all defensive measures;consequently, there was no joint staff withthe function of preparing and executingan overall defense plan. Instead, thesenior Army and Navy commanders in thefield were responsible directly to their re-

spective headquarters in Tokyo.” Thisduality of command was a feature of the,Japanese military system, and to a greatextent it also existed in Tokyo at the heartof the enemy war effort. Imperial GeneralHeadquarters was only the term used toconnote the co-equal existence of the gen-erll staffs of the two services. Any ordertabbed as coming from the Heudqwwtws

“ Imamura-Kato Interrogation, op. cit., p, 88.


was simply an Army -Nwvy agreement. Inoperation, this system could mean, as oneJapanese admiral expressed it, that:

. . . as far as questions of Army opera-tions are concerned, if the Chief of the ArmyGeneral Staff says we will do this, that isthe end of it; and so far as the Navy opera-tions are concerned, if the Chief of the NavalGeneral Staff says we will do this, that fixesit. . . .’6

Obviously, decisions involving inter-service operations had to be made; stale-mate was unacceptable, but the opportu-nity for unnecessary delay and uncoordi-nated unilateral action was inherent in thesystem.

Fortunately for the ,Japanese, the twocommanders at Rabaul got along well tog-ether and were determined to cooperate.The single aim of both General HitoshiImamura and Vice Admiral Jinichi Ku-saka was to hold their portion of Japan’sdefenses with all the men and material attheir disposal. Imamura’s command, theEighth A~ea Amy, comprised the Seven-teenth Amny in the 13ismarcks and Solo-mons and the Eighteenth Amy defendingEastern New Guinea. Both were sup-ported by the 6th A:ir Diwkwn. Kusaka,as Commander of the Sowthea.st AreaFleet, controlled the land-based planes ofthe Eleventh Air Fleet and the ships andground units of the EigLt.h Fleet whichwere strung out from New Guinea to New

Georgia. Both men expected that the nextAllied targets would be found in the area

under their control. The choice of thetime, place, and strength of those attackswas made, however! by planners in Bris-bane, Noumea, Pearl Harbor, andWashington.

1’ USSBS, fnterro~ation No. 379, Adm Mitsu-masa Yonai, IJN, II, p. 328.

ALLIED STRATEGY “

In World War II the military fortunesof Great Britain and the United Stateswere so closely enmeshed that it was im-perative that a workable inter-Allied com-mand system be developed both in the fieldand at the national level. Meeting inWashington five days after the attack onPearl Harbor, the political and militaryleaders of the two major Western powersagreed to adhere to the principle of unityof command in the various theatres of op-erations. The same basic decision wasreached in regard to the higher directionof the military effort of the two nationsznd of the numerous other Allied powersthat they perforce represented. While theconcept of a single commander who wouldcontrol all national forces committed wasaccepted for limited areas and specific op-erations, there was no inclination to trustoverall command to one man, if indeedsuch a superman existed. The chosen in-strument for the direction of what might

“ Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : Corn SoPac WarDs, Jan–Mar43 (CO.*, NHD ), hereafter 6’omSOPaC

WarD.s with appropriate months; CinCSWPAPlan for the Seizure of the New Britain-NewIreland-New Guinea Areas—ELKTON, dtd28Feb43(COA,NHD) ; FAdm ErnestJ. King andCdr Walter M. Whitehill, F.teet Admiral King—A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton &Company, 1952 ), hereafter King and Whitehill,Kinq’s Naaal Record; Richard M. Leighton andRobert W. Coakley, Global tigistim and tYtrat-

egv 19.10-19&—The War Department-UnitedS’tates Amy in Worht War II (Washington:

OCMH, DA, 1955) ; Samuel E. Morison, Break-

ing the Biwnarchx Barrier, 22 July 19~2–1 May

194&H i8tory of United States Naval 0peration8in World War II, v. VI (Boston: Little, Brownand Company, 1950), hereafter Morison, Break-

ing tk e Bismarck.s Barrier, 2.2 July 1942–1 MavRoo.wveU and Hopkirw-.4n Intimate History

( New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948).

,-

SETTING THE STAGE 13

best be called the Western war effort wasthe Combined Chiefs of Staff ( CCS) ; itsmembership, the chiefs of the land, sea, andair services of Great Britain and theUnited States.

Washington was selected as the site ofthe new headquarters and Field MarshalSir John Dill, as the senior on-the-spotrepresentative of the British chiefs, waspermanently stationed in the Americancapital with an executive staff. In order torepresent adequately the military views ofthe United States in CCS discussions, itwas necesswy that the American chiefsmeet regularly and air the problems oftheir respective services. In short order, aseries of inter-service staff agencies cameinto being to support. the deliberations ofthe American chiefs, and a flexible work-ing organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff(,JCS), became the right hand of thePresident, acting as Commander inChief.’*

Admiral Ernest ,J. King, Chief of Na,valOperations and Commander in Chief ofthe United States Fleet, was the naval rep-resentative in the JCS. The Army wasrepresented by two officers, its Chief ofStaff, General George C. Marshall, and itssenior airman, General Henry H. Arnold,whose opposite numbers on the BritishChiefs were the heads of the Imperial Gen-eral Staff and the Royal Air Force.Through most of the war there was afourth member of the JCS, Admiral Wil-liam D. Leahy, tiho acted as Chief of Staffto the President.

The Combined Chiefs, working directlywith Churchill and Roosevelt, established

“As a result of a British suggestion at the.\RCADI.\ Conference ( 23Dec41–14,Jan42 ), theterm “conlbine{l” was applied thereafter to col-lilboration between two or more nations, while“joint” !vas reserved for collaboration betweent~vo or more services of the same nation.

spheres of strategic responsibility bestsuited to national interests and capabili-ties. In mid-April, the United States wasgiven responsibility for directing opera-tions in the Pacific from the mainland ofAsia to the shores of the Western Hemi-sphere. This decision had the effect ofplacing all Allied troops and materiel al-loted to the Pacific under control of theJoint Chiefs and of the two men they se-lected for command.

The JCS divided the Pacific into twoareas of command responsibility, one in-cluding Australia, the Netherlands Indies,and the Philippines and the other the restof the ocean and its widely scattered is-lands. To head the relatively compactSouthwest Pacific Area, where most opera-tions could be conducted under cover ofland-based air, the JCS chose the colorfulcommander of the defense of the Philip-pines—General Douglas MacArthur. Theappointment of MacArthur, made with theassent of the Australian government, wasannounced on 18 April 1942 after the gen-eral was spirited out of beleaguered Cor-regidor; his new title was SupremeCommander, Southwest Pacific Area(CinCSWPA). For Commander in Chief,Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA) the logi-cal choice was Admiral hTimitz; his con-current command of the Pacific Fleet asCinCPac recognized that the war in hisarea would be essentially a naval one.

The initial boundary line between theSWPA and POA. included all of the Solo-mon Islands in MacArthur7s command;however, the fact that Nimitz’ forces weregoing to mount the first offensive at Gua-dalcanal made a shift of the line westwarda matter of practicality. The new bound-ary just missed the Russell Islands, rannorth to the Equator, turned west to 130°north longitude, then north and west

14

again to include the Philippines in theSWPA. The line hugged the tortuousIndochinese, Thai, and Malayun coast-lines to Singapore and then cut south be-tween Sumatra and Java to divide theAmerican area of responsibility from theIndia-Burma sphere of operations, whichcame under the British Chiefs of Staff.

The JCS issued a directive on 2 July1942?to govern offensive operations in theSouthwest Pacific, setting forth a conceptthat included three tasks: 1) the seizureand occupation of the Santa Cruz Islands,Tulagi, and adj scent areas; 2) the seizure

and occupation of the rest of the Solomonsand the northeast coast of NeT~~Guinea;

and 3) the seizure and occupation ofRabaul and surrounding positions. A

subordinate command, the South Pacific.krea, was established under AdmiralNimitz and charged with responsibilityfor executing Task One—the Guadalcanaloperation. The post of Commander,South Pacific ( ComSoPac) was held firstby Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley andthen by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey.Task One was completed under Halseywith the evacuation of Guadalcanal by theJapanese, but neither Nimitz nor Mac-Arthur considered that he had availablethe forces or supplies necessary to initiateTask Two immediately. The relativelyfew Australian and American infantry di-visions assigned to the Southwest Pacificwere either committed to forward gar-risons, still forming and training, or badlyin need of rest and rehabilitation as a re-sult of hard campaigning.ls

‘“ CinCE’ac msg to CominCh, dtd 8Dec42, Subj :Future OIM in the Solomons Sea .4rea ( COA,XHD ) ; CinC’SWPA msg C–251 to Cof SA, dtd~~Jan43 ( WJV II RecsDiv, FRC Alex).

ISOLATION OF RABAUL

Equally as important, though hardly aswell publicized as the feats of the fight-ing troops and ships, were the accomplish-ments of the service and supply agenciesfurnishing logistic support to the combatoperations. The South and SouthwestPacific are certainly not areas that wouldbe voluntarily chosen for amphibious cam-paigns. When the fighting started, therewas almost. a total lack of ports and basessuitable for support of large scale opera-tions. In a surprisingly short time, how-ever, islands like 13spiritu Santo andEfate in the New Hebrides and NewCaledonia sprouted vast compounds ofsupplies, tank farms for fuel storage, anda host of vital maintenance, repair, andservice facilities. Hardly had the smokeand dust of battle settled before Tulagiwas turned over to the engineers, base per-sonnel, and defense troops who quicklyconverted it into an essential advancenaval base. C~uadalcanal in its turn under-went extensive development as the Japa-nese were driven off. A full stride for-ward in terms of the 2 ,July JCS directivecould be taken only after an adequatestockpile of military materiel had accumu-lated in the forward dumps and depotsof an expansible logistic network.

A good part of the supply and man-power difficulties of the Pacific command-ers were traceable directly to the favoredapportionment given to the European andNorth African theaters of operations. Thebasic war policy of the West,ern Allieswas affirmed by the Combined Chiefs in,January at the Casablanca Conferencewhere their outline of action for 1943 em-phasized again the primacy of the defeatof Germany. First priority of resourceswas allotted to the campaign to wipe outthe U-Boat, threat in the Atlantic; theoccupation of Sicily, a stepped-up bomber


offensive against Germany, and “the send-ing of the greatest volume of suppliespossible” to Russia were among tile otherpriority programs. Offensive operationsin the Pacific were to be kept within limitsthat would not jeopardize the chance fora decisive blow against C~ermany.20 Intheir report to the President and PrimeMinister, the CCS indicated n number ofprospective lines of action in the Pacific,including an advance west from Midwaytoward the Marianas and Carolines ancl adrive north from Samoa into the Mar-shalls. Implicit in these projections ofpossible offensive act ion was the success-ful completion of a campaign to captureor neutralize Rabaul.21

In early February, Admiral Halsey v-asqueried by King on his reaction to an op-eration to seize the Gilbert and Ellice Is-lands using South Pacific forces. Halseystrongly recommended against it, prefer-ring instead to continue pressure in theSolomons. Admiral Nimitz supportedHalsey’s opinion, but asked if ‘South Pa-cific operations cotdd be depencled upon topin down the ,Japanese Fleet. On 17 Feb-ruary, ComSoPac replied that he believed‘%hat the best way to pin down the Japa-nese Fleet is to threaten Rabaul,” andwent, on to indicate that he intended tooccupy the Russell Islands inside of a weekand move into the New Georgia Group “assoon as possible.” “ He soon set earlyApril as his target date for the NewGeorgia operation, but a re-evalua,tion ofPacific strategy forced a revision of hisplans.

‘0 CCS 155/1, dtd 19Jmw13, Subj : Conduct ofthe \Var in 19-13 ( C().\, X-HI})

= CCS 170/2, dtd 23Jan43, SYMBOL-FinalRept to the President and Prime Minister ( COA,NHD ) .

“ CowSoPac Fc1143 WarD, p. 33.

Under terms of the JCS directive of 2,JLdy 19+!2, General MacArthur had beengikren respo]lsibility for strategic directionof all operations against Rabaul, includingthoso undertaken by South Pacific forcesafter completion of Task One. On 28 Feb-ruary 1943, his stnfl completed a plan(code-named EIJITON) that reflectedMacArthur’s conviction that, the Japamesewere now much stronger in the SouthwestPacific, than they had been the previoussllmmer. The situation prompted him tosubmit, a new concept of operations callingfor a more cleliberate advance than hadonce been contemplated and a substantialincrease in 111categories of forces.

Under ELKTON, the command positionof .!(lmiral Halsey as ComSoPac was anLUIIISII:I1one. The operations contemplatedin the Solomons would of necessity gettheir logistic support from SoPac basesand be executed in the main by SoPacforces. Naval officers were strongly of theopinion that these forces should remainunder command of Halsey, but did notquestion the need for MacArthur to con-tinl~e to give strategic direction to the over-all rampaign against Rabaul. Halsey’splan to attack New Georgia in April, ten-tatively approved by Nimitz, clashed withthe seqllence of operations thought neces-sxry by SWPA planners. The upshot ofthe submission of ELKTON to the ,JCSwas that a Pacific Military Conference ofrepresentatives of SWPA and POA wascal led together in Washington to resolvedifferences and to try to find the additionaltroops ancl equipment that Mac.4rthurthought necessary.

En route to Washington, MacArthur’sreprescl~t atives, headed by his chief ofstati, Ifajor Genera] Richard K. Suthel.-lan(l, stopped at Noumea to talk withHalsey ancl hear his plan for New Georgia.


They then flewont oP earlH arbor wherein a round of conferences with Nimitz’staff they learned the views of that com-mander on ELKTON. On 10 March, theconferees arrived in Washington to begintwo weeks of discussion in an atmospherewhere the requests from the Pacific couldbe best assessed against the world-widecommitments of the United Statw.

The sequence of operations called for inthe ELKTON Plan listed the capture ofnirdromes on the Huon Peninsula of East-ern liTewGuinea as a necessary preliminarymove to closing in cm Rabaul. Bombersquadrons operating from fields in theLae-Salan~aua-Finschhafen area wouldthen control the I’itiaz (Dampier) Straitand could neutralize the ,Japanese strong-points at Kavien g, New Ireland, and onNew Britain, Buka, ancl IIougainville.With this assistance from SWPA air,SoPac forces would seize and occupy posi-tions in the hTew Georgia Group. Nextwould come a simultaneous drive on w-est-

ern hTewBritain from New Cxuinea and onBoug-ainville from the lower Solomons.The two-pronged attack would then con-verge in the capture of Kavieng, cm if thesituation seemed favorable, the last step,the capture of Rabaul, would be attempteddirectly.

General Sutherland and Major (IeneralMillard F. Harmon, commander of Armyforces in Halsey’s area, agreed that in or-der to accomplish ELKTON as outlined,all the men, ships, and planes asked forwould have to be made available.23 Therewas no chance that this would be clone,since the JCS was already engaged in a re-examination of the resources available forall the strategic undertakings decided on

‘“ 4th PMC meeting, dtd 15Mar43, Anx A

( Co-k, NHD) .

at Casablanca. It was now apparent thatthere just. was not enough to go around togive full coverage to every scheme; forcesrequested for ELKI’ON would have to becut drastically .24

The requirements of the heavy bomberoffensive against, Germany changed oneaspect of ELKTohT immediately. Theplanned aerial interdiction of Japaneserearward bases from the Huon Peninsuladepended on more long range planes reach-ing the Southwest Pacific. Since theseplanes could not be made available; air-bases closer to Solomons’ objectives withinrange of medium bombers would have tobe taken. Woodlark and Kiriwina Islandsin the Solomon Sea east of Papua wereak~reeclupon as suitable objectives. De-spite this modification of the ELKTONconcept, General Sutherland still consid-ered that the Huon Peninsula operationswould have to precede all others; on theother hand, Halsey’s Chief of Staff, Cap-tain Miles R. Browning, USN, maintainedthat the seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwinawould allow Halsey to make his move into11’ewGeorgia without waiting for the cap-

ture of Huon airfields. The varyingpoints of view were presented to the JCSfor decision.25

The solution arrived at by the JCS wasworkable and retained elements of both theunity of command concept and that of co-operative action. Subject to the check-rein authority of the JCS, General Mac-hthur was given overall control of the

campaign. Admiral Halsey would havedirect command of operations in the Solo-

‘4JCS 238, Memo by the JSP, dtd 16Mar43( COA, NHD ) ; JSSC 11, Surv of the PresentStratSit, dtd 22Mar43 ( COA, NHD).

“ Minutes of the JCS 6Sth meeting. dtd 21 Mar-43 (COA, NHD) .


mons within the scope of MacArthur’sgeneral direct ives. Any Pacific OceanArea. forces not specifically approved bythe ,JCS for inclusion in task forces en-gt~ged in ELKTON operations \vould re-main under Admiral Nimitz.

On 28 March 1943, the ,Joint Chiefs is-sued a new directive that caneelled that of2 July 1942 and outlined the new schemeof operations for the campaign againstRabaul. The schedule of tasks now calledfor establishment of airfields on Wood-lark and Kiriwina Islands, to be followed

by seizure of bases on Huon Peninsulacollcl~rreutly with Halsey’s move into hTew

Georgia. Western New Brit~in and south-ern Bougaiuville were the next steps to-ward the goal of Rabaul. The purpose

of these oper~tious was set down as “theultimate seizure of tile B ismarck Archi-pelago.” 2’

‘“ JCS 238/5/D, dtd 23Mar43, Directiv+Planfor the Seizure of the Solwncms Islands-NewGuinea-New Britain-New Ireland Area (COA,NHD).

CHAPTER2

The Opening Moves

AREA OF QOAIFLICT’

Prior tot heoutbreak of war, the stra-tegic area centered On Rab:lul was a SIOW-

packd frontier of Western civilization.Economic development of the BismarckArchipelago, the Solomon Islands, andEastern New Guinea was pretty well lim-ited to the cultivation of coconut palms forcopra. The coconut, plantations, togetherwith a scatteringof trading posts, mis-sions, and government stat ions, housed therelative handful of non-native inhabitants.The islands had little in the way of climateor terrain to attract tourists or anyone elsewithout a surpassing good reason for visit-ing them. For the most part the area re-mained as it had been when the first Euro-pean explorers visited it in the middle ofthe sixteenth century.

More than 300 years passed b~fore aWestern nation thought it worthwhile tolay claim to any of the islands. Then Gw--many, as part of her belated attempt tobuild a colonial empire, followed hertraders and missionaries into NortheastNew Guinea, the Bismarcks, and theNorthern Solomons, proclaiming them theprotectorate of Kaiser-Wilhelmsland in

‘ [-nless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from: MID, WD, Surv ofthe Solomons Islands ( S3(P677), 2 vols, dtd15Mar43, hereafter S’olomons &’urvew; MIS, WD,Surv of A-E New Guinea and Papua ( S3@678),dtd 15Ju143; MID, WD, Surv of Bismarck Archi-pelago ( S30--673 ), 2 vols, dtd 50ct43, hereafterTliwnarcl;s Swmey.

1884. Britain countered by establishingher own protectorate over the Southern ~Solomons and by annexing the rest ofEastern New Guinea. As the Territory ofPapua, with a capital at Port Moresby,this latter area was turned over to Aus-tmlia in 1905. At the outbreak of WorldWar I, the Australians occupied Kaiser-Wilhelmsland and kept it, under a Leagueof Nations mandate f ollovving the peace,as the Territory of hTewGuinea. The man-date capital was established at Rabaul;and the territory divided into governmentdistricts of Northeast New Guinea, NevvBritain, New Ireland, Manus (the Admir-alty and Northwest Islands), and Kieta(Buka and Bougainvillea). South of Bou-gainvillea, the Solomons, including theSanta Cruz Islands, formed the BritishSolomon Islands Protectorate, admin-istered by a resident commissioner atTulagi.

Each island in the Rabaul strategicsphere, with the exception of a few outly-ing atolls, has a basic similarity of ap-pearance which holds true regardless ofsize. High hills and mountains crowd theinterior, sending out precipitous spurs andridges to the coasts. A matted jungle can-

opy of giant trees covers all but the highestpeaks, and the sun touches the ground only

along the banks of the numerous streams

‘ The capital of the New Guinea Territory wastransferred to I,ae in Northeast New Guinea on1 Ikwember 1941 because of the danger of vol-canic activity in the Rabaul area.

18

THE OPEA’ING MOVES 19

that slice the slopes. Where fire or waterforces a temporary clearing, the vine anclbush bnrrier of second growth springs upto add to the diflicultie.s of trnnsit. Alongthe shores most of the low-lying groundis choked with rank second growth, andvast stretches of fetid mangrove swampmark the months of streams and rivers.Easily accessible and well-drained land isat a premium and on most such sites coco-nut plantations had been established.Years are required to grow the trees mdconstant attention is needed to prevent theencroachmeflt of jungle. These planta-tions, together with the few significant,reaches of grassland scattered throughout,the larger islands, were the potential air-fields that figured so prominently inSouthwest Pacific planning.

Along with tropical forest and ruggedhills, the area shares a common climate—hot, hl~rnid, and unhealthy. There is arainy season around December w-hen thenorthwest monsoon blows, but the “drymonths)’ of the southeast trade winds,April throngh October, are wringing wet

by temperate zone standards. Althoughthe amount of precipitation varies consid-erably according to locale, an averagerainfall of more than 200 inches in the up-lands and 100-150 inches along the coastsis not unusual. The islands lie in the onlylatitudes in the world where evaporationis greater over land than waters The

temperature of the moisture-saturated airstays in a steady range of 75–90 degrees

the -year around. Constant high heat andhumidity sap a man’s strength and make

him prey to a wide variety of tropicaldiseases.

‘G. T. Trewartha, An Introduction to Climate( New York: McGrawHill Book Company, 1954),p. 112.

Strange though it may seem, this unin-viting area has well over a million inhab-itants. The majority are Melanesians, thedominant race in the islands northeast ofAustralia. Primitive in habit and appear-ance, these people have dark brown, al-most ‘black, skins, small but solidly-builtbodies, and frizzled, upstanding mops ofhair. The natives of Papua belong to arelated but separate race, shorter, darker,and more Negroid in aspect. In the atollsaround the periphery of the area there area few thousand Polynesians, tall, fair, andfine-featured members of the race thatoccupies the Central Pacific islands.Mixed marriages among these peoples arenot uncommon; the Melanesians them-selves are thought to be the product of amerging of Papuan and Polynesianstrains.

Tribalism is the way of life in the is-lands; there is no native national spiritor traclit ion. The frankly paternalisticIh-itish and Australian administrations re-spect the tribal organization and governthrough the local chiefs. Almost all thenatives live in small villages, their outlook

limited to what they can see, feel, or hear.Village garden plots, temporarily wrestedfrom the jungle, grow only enough tare,yams, and sweet potatoes for local needs;fruit and fish supplement an otherwisemonotonous and starchy diet. AlthoughChristian missionaries have been moder-ately successful in gaining converts, thebasic religion of these simple people isa natural animism. The diversity of dia-

lects is so great that the traders’ jargon ofpidgin English is the only universally un-derstood language. By Weskrn stand-

ards, the natives live a severely limited life,but this simple existence has the sanctionof centuries.


In general, a view of life outside thevillage is sought and seen only by thelaborers who work the coconut plantationsand the relatively few natives who servein the government or police. These men,especially the “police boys,” are capableof great personal loyalty to those lTho

can understand and lead them. The evi-dence for this statement is easily found inthe existence of the spy system that oper-ated behind Japanese lines in the South-west Pacific.

Years before the enemy invaded theNew Guinea Territory and drove southtoward Port Moresby and Tulagi, theprobability of hostile approach through

the island screen had been foreseen by theAustralians. In 1919, their Navy beganto set up a network of observers along thesparsely settled northeastern shores of thecontinent. As compact and reliable radioswere developed, the observer system spreadnorthward into the islands where strate-

gically located oflcials and planters wererecruited and trained to send coded reportsof enemy movements. Many of these vet-eran islanders, famed as the coastwatehers,remained behind when the Japanese ad-vanced, and from vantage points deep inthe midst of enemy-controlled waters,sometimes even from enemy-held islands,fed a steady stream of valuable intelli-gence into Allied hancls. The natives who

stayed with the coastwatchers were innM12y cases their eyes and ears in theenemy camp. Though the opportunity forbetrayal was great, it, was seldom seized.’

‘ Cdr l~lric A. Feldt, RAN, !f’hc Coast zootch frs( Xe\v I-t)rk & Melbourne : Oxford UniversityPress, 1946 ), p. 4ff, hereafter Feldt, !Z’}lC f_’oast-lrrltd(c)’.?.

While the success of the coastwatchingsystem was a tribute to human courage andresourcefulness, it was equally an acknowl-edgment of the complex geographic fac-tors making it possible. Each island andisland group that figured in the Allieddrive on Rabaul has its own peculiarcharacter, and its detailed description ispart of the narrative of the operations thatconcern it. A general sketch of the whole

strategic area is needed, however, to set inmind the relationship of these islands toeach other.

On the map, New Guinea, the world’ssecond largest island, dominates the seanorth of .iustralia. More than 900,000natives live in the scattered villages ofPapua and Northeast New Guinea, an arearoughly the size of California. Loftymountains, some ranging well above 13,000feet, form n spine for the Papuan Penin-sula which juts out into the Coral Sea. Inthe bulging midsection of the island nearthe borcler of Dutch New Guinea, thou-sands of square miles of soggy ground andtanglecl swampland spread out along thewandering courses of torpid rivers comingdown out of the highlands. The HuonPeninsula, which harbors near its base andsouthern flank the airfield sites so promi-nent in the ELKTON planning, thrustseast toward New Britain, less than 50miles away across Vitiaz ( Dampier)

Strait. (See Map I, Map Section.)The tip of western New Britain, Cape

Gloucesterj has enough low grassland nearthe coast to allow airfield development.Thus, from the Cape and from the HuonPenin sL~la, directly opposite on NewGuinea, control could be easily maintainedover T)ampier Straitj the only entry intothe Solomon Sea from the northwest.. New

THE OPENING MOVES

Britain,anelongated and crescent-shapedisland, 370 miles long and 40–50 mileswide, is he~vily forested znd has the usualprominent jumble of mountains and hillsridging its interior. Midway along thecoasts,Talaseain thenorthandGasmatainthesouthofferway-pointairdromesitesfor a driveon Rabaul,which“hasby alloddsthebestnaturalharborandbaseformilitaryoperationsin the entire NewGuinea-New’Britain-SolomonIslandsarea.”5

Curvingto the northwestfrom thewatersoffRabaul’sBlancheBay,scimitar-like NewIrelandparallelsNewGuinea’scoastline300 milesawayand closesonesideof the BismarckSea. The airfieldsandharboratKaviengontheslimisland’snorthernpoint madethe smallcolonialtown a primestrategicobjective. TheBismarckSeais outlinedby a staggeredarc of islandswhichswingsnorthfromNewHanoveroff Kaviengto the SaintMatthiasgroup,thenwesttotheAdmiral-ties and on to the atollsknownas theNorthwestIslands,whichdip southto-wardNewGuinea.Thenativepopulationof thewholeareaof theBismarckArchi-pelagois approximately150,000,thelarg-estnumberby far livingon NewBritainandNewIreland.

PlanesbasedatRabaulandatairfieldson Bukaor Bougainvilleacan effectivelycloseoff thepassagebetweenNewIrelandandBuka,the secondmajor gatewaytothe SolomonSea. Politicallyspeaking,thesetwonorthernislandsarepartof theNew GuineaTerritory; geographically,they are one with the restof the Solo-mons. Theprincipalislandsof theSolo-

5Bismarci-s A’urtxg,p. 1.

21monsconstitutea doublemountainchainrunningnorthwestandsoutheastfor about’700milesbetweentheBismarcksandtheNewHebrides;thewidthof thiscentralgroupingis 100miles. Severaloffshootislandswellawayfromthemainchain—OntongJavaatollto thenortheast,Ren-nell due southof Guadalcanal,and theSantaCruzgroupto the southeast—arealsoconsideredpartof theSolomons.

In alltheislandstherearesome165,000nativeslivingin a totallandareaequiva-lenttothatof WestVirginia. Theterrainfitsthegeneralpatternof thewholestra-tegicarea—jungleandhillsextremelydif-ficultto traversewhichtendto localizelandcombatandputapremiumonairandsea power. The major islandsof thenortheastchain,Choiseul,SantaIsabel,and Malaita,have few naturalmilitaryobjectives,andthesamelackcharacterizesSan Cristobal,the southernmostof thesouthwestchain. Theotherlargeislandsof theSolomons,Guadalcanal,NewGeor-gia,andBougainville,havesizableharborsandairfieldsitessufficientto makethemlogicalstoppingpointsin a deliberatead-vanceon Rabaul. Each of thesemajorislandobjectiveshas severalsmalleris-landsnearbywhichalsoclassaspotentialtargets:TulagiandFloridaarecoupledwith Guadalcanal;Vella Lavella andKolombangarawith New Georgia; andBukaandtheShortland-TreasuryIslandswithBougainvillea.

Typicalof thesmallerislandgroupsinthe Solomonsis the Russells,which lie30–35milesnorthwestof CapeEsperanceonGuadalcanal.Theaccidentof locationratherthananyconsiderablestrategicad-vantagemadethemAdmiralHalsey’sfirstobjectiveafterGuadalcanalwassecured.

THE OPENING MOVES 23

OCCUPATIONOF THEZ?UAYSELLS‘

TheRussellgroupconsistsof twomainislandsfringedby a scatteringof lesserislets. Pa.vuvu,thelargerisland,is veryirregularin shapeandno morethantenmilesacrossat its widestpoint. Thelowlandalongthe shorelineof manyof itscovesand bays is clearof undergrowthand lined with coconuttrees,but tlheseplantingsonlyedgethejungleandmarkthesteeprisetowardsthehillsof thein-terior. On thenorthcoast,severaldeepwaterbaysprovideshelteredanchorageswhichwill accommodatelargeocean-goingvessels.Onlya narrowchannelseparatesPavuvufrom its smallerneighborto theeast,Banika,whichhas unusualterrainfor the Solomons. Exceptin its south-westernportion,wherehillsriseto400feet,theislandis low androllingandsuitablefor militarydevelopment.Banika’snorthcoastis cleftby RenardSound,a deepin-let that provides access to the lowground. (SeeMap1.)

In January1943,whenit wasevidentthattheJapanesewerelosingtheirfightto regaincontrolof Guadalcanal,thepos-sibilityof movingforwardto theRussellswasgivenseriousconsiderationat Com-SoPac headquarters.ToHalsey’sstaff,

eUnless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : ComSoPac Jan-Apr@~VarDN; ComPhibSoPac Rept of Occupation oftiheRussell Islands (CI.EANS1,ATEOP) 21Feb–17Apr43,dtd 21.4pr43;43d InfDiv FO N’o.2, dtd15Feb43; 3d Rdr13nRept of the Russell Islands(CI.EANSL.4TEOP), dtd 9Apr43; Russell Is-lands Det. Ilth DefBn Jnl ; LtCol E. S. Watson,G–3, 43d InfDiv, “Movement of a Task Force bySmall Landing Craft,” dtd 17Apr43; LS’olornonsSurwy; IJlorrison,llrcakin.ytfie Bismarcks Bar-rier. ~oeurnentsnot otherwise identifiedare lo-cated in the Russell IslandsArea OperationsFileof the Archives, Historical Branch,G–3Division,HeadquartersMarine Corps.

the islandgroup seemeda desirableob-jectiveandone thatcouldbe takenandheldwiththe limitedresourcesavailablein the SouthPacific. A presentationofthisconceptwasmadeto AdmiralNimitzwhenhe visitedNoumeafor conferenceswithHalseyon 23January. ThePacificFleetcommandergave oral approvaltotheideaandbeforethemonthwasouthegavespecificauthorizationfor theopera-tion.

The Japanesehad not occupiedtheRussellswhentheymovedintotihelowerSolomons,butoncethedecisionwasmadeto pull out of Guadalcanalabout 300troopsweresentto tinyBaisenIslandoffPavuvu’snorthwesttip, Pepwda Poinhto set up a barge-stagingbase.’ Theenemyunit left whenits job wasdone;thewithdrawalwasreportedon11Febru-aryby a coastwatcherwhohadbeenland-ed in the islandsearlierto keeptab onJapaneseactivity.Theprospectof anun-opposedlandingwascheeringto Alliedplanners,but it resultedin no reductionin assaulttroopstrengthfor theproposedoperation. A healthyrespectfor Japa-neseoffensivecapabilitieskeptthefigurehigh.

SouthPacificAreaplannersfelt thatafurther“attemptonthepartof theenemyto reestablishhimselfonGuadalcanalwasa distinctpossibility,”and that if thishappenedthe reactionto Allied occupa-tion of the Russellswould be violent.8The landingforce allottedunderthesecircumstanceshadto bestrongenoughto

‘ HistSec, G–2, FEC Japanese Monograph No.48, SE Area NavOps—Part I, n.d. (OCMH), P.61, hereafter SE AreaNavOps—I.

8CGUSAFISPA 1st Ind, dtd lMay43, to 43dInfDiv Summary of the Occupation of theRussell Islands, dtd 17Apr43, in Watson Rept,op. cit.

691–360O—63—3


sustaina majorcounterattack.A furtherconsiderationin determiningthe sizeofthe force wasthe beliefthatthe assaulttroops would be favorablydisposedtotakepartinfutureoperationsagainsth’ewGeorgia.

On 7 February,Halsey’sdirectiveforCL13ANSLATE,tl~eRussellsoperation,wasissued. h~amedto overallcommandwasRearAdmiralRichmondK. Turner,who headedSouth Pacific AmphibiousForcesaThe43dInfantryDivision,lessits 172d Regimental Combat Team(RCT), wasdesignatedtheprincipalcom-ponentof theCLEANSLATEoccupationforce. MajorreinforcingunitsweretheMarine3clRaiclerBattalion,antiaircraftelementsof theMarine1lth DefenseBat-talion,halfof the35thNavalConstructionBattalion,andAcorn3.9 Oncetheacornunit had an airfield in operation onBanika, MAG-21,thenen routeto theSouthPacific,wouldmovein its fightersquadronsfor interceptand escortmis-sions..

The assemblyof the CLEANSLATEtaskforce washardto detect. No shiplargerthana destroyerwas assignedtotransport,troopsor supplies;mostof theworkloadfell to newly arrivedlandingshipsandcraftgettingtheirfirstoffensivetest in the Soutl~Pacific. While largervesselsbroughtthe43dDivisionfromNewCaledoniato Guadalcanal,themovementwasmacleinnormal-sizedconvoys.Japa-neseplaneslocatedandunsuccessfullyat-tackedone of theseconvoysnear SanCristobalonthe11’th,buttheenemypilotssawnothingaboutthetransportsto indi-

o.+n acorn was a naval unit designed to con-struct, operate, and maintain an advanced land-plane and seal)lane base and to provicle facili-ties for operations.

catethattheywereanythingmorethananotherreinforcement-replacementgroupheaded for the Guadalcanalgarrison.ShipsarrivingoffKoliPoint,stagingareafor the operation,unloadedimmediatelyandclearedthe vicinity. Only a clusterof innocuoussmallvessels,mainlyLCTS(landingcraft,tank)andLCMS(landingcraft,medium),andascreenof destroyersstooclby for therunto theRussells.

TheprojectedD-Dayfor planningpur-poseswas21February;four daysbefore,whenitwasevidentthattheoperationwasproceedingon schedule,AdmiralHalseyconfirmedthis date. Late on the 19thloadingout began,LCTSfirst,followedbythesmallercraft,andtoppedoffbythedestroyertypes. Only the APDs (highspeedtransports)wereequippedto hoistonboardlandingcraft,andthedestroyersancldestroyermine-sweepersassignedastransportseachtook a quartetof smallboatsundertow. Nearmidnighton 20February,the strangeflotillagot under-way.Destroyerswereinthevan,throttleddownto thespeedof a dozensquatLCTSthat followed in trace, with the rearbroughtup by a tug-drawnbargeloadedwithammunitionandbarbedwire.

ThesupportgivenCLEANSLATEwasimpressive.Bombersfrom SWPA hit~Tapaneserearwardbasesin theNorthernSolomonsand Bismarcks.Aerial coveroverthetargetandinterdictionmissionsagainstenemyinstallationsin theCentralSolomonswereflownby squadronsfromHendersonField,temporarilyreinforcedby theSmwtoga’sairgroup.Nearlyeverycombatshipin Halsey’scommandputtosea,readyto meeta Japanesesurfaceat-tack; four cruisersand four destroyerssteamedup New GeorgiaSound (aptlynicknamed“The Slot”) as a covering


force. Theprecautionspaidoff; noenemyscoutplaneor vesselspottedthetaskforceandthelandingwasmadewithoutopposi-tion.

Reconnaiss:~ncepartiessentto theRus-sellsseveraldaysbeforethelandinghadselectedsuitablebeachexits,gun sites,andcampancldumpareas. Onthemorn-ingof the21st,tileArmybattalionsland-ingonthetwobeachesof 13anikaandtheMarineraiclersgoingashoreon Pavuvu’s“PepesalaPoint weremetby guideswholed themto pre-selecteclpositions. Onehour after the wavesof assaulttJroopslandeclfromtheirdestroyertransports,theLCTSnoseclashoreanclbeganunloading.Thefirstechelonof al~tiaircraftgllnsandcrewsof thellth DefenseBattalionwereinpositiononBanilmbynoon. Theraid-ersandinfantrymenweredugin to meeta counterlanclingattemptbeforenight-fall.

MarineantiaircraftguncrewsandtheArmy fieldartillerymenwl~omtheyhadretrainedfor the air defensejob1°werethe only ones to see actionduringtheensuingweeks.On6March,thefirstJap-aneseattackoccurredwhena dozenfight-ersandbombersmadea low-levelstrikeonthemainislands.Earlywarningradarwas not,yet in operationanclthe firstenemybombingandstrafingrun causedsomecasualtiesbeforetheantiaireraftde-fenseswerernannecl;at leasttwo enemyraidersweresl~otdown. Sporaclicairat-tacksfolloweclthis firsteffort,but nonewereof seriousimport.

The Marineelementsof the originalCLEANSLATElandingforcewereonlytemporarilyassignedto the operation.

‘“ Maj Joseph L. Winecoff ltr to CO, llthDefBn, dtd 22Feb43.

The llth Defensedetachmentwasusedonly until the loth Defense13attalionarrivedin theRussells;on 15March,thenewunit begantakingoverthellth’s bat-terypositions.Thechangeoverwascom-pletedby 17March,andthedetachment’s~Y1lllcrell~sretllrlledto Port pur~~isonFloridaIslandthefollowingnight. The3d Ra,iclerBattalionpulleclout on 20lMarch:~ndreturnedto EspirituSanto;43d Divisionunitsoccupiedthe raiders’defensivepositions.

The withdrawalof the Marineswasabout the only rear~~ardmovementoftroops from the Russellsduring thisperiod. Each clay after D-Day, LCTSloadedat,Guadalcanaland undercoverof darknessmadetherunto thenewfor-wardbase;succeedingechelonsof Turn-er’staskforcearrivedattheislandsfor 50nightsrunning. By theendof Februaryover 9,000men were ashoreand by 18April, when responsibilityfor logisticsupportanddefenseof theRussellspassedto the commandinggeneralat Guadal-canal,16,066menand48,51’7tonsof sup-plieshadbeenbroughtinbytheLCTshut-tle. Ilanikanowboastedanoperatingair-field for MAG-21’sthreefightersquad-rons,amotortorpedoboatbase,extensivebasedefenseinstallations,andthestartofa considerablesupplyhandlingcapacity.

AdmiralKinginWashingtonwassome-whatdubiousof thevalueof puttingsomuchinto the Russells,but Halseyde-fendedhispolicyasnecessaryfor thepro-tectionof thenewairbase. AsfarasCom-SoPac was concerned,CLEANSLATEwas merelythe completionof the firststageof hismovetowardNewGeorgia,andthe troopsand suppliesstationedtherewereearmarkedfor thecontinuedadvanceuptheSolomonschain.


BATTLE OF THEBISMARCKSEA‘1

WhileComSoPacwasconsolidatinghishold on the new Russellsairdrome,aneventoccurredin the SouthwestPacificArea that emphasizeddramaticallytheimportanceof land-basedair in thecam-paignagainstRabaul. On 2-3 March,aJapanesetroopconvoyheadedfor Laeatthebaseof the HuonPeninsulawasen-gagedinarunningfightbyAustralianandAmericansquadronsbasedonNewGuinea.Theresultsof thisBattleof theBismarckSeaweresosignificantthatGeneralMac-Arthurstated:

l~e have achievecla victory of such com-pleteness as to assume the proportions of amajordisasterto theenemy.Ourdecisivesuccesscannotfailtohavemostimportantresultsontheenemy’sstrategicandtacticalDlans.Hiswmpaign,forthetimebeingatleast,iscompletelydisrupted.12

TheconvoywasanattemptinitiatedbyEighth A~~eaAmy to strengthenits de-fensesintheLae-Salamauaareaandto in-surecontinuedcontrolof bothshoresofDampierStrait. Eighttransports,vary-inginsizefrom500to6,800tons,andeightescortdestroyersmadetherun. Onboard

11Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is deri~redfrom : HistSec, G–2, ~EC,.JapaneseMonograph No. 32, SE Area AirOps~ov42-Apr44, n.d. (located at OCMH), hereafterS’l??Area AirOps; SE Area NacOps—II; WesleyF.Craven and James L. Cate (eds), The Pacific:Gufldalcanal to Haipan, August l~@ to Julyl!)~&T/~e Arw]j Air Forces in World War II, v.IV (Chicago:Universityof Chicago,1950),hereafterCravenand Cate,GuadakanaZ tofJaipan; llorison, Brea7cingthe Bisrnarcks L3ar-rier.

mQuoted in MajGen Charles A. lVilloughbyand John Chamberlain,Mac.4rthur 1941–1951(New York:McGraw-HillBookCo.,1954), p.112.

wereapproximately6,000soldiersof the61stDivisionand 400 replacementsforSpecialNavalLandingForceunits.” Acanopyof fighterplanes,bothArmyandNavy,wasprovidedfor overheadprotec-tion.

TheenemyconvoyclearedRabaulon 1March,steamingat slowspeedalongthenortherncoastof NewBritain,partiallyhiddenby loweringskieswhichmadeob-servation difficult. A reconnaissancebomberof MacArthur’sFifth Air Forcesightedthe shipsand escorting”fighters,however,andradioedin its find; a flightof B–17’swasunableto locatethetargetwhentheweatherclosed. ThefollowingmorningtheconvoywasspottedagainandthistimetheFlyingFortressesfoundtheirquarry,brokethroughthescreenof planesandantiaircraftfire,andsankonetrans-port, the 51stDtkhion commandship.Survivorsweretransferredtotwodestroy-ers,whichseparatedfromthemainconvoyand steamedaheadto Lae. Australianand Americanplanescontinuedto seekouttheshipsthroughouttheday,butthecontinuedbadweatherhelpedto foil theseattacksandfurtherdamagewasminor.

Despitetheaerialharassment,theJap-aneseadheredto their originalsailingschedule,whichwastobringthemoffLaeabout1’700on3March. Byearlymorningof the 3d, the convoy was well withinHuonGulfandalsowellwithinrangeofAllied airbaseson NewGuinea;for allpracticalpurposesthe enemyhad sailedinto a trap. MacArthur’s air commander,MajorGeneral GeorgeC.Kenney,sprangit witha coordinatedattackled by low-levelfighter-bombersspeciallypracticedin

19USSBS,Carnpaign8,p.174.

28 ISOLATIONOFRABAUL

anti-shippingstrikes, backed Up bymedium-andhigh-levelbombersandanescortof fighters.Theresultingmeleewasdisastrousfor theJapanese.Everytrans-portwasburninganclin a sinkingcondi-tion in lessthanhalf an hour; two de-stroyersweresunkand a thirdheavilydamaged.Theattackscontinueduntilafourtl~destroyer,engagedinresclleoper:~-tions,wasl~itthatafternoon.Motortor-pedoboatsreachecltl~esceneduringthenightandfinishedoff oneof thecripples,andthenextmorningtl~ebomberscom-pletedthe score. .kfter rescuing3,800men,four destroyers,all thatwasleft oftheoriginalconvoy,madeit backto Ra-baul; fewerthan900mengot throllghtoLae.

The overwhelmingAllied successhad,as Genera]MacArthurobserved,impor-tantresults. Notonly did theJapanesefail to get a substantialreinforcementthroughto theHuonPeninsulaarea,butthetransportlossesforcedthemto aban-don large-scalereinforcementattemptsaltogether.DampierStraitdid not be-longto theAlliesyet,butKenney’sfliersmadeit clearthatthe Japanesehad noclear title either. Supplies and menslatedfor enemygarrisonsin EasternNewGuineaortheSolomons—foranybasewithineffectiverangeof Alliedplanes—werenow movedforwardby destroyers,whosehigh speed,excel~entmaneuver-ability,and antiaircraftgunsgavethema measureof protection,or by smallcrafthuggingtheislandcoasts. TheJapanesehadbeendecisivelydefeated,buta battleis not the war,andthe sorryrecordoftheirdefendingaircraftpromptedanall-out effortto restoreat leasta parityofairpowerintheRabaulstrategicarea.

JAPANESE “I” OPERATION‘4

Followingthe BismarckSea debacle,JapanesescoutplanesreportedincreasedactivityinPapuaandthelowerSolomons.Allied troop and materialstrengthwasclearly increasing,and all intelligencepointedtotheimminenceof offensiveoper-ations. Alliedairraidsandantishippingstrikesseriouslydisruptedenemydefen-sivepreparationsandcurtailedthemove-mentof reinforcementsto forwardbases.TheJapanesedecidedthata strongcoun-ter-strokewasneededto blunttheAlliedair spearheadand to gain a respitefortheir own defensebuild-up. Tokyo as-signedthe task, designatedZ Go (“I”operation), to AdmiralYamamotoandhisG’ornbinedFleet.

In order to bolster the strengthofRabaul’sEleventhAh Fleet, YamamotoorderedforwmdfromTruktheplanesandpilots from four of the carriersof hisThird Fleet. On 3 April, the admiralhimselfflewto Rabaulto takepersonalcommand.Thecombinedforceavailablefor Z Go wasatleast182fighters,81divebombers,and72medium-rangelandbomb-ers,plusa few torpedoplanes. The 15-dayoperationwasplannedto proceedintwophases,thefirstincorporatingastrikeagainsttheSolomonsandthesecond,at-tackson Alliedpositionsin Papua.

The busy clusterof ships,large andsmall, in the vicinity of Tulagi andGuadalcanalwasthe initialZ Go target.Nearnoonof 7 April,67enemyVal divebomberswithanescortof 110Zekefighters

14Unlessotherwisenoted,materialinthissec-tionis derivedfrom:HistSec,G–2,FEC,Jap-aneseMonographNo.122,SEAreahTavAirOps—PartIII,Nov42-Jun43,n.d.(OCMH), hereafterHEAreaNuvAirOps—III; i3E Area NavOp8—II; Morison,Breaking the Bismarcks Barr&r.

THEOPENINGMOVES 29

took off from stagingairfieldson Bukaand Bougainvilleato make the attack.Theirdeparturewasdulynotedandre-portedto HendersonFieldbycoastwatch-erson Bou~~inville;at1400,radarintheRussellspickedup the oncomingflightsand’76interceptors,Guadalcanal’stypicaljoint-servicemixture,scrambledandtan-gledwiththeZekeescortoverThe Stot.The Japanesebombers,hidingbehindablanketof heavyblackcloudsthatcoveredIndispensableStraitbetweenMalaitaandFlorida,headedfor Tulagi. Almostalltheshipswereoutof Tulagiharborwhentheraidersstruck;onlya fleetoilerandaNewZealandcorvettew~recaughtin theconfinedwaters. Both weresunk. Theattackcontinuedagainsttherapidlyma-neuveringvesselsin Iron BottomSound,but shipandshoreantiaircraftfirekepttheValshighandthebombinginaccurate.ThedestroyerAaronWard,attemptingtoprotectanLST thathadbecomethefocusof enemyattention,was seriouslydam-aged; she later sank under tow. Thebomberscausedno othersignificantdam-age and drewoff soonafterthey loosedtheirloads. TheZekesscoredjustaslight-ly astheVals,accountingfor onlysevenplanes,all of themMarine. The welterof conflictingclaimsfor enemyaircraftshotdownwaswinnowedto an estimatethatlessthan25 Japanesewerelost,15afigurethatarguedwell withthehighestofficialenemyreportof 24planesdowned.lG

Asidefromtherelativelylightdamageto Alliedshipsandaircraft,thei’ Aprilattackhad one othertangibleresultfor

1’CinCPac,OpsinthePOAforApr43(COA,XHD),p.14.

1“Morison,Breaking tile BiwnarcksBarrier, p,124,indicatesthatJapanesepostwarrecordscon-firmthelossof only12Valsand9 Zekes.

theJapanese.It enabledthemto slipre-inforcementsinto Kolombangaraby de-stroyertransportwhileComSoPacconcen-tratedhisair strengthat Guadalcanaltomeetfurtherattacks. Similarreinforce-menteffortswereexecutedfor WesternNewBritainandtheHuonPeninsulaun-der coverof the trio of attackson NewGuineatargetsthatmadeup the secondphaseof Z Go.

On 11 April, 94 Third Fket carrierplanesattackedshippingin Oro Bay,20milessoutheastof Buna. Fifty Alliedfightersfought themoff but not beforeJapaneseVal pilotshad sunkone mer-chantman,beachedanother,anddamagedan Australianminesweeper.On thefol-lowingday, 1’74Japanesenavalplanes,including43 mediumbombers,madeamassattackon theairfieldssurroundingPortMoresby. Whiledefendingfighterstook on the Zeke escort, the bombersploweduptheairstrips,butotherwisedidlittledamage.ThethirdZ Go raidwasmadeon shipsandairfieldsatMilneBayon14April. TheJapaneseagainattackedinoverwhelmingforce,188planes;only24Australianfighterswereavailabletomeetthem,butall shipswereforewarnedandunderway,firingtheirantiaircraftgunstomakethe enemypilots shearoff. Themajorresultof theattackwasthesinkingof a merchantmanandsomeminordam-age to othershipping. In all threeat-tacks,5 Allied planeswerelost,andtheJapaneseadmittedthelossof 21aircraft.

On16April,AdmiralYamamotocalledoffthe“I” Operation,orderingtheremain-ingThirdFzeetplanesbackto Truk. Hehadbeencompletelymisledby theglow-ingreportsof hispilotsintobelievingthatI Gohadbeenatremendoussuccess.Thetotaldamageclaimfor th’efourraidswas


staggering:1 cruiser,2 destroyers,and25assortedtransportsandcargovesselssunk,withheavydamageto 2 moretransportsandseveralsmallervessels;134planesshotout of the air (including39 probables).LMatchedagainstthesetotalswastheac-tuallossof 1 destroyer,1corvette,2mer-chantmen,andlessthan20 aircraft. ItwouldseemthattheThirdR?eetpilotshadadoptedthepenchantfor reporting“grossexaggerationof damageinflicted”thatwasrampantin theranksof theEleventhAiYFleet.” Whateverthe explanationforpilot error,be it willfulexaggerationorwishfulthinking,the prematureendingof I Gowithoutanysignificantresultswaschillingto Japanesehopesof delayingAlliedoffensivepreparations.

ALLIED RAIDS‘8

Theprimetargetsof Halsey’spressuretacticsintheearlymonthsof 1943weretheenemyairfieldsatMundaonNewGeorgiaandVila on Kolombangma.The tempoof air raidsagainstthesebasesincreasedsteadilyasAlliedstrenagthmounted.Cou-pledwiththeseair strikeswasa limitedprogramof navalbombardmentmadepos-sibleby the fact thatSoPacplanesandshipshad wrestedcontrolof the watersimmediatelynorthof GuadalcanalfromtheJapanese.TheJapanesecouldanddidrisktheirwarshipswithinrangeof Hen-dersonField’sbombers,buttheneedhadtobegreatasintheevacuationof Guadal-canal. The chancefor a showdownseabattlestillbrightenedthehopesof enemynavalofficers,but therewaslittledesire

‘7 TJSSDS, IHtcrro~at ion A’o. 601, Cdr Ryoske~Nomura,IJLN,II, p. 532.

‘“ Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : SE Area NaaOp8—11;Morison,Breaking the BismarckxBarrier.

anylongerto seekthiscriticalfightintheconfinedwatersof the lower Solomons.Halsey’scruisersanddestroyershadtimeto getsomeexperienceatshorebombard-ment,thusexposingenemygarrisonstoa bitof thebittermedicinedishedoutbyJapanesenaval gunnersin the darkestdaysof thestrugglefor Guadalcanal.

Rear AdmiralWaldenL. Ainsworthtook a cruiser-destroyerforce againstMundaon5Januaryandagainonthe24thbroughthis bombardmentgroup up toNewGeorgia,thistimeto shellthe fieldat Vila. On bothoccasions,firesstartedby navalgunfirelit up thenightandtheresultsof thebombardmentwereat leastspectacular.Follow-upattacksbyAlliedaircausedmoredamage,accordingto theJapanese,butneitherbombingnor shell-inghadanylastingeffectontheprogressof the enemyairbaseconstruction.Ad-miralAinsworthnotedthat,whiletheseair-seaattacksmightrenderthefieldsun-usablefor criticalperiodsof time,“theonlyrealansweris to takethefieldawayfromthem.”‘g

AdmiralHalseywasin completeagree-mentwiththissentiment;heexpectedlit-tle morefrom his attackpatternin theCentralSolomonsthantheharassmentanddelayheachieved. TheJapanesebecameexpertatfillingin thecratersin therun-ways and dug-intheir scattereddumpsandsheltersto minimizetheeffectof theAlliedraids. Lifewasmightyunpleasantundertheconstantroundof attacks,how-ever,andtheportentswerehardlyencour-agingfor the successof Japanesearms.

Anotherof Ainsworth’sshorebombard-mentgroupswasunderwayfor NewGeor-giaafterdarkon5Marchwhenhereceived

“ CTF67ReptofVila-StanmoreBombardment22-24.Jan43,dtd28Jan43(COA,NHD).

THEOPENINGMOVES 31word from Guadalcanalthattwo enemyshipshadleft Bollgainvilleheadedsouthearlier in the day. Guadalcanal’ssea-planescoutsspottedtheships,twodestroy-ersthathadjustdeliveredsuppliesto theVila base steamingnorth on a returncourse. Fire controlradarscreenspin-pointedthe locationof the targetsforships’batteries,andtheenemyvesselswereburiedinadelugeof shells. Bothquicklysank; only 49 crewmensurvivedto telltheir harrowingtale to tl~egarrisononKolombangara.20

Thecruiser-destroyerforcewasslatedtohit Mundaand Vila aga,inon the nightof 7–8April andwasalreadyoutof portwhenAdmiralYamamotolaunchedhis“I” OperationwiththeassaultonTulagi.The Japaneseplanesfailedto sightthebombardmentships,but the prospectoffurtherenemyattackspromptedHalseyto calloff themissionandconcentratehisforces. Thetemporaryslackening-offof

‘0USSBS, Interroflation No. 138,LCdrHorishiTokuno,IJN,1,p.142;Morison,Breaking theBismarck,sBarrier, ~).110, indicates that othersources show there were 174 survivors.

surfaceandair raidsmadenecessarybythisassemblageof powermayhavebeeninstrumentalin convincingYamamotothatI (2owasa success.The enemyad-miralhadno timeto discoverhismistake.

On18April,twodaysafterYamamotoendedI Go,he left Rabaulwithhisstaffonaninspectiontripto 130ugainville.Asa resultof a messageintercept,Alliedin-telligenceknewtheitineraryof theinspec-tion partyand a killer groupof Armylong-rangefightersfromHendersonFieldmettheJapaneseplanesovertheirdesti-nation,Buinairfield. Theexecutionwasswiftandsure;a few momentsaftertheinterceptors attacked,thestafftransportscrashedin flamesand the enemy’smostfamous naval commanderwas dead.Yamamotodied primarilybecauseNim-itz) staffevaluatedhim as thebestmantheJapanesehadtocommandtheirCorn-bhed Fleet; hadhe beenlesscompetent,lessof aninspirationto enemymorale,hemightwellhavelived. His deathdealtatellingblowto thespiritof thedefendersin the Solomons,and furnishedgrimwarningof thedownwardcourseof Jap-anesefortunes.

CHAPTER 3

Orderof Battle

FLEET MARINE FORCE1

By 30 April 1943,the Fleet MarineForcein thePacifichadreachedformid-ablestrengthin comparisonto the fewbattalionsand squadronsthathad beenits aggregateat the outbreakof war.over 110,000Marinesand sailorswereservinginthreedivisions,threeairwings,and a wide varietyof supportingunitspositionedat Alliedbasesalonga broad,sweepingarc fromMidwayto ~~ustralia.The majorityof combattroopswerelo-catedin theSouthPacificunclerAdmiralII:~lsey’scon]nmnd,where tl]e l]igl~estMarinegroundecl~elonwasMajorGeneralClaytonB. Vogel’sI Marine.IrnphibiousCorps(131AC). TheseniorMarineavia-tor,MajorGeneralRalph,J.Mitchell,woretwohatsascommanderof a newlyestab-

‘ I’nlessotherwisenoted,thematerialinthissectionisderivedfrom: CMCAnRepttoSecNavforthePis{.alYearEnding30,Jun43; “Historicaloutlineof theI)evelopn]errtof FleetMarineForce,Pa(’itic,1941–19.55(Preliminary),“ MSofficialhistorywrittenat FMFI’acHqabout1991:KennethW. Condit,GeraldDiamond,andEdwinT.Turnbhrdh,flfari~~cCorps Grou??dTrai?tinfl in, WO?”7{7War 11 (Washington: Hist-13r, G–3, HQMC, 1956) ; lstI.ts Robert A.Aurthur- and Kenneih Cohlmia, T1/c T?/ird.lfurincI)ivision (Washington: Infantry .JournalI’ress, 1948), hereafter Authur and C’ohlmia,Sd .?[ar~ivZYist;C. W. Proehl (cd.), 7’hc Fourth.VarincDirisiomin W’orldWar II (11’fishin:ton:Infantry .JournalPress, 1946) ; Robert Rherrod,History of McirincCorpsA?>iatio?lin World ~~’urIf (Washington : Combat Forces Press, 1952),hereafter Sherrod,MarAirHist.

lishedareaheadquarters,MarineAircraft,SouthPacific(MASP), andof itsprinci-pal operatingcomponent,theIstMarineAircraft Wing (1st MAW). NeitherIMAC nor MASP had any substantialtacticalfunction;bothcommandswereor-ganizedprimarilyto serveasadministra-tiveandlogisticalheadquarters.

From his commandpost at Noumea,GeneralVogel controlledthe 2d and3dMarineDivisions,thenintraininginNewZealand,aswellas a strongbodyof sup-portingtroopseitherattachedto thedivi-sionsor encampedin NewCaledonia,thelowerSolomons,andthe New Hebrides.GeneralMitchell’sunits,all temporarilyassignedtothe1stWing?werestationedatxirfieldsfromNewZetilandtotheRussells.Guadalcana]was the focal point of airactivityasa steadyrotationof squadronswaseffectedtomaintainmaximumcombatefficiencyintheforwardareas. Alsopartof MASPwasHeadquartersSquadronofthe2d MAW,newlyarrivedin NewZea-land to preparefor a commandrole infuture operations.

In additionto the troopsassignedtoIMACandMASP,therewasstillanothersizeablebodyof l?Ml?unitsin theSouthPacific—thoseunitswhichwerepartofthe gmrisonsof Americanand BritishSamoa,WallisIsland,andFunafutiintheEllice Group. Americanbaseson theseislandswereallincludedinMajorGeneralCharlesF. B. Price’s SamoanDefenseCommand.For ground defense,Price

32

ORDEROFBATTLE 33

hadtworifleregiments,one(3dMarines)underordersto join the3dDivision,andfour defensebattalions.In specialcom-battrainingcentersweretworeplacementbattalionslearningthe fundamentalsofjungle warfare.’ Price also had opera-tionalcontrolof thesquadronsof MarineAircraftGroup13(MAG–13),whichwasadministrativelypart of the 4th MarineBase Defense Aircraft Wing (4thMBDW).

The remainingsquadronsof the 4thWingwerestationedintheCentralPacific,on Oahu,andattheoutpostislands,Mid-way,Johnston,andPalmyra,thatguardedtheapproachesto thePacificFleet’smainbase. Ground garrisonsfor theseout-postswerefurnishedby Marinedefensebattalionsadministeredfroma headquar-ters at Pearl Harbor. The remainingma-jorunitof theFMF in thePacific,the1stMarineDivision,wasin Australiaas-signedto GeneralMacArthur’scommand?andjustbeginningto feel fit againafteritsordealonGuadalcanal.

Therewasnosingleheadquarters,opera-tionalor administrative,for all FMF or-ganizationsin the Pacific, althoughMarineairunitsdidhaveanadministra-tive headquarterson Oahu—MarineAir‘Wings,PacificunderMajorGeneralRossE. Rowell. Seniorgroundcommanders,like~~ogelandPrice,had b consulttheCommandantdirectlyon manyorganiza-

QIn the fall of 1942, it was decided to seasonthe Rlarine replacementbattalions organized onthe east coast of the U.S. in Samoa, where theycould receive advanced combat training underclimatic conditions and over terrain matchingthe battle area. Beginningwith the 1st Replace-mentBattalion,which arrived 17 ~ecember 1942,sevenbattalionswere trained before the high in-cidence of filariasis forced a discontinuance ofthe programin July 1943.

tional,administrative,andlogisticalmat-tersthatcouldwellhavebeenhandledbyatypecommandatthefleetlevel. As theFMF grew in size,and its components’missionsincomplexity,thelackof ahigherMarineheadquartersto supportand co-ordinatethe activitiesof the air-groundteamwastobefeltmoreacutely.Theles-sonsto be learnedin thefightingin theSolomonsandBismarcksandontheatollsof the CentralPacificwouldhaveto beabsorbedbeforesucha headquarterswasestablished.

MostFleetMarineForceactivityintheStateswasconcentratedin a complexofneighboringbaseson eachcoast. In theeast,themajorgroundtrainingcenterwasCampLejeuneatNewRiver,NorthCaro-lina, a site incorporatingthousandsofacresof tangled,stream-cutforestbacking11 milesof dune-toppedbeaches. ThesprawlingMarine Corps Air Stationat CherryPoint,lessthan40milesnorthof Lejeune,controlledanumberof smallerairfieldsscatteredthroughoutthe Caro-linas. On the westcoast,mostgroundtrainingwascarriedonatCampElliott,arelativelysmall area just outsideSanDiego, or at Camp Pendleton,whichstretchednorth from Oceansidefor 18milesalongthe coastalhighway—avastareaof rollinghills,steep-sidedcanyonsandarroyos,andfrequentthicketsasdenseastropicaljungle. A networkof airst,a-tionsandauxiliaryfields,the largestbe-ingEl ToronearLosAngeles,housedthesquadronstrainingfor Pacificduty.

Thesebases,liketheMarineCorpsitself,werefeverishlybuildingat thesametimetheyperformedtheirfunctionof readyingmenfor combat.The1stMarineDivisiondevelopedthe New River areafor am-phibioustraining,andwhenitshippedoutin April 1942it left behindcadreswhich


formedthenucleusof the3dMarines,or-ganizedin June. In likemanner,the2dMarineDivision,whichgaveCampsEl-liottandPendletontheirbaptismascom-bat trainingareas,furnishedthe cadresfor mostof theunitsof the3d Division,whichwasactivatedatElliotton 16Sep-tember1942.The4thMarineDivisionwasnotscheduledfor formalactivationuntilAugust1943,but its major componentswerein beingby midyear,againby theprocessof buildingonaskeletonof veteranofficersandenlistedmen.

On the air side,thepictureof experi-encedcadresformingthecoreof newunitswas muchthe sameas with groundor-ganizations.In contrastto thedivisionand the regiment,however,the Marineaircraftwingandgroupwereessentiallytaskforcesshapedto thejob athandandconstantlychangingtheirmake-up.The1stMAW, for example,joineda numberof squadronsof the2d Wing duringtheairbattlesoverGuadalcanal,whilethe2dMAWoperatedlargelyasatrainingcom-mandin the States. Whenthe2dWingleft Californiafor the SouthPacificinJanuary1943,its trainingfunctionsweretakenover by MarineFleet Air, WestCoast—asubordinatecommandof MarineAir Wings, Pacific, in Hawaii. Addi-tionalsquadronstentativelyassignedtothewingsalreadyoverseaswereintrainingat everyMarineairbasein Californiain1943.

Ontheeastcoast,the3dMAWwasac-tivatedin Novemberand its componentunitsgrewupwiththenewairfieldsthenbuilding. Nearlya year’sformingandtrainingtimewasneededbeforethefirstof the wing’s squadronswas combatready.3

‘ SeeAppendixBfora locationandstrengthbreakdownontheFMFon30April1943.

The overall growth of the MarineCorpsmatchedtherapidswellingof theranksof theFMF. Althoughthelion’sshareof newofficersandmenendedupinFMF units,thousandsof Marineswereneededfor seaduty,guardassignments,and the supportingestablishment.Be-ginninginFebruary1943,asteadystreamof youngwomenenteredtheCorpsto freemenfor combatby takingovera hostofadministrativeandtechnicaljobsin non-FMF units. Theirperformanceof dutyas Marines“provedhighlysuccessfulinevery way.”4 The enlistedstrengthofthe MarineCorpsrose from 222,871atthe startof 1943’ to 28’7,621withinsixmonths;on30Junethenumberof officershad reached 21,384. Projected totalstrengthfor theendof theyearwasmorethan355,000officersandmen,Ga far cryfrom the 66,000-manMarineCorpsthatexistedon7December1941.7

The secondyear of fightingsaw acherishedtraditionof theMarineCorps,its all-volunteercomposition,becomeawar casualty. A Presidentialexecutiveorderof 5 December1942put an endtovoluntaryenlistmentof menof draftagein anyof theservices.The intentof thedirectivewasto givemanpowerplannersinWashingtonagreatermeasureof quali-tativecontrolovertheinfluxof menintoeachservicein keepingwiththequanti-tativecontrolalreadyexercisedthroughaquotasystem. Startingwiththe intakeof February1943,the recruitdepotsat

4LtGen KellerE. Rockeyltr to CMC,dtd6Nov55.

5M–1 Sec OpDiary7Dec41–31Dec44,dtd20Mar45,p.8.

sIbid.TFora locationandstrengthbreakdownof

theMarineCorpson theeveof WWII, seeVolumeI,PartI,Chapter5ofthisseries.

ORDEROFBATTLE 35

ParrisIslandandSanDiegosawonlyasprinklingof men (mainlydraft-exemptIf’-year-olds)whodidnotcomeinthroughtheSelectiveServiceSystem. It wasstillpossible,however,for manydrafteesWThOanticipatedtheircall-upto entertheserv-ice of their choice. The Commandant,LieutenantGeneralThomasHolcomb,as-signedliaisonofficersto stategovernorsanddraftboardsto encouragethedefer-ment of thosemen who wantedto beMarinesuntiltheycouldfitintotheCorps’quota.gThis program,whichwasquitesuccessful,resultedin the seemingpara-dox thatmostof thedrafteesin Marineuniformswerestillvolunteers,in fact ifnotinname.

The intangiblebut clearlyevidentat-mosphereof avolunteeroutfitwasretainedby theMarineCorpsthroughoutthewar.This spiritwasespeciallyevidentin theunits of the Corps’ strikingarm—theFleet MarineForce—whereofficersandmenalikewereintolerantof anyoneat-temptingto getby witha marginalper-formance. The prevailingattitudewasthateverymanhadaskedto bea Marineandnocomplaintswereexpectedwhenthegoing got a little rough. EachMarineassi~gnedto a unitearmarkedfor theim-pending Central Solomons operationsseemedquietlydeterminedto equal,evenif hecouldnotbetter,thefightingrecordof hisfellowsonGuadalcanal.

THEBATTLELINESARE DRAWN‘

ComSoPacanchoredhis ELKTONat-tackagainstenemypositionsin theSolo-monson a trioof islands,NewCaledonia,

sRockeyltr,op.cit.“Unlessotherwisenoted,thematerialinthis

sectionis derivedfrom: R.4dmCharlesM.CookememoforPacificConferees,“Availability

EspirituSante,andEfate. Oneachtheregrewupacomplexnetworkof portinstal-lations,air bases,supplydepots,andsal-vageandrepairfacilitiesgearedtooperateat a pacethatmeshedwellwithHalsey’saggressiveoffensivephilosophy. LikethetacticaltaskforceswhichactuallyclosedcombatwiththeJapanese,thelogisticor-ganizationsformedan integratedwholein whichthe variousservicescooperatedto solvesupplyandsupportproblems.Allunitswereunderordersto“considerthem-selvesas part of the sameteamratherthanNavy,Army,or Marineservicesina separateandindependentsense.. . .“ 1°

ThehustlingbasesintheNewHebridesa.ld at Noumeafed a growingstreamofsuppliesforwardto theGuadalcanalareato meettheimmediateneedsof thegarri-son and to build a stockpilefor futureoperations.In combattrainingcampsscatteredthroughouttheSouthPacific,theinterserviceexchange and cooperationcharacteristicof thelogisticagencieswasrepeated.A senseof impendingactionwashigh;therewasa distinct“getthejobdone”atmosphere.

At this stageof the war—springof1943—noAllied positionin eithertheSouthor SouthwestPacificcouldyet beconsidereda “safe“ reararea. As a ccm-sequence,large ground garrisons,kept

of hTavalForces,“ innotesof 3dPMCMeeting,dtd13Mar43(COA,NHD) : Army-NavyCentralAgreementon SEAreaOps,dtd22Mar43inIGHQNavDireetiveNo. 213,dtd 25Mar43(OCMH), hereafter l~HQ Agreement Of22.}1ar~3;Seventeenth Army OPS—11;AS’EArea.NauOp$—11:RAdmWorrallR. Carter,Beam,Liuttet.s omd Btac7c Oit (Washington:NHD,N), 1953) ; Morison,Breakingthe BismarclixBarrier.

‘0Carter,Beans, Bullets and Black Oil, op. tit.,p. 46.


strong in tribute to Japan’s offensivecapabilities,were immobilizedat keypointswellawayfromtheprospectivecen-ter of conflict:e.g.,Samoa,Fiji, Tong~.Addingto thisdrainof offensivestrengthwastheslowrecoveryof battle-testedunitsfrom thedebilitatingeffectsof sustainedjunglewarfare. Thetroopsavailableforanoffensive,therefore,werequitelimitedin viewof the considerablejob at hand.In all,MacArthurandHalseycouldcounton havingonly14divisions,bothveterananduntried,readyfor offensiveactionbymid-year.11Of thistotaltheSoPacsharewas six divisions,four Army and twoMarine.

Although the manpower squeezebroughton by the shippingdemimdsofthe two-frontwar set,a low ceilingonPacificgroundforces,Allied planeandship strength wero on the upswing..4mericanwarproductionmadethediffer-ence. over 2,000combataircraftwouldbe availablefor the campaignagainstRabaul,’2a fair matchfor anythingtheJapanesecouldputL~pagainstthem. Atsea, the Pacific Fleet was rapidly ap-proachinga positionof absolutesuperior-ityovertheJapaneseasnewshipsof everytype, includingthe carriersandlandingcraft vitalto amphibiousoperations,re-portedtoCinCPacfor duty.” Thenavalelementsof Halsey’sand MacArthur’sarea commands,now designatedThirdFleet and SeventhFleet respectively,”

“ CCS23!3/1,dtd23May43,Subj: OpsinthePacificandFarEastin194,3-44(COA,NHD).

“ Ibid.“ King and ~hitehill, Kin~’sNaval Record,pp.

491495.1*~drniralKing establisheda numberedfleet

systemon15March1943withallfleetsinthePacifichayingoddnumbers,thoseintheAtlanticeven.

couldbe reinforcedfrom Nimitz’mobilestrikingforce as strategicrequirementsdictated.

Japanesepreparationsto meetthe of-fensivethattheyknewwaspendingintheSolomonsbeganto take shapeconcur-rentlywiththeevacuationof Guadalcanal.The SoutheastArea Fleet set navalde-fense troops to buildingbaseson NewGeorgia,Kolombangara,and SantaIsa-bel. In March,thefirstof severalrein-forcingunitsfromtheEighthAreaAmywasaddedto thenavalforcesin theNewGeorgiaGroup. On BukaandBougain-villeain the NorthernSolomons,the 6thDivisionwasmovedin fromTrukto pro-videthebulkof thegarrison.

A steadybuild-upof defenses,withtroopsandsuppliesbroughtin by bargeanddestroyer,tookplacedespitethe in-cessantandtellingattacksof Alliedplanesandsubmarines.Enemyairstayednorthof NewGeorgiaexceptfor occasionalraidsonGuadalcanal;enemycombatshipsstuckcloseto TrukandRabaulwaitingfor theopportunemomentto strike.

Defenseof the Solomonstook secondplacein Japaneseplansto measuresforcontinuedretentionof theLae-Salamauaregionof NewGuinea.On22March,theArmyandNavystaffsinTokyoagreedona newdirectivefor operationsin theRa-baulstrategicarea,replacingtheonethathad governedduring the Gu&dalcanalwithdrawal.The new orderspelledoutthe primacyof defensiveeffortsin NewGuinea,butitsgeneraltenorwasthesameas thatof its predecessor.In emphaticlanguage,the seniorcommandersin thefield, General Imamuraand AdmiralKusaka,wereenjoinedtoholdallthe posi-tionsthattheirtroopsthenoccupied.

.41thoughtheJapaneseretaineda dualcommandstructurein Rabaulunderthe

ORDEROFBATTLE 37

22Marchdirective,ImamuraandKusakaweretoldtocooperatecloselyandelementsof bothserviceswereorderedto’’literallyoperateas oneunit.”15 In thefield,theseniorArmyor Navygroundcommanderin an areawouldtakechargeof theop-erationsof troopsof bothservices.Untilthe first Allied assaultforce attacked,thoseoperationsconsisted,inthemain,ofconstructingdefensivepositionsskillfully

16IGHQ Agreement of 22M0r.4/l.

weddedto the terrain. AlthoughJapa-nesesoldiersandsailorsweredeeplyim-buedwithanoffensivespirit,theyseemedto have a specialaffinityfor defensivefightingwherethepick andshoveloftenratedequalwiththerifle. OnNewGeor-gia,SouthPacificforcesweredueto gettheir first real tasteof the burrowing,grudging,step-by-stepadvancethatchar-acterizedthe laterstagesof the PacificWar.

PART II

TOENAILSOperation

691–3600--—63-4

CHAPTER 1

Objective:NewGeorgia

BACKGROUNDOFMUNDA‘

Occupationof the Russells,followingcloselyon the heelsof the Guadalcanalvictory,seemedto whet,the appetiteofAlliedforcesintheSouthPacificfor moreaction,moreshow-downswith the Jap-anese. In AdmiralHalsey’sNewCale-doniaheadquarters,optimismandenthu-siasmran high. Singlenessof purposeandaspiritof camaraderieunitedallrep-resentativeson ComSoPac’sstaff; and,chargedby Halsey’simpatienceto getonwiththewar,hisstaffbusieditselfplan-ning for thenextmajoroffensivein theSolomons.The objective:seizureof theNewGeorgiaGroup.’ (SeeMapII, MapSection.)

1Unlessotherwisenoted,thematerialinthissectionisderivedfrom:AlliedGeographicalSec,GHQ,SWPA,Studyof NewGeorgiaGroup-TerrainStudyNo.54,dtd26Mar43;IntelSee,SoPaeFor,ObjectiveRept25-13,NewGeorgiaGroup,dtd15Feb43; SoPaeForPhotoInterpre-tationUReptsNos.37–39,42,43,and47,24Nov–17Dec43; Morison,Breakingthe BismarcksBarrier; MajJohnX. Rentz,Marines in theCentral i3010mons(Washington: HistBr,G–3,HQMC,1952),hereafterRentz,Marines in theCentral L9010mons.Documentsnototherwiseidentifiedinthispartarelocatedinthefollow-ingfilesof the.4rchives,HistoricalBranch,G–3Division,HeadquartersMarineCorps:Avia-tion; MonographandComment;NewGeorgiaAreaOperations;Publications; UnitHistoricalReports.

2In thesucceedingchapters,theterm“NWGeorgiaGroup”willreferto theentireislandgroup.Theterm“ATewGeorgia”will refer onlyto the island of that name.

A compactmazeof islandsseparatedbyshallow,coral-fouledlagoonsor narrowreachesof openwater,theNewGeorgiaGrouplieson a northwest-southeastaxisbetweenBougainvillea,110milesto thenorthwest,andGuadalcanal,180milestothesoutheast.Nearly150mileslongand40 mileswide,it comprises12majoris-landsoutlinedby manysmallerislandsandformidablereefs. A dense,forbiddingjunglegrowthcoversthe ruggedterrainand accentsthe abruptlyrising,conicalmountainswhichmarkthevolcanicoriginof thegroup.

Largestislandinthegroupis itsname-sake,NewGeorgia. It is huggedcloselyonthenorthbytheislandsof WanaWana,Arundel,andBaangaandguardedto thesoutheastby Vangunu and Gatukai.StandingofftothesouthareRendovaandTetipari,withtwoislands—VellaLavellaandGanongga-inalinetothenorthwest.GizoIslandchainsVellaLavellatoWanaWanaandblocksthesouthernendof VellaGulf. Completingthe New GeorgiaGroupisthecircular,5,450-footmountainpeak,Kolombangara,whichjutsoutof theseabetweenVella Gulf andKula Gulf,onlya fewmilesnorthwestof Arundel.

Thegroupcenterson NewGeorgia. Atortuous,misshapenmasswith a spinyridgeof peaks,it liespointingnorthin abig invertedV, 45milesin lengthand20miles wide. Its southerncoastline isborderedfor nearly20milesby Roviana

41


Lagoon, a coral-lacedand treacherousstretchof watervaryingfromonetothreemiles in width. Only smallboats cansafelytracea channelbetweenthenarrowopeningsin thereefandarolu]cltheshal-low bars of the lagoon. Vim Harbor,southeastof Roviana,is one of the feweasy-accesspointson thesoutheastcoast.A land-lockedanchorage,it hasanunob-structedbutzigzagchannel.

Theentireeastandnortheastsideof theisland is reef-lined,with Marova andGrassiLagoonsborderingthatcoastal-mostas Rovianadoeson the south. Asthe coastlineturns south at VisuvisuPoint—apexof theV—KulaGulf swellsdirectlyintothreedeep-wateranchoragesformed by jungle rivers rising in themountainson thenorthcoast. RiceAn-chorageandEnogaiInlet are shortandmangrove-linedwithdeepforestcrowdingthe shores;BairokoHarbor,deeperandlonger,ispartiallyblockedby reefsbutisthebestanchoragealongthegulf. PastIlairoko, Hathorn Sound connectsthegulf with the passagethroughto thesouth,DiamondNarrows. Only224feetwideat its narrowestpointand432feetacrossatitswidest,theNarrowsseparatesNew Georgiafrom Arundeland is thenorthernentranceto RovianaLagoon.Itstwistingchannelisnavigable,however,onlybysmallboats.

The dank,oppressivenatureof the is-landcharacterizedeventhelifeof theNewGeorgianatives. Theirswas a scrubbyexistencefrom small gardens, nativefruits,somefishing,andoccasionaltrad-ing. One-timeheadhunters,theybecameaggressivesailorswhomovedfrom pointto point throughthe lagoonsby canoe,avoidingtheruggedinlandtravel. As aresult,theywere,in 1943,excellentguides

to thecoastlinesof theislandsbutalmostcompletelyignorantof theinteriors.

In November1942,whilestillcontestingpossessionof HendersonFieldonGuadal-canal,the Japanesesoughtanotherair-field which would bring their fighterplaneswithinshorterstrikingdistanceofthesouthernSolomons. Theyfoundit atMundaPointonNewGeorgia,abouttwo-thirdsof thewayfromRabaultoGuadal-canal.It wasa naturalselection.MundaPoint was relativelyflat and could bereachedfrom the sea only throughonenarrowbreakin its barrierreef, whichwasriskyevenfor shallow-draftshipsathightide,or throughseveralopeningsinthe stringof isletslockingRovianaLa-goontotheisland.Anoverlandapproachrequiredan arduousjungle trek eitherfromriverinlets10milesto thenorthorfrom pointsto theeastin Roviana. ‘Thepositionof theproposedairfieldmadeanallyof theentireisland,utilizingin pro-tectionallthereefsandisletswhichringedNew Georgiaandthe mattedcanopyofjunglegrowthwhichcoveredit.

The Japanesecameto Mundain forceon 13 November1942. TheirtransportsstoppedoffMundareeflatethatdayand,byearlymorningof the14th,troopscom-pleteddebarkingby smallboats. Theoc-cupationunitimmediatey sentoutarmedpatrolsto “subjugate”thenativesandin-form them of the Japaneseintentions.Kolombangara,Rendova,Vangunu,andsurroundingsmallerislandswerevisitedandquicklyputundercontrol. Thecon-structionof anairfieldbeganwiththear-rival of additionaltroopsandengineerson21November.

CoastwatcherDonaldG. KennedyatSegiPlantationontheextremesoutheast-erntipof NewGeorgiawasoneof thefirst

OBJECTIVE:NEWGEORGIA 43

to hearof theoccupation.In October,amonthprevious,whentheJapanesefirstreconnoiteredNewGeorgia,Kennedyor-ganizeda bandof nativesto helphimde-fendhispost. Whentheyinformedhimof the Mundalanding,he sent HarryWickham,ahalf-nativeco-worker,toRen-dovato watchMundaandreporton theprogressof theairfield.

Wickham’sreportof JapaneseactivityatMundawasinvestigatedimmediatelybyAlliedairreconnaissance.Thefirstreport,on 24 November,was negative. Photo-graphsclearly,showeda plantationarea,asmallclusterof buildingsatMunda,andasimilarclusterof buildingsatKokengolaMissionnorthof Munda. Therewasnoactivitywhichcouldbeclassedasenemy,no evidenceof airfieldconstruction.Al-lied planesbombedtheareaanyway. Itwasa gestureof confidencein KennedyandWickham.

Thenphotointerpreterspickedup in-terest. Newbuildingsbeganto showupin laterphotostrips,anda strangewhitelineappearedbeneaththeplantationtrees.On 3 December,SoPac interpretersan-nouncedtheirdiscovery: apossible]and-ingstripunderconstruction.Twodistinctstrips,125feetwideandabout1,000feetapartina directlinewitheachother,werevisibleintheprints. Onestripwasabout175feet long, the otherabout200feet.Naturalcamouflage,it wasdecided,par-tiallyshieldedtheconstruction.Twodayslaterthefieldwas2,000feetlong. Notreeshadbeencutdown,butpilesof eitherlooseearthor coralappearedbeneatheachtree.Newbuildings,obviouslycontroltowers,hadbeenbuiltadjacentto thefield. On9December,photosshowedthefieldnearlyclear,thetreesapparentlypulledup and

takenaway,andthe holesfilledin withcoral. TheJapanese,alertedby thecon-tinuedinterestof AlliedplanesoverMun-da, had abandonedfurther camouflageattempts.3

By 1’7December,afteronlya monthatMunda and despitemultiplebombingraids,theenemyhadan operationalair-strip4,’ioofeet long. A seriesof revet-mentsanda turn-aroundloop eventuallyfinishedthefield. An advanceechelonof24aircraftwasmovedto Mundauponitscompletion,but all were destroyedorbadlydamagedbybombingraidswithinaweekafterarrival. Thereafter,theJapa-neseusedthe fieldmainlyfor servicingplanesafterraidsonGuadalcanalandtheRussells,and few pilots dared Alliedbombingsto tarry at Mundavery long.Repairof thestripwaseasy;bulldozersquicklyfilledintheholes.Despitetherainof bombsand occasionalshellings,thefieldwas neverout of operationlongerthan48hours.4

New Georgia,the Allieshad decided,wouldbe t,hetargetof thenextoffensivein theSouthPacific. Mundaairfieldwasthebull’s-eye.As amilitaryprize,itheldtheenemy’shopesfor a re-entryintothelowerSolomonsandtheAlliedhopesforanothersteptowardsRabaul,

3Oneofthepopularbutunverifiedstoriesaboutthecamouflageof Mundafieldis: “TheJapa-nesehadspunawebofwirecablesbetweenthetol)sof thepalmtrees.Thetrunkswerethencutoutfromunderthebrancheswhichremainedsuspendedexactlyinplace,heldbythecables.”Cal)tl~alter Karig, [JSh”R,andCdrEricPurdon,USXR,Battle lik’port,PacificWar: MiddlePkaw(Xew York:RinehartandCompany,Inc.,1947),p.201.

4USSBS, InterrogationsNo. 195, LCdrS.l’unoki,IJNT,I,p.192.


NEW GEORGIARECONNAISSANCE5

HalseyhadintendedtobeinNewGeor-gia by mid-April, His planningdatescrappedbytheJCSandhisoffensivetiedto constructionof airfieldsat KiriwinaandWoodla.rk,theadmiralwaitedfor thego-aheadsignal. Whilewaiting,he sentreconnaissancepatrolsprobingtheCentralSolomons.

Guadalcanallandoperationshadbeenplaguedby a dearthof informationonterrainand topography. New Georgiawaslikewiseunmappedanclhydrographicchartswere badly out of date. Sinceaerialphotographyrevealedonly thickjunglegrowth,actualphysicalscoutingby trainedmenwastheonlyanswer. Acombatreconnaissanceschool with ex-periencedMarineandArmypersonnelandselectedcoastwatchersas instructorswasorganizedat Guadalcanal,andabout100menweretrainedandformedintoscout-ing teams. Halseyfound their reportsinvaluable,andbeginningwithELKTONplanning,“nevermadea forwardmovewithouttheirhelp.”~

FirstterraininformationonNewGeor-gia had beenreceivedfrom a patrolofsix Marinesanda ComSoPacstaffofficerthathadprowledRovianaLagoon~ndthe

5Unlessotherwisenoted,thematerialinthissectionisderivedfrom:PomSoPac Apr–May.@WarL)s; CtJnlI’hibFor, SoPacFor WarlJ, 17–30Jun43; (3o1\VillianlF. Coleman,“AmphibiousReeon Patrols,” Marine Corps Gazette, v. 27,no. 12(I)ec43) ; SgtFrank.X.!I’olbert,“AdvanceMan,” Leatherneck, v. 28, no. 3 (Mm45) ; Feldt,The Coastwatchers; Rentz,Marines in, the Cen-tral Solornons.

GFAdmWilliaml?.HalseyandLCdrJulianBryan,III,.4dmiral Halsey’s Story (New York:WhittleseyHouse,1947),p.158,hereafterHalseyandBryan,Halsey’sStory.

Mundaareain lateFebruary,contactingcoastwatchers,scouting and mappingtrails, and selectingpossible landingbeaches.Theirreporthelpedtheadmiralreacha decisionon hittingthe CentralSolomonsand gave SoPacplannerstheinformationfor tentativestrakgy.’

on 21March,a groupof Marinescoutsdrawn from the raider battalionsandgraduatesof the combatreconnaissanceschoollandedby PBY (Catalinaflyingboat) at Segi Plantation.’ With Ken-nedy>snativesas guides,thegroupsplitintopatrolsandsetoutto scoutpossiblelandingbeaches,landmarks,and motortorpedoboat(MTB) anchorages.Travel-ingby canoeat nightandobservingdur-ing daylighthours,the patrolscheckedtraveltimefrompointtopoint,tookbear-ingson channels,scoutedenemydisposi-tionsandinstallations,andsketchedcrudemapsto helpfillinthescantyinformationalreadyavailable.Onegrouphadthemis-sionof “collectinginformationabouttheVirugarrison,armamentandaccessibilityto the area,bothby wayof directattackup theharborcliffsandby inlandnativetrailsthroughthejungle,”9whichmarked

TAmember of that first patrol said that Hal-sey, after hearing the reports on New Georgia,declared, “JT’ell, gentlemen, we’re going to hitthat place. I don’t know when or how, butwe’re going to hit it.” Maj Clay A. Boyd inter-view by Maj John N. Rentz, dtd 16Feb51.

‘ 17hesenior member of this patrol group later(wmxnented: “1 never heard of the ‘combat re-connaissance school’ and know that I and theother two members of the patrol from the 3dRaider Bn. didn’t graduatefrom it.” Col MichaelS. Cumin ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtdl10c”t60,hereafter GwrrinZtr.

“Maj Roy 1). Batterton, “You Fight by theBook,’” l[arine Corps Gazette, v. 33, no. 7(Ju14!)), hereafter Batterton, “You Fight by theBook.”


itasapossibletargetintheassault.Otherpatrolsrangedfrom RovianaLagoontoArundeland Kolombangara,along thenorthernshore of New Georgia.fromEnogai Inlet to MarovaLagoon, andaroundt,hecoastofVangunu.Anotherpa-trol contactedtheRendovacoastwatcher,Harry Wickham.’OThe missionswerevirtuallythesame:to bringbackallpos-sibledataon theenemyandterrain.

At thisearlydatein thespringof 1943,tentativeinvasionplansenvisioneda di-visionallandingat Segi Plantationfol-lowed by a sweepoverlandto captureMunda field. The patrol reports con-firmed the growing suspicionsof theComSoPacwarplansstaff: Segi’sbeacheswouldnot accommodatea largelandingforce,anda sizablebodyof troopscouldnot move throughuntrackedjungle toMundawithanyhopeof success.Anothermethodof attackwouldhaveto be de-veloped.

The patrolscontinuedto shuttlebackto New Georgiafor more information.CoastwatchersA. R. Evanson Kolom-bangara,Dick HortonandHarryWick-hamat Rendova,and Kennedyat Segiplayedhoststo furtiveguestswhoslippedin by nativecanoesfromsubmarines,fastdestroyers,orPBYs. Thepatrolssearchedopeningsin thebarrierreef of Roviana,checkedoverlandtrailsfromRiceAnchor-ageonthenorthcoasttoZananaBeachonthesouthin Roviana,andlookedfor easyaccesstoMundafield., Inthisconnection,Wickham-whohadlivedonNewGeorgiamostof his life—’’wasparticularlyvalu-able.”11

Thereportson Mundawerediscourag-ing. HathornSoundhadno beachesand

‘0Currinltr.“ Feldt,The (70astwatcher.s,p.149.

shallowlandingcraft could passsafelyonly halfway through Diamond Nar-rows.lz LSTS might possiblyskirt thewestshoreof BaangaIslandto get toMunda,but it wouldbe a hazardous,ob-stacle-linedtrip. Crossingthe reef atMundabarwasanotherrisk. Soundingsindicatedthattheopening,throughcon-tinuedcoral deposits,had becomemoreshallowand restrictedthan admittedlyoutdatedreportsindicated.A directas-saultoverMundabar,theclosestentranceto Munda,waspatentlythemostdanger-ous courseand held the leastchanceofsuccess.

Finalassaultplanswerea concessiontotheterrain. Theyprovidedfor landingsoff-shorefromMunda,followedbyatroopbuilduponhTewGeorgiaandthenastrongattackontheairfieldfromallsides. ThelastreconnaissancepatrolswentintotheNewGeorgiaGroupon13June. Landingat Segi they took off in log canoesforthe four landingspotsfinallyselected:Rendova,RiceAnchorage,ViruHarbor,and Wickham Anchorage. Teams ofMarineCorps,Army, and Navy officersstudiedthedesignatedbeachesandsoughtartillery positions, observationposts,waterpoints,bivouacareas,andinteriortrails. Someof thepatrolsskirtedJap-anesedefenses,notingthe strengthandhabitsof the enemy,beforestrikingin-landfor terraininformation.Whentheteamspaddledbackto Segi,someof themembersstayedbehindwith nativesto

‘zIn thelaterstagesof thecampaign,someLSTSmadeit throughtheNarrowswithZ5thInfantryDivisiontroopsandequipmentonboard,butthedivision’schiefofstaffremembersthetripas“a tightsqueezew/fasttidalflow—nopicnic.”MajGenWilliamW.Dick,Jr.USA,1trtoACofS,G–3,HQMC,dtd310ct60,includingcommentsbyMajGenDavidH.Buchanan,USA.


guidethe landingpartiesto thebeacheswithlightsflashedfromtheshore.

AWAITING ASSAULT13

Mundaassumeda new role in enemystrategyduringthespringof 1943. In-steadof theproposedspringboardfor re-captureof Guadalcanal,it becamea key-stonein Japan’sdecisionto buildup theLae-Salamauadefenseline whilemain-tainingthe Solomonsas delayingposi-tions.

Japaneseengineers,afterrushingMun-daintocompletion,hurriedto Kolomban-gara to constructanotherfield at VilaPlantationon thesoutheastshore. Heretheydid not attemptconcealment.Thetask went aheaddespitealmostdailybombingsandoccasionalnavalbombard-ments. The enemynow had two stripsfrom which they could stage attacksagainstAllied positionson Guadalcanalandthe Russells;but the air over TheSlotwasatwo-waystreet,andmostof thetrafficwasfromHendersonField.

13Unlessotherwisenoted,thematerialinthissectionisderivedfrom: MilHistSec,G–2,FEC,JapaneseMonographNo.34,SeventeenthArmyOps—PartI (OC.MH), hereafterSeventeenthArmy Ops—I; SE Area NavOps—11; CIC,SoPacForItemNo.635,NewGeorgiaAreaI)efButaiSecretONo.16,dtd23Mar43,ItemNo.647,KolombangaraIslandDefOA No.5, dtd2Ju143,ItemNo.672,Outlineof DispositionofSE Det,dtd20Jun43,ItemNo.690,Kolom-bangaraIslandDefTaiO,dtdlMar43,ItemNo.702,NewGeorgiaDefOpO“A” No.8, 0. lateJun43,ItemNo.711,SeventeenthArmyONo.244,dtd27Apr43,ItemNo.753,SEDetHqIntel-RecNo.2 (MiddleJuneRept), dtd24Jun43;SoPacForPOWInterrogationRepts105and106,dtd90ct43,and138and140,dtd24ATOV43;USAFISPAOBG-2ReptNo.27,17-24Ju143;ReD@,Marinesin the Central i30tomons.

Buildupof troopstrengthin theVila-Mundaareawassteadybutslow. Air su-premacywasstill contested,butthe ini-tiativewas with the Allies. Japaneseplansfor reinforcingthe CentralSolo-monswereslowedbythecontinualharass-mentfrom planesof Commander,Air-craft Solomons(ComAirSols),and theenemywaseventuallyreducedto schedul-ing trooptransfers“from theendof themonthto thebeginningof the followingmonth to take advantageof the newmoon.”14 Then,too,thetransportlossesin the Battleof the BismarckSeaon 3Marchandthesteadilymountingattritionof navalcraftfromairattackswasslowlysappingJapaneseseapower.

By theend of April, landdefensesintheCentralSolomonshadbeenstrength-enedwith Army and Navytroops,andadditionalreinforcementswerestandingby in theBuin-Shortlandareafor furthertransportation.The8thCombinedSpecialZVavalLanding Force (CSZVLF),whichincludedtheKure 6th Special iVavaZLarui-ing Force andthe Yokosuka7th SN.LPwastheNavy’scontributiontothedefenseof Vila-Munda.15After Japanlost theinitiativein thePacific,theseamphibiousassaulttroops werechangedto defenseforces. Namedforthenavalbaseatwhichtheunitwasformed,anSNLFgenerally

“ S’ezxmteenthArmy OPS—1,p.6.IsThetotalordnanceof the8th CSNLF in-

cluded: 8 140mm coast guns; 8 Izomm coastguns; 16 8@nmcoastguns;4120nlmAAguns;875nlmAAguns;1240mmAAguns;2 75mmmountain(artillery)guns; 2 70mmhowitzers;4013mmAAmachineguns; 38heavymachineguns;102lightmachineguns. MilIntelDiv,WarDept,HandbookonJapaneseMilitaryForces(TM-E30480),dtd15Sep44,pp.76,78;GHQ,SWPA,MilIntelSec,Organizationof theJapa-neseGroundForces,dtd22Dec44,p.299.

OBJECTIVE: NEWGEORGIA 47

included:a headquartersunit; two riflecompanies;a heavy weaponscompanywithhowitzer,antitank,andmachinegLmunits;an antiaircraftcompany;a heavygunor seacoastdefenseunit;andmedical,signal,supply,andengineertroops.

The Yo7cosukaTth landedat Kolom-bangaraon 23Februarywith1,807men,andwasfollowedon9MarchbytheKure6thwith2,038men. ThisunitwentintopositionsbetweenBairokoandEnogaiandaroundtheairfieldat Munda. RearAd-miralMinoruOta,commandingthe 8th~sA7~~, assumedresponsibilityfor thedefenseof theNewGeorgiasector.

By prioragreementbetweenthe/!leven-ipenthArmyandtl~eEighth~leet, .YrmyanclA“avystrengthin the CentralSolo-l~~c)nswas to be about even. After send-ing the 8th CSNLFto the Xew CTeorg,iaareajtheX-:lvywasdeterlnilledtohole]the.\rnlyto itsendof thebargain. Follow-il]g a l]umberof co]~ferences,the Armyreinforcementsbegan arriving in lateMarch. Theorigil~alforceatMundacon-sistedof twocompaniesfromthe2dBat-ta7/on.M?,9thRegimentof tl~e,38thDivi-.Yionwith two antiaircraft battalions forI)l”otection for tl~e naval base constructiont1’00]1S. Kolombal]~ar:t was garrisonedearly in 1943 with troOpS from the 51,sj~i~’jsion inducting an infantry battalion,nn artillery (Ietachrnent, nncl engineer and:lir clefellse units.

Tlie ~emai~~clerof the $i?2,9thRegimentatBllin,with sll~)portingtroops,“be%intofilterintoATew~eor~ialatein ~~prilandthe57stDivisiontroopsonKolombangarawererelievecl. The l?l?,9thmovedto theMul~daairfieldarea,andabattalionfromtheI,?thInfuniiyZ7eginzentJ6thDivision,tookoveractualclefel~seof Kolombangara.As opportunitiesarose, the Japanese

Guadalcanalhadbeena well-learned—albeit,painful—lesson.Thereinforcementof theVila-MundaareareflectedJapan’sI]ewstrategy:

Our fundamental policy was to bring thedesired number of troops into strategic keyl}[)intsbefore the enemyoffensive, in spite ofnl:lnifol(l diffi(wlties; and in erent of anenemyoffensive,to preventour supplytrans-I)ort;ition from being hampered; to throwin our entire sea, kind, and air strength atthe first sign of an enemy landing to engageit in {le[jisive combat; and to secure com-I)lett’lythe strategic key positionslinking theCentralSolomons,I.ae, and Salamaua,whichformed our national defenseboundaryon thesoutheasternfront.1’

OnNewGeorgia,theJapaneseprepareddefensesfor all eventualities.MundaPoint and the airfieldvicinity bristledwith antiaircraftand artilleryweapons.Theenemydid notdiscountthethreatofa directassaultoverMundabarandsitedsomeof theirarmamentto coverthatap-proach; but the bulk of the weaponspointed north toward Bairoko—fromwhichan overlandattackmightcome-and towardLaianaBeach on RovianaLilgoon—whereanattackseemedlogical.The Japanesebelieved,however,thatthenextAllied objectivewasto be Kolom-bang-a.rain an attemptto attackMundafrom therear; so Vila likewisewaspre-paredto repl~lseany assault. Increased.Alliedairactivity,thepresenceof a greatnumberof trooptransportsintheGuadal-canalarea,and increasedreconnaissanceconvincedthe enemythatan attackwasimminent.Their intelligencereportsofabout50cargo-typeairplanesatHender-sonFieldalsopromptedspeculationonthepossibilityof airborneoperationsagainstVila-Munda.

movedin moretroops. ‘6SE .~7”CUNaI)Ops-11, p. 4.


With bothArmy andNavytroopsoc-cupyingidenticalCentralSolomonsposi-tions,a moreunifiedcommandarrange-mentwassought.AdmiralOta,theseniorcommanderinthearea,hadbeenresponsi-blefor bothArmyandNavylanddefensesin theVila-Mundaarea. On2May,how-ever,Imperial Headquar+xwdirectedthata commandpost be establishedin NewGeorgia,andon 31 May,MajorGeneralNoboruSasakiof the 38thDivisionar-rivedat Kolombangarato headthenewSoutheast Detuchrnent,a joint Army-Navydefenseforce. Administrativelyat-tachedtotheSeventeenthAmnybutunderthe operationalcommandof the EighthFZeet,GeneralSasakiwas assignedre-sponsibilityfor all land defensesin theNewGeorgiasectorandcommandof allArmytroopsin the area. AdmiralOta.,still in commandof Navytroops,wasdi-rectedto givehimfullestcooperation.Itwas a commandstructurewhich criss-crossedArmyandNavychannels,butwithSasaki’sassignmentspelledout,andwithOta’scooperationassured,a unifiedforcewasestablished.

By late,]une,as ?Japanwaitedfor anAlliedthrustshebelievedwascoming,thedefensivepositionsin the New GeorgiaGroupwereset. Toobtaingreatercoordi-nation,GeneralSasakidivicledhisdefensearea into threezonesof responsibility:the Central (Munda); the western(Kolomban~ara); andtheEastern(Viru-l~ickham).Thetaskof defendingMundaPointhe gaveto colonel GenjiroHirataand the W9th Regiment,augmentedbytwo batteriesof the 10th IndependentMountainArtillery Regiment. Air de-fensewouldbe providedby the15thAzWDefense Unit which combinedthe ijlst

Field Antiaircraftt Battalion (less one

battery), the 3’lstIndependentFieldAntiaircraftoonzpany,the.ZVthFieldMa-chine LyannonCompany, andthe3d FieldSearchlightBattalion(lessonebattery).Onecompanyof the2Z9thRegimentwasdispatchedto Rendova.

To aidSasakiinthedefenseof theair-field,AdmiralOtaestablishedthreesea-coastartillerybatteriesat Mundawith140mm,120mm,and 80mmguns. Alsobasedtherewasan antiaircraftmachineguncompanyof theKzwe6thSiVLF,the.4?IstAn,tiaircraft Componyandthe17thand131stPioneers(labortroops). Otaalsosenta riflecompanyfrom theKuretitli to Rendova. The remainderof theKuretlth,underCommanderSaburoOkl~-muralwasto defendthel;airokoHarborarea. ~olombangara>sdefensewas en-trustedto a battalionof the It?thRegi-ment,reinforcedby a batteryof the10thIndependentMountainArtillery. Airdefenseof Vila airstriprestedwiththe58th Fiei?dAntiaircraftt Battalion(lessone battery), the%V?dandthe %’3dFieZdMachineCannonG’ornpanies,andasearch-light battery. The maindetachmentsofthe Yokow&aYthSNLF and the 19thPionee~swerealsobasedon Kolomban-gara.

ViruHarborwasgarrisonedby thelth(70mpanyof the%Wth,lessoneplatoonwhichwentontoWickhamAnchoragetoaugmenta seacoastdefensebatteryfromtheKurerlth. To completethedefensivepicture,lookoutplatoonswerescatteredaboutthecoastlineof NewGeorgiaandonsomeof the smalladjacentisletsto actassecuritydetachments.

In all,asSasaki’sreinforcementandde-fenseplansracedrightdownto thewirewith Allied offensivepreparations,theJapanesehadabout5,000Navyand5,500


ArmytroopsintheNTewGeorgia-Kolonl-bangaraarea. Althoughthe8th~ASNLFwasnot combattested,the .Z$7,9thRegi-ment and the f3th li’eg~naentwere an-othermatter.The22,9thhadparticipatedin thecaptureof HongKongbeforetak-ingpartin theoccupationof ,Java.Com-mittedto combatagain,theregimenthadonebattalionnearlyannihilatedon NewGuineaand anotherbattalionsufferedheavycaslmltiesat Guaclalcanal.Rein-forced by fresh troops at IiabaulandBougainvillea,the survivors had beenformedintonewbattalionsto join theZdBattaZionat NewGeorgia. Theelementsof thel$thReghen t, beforebeingsent,toKolombangara,werepartof theGthDz’-?’ir$ion,whicl~g:~rrisonedthe ~TorthernSolomons. One of Jap:ul’soldestdivi-sions,the 6th waslikewisehardenedbycombatin Chinabeforebeingsentto theSolomonIslands.

ExpandingseaandairoffensivesbytheAllies in the latespringof 1943hat{adefinitebearingon ,Japan’soutlookto-wardher defensesin the SouthPacific.Wideningthescopeof thewar,a large-scalebombingattackin n~id-Mayplas-teredthe,Japanese-helclatollof WakeintheCentralPacific. Thisstrikefolloweda landingin theAleutianson 11Mayby

1’LTnlessotherwisenoted,thematerialinthissectionis derivedfrom:CinCPaeOpsinPOA,~lay43,dtd15Aug43;CinCPacOpsin POA,.Jnn43,dtd6Sep43: OATI,C’omfiatNarratives,Nolomon,Islands Campaign:IX—Bombardmentsof Mundu and Vila-i3fanmore, Januarg–illay19J3 (Washington, 1944), hereinafter cited asONI, Corn7)atNarratives IX; SE Area NauOps—II; h!lorison,Breaking t]!e Bi~marcks Barrier;.Miller,Reduction of Rabaul; Sherrod,MarAir-HitW.

IJ.S.Armytroopscoveredbynavalforces.The enemybelievedthat the counter-landingsintheNorthPacificwereadirectthreatto theHomeIslands,andpkuMforthesoutheastareawereimmediatelycur-tailed. .!lbout~o per centof thetroopsearmarkeclfor the Solomonsand NewGuineawereshiftedto thenortheastarea;and~idmiralMineichiKoga,successortoAdmiralYamamoto,pulledhisCombinedF7eetl~eaclquartersoutof Trukandmovedto Tokyo so thathe couldbettercontroloperationsthroughoutthe Pacific. Hismain fleet,units,however,remainedatTruk.

Trueto his promiseto theJCS at thetimeof the 28 Marchdirective,AdmiralHalseykept.thepressureon theJapanesein the Central Solornons. Under thepoundingof bombsand sea bombard-ments,iheVila-Mundaareaneverhadtheopportunityto developpastits useas arefuelingpoint for enemyplanes. TheAlliedstrikesscoredfewcasualtiesamongtheMundadefenders,relativelysecureinundergrounddefensesneartheairfield,butkeptenemyengineersbusyrepairingthecrateredrunways. The attacksloweredmorale,however,bykeepingtheJapanese“sleeplessandfatigued,”18andoccasionalhitswerescoredonfuelandsupplydumps.Priorto May,MundaandVilahadtakennearly120bombingraids,andfourmajornavalbombardmentshadrainedshellsonthetwoairfields.

The Tokyo Express—fastdestroyerscarryingtroopsandsuppliesto theNewGeorgiaGroup—stillsteamedon. TheAlliesfoundtheycouldnotpossiblycoverallavenuesof supply,andthattohaltthetrafficentirelywouldrequiremoreplanes

“ I-SSBS, 1)/terrogation ATO.224, CdrYasumiIMi,IJX,I,p.210.


andshipsthanSouthPacificforcescouldmusterat this stageof the war. On 6May, however,the expressruns wereabruptly,if onlytemporarily,disrupted.Rear Admiral Walden L. Ainsworth,headinga ThirdFleettaskforceof threecruisers,five destroyers,and threecon-verteddestroyer-minelayers,steamedupthe gap betweenGizo andWanaWanaIslandsinto the Vella Gulf. As Ains-worth’s cruisers and four destroyersblockedthe northernentranceto VellaGulf, thethreeminelayersescortedby aradar-equippeddestroyerlaidthreerowsof minesacrossthestraitsbetweenKolom-bangaraandGizo. Thentheentireforceturnedfor homebasesat Guadalcanal.(SeeMapII, MapSection.)

Dividendswerealmostimmediate.Thenext night, four JapanesedestroyersslippedintoBlackettStraitswithVila astheirdestination.Theyneverreachedit.The trap wassprung. Blunderingintotheminefield,oneshipwentdownalmostin~mediately;twootherswerebadlydam-aged. The fourthshipstoodby to pickup survivors.And that’sthewayAlliedplanes,somewhatdelayedby adversewea-ther,foundthemthenextday. Thetwodamagedshipsweresunkby bombs,butthe fourth ship, heavily bombed andstrafed,managedto limp back towardBougainvillea. Gleeful coastwatchersradioedthebox scoreto (luadalcanal.

Heartenedby the success,the ThirdFleet plannedanothersurprise. Thistime,VilawouldbeshelledasthenorthernentrancetoKulaGulfwasmined. Onthenightof 13May,AdmiralAinsworthleda forceof threecruisersandfivedestroy-ers in firingrunspastVila, steaminginfrom the north,while a destroyerandthreefast minelayersplantedminesoff

theeastcoast.of Kolombangara.As eachof Ainsworth’sshipscompletedher runpastVila, sheturnedandpumpedheavyfireintotheBairokoandEnogai-RiceAn-chorageareas.

At thesametime,a forceof onecruiserandthreedestroyersplasteredMundaonthe oppositesideof NewGeorgia. Theairfieldhadnotbeenincludedin theori-ginalbombardmentplans,buta last-hourswitchin order.~accomplishedby dis-patchanda messagedropfromplanestothe ships designated—hadadded thatstronghold.Vila washit by a to~alof2,895six-inchand 4,340five-inchshells,Mundaby9’70six-inchand1,648five-inch.Theoperationwascoveredbyanairstrikein theNorthernSolomonsandadditionalfighterplanesflew cover and reportedbombardmentresults.

The mine-layingdid not producetheearlierresults. It slowedthe Japanesesupplychainby forcing it to be morecautious,but it did not halt it. Thebombardmentwas a bigger disappoint-ment. Lessthan12hoursafterthe lastshellhadbeenfired,a flightof 26Japa-nesefightersstagedfromMunda-Vilawaschasingtheattackforcebackto Guadal-canal. Coastwatchersradioedthe warn-ing; 102Alliedaircraftformeda welcom-ing committee.Seventeenenemyplaneswerereportedlyshot down; 16 of themwereclaimedbyMarinefighters.FiveAl-liedplanesandthreepilotswerelostintheaction. The bombardmentwas the lastscheduledbeforetheactualinvasion;theresults,it wasapparent,werenot worththe price. .4 harassingbombardment,CinCPaclateradvised,wasnot justifiedwhen“all shipsweresubjectedto thehaz-ardof enemyMTB andSS [submarine]


attackswithno prospectof equaloppor-tunitytodamagetheenemy.”19

AiractivityincreasedduringJune.Air-fieldsin the Russellsgave the Allies ashorterrangeto targetsin the NorthernandCentralSolomons,aswellasprovid-ing anotherlaunchingarea for gettingplanesintotheair to repelattacks.At-tractedby theconcentrationof shippingintheGuadalcanalarea,theJapanesetrieda newone-twopunchof heavyflightsoffightersfollowedby large numbersofbombers,butthreemajorstrikeson 7, 12,and16Juneresultedin staggeringlosses.The enemyhad hopedto breakeveninfightertolls,whichwouldthengivetheirbombersopportunitytoattackunmolested.Themaneuverboomeranged.Eachtime,ComAirSolswasableto meetthethreatwithfrom 105to 118aircraftandin thethreestrikes,atotalof 152enemyairplaneswasclaimed. TheAllieslost21.

PREPARING TO STRIKE20

Theassaultof NewGeorgia,viewedinoptimismcontagiousat thetime,seemedan easyassignmentdespitethe inaccess-ibility of Munda. Reconnaissancehadvirtually pinpointed Japanese strongpoints,andthecombateffectivenessof theVila-Mundaairfieldshad been reducedconsiderablybytheAlliedpounding.In-telligencesources,whichlaterprovedre-markablyaccurate,estimatedthat therewereonlyabout3,000JapaneseatMunda,with another500troopsat Bairokoand

‘6ONI,Combat Narratives IX, p.74.‘0Unlessotherwisenoted,thematerialinthis

sectionisderivedfrom: ComSoPacOPlan14-43,dtd 3Jun43;ComThirdFltOPlan12–43,dtd5iJun43;CTF31OpOAS–43,dtd4Jun43;NTGOFFOXo,1,dtd16Jun43andNo,2,dtd24Jun43;Rentz,Marinesin the Central Sotomons.

a detachmentof 300menatWickhamAn-chorageandabout100moreatViruHar-bor. Thebulkof theforces,estimatedat5,000to 7,000troops,wason Kolomban-gara, togetherwith an additional3,000laborers.

Japan’s reinforcementability frompoints in the NorthernSolomonswasnoted,buttherewasno readyestimateofthe numbersavailablefor quickassign-mentto combat. Her seastrengthin theSolomonswasbelievedtobe6destroyers,5submarines,and 12 transports,with acruiser,5destroyers,7submarines,and25attacktransportsatRabaul.Japaneseairstrengthwasputat89land-basedaircraftin theSolomonswithanother262at Ra-haul. Whiletroopestimateswereneartheactualenemytotals,ComSoPacguessesonairandseanumbersof theenemywerelow.TheentireEighthFleetwasintheShort-handsarea,whilea partof theCombinedFleet at Trukwascommittedto lendas-sistancein SoutheastArea operations.The JapaneseNavyhad 169land-basedplanesavailablefor combatfrom a totalof nearly300deployedin the BismarckArchipelagoandtheNorthernSolomons.TheEighthAreaAmy hadabout180air-craftattacheddirectlytoit; however,mostof these were supporting operationsagainsttheAlliesin NewGuinea.

Thetargethadbeenmarked.EarlyinJune, Admiral Halsey publishedhisordersfor theseizureandoccupationofNewGeorgia.TheimprobablecodenameTOENAILSmaskedHalsey’spartin theC.4RTWHEELoffensive.Themissions:captureWickhamAnchorageand ViruHarborassmall-craftstagingareas;seizeSegiPlantationasa possibleairfieldsite;seizeRendovaasabasefortheneutraliza-tion of Mundaby artilleryfire. Ordersfor the actualassaultof Mundaairfield

52 ISOLATIONOli’RABAUL

wouldbe issuedby ComSoPacafter thesuccessfulcompletionof thefirstphaseofTOENAILS.

Taskunitsof theThirdFleetwereas-signedcoveringmissionswhichwouldin-suresuccessof theoperationby blockinganyenemyforceattemptingto disruptthelandingswitha counteroffensive.Whileoneforceof destroyersandcruisersmovedin to minethe mainseachannelsaroundthe Shortland1s1ands,anotherheavierforceof battleshipsanddestroyerswastostagea bombardmentof Japanesestrongpoints in the NorthernSolomonsandShorthands.Air unitsof the SouthPa-cificAir Command,underVice AdmiralAubreyW. l?itch,wereassignedstrikes~gainst,shippingill the Shorthandsareaandbombingmissionscmairfieldscm Bou-gainvillea.Carrierair groupswereto in-terceptanyenemyshipscmaircrafthead-ing for the NewGeorgiaGroup. SoPacsubmarineswereto rangeintotheNorth-ern Solomonsfor interceptionandearlywarning of any Japaneseforce, anddestroyerunits would provide close-insupportfor thetransportgroupsengagedin the actuallandingoperations.Thus,with .4dmiralHalsey’sforces guardingthe northernand easternapproachestoNew Georgia,and GeneralMacArthur’soperationsin NewGuineashieldingthewesternflank,the assaultforces couldproceedwiththeseizureof TOENAILSobjectives.

TheArmy’s43dInfantryDivision,partof Major GeneralOscarW. Griswold’sXIV Corps,wasnamedastheassaultandoccupationtroops. The 2d MarineAir-craftWingheadquartersunderBrigadierGeneralFrancisP. Mulcahywasassignedto directtacticalairsupportoverthetar-get duringtheoperation.RearAdmiralTurner,commanderof amphibiousforces

in theSouthPacific,wasgivenoverallre-sponsibilityfor NewGeorgiaoperations.Detailedplanningfor the actualseizureandoccupationof theobjectivesoutlinedin Halsey’sbroadplanswouldbeTurner’sjob.

To accomplishthe TOENAILS mis-sions,Turnerdividedhis commandintotwo units. He would personallydirectthelargerwesternForceinthemainland-ing atRendovaandwouldberesponsiblefor movementof troopsand suppliestotheobjectiveandfor theirprotection.TheEasternForce,underthedirectionof RearAdmiral George H. Fort, would seizeViru,SegiPlantation,andWickhamAn-chorage. AdmiralFortwouldberespon-siblefor movementtothesetargetsandforembarkingtroopsandsuppliesfrom theRussellsfor subsequentoperations.

AdmiralTurner’sgroundcommander,MajorGeneralJohnH.Hester,headedtheNewGeorgiaOccupationForce(NGOF).Itscombatunitsconsistedof Hester’sown43dInfantryDivision,includingthe172dand169thRegimentsandonebattalionofthe 103dRegiment;the Marine9thDe-fenseBattalion;the136thFieldArtillery13at,talionfrom the 37thInfantryDivi-sion; the 24thNavalConstructionBat-talion(NCB) ; CompanyO of theMarine4thRaiderBattalion:the1stCommando,Fiji Guerrillas;2’ and assignedservicetroops.

Fort’sEasternForcewouldincludethe103dRCT (lessthebattalionwithHes-ter); CompaniesN,P, andQ fromthe4thRaiderBattalion;elementsof the 70thCoastArtillery(Antiaircraftt) Battalion;partsof the20thNCB; andserviceunits.

nCentralOfficeof Information,AmonuThosePresent (London,1946),pp.*56.

OBJECTIVE:NEWGEORGIA

The landingforce wouldbe headedbyColonelDanielH. Hundley,commandingthe103dRCT. Selectedasreadyreservefor theoperationwastheIstMarineRaid-erRegiment(lessthe2d,3d,and4thBat-talions),commandedbyColonelHarryB.Liversed~e.The Army’s37thInfantryI)ivision(lessthe12$)LhRCTandmostofthe148thRCT’) wouldbe in generalre-serveat Guadalcanal,readyto moveonfive-days’notice.

Executionof theassignedtaskslookedeasy. Turner’soriginalconceptwastoseizethe southernend of New GeorgiasimultaneouslywithRendova. Artillerybasedon Rendovaand offshoresmallerislandswouldsoftenMundafieldwhilethebuildupof assaultforces began. Fourdayslater,it wasplanned,MundawouldbeattackedthroughRovianaLagoonandoverMundaBar,whileBairokowouldbestruckeitherfrom the Russellsor by aforcehittingoverlandfromRovianaLa-goon. This maneuverwouldblockrein-forcementsfor the airfield. capture ofMundawouldthentri~~erthenextshore-to-shorejumpto Kolombangara,thelastphaseof OperationTOE~AILS.

Thesewerethefirstplans. ComSoPacordersstressedtheir successfulcomple-tionwitha minimumof forces. It couldnotbeforeseenattheinitialplanningcon-ferencesthat,beforeMundacouldbecap-turedandtheNewGeorgiaGroupoccu-pied,elementsof four infantrydivisionswouldbecommittedandextensivechangesinplanswouldberequired.Theproblemsmountedearly. LaianaBeachonRovianaLagooneastof Mundawasheavilyde-fended,althoughthe best landingarea.The channelthrou@ Roviana,scoutedfrom canoes,wastoo shallowfor LCMS.

53

TheislandsnearRendovaoriginallycon-sideredfor artillerypositionswerenotwithineffective105mmhowitzerrangeofMundaairfield.Andcoastwatcherreportsindicatedthattheenemy—despiteAlliedefforts-wasslippingreinforcementsintothe~ila-Mundaarea. Further,a recon-naissanceteamreportedthata strikeatBairoko from Rovianawas impossiblewithinthetimelimitsplanned.

The solutionsplaguedTurner’sstaff.ZananaBeach, about 5,500yards eastof Laiana,wassmallerbutvirtuallyun-defended,the scoutsreported. While itwouldholdonlya few landingcraft,thePirakaRivermouth1,000yardsfarthereastcouldpermitbeachingof additionalboats. Hesterdecidedon Zananaas hislandingbeach,andTurnergavehis ap-proval. ReachingZananawould be aproblem,however.Landingboatswouldhavetoslipthroughnarrow,coral-chokedOnaiavisiEntrancethatthreadedbetweenthesmalloffshoreislandsandthenfollowa twistingchannelto the beaches.Theselectionof ZananawTasbasedasmuchonitsundefendednatureasonitscapabilityof beingreachedby LCMS. It had,how-ever,oneapparentdrawback.Theattack-ing troopswouldbe unloadedat a con-siderabledistancefrom their objective.(SeeMap5.)

The planningproblemswereunexpect-edly ma@fied by an emergency. Anurgentcallfor assistancebyCoastwatcherKennedyatSe~iresultedintheprematurecommitmentof two Marineraidercom-paniesandtwocompaniesfromtheIosdRcT on 21June. AdmiralTurnermadethedecision.Thespeedupinscheduleup-setpreviousplannin~lbutit wasdeemednecessary.It requireda changein basic


strategy,ashufllingof troops,a changeinthetransportplans-andsomearound-the-clocksupplydutyby theMarine4thBaseDepot,inthe Russells—butthedecisionre-tainedpossessionof Segi for the Alliesuntilthe actualNewGeorgiainvasion.22

GeneralHester,who woulddirecttheoperations ashore, continually facedthornyproblems.To dealwiththemount-ing complexities,he delegatedthe plan-ning for the Rendovalandingsto a 43dDivisionstaffheadedbyhisassistantdivi-sioncommander,BrigadierGeneralLeon-ardF. Wing. A secondstaff,theNGOFstaff,completedthe NewGeorgiaattackplanning. Hesterretainedcommandofbothstaffs.Thefinalassaultplansevolvedfromthebestsolutionstoamultiplicityofproblems. ln the schemeof maneuver,part of thewesternForcewouldhit atMundathroughOnaiavisiEntrancewithtwo regimentslandingat Zananaandpivotingto thewestinanoverlandattackwithoneflankrestingonthelagoon. Thisforce, designatedthe SouthernLandingForce,wouldbe commandedinitiallybyGeneralWing.

Liversedge’sraiders—nowtitled theNorthernLandingGroup—wouldstrikedirectlyatBairokofromKulaGulf. Thiswouldbe coordinatedwith the landingsat,Zananaandwouldblockreinforcementsto Munda. It wasnot expectedthattheMundaforceswouldattemptto reinforcethe Bairokodefenders. This half of apincermovementfacedonehandicap;theareawasnot as well scoutedas thatofRovianaLagoon. TheHesterplanof at-tackenvisioneda shortcampaignduringwhichtheJapanesewouldbe caughtbe-

‘2ThecaptureofSe~iisrelateciinthefollowingchapter.

tweena hammeringforcefromthesouthanda holdingforce in thenorth. Thus,theenemywouldbepushedbacktowardsan areawhere>ringedby Allied troops,theycouldbepoundedintosubmissionbyaircraftandRendova-basedartillery.TOinsuresuccess,additional43d Divisionartillery (the 192dand the 103dFieldArtilleryBattalions)was addedto theNGOF.

D-Dayassignmentswereset. Troopsofthe l’72dInfantrywouldseizetwo smallislandsguardil~gthe approachesto Ren-dovaandthenestablisha beachheadonRendova itself. Through the securedpassage,HesterandWing wouldfunneltherestof thelandingforce,withthe103dInfantrygiventhetaskof expandingthebeachheadandmoppinguptheisland,re-portedto be lightly defended. Sirnul-t,aneously,two companiesof the l@thInfantrywould land on isletsflankingOnaiavisiEntranceanda detachmentofFiji guerrillasandMarineraiderswouldmarkthe channelwith buoysto ZananaBeachandthenearbyPirakaRiver. Fourdayslater,the172dInfantrywouldmakethe Rendova-Zananamoveand establishabeachheadfor thelanding,thefollowingdayof the169thInfantryfromtheRus-sells. The 169thwasto moveinlandtothe northof the l’72d,thenface to thewest. This would put two regimentsabreast,readyto launchan attackfromalineof departurealongtheBarikeRiver>some2,000yardscloserto Munda. Ar-tilleryontheoffshoreislandsandRendovawouldsupporttheattack.Fivedayslater,it wasplanned,the 3d Battalionof the103dInfantryandtheeighttanksof theMarine9thDefenseBattalionwouldcrossMundabarfor thefinal,directassaultonMundaairfield.


MARINECORPSSUPPORT2’

Marineunitswhichwereto participatein theseizureof Mundawerefulfillinganumberof tasksand trainingmissionspriorto theoperation. Theactualjob ofpushingtheenemyfromNewGeorgiabe-longedmainlyto GeneralHester’s43dDivision;contributionsto the campaignby theMarineCorpswouldbein supportof themaineffort. The9thDefenseBat-talionwasgivena dualmissionof makingenemypositionson Mundauntenablebyartilleryfireandof providingantiaircraftprotectionfor thelandingforces. The1stMarineRaiderRegiment,atfirstintendedas a reserveelement,wasthrustinto anactiverolewithits missionof wedgingablockon DragonsPeninsulabetweentheMundadefendersand reinforcementsat13airokoHarbor.

Colonel Liversedge’sraiders were acocky,confidentgroupwhichprideditselfon beinga volunteerunitwithina volun-teercorps. Carryingonly60mmmortarsandlightmachinegunsassupportingwea-

‘3Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : 1st MarRdrRegt WarD15Mar-30Sep43,dtd 60ct43; 9th DefBn RecofOpsl–28Jun43, dtd 30ct43 ; 9th DefBn Rept on AAOps 18Jun–18Sep43,hereafter .Yth DefBn AAOf).!;$}thDefBn NarrativeHist lFeb42-14Apr44,dtd 2May44; 4th Basellep OrgHist lApr–31Ju14&dtd 24~ug43; I+istSecG–2, SoPacBaseComd,MSHist of the New Georgia Campaign, 2 vols,, c.1947 (OCMH), hereafter l?ew Georgia Cam-flaign; I,tCol Wilbur J. ‘Mc~enney, ObserversRept New Georgia OpS to (3G, IMAC, dtd17Ju143; LtCol Wright C. Taylor ltr to CMC,dtd 4Mar52; Col Archie E. O’Neil Itr to CMC, c.lMar51 ; LtCol Robert C. Hiatt ltr to CMC, c.26Feb52; Maj Cyril E. Emrich ltr to CO, 10thDefBn, dtd 1Ju143; Maj John L. Zimmerman,TheGuadalca$?alCampaign (Washington: Hist-I)iv, HQ7MC,1949) ; Rentz, Marines in the Cen-tral flolornons’;Sherrod,MarAirHi8t.

691–360O—63——5

pens,eachbattalionwasgenerallyorgan-ized with four riflecompanies,an engi-neeranddemolitionplatoon,anda head-quarterscompany.Smallerin authorizedstrengththantheregularMarineinfantrybattalion,theactualstrengthof theraiderbattalionsvariedbetween7’00and 950.Special]y trainedfor junglefighting,am-phibiousraids,andbehind-the-linesguer-rilla action,theraidershadparticipatedin theTula@-assault,a hit-and-runraidat MakinIslandin theGilberts5the de-fenseof Midway,andjunglewarfareonGuadalcanal.TheseMarinesthusbroughttotheNewGeorgiacampaignconsiderablecombatexperienceplustheconvictionthatthefightingaheadwouldfollownoorderlylinesof battle. Thevexingproblemspre-sentedby thejunglein maintainingcom-municationsand supply would demandthe utmostin courage,ingenuity,andstamina;buttheraidersfeltuptothetask.They werefirmin the belief that thesedifficulties,inextricablycomplicatedbytheterrainandenervatingclimate,couldbeovercomebytheirtoughphysicaltrain-ing, combatexperience,andhighmorale.

At thetimeof consolidationof thefourbattalionsunder one commandon 15March 1943,the raiderswere scatteredthroughoutthe SouthPacificwith regi-mentalheadquartersandthe2d and4thBattalionsat EspirituSante,the 1st at~oumea,andthe3dintheRussells.UponassignmenttotheTOENAILSoperation,the regiment(less the 2d and 3d Bat-talions)movedto Guadalcanal,arrivingtherethe firstweekin June. Heretheraidershad only a few daysto go overtheirorders,ironoutorganizationalkinks7andpracticeas a singleunit beforethe4th Battalionwas abruptlyassignedtoKennedy’sassistance.


The9thDefenseBattalioncommandedbyLieutenantColonelWilliamJ.Scheyer,hadparticularreasontobe proudof itsassignmentin theTOENAILSoperation.With a quickconversionof its seacoastbatteriesto fieldartilleryunits,the 9thwouldbe in an offensiveroleagainsttheJapaneseat Munda and the prospectpleasedthe entirebattalion. One of 14suchhighlyspecializeddefenseforcesscat-teredfromCubato NewZealand,the9thwasprovidingantiaircraftprotectionforGuadalcanalforceswhenpickedfor theNewGeorgiaoffensive.Activatedearlyin 1942,the 9th trainedextensivelyinCubabeforearrivingat Guadalcanalon30November1942. ThebattalionWLSindefensiveactionalmostimmediately,andits 90mmbatteriesbaggeda totalof 12enemyaircraftin the followingmonths.

Organizationalchangeshadtobemade,however,togettheunitreadyfor itspartin thecaptureof Munda. ln 21days,theseacoastbatteries,augmentedby 145newmen,weretrainedinfieldartilleryfiredi-rectionmethodsandhadtest-firednewlyarrived155mmpieces. Thechangefromseacoastsightsto fieldartillerysightsandclifferentfirecomm:~ndswasonly partofthe problem,though. AS one battalionofficerreported:

Ourproblemwasnotoneof trainingbutoneof obtainingthenecessaryequipmentandammunitionsothata relativecalibra-tioncouldbefiredtoobtainsomeideaasto therelativevelocityerrorsof thenewweaponsinordertomasstheirfires.Wewereplaguedthroughouttheoperationwiththisequipmentandammunitionproblem.Whenthe ammunitiondid arrivefromNoumea,therewere19differentpowderlotsinashipmentof25rounds.Obviously,cali-brationscouldnotbeconductedwithpro-pellantsof differentpowderlotsandaboutallthatwasaccomplishedwastestfiringof

theweaponssothatthemencouldbefamil-iarwiththem.24

The battalion,with an assistfrom itsrelievingArmyunit,the‘70thCoastAr-tillery (Antiaircraft)Battalion,pickedup new90mmantiaircraftgunsequippedwithpowerrammersandremotecontrolequipmentin exchangefor the old gunswhichwereleft in position. In addition,power-operatedmountswere placedonspare20mmguns,increasingspeedandefficiencyoverthestandardmountswhichwerepedal-operated.The 9thalsobor-rowed12amphibiantractorsfromthe3dMarineDivision,and Griswold’sXIVCorpsexchangednewtrucksandjeepsforold. As the9threadieditselffor itsmis-sion,its armamentincludeda platoonof8 light tanks,8 155mmguns,12 90mmguns,1640mmguns,2820mmguns,and35 .50caliberantiaircraftmachineguns.

Relievedof itsdefensiveroleonGuadal-canalon 17June,thebattalionspenttheremainingtimeinfamiliarizationfiringofweapons,gun drills which includedre-connaissance,selection,andoccupationofpositions,andpracticelandings.Gunnersandloadersfromtheantiaircraftbatteriesturnedriflemento givethetankmenprac-tice in tank-infantrytactics. The am-phibiantractorsweretest-loadeduntilaloadingarrangementwasobtainedwhichwouldprovideenough40m7 20mm1and.50caliberammunitionfor allthreetypesof antiaircraftgunsto g,ointoactionim-mediatelyuponlanding.The9thalsotookadvantageof aliberalinterpretationof itsordersto get moreammunitionfor the90mn~batteries.Loadingordersspecifiedthreeunits of fire were to be carried.SinceanArmyunitof firefor the90mmgunswas125roundsanda Marineunitof

24Hiattltr, Op.Ci$.


fire300rounds,the 9th interpretedtheordersto meanMarineCorpsunitsof fireandcarriedthe extraammunition.De-spitesomemisdirectedtrucksand someconfusionasto unmarkeddockareas,theeager9th was aboardship and waitinghoursbeforethescheduleddeparture.25

In time,elementsof the 10thandthellth DefenseBattalionswouldbe calleduponto augmentthe9thin itsmissionatRendovaandMunda,butuntilplacedonalert,theycontinuedto assistin thede-fenseof GuadalcanalandtheRussells.Afourth unit, the 4th DefenseBattalion,whichhadbeenin theNewHebridesbe-fore goingto NewZealand,w-assoontobe recalledto Guadalcanalfor partici-pationin thefinalphaseof thecampaignin the central Solomons. The employ-mentof thesebattalionsas offensiveele-mentsinsteadof defenseforcesillustratedthechangein thecharacterof thewar.

Althoughnot carriedon the ordersaspart of the New Georgia OccupationForce,anotherMarinecorps elementwasto provideinvaluablesupportto theop-eration. Thiswasthe4thBaseDepot,asupplyorgal]izationwhichhadbeenacti-vatedat Noumeaon 1 April 1943asthedirectresultof a logisticslogjamin the~SouthPacific. Priorto thehTewGeorgiaoperatiol~,thelwmyhadresponsibilityforl~nloadingall supplies,but as thesizeofforces in the areagrew, the inadequateandlimitedfacilitiesandtheunderstaffedcorps of laborersin the Pacific werestrainedto maintaina smoothandunin-terruptedflowof ]lecessarysupplies.De-spitethe~rmy)sbestefforts,tl~eresultwas

‘5~mrich ltr, op. cit. In order to avoi(l similarmisunderstandings and to facilitate logisticall)lanning, ~in]itz’ hea(lqllarters subsequentlylmblished a CinCI’ac order listing units of firefor all types of weapons.

a confusedbacklogof equipmentandsup-pliesat NewCaledoniaandGuadalcanalwhichalmostsidelinedtheNewGeorgiaoperation.

ShippingtothelowerSolomons,exceptfor vitalaircraftenginesandspareparts,motortransportspareparts,rations>andmedicalsupplies,wascurtailedfor atime,andall othergoodswereroutedto Nou-mea for transshippingto Guadalcanalon call. suppliesnecessaryfor theNewGeorgiaoperationwerethenpluckedfromthestockpilesatNoumeaandassembledatGuadalcanal.Otherwar materialsweredirectedto the southwestPacificforces,addedto thegrowingdumpsin theNewHebrides,or storedinNewZealand.

The4thBaseDepot,underthecommandof ColonelGeorgeF. Stockes,andwithpersonnelgleanedfromthelst,gd,andadBaseDepotsandtheMarine12thReplace-mentBattalion,movedwith61officersand1,367mento Guadalcanalto helprelievethe congestion. Placedunderthe com-mandof the XIV Corps,it wasorderedbyGriswoldtorelievetheserviceelementsof the43dInfantryDivisionin theRus-sells,andtobringorderoutof thegeneralconfusion.The4thBaseDepotwasthento receiveandstoreall suppliesfor theNewGeorgiaoperationandthe Russellsgarrison;maintaina 60-daylevelof sup-pliesfor TOENAILSforces;andhandleandloadaboardshipsallsuppliesascalledfor by the 43dDivisionandsupportingtroopsonNewGeorgia.

The assignmentwasinsurancethatlo-gisticalproblemswouldnot slowtheat-tack. lt was a timely move. Shortlyafterthe4th BaseDepotbeganworkingonthejumbledstockpilesof material,theinitialphaseof TOE~AILS beganwiththe Segi Plantationoccupation?andtheMarineswerecalleduponfor supplyas-


sistance.BythetimethemainoperationsstartedatRendova,thedepothadthenec-essarymaterialreadyfor forwardmove-ment,andin thefollowingmonthsit fun-neleda steadystreamof lumber,cement,ammunition,rations (including freshfruit and meats),clothing,tires, spareparts, gasoline,lubricants,sand bags,tents,engineerequipment,postexchangeitems,andmanyothertypesof suppliesintoNewGeorgia.

170rMarineCorpsaviationunits,estab-lishmentof anexactdatefor thestartofthe New Georgiacampaignis difficult.The conflictfor air superioritywascon-stantandcontinuing,not boundariesbybeachheadsor D-Days. Thestruggleforundisputedpossessionof the lowerSolo-monsphaseddirectlyintotheNewGeor-giacampaign,andit ishardto differenti-ate betweenthe squadronswhich sup-portedtheconsolidationof theSolomonsandthosewhichdirectlytookpartin thecaptureof Mundaairfield. In anYevent,most Marine squadronsthen based atGuadalcanalor in the Russellspartici-patedinbothcampaigns,eitherinpartorin whole.

Rear AdmiralMarc A. Mitscher,asComAirSols,hadan Allied force of 62’7planeswithwhichto supportoperationsin theCentralSolomons.It wasa com-positeof Marine,Army,Navy,andNewZealandaircraft,andincluded290fight-ers,94scoutbombers,’75torpedobombers,48heavybombers,26mediumbombers,30flyingboats,24 seaplanes,and a miscel-lanyof 40 search,rescue,and transportplanes.2’

“ ComAirPac to ComSoPac ltr ser 00517 of4Jun43,quoted in New Georgia Campaign,p.60.

Althoughplans for garrisoningNewGeorgiawerestillin thetentativestage,anumberof Marinesquadronswereto bebasedatMundaairfieldfollowingitscap-tureandwouldbecomeanintegralpartoftheNewGeorgiaAir Force. Priorto thecampaign,however,thistermwasapaperdesignationfor a forwardechelonof the2dMarineAircraftWing,attachedto theNGOF; its commandingofficer, Gen-eralMulcahy,would“exerciseoperationalcontrolof aircraftinflightassignedtoaircoverand supportmissionsin the NewGeorgiaarea.”’7 Requestsfor air sup-portstrikeswouldbemadeto liaisonpar-tieswitheachlandingforce,andGeneralMulcahyasCornAirNewGeorgiawouldapprove,disapprove,or modify. It was,ineffect,afighter-bomberdirectioncenterfor both air defenseand directsupportmissions.Controlof theassignedaircraftwouldpasstoCornAirNewGeorgiawhentheplanestookoff fromtheirhomefields.

Available,for suchtacticalair supportmissionsaswouldbeassignedtheminthemonthsaheadweresevenMarinefighterandfour scoutbombersquadrons,backedupby threeutilitysquadronsandaphotoreconnaissancedetachment.For themostpart,though,theroleof theMarinesquad-ronsintheseizureof Mundaispartof thebiggerstoryof howAlliedairstrengthre-ducedtheJapanesestrongholdatRabaultoimpotency.ThiswillberelatedinPartV of thisvolume.’s

27NGOF I’O No.1,Op.cit.=StationedintheSolomonsinJune1943were

~TM~_llz, _lzl, _lzz, _lz3, _124,_2@and_221,with several more squadrons due to arrive asreplacementslater; VMSB–132,–143, –144, and–234; ~MJ–152, -153, and –253; and a photo-graphic detachmentfrom VMD-154.

CHAPTER2

ELKTONUnderway

WOODLARK-KIRIWINAI

Theplannedmovesof theAlliedforcesin theCentralSolomons—Papuanareainthesummerof 1943resembledpiecesof ajigsawpuzzle. Each operationin itselfdid not representa seriousthreatto theenemy’sdefenseline,but,aspartof a big-gerpicture,eachwasimportantandcon-tributedto thesuccessof all. Thepiecesfittingtogetherformeda patternof co-ordinated,steadyadvance.

D-Day (30 June) for ELKTON waspracticallyaplanningdateonly. ComSo-PacoperationsbeganatSegion21June;andWoodlark-Kiriwinalandingstwodayslateropenedtheactionby SouthwestPa-cific forces,well in advanceof the date

1Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from: VII PhibF’or, SWPA,ComdHist 10Jan43–23Dec45,n.d.; MIS, WD,Survey of North Ilast h“ew Guinea and Papua( S30-678), dtd 15Ju143; 12th 13efBn WarD,30Jun–31Ju143,dtd 2Aug43; OCE, USAFPac,.lirfield a?ldBase Development—Engine~r8in theSouth West Pacific. 19J1–1.9&,v. VI (Washing-ton, 1951), Engineer &ipply—Engineers in theSouth West Pacific, 1241–1945,v. VII (Washing-ton, 1950), and Critiqt[e—h’)lgi)zecrsin the L30uthWest Pacific, 1941–1945,v. VIII (Washington,1950) ; Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crow], The77.S.Marines and Amphibioas War (Princeton :I’rineeton University Press, l!l.jl ) , hereafterXselyand Crowl, blc[rincsand .lmp?liljiousWar;GeorgeC. ~ermey, (icncrat IfenMeyReports (NewYork : Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), hereafter~enney, Reports ; Morison, 13rcaj2in~ the ~~.v-marcks I;arrict”; Halsey and Bryan, HalseV’sStory.

set. The near-concurrentstartwasa co-incidence;a two-prongedattackby Hal-sey andMacArthurhad beenpostponedthreetimesbefore30JuneasamutualD-Day wasaccepted.A numberof factorsforcedthedelay,chiefamongwhichwasthe scarcityof amphibioustroops re-quiredbythemissionsof ELKTON. The43dDivisionwasthe‘earlychoiceastheNewGeorgiaassaultforce,andthatunitwasscheduledfor extensiveship-to-shoretrainingprior to the operation. In theSouthwestPacific,anentirenewcommand—theVII AmphibiousForce (VII Phib-For)—wasactivatedtoassembleandtraintheneededtroops.

MarineCorpsdivisions,whosespecialtywassuchamphibiousmovements,werenotavailable for assignmentto CART-WHEELoperations.Twodivisionswereundergoingrehabilitationand training;a thirdwasnotyet combat-ready;andafourth was still formingin the States.TheresultwasthatMarineraiderandde-fensebattalionswereatahighpremiumtoaugmentavailableArmyunitsforthetwinoperationsof TOENAILSinNewGeorgiaand CHRO~ICLE at Woodlark-Kiri-wins.

A tentativelineupof forces for theplannedattackswasmadein April. Ad-—miralHalseymadeaquicktriptoBrisbaneonthel~thtomeetthegeneralunderwhomhe wouldbe operating,andhe andMac-Arthur quickly came to an agreementbaseduponmutualrespect. MacArthur

59


neededsomehelpin his amphibiousven-ture; Halseyotferedit. He orderedhish’oumeaheadquartersto assignthe 20th~C13(Acorn5) to 13risbaneandto selectone combat-readyRCT plusone Marinedefensebattalionfor furthertransfertoSWPA. ilssignmentof theMarineunit\vaseasy;thel~thDefenseEattalionhadarrivedin PearlHarborin earlyJanuaryandwm awaitingfurthertra]lsfer. Butthe n]any]~eedsof theexpandingSouthPacific clefense mea hd left few Armyregimentswithontacti~-eassignments.Itw:~sfinallydecided,aftera lnusical-chairshuffleof troops,thatthe 112thcavalry(dismounted)on New (_’aledoniawouldjoin the12thDefense~att:~lio~~,Acorn5,andothernavalbaseandsel>viceunitsinatransferto SWPA. Here they wouldserveastheWoodlarkdefenseforce. I~ieu-tenantGeneralWalterKrl~eger’sSixthArm-ytroopswould~arrisonKiriwina.

MacArthur’stargets,Woodlark andKiriwinaIslands,layintheCoralSeaoffthe southeasternshoreof New Guinealabout 60 miles north and east of theD’13ntrecasteauxMands.Kiriwina,intheTrobriandGroup,is about125milesdi-rectlysouthof NewBritain;Woodlarkisabout200milessouthwestof Bougainvillea.Their designationas futureairfieldsitestosupportoperationsinbothNewGuineaand the SolomonssentArmy engineersscramblingoverthemto obtainbeachandterraininformationto supplementnativereportsandaerialphotography.There-connaissanceteamswerewary,butpriorinformationwas correct—theJapanesehad not occupied the islands. (EkMap 2.)

Kiriwina,shapedlikea benttoadstool,was ringed by an extensivecoral reefbrokenby onlya fewnarrowopeningsfor

shallow-draftboats. Twenty-fivemilesinlength,andfromtwoto eightmileswide,the islandheld about7,500natives,hada sub-surfacecoralbasewhichwouldsup-portanairstrip,andhadmanygoodtrailsfor jeeproads. But therewereno goodbeaches. Woodlark, about 100 milessoutheastof Kiriwina,wasnearly44mileslong andfrom 10 to 20 milesin width.Curvedin shape,itheldanumberof goodanchoragestuckedwithinthe protectedshorterarc. The beaches,however,raninlandonly a few hundredyardsbeforebumpingintoa coralcliff. Sparselyset-tled,Woodlarkwascoveredwitha thick”junglegrowthanddottedwithlargeout-cropping of coral.

Together,theseislandscould providebasesfor fighterescortsof LieutenantGeneralGeorgeC. Kermey’sAllied AirForceshittingatNewGuinea,NewBrit-ain, and New Ireland,and for SoPacstrikesagainsttheNorthernSolomonsinsubsequentoperations.Theircapture,theJCS had decidedearlier,wouldprovidethefirsttestof thenewlyformedVII Am-phibiousForce.

This force had comeinto beingunderthedirectionof RearAdmiralDanielE.Barbey,who openedhis headquartersatBrisbaneinmid-January1943.By April,it wasapparentthatthetaskof formingandtraininganamphibiousforcewasfarmorediff~cultthanhadbeensupposedatfirst. An assortmentof UnitedStatesandAustralianshipsformedthetransportdi-vision,and SixthArmy troops,recuper-ating from the hard fighting in the13una-Gonacampaign,weretrainedinam-phibiousoperations. Practice landingswhich were sandwichedbetweentrooplifts to NewGuineawereneverrealistic.Few troops, ships, or piecesof heavy

ELKTONUNDERWAY 61


equipmentcouldbe sparedfromthatop-erationfor practicepurposes.With anoperationaldeadlinepressing,AdmiralBarbeyscouredtheSouthwestPacificformore ships. Somenew LSTS were as-signed him; othershe borrowedfromCornSoPac.TheUSSRigel,arepairshipwithnoneof thedesiredcommandfacil-ities,waspressedintoserviceasaflagship.

MacArthur,in hisfirstconferencewithHalsey,had tentativelyset 15 May asD-Dayfor thecombinedoperation.Latein April, MacArthurannouncedthathecouldnot meetthisdateanddirecteditspostponementto 1 June. It was laterchangedto 15Juneaslogisticalandship-pingproblemspiledupinthePacific. On26May,thegeneralproposedthe30thoftJuneasD-DayandrequestedComSoPacconcurrence. This d at e, MacArthurpointedout,wouldalsocoincidewithland-ings by other SWPA forces at NassauBayon NewGuinea,about10milessouthof Salamaua.Halseyaagreed.

The CHRONICLEforces assembled,Kiriwina’s garrison (code-namedBY-PRODUCT) at Milne Bay on NewGuineaand Woodlark’sgarrison(code-namedLEATHERBACK) at Towns-ville,Australia. On 21 June,ninedaysaheadof schedule,theadvanceechelonofthe~12thCavalry,withheavybulldozersandoperatorsfromthe20thNCB,setoffforWoodlark.Thenextnight,troopsandequipmentwerelanded. Thespeedupre-sultedbecausethetroopswereready,therewouldbenoenemyto opposethelanding,and Barbey’stransportswouldneedtheextratimeto carrytwolandingforcestotheir destinations.Kiriwina’sadvanceechelonwaslandedon the nightsof the23dandthe25th,the lastgrouplandingacrossthereefovera coralcauseway300

yardslongand7feethighwhichhadbeenbuiltby combatengineersandnatives.

Themainlandingof theKiriwinaforce,whichincludedthe 158thRCT, the46thEngineerCombatCompany,andantiair-craftartilleryandservicetroops,wasmadeon thenightof the29thaccordingto theELKTON schedule. AdditionalWood-larkadvanceechelonshadbeenlandedonthenightsof the25thand26th,withthemainlandingof supportelementscomingontlie30th,alsoasscheduled.Woodlark’sgarrison,in additionto thetroopstrans-ferredfromComSoPac,includedthe404thEngineerCombatCompanyas well asotherserviceandordnancetroops.

Enemyoppositionwasneitherexpectednor received,althougha fightercoverofGeneralKenney’sforcesprovidedassur-anceof success.ThelandingsatWoodlarkproceededsmoothlythroughout.With abetterareain whichto landandwithex-periencegainedina last-minuterehearsal,theLEATHERBACKforcewentashorewitha minimumof effort. TheKiriwinaoperation,however,left muchto be de-sired. Lackof prior trainingandinsuf-ficientequipment,complicatedby poorlandingareas,contributedto theconfus-ion. In addition,theisland’scoralcircletmaderesupplyof theislanddifficult.Re-gardlessof thesehandicaps,VII PhibForcarried12,100troopsto Woodlarkand4,700toKiriwinawithoutacasualty,whileatotalof 42,900tonsof suppliesandequip-mentwereunloadedwithoutlossof ashipor landingboat.

For theMarine12thDefenseBattalion,theWoodlarklandingwasanticlimactic.organizedin SanDiego in August1942underthecommandof ColonelWilliamH.Harrison,thebattaliontrainedextensivelyandtest-firedallitsarmamentbeforemov-ing to PearlHarborandfurthercombat

ELI{TONUNDERWAY

training. ThebattalionjoinedtheLEA-THER13ACKforcein Australiapriortothe operation. Two 90mmantiaircraftbatterieswentashorefrom LcIs on 30June and the remainingbatteriesandgroupsfollowedthemashoreduringthenext12days. Thefirsttwo90mmbatterieswerereadyto fireby 1300on 1 July,andtheotherunitswerein firingpositionsinequallyshortorderonceashore. Buttheopportunityfor combat firing seldomcame. It wasnotuntil27Julythatasoli-taryJapaneseplane,aftermakingseveralfalseattempts,hurriedoverWoodlarktodropfivesmallbombs.Therewasnodam-age,andthe planeescaped.After that,only occasionalalertswerenotedin the12thDefenseBattalion’slog. Kiriwina,however>wasbombedseveraltimesduringconstructionwithsomedamageto equip-mentandinstallationsandsomecasualtiesto theBY-PRODUCTtroops.

Constructionof the airstripon Wood-lark progressedspeedily; the Kiriwinafieldwasslowedby heavyrainsandthefactthatmuchof theheavyequipmenthadseentoomuchpriorserviceandwasdead-linedfor repairwithinafewdays. C)n14July,Woodlarkwasdeclaredoperationalwitha strip150feetwideand3)000feetlongavailable.Thefirstfightersquadronfrom south l?acificforcesarrivedon 23,July. The runwayat Kiriwinawasop-erationalinlateJuly,andon18August,aFifth Air Forcefightersquadronarrivedonstation.Kiriwinastageditsfirststrikeagainstenemyforceson NewGuineainlateAugust,andlaterwasa basefor aFifth Air l?orcefightergroup.

No AlliedstrikewaseverstagedfromWoodlark’sstrip,andSouthPacificair-craft commanderslost interestalmostassoonas it wascompleted.In fact,afterthe captureof Munda,woodlark was

63

turnedoverto theFifthAir Force. Kiri-winaremainedfor atimeasafighterplanebase,but laterthewarmovednorthwardtowardtheBismarckArchipelagoandtheAdmiraltiesand left bothfieldsfar be-hind. However,theWoodlark-Kiriwinaoperationgaveneecledexperiencetoanewamphibiousforceandprovideda protec-tivebufferto theNewGeorgiaoperationwhichwasconcurrentlyunderway.

OCCUPATIONOF SEG2,~E~zJJREOF V~&JJ2

The manwhowasto calltheclefenseof Mundaairfield

AND

the shotsinunknowing-

ly trippedthealarmwhichsettheELK-TON plansinto action. Major GeneralSasaki,inhisareaheadquartersatKolom-bangara,wasirkedatCoastwatcherKen-nedyatSegiPlantationnearViruHarbor,and—aftermonthsof toleratingKen-nedy’spresence-determinedto getrid ofhim. Sasakihadgoodreasons:Kennedy’sstationwas the centerof resistanceonNewGeorgia,andhisairraidwarningac-tivitieshadcontributedgreatlytothelackof successof JapanesestrikesagainstGuadalcanal.on 17June,Sasakisentre-

‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from: iVew Gem@a Cam-paion; TF 31 ltr to holdersof EasternForLoadingO143,dtcl22Jun43;TG31–3OpOAL10-43,dtid21Jun43;TG31.3LoadingOs14, dtd16Jun–7Ju143;4thRdrBnSAR10Jun–10Ju143,dtd14Sep43;4thRdrBnWarD,26Fe&WAu@3,hereafter~th RdrBn Warn; HEArea iVauOps–II; Seuerdeenth Army Ops–I; CO1Michael S.Currin ltr to CMC, dtd 8Feb51; LtCol AnthonyWalker ltr to CMC, dtd 23Feb51; Batterton,“You Fight by the Book ;“ Feldt, !7’heCoastwatch-ers; ONI, Combat Narratives, Solomon 181arLd8Campaign: X-Operations in the New Geor@u,21Jun-5Auo43 (Washington, 1944),hereafterONI,Combat Narratives X; Rentz, Marines inthcCentrul lilolomow.


enforcementsto theViruHarborgarrisonwithorders“ to pacifythatarea.”3 (SeeMap3.)

Prior to Sasaki’sdecisionto reinforceViru, Segi Plantationon the southeastcoastof NewGeorginhadbeenimportantonlytotheAllies. Segiwasanidealentry-wayintotheisland. Amphibiouspatrolshad landedhere,andtheplantationhadbeena havenfor manydownedaviators.For thenewadvance,theAlliesplannedto buildanairstriphere,butKennedyre-portedon 18Junethathe wouldnot beableto holdthispositionif hedidnotgethelpin ahurry. TheJapanesewereclos-inginonhim.

AdmiralTurnerorderedan immediateoccupationof Segi. If Kennedysaidheneededhelp,he was to be takenat hisword. This determinedNewZealander,theformerDistrictOfficerfor SantaIsa-bel Island acrossThe Slot from NewGeorgia,wasno alarmist.Hehadmovedto SegiPointafterthe,JapaneseoccupiedtheSolomonsandtherehehadbeencom-pletelysurroundedby enemygarrisons.Buthe hadheldon,andhisposition160milesnorthwestof LungaPointhadfittedin admirablywiththesystemof air raidwarnings.HisreportsonJapaneseflightsmeantthattheirarrivaloverGuadalcanalcouldbe forecastwithina minuteor two.Kennedyhad told the nativesof NewGeorgiathatBritainwasnotgoingtogiveup theseislands,andthe successof theAllies at Guadalcanaland‘Tulagi gaveconvincingevidenceof this. Hecontinuedto live almostopenlyin the plantationhouseatSegi. Therewereno trailslead-ingto hisstation,andtheapproachalongthebeachcouldbewatched.ButKennedy

3CICSoPacItemNo.786, 8th CSNLFOpera-tionalRadandTgOs,translated17Dec43.

andhisnativeshadbeenforcedto ambush~Japanesepartiesto keepthethepositionsecret. Some enemyhad escapedKen-nedy’sattacks,however,and SasakihadissuedtheorderwhichmadeKennedythemostwantedmanon NewGeorgia.

Alreadyat Viru Harborwasthe &hCompanyof tJleIstBattalion,2i29thRegi-ment,plusa fewassorbdnavalpersonnelfrom the Kure 6th and Yokos@a 7thSNLF, a 3-inchcoastalgun,four 80mmguns,eightdual-purposeguns,andavary-ingnumberof landingcraft. To augmenttheVirugarrison,MajorMasaoHarawasto takeanotherinfantrycompanyandamachinegunplatoonfromhisIstBattal-ion andcombsoutheasternNewGeorgiafor the coastwatcher’shideout.’ Whenthisforcecameclose,Kennedyfadedintothehillsandradioed:

Strong enemy patrol has approached veryclose, and by their numbers and movement,it is believedthey will attack. Urgentlysug-gest force be sent to defend Segi.G

The messagereachedTurnerat KoliPoint,Guadalcanal,duringthenightof18–19June,and the admiraldecidedtosenda forceto Segiat onceratherthanwaituntil30June,theD-DayestablishedbyELKTONplans. Fortunately,thead-miralhad combatunitsready. The de-stroyer-transportsDent, Waters,Schky,andCrosby werestandingby in Guadal-canalwatersfor the operationsagainstNewGeorgia,andLieutenantColonelMi-

4Ibid.‘4th RdrBn SAR, op. cit., p. 9. Kennedy had

good reason for his suspicions. A diary latertaken from the body of Second Lieutenant Har-umasaAdachi at Viru Harbor indicated that theJapanesehad discovered Kennedy’s hideout andthat an attack was being planned. ICX?OAItemNo. 598,Translation of CapturedJapaneseDocu-ment, dtd 6.Ju143.

ELKTONUNDERWAY 65

chaelS. Currin’s4thMarineRaiderBat-talion,whichincludedpersonnelwhohadbeentoNewGeorgiaonprelandingrecon-naissancemissions,was also completelycombat-ready.Withtheseshipsandmen,Turnercouldmountouta forcetoprotectKennedyandalsothrustatoeintheCen-tralSolomonsdoorthattheJapaneseweretryingto slamshut.

Currin’sbattalion(less CompaniesNandQ, scheduledto attackVangunuIs-landon30June)wentonboardtheDentandWaterson20Junefor a nightruntoKennedy’said. This forcewasfollowedthenextnightby CompaniesA andD oftheArmy’s103dInfantryRegiment.Ini-tially,theseunitswoulddefendSegi,andthencarryouttheplannedattackonViruHarboron30Juneasscheduled.Withtheexceptionof raiderCompanyO, previ-ously detachedto duty with Turner’sWesternForcebut,nowreturnedto Cur-rin, theseunits were part of AdmiralFort’sEasternForceandwerescheduledfor useinthisareaof NewGeorgia.ThusthelandingatSegion 21June,whichsetoff the CARTWHEEL operations,amountedonly to steppingup thetime-table.

All wasnotsmoothsailingfor theDentandWaters. Thenaturalobstacleswhichhadcontributedto Kennedy’ssecurityatSegiPointwerehazardsfor theseships.Thereisdeep,shelteredwateroffSegi,butthechannelsto this anchoragewereun-charted,dismissedon thechartsas “foulground.” Thereare so manyreefsandcoral outcropping in thesewatersthatVangunuappearsto be almosta partofthelargerislandof NewGeorgia. Thereisnosuitablerouteto Segifromthenorth,andonlythenativesanda few localpi-lotswereacquaintedwiththepassagesto

thesouth. Evenwitha localpilotsight-ing on Kennedy’sbonfiresignalon thebeach,thetransportsscrapedbottomandrodeoverreefs. At 0530on 21June,theMarineswentoverthesideandintoships’boatsfor the landing,and by 1030,allsupplieshadbeenbroughtashoreandthetransportswerepickingtheirwaythroughthe coral headsand reefs for a speedyreturnto Guadalcanal.Currinimmedi-atelyestablisheddefensivepositionsandsentoutpatrols,buttherewasno contactwiththeenemy. At 0600on thefollow-ingday,thetwoArmycompaniesplusanairfieldsurveypartyfromAcorn7 cameashorefromtheflchleyandCrosby.

Kennedywasgratefulthatthesetroopshadcometo his rescue,butbothhispio-neerspiritandhisscoutingroutinewerepinchedby thispopulationinflux. Forpeace and quiet, and to re-establishascheduleof unrestrictedmovementsforhisnativescouts,hemovedacrossthenar-rowchannelto VanagunuIsland. Currinkeptcontactwiththecoastwatcher,and,with nativesprovidedby Kennedy,sentoutpatrolsto determinethemostsuitablemeansof approachto Viru Harbor. Atthesametime,Seabeesbegin convertingSegi’sunevenandmuddyterrainintoanairstrip. With bulldozersand powershovels,workingat night underflood-lights,themenhadan airstripreadyforlimitedoperationsasa fighterbaseby 10July. It wastheintentionsof ComSoPacto havethefieldcapableof servicing20planesan hour at first, and then—by25 September—ofbasingabout60 lightbombers.’

6ComSoPac ltr ser 00534,dtd 10Jun43,Subj :“Proposed Master Plan for Construction of Air-fields and Seaplane Bases in the South PacificArea, Guadalcanal Island, Koli Point Section,”quoted in New GeorgiaCampaign.

.,,

ELKTON UNDERWAY

TheAllieshadplansfor ViruHarbor,too. Thissmall,landlockedcove35milesfrom Mundawasto be developedintoaminornavalbaseforsmallcraft. Thebestanchorageon the NewGeorgiacoast,ithad an entrance300yardswideand800yardslong,outlinedonbothsidesbycoralcliffs. Theinnerharborwidened,andwasfedbythreesmallrivers,theMango,Tits,andViru. Previousamphibiouspatrolshadreportedthebulkof theVirudefend-ersto belocatedonthehighheadlandsonthewestsideof theharborat thevillageTetemara,with anotherdetachmentatTombe,a villagefacingTetema,raacrossthechannel. But intelligencereportsonthe sizeof the Viru garrisonconflicted.Early estimateshad rangedfrom 20 to100men;anearly-Junereconnaissancepa-trol revisedthesefiguresto 200enemytroops. (SeeMap3.)

As CompaniesA andD of the103dsetupa defenseagainstanyfurtherattemptsby the Japaneseto wipeout Kennedy’sstation,raideramphibiousreconnaissanceteamsconcentratedtheirattentiononfind-ingthemostsuitablerouteto Viru. Sev-eraltimestheynarrowlymissedbumpinginto Japanesepatrolsor sentriesas theMarinesexaminedanumberof smallriverinletssearchingfor a beachwhichwouldexit to an overlandrouteto the rearofViru Harbor. While Currin’sraidersscouted-theareabetweenSegiandthepro-posedlandingsite,a memberof thestaff,CaptainFosterC.LaHue,slippedby na-tivecanoethroughthebaytoHeleIslandsinBlancheChanneltomeettheSychteyandreceiveAdmiralFort’sordersfor theMa-rines’attackon Viru.

Currinhad hopedto landduringthenightof 27 Juneat Regi,a villagejustsevenmilesfromViruHarborandconsid-erablywestof Segi Plantation. From

herehis force couldmoveoverlandto apointeastof the Viru River,andtheresplit for attacksdownbothsidesof theinletto seizethevillageof Tombeon theeast bank and Tetemaraon the west.Fort’sorders,however,directedonlyCom-panyP tolandonthe28thatNonovillage,just a few mileswestof Kennedy’ssta-tion. Currinwasthento strikethroughthejungleto attackTetemaraat 0700on30June,and capturethe seacoastgunsreportedto be in Tetemara.The APDsKittyandC~osbywouldthensailintotheharborandputashorea 355-manoccupa-tionforceconsistingof CompanyB of the103d;one-halfof CompanyD,20thNCB;BatteryE (lessoneplatoon)of the‘70thCoastArtillery(Antiaircraft)Battalion;andanavalbaseunit.

Additionalparagraphsof theordergavedetailsconcerningtheproposedseizureofWickhamAnchorageandthedevelopmentof Segi Point,but containedno instruc-tionsfor CompanyO of theRaidersandthatportionof the4thRaiderBattalionheadquartersalreadyat Segi.7 At 1600that afternoon,ColonelCurrin radioedAdmiralFort for permissionto land atRegi,to useCompanyO aswellasCom-panyP, andto begintheoperationon 27June ratherthan28June. The raidercommanderhadspent20daysinthisareawith amphibiouspatrolsduring MarchandApril, andhe estimatedthatevenifhestarteda dayearlierhewouldbehard-pressedto maketheD-Dayof 30JuneatTombeandTetemara.An overlandtrekwouldmeantortuoustrailsover ridges,rivers,and swamps,and the hikingdis-tancewas considerablymore than map

7TG 31.3 OPO AL-10, dtd 21Jun43; TF 31 ltrFE25/LI over 0013b, dtd 22Jun43; TG 31.3LoadingO 143, dtd 16JuK143.