wwii 7th armored division

8/9/2019 WWII 7th Armored Division

1/43

THE

BATTLE

AT

ST.

VITH BELGIUM

17 23 DECEMBER 1944


2/43

GENERAL ORDERS

)

NO. 43

DEPARTMENT

O F

THE

ARMY

Washington 25, D. C., 19 December 1950

E X T R A C T

7TH ARMORED DIVISION

q q

Co, 7th Armd Div

Combat Command A Hq

q

Co

Combat Command

B,

Hq

q

Co

Reserve Command, Hq

Hq

Co

17th Tank Battalion

23d Armd Inf Bn

31st Tank Battalion

33d Armd Engr Bn

38th Armd

nf

Bn

40th Tank Battalion

48th Armd Inf Bn

87th Cav

cn

Sq

Mecz)

147th Signal Co

q q

Btry , 7th Armd Div Arty

434th Armd FA Bn

440th Armd FA Bn

489th Armd FA Bn

q q

Co, 7th Armd Div Trains

77th Armd Med Bn

129th Ord Maint Bn

Band, 7th Armd Div

CITED IN THE ORDER OF THE DAY

of the Belgian Army, in Decree No. 7253,

13 July 1950, by Charle s, Prince of Belgium,

Regent of the Kingdom, with the following

citation:

During the crucial period of the German

offensive of the Ardennes, in 1944, the

American 7th Armored Division, attacked by

enemy force s estimated at eight divisions,

among them

3

Panzer

nd 2

Panzer Divi-

sions, held the important cente r of Saint

Vith, preventing

any

advance and

ny

exploi-

tation on th is main line , thus dooming the

German offensive to frustration and,

by

i ts

sacrifice, permitting the launching of the

Allied counteroffensive.

CITED IN THE ORDER

O F

THE DAY

ofthe Belgian Army,

in

Decree No 7253,

13

July 1950, by Charles, Prince of Belgium,

Regent of the Kingdom, with the following

citation:


3/43

FOREWORD OF 1966

Nearly twenty-two years ago this battle was fought a s the re -

sult of a su rp rise attack on the Western Front. Since then the de-

ta il s have gradually unfolded and the Battle of the Bulge

s

now held

in better perspective.

Twenty-two years l ater five United States divisions plus other

NATO troops a re along the Iron Curtain in Europe facing a Russian

force that could launch another such surpr ise attack without build

up. If such shouldoccur, the patte rn of the battle could well follow

this one su rprise , cut off units, bad weather, short supply

to

some units, cut communications, loss of contact to the right and

left and to the re ar , and the other confusions of a modern fluid battle.


4/43

Editor's Note:

General von Manteuffel

h s

agreed at several joint press conferences thut

for the CemEan counter-offensive

o f

December 1944 to be successful at least

three things had to happen:

a

The German attack had to be a surprise.

b. The weather to be such

as

to prevent strikes by allied aircraft on the

German columns coming through the Ardennes.

c.

The progress

o

the German main effort through and beyond St. Vith

must be rapid and not delayed.

Requirements a. and b. were met. Requirement c. was not

met

because of

the defensive and delaying act,ion of the 7th Annored Divisiolt and attached

troops in the S t Vith area from 17-23 December

1944.

His timetable cd e d for the capture of St Vith

b y

1800 hours on 17 Decem-

ber. He did not capture it until the night of

21

December and did

ot

control

the St Vi th area until

23

December

when

CCB withdrew on order.

On

22 December

1964

at a press conference

in

Watertown, New York,

General von Manteu el stated on the evening of 24 December 1944, recom-

i

ended to Hitler's A jutant that the German Army give up the attack and return

to the West WaU. He stated that the reason for this recommendation was due

to the time lost by his Fifth Panzer A m y i.n the St. Vi th area. Hitler did not

accept von Manteuffel's recommendation.


5/43

THE BATTLE AT ST . VITH, BELGIUM

17 23 December

1944

A HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

OF

ARMOR IN THE DEFENSE


6/43

LlNE HELD BY

ARMORED DIVISION

CHED UNITS UNTIL 23

7

TH ARMORED DlViSlON

POSITION DURING PERIOD

17-23 DECEMBER

1944

RTnN OF LINE HELD BY

8 7T H ARMORED DIVISION

MAlN GERMAN EFFORT

~-;~~~ ~.~~g~~~~ SECONDARY

EFFORT TO

;:.g;:.;?;;:. ?:m

;i:::.:;


7/43

G E N ~ L

RDEBS

NO. 48

DEPARTMENT

O F

THE

RM Y

W ~ H I R C T O N

5 D.

C., 12

Ju l y

1948

. I

BATTLE HONORS-Citation of unit

I

11--BATTLE HONORS.-As authorized

by

Executive Order

9396

sec. I Bul.

22, WD,

1943 ,

uperseding Executive Order 90'75 sec. 111, Bul. 11WD 1942 .

the fol lowing un it i s cited u nder the provisions of AR 260-15 in the name of th e

President of the United Sta tes as puhlic evidence of deserved honor an d distinc-

t ion. Th e ci tation reads as fol lows:

Combat Command. B, 7th Armored Dioision, composed of the following units :

Headquarters and Headquarters Company;

17th Tank Battalion;

3lst Tank .Battation;

23d Amnored

In fan t ry Battaliolt

38th Armored Inf ant ry Battal ion;

87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Gquadron Meckanized

less Troop

D

275th A m w e d Field Artillery Battalion;

434th Armored Field Artil lery Battal ion;

965th

Field

Artillery Bcrtt alio~~;

168th Engineer Combat Battalion;

3d Plafoon,

Company

F W d nf ntry Regiment;

Company

B,

5

Aronored

Engineer Battalion; a n d

Company

A

811th Tank Destroyer Battalion

SP)

is cited for outstanding performance of du ty In act ion from 17 to 2.3

December


8/43

FOREWOR

Two of the most important tactical localit ies on the eighty-eight

mile front held by the m Corps in the Ardennes Fores t, at the

beginning of the Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944, were

Bastogne and St. Vith. Through these local ities were the road nets

which, i held, would disrupt the plan of any Aggressor. Bastogne

was an important communications center and was worth the gamble

made for its defense. ts garr ison wrote a brilliant chapter in

history by denying the locality to the enemy; therefore , much of the

comment pertaining to the Battle of the Bulge has centered around

this important terrain feature. This fact has caused many to lose

sight of the importance of St Vith and the gallant stand made for

its defense by elements of Corps troops, by remnants of the 106th

Division, and by CCB of the 7th Armored Division.

Realizing the importance of St. Vith to the American Forces,

the Corps Commander directed the Commanding General of CCB,

7th Armored Division, to march h is command to that locality, report

to the Commanding General of the 106th Division, whose headquarters


9/43

T A B L E O F C O N T EN T S

P e

INTRODUCTION

T H E F R O N T O N 1 6 D E C E M B E R 19 4 4 2

T H E G E R M A N S T R I K E

T H E M A R C H T O S T . V I T H

5

T H E D E F E N S E I S O R G A N I Z E D 7

TH E LIN E HOLDS ON

18

DECEMBER 1944

1

E V E NT S O F

19

DECEMBER 1944 14

EVENTS O F 20 DECEMBER 1944

16

VENTS O F 2 1 DECEMBER 1 9 44 19

VENTS O F 2 2 DECEMBER 944 22

TH E SEVENTH DAY 23 DECEMBER 1944 2 5

UPPLY DIFFICULTIES 2 6

ANINVENTORY 2 7

LESSONS 29

B A C K T O S T . V I T H 3

APPENDIX I ALLIED ORDERS O F BATT LE

31

I 1 G E R M A N O R D E R O F B A T T L E em 3 2

111 TR OO PL IS T

33


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INTRODUCTION

1

T h i s s t h e n a r r a t i v e o f o n e p h a s e of t h e g r e a t e s t p i t c h e d b a t t l e o n t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t i n

World

ar

11. T h e b a t t l e a t S T . V i T H (1 7- 23 D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 4 )

s

a n e x c e l l e n t e x a m p l e of h ow

A m e r i c a n t r o o p s h e l d t h e i r g r ou n d i n t h e m i d s t o f c o n f u s io n , d e f e a t , a n d u n c e r t a i n t y ; a n d t h e r e b y

threw the G e r m an t i m e t a b l e 's u f fi c i en t l y off s c h e d u l e t o a l l o w A m e r i c an f o r c e s t o r e gr o up , h o ld ,

a n d t h e n c o u nt er a tt a ck . T h e s t a n d a t S T . VIT H h a s b ee n t e c o g n iz e d by ~ o t h erman and Al l ied

c o m m a n d e r s a s a t u rn i n g p o in t i n t h e B a t t l e of t h e B u lg e. G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d

t h e t i m e g i v e n t o h im b y t h e d e f e n d e r s of S T . V I TH w h e n o n 2 3 D e ce m b e t h e a d d r e s s e d a l l c om -

m a n d e r s i n t h e d e f e n s i v e h o r s e s h o e : T h e m a g n i f ic e n t j ob y pu a t e d o in g i s h a v i n g a g r e a t b en e -

f ic ia l e f fec t on our who le s itua t ion . I am persona l ly g ra te fu l to you and wi sh you would le t a l l of

y o ur p e o p l e kn ow t h a t if t h e y c o n t i n u e t o c a r y o u t th e i t m i s s i o n w i t h t h e s p l e n d i d s p i r i t th e y h a v e

s o fa r shown, the y wi l l hav e de serv ed wel l o f the i t count ry .

T h e G e tm a n p l a n f o r t h e A R DE N NE S c o u n t et o f fe n s i v e i s s u p p o s e d t o h a v e b e e n c o n c e i v e d

by Hi t le r h imse l f dur ing th e summer of 1944 . T h e p l an wa s no t wel l t ec e ive d by the German gen-

e r a l s ( t h ey h a d a l s o b e e n l u ke w ar m t o t h e A R D E N N ES o f f e n s i v e of 1 94 0 ), 2 w h o f e l t t h a t t w a s

f a t t o o a m b it io u s. I t w a s n ot t o b e t h e banzai cha rge of a ho pe les s foe , however , bu t a wel l -

p l an n e d a n d c o o r c in a t e d a t t a c k c a l c u l a t e d t o s t r i k e t h e A m e r i c an l i n e i n a t e l a t i v e l y q u i e t s e c t o r

w i t h o v e rw h e lm i n g f o r c e a n d t o d r i v e o n t o A N TW E R P a n d B R U S S E LS b e f o re c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s

c o u l d b e t ak e n . T h e s u c c e s s of t h i s p l a n m ig h t w e l l h a v e c h a n g e d t h e e n t i r e c o u r s e o f t h e w ar.

T h e ac a d e m i c q u e s t i o n s a s t o t h e s t r a t e g i c s o u n d n e s s of t h i s o f f e n s iv e , w h i c h w e t e r a i s e d b y

G e rm a n a n d A l l ie d g e n e r a l s a f t e r t h e w a r , h o l d l i t t l e i n t e r e s t t o t h e m e n w h o w e r e c a l l e d u p on t o

s t a n d a g a i n s t o v er w h el m in g o d d s a n d t u r n b a c k t h e o n s l a ug h t . T h i s s t o r y s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e

d e f e n s e of t h e S T . V IT H s a l i e n t a n d w i l l n ot d e a l w i th s p e c u l a t i o n s a s t o t h e s t r a t e g i c e x p e d ie n c y

of the German plan.

T o b e s u c c e ss f u l ,

t

w a s n e c e s s a t y f o r t h e G e rm a n c o u n te r o f fe n s i v e t o b e c a r r i e d o u t w it h

surpr i s e

a n d speed

A s t h e t e c o rd i n d i c a t e s , s u r p r i s e w a s a tt a in e d. I t o l d t h e F u e h r e r o n t h e


11/43

L at e on 1 6 December, German Fie ld Marshal Model, commander of nny G f m p B , ordered:

Qu ic k e x p lo i ta t io n of th e s u c c e s s e s of th e f i r s t d a y of th e a t t a c k

is decis ive.

T h e f i r s t o b je c-

t i v e is to achiev e l iberty of movement for th e m obiIe units.

T h e s tabborn def ens e of ST. VITH contributed materia lly t o delaying th e enemy, and

is

cred-

i ted a s a major fac to r in th e fa i lu re of th e German main e ffo rt . T h e importance of t he s tan d a t ST.

VITH is descri bed in th e Fir s t US Army Report of O perations:

Without the communications center of ST. VITH, focal point of five main highways and

three rail fines , the enemy's annored, infantry, and supply columns were

all

practically immo-

bilized.

The rugged, hilly terrain of the ARDENNES heavily forested, permitted no cross-

country movement. The few columns that were able to move, struggled along muddy, cratered,

narrow secondary mads. Traffic was jammed bumper-to-bumper for miles from the original

point of departure and provided excellent targets for our artillery and fighter bombers.

Also,

lacking ST.

VITH

and its high ground the enemy could not launch his 'Operation Greif' in

accordance with

plan.

The salient at

ST. VIT

not only threatened the whole of Fifth Panzer Army s northern

flank, but continued to prevent the movement of Sixth SS Panzer Amy. This afforded First

US Army suffic ient time to bring up reinforcements to a new de fensive line. . .

TH

FRONT ON 6 DECEMBER 1944

On th e ev e of th e German a t tack , th e F i rs t US Army he ld a 165-mile front, roughly from

AACHEN to LUXEMBOURG. T h e Thir d US

Army w as o n the so u th f lan k and th e new Nin th US

Army wa s o n th e noxth flank.

T h e F i r s t US Army ha d th te e c o rp s in th e line -VII Co tp s in th e

north push ing toward th e ROER, V Corps i n the cen te r p rob ing towards th e dams tha t con tro l led

th e wa te r s of th e ~ 0 ~ 2nd VIII Col ps , commanded by Major Gene ral Tr oy Middleton, holding

approxim ately a 90-mile front in the re la tiv ely qu iet ARDENNES sector. T h e 2d and 99th Infantry

Div is ions he ld th e sou th f lank of V Cotps , n eares t VIII Corps. T h e gap be tween V and VIII Corps

w as he ld by th e 14 th Cava lry Group (Rfechan ized) under VlII Cotps con tro l. T h e VIII Cor ps sec tor

front w as held: in the north, by th e 106th Infantry Divis ion, w hich had jus t arrived in Europe and


12/43

DISPOSITION OF U S AND

GERMAN TROOPS

AT TIME H

OFFENSIVE

WAS

LAUNCHED

X X X X X


13/43

South of the

Sixth SS

anzer Army t h e

i f t h

anzer Army under Manteuffel , planned to

s t r ik e us ing tank-infantry te am s wi th only light ar t i ll e ry preparat ions . T h e

LXVZ

Corps

undet Lt

General Lucht, wa s to s t r ik e th e 106th Infant ry Divis ion, i s ola te the SCHNEE EIFE L, and dr ive

rapidly in to ST. VITH. T o th e sou th th e LVZZZ and XLVZZ Corps were to burst through the 28th

Infanhy Divis ion, i so la te BASTOGNE, and then dr ive on to th e MEUSE wi th the panzer divis ions .

(See enemy order of battle, appendix 11.)

T h e Seventh

Army

under Brandenberger , wa s to p ush back th e 4th Infant ry D ivis ion, furnish

f lank protect ion, and s tem any a t tempt to re inforce th e ba t t le a rea from the south . With th i s p ic-

t ur e, i t can be seen t ha t t he ma i led f i s t was point ed , po i sed , and r eady t o s t r ike . L e t us see how

the blow was rec eived by th e t roops i n the ST. VITH area .

On that bleak, co ld motning of 1 6 December 19 44, Germans from M anteuffel s i f t h anzer

Army sprang out of h iding in the d en se fores t s of the ARDENNES and began a g igan t ic p incers

movement around SCHNEE EIFE L, th e large r idge m a s s

about 1 6 mi les du e ea s t of ST. VITH.

Ast r ide th i s r idge l in e were the 422d and 423d Regim ents of t he 106th US Infant ry Division, which

had l anded i n F ranc e l e s s t han two weeks p rio r t o t h i s time; t h i s un it had been sen t t o t he

ARDENNES for a cond it ioning and sea so nin g program prior to h eavy f ight ing.

A s th e a t tack pro-

gressed, i t became apparen t tha t th e Germans planned to by-pass th e t roops on SCHNEE EIFE L;

cut them off; and converg e upon ST. VITH. T h e American higher hea dqu arters intended to counter

by moving the 7th Armored Divis ion in to th e are a to a ss i s t in th e res tora t ion of the l ines .

Major General A.W. Jo ne s, commanding general of the 106th Infant ty Division, m oved Combat

Command B of th e 9th Armored Divis ion south to a s s i s t the 424th Infant ty , t he regiment on the

southern f lank of the 106th Infantry Division.

On the 16th of December 1944, the 7 th Armoted Divisio n with its at tach ed troops , located

e a st and n orthe ast of HE ERL EN, Holland, w a s in XI11 Co rps reserve. At 1730 i t was a l e r t ed fo r

ear ly movement to VII I Corps in the vic ini ty of BASTOGNE, Belgium. T h e act ion taken is


14/43

The w eather condi t ions on 1 6 December 1944, were typica l of th e weather which wa s to be,

experienced for th e next se ve n days. Overcast; c loudy; penetrating cold; snow flurries , turning

to rain; poor aerial observation with no aerial activity; ground soft ; road s muddy and sl ick, read

the repotts.

T he terrain between SCHNEE E IF EL and the ARDENNES w as rough, forested, and rocky.

Frequent s t reams and numerous sad dle s added to the d i f f icu l t ies which channeled a l l vehicula r

t ra f f ic a long th e few narrow, tor tuous roads which se tve d the a rea . ST. VITH w as one of the thre e

key road junctions t o the e ntir e ARDENNES, and from

it

road s rad ia ted to DINANT and LIEGE in

th e west and northwest; to MALMEDY and STA VELOT i n the north; to HOUFF ALIZE and

BASTOGNE in th e south; a nd to SCHONBURG and PRUPA in th e east. Through ST. VITH ran th e

only east-west rai lroad extending from the RHINE through the E IF EL and into the ARDENNES.

THE MARCH TO ST. VITH

On the morning of 1 7 December, when it had b een thought that t he 7th Armored Division

would a rr ive in th e ST. VITH area , the d iv is ion w as f ight ing c logged roads to the west ra ther than

Germans. To reach t he ST. VITH a rea, th e 7th Armored Division moved in multiple columns over

two routes (east and west ) , a s shown in figure

3

Th e weather wa s rainy and the roads we re a s ea

of mud; movement cross-country or in th e fie ld s along side the roads wa s impossible . T h e divisio n

was a le r ted to move a t 170200 December . I t rece ived orders to c r os s the in i t ia l po in t on the we st

route a t 0330. T h e column w as on the road when further orders were received to de lay th e move-

ment one hour.

On th e west route, th e 87th Cavalry Recon naiss ance Squadron led th e way followed by CCB,

CCA, 814th Tan k Destroy er Battalion, Divis ion @lain) Head quarte rs, 3 3d Armored Eng ineer Bat-

ta l ion , and Divis ion Tra ins . Clea rance s on th e ea st route were de layed unt i l 170800 December

when Reserve Command led off followed by Division (TAC) Headquarters, Division Artillery, and


15/43

R O U T E S T O

V I E L S A L M ST

V l T H

AREA

7 T H A R M 9

DIV

I7

DEC 44

DOCUMENTAL REFERENCE

OVERLAY NO.

HQ

7 T H A R M 0 DIV 162300 DEC

ROUTES TO

VIELSALM ST

VlTH

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1

ID

m

m-

-

b

*-

1 0

-

EAST R O U T E

N

-

-

N


16/43

My driver and I arrived a t the road junction a t POTEAU a t about 1230, 17 December. W e

were about an hour a head of th e 38th Armored Infantry Battalion which was the l ead unit in

th e Reserv e Command's march column. A s we arrive d a t the road junction, we were hit by a

sight that we could not comprehend, a t first; a con stant stream of traffic hurtling to the rear

(to th e west) and nothing going to the front (to the east). We realized tha t this w as not a con-

voy moving to the rear; it was a c as e of & every og for himself1; it was a retreat, a rout.

Here would com e a 2%-ton, with only a driver, then ano ther with sev era l men in i t (most

of them bareheaded and in various s tag es of undress), next perhaps a n engineer crane truck

or an armored car, t he n sev era l arti llery prime movers-perhaps on e of them towing a gun, com-

mand

ca rs with offi cer s in them. 5-tons-anything which would run and which would get the

driver and a few othe rs away from the fro nt It wasn't orderly; i t wasn't military; it wasn't a

pretty sight-we were seein g American soldier s running away.

About a mile farther up the road at th e litt le town of PETIT-THIER, ai l traffic had stopped.

In fact, i t was the most perfect traffic jam I have ever seen. We had run into this hopel ess

ma ss of v eh icl es fleein g to th e rear on a narrow road which would barely support two-way traf-

fi c at slow speeds. Vehicles streaming to the rear had attempted to pa ss e ach other in the

intervals between the tank s of the 31st Tank Battalion, which wa s leading CCB, and now no

one could move.

It wa s already 1515 and from the lo ok s of the road jam, n eith er the tanks nor anything

el se w as going to retich ST. VITH for a long time. Lie uten ant Colonel Fuller. Corporal Cox

and

I

took over the job of clearing a path for the tanks, and we starte d getting veh icle s to

move over to the side s. Slowly

a

path wa s beginning to open and the tan ks began to roll

along at a snail's pac e with ha lts ever 50 to 100 feet. Several times we had to wave the lead

tank forward at full s peed when some vehicle refused to pull over. Usually th e sig ht of

30-

odd tons of s te el roaring down on him w as a ll we needed t o get t he driver to move over.

K Several imes senior offic ers in command car s attempted to pull ou t into a spa ce which I

was opening up, and ea ch time

I

told them to get back,

that

I didn't ca re who they were, noth-

ing was coming through except our tan ks and anything e ls e which w as headed for the front,

end t o get out of the way. (One company commander, Cap tain Dudley J. Britton, Company B

23d

Armored Infantry Battalion , said. 'That day

I

saw the highest ranking traffic cops

I

have

ever seen.'.

Fin ally a t 2015, Company ente red ST.

VITH

ollowed clo sely by

B

and Headquarters


17/43

S T V l T H


F A Y M O N V I L L E

MILE

o

I 2 3

4

9

1

6 7 8

l

KILOMETER I 2 4 6 7 1 12 13 14 15 K11

R

V I E L S A L M


7 TH

A

AFTER ACTION REPORT

SITUATION OVERLAY ST VlT H AREA

U PO N A R RI V A L 7 T H A R M D D I V

7 DEC 44

MILES

OMETERS

SITUATION ST VlTH AREA

UPON ARRIVAL 7 T H ARMD D1V

WI~TEGPE~T

17 DEC 1 9 4 4

F igu r e 4 T he 14 th Cava l ry Group had been d r iven back to pos i t ions s hown he re and we te under heavy p ressu te

f rom the enemy T o the eas t of S t Vi th the 422d and 423d Comba t Team s of the 106 th Infan t ry Div is ion were cu t

off CC B of the 9th Arrno led P iv is io n was a t tack in g toward ~ i n t e r dp e l t Th e 424 th Comba t Team o f the 106 th

was hold ing l ine to the sou th


18/43

T h e p lan fo r an i m m ed i a te a t t a ck ea s t f rom S T . V IT M, t o t i n

21ld

hold SCHONBERG and

open e sc ape co r r i do r s fo i t he t w o su t rounded com ba t t e am s ,

could

not be carried out ; it wa s impos-

s ib l e t o br ing the 7 th Armored Eiv i s io n up to th e ST. V IT H a e a o v e r t h e tr a ff ic - co n g es te d r o a d s

in time to l aunch t he a t t ac k th a t a f te rnoon.

C C B es t ab l i shed i t s com m and pos t

i n

a

schoo l bu i l d ing i n t h e s ou t hea s t co t ne r of S T . VITH;

t he sam e build ing housed th e command pos t o f t h e 106ti1 Infan t ry Div i s ion . S t af f members of CC B

t r ied t o ge t a t e l a t i ve l y a c c u a t e p i c t u t e of t h e s i t ua t i on from o f f i ce r s of t h e 106 t h D i v is i on ; but

it w as obv i ous t ha t t he s hock of t he i n i t i a l G e rm an blow ogethe r wi th the i r l ac k of combat exper-

i ence , had pa l t i a l l y d i s rupted the s t a f f func t ion ing of t h e 106th . Al l k ind s of rumors were be in g

sp read ; m en w ho had f l ed from t he f t on t, appa ren t l y s eek i ng t o j u s t ify t he i r a c t i on , gav e an exag -

ge ra ted and i naccu ra t e p i c t u t e of w ha t w a s tak i ng p lace. T h e s i t ua t i on m os t c e r t a i n l y w as bad ,

a n d t h e i m p r e ss i o n t h a t o f f i c e r s o f C C 3 g o t w a s t h a t t h e 1 0 6 t h n o lo n g e r e x i s t e d a s a n e f f e c t i v e

division. s s t a f f sec t ions of

CC

began t o a r r i ve , c a r ry i ng t he i r equ i pm en t i n t o t h e bu il d ing ,

they met men f rom th e 106 th Div i s ion I l eadqu ar t e rs l eav ing wi th the i r equipment .

T h e de fense of t h e S T . V ITH sec t o r w a s t urned ove r t o G ene ra l C l a rke , com m and i ng C C B ,

7th Armored Div i s ion , by Genera l Jo n es (106th Div i s ion) a t about 1 430 on th e 17 th of December ,

and w as l a rge l y i n h i s han ds fo r t he r em a inde i o f t h e ac ti on . A t t he ti m e of t he t r an s fe t , t h e

enemy wa s only about t h r ee or four t housa nd yards f rom th e town, and smal l -a rms f i re from th e

ea s t w as com ing i n t o t h e v i c i n i t y o f t h e com m and pos t.

T he t roops f rom t h e 106 t h In fan tt y D i v i-

s ion , which cam e under Genera l Clarke s command, were : Head quar t e rs Company, 81 s t Engin eer

Bat t a l ion (Lt Col T. J. Riggs) ; He adq uat t e t s Company, 168 th Engineer Bat t a l io n (Lt Col

W

L.

Nungesse t) ; one p l a toon of i n fan t ry , which had bee n th e d iv i s ion command po s t guard 1st P l a t oon ,

Company

F

423d Iniant ty Fegiment); and a 105-mm atmored field art i l lery bat tal ion).

T h i s a r t i ll e ry ba t t a li on w a s t he 275 t h A rn~ ored i e l d A r t il le ry B a t t a l i on (S epa ra t e ) a s s i gn ed

t o VIII Corps and i n pos i t i on nea r OBER E UM EL S. T h ey had r em ai ned i n p l ace de s p i t e t he f ac t


19/43

Co lonel Will iam H. G. Fu ller , 38th Armored Infantry Batta lion , w as giv en command of tha t secto r,

inc lud ing e lements of th e 106 th In fan try Div is ion in p lace. H e was a ls o g iven Troop B of th e 87 th

Cava lry Re conn a is san ce Squadron , and la te r on tha t even ing w as re in forced wi th Company

B

of

th e 23d Armored Infantry Batt a lio n and Company A of th e 31 st Ta nk Batta lion. T he remaindet of

CCB (31s t Tan k Ba t ta l ion

-),

23d Armored Infantry Batta lio n

-),

Company B of t h e 33d Armored

Engineer Ba t ta l ion) c losed in the assemb ly a tea to the wes t of ST. VITH. Before midn igh t, 17-18

December 1PQ4, CCB wa s d isp osed as shown in f igure 5.

A typ ica l example of how un i ts went in to the l in e f igh t ing to sec ure the i r de fens ive po s i t ions

is

given by Lieu tenan t Colonel Robett C. Erlenbusch, commanding officer of th e 31st Tank Batta lion:

adcompanyA, 31st Tank Battalion, w as ordered to take up a defensiv e position on the high

ground about 2000 yards e as t of ST.

VITH.

Lieuten ant DUM, the leading platoon leader, pre-

ceded hi s lead tank in a *ton to reconnoiter for positions. About 1500 yard s from ST. VITH

upon rounding a bend in the road, Lieuten ant Durn spotted, about 800 yards t o hi s front, three

German tank s and about one company of infantry moving i n th e direction of ST.

VITH.

He

turned hi s vehicle around, i ss ue d instructions to h is platoon by radio, climbed in h is fi rst tank,

and led his platoon t o the point where he saw the enemy approaching. The German force and

th e 1s t Platoon, Company A, met he ad on at the bend of th e road. Th e fight was sho rt and at

point blank range. We destroyed the three enemy tan ks and killed or wounded about

50

of the

enemy with no l o s s to our own forces. Company secu red the high ground, blocked the road,

and extended i t s position north from the road along the ridge. Here, using part of each tank

crew a s infantry, they defended against sev eral sma ll attac ks during the night of 17-18

December.

1

THE LINE HOLDS ON

18

DECEMBER 944

Ry 0300 of 1 8 December the 7 th Armored Div is ion s p lan had been formulated. Re se tv e

Command, Colonel John L. Ryan, J r., commanding,z w as to defend th e northern flank of the divi-

s ion sec tor ;

CC

wa s t o defend in a n ar c around ST.VITH joining with CC B of th e 9th Armored

Div ision, sou th of th e town; CCA, Co lonel Dwight D. Rosebaum com manding, had gone int o an

assembly a r ea sou thwes t o f ST. VITH, and wa s t o remain the re a s d iv is ion reserve . Al l n igh t


20/43

-. - . 77 . -,

SITU TION

7 TH

RMD

I

\

DIV

I72000

H Si81 ENGRBN

BLOCK

EAST

O

B

9TH

ARM DlV

0

g g

YARDS rr)

R

?

I l l I

1 1 1 1 1 1 l )

METERS 8

8

0

0

Si 0

N

Figure 5. Th e build-up of the defen se was a piecemeal procedure. At about 1530 elements of Headquarters

Company, 81s t Engineer Battalion, under Lt Col T. J Riggs; 168th Engineer Battalion -) under Lt Col Nungesser;

and one platoon of infantry 1/F/423) est abl ish ed a road block eas t of ST. VITH. Troop Capt

R

J.

Stewart) of

the 87th Cavalry Reconn aissan ce Squadron

was

place d to the north of th is road block. About 1630 Company

B

apt D. J. Britton) of the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion wa s placed sout h of the road block. Company A Capt

R

C. Fos te r )

of

th e 31st Tank Battalion wa s placed sou th of the road block. Company A Capt

W

H. Antsey) of

t h e 38 th ~ r m o r e d nfantry Battalion was placed north of Troop

8

7th

Cavalry

Reconnaissance Squadron and all

t roops to th e eas t o f ST.

VITH

were a t tached t o the 38 th Armored Infantry Rattalion under Lt Col

W H. G

Fuller.

Troops of the 87th Cavalry Recon naissa nce Squadron were sent to the north to se cure that f lank. Other CCB uni ts

c losed in assembly a reas wes t o f ST. VITH before midnight. See figure 10 fot the succe ssiv e lin es held by

CCB,

7th

Atmored Division, in the defense of St. Vith,


21/43

A t 0 2 0 0 t h e G e r m a n s la u n c h e d t h e f i r s t of t h e b i t t e r a t t a c k s w h i c h w e re t o b e h u rl ed a t t h e

7 t h A r m or ed O i v i s i o n d u r in g t h e n e x t s i x d a y s , T h e a t t a c k h i t R e s e r v e C om m an d t o t h e n o rt h of

S T . V I T H a n d s e e m e d t o b e a d r iv e t o t a k e R EC H T . G e r m a n s of t h e

st anzer

D i v i s i o n

s t r u c k w i t h s u c h f o r c e i n t h i s n i g h t a t t a c k t h a t w i t hd r a w a l of R e s e r v e C om m an d H e a d q u a r t e r s t o

P O T E A U w a s or de re d. T h e G e r m a n s m a d e e f f e c t i v e u s e of f l a r e s s h o t fro m t h e i t t a n k s t o sil

hou e t te ou t. t an ks and b l ind our gunners . T h e 17 th Ta nk Ba t ta l ion (p lus Company C of the 38 th

Armored In fan try Ba t ta lion) , commanded by L ieu te nan t Co lone l John

P

Wemple, took up posi t ions

s o u t h o f R E C H T w h e r e t h e y c o u l d p l a c e c o m m a nd i ng f i r e on t h e to w n a n d c o u l d a s s i s t i n c o v e r i n g

th e no tth f l ank of CCB , which w as now se r io us ly th rea tened .

S topped by Re se r ve Command, th e Ge tm ans con t inued the i r "sque eze p lay" on th e ST.

VITH iuea du t ing the co ld , mis ty motn ing when a t 0800 they h i t C CB wi th a we l l -coo tdina ted

a t t ac k by in fan t ty suppor ted by heavy tanks . F to rn th e no t th th e a t t ack moved in on HUNNINGEN

a n d fto m t h e e a s t a g a i n s t t h e l i n e a c t o s s t h e SC H O N BE R G to ad . H UN NIN GE N w a s l o s t t e m p ot at -

i l y , b u t a n a g g t e s s i v e c o u n t e t a t t a c k w a s m o u nt ed b y

CCB

us ing th tee medium tan k com panies and

on e t ank de s t toye t company (Company

8

1 s t T a n k B a t t a l i o n ; p l u s t w o m ed iu m t a n k c o m p a n i e s

fro m t h e 1 4 t h T a n k a a t t a l i o n ; a n d C o m p a n y A of t h e 8 1 1 t h T a n k D e s t r o y e t B a t t a l i o n , b ot ro w ed

from CCR of the 9th A t n o r e d D iv is io n ). T h e c to s s r o a d w a s t e c a p t u t e d a t a c o s t t o t h e Ge rm a ns

of s e v e n t a n k s a n d o n e a tm o r ed c a r d e s t r o y e d , a n d o v e t 1 0 0 i n fa n t ry k il le d . O n t h e e a s t , C C B

t e s t o t e d t h e l i n e w i t h a c o u n t e l a t t a c k b y t w o me diu m t a n k c o m p a n i e s ( C o m p a n i e s A a n d

C

of the

31st T a n k B a t t a l i o n ) a f t e t i n i t i a l p e n e t t a t i o n s h a d b e e n m ad e. S u c h c o u n t e r a t t a c k s , c a t r i e d o u t

b y C C B w i th a g g t e s s i v e n e s s a n d d e t e t m in a t io n , w e t e c h a a c t e t i s t i c of t h e d e f e n s e of ST . V IT H

a n d m u s t h a v e c a u s e d t h e G e tm a n s t o t h in k t h e d e f e n d e t s w e t e i n g t e a t e t s t t e n g t h th a n w a s t h e

c a s e .

Wh ile t h e n o t t h e tn a n d e a s t e r n f l a n k s h ad b e e n h e a v i l y e n g a g ed , t h e n o t t h e a s t e r n s e c t o t

(Troop A, 87 th Cava l ry R eco nna i s sa nce Squad ton ; Company A, 38 th Armoted In fan try Ba t ta l ion ;

T t o o p

E

8 7 t h C a v a l t y R e c o n n a i s s a n c e S q u a dt o n) h a d b e e n ~ a t h e t u ie t. T h e o nl y ex c it e m en t

t h e r e h a d b e e n w h e n a n N18 a rm o t ed c a r f to m T t o o p r3 d e s t t o y e d a T i g e t ta n k . T h e a t m o t ed c a t


22/43

o n t o t h e s o u t h w e s t , h a d t a k e n P O T F A U , a n d w e r e i n d a n g e r of i s o l a t i n g C C B f t om t h e r e s t o f

t h e d iv is io n . T o co u n te l t h i s t h re a t , C o m pa n y D of t h e 3 1 s t T a n k B a t t a l i o n w a s p l a c e d a s t r i d e

th e ST. VITFI-POTEAU Road about 10 00 ya rd s w es t of RODT. Meanwhile, th e d iv i s io n o tde ted

C CA t o m o v e fro m B E H O , w h e t e i t w a s i n t e s e r v e , a n d a t t a c k t o t h e n o r th a n d r e t a k e P O T E A U .

T h e G e t m a n s re c o g n i z ed w e l l t h e v a l u e o f t h e c r o s s t o a d s a t P O T E A U a n d i n t e n d e d t o h ol d

i t a t a l l c o s ts . I m m e d ia te l y a f t e r o c c u p y i n g i t t h e y s t a t e d d i g g in g i n t h e i r t a n k s a n d i n f a n t r y

a l on g t h e w o o d s t o t h e n o ~ t h n d e a s t o v e rl o ok i ng t h e c r o s s r o a d s a n d t h e o p e n g r ou n d s u rr o un d i ng

it. I n i t s i n i t i a i a t t a c k a t 1 3 2 0 , C CA f o r c e d i t s w a y i n t o P O T E A U , b ut t h e m u r de r ou s f i r e of t h e

e n e m y f o r c e d t he m b a c k t o c o v e r s o u t h o f t h e c r o s s t o a d s . L a t e t i n t h e a f te r n o o n , C CA r e c e i v e d

orders f tom divis ion:

"Imperative you s e ize POTEAU thi s P.h.1. and hold it "

J u s t a s d a l k f e l l, JC A l a u n c h e d ts s e c on d a tt a c k a n d t h i s t im e s e c a t e d t h e a o s s t o a d s . I t

w a s b i t te r f i g h t i n g i n t h e d a lk ; h o u se - to - ho u s e f i g h ti n g b y t h e i n f a n tr y , a n d a s t a n d t o t h e l a s t m a n

b y t h e G el m an s. T h e s t a n d p u t up by t h e u n i t s of t h e 1st SS Pan zer Adolph Hi t ler ) Div is ion w h i c h

h ad s e i z e d P O T E A U w a s a n e x c e l l e n t i n d e x of t h e c a l i b e r o f t t o o p s i n v o lv e d i n t h e S T . V I TH

opera tion . Vigorous , we l l -t ra ined , in sp lendid phys ica l condi t ion , sup e tb ly equipped , and imbued

w i th t h e i d e a t h a t n o th i ng c o u l d s t o p th em , t h e s e SS v e t e r a n s d i s p l a y ed i n i t i a t iv e a n d s k i l l t h a t

s t a m p e d t he m a s b e i n g t h e e q u a l o f t h e b e s t t t o o p s G e rm a ny h a d e m p l o ye d a t a n y t i m e s i n c e 1 93 9.1

13y n o on i t w a s a p p a r e n t t h a t a l t h o u g h v o n S u n d s t e d t h a d n ot g a i n e d S T . V I TH i n h i s f i r s t

d ri ve , h e w a s d e t e rm i n ed t o t a k e t h e t o w n T h r ou g h S T . V IT H r a n t h e o n l y e a s t - w e s t r a i lr o a d

be tween t he RHINE an d th e ARDEIVNES, and

it

w a s l e a r n ed l a t e r t h a t t h e e n t i t e c o u n t e ro f f e n si v e

w a s b a s e d u po n u t i l iz i n g t h e t o w n a s t h e a d v a n c e r a i l d e p o t fo r b o th t h e Fif t l : ?anzer a n d t h e

Sixth SS Fanzer Armies.

Als o th e ne twork of ro ad s wa s needed fox. dep loy ing th e advan c ing co l -

umns of the Fi f th Panzer , my t o w ar d s t h e n o tt h w e st s o a s t o s u p po rt t h e Sixth

SS

P a n z e r rny

i n i t s d r i v e t ow a t il L I E G E a n d A N T W E R P.


23/43

a com bat command f rom th e sf SS l a n z e r D iv is io n .

A l s o i n t h e les o f t h e a f t er n o o n a s s a u l t o n

Company

3

of t h e 38 t h A rm ored In fan try B a t t a l i on , 1 9 dead p a t a t ro ope l s w ea r i ng t h e i n s i gn i a of

C , ro s s -C eu t sch l m d G i v i s i on had been i den ti f ied .

T h e f o l l o u i n g v r a s

the

t o t a l o f know n ca su a l t i e s i n f l i c t ed on t h e G e l m ans by C C B , a f t e t one

and one-hal f d ay s of corrbat :

C e s t r o y e d

amaged Killed

It

VI (King Tiget )

2

P.ssa ul t Guns, 75-mm 33 9

9 YK IV s

A s s a u l t

Sun, S s m m

(Fe ld inand)

9 s s a u l t G un s, 7 ~ - m r r

8

Almorecl

cats

In t he a f t e t noon of t he 18 t h it w a s d e c i d ed t h a t ST. V IT H w as no l ongex t enab l e fo t t he

Combat Command He adqu at t e t s , an d th e l a t t e t w as moved to KRO&Tr3ACH o th e southw est .

T h i s

w a s acco m pl i shed j u s t be fo re da rk .

C o n im u n ic a ti on a n d l i a i s o n w e l e e s t a b l i s h e d w i th t r o o p s i n

t h e l i ne from t h e new com m and pos t and w i th C C B of t h e 9th Alrnoted Div i s ion on th e l i gh t f lank .

F o t l o w in g a G e t m a n a t ta c k a t

2230,

w h i c h w a s r e p u l s e d , c o n t in u e d n o i s e s a n d t t o o p m o v e m en ts

w a r : hea td , bu t no fu t t he t deve l opm en t s occm red .

T h e e x p e t i e n c e of Z o m pa n y

8

38th Armofed Infan t ry Ba t t a l ion , which had Deen p l aced i n

t h e l i n e e a s t of

ST.

V IT fi , v i a s t yp i ca l of t h e sm a l l un i t a c t i on o n t he no se of t he de fens i ve ho rse-

s h oe . I t w a s t h e s u m to t a l o f s u c h a c t i o n s a s h e s e t h a t m a de u p t h e b i g p ic t ur e o n 1 8 D e ce m be r

1944.

A n i n t e ~ v i e w i th

a

menibex of Com pany re ve al s a port ion of th e picture.


24/43


25/43

suppo t t ed by t anks . A t 13 00 they f i na l l y wi thd tew, l eav in g one t ank bu tn ing and 15 0 dead .

Other

t an ks were h i t an d damaged , bu t we l e a b l e t o w i thd raw.

Ano the r a t t ac k s t a r t e d f rom the d i r ec t i on

o f WALLEEIODE, whe re t he Germans we le m ass ing i n s t l eng th , bu t i t w as b roken up when ou r

a r t i l l e ry caugh t t he Germ ans i n t he open t e r r a in be fo re our l i ne s .

F a i l i n g t o f i n d a s o f t s p o t o n t h e n orth , t h e G e r m a n s n e x t h i t t h e s o u t h e rn f l a n k w h e re t h e y

moved a ga in s t CC B of the 9 th Armored Divis ion .

B e f o r e t h i s a t t a c k e v e n g o t g o i ng t h r e e e n em y

t a n k s w e r e k n oc k e d o u t a n d t h e r e s t o f t h e f o r c e w i th d re w t o t r y a n o th e r p la ce . T h e s o u t h e r n

f lan k of C CB of th e 7 th Armoted Div is ion w as the n h i t by a re info tced infant ry company wi th

armored suppor t (one

31K

V(Panther ) and tw o as sa ul t guns) . Dur ing th e morning , th i s pa t t of th e

l i ne had b een re inforced by a ta nk des t ro yer s ec t io n of tw o 90-mm gu ns ( from Company A of th e

814 th Ta nk Des t roye r Ba t t a li on ) , T h i s t ank des troyex se c t i on , w i th th r ee t ounds, knocked ou t t he

P a n t h e r a n d o n e a s s a u l t g u n, l e av i n g t h e i n f a n t ~ y o adv ance a c t os s open g round wi th no armored

suppor t. On the y cam e only to be s laug htered by our infant ty (Company

8

3d Armored Infantry

Ba t t a li on ) , who he ld t he i r f i r e un t i l t h e enemy had c lo s ed t o l e s s t han 5 0 ya rds. What w as l e f t of

t h e a t t a c k i n g G e t m a n s q u i c k ly f l e d l e a v i n g a l m o s t 6 0 c a s u a l t i e s .

CC B rece ived add i t i ona l suppo t t a t 1510 on t h e 19 th of D ecember , w hen the 434 th Atmoted

F i e l d Ar t i l le ry Ba t t a l i on and two ba t t e r i e s of t h e 965 th F i e ld A r t i l l e ty Ba t t a l i on were a t t ached

and p l ac ed i n pos it ion . T he on ly a r t il l e ry suppor t up t o t h i s t ime had been fu rn i shed by t he 275th

A rm o re d F i e l d A t t il l e ry s a t t a l i o n . T h e 9 6 5 th F i e l d A r t i ll e ry B a t t a li o n

-),

t h e 2 7 5 th A ~ m o r e d

F i e l d Ar t il l e ry Ba t t a li on , and t he 434 th F i e l d At t i l l e ry 3a t t a l i on were p l aced under con t ro l of

Lie ute nan t Colonel Ja m es G. Dub uisson, t h e conimanding of f icer of the 434th Fie l d Ar t i lle ry Bat-

t a l i on ; and a g roup f i l e d i r ec t i on cen t e r , wh ich func t i oned smoo th ly and con t inuous ly t hroughou t

t h e a c t i o n , w a s e s t a b l i s h e d . O b s e r v a ti o n of f i l e s w a s l im i t ed ; t h e r e w e r e no l i a i s o n p l a n e s w it h

th e a r t i ll e ry a t ST . VITH. Al though the enemy was cha nne l i z ed i n h i s movemen t along t he roads ,

o f f e li ng wo nde ~fu l ppo t tun i t i e s t o des t roy h im by a r t i l l e ry f i l e ,

tCB

could not de l ive r the b low

wi th comple t e e f f ec t bec au se of t h e l ack o f ae r i a l obse tv a t i on needed t o ad ju s t f ir e .

SITUATION OF 7

T

,RMD DIV

\

I d h I L L k *


26/43

AS OF 20

DEC

i

L I N D S A Y ~ \

1

I l l

0

J

YARDS V 2 m

I I

M E T E R S o

Figure 7. Combat Command 3 had a relatively quiet day but

th r

was a constant build up of enemy strength for

an attack on ST. VITH.

ask Force Jone s was formed to secule the southern flank. here was inct easing enemy

pressute on

supply instal lations at

SAMREF

and LA

RC CME.


27/43

de fen de r s were ca t c h ing a heavy po r t i on of

it

i n t he i r s ec to r . Th rough in t e l l i ge nce r epo r t s from

highe r headqua r t e r s , and cap tu red p r i sone r s , t he Am er i cans knew th a t t hey were mee t ing t h e bes t

of t h e German troops.

By th e en d of t h e day p r i sone r s from the fo l l owing German d iv i s ions had been i n t er roga ted

by the IPW Team of t he 7 th Armored Div i s ion ( enemy d iv i s io ns l i s t ed i n r e l a t i ve o rde r of po s i t i ons

from north t o south): 1st P a n z e r D i v is i on , G r o s s D e u t ~ c h l a n d ri g ad e , 1 8 th V o l k s G r e n ad i er

Div i s ion , 62d Vo lks G renad i e r D iv i s ion , 2d Pa nz e r D iv i s ion , 560 th Vo lks Grenad i e r D iv i s ion , and

116th Pa nz e r D iv i s i on Man teu f fe l had a s s ig ned t h e t a sk of t ak ing ST . VITH to two in f an try d iv i-

s i o n s of t h e 6 6 t h C or ps ; h i s f a i l u r e t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e h a d c a u s e d t h e c om -

mi tment of addi t ion al t roop s f rom both Fi f th an d Six th Pa nz er Armies .

Al l manne r of r epo t t s we re r ece ived i nd i ca t i ng t ha t t he enemy wa s by -pas sing t h e 7 th Armored

Div i s ion ' s pos i t i o ns on t he no rth and ro l li ng up t h e f l ank on t he so u thea s t , mak ing t he ST . VITH

sec to r comparab l e t o a t humb p ro truding i n to t he enemy 's mouth ; and

it

seemed tha t t h i s t humb

c o u l d b e e a s i l y b i t t e n off. T h e e n e m y w a s t e p o r te d t o b e i n s t r e n g t h a t H O U F F A L I Z E , L A R O C H E,

and SAMREE, a l l t o t h e we s t o f

CCB

and a t TROIS-PONTS t o t h e no r thwes t. I n o rde r t o p ro t ec t

t he i r f l ank, D iv i s ion Headq ua r t e r s , on t h e 19 th , had o rde red t he 40 th Ta nk Ba t t a l i on an d Company

A, 33 6 Armored E ngine er Bat ta l ion , t o outpos t CHERARl and GOUVY. At GOUVY th es e t roop s

found an army ra t ion dump, conta in ing 50 ,000 ra t ions , w hich had jus t b een set on f i re by army

qua r t e rmas t e r pe r sonne l t o p r even t its cap tu re by t he enemy , who were a l r eady t h r ea t en ing wi th

smal l -a rms f i te . Company D of the 40th Ta nk Ba t t a l i o n d rove off t h e enemy and ex t i ngu i shed t he

f i r e , wh ich had done l i t t l e damage, and began t h e i s su an ce o f r a t i ons t o a l l un i t s of t h e div is ion .

At GOUVY the re wa s a l s o an abandoned a rmy p ri sone r of wa r enc losu re , con t a in ing ove r 700

German pr i s on ers of war, guatded by on e of f icer and e ight mi l ita ry pol ice . T he se pr i sone ts were

s u c c e s s f u l l y e v a c u a te d b y t h e

division.

Div i s ion Headqua r t e r s c r ea t ed o the r t a sk fo rc es ou t of

t h e l e r n a n t s of t h e 1 4 t h C a v a lr y G ro u p an d a s s i g n e d t he m t h e m i s s i o n of s c l e e n i n g a n d p ro t ec t in g

th e sou th eas t f l ank o f t h e d iv i sion . T roop

D,

87 th Cava l ry Re conn a i s san ce Squadron , w as d i r ec t ed


28/43

out a light tank platoon on outpost there; but the f orces on the high ground to t he south held fbmly.

Duttng the night of 2G2L Decembel approximately

68

men and two officers led by Lieutenant Long

of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon,

4 3d

Regiment (one of the surrounded regiments

of the 106th Infantry Division) infiltrated back through CC3' s lines .

When interviewed, Lieutenant Long stated that the commanding officers had told them that

the two regiments (422d and 4236) weie prepating t o surrendet, and that otd ets were being given

for the destluct ion of theit arms and equipment. Th e tro ol s had been told that a n3 petsannel wish-

ing to attempt to infilttate to friendly line s tathet tha c su~ ten de rwere authotized to leave. Th es e

men were some of t hos e who had chosen to risk returning and fighting aga in to laying down their

arms and srurendering. CC8 established an assembly point in th e schoolhouse at ST. VITH where

th es e men were given tations, such othex supp ies a s they needed, and a well-deserved rest.

Dm

ing the night of

21-22

Cecembet, when the situation became critical, th es e men w a e put back into

the line. Vhen they were told that they were going back into the line, t heir enthusiasm was high,

and subsequent re polts ob tained fiom the tloops with whom they fought indicated that without

exception the se men discharged their duty in exemplaly fashion.

Dming the day, Combat Command A t o th e lef t lea l of Combat Command

B

was under con-

siderable ptes sute in the vicinity of

POTEAU.

Division headquattets had sent them a me ssag e at

0925 that it was impelative that they command the toad leading into

POTE U

rom RECHT.

Although

CCE

did not know

it

a t the time, the situation to th e left reat and on the notthern flank

was c~i t i ca l .

A unit cornrnandms' meeting was held at the CCB command pos t just aft er dark. The

S4

tepolted on the supply situation; and in view of th e vague information available, Genela1 Clatke

emphasized the necessity of conserving supplies of ammunition and rations.

Instructions were

given to i ssue only two-thirds of a tation daily and to fi le altiller y missions spatingly and then

oniy where the situa tion appeared to e critical.

EVENTS

O F

21 DECEMBER

1944


29/43

SITUATION OF

DIV 21DEC 4

HE 7

TH

ARMD

\

......

.. ,....

OSN AT

2116

DE

POSN AT

2 1 2 4

DEC

\

/

I

\

O

\

YARDS 2

rr

l I

I

I I I I I

I

1 1 I I

M E T E R S 8

8

Figure

8. A

full- scal e col ps attack wa s launched against the town and at

2200

CC

of the 7th Armoied Division

withdrew to the high giound w est of ST.

VITH C 3 A o

the 7th captu ted high giound northwest of POTEAU and

repel led countelattacks. Task Force J on es was teceiving enemy attacks from the south.


30/43

infantrymen, engineers, t ankers , reconna issance troops, and others who stood their ground and

inflicted huge lo ss es upon the attacking formations. Even th e heavy tan ks were forced t o with-

draw, leaving destroyed hulks battered and

burning

in their wake.

On tha t day, t he men of t he 7th Armored performed, individually and collective ly, repeated

deeds of heroism; soldiers not only engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the German infantry, but

al so destroyed German tanks with bazookas and grenades.

Still the Germans attacked. Starting at 1100 with an arti llery barrage on th e notthern and

eastern posi tions of CCB and an infantry-tank att ack against th e juncture of CCB and CCB of the

9th Armored Division, t he Germans stepped up the sca le of their as sault; by 1300 the entire line

of CCB, 7th Armored Division, was aflame with enemy artil lery, screeming meemies, tanks,

and infantry pouring a concentrat ion of s teel a t the defenders. As the enemy closed in they were

met in turn by all pos sible concentrated fires that could

be

brought t o bear-but st il l they attacked.

Major attacks were launched against tha t part of the line held by the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion

at 1100, 1230,1400, 1610, and 1710; while the

notthern flank manned by the 31st Tank Battalion

and the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was hit with attacks at 1300, 1730, 1805, and 1820.

All att acks were turned back, and CCB's li ne s continued to hold.

Then three heavy as sau lts

were started by the Germans, with each directed along th e ax is of th e main roads entering ST.

VITH; at 1650 from th e eas t along th e SCHONBERG Road; followed by an a ttack down the

MALhIEDY

Road at 1835; with the last one starting up the PRUM Road

t

2000.

Each of th es e attacks was

preceded by intense artillery barrages lasti ng from 15 t o 35 minutes, and clo sel y followed by the

infantry and tanks. Th e Germans were not t o be denied and their r elent less pressure s in ce 1100

in the morning had left g aps i n the line, sin ce there were no replacements for the dead and

wounded. By 2000 CCB s lin es had been penetrated in at l east thee points.

Th e battle con-

tinued until appoximatel y 2200 when Gene-a1 Clarke, seeing that

a

pottion of his position was no

longer tenable, iss ued the order to withdraw t he center of t he Jine to the high ground west of ST.

VITH.


31/43

ef fe c t iv e ambush in som e th ick w oods sou theas t of POTEA U on th e ST. VITH-POTEAU Road.

B efo re t he ambush w a s d i scove red , t h e enemy w as succ es s fu l i n cap t u ri ng t he occupan t s o f e igh t

pee ps and on e l i gh t t ank w hich had been knocked out. Pe r sonn e l i nc luded such key o f f i ce r s a s

th e Exe cut iv e Off icer , CCA; L ia i s on Off icer, CCA; Exe cut iv e Off icer and Adjutant, 48th Armored

Infantry Bat ta l ion; and others . Upon discovery , th e enemy abandoned i t s ambush, and th e key

road w as ag ain opened for f r iendly tra ff ic . At 2000 another s t rong hos t i l e a t t ack , suppor ted by

heav y mortar , mach ine gun, and ar t i l lery f i re, w as repulsed.

Ant ic ipa t ing the po ss ib i l i ty of CCR s be ing unable to hold the presen t pos i t ion , Genera l

C l a t ke had i n i t i a t ed r econ na i s sance on t he road l ead i ng t o t h e w es t , t hrough H IN D ER H AU SEN and

COMMANSTER t o VIELSALM, a pos sib le ave nue of withdrawal . T h is road w as in poor condi t ion

and for th e most par t pa sse d through a fores t . En gine ers and ar t il l e rymen had been put to work on

c r i t i ca l a nd i m passab l e spo t s ; bu t even w i t h t h i s improvemen t pa s sag e ove r

t is

road was not easy.

EV EN TS O F 22 D EC EMB ER 1944

T h e Germans cont inued t o a t t ac k wi th infantry and tanks . At 0200 th e 928th Grenadier

Bat

t a l i on a t t acked R O D T from t h e rear . Th e enemy w i dened t h i s pene t r a t ion and a t 1135 R O DT w as

captured, sp l i t t ing CCA and CCB.

T he nine-hour ba t t l e for RODT wa s a grim af fa ir in which

perso nne l from every po ss ib le source-cook s, dr ivers , radio operators-were employed t o augment

t h e de f e nse i n a despe ra t e e f fo r t t o p r even t t he enemy f rom dr iv i ng a deeper w edge be t w een t he

two combat commands . T h e lo s s of RODT nec ess i t a te d CCB s pul l ing back i t s le f t fl ank to pro-

te ct HINDERHAUSEN, a k ey po si t ion on th e emergency ex i t route t o COMMANSTER and VIELSALM.

(See f igu res and 10.)

B y da rk t he l i n e w a s e s t ab l i sh ed aga i n and w a s s t r eng t hened by t he add i t i on of t he 17 t h

T a n k B a t t a li o n

-)

on th e sou th f lank of CCB t o t ie- in w ith CC B of th e 9 th Armored Division.

Contac t wi th CCA on th e nor thwes t was los t . At 0700 th e command pos t of CCB wa s moved to

COMMANSTER. D uri ng t h i s day a l l unes sen t i a l veh i c l e s w ere s en t t o t he rear . B y n igh t fa l l t he


32/43


33/43

CONTACT RES COMD

ARMD

NO

HINDERHAUSEN

CONTACT

C C B

9TH ARMD WIESENEACH

ST VITH

CONTACT CCB

6

T H ARMD

I

NIGHTFALL 17 DEC

4 4

2 NIGHTFALL 19 DE 44

3

NIGHTFAU

21

DEC

44


34/43

At about 1700, stron g enemy combat pat ro ls began coming along the rai lroa d embankment,

and tank s came toward the underpass. The bazookaman fired at the tanks, and when th e

bazooka round bounced off the front, h e withdrew. Captain Britton had just come up toward

the front and was warming hi s fee t in

an

oven when the enemy burst into hi s pos it io n Some

of th e men pulled back to t he north until the y

r n

into tanks of Company D of the 31st Tank

Battalion; th ese men rode out with thos e tanks. The remainder of the company fel l back to

the motor park in KROMBACH where the half-trac ks were gassing. La te Friday night the se

half-tracks moved to VIELSALM where they met the remainder of the company next morning.

Captain Britton s aid there were men from almost every conc eiva ble unit on the vehicles.

Back at th e line, some men remained with another unit which held f as t and foughr i t out.

ur

artill ery and mortar fire worked up and down the railroad track. One Company

B

mechadc,

T 5

Robert Cutts, had a radio with which he called back to the

FO

giving him the necessary

adjustments in the artillery fire. Th ese men als o finally pulled back from the line when the

17th Tank Battalion moved out, and many of them rode the tanks out of the area.

Pre ssu re con tinued to in c rea se a long the en t i re fron t; and , a s th e 7 th Armored Div is ion

shor tened i t s l in es and ag a in regrouped , German in fan t ry and tan ks p res sed s t rong ly on a l l pos i -

t ions. Prac t ica l ly t he en t i re d iv i s ion a re a was now be ing engaged by long- range a r t i l le ry f ire.

In

the nor th , t he enemy in s t reng th w as a long the e as t bank of th e SALM River f rom ea s t of TROIS

PONTS t o GRAND

HA LL W X, and in the sou th a long the h igh ground sou th of th e h ighway running

we st f rom SALMCHATEAu. T h is meant tha t th e remainder of th e 106 th Infantry Divis ion, CCB

of th e 9th Armored Divis ion, th e 14th Cavalry Group, some co tps t roops, includ ing ar t i l le ry which

had been a t tache d t o th e 7 th Armored Div is ion , an d the en t i re 7 th Armored Div is ion wi th a t tach-

m e n ts , l e s s tr a i n s, w e r e l e f t east of th e SALM River; a l l uni ts were short of s up pli es and were

completely fat igue d from f ive or more da ys and nights of cont in uou s f ighting. Th ere w as only one

su re exi t route , a s eco nd ary road running we st f rom VIELSALM; and o ne probable al te rna te route ,

th e road

SALMCHATEAU-JOUBIEVAL-LIERNIEUX.

A s the pos i t ion w as obvious ly un tenab le , F ie ld Marsha l Montgomery in a me ssage t o Major

General Hasbrouck, Commanding the 7 th Armored Divis ion and ts cong lome ration of units, o rdered


35/43


36/43

The other cas e i s practically the same story. Th is convoy was commanded by Sergeant

Trapp and consisted of three trucks from the 31st Tank Battalion and one truck of the 23d

Armored Infantry Battalion, with a defense crew organized very similar to the first convoy.

Their mission wns to obtain badly needed ammunition from a dump in the LAROCHE area.

Their experiences were about the same; they had two skirmishes and suffered one casualty.

The ammunition dump was not guarded by friendly or enemy forces. Like the first group, they

too returned at dusk of the second day, reporting, 'Mission accomplished'. l

T h e magnif i cen t e ffo r t of a l l se rv ice pe rsonne l w as recogn ized and apprec ia ted by a l l t roops

i n t h e l in e

In many ca se s the se se rv ice t roops were ca l l ed upon to repe l enemy a tt acks . In one

a c t i o n o n 21 December near SAMREE th e combat command As sis tan t S4 Ca ptain Robert

H

Barth

wa s k i l l ed whi le a t t empt ing to main tain the c ons tan t f low of sup p l ie s t o the f ron t.

The supply problems

for

ar t i l l e ry were e spec ia l ly c r i t i ca l . T he on ly way ammuni tion supp ly

cou ld be kept up wa s by hunt ing for and f inding abandoned dumps toward th e front. Very l i t t le

ammunit ion wa s get t ing through from th e rear. Some of th e ar t i l lery t ra in s were with divis ion

tra ins in th e vic ini ty of SAMREE where they were forced to f ight for their ex is tence. A balan ce of

ammunit ion was maintained between bat ta l ions; when the expendi tures were except ional ly heavy

in one bat t al ion severa l t ruck loads would be s en t to i t from ano ther ba tt al ion . On

22

December

ammunition amounted to o nly a few rounds per 105-mm howitzer for CCB ar ti llery . Any s i za bl e

amount of firing had to be approved by th e combat command commander.

At one t ime during th is cr i t ica l ammunit ion shortage a German column got los t on the road

betw een OB ER EMMELS and NEIDER EMMELS and stop pe d bumper-to-bumper a perfect target

for a concentra tion. When ar t il lery wa s cal le d for th e ammunit ion sho rta ge had t o b e considered.

F ina l ly i t was dec ided tha t th i s t a rge t meri ted the f i r ing of th e remain ing wh i te phosphorus . Th e

German column w as burned and destroyed. La ter on

22

December a 90-truck convoy carrying

5000 round s of 105-mm ammunition finally made i t s way thtough a fte r trave ling m any m ile s of

circui tous route s and back roads. From then on th e ammunit ion s i tua t ion eased.2

T he dr ivers of the 40- truck convoy which came through t o th e combat e leme nts on

22

December had been behind their s teer in g wh eels for hou ts on end without s leep. They had dr iven


37/43

Another factor that gave the Germans pause was the aggressivenes s and tenacity of the

defense. CCB was not content to dig in and merely try to hold the Germans when they attacked.

Their patrols were aggressive, and wherever a weakness was sensed, a probing attack was made.

Their countera ttacks were quick and effective. Had the Germans realized th e limited strength

CCB had a t i t s disposal and th e disorganization and lo s s of morale of some of t he Allied troops,

caused by the initial attack, they could have closed th e pincers and annihilated the American

force s a t their choosing. However, instead of committing their forces to a major blow, they dis-

sipat ed their strength and l ost valuable time in making limited objective and probing attacks.

Defenders of ST. VITH were puzzled a t th e time a s to why the Germans did not pour more

artillery fir e into ST.

VITH

It was only after t he third or fourth day that they began firing anything

tha t resembled the intensity of an American barrage. Undoubtedly, they counted on a quick capture

of the town and did not want to destroy it ar make the s tr ee ts impassable. As was learned after-

wards, i n th is offensive the Germans were counting heavily on using ST. VITH a s a forward railhead.

Th e arrival of CCB in ST. VITH on th e afternoon of th e 17th wa s quite timely. Advance

patrols of th e Germans were on the SCHONBERG-ST. VITH Road at tha t time. Th e only forces to

stop them were the provisional engineer troops, and there

is

no doubt that th e Germans could have,

and probably would have, been in ST. VITH on th e night of the 17th, had 7th Armored Division

uni ts not arrived and been placed in pos ition when they were.

It would be very interesting indeed to have a transcript of the conversat ions between com-

manders of th e various echelons of command of the Germans after thei r failure to tak e ST. VITH

on schedule, particularly when they discovered the s i z e of th e small force that was denying th is

area to them. Th e atti tude of th e German command was well-expressed by a German lieutenant

colonel who, while he was attempting to interrogate one of our men who had been captured,

remarked: "You and your damned panzer divis ion have kept us from getting to LIEGE "

Every off icer and man of the 7th Armored Division who participated in the ST. VITH action,

sing s th e praise s of the 275th Armored Fie ld Artillery Battalion. Th is VIII Corps Artillery Bat-

talion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Clay, ch os e t o st ay and fight. The coolness and the


38/43

L SSONS

1

Flex ib i l i t y

Although the unit s of

CCB

were mixed a s they were placed i n the line of

battle and troops were frequently moved from one command to another, an effective fighting fmce

was estab lished and maintained. An armored division trained t o work in an ever-changing t act ica l

situation will not find itself in confusion when th e exigencies of battl e require

ts

employment in

unusual situations.

2

Mobile defense. Until th e final day of the defense of ST VITH a mobile re se we was

maintained t o move quickly and d e d with any att ack or penetration. At times th is reserve struck

the enemy before his attack was ev en fully launched s o that th e attack became disorganized and

was stopped.

In

a mobile defense, particu larly ag ain st a force of superior numbers, t he reserv e

must be mobile and it must carry out i t s mission with aggressiveness.

3. Ela s t i c

defense Even though th e lin e to b e defended was long the defensive setup

remained e las tic and p lans were constantly in mind for continuing th e def ense in th e event that

forward elements were overrun.

4 iaison planes

Th e absenc e of liaison planes for artillery and other observation atST

VITH was keenly felt. Th is equipment

s

of enormous value

i n

th e conduct of the defense.

5

Maale Even though the men were operating under the most adverse conditions, includ-

ing rain, mud, cold, an d shortage of food, their r espon se to th e situation, when apprised of the

importance of the st and, was magnificent. It seemed that the longer th e defen se held, th e higher

the morale became. Th e desperateness of th e situation only increased th e determination.

It

s

interestin g to note the effec t of a personality on th e morale of fighting men. While at

the front, about the 20th of December, General Clarke told a first sergeant that word had been

received that General Patton was attacking the south side of the

BULGE

The

sergeant, who

had been with the Third Army during it s sweep acr os s France, replied with confidence

and

affec-

tion, If Georgie's coming-we've got it made.

6

Coordination

end

cooperation, Th e .defensive stand at ST. VITH was made pos sib le only


39/43

9. Summary Armor is genera l ly though t of a s a n o ffens ive fo rce . However, i t s cap ab i l i t i e s

on de fe nse a r e g rea t.

I t conduc t s an aggres s ive and an e la s t i c de fense . I t ro l l s wi th the punches.

I t s e e k s o p p o t t u ni t ie s t o s t r i k e w h en t h e e n e m y l e a v e s a n o pe ni ng . I t t r a d e s t e r r a in f o r ti m e a n d

tac t i c a l advan tage , an d in s o do ing makes the enemy pay heav i ly fo r th e ga i ns which he makes .

F i n a l l y , i t d i s e n g a g e s a nd s t r i k e s a g a i n fro m

a

new direction.

BACK

TO ST. VITH

T h e fol lowing mes sage from the 7th Atmored Divis ion commander , General Robel t W

Hasbrouck , w as read t o th e men abou t 4 January 1945.

"To the O fficers a nd Men of the 7th Armored Division

"Since

it

is imp oss ible for me to talk personall y to e ach of you. I am taking thi s method of

bringing to your attention some of the things I want you to know.

"First of all, I want you to know that the German attack ha s been disrupted and their plans

upset. Th is division, by i t s gallant action in denying the important road center of ST. VITH

to the enemy for more than five days contributed greatly towards upsetting Van Rundstedt ~

carefully planned schedule. General Eisenhower and our old friends, the

V I I ~

British Corps,

have telegraphed us their congratulations. The se messag es will be read to you later.

"Secondly, we

ate

resuming the offensive.

On

January 3 4 the

XVIIX

Corps (Airborne) to

which we now belong, resumed the offensi ve by attacki ng south. We are in Corps Reserve

and may be cal led upon a t any time to add our power to the attack. Th is att ack may help to

sho rten the war by many months. If t he German for ces to our south are c ut off by the power

and sp eed of our drive, th e enemy will hav e suffered a n overpowering defeat.

#'Naturally there will be ob sta cles to overcome. The Germans will fight savagely to avert

defeat. We must fight eve n more sav age ly, knowing what

is

a t s ta ke and remembering the

American prisoners who were shot down in cold blood by the Germans at STAVELOT and

MALMEDY. German paratro oper s may be dropped in our rear; Germans in American uniforms

may infiltra te our lines. Th is will nec ess itat e unceasi ng vigilance by al l troops, wherever

located, to prevent sabotag e and espionage. No matter how many parachutists come down in

any one area, there will always b e a far greater number of our troops in the vicinity who can

be concentrated quickly agains t them.


40/43

Appendix

I

ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE

(160530 Dec 44)

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

(EISENHOWER)

NOTES

About 161900 December 1944 The 7th Armored

Division received orders to march south and report

t the Commanding General, Vlll Corps.

Later

moved south and was attached to the 106th

Infantry Division.

First Allied Airborne Army

82d ABN Div

lOlst ABN Div

17th ABN Div

I

21st Army Group 12th Army Group 6th Army Group

(Montomery) (Bradley) (Devers)

b i


41/43

Appendix

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

(160530 Dec

44)

ARMY GROUP

B

(MODEL)

OKW RESERVES

Fuehrer Begleit Brigade

Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade

3d Panzer Grenadier Division3

9th Panzer Division

15th Panzer Grenadier Division3

9th

Volks Grenadier Division2

79th Volks Grenadier Division2

Sixth Panzer Army

(Dietrich)

Fifth Panzer Army

(Manteuffel)

Seventh Army

(Brandenberger)

-

LXXXV Corps

LXVll CorpsSS Pz Corps

SS Pz Corps

LXXX Corps

Llll Corps


42/43

APPENDIX 111

TROOP L ST

7th

Armored

Divis ion

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Combat Command A

Headquarters and Headquatters Company, Combat Command B

Headquarters, Reserve Command

147th Armored Signal Company

87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized)

17th Tank Battalion

31st Tank Battalion

40th Tank Battalion

23d Armored Infantry Battalion

38th Armored Infantry Battalion

48th Armored Infantry Battalion

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery

434th Armored Field Artillery Battal ion

440th Armored Field Artiflery Battalion

489th Armored Field Artillery Battal ion

33d Armored Engineer Battalion

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Division Trains

77th Armored Medical Battalion

129th Armored Ordnance Maintenance Battalion

Military Police Platoon

Band

ttached

and

Supporting

Units

7th rmored

Division


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wwii 7th armored division

Documents