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WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 415
Work in progress w 7PHIE fer pubic discussion Nov. iqqs
Identification of JointManagement Structuresfor Shared AquifersA Cooperati-ve Palestinian-Israeli Effort
Erano Feite9lmioMarwan2v, Haz,llad,
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WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 415
Identification of JointManagement Structuresfor Share(d AquifersA Cooperative Palestinian-Israeli Effort
Eran FeitelsonMarwan Haddad
The World BankWashington, D.C.
Copyright X 1998The International Bank for Reconstructionand Development/THE WORLD BANK1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
All rights reservedManufactured in the United States of AmericaFirst printing November 1998
Technical Papers are published to communicate the results of the Bank's work to the development community withthe least possible delay. The typescript of this paper therefore has not been prepared in accordance with the proce-dures appropriate to formal printed texts, and the World Bank accepts no responsibility for errors. Some sources citedin this paper may be informal documents that are not readily available.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) andshould not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board ofExecutive Directors or the countries they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data in-cluded in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. The boundaries, colors, de-nominations, and other information shown on any map in this volume do not imply on the part of the World BankGroup any judgment on the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
The material in this publication is copyrighted. Requests for permission to reproduce portions of it should be sentto the Office of the Publisher at the address shown in the copyright notice above. The World Bank encourages dissem-ination of its work and will normally give permission promptly and, when the reproduction is for noncommercialpurposes, without asking a fee. Permission to ccpy portions for classroom use is granted through the CopyrightClearance Center, Inc., Suite 910, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Massachusetts 01923, U.S.A.
ISSN: 0253-7494Eran Feitelson is senior lecturer in the Department of Geography and the Truman Institute for the Advancement of
Peace at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Marwan Haddad is associate professor and dean of engineering at An-Najah National University, Nablus.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Feitelson, Eran, 1956-Identification of joint management structures for shared aquifers
a cooperative Palestinian-Israeli effort / Eran Feitelson, MarwanHaddad.
p. cm. - (World Bank technical paper; ISSN 0253-7494 ;no.415)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ).ISBN 0-8213-4307-61. Water resources development-Israel-Management. 2. Water
resources development-Palestine-Management. 3. Aquifers-Israel.4. Aquifers-Palestine. I. Haddad, Marwan, 1950- . II. WorldBank. III. Title. IV. Series.HD1698.17F45 1998333.91'0095694-dc2l 98-34239
CIP
Table of Contents
FOREWORD ............................................. IV
ABSTRACTV .................. I
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......... ,VI
INTRODUCTION ................... 3
THE PROCESS ......... ,3
THE ANALYTIC APPROACH ................... 7
THE PROPOSED FLEXIBLE-SEQUENTIAL APPROACH .................. 10
RESOURCE PROTECTION STRUCTURES .................. 13CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES .................. I 5ECONOMIC STRUCTURES .................. 16COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRATIVE STRUCTURES .................. 18
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND REQUISITES .................. 20
DISCUSSION ................. 23
CONCLUSIONS ................. .. 25
REFERENCES ......... 27
Tables
TABLE 1: POSSIBLE JOINT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES ............... 6
TABLE 2: EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE AQUIFER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS ............. ...............9
TABLE 3: SEQUENCING OF ACTIVITIES' INCORPORATION BY TYPI, OF JWM STRUCTURE ....... 13
Figures
FIGURE 1: IDENTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATE STRUCTURE FOR JOI[NT AQUIFER MANAGEMENT. 4
FIGURE 2: THE EVOLUTION OF JWM ................ ............................................. 11
Maps
iii
Foreword
In recent years there has been an increasing reliance on groundwater for water supplyworldwide. Groundwater, however, is highly susceptible to pollution and to salinization, and it isvery difficult to rehabilitate once the water quality has deteriorated. Consequently, it has becomeincreasingly important to ensure that aquifers are managed judiciously and in a sustainablemanner.
Groundwater, like surface water, does not conform to either administrative or internationalboundaries. While there is extensive experience in the management and adjudication of cross-boundary surface water, less information exists on the management of transboundary groundwater.Consequently, the need to establish a mechanism for identifying and establishing cross-boundarymanagement institutions for groundwater has become more pressing.
This paper presents a mechanism for identifying possible transboundary groundwatermanagement regimes on the basis of a five-year project undertaken cooperatively by Palestinianand Israeli researchers. The study was conducted by the Truman Institute for Advancement ofPeace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestine Consultancy Group, an umbrellagroup of Palestinian research institutions. The paper advances an open-ended approach foridentifying cross-boundary management institutions for groundwater basins. In addition, theauthors discuss the work they conducted, focusing on the elements that allowed for such acooperative effort.
While the need for joint management of shared aquifers may be more apparent in theMiddle East in general, and in the Israeli-Palestinian case in particular, this political setting is onlya backdrop for the main issue addressed in the paper - the identification of ways to advance jointmanagement structures where none existed before. The paper also discusses the implications ofchanges in the geopolitical setting on the efforts to establish joint management structures.However, this discussion does not imply that its conclusions are limited to the Israeli-Palestiniancase. On the contrary, the points raised in this case are likely to be relevant in a wide array ofsettings.
As the authors maintain throughout the paper, the establishment of joint managementstructures for transboundary aquifers should be viewed as a process. It is hoped that this paperwill represent an important step toward better management of shared aquifers in all parts of theworld.
Alexander F. McCallaDirectorRural Development DepartmentChair, Rural Board
iv
Abstract
In this study, the authors provide an approach for building joint management institutionsover time for groundwater, and present some of the lessons that may be gleaned from their col-laborative experience. Although the paper's focus is limited to the Israeli.-Palestinian situation,the conclusions reached in this study can be applicable to other settings.
The paper begins by describing the process by which the joint management institutionswere identified. This process is described at two levels: one, the course that the team wentthrough; and two, the analytical approach by which these structures were identified. The authorsthen describe the outcome of the first phase of the team's work, namely, a flexible-sequential ca-pacity building structure. In the second phase of the team's work this structure was further scru-tinized, given the geopolitical changes in the region, and its accumulated experience. In addition,issues that did not receive sufficient or any attention in the first phase were discussed in the sec-ond phase. As a result, a number of issues and problems that may adversely affect the imple-mentation of joint management structures were identified. These are described in the fourth sec-tion. A brief discussion of the process and outcomes is presented in the fifth section of the paper.Particular attention is given to the possible role and limitations of international organizations inthis process, as seen from the local (i.e. Israeli and Palestinian) perspective. While the discussionfocuses on the Israeli-Palestinian case, the process and results are likely to be applicable in amuch wider array of cases, including at the sub-national level.
v
Acknowledgments
An Israeli-Palestinian team conducted the work on which this paper is based over a four-year period. Shaul Arlosoroff and Taher Nasseredin participated in all the stages of this work.Ali Wihaidi participated in the first phase of the study. In addition, many experts participated intheir private capacities in the four workshops conducted as part of this effort. Many of the ideaspresented in these pages originate from the important contributions of these team members. Wethank them all for their support.
The work was a cooperative enterprise of the Palestine Consultancy Group and theTruman Institute for the Advancement of Peace of the Hebrew UJniversity of Jerusalem. The In-ternational Development Research Center (IDRC), Canada, and the CRB Foundation generouslyfunded it. David Brooks, Dan Bitan, Issa Kahter and Edy Kaufman did everything possible tofacilitate this study within this complex institutional setup.
This paper was submitted to Israel's Commissioner of Water, Meir Ben-Meir and to theChairman of the Palestinian Water Authority, Mr. Nabil El-Sharif for their comments. We aregrateful for their time and consideration in reviewing it.
The publication of this paper was made possible through the sponsorship of the WaterResources Thematic Group of the Rural Development Family at the World Bank. We are grate-ful to the thematic group team for its support and encouragement, and particularly to Ariel Dinarfor suggesting the publication of this paper in this venue.
We also would like to recognize the many specialists within and outside the World Bankwho read the paper and provided insightful comments, including Franklin Cardy, Stephen D.Mink, and Miguel Solanes of UN/ECLAC. We also are indebted to Joseph Saba of the WestBank/Gaza Program, Jamal Saghir and Andrew Macoun of the Middle East and North Africa(MENA) region for their invaluable assistance in facilitating the publication of this paper.
Finally, we would like to thank Lili Monk for her endless efforts in reviewing, editingand publishing the paper. Still, the views and positions expressed in this paper are solely thoseof the authors and do not represent those of any other institution or body.
vi
Introduction
Water can be both a source of conflict and a basis for cooperation. The discrepancy be-tween water sources, water users, spheres of control (either at the national or sub-national level)and ownership patterns, and the extensive externalities involved can all be a basis for conflicts.In essence, the effects water withdrawals or wastewater disposal upstream may have on usersdownstream have often been a basis for contention. Yet, overcoming the scarcity and temporalvariance of water availability in semi arid regions, or the excess of water in temperate regions,often requires cooperation. Thus, water works and institutions have long been central elementsof societal organization (Wittfogel, 1957).
All these factors have been well recognized in riverine systems. However, they are justas pertinent to groundwater. Groundwater basins do not con]form any better to administrativeand international boundaries than surface water, or involve lesser externalities. While most ofthe attention has focused on cross-boundary surface flows, the growing dependence on ground-water in many parts of the world requires that cross-boundary groundwater should not be over-looked if conflicts are to be contained and cooperation enhancecl.
There is widespread recognition that groundwater is best managed in a comprehensivemanner (Das Gupta, 1993; Hayton, 1982). This is especially true in light of the susceptibility ofaquifers to pollution, their liability to salinization if they are over pumped, the high levels of un-certainty regarding their structure, the often not fully understood inter-relationship betweengroundwater and surface water, and the potential of aquifers to serve as multi-year storage withincomprehensive management schemes. In cross-boundary circumstances this implies a need forjoint management, as in most situations it is unlikely that any party will be able to manage itsshare of an aquifer (assuming such a share can be clearly defined and identified) in a sustainablemanner independent of other parties.
These issues are of particular importance in the Palestinian-Israeli context, since the areahas been the scene of a protracted and still unresolved conflict, which is still subject to negotia-tions. Currently, the mountain aquifers underlying the West Bank and Israel (Map 1) provideapproximately 35 percent of Israel's total annual consumption. Moreover, the western-sharedaquifer is Israel's major multi-year storage of high-quality water, and thus is arguably the mostimportant element in its water supply system. The same aquifers provide virtually the total con-sumption of the Palestinians on the West Bank. Moreover, there are no other readily availablegroundwater sources for the Palestinians and there are no other cross-seasonal and multi-yearstorage options available to them'. The Israeli-Palestinian case is further complicated by theforecasts for a rapid increase in domestic demand, due to the high levels of population growth inboth parties and the likelihood of increasing per-capita use in the Palestinian sector, the fact that
' The Palestinian share in the Jordan River basin is also unresolved at present. Since this issue is largelyindependent of the mountain aquifers it is not addressed here.
I
all the feasible freshwater sources have been utilized2and the rapid rate of development over aq-uifer recharge areas.
There is scant practical experience in joint management of shared aquifers, much ofwhich cannot be seen as successful. While there is extensive experience in the management ofcross-boundary surface water, that experience is not directly transferable due to the inherent dif-ferences between ground and surface water, making the management of groundwater more diffi-cult and risky than that of surface water3. Overall, only limited attention has been given to coop-eration mechanisms, as the focus of international law has been on allocation of (surface) fresh-water (Benvenisti, 1996). The few attempts to identify cooperative mechanisms for groundwatertried to define 'ideal' management regimes for groundwater. Foremost among these attempts isthe Bellagio draft treaty, modeled after the U.S.-Mexico case (Hayton and Utton, 1989). Yet,these attempts focused on an 'end state' providing only limited guidance as to how that 'endstate' may be achieved. One of the few applicable lessons that can be gained from the extensiveexperience with international surface water management, and the more limited sub-national ex-perience in groundwater management, is that management institutions develop over time. Usu-ally institutions initially focus on a single issue, and where they prove successful the scope oftheir responsibilities may eventually expand.4 Thus there is a need to identify an approach forbuilding joint management institutions over time for groundwater.
This paper describes the approach taken by an Israeli-Palestinian team to identify jointmanagement structures for the aquifers shared by these two parties and some of the lessons thatmay be gleaned from their experience. It begins by describing the process by which these insti-tutions were identified. The process is described at two levels: one, the process the team wentthrough; and two, the analytical approach by which the structures were identified. Then, the out-come of the first phase of the team's work, a flexible-sequential capacity building structure is de-scribed. In the second phase of the team's work this structure was further scrutinized, given thegeopolitical changes in the region, and the accumulating experience. In addition, issues that didnot receive sufficient or any attention in the first phase were discussed in the second phase. As aresult, a number of issues and problems that may adversely affect the implementation of jointmanagement structures were identified. These are described in the fourth section. In the fifthsection a brief discussion of the process and outcomes is presented. Particular attention is givento the possible role and limitations of international organizations in this process, as seen from thelocal (i.e. Israeli and Palestinian) perspective. While the discussion focuses on the Israeli-
2 Actually, several sources have been overutilized, and there are grave concerns over the long-termn viabil-ity of several aquifers, in particular the Gaza aquifer (Macoun, 1995).
3 The most important differences are (a) the inability to control groundwater flows, thus precluding solu-tions based on diversions (such as implemented in the Indus River case), (b) the inability to clean up aquifers oncepolluted or salinity levels rise, and (c) the much higher levels of uncertainty regarding aquifer flows and boundaries.
4 Examples include the Rhine River, the Danube basin, the Nile, the Murray-Darling basin, and the experi-ence with cross-jurisdiction groundwater management in Southern California and the Edwards Aquifer.
2
Palestinian case, the process and results are likely to be applicable in a much wider array ofcases, including at the sub-national level.
The Process
In early 1993 the Palestine Consultancy Group, an umbrella group of Palestinian researchinstitutions, and the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace of the lHebrew University ofJerusalem searched for appropriate research efforts to follow up on the first Palestinian-Israeliwater conference held in Zurich in December of 1992 (Isaac End Shuval, 1994). The study de-scribed hence was formulated in response to this search. Two outside (Canadian) sources, theInternational Development Research Center (IDRC) and the CRB Foundation, funded the study.The two principal researchers were affiliated with universities a fact, which allowed them to pur-sue this study as part of an academic research effort, regardless of the positions, held by Israeland the Palestinian authorities at the time. This was important since it allowed the researchers topropose options without committing anybody to these propositions (including the participantsthemselves when appearing under fornal hats). The two principal researchers were joined in theresearch team by leading experts with current or past experience at the top level of water admini-stration in Israel and the occupied territories.5
The first phase of the study took two years. It was greatly facilitated by the environmentof rapid and sometime dramatic developments in the overall peace process, in particular the dec-laration or principles agreed upon in Oslo and signed in Washington in September 1993, fol-lowed by the Gaza-Jericho accords of 1994 and Oslo B accords of September 1995. Still, clo-sures following terrorist attacks (such as the Hebron massacre in February 1994, or suicidebombings later on) created technical difficulties, as Palestinians involved in the study were pre-vented from reaching Jerusalem, where most meetings were held.
The structure of the first phase of the study shown in Figure I included two closed inter-national workshops. Participation in each workshop was limited to approximately thirty invitedexperts. About one third of the experts were Israelis one-third were Palestinians and one-thirdwere of other nationalities. A specific agenda was set for each workshop. The first workshopfocused on the international experience with regard to cross-border water resources and the is-sues that need to be addressed when managing an aquifer in gerLeral, and the mountain aquifers inparticular. The second workshop focused on more specific issues, such as the requisites for themanagement of aquifers, the potential of water trading, and the legal and institutional facets ofjoint management.
Each workshop was comprised of papers prepared in aclvance (and included in the work-shop proceedings) and of a series of roundtable discussions. The main points raised in these dis-
The experts are Mr. Shaul Arlosoroff, formerly deputy Water Commissioner of Israel and head of a na-tional committee for examining the national water policies, and Mr. Taher Nasseredin, director of the West Bankwater department. In the first phase Mr. Ali Wahiadi, director of the Gaza water department was also part of theteam.
3
cussions were summarized in the proceedings. However, the discussions were not recorded, andstatements were not attributed to the speakers in order to assure them that they could speak freelyregardless of their official affiliations.
Figure 1: Identification of Appropriate Structure for Joint Aquifer Management
STAGE ACTION
Lit. Surveys ~~Identification ofI Lit. P ues Issues
Previous Joint
nExpertiosea rkshop I LocalExperntiselL.........Wo ....... Expertise
Identificatio Identificatio Delineatioof 0 of IofStructural Criteria Structures
| I , 1 = o. o.~~~I
r . ... .. .. .. .. .. .. ....... ....I
Worksho IP4 EvaluationIII Workshop ~~~~~Possible
|Appropriatel
Source: reproduced rrom E. Feltelson and M. Haddad, RevisionsJolnt Management of Shared Aquifera: Flnal Report Fmal(1995)
4
The research team held several meetings before and after each workshop. In these meet-.ings the tasks that needed to be addressed by joint manag;ement institutions were discussedamong the participants. On this basis, nineteen initial structures were identified. A basic govern-ance structure was proposed for each one, and its main attributes outlined (Table 1). These werethen evaluated according to criteria elicited in the discussions during the second workshop. Onthis basis the team met for an intensive two-day working sessions, following which a final reportof this phase was drafted (Feitelson and Haddad, 1995). In this report a flexible-sequential ap-proach for building up joint management structures over time was advanced. These structuresare described later in this paper.
All the structures identified at this stage had several elements in common. In particular,all emphasized the need to begin with confidence-building measures, in particular joint monitor-ing and data sharing, and the establishment of conflict resolution mechanisms. The first step ofthe second phase was therefore a more careful scrutiny of these issues. In the first phase, waterrights and allocations were not discussed, as they were seen as sensitive issues, which wouldneed to be resolved by decisionmakers. However, many of the structures proposed have directbearing on the definition of water rights and the determination of water allocations. Moreover, itis unlikely that any structure could be implemented before these issues are resolved. Thus, in thesecond phase these issues were addressed. In this phase two additional workshops were held.One focused on the technical issues, and one on the question of water rights.
Important geopolitical shifts were taking place during the course of this study. First, theOslo B accords were signed in September 1995. The accords called for the establishment of aJoint Water Commission (JWC) and Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSETs). So far,these institutions have failed to establish confidence among the two parties. As a result of thissituation and the conclusions reached after two additional worikshops, several problems will needto be addressed before a joint management structure is implemented. These problems are de-tailed in the section entitled Implementation Issues and Requisites.
An important element in this process has been the continual dissemination of informationregarding the workshops and the reports generated by the team to professionals and decision-makers on both sides. As the study was an academic one, regardless of positions held by severalteam members at different points of time, all the information generated through it was madepublic. This is not the general attitude in both communities, as reports dealing with water issueshave generally tended to have a highly restricted circulation. Thus, negotiators from both partieswere well aware of the ideas and views generated by this situdy throughout the course of theoverall negotiations.
5
Table 1: Possible Joint Management Structures
Coopera- ExternalStructure Function Staffing tive Level Financing Support
l Apportionment monitoring Monitor extractions & Separate professional Moderate By parties Perhaps bybody compliance staff (hydrologists) funding
2 Investigative advisory body Investigation of tech- Administrative staff only Moderate By parties Perhaps pro-nical disputes fessional
oversight
3 Technical research body Coordinate & initiate Small Administrative Limited Research by Funding &research staff grants & by peer reviews
parties
4 Aquifer monitoring body Monitor water quality Joint or separate hydro- Minimal By parties None& quantity logical staff
5 Economic development Plan & coordinate Technical, economic & Very high By parties Finance andbody economic develop- engineering staffs technical
ment over aquifer I
6 Project management body Manage & coordinate Economic & engineering Very high By parties and Mainlywater projects staff foreign aid funding
7 Joint regulatory body Protect aquifer Planning, legal & techni- High By parties Nonecal
8 Integrated aquifer manage- Manage aquifer Moderate size, compre- Extremely By parties & Nonement body hensive high charges
9 Centralized aquifer man- Manage aquifer Large staff, comprehen- Extremely Self-financing Financing &agement body sive high arbitration
10 Water transfer & market Administer water mar- Moderate size, economic, Very high Mostly self- Noneadministering body kets legal & engineering financing
11 Risk management body Prepare for & manage Separate technical Staffs Moderate By parties Noneemergencies
12 Pollution control body Aquifer protection Separate legal, planning High By parties None& hydrological
13 Resource conservation Promote water conser- Small separate technical Low By parties Fundingbody vation staffs
14 Resource apportionment Discuss apportionment Minimal joint adminis- Low By parties & Funding &body issues trative staff foreign aid teaching
15 Training establishment Train professionals Minimal joints adminis- Low By parties & Funding &trative & professionals foreign aid teaching
16 Arbitration body Dispute resolution Small administrative Moderate None None
17 Water utility Water supply Large professional* Very high Self-financing None
18 Waste-water utility Waste-water treatment Comprehensive staffs* Moderate- Self-financing Fundinghigh
19 Aquifer management cor- Pump & sell water Large professional staff* High Self-financing Noneporation
Source: E. Feitelson and M. Haddad, Joint Management ofShared Aquifers: Final Report (1995).* In the case of utilities in addition to the utility's staff, a supervisory staff is needed ito oversee and regulate the utility's operations.This staff can be joint or separate.
6
The Analytic Approach
The management of an aquifer requires that decisions be made on a wide set of issues, in-cluding pumpage regimes, drought policies, protection measures, monitoring, enforcement of re-strictions, recharge enhancement policies, wastewater treatment standards and reuse policies andcrisis management measures. In addition, coordination of research, sharing of data bases, modelsand expertise facilitates a more effective and efficient management regime. Joint managementimplies that institutional structures allowing coordination of such activities would be established.All these features can thus serve as bases for joint management efforts, though not all of themwould necessarily be included in any specific joint management structure.
As there is limited viable prior experience with the management of shared aquifers; theresearch team took an exploratory open-ended approach, whereby no option was discarded a-priori. The first step in this approach was the identification o:f the full range of options for jointmanagement activities, regardless of whether they exist in practice or not. To this end, a possiblestructure was devised for each activity and issue identified above. For every structure staffingrequirements, necessary level of cooperation, financing options, possibilities for third party in-volvement, and basic governance structure were then specified (Feitelson and Sylvan, 1995).These initial structures, summarized in Table 1, include both single-task bodies (such as a jointmonitoring body) and more comprehensive multi-task structures. The structures differ not onlyin their actual goals, but also in the scope of goals, ambitiousness, tasks needed to carry out themandate of the structure, level of cooperation, needed capacities, role of markets and privatecapital, and the possibilities for third party involvement. They provide thus indeed a wide arrayof options to consider. Moreover, many of these structures have not been tried yet in any realcross-boundary groundwater basin.
The elementary structures identified in Table I are only the initial building blocks towarda joint management structure. The next step is to recognize the advantages and disadvantages ofeach of them. To this end the nineteen structures were evaluated according to a set of criteria.These were:
> Sustainability - the degree to which the structure contributes toward resource protection,facilitates proper responses to emergencies and promotes efficient use of the resource;
> Flexibility - the ability of the structure to adapt to changes;
=> The ability to monitor and verify the agreements, and thus reduce the potential for futuredisagreements;
> Minirnal infringement on sovereignt. 6
This last criterion was introduced as it was recognized that infringement on sovereignty isa major impediment to cross-boundary environmental action (Piddington, 1989).
6 This criteria assumes that water rights and allocations can be defined, identified and agreed-upon at thepolitical level, regardless of the institutional joint management structures.
7
An additional criterion that is often referred to is equity. However, this criteria was foundto be inoperable, regardless of how equity was defined, since in most cases equity effects varywidely as a function of the specific provisions of any agreement reached, rather than because ofthe basic character of the institutional structure agreed upon. It was found that for almost anyone of the institutional structures discussed several equity results could conceivably materialize(Feitelson and Sylvan, 1995). Therefore this criterion was dropped. The ensuing analysis issummarized in Table 2.
As the sustainability criterion has several facets, among which there may be contradic-tions, it was subdivided into three criteria: contribution to resource protection, efficiency, andcontribution to facilitation of emergency responses. Each of the possible nineteen structuresidentified in Table I was evaluated on a seven-level scale, according to its perceived effect oneach criterion. While this evaluation is clearly subjective, it does clarify the considerations forrecommending or rejecting a certain function or structure, and thus is helpful in focusing the dis-cussions among policy analysts and with decisionmakers.
The wide array of options delineated in Tables I and 2 may seem bewildering, even whentheir advantages and disadvantages are well understood. The degrees of freedom these optionsleave to decisionmakers and policy analysts are such that a major effort is needed in order to nar-row down the field to those structures that may actually be of interest. Moreover, the structurespresented in Table I are not mutually exclusive. There are many possibilities to combine differ-ent structures. The actual number of permutations that can conceptually be considered is there-fore much higher than seen in Tables 1 and 2. Thus, it is pertinent that the initial structures bealigned in a way that would help decisionmakers focus on the main issues that need to be dis-cussed and agreed upon.
Conceivably, there are many ways in which the initial structures can be combined andaligned. One option would be to sort them by level of cooperation. In this situation, decision-makers would define the level of cooperation desired, and thus focus only on the institutions thatare within that level. A second option would be to align the structures according to level ofcomprehensiveness. Decisionmakers would agree on the level of comprehensiveness, and henceon structures that are within the agreed-upon range. However, decision makers may find it diffi-cult to think and discuss relatively obtuse terms such as "desired level of comprehensiveness" or"level of cooperation." Therefore, in this study the structures were aligned according to their ul-timate goals. Essentially, four main goals, or rationales were identified, and the structures werecombined according to their contribution toward achieving these goals. These four goals are thusseen as the optional directions that an institution building initiative may take.
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Table 2: Evaluation of Possible Aquifer Management Institutions
Structure's Goals Contribution to Contribution Contribution Contribution to Disagreement Infringement onResource Pro- to Flexibility to Efficiency Emergency Re- Potential Sovereignty
tection sponse1 Apportionment monitoring Limited Very limited None Very limited Moderate-significant Limited
2 Investigative advisory body Moderate Significant Moderate Very limited Moderate-significant Limited3 Technical research Moderate- Moderate Significant Very limited Limited None-limited
Substantial
4 Aquifer monitoring Substantial Limited Moderate- Significant Limited None-limitedsignificant
5 Economic development Limited Very limited Significant Moderate Significant Potentially significant*
6 Project management Moderate- Moderate Limited Moderate Significant Limitedsubstantial
7 Joint regulatory Major Very limited Limited Limited Significant Significant major*
8 Integrated aquifer manage- Substantial Moderate* Substantial Major Significant Significantment
9 Central integrated aquifer Substantial Significant Substantial Major Substantial Majormanagement
10 Administer water trans- Limited Significant Major Substantial Significant None-limitedfers/markets
11 Risk management Limited Significant Limited Major Significant** None*-significant
12 Pollution control Major Moderate Significant Very limited Significant- Moderate-substantialsubstantial
13 Resource conservation Moderate- Moderate Significant Very limited Limited Noncsignificant
14 Resource apportionment Significant Major Limited Signiticant Signiticant Limited
15 Training Limited Very limited Limited Very limited Very limited None
16 Arbitration forum Very limited Moderate Very limited Limited Not applicable None
17 Water utility Limited Substantial Substantial Substantial Limited Limited
18 Waste-water utility Substantial Moderate Substantial Limited Limited-moderate None-Limited
19 Aquifer management cor- Substantial-major* Substantial Moderate-sub- Significant Moderate Limited-moderate*poration I I stantial** *
Source: E. Feitelson and M. Haddad, Joint Management of Shared Aquifers: Final Report (1995).* Effect would be a function of the exact authority given to the new structure.** Disagreement in emergency situations can be acute with out this structure.*** Effect would be a function of oversight of potential monopoly power.Note: (Major>substantial>significant>moderate>limited>very limited>none)
The four directions identified were:
= Aquifer protection - whereby the institutional focus is on the long-term protection of thewater quality in the aquifers;
=> Crisis management - whereby the focal point is on structures that are needed to formulateresponses to both rapidly developing crises (such as accidental spills of contaminants),and evolving crises, most notably droughts.
z Efficiency - whereby the main goal would be to supply and use water from the aquifer inthe most efficient manner. Actually, this goal can be sub-divided into two distinct sub-goals. The first is to promote efficient water use. To this end, structures whose primarypurpose was to reduce transaction costs, that would otherwise impede water trading,would need to be identified. The second sub goal is to promote efficient water supply.This would focus primarily on privatization options, broadly defined.
> Integrative-comprehensive structures - the fourth possible goal is to address all the facetsof aquifer management. This would require that an integrative-comprehensive structurebe formed, and thus the formation of such a structure carn be viewed as a goal onto itself.
Each of these four basic options can be the primary goal of a joint management structure.However, none of these possible joint water management (JWM4) structures is a singular struc-ture. Rather, each group includes multiple possibilities for structures, to which different taskscan be added or detracted. In all four cases it is likely that the structure will evolve over time.Moreover, the four groups are not mutually exclusive. Thus it is possible that a JWM structurewould begin as one group and eventually be expanded to include elements from other groups.The question that has to be faced now is which tasks should be included in each step.
The Proposed Flexible-Sequential Approach
The approach advanced by the research team at the end of the first phase is a sequentialprocess during which a decision would need to be made at certain time intervals within a pre-agreed framework (Feitelson and Haddad, 1995). There are four possible initial routes, leadingto the four basic options. However, it is possible to move from one route to another, and expandthe scope of any management structure. The only caveat to this statement is the integrated com-prehensive option, which already includes all other facets, and thus to shift from such a structureto one of the other options would not be feasible.
This approach allows decisionmakers to embark on a cooperative route without commit-ting themselves in advance to a fully integrative structure. Thus they may choose a less de-manding level of cooperation (and lesser restrictions on sovereignty) and still obtain importantbenefits from an aquifer management perspective. Moreover, as it is not clear which course willbe attractive or acceptable to decisionmakers at any given moment, this approach provides theflexibility to include elements from other courses as circumstances change, without compromis-ing previous achievements.
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Figure 2: The Evolution of JWM
Integrated Comprehensive JWM
\ Crises Resource Ecoomi\Management Protection Orentiomlc\Orientation Orientation Oretio /
Monitoring
_____Short term supplyAugmentation
Conflict regulation
Trading/Pricing/Fund
Regulations
Planning
Research
Project coordination
Source: reproduced from E. Feitelson and M. Haddad, Joint Long term supplyManagementofShared Aquifers: FinalReport (1995) Augmentation
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The approach is depicted conceptually in Figure 2 (preceding page). At the beginning, alimited set of activities are undertaken jointly. These serve as a basis for the JWM structures.Additional activities are added to the purview of the JWM over time. The activities added canlead up to one of the four basic options. Alternatively, from the second stage onward, activitiescan be added horizontally, to widen the scope of the JWM structure. It is thus possible to beginwith elements leading up to a crises management structure, but at a certain stage include alsopollution prevention elements (such as coordination of wastewater standards and re-use), thuswidening the scope of the evolving JWM structure.
The direction shown in Figure 2 is fundamentally different from that presented by theBellagio Draft Treaty, which essentially proposes a concurrent agreement on all the elements ofan integrated structure. However, the approach shown in Figure 2 does not contradict the optiondetailed in the Bellagio Draft Treaty, as eventually it can also lead to a fully integrated JWMstructure.
One advantage of the proposed approach is that it allows confidence to be built over timein the new institutions. This may be of particular importance in cases where the parties werepreviously belligerent, as in the Israeli-Palestinian case.
Table 3 details the proposed sequence of activities that would be included in each of theprocesses leading to the four basic types of JWM structures. Each columnn represents one of thefour basic types of JWM structures: a resource protection structure, a crisis management struc-ture, an economic management structure and an integrative structure. The numbers in each col-umn represent the priority of each activity for the structure, as analyzed by the project team, andthe stage in which it needs to be incorporated in the structure. Therefore, an activity with a num-ber one in a certain column means that this activity should be included in the first stage of thestructure discussed in that column. For example, joint monitoring of water use would be a firststep toward any economic management structure, but could be incorporated in the second stagein a process geared toward an integrative structure.
In the following sub-sections the rationale for the sequencing of each process is ex-plained. However, before turning to this discussion several additional points have to be clarified.
* Many activities can seem pertinent to all JWM structures. Therefore, in compiling Table 3an effort was made to identify the minimal number and scope of activities that need to be in-corporated in each stage to make the process rational and operational.
* Description of a JWM structure requires that its governance, decision making, staffing, fi-nancing and conflict resolution mechanisms should be outlined, as well as the degree towhich external involvement may be involved (Feitelson and Sylvan, 1995).
* In formulating the structures it was assumed that an agreement on water rights and alloca-tions would be reached separately. Therefore, each structure is designed so that it can be im-plemented regardless of the specifics of such an agreement.
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* In formulating the structures it was assumed that all JWM structures should not supplant theexisting water institutions of the different parties (the Israeli Water Commissioner and Pales-tinian Water Authority in this case).
* To improve the operational capabilities of the JWM institutions, a two-level structure is ad-vanced. In addition to a governing body, a number of specific units would be set up at alower technical level to carry out professional tasks. Ex,amples of such bodies are a jointmonitoring unit to carry out monitoring or data collection activities or a planning and policyunit to draft contingency plans for drought situations.
Table 3: Sequencing of Activities' Incorporation by Type of JWM Structure
Structure Type Ac- Resource Crisis Man- Economic- Comprehensivetivities Protection agement based Struc- Integrated
Structure Structure tures StructureMonitor water resources 1 1 4 1Monitor water extraction I I 1 2Crisis management 2 1 2Preparation for droughts 5 3 3 3Licensing of drilling and 5 4 2pumping _
Wastewater management 2 4Landfill siting 3 5Hazardous waste disposal 3 2 2 4Enforcement 3 2 2 4Funding of joint projects 4 3 4 3Impose & collect 3 5taxes/levies
Planning of supply and re- 2source
Difference/conflict man- 2 2 2 2agement
Structure modification 4 4 3 3Pass by laws _5
Coordinate standards and 3 3 4regulations
Research and develop- 3 2 2ment
Operation (pumpage) _ _ 3Price setting _ 2 5Database compilation 1 1 1 1Facilitate water trading _ 2 5
(Source: E. Feitelson and M. Haddad, Joint Management ofShared Aquifers: Final Report 1995).
Resource Protection Structures
Perhaps the most important inducement for joint management is that all parties have ajoint interest in maintaining the water quality of the aquifer and its storage capacity. This factor
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makes joint management a potential win-win solution, and the lack of it a likely lose-lose situa-tion.
In the first column of Table 3 the activities that should be included in structures whoseprimary goals is to assure that the resource base (i.e. the aquifer) be protected are identified, anda sequencing of their introduction is proposed.
Four or five stages can be identified in the sequence leading up to most resource protec-tion structures. Since the monitoring of the quality and quantity of water in the aquifer and thecompilation of resulting data in a joint data base are a prerequisite to any joint management effort(Haddad and Mizyed, 1995), they are placed in the first stage. At the second stage, emphasisshifts to addressing the main threats to the aquifers. These often pertain to wastewater treatmentand reuse (or lack of these), as is the case in the Palestinian-Israeli scene. Therefore wastewaterissues and preparation of plans for containing pollution incidents and resolving disagreements areplaced in the second stage. The latter element is placed early so as to preclude the possibility ofdisagreements leading to a loss of confidence in the joint institutions, something that may be det-rimental to the whole process.
After laying the foundations for addressing the most irrimediate concerns, more compre-hensive long-term issues can be addressed. These include the capacity to set standards, the con-trol of solid and hazardous waste, the coordination of research on long term threats to the aqui-fers, and the advancement of possible solutions to these threats.
In subsequent stages, joint planning and funding of projects that may help protect the aq-uifer (most notably wastewater treatment plants) can be introduced, as well as drought planning(to preclude over-pumping), and the assumption of drilling licensing power.
A possible structure for carrying out the tasks outlined above is composed of four levels.At the top are decisionmakers and mediators. Below them is the Aquifer Protection Commission(APC), to be composed of high-ranking representatives of the main interests (water, health, envi-ronment, agriculture and industry) from the different parties. The APC would have the ultimateresponsibility for protecting the aquifer, and would need to make the main policy decisions nec-essary to do so. It would also be the first stage for resolving any differences regarding the aqui-fer.
To help the APC in its work several joint technical units need to be set up. The first is anaquifer monitoring and data compilation unit, responsible for monitoring and data storage anddissemination tasks. A second body is a project review unit. This unit would initially review thevarious economic initiatives, as well as the wastewater treatment and re-use schemes, to assurethat they do not damage the aquifer. However, its terms of reference may be expanded as thestructure evolves, to include planning of joint schemes, promulgation of land use controls neces-sary to protect the aquifer (including review of landfills and hazardous waste schemes) and re-view of water projects. In addition, the role of this unit may be extended to include the financingof joint projects and drought planning.
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Another task that would require institutionalization is standard setting. The unit or com-mittee charged with this task would suggest qualitative and quantitative water standards (ormodifications of existing standards), and guidelines for wastewater re-use. IHlowever, these stan-dards would need to be ratified by the APC. In addition, joint inspection teams may be desirable,to assure compliance with the agreed upon standards, guidelines, principles, land use policies,waste management requirements, and similar agreed upon actions.
As there is much uncertainty regarding most shared aquifers, there would always be aneed for a long-term continuous research program to improve and guide the protection efforts.One of the goals of this program would be to update the best available information on the safeyield of the aquifers. Based on this information, the pumping rates of both sides should be ad-justed. To this end a research coordination unit may be established. This unit may help set theresearch agenda, and prevent duplications of effort. Finally., a drilling licensing element isneeded to prevent over-pumping and consequent salinization.
The fourth level of the JWM structure includes field tearms of both sides, and the differentlocal and regional authorities and water utilities or units. These may include local water orwastewater utilities, or municipal or regional water units. This level, where local units operateseparately according to the guidelines set by the JWM structure, will be responsible for imple-menting many of the provisions needed to protect the aquifer.
If a need for modifications in the JWM structure emerges, a special forum would be es-tablished to address these issues. This forum could even include high level decisionmakers ofboth parties, or at least receive authorization from these individuals.
Crisis Management Structures
The management of any aquifer faces its most severe test during crisis situations. Threetypes of crisis are possible: 1) sudden crisis, such as the spilling of toxic material in highly po-rous areas, the discovery of hazardous materials in drinking water coming from certain wells, orthe breaking of levies built as part of aquifer recharge efforts; 2) cumulative crisis, which couldstem from the cumulative effects of certain trends or natural events, such as droughts, or 3) theoverpumping of water by one side, above the quantities previously agreed upon by both parties.
Crisis management involves three basic actions: first, the recognition of the crisis (the re-alization that a crisis has occurred); second, agreements on the steps that need to be taken to ad-dress the crisis (contingency planning); and third, implementation of the crisis managementscheme, which requires the availability of appropriate facilities, personnel and means. The sec-ond column in Table 3 advances a possible sequencing of the activities that should be included ina joint crisis management structure.
The first stage is the establishment of a joint monitoring and data sharing system, in-cluding water extractions and use monitoring. In addition, to identify a crisis, it is necessary thatboth background information be available (to serve as a basis for monitoring and inspections,)and the basic knowledge (necessary for both contingency and drought planning) be available.
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In the second stage clear guidelines and a decision-making mechanism that can declare acrisis situation need to be set. Such mechanisms are especially needed to cope with suddenemergency-type crisis. In the second stage enforcement and conflict-resolution mechanisms arealso needed, as the requisite steps in such situations often impinge on practices of various waterusers, generating sometimes-vehement opposition.
Drought management, including contingency plans and agreement on tentative measuresfor responding to such situations should be incorporated into the structure in the third stage.Feedback mechanisms should be introduced in the fourth stage to learn from each crisis and al-low for adjustments.
Over pumping needs to be recognized and managed at the earliest stage because of itspotential long-term impacts on the aquifer, and in order to preclude the creation of vested rightsin the over-pumped water. The terms for resolution of such a crisis have to be spelled out clearlyat the outset, in the political agreement, and may include a process with several steps, beginningwith fact-finding and discussions within the joint management structure.
The central body in a JWM crisis management structure would be a Water Crisis Man-agement Board. This is the body that would be authorized to declare a crisis and that would needto ratify all contingency plans and see that they are implemented. It may also serve as the firstlevel in a conflict resolution mechanism, by differentiating between facts that are agreed upon tothose under dispute, and by advancing potential solutions for the disagreements. This bodywould include top water, environment and health officials. It would be assisted in its duties byseveral joint technical units, including the contingency planning and response coordination team,and investigation and inspection unit, research and monitoring teams, and a drought-planningunit. As in other cases, local authorities would implement th[e measures proposed by the jointtechnical units and ratified by the Water Crisis Management Board. However, in this case jointinspection is warranted.
Economic Structures
The focus of the two previously discussed structures is ultimately on the long-termsustainability of the aquifers. Yet, the term "sustainable development" as promoted by theBrundtland Commission also implies that the resources will be managed efficiently or at least ina cost-effective manner. In addition, the development of a resource in a sustainable way requiresinvestments, and this implies the need for sustainable funding. The economic structures addressthese two issues, although their objectives may not be as clearly spelled out as in the previousstructures.
The economic structures envisioned in this section can be divided into two groups. Thefirst contains structures intended to facilitate trading of water allocations, to allow greater flexi-bility in accommodating changes in circumstances and coping with situations of rapid shifts indemand. By using a market mechanism these structures allow for such accommodations withoutrequiring a readjustment in the more sensitive issues of water rights or basic allocations. The
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second type of structures is utilities. These open the way for private sector involvement in themanagement of the aquifer, and in funding the necessary water supply and protection programs.
The common denominator of both groups of economic structures is their reliance on mar-ket mechanisms, thus allowing them to circumvent some of the most problematic issues that facewater negotiators on both sides, and their promise of greater efficiency in the production and useof water. The third column in Table 3 notes the main activities that would need to be included insuch structures, and proposes an approximate sequence for their incorporation.
The first step towards any kind of economic structure is the establishment of a jointmonitoring system and a center for compiling and assessing this in-formation. This priority is duethe fact that all economic structures require that water be priced, or bought and sold, and unlessconsumption is monitored no market transaction is possible (Lonergan, 1995).
The second stage requires that trading and/or pricing mechanisms be set up. However,such mechanisms are meaningless unless enforcement capacities are established concurrently. Inaddition, any trading or other transaction mechanism also requires the establishment of a systemfor adjudicating disagreements.
After these primary functions have been institutionalized, several additional, more com-plex, issues need to be addressed. First among them is the variance in water availability. To ad-dress the adjustments needed in such situations a priority system of water allocations should beconsidered (Berk and Lipow, 1994), and trading rules across priorities be set and enforced. Asecond topic that should be incorporated in the third stage is a mechanism for adjusting tradingrules after there is sufficient experience in this area, and in response to unforeseen situations. Inthe case that utilities are established, the two parties should agree upon the financing mechanismsor the power to collect levies.
In the fourth stage, the constraints for trading should be further scrutinized, to assure thatthe aquifer is not damaged. As part of this effort the joint commissions should require drillingand pumpage licenses (also of the utility), and the water quality in the aquifer also should bemonitored. In addition, the financing mechanisms can be elaborated, by allowing the utilities toissue bonds, or by setting a special development bank as was done under the North America FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA) in the U.S.-Mexico case (Killgore ancl Eaton, 1995).
The institutional structure of an economically based JWM system would include threebasic elements. At the top there would need to be a board of directors (in the case of a utility) oran aquifer management commission, which would set the trading rules and govern the structure.This body would be composed of top officials of both sides, representing water, environment,health and economic development interests, as well as some consumer or local authorities' repre-sentatives. In determining its policies this body could be assisted by a staff unit that would relayto it the aquifer's condition, and suggest what constraints need to be placed to prevent a deterio-ration of its water quality. In the case of a privatized utility this body would need to set the termsfor a tender, and choose the operator.
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The second basic element is the aquifer utility, or the water trading authority. In the caseof a utility, this body would be a private or publicly owned company, and managed as a businessenterprise. It would pump the water and sell it to local water authorities for both domestic andagricultural use. This utility could also initiate schemes to replenish the aquifer. In this capacityit may buy or sell water to other regional water utilities. For example, a utility managing thewestern mountain aquifer in the Israeli-Palestinian case could, conceivably, buy water from theIsraeli national water carrier during winter for replenishment purposes if rains were plentiful inthe north, but less so over the West Bank.7
If a water trading authority were established, it would need to manage and enforce thetransactions among local water authorities. If a certain authority would want to increase its watersupply it would contact some other authority with a water allocation and offer to purchase someof its water. This transaction would need to be ratified by the joint authority, to assure that thebasic needs of all the population are maintained.
The third element in these systems is the local authorities that supply the water to end-users. These authorities would be funded by user fees or government subsidies, and use theserevenues to purchase water from the utility, or buy additional water from other jurisdictions (inthe trading scheme case).
To operate these systems several issues would need to be addressed. Paramount among* them would be the financing of water transfers, and of the infrastructure necessary to facilitate
these transfers. It is possible that these issues would be part of the mandate of a jointly manageddevelopment bank, such as proposed in the U.S.-Mexico case.
Such a bank, jointly managed by the two sides, may also help address a second issue, thetreatment and use of wastewater, not included in the third column in Table 2. However, this is-sue can be easily incorporated within the general framework by establishing wastewater utilities,and allowing treated wastewater to be sold to low priority (i.e. irrigation) uses, subject to envi-ronmental constraints imposed by the aquifer governing board.
Comprehensive Integrative Structures
The goal of an integrative structure is to cover all the aspects of aquifer managementcomprehensively, so as to ensure the best results from an aquifer management perspective and toassure its long-range sustainability. To accomplish this, such a structure would need to be morethan a combination of the previous three types of structures, as it would need to address issuesnot addressed so far. A sequencing of the activities that could be included in such a structure ispresented in the fourth column of Table 3.
7 It is important to note that utilities can be created at different spatial scales, and allowed to operate differ-ent elements of the water system, and can take various forms (Lee and Jouravlev, 1997). These options have notbeen fully scoped yet in the Israeli-Palestinian context.
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In the first stage a joint monitoring and data storage and cojmpilation unit would be estab-lished. At this stage, this unit, whose fieldwork would be conducted by teams from both sides(but with compatible guidelines), would focus on monitoring the aquifer parameters (rather thanwater use). The establishment of an agreed-upon database and monitoring system is a prerequi-site for any successful aquifer management (Haddad and Mizyed, 1995).
In the second stage, mechanisms for resolving disagreements would be set up, as well asa crisis management unit. These are intended to anticipate the dEngers of an early crisis in theaccommodation process. At this stage it would also be necessary to establish a coordinateddrilling permit system so that aquifer yield and quality would be sustained. Joint water supplyplanning, to address current supply problems, including water allocations to users would followthis system. Joint research could then be initiated to address fundamental issues that are likely tobe faced in the future by the aquifer managers.
In the next stage, policies for drought situations would be drafted and agreed upon, sincedrought periods are those likely to cause the greatest stress in the system and thus put the JWMstructure to its severest test. In order to help address future strains re-allocation mechanismsshould also be established in this (third) stage, to accommodate future structural changes. Itwould also possible to add financing instruments and a joint water project management capacityto the structure at this point.
At a later stage a comprehensive regulatory capacity and enforcement unit should be setup. This unit would be able to propose standards or by-laws and, following their approval, en-force them. This stage is perhaps the most problematic in the transition from a comprehensivestructure, covering many facets, to an integrative one, whereby a single aquifer managementauthority is established.
In the next stage the regulatory capacity can be expanded to other issues, such as land usecontrols. Other issues might include water-trading mechanisms. At this stage a self-financingcapacity may be necessary. This could be achieved by levying an aquifer use ]levy, whereby theauthority would collect a fee for any water pumped from the aquifer, and/or a water use tax.
The Bellagio Draft Treaty, which proposed an integrative JWM structure, suggested thata single commission be charged with all the duties (Hayton and Utton, 1989). This commissionis to have the ability to regulate, establish conservation areas, draft and implement drought poli-cies and investigate complaints. It would also propose budgets ifor water projects, monitor theaquifer and withdrawals from it and direct aquifer-related research. Finally it would also preparecomprehensive management plans. However, enforcement is left to the parties, as is conflictresolution, followed by a mediation procedure.
In contrast to the Bellagio Draft Treaty, this study takes the approach that any JWMstructure needs to be built up over time, and that any such structure should include a governingboard and several joint technical units.
In tandem with the stages outlined above, a monitoring and data compilation unit shouldbe set first, followed by an aquifer oversight commission. Under this commission several joint
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professional units need to be established to implement the tasks assigned. These should includea drilling licensing committee, a planning unit that would coordinate water supply plans of thepopulations, a crisis management team, and a research coordiination unit.
Over time, as the structure evolves, some units may assume additional tasks, while othertasks added would require that new professional units be set up. Thus, the planning unit couldalso prepare drought contingency plans, while the drilling licenses committee can be incorpo-rated in a wider regulatory structure that would issue permits to all activities that have to meetstandards set by the JWM institutions. This body could also propose such standards, based onthe monitoring and research conducted by the joint monitoring and research units. If a self-financing capacity is indeed created, a new financial unit that would manage these finances mightbe set up.
Eventually, the aquifer oversight commission may assume the role of a governing boardfor the JWM structure, and take on the responsibility to re-alpportion water if circumstances re-quire it.
From an institutional perspective this framework can accommodate additional activitiesthat are added in the later stages. The only possible additional unit that may need to be estab-lished is a water-trading unit, if water trading is indeed allowed. Such a unit would have to rec-ord, enforce, and authorize water trades.
Implementation Issues and Requisites
The flexible-sequential approach and structures outlined so far are essentially directionsthat negotiators may choose to take. However, before any road is taken, several implementationissues have to be addressed. The experience accumulated with the JWC and JSETs establishedpursuant to the Oslo B accords, as well as the discussions at the third and fourth workshops haverevealed several issues that may preclude or delay the establishment of any JWM structure in theIsraeli-Palestinian case.
After two years of operation, the JWC and JSETs have not met the expectations of bothparties. Palestinians feel that the JWC's purpose has been to further Israeli control, and that ithas not addressed Palestinian needs (Nasseredin, 1998). Several Israeli projects proceeded with-out the JWC's authorization. Information and data on water resources and use requested by thePalestinians have not been provided to them. At the same tiime the water supply to Palestiniancities and towns continues to be precarious. In most cities and towns running water is not avail-able to all households throughout the year. As a result there has been a loss of confidence in thecoordination of structures that were established. Consequently, the starting point for any futurebuilding of JWM institutions is more difficult now that in the past.
The first step that was identified in all structures, as can be seen in Table 3, is the estab-lishment of joint monitoring structures and databases. This was viewed also as a confidence-building measure. Yet, as van der Gun (1997) warned, such efforts may backfire, if these effortslead to the creation of "data graveyards". That is, if monitoring and data collection and man-
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agement become an end to themselves, and do not facilitate the work of the joint managementand decision making efforts of both parties. Thus, it is imperative that monitoring, modeling anddata handling efforts be well integrated in a wider decision and manragement oriented framework,and not become an end to themselves.
The implication of these two points, the loss of confidence in existing coordination insti-tutions and the danger that the first step proposed in the flexible-sequential approach may be-come another source for disillusionment, is that much greater attention needs to be accorded tothe initial steps. Concrete measures are needed to assure that the first step would not be the last.
In addition to the need to give greater attention to the initial steps, several issues have notreceived sufficient attention in the general framework, yet may be important. The first is thelevel of cooperation. In the framework outlined above the implicit assumption is that most coor-dination and cooperation mechanisms would be established at the national level. Yet, that neednot be so. Recently, an Israeli regional council (Emek Hefer) has reached an agreement with anearby upstream Palestinian city on the West Bank (Tul-Karem) for the treatment and re-use ofthe city's wastewater. It is possible that similar local agreements be reached, and that positiveexperience at the local level would help build up confidence.
The structures of which the general approach is composed include both innovative sug-gestions and more mundane, straightforward structures. The structures lumped under the 'eco-nomic orientation', in particular, may require greater adjustment than other orientations. How-ever, this orientation may hold some of the most promising options for overcoming several of themost difficult issues faced by the two parties. In a study of the options for addressing Jerusa-lem's sewage problems it was noted that utilities, established through an international tender,may help overcome political problems posed by cross-border sewage flows better that any othermanagement structure (Feitelson and Abdul-Jaber, 1997). On a more general level, the privati-zation of water supply and treatment elements forces the two parties to cooperate in structuringthe tender and to establish mechanisms that will monitor the actions of the utility. Privatizationmay thus create common goals for the parties vis-a-vis the (foreign) utility operator. Yet, asBeecher (1997) has noted, the introduction of large international firms is also fraught with risk.Therefore, more work is needed to analyze the potential and limitations of this option.
The second option lumped under the 'economic orientation' heading is that of watertrading. This option has been shunned in Israel to date. Also, there is only very limited prior ex-periences with international water transfers. Two recent developments may help overcome theobstacles to trading. Within Israel there is growing recognition of the need for allocative effi-ciency in water use. This may make trading more acceptable. At the same an international teamhas developed a model that allows for analysis of trading options in Israel-Palestine. This modelmay help reduce the transaction cost of such trading, and thus reduce the difficulties inherent inthe introduction of trading. Still, unless the problems associated with definitions of propertyrights in water are overcome, such trading may be unfeasible (Dellapenna, 1995; Benvenisti,1996).
21
The determination of water rights and their initial allocation is not only a requisite fortrading, but it is also a pre-requisite for any settlement of water conflicts. In the fourth workshopparticipants reached several important conclusions with regard to this topic:8
1) Water rights need to account for variances in quality and over time. Thus there is a need toestablish priority rights and define water allocations as a function of water quality. The allo-cation of water, when defined as a function of quality and time has to take into account theuse of water, as the priority should be given to the domestic sector.
2) The domestic sector should have priority rights regardless of nationality. This is in essence achange toward a human right perspective on water allocations. From this perspective allpeople should have an equal right to water on a per-capita basis for domestic use.
3) The combination of these understandings, the dire situation of water supply to the Palestiniandomestic sector, and the need to establish confidence, leads to recognition of the need to en-hance Palestinian water supply as an early confidence-building step, prior to the establish-ment of a comprehensive JWM structure.
While these understandings reflect merely the views of a limited number of experts fromboth parties, they are indicative of the range of issues that need to be addressed before a JWMstructure is established.
The implementation of any joint management scheme requires widespread support withinthe two communities. No community is homogeneous. Rather, there are various interest groupswithin each community, often with conflicting perspectives on appropriate water use. It is there-fore necessary to assure that a wide coalition will support, or at least not oppose, the creation of ajoint management system. To this end it may be helpful to assure that all interest groups are rep-resented in the joint management institutions. While the possibility that the joint managementinstitutions (and particularly governing boards) would be composed of representatives of differ-ent sectors from each party, the need for such representation has not been emphasized. As thedifficulties in the peace process become more apparent, the need for such broad-based represen-tation increases. Moreover, it can be visualized that in certain circumstances, when the generalatmosphere improves, there may be cases when similar interests from the two parties may formcoalitions regarding various management issues.
A major impediment to the establishment of joint management structures at present is thelack of public awareness of the potential for cooperation. The dominant public perception ofwater issues is still that of a zero-sum game for a limited strategic resource. This view is notshared by many, if not most, of the professional community. The dissemination of the idea ofjoint management, its promise and implications, to decisionmakers and the public at large should
B See "Summary of Roundtable Discussions," in: E. Feitelson ancd M. Haddad (eds.) Joint Management ofShared Aquifers: The Fourth Workshop, The Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Palestine Con-sultancy Group, Jerusalem, 1998.
22
thus be an important element in any strategy geared toward the implementation of a JWM sys-tem.
.Discussion
The study described in this paper has been instrumental in introducing the notion of jointmanagement of shared aquifers to the Israeli-Palestinian discourse. It demonstrates thus the use-fulness of parallel-track discussions in academic settings for introducing new positive-sum solu-tions to negotiations regarding cross-boundary water resources.
There are several factors that enabled the work to proceed and reach meaningful results:
z The availability of a large number of professionals on both sides, and the availability ofan appropriate academic setting. This enabled the researchers and participants in theworkshops to express ideas openly, even when they did not conform to the official posi-tions held by the negotiating team of their side at the time.
= The enabling environment created by the peace process at the time the study was initi-ated. This enabled the widening of the circle of both Palestinian and Israeli experts thatwere willing to be involved in such a joint endeavor. Once the study was well underway,and personal rapport was established between the team members and among other profes-sionals, it was possible to continue the meetings and work also when the overall situationdeteriorated and the organization of meetings became difficult.9
=> The partners were equals, and all activities were conducted jointly. The workshop or-ganization was undertaken jointly, and the workshops were structured -so that both partieswould be equal, in terms of both the number and level of participants. There was no ele-ment of training or data transfer from one party to another as part of this project.
=T The early definition of a win-win framework. Both sides accepted the premise that nei-ther can manage the aquifers alone, and that mismanagement of the aquifer will be delete-rious to both. Both viewed joint management as a feasiible option that may allow bothparties to have more water of better quality in the future.
=> The participation of foreign experts. These helped elevate the discussions above the localagenda by showing that similar problems exist elsewhere. This perspective emphasizedthe fact that all experts need to search for ways to better rnanage cross-boundary aquifers,and that none have a ready-made solution. By showing the problems inherent in differentsolutions the foreign experts help diffuse local anxieties regarding the motives of eitherparty to accept or oppose particular options.
9 The third workshop was delayed by three months, and later moved from Jerusalem to Bethlehem due toconsecutive closures limiting Palestinian access to Jerusalem, and the fourth workshop was held in Istanbul due tothe increasing difficulties in finding appropriate venues in Israel and Palestine.
23
=' The provision of adequate funding. The fact that both parties were fully supported byhands-off outside sources allowed them to proceed without undue regard to the positionof local officials at different points in time. It also allowed them to be in a position wherethe local parties invite the foreign participants. Thus, the foreign participants did not fa-cilitate or run the workshops. Rather, the local teams were fully responsible for all facetsof the work, and was free to do as they saw fit.
After its initial success in introducing the concept of'joint management, and identifying anumber of possible directions and institutional forms such a JWM structure may take, severallimitations to the implementation of these ideas were identified. This critical review of the firstphase in the second phase of the study has led to the realization that much more concrete workneeds to be done. In addition three directions for action were identified.
The first direction is the identification of a wide array of topics that need to be addressedin the water negotiations between the two parties. These negotiations tend to focus on waterquantities, with only limited regard to other issues and to institutional structures. This studyshowed that many other issues need to be addressed, and that these issues are not less (andsometimes more) important than the allocation of water quantities. The issues identified includethe need to define decisionmaking structures, and agree on how changes to such structures mraybe made, and how disagreements or disappointments regarding the functioning of the decision-making structures are to be dealt with. In addition there is a need to fully specify water alloca-tions not only in quantities, but also in terms of time and quality, and to define the liabilities ofthe parties with regard to the protection of the aquifers. In addition, financing of water transfersand wastewater treatment, wastewater reuse, the role of thiri parties and private capital and theregulation of such capital should be an integral part of the negotiation agenda. The ensuingagreements should also include provisions that would allow for continuous capacity building andreduce the risk that institutional development will 'freeze' before its benefits are felt. It is possi-ble that third parties may play a role to this end.
The second direction is the need to take immediate steps to facilitate the discussions ofjoint management options. First among these is the need to establish confidence in the ability ofsuch institutions to address the concerns of the two parties. This would require changes in theway the current JWC operates (for example rotation of chairmanship and meeting places hasbeen suggested as one way to address the imbalance felt by Palestinians). At the same time thereis a need to address the acute problems faced by many Palestinians, especially during the summermonths. This would require some supply augmentation. Finally, the notion of joint managementhas to be sold to the public at large. Thus, the dissemination of this idea is part of any compre-hensive strategy for the implementation of joint management.
The third direction is to better understand, and clearly demonstrate, the advantages anddisadvantages of the different options. At present many of the concepts advanced here may stillbe too obtuse for many decisionmakers. To this end a simulation game whereby different sce-narios would be played out given different institutional settings is planned. This may serve as athird phase to this study.
24
Conclusions
The management of an aquifer in a sustainable manner is a challenge everywhere. It re-quires a diverse and complex series of ongoing decisions to be made often without sufficient un-derstanding of groundwater flows and aquifer structure, using models that do not capture the fullcomplexity, and with full knowledge that mistakes may be irreversible. As the utilization of aq-uifers shared by more than one country grows so does the need to find ways to accommodate thedifferent users without compromising the aquifers' long-term storage capacity, and the quality ofthe water withdrawn from it. The necessity to manage aquifers in such circumstances is thus adoubly difficult challenge. Moreover, solutions that may be feasible in cross-boundary surfacewater cases are often inapplicable to groundwater. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are noreadily available models for the successful management of shared aquifers. Yet, in many semi-arid regions, such as in Israel-Palestine, there is a need for immediate action.
This study has suggested a step-by-step open-ended approach for the identification andstructuring of joint management systems for shared aquifers, with special reference to the Israeli-Palestinian case. In the first phase of this study four directions and routes for building joint man-agement structures have been outlined. However, further scrutiny in the second phase of thestudy has shown that there are many elements that need to be addressed in negotiations by thetwo parties before such structures can, or are likely to, be implemented.
A Palestinian-Israeli team, with international funding and support conducted this study.The conduct of this effort has demonstrated the potential of parallel-track academic endeavors inintroducing new concepts, such as joint management, into the water discourse. This study hasbeen able to continue even when the geopolitical climate became less conducive for cooperativeefforts. However, it is also clear that the likelihood of a joint management agreement beingreached is small or negligible when the relations between the parties deteriorate and confidencein the current coordination institutions erodes.
This study suggests that international agencies can have a role in advancing new ideassuch as joint management by providing the funds for independent local research, where local ca-pacities exist. In such cases a no-strings attached hands-off approach, such as was taken by thefunders of this effort, may be the most constructive.
International bodies may have also an important role in the joint management schemes.One idea found to be of interest is the possible role privatization eifforts may play in reducing theconflict between the parties, by changing the rules of the game and the interest structure of theparties. This option, however, needs more theoretical and empirical research. Internationalbodies may also play a role in conflict management functions, though it is also not clear at thisstage whether the availability of outside elements helps or detracts the sides reach an accommo-dation by themselves.
This study has shown that there are several real options for joint management of sharedaquifers. However, much work still needs to be done before joint management can be success-fully implemented. This work should commence immediately, as it is unclear where and when
25
would the policy windows open that would allow such structures to be implemented. However,once the options have been presented and accepted, it is likely that when the local conditions arefavorable, and the different parties recognize the need to reach a sustainable accommodation formanaging their shared groundwater resources joint management structures, one would be estab-lished. Once set up, they would need to evolve in response to changes in understanding of theaquifer's structure and problems, and of changes in human demand pattems and attitudes. Thestructures outlined in this study may provide the initial map necessary to facilitate such adapta-tions without losing the course.
26
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SEPTEMBER 1 998
RECENT WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPERS (continued)
No. 377 Walsh and Shah, Clean Fuelsfor Asia: Technical Optionsfor Moving toward Unleaded Gasoline and Low-Sulfur Diesel
No. 378 Shah and Nagpal, eds., Urban Air Quality Management Strategy in Asia: Kathmandu Valley Report
No. 379 Shah and Nagpal, eds., Urban Air Quality Management Strategy in Asia: Jakerta ReportNo. 380 Shah and Nagpal, eds., Urban Air Quality Management Strategy in Asia: Melrro Manila Report
No. 381 Shah and Nagpal, eds., Urban Air Quality Management Strategy in Asia: Greater Mumbai Report
No. 382 Barker, Tenenbaum, and Woolf, Governance and Regulation of Power Pools and System Operators: An InternationalComparison
No. 383 Goldman, Ergas, Ralph, and Felker, Technology Institutions and Policies: Their Role in Developing Technological Capabilityin Industry
No. 384 Kojima and Okada, Catching Up to Leadership: The Role of Technology Support Institutions in Japan's Casting Sector
No. 385 Rowat, Lubrano, and Porrata, Competition Policy and MERCOSUR
No. 386 Dinar and Subramanian, Water Pricing Experiences: An International Perspective
No. 387 Oskarsson, Berglund, Seling, Snellman, Stenback, and Fritz, A Planner's Guidefor Selecting Clean-Coal Technologies forPower Plants
No. 388 Sanjayan, Shen, and Jansen, Experiences with Integrated-Conservation Development Projects in Asia
No. 389 International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID), Planning the Management, Operation, and Maintenance ofIrrigation and Drainage Systems: A Guidefor the Preparation of Strategies and Manuals
No. 390 Foster, Lawrence, and Morris, Groundwater in Urban Development: Assessing Management Needs and Formulating PolicyStrategies
No. 391 Lovei and Weiss, Jr., Environmental Management and Institutions in OECD Countries" Lessonsfrom Experience
No. 392 Felker, Chaudhuri, Gybrgy, and Goldman, The Pharmaceutical Industry in India and Hungary: Policies, Institutions, andTechnological Development
No. 393 Mohan, ed., Bibliography of Publications: Africa Region, 1990-97
No. 394 Hill and Shields, Incentivesfor Joint Forest Management in India: Analytical Methods and Case Studies
No. 395 Saleth and Dinar, Satisfying Urban Thirst: Water Supply Augmentation and Plricing Policy in IHyderabad City, India
No. 396 Kikeri, Privatization and Labor: What Happens to Workers When Governments Divest?
No. 397 Lovei, Phasing Out Leadfrom Gasoline: Worldwide Experience and Policy Implications
No. 398 Ayres, Anderson, and Hanrahan, Setting Prioritiesfor Environmental MAnagement: An Appiication to the Mining Sectorin Bolivia
No. 399 Kerf, Gray, Irwin, Levesque, Taylor, and Klein, Concessionsfor Infrastructure: A Guide to Their Design and Award
No. 401 Benson and Clay, The Impact of Drought on Sub-Saharan African Economies: A Preliminary Examination
No. 402 Dinar, Mendelsohn, Evenson, Parikh, Sanghi, Kumar, McKinsey, and LorLergan, Measuring the Impact of Climate Changeon Indian Agriculture
No. 403 Welch and Fremond, The Case-by-Case Approach to Privatization: Techniques and Examples
No. 404 Stephenson, Donnay, Frolova, Melnick, and Worzala, Improving Women's Health Services in the Russian Federation:Results of a Pilot Project
No. 405 Onorato, Fox, and Strongman. World Bank Group Assistancefor Minerals Sector Development and Reform in MemberCountries
No. 406 Milazzo, Subsidies in World Fisheries: A Reexamination
No. 407 Wiens and Guadagni, Designing Rulesfor Demand-Driven Rural Investment Funds: The Latin American Experience
No. 408 Donovan and Frank, Soil Fertility Management in Sub-Saharan Africa
No. 409 Heggie and Vickers, Commercial Management and Financing of RoadsNo. 410 Sayeg, Successful Conversion to Unleaded Gasoline in Thailand
No. 411 Calvo, Optionsfor Managing and Financing Rural Transport Infrastructure
No. 414 Salman and Boisson de Chazournes, International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict,Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar
No. 417 Rutkowski, Welfare and the Labor Market in Poland: Social Policy during Economic Transition
No. 418 Okidegbe and Associates, Agriculture Sector Programs: SourcebookNo. 420 Francis and others, Hard Lessons: Primary Schools, Community, and Social Capital in Nigeria
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