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Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT URUGUAY SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1689-UR) JUNE 10, 1993 Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division Country Department IV Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. 7 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

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Page 1: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/pt/534921468127497643/pdf/... · ERR Economic Rate of Return IDB Intm American Development Banks ... to reestablish a borrower-Bank

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

URUGUAY

SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1689-UR)

JUNE 10, 1993

Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division Country Department IV Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance o f their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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January 1 to December 3 1, 1992

Metric

1 Metet (m) 1 Kilometet (Km.) 1 Kilogram (Kg.) 1 Metric Ton von.)

3.28 feet (ft) 0.62 mile (mi) 2.20 pounds (lb) 2,205 pounds

ABT Average Daily traffic AFE Administracidn de 10s Ferrocarriles del Estado AID Agency for International Development ANCAP Administracidn Nacional de Combustible, Alcohol y ~ortland ANP Administracidn Nacional de Puertos CIF Cost Insurance and Freight CNPA Comisi6n Nacional de Polftica AeronAutica DAC Direcci6n General de Aeropuertos Nacionales DODE Directorate of Economics Development Works ERR Economic Rate of Return IDB Intm American Development Banks MTOP Ministry of Transport and Public Works PLUNA Primera Lheas Uruguayas de Navegaci6n AQea RAM Real Analysis Model SEPLACODI S e a m a de Planificaci6n Coordinaci6n y Difusi6n TAMU Trmportes AQm Militar Uruguayo TPU Transport Planning Unit UNDP United Nations Development R~yram V P ~ Vehicles per day

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433

U.S.A.

Off ice o f Director-General Operatione Eva lua t ion

June 10, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO TRE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND TRE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT : Project Completion Report on Uruguay Second Binhway Proqect (Loan 1689-UR)

Attached is the report entitled "Project Completion Report on Uruguay - Second Highway Project (Loan 1689-UR)", prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. The report, written some six years after loan closing, does not include a borrower review of the project (Part 11). However, the report is of satisfactory quality and incorporates findings of a brief borrower implementation report issued within one year after project completion.

Project objectives, characterized in the PCR as modest, were vague: to reestablish a borrower-Bank working relationship in highways and continue improving the sector. Project components were physical investments and measures to imprwe transport sector management. After substantial delays, the project was successfully implemented. Overall project performance is rated as satisfactory, institutional development as partial, and sustainability as likely.

Attachment

This docunmt has a restricted distr ibut ion and mey be u s d by recipients only i n the prfonnance o f their o f f i c i a l duties. I t s contents m y not otherwise k disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY URUGUAY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Table of ContenQ

m e No.

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EVALUATIONS-Y iii

PART I PROJECI' REVIEW FROM BM+X'S I % ~ S P E C I m

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . Project Identity 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . Bakgo und 1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 . Project Objectives and Description 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . Project Design and Organization 2

5 . Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 . ProjectResults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 . Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8 . Bankperformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . Borrower's Performance 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 . Project Relationships 7

11 . Consulting Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 12 . Project Documentation and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 9

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PART Ill STATISTICAL INFORMATION 10

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Related Bank Loans 11

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . Project Time Table 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Estimated and Actual Schedule of Disbursements 13

4.EstimatedandActualCosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . Project Implementation Schedule (Civil Works) 15

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . Status of Loan Covenants 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Economic Reevaluation of the Project 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 . Use of Bank Resources . Mission Data 19

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties . Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization .

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URUGUAY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT m a n 1689-UR)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Second Highway Project in Uruguay, for which Loan 1689-UR in the amount of US$26.5 million was approved on Bpfi l 17. 1979. The loan was closed on Juae 30. 1986, two years behind schedule, when (US$24.6 million) was disbursed, and US$1.9 million was cancelled.

The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division of the Latin America and the Caribbean Country Department IV (Preface, Evaluation Summary, and Parts I and m.) The Borrower sent a brief PCR in May 1987. Due to lapse of more than 5 years since the conclusion of the projezt, it is not expec&d that the borrower will have any significant contribution to make towards Part II (Project Review from Borrower's Perspective) other than the data and comments given in the Borrower's PCR of May 1987, which have already been incorporated in this report.

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i i i

URUGUAY

PR OJECI' COMPLETION REPORT

s ECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (Loan 1689-UR)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

1. The main objectives of the project, the establishment by the Bank of a working relationship in regards to the highway sector in Uruguay, and the initiation of improvements in the sector by improving a highway connecting Uruguay with its neighbor Brazil, were basically achieved. The technical assistance provided under this project helped define a long term plan for the highways, and helped provide a framework for the restructuring of the railway system.

2. There were substantial delays in the implementation of the Civil Works, initially in the evaluation of the bids, and later, rather more seriously, in obtaining the land appropriations for the project and the relocation of the utilities from the area to be covered by some of the new alignments of Route 8 (Para. 5.5). As a result, the loan closing date had to be extended twice and the loan was closed two years later than the date foreseen at appraisal.

3. Changes in the country's monetary policies resulting in frequent devaluations of the Uruguayan peso reduced the cost of the project (in US$ terms), which enabled some additional works to be included for Bank financing (Para. 5.6) and eventually led to the cancellation of US$1.9 million out of the Bank loan of US$26.5 million (Para. 5 3).

4. The Project as originally conceived was sustainable in as much as it resulted in the development of a long-term program for the improvement of the generally rundown highway infrastructure of Uruguay, which has incidentally been followed up in the subsequent highway/ transport sector projects.

5. This was a relatively small project with modest objectives which were largely achieved, although there were substantial delays. The execution of the Civil Works and their Supervision were germally competenty done, although it seems the problem of land acquisition and relocation of utilities from the projects area were inadequately studied at the time of the preparation of the project. There is evidence that some of these delays affeded the performance of the Contractors. This project highlights the need for adequate attention to this important subject at the time of project preparation.

6. The project served to strengthen transport sector planning. Technical assistance to the Transport Planning Unit (TPU) helped define a long-term development plan for highways and bridges, which has formed the basis of the subsequent two projects in Uruguay, and prepared recommendations concerning appropriate refonns in the role of the railways, on which the pattan for the restructuring of the A.F.E. in the following years has by in large been based.

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URUGUAY letion R e ~ o d

Second Hinhwav Proiect b a n 1689-UR)

iect Review from Bank's Pers~ective PART I - Pro

1.1 Project Name Loan Number Loan Amount

03-Financing Total Project Cost

at Appraisal Actual Project Cost

RVP Unit 03- Sector Sub-Sector

Second Highway Project 1689-UR $26.5 million (reduced to $24.6 million)/l.9 $5.0 million, by the Bank of Nova Scotia, Canada

$61.2 million $52.8 million Latin America and the Caribbeau Region Uruguay Transport Highways

2.1 The concen*on of Uruguay's commercial activity and population in the capital city of Montevideo is reflected in the country's transport system which developed road and rail permanent ways extending radially north, east and west from the poli it an region around the seaport of Montevideo. At the time of the inception of this project, roads accounted for about 73 % of the traffic, rail 20 46 and water 7 46.

Of the road network of some 50,000 km., at the time of appraisal 9800 km. were national roads (Map IBRD 14225), the remainder of the network's nearly 40,000 km. consisted of secondary and feeder roads. Although the coverage of the national road network was adequate, its principal problems were its old standards, age and seriously deteriorated condition, notably on the international co~lnections with Argentina and Brazil which have considerable importance, given the country's reliance on trade and tourism with its neighbors. The Bank's first operation, a highway loan made in 1963 (First Highway Project, loan 324- UR for US$18.5 million) was made to finance the improvement of Route 5 from the outskirts of Montevideo (Progreso) to Rivera on the Brazilian border. It also helped to initiate the strengt&ening of the highway maintenance, including the purchase of equipment, and a highway planning study. Thii study formed the basis for the organization of a regular maintenance program for Uruguay. The first Highway Project was completed in 1972.

2.3 Following a Bank Transport Sector Review undertaken in 1974, the Government of Uruguay obtained UNDP financing to carry out a comprehensive s w e y of the transport sector. The survey was entrusted to consultants SOTECNI, with the Bank acting as Executing Agency; the draft SOTECNI report was submitted in early 1977 and pointed out the need for improvamnt in sector management, and for systematic and coherent programs for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the main national roads. In the same year the M i t e r for Public Works

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suggested to the Bank various Highway Projects of which the first priority was given to Route 8 leadiig from Montevideo to the Brazilian border.

The first Project Brief was prepared following a Bank Mission in October 1977. The construction element of the project envisaged the rehabilitation of about 130 km. of Route 8 from Pando outside Montevideo to a point about 30 Km. north of Minas. (This was amplified during appraisal -see para. 3.2). There was basic agreement on the need for this project, although the Bank felt that there was a degree of over design in the road-plans, and it was suggested that an Economic study should be carried out to define precisely the size of the project and the design standards to be applied in the light of the growing traffic density. The Project Brief also highlighted the importance of sector planning, and the need for preparation of plans to set up a Transport Planning Unit for improving sector madination.

The consultant for the Economic Study was selected in early 1978 and upon the conclusion of the consultants' report, the Second Highway Project was appraised in August-September 1978.

: The proposed project was aimed at reestablishing the Bank's dialogue in regards to the highway sector and to prepare further improvements in the direction suggested by the Transport Swey, in particular to assist the Government:

(i) In improving the integration of the northern area of the country and Brazil with Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay and its principal seaport;

(ii) In strengthening Transport Sector Management especially with regard to the Planning aad programming of the highways and the testructuring of railways.

-: The project consisted of:

(a) Reconstruction of 140 Kms. of Route 8, between Punta Rieles (Km. 13 from Montevideo) aad Arroyo Marmaraja (Km. 153) including: (i) Civil works by contractors; and (ii) Supervision by Consultants

(b) Strengthening of Transport Sector Management and Studies including: . (i) Preparation of a four-year road rehabilitation and reconstruction program;

(@ W e d engindug of roads for the first two-year tranche of the program; and (iii) Technical assistance to strengthen and improve transport sector planning.

The total estimated cost of the project including contingencies was about $61.2 million. The foreign exchange component was about $31.5 million of which $26.5 million was to be fhanced by the Bank loan, and the balance $5.0 million by the Bank of Nova Scotia. The Govunment would fhnce the entire local cost of $29.7 million.

The project was designed to start rehabilitation of the national road network, and to initiate the s t m g h h g of the Government's transport sector planning capability. The execution of

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the project was entrusted to the Ministry of Transport and Public Works (MTOP). The National Roads Directorate (Vialidad) was the executing agency for all project components except the transport sector planning component which was under the National Directorate of Transportation (DNT). A Project Coordinator responsible to the MTOP coordinated and served as liaison between Vialidad and the various agencies involved in the execution of the project.

4.2 Procurement under the project was carried out in accordance with the Bank's "Guidelines for Procurement". During negotiations bidding and contracting procedures were reviewed and agreed, as were terms of reference for consulting services and technical assistance. The indicators to be used for monitoring the project were also agreed and the borrower was required to prepare a project compldon report within six months of the loan closing date.

5.1 Loan EWveness and Project Start-w

The project was appraised in August-September 1978, negotiated in March 1979, and approved by the Board in April 1979. The Loan Agreement was signed in June 1979 and became effective in December 1979.

5.2 Preparatory work for supervising the project started in May 1979 when a Bank mission reviewed the terms of reference for the Consultants for supervising the Civil Works, and agreed to a shortlist of firms to bid for the Supervision. A follow-up Bank mission in October 1979 reviewed the project start-up arrangements, and prepared the terms of reference for consultants to prepare the Four Year Program for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the.highways and bridges. The tenders for the Civil Works were opened in late November and the borrower's recommendations were approved in March 1980. The variants with the cement concrete pavements were evaluated, the lowest fot sections 1,2 and 3, whereas section 4 was awarded as originally foreseen with an asphalt pavement. The following awards were approved by the Bank: Section 1 and 2 Tracoviax S.C. (Uruguay) Section 3 Techint SACI (Uruguay) Section 4 Consorcio Depival (Uruguay)

5.3 Civil Worh started almost 10 months Mind schedule mainly because of the delays in the evaluation of the bids occasioned by the lively interest of the bidders and the alternatives offered (40 bids including 15 foreign bids, plus 50 alternatives). The Bank agmd that the supervision of the Civil Worh on Route 8 would be d e d out by a Joint venture of the four firms which had designed the Highway 1' providing that the staffing would be satisf&tory to the Bank and an expatriate chief engineer would be appointed. The Bank's "no objection" to the Supervision Contract with Consorcio 8 was given after the appointment of Ing. Arturo Panzarini (kg-) as Chief Engineer and Ings. Ardaaaz Vamlini and Lindmayer as Resident eqhems.

U They also carried out satisiimorily the evaluation of the prequalification of the contractors and the bids for the civil works.

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5.4 As the first step towards improving transport planning and co~rdination, the Transport Planning Unit V U ) was established in the National Directorate of Transportation (DNT) in MTOP and a French Transport Economist (Mr. Alain Wartel) was appointed to lead the Technical Assistance for the Transport Sector.

5.5 iect Execution A chronological account of the important steps in the execution of the civil works is given in Table 5 (Part III). It is noted from this table that there were substantial delays in the implementation of the civil works. Review of the supervision reports indicates these were caused by:

(i) Delays in obtaining the land appropriations and in many cases protracted litigations to get the rights to the corridors required for the project. (ii) Hold-ups in the relocation of public services (telephone, water and other services) from the land required for the project, particularly in Section 1 where the maximum delays occurred. (iii) Some delays occurred due to difficulties experienced by the contractors particularly in Sections 1 and 2 and partially in Section 4 (due to the bankruptcy of one of the partners). Some of the organizational problems which appear to have arisen mainly in the initial stages were caused by the delays referred to in (i) and (ii) above and tended to get resolved as the work garhered momentum. In fact as the work progressed, efficiency increased, and towards the end, not only the original project, but also the additional items (para. 5.6) were executed expeditiously and with fairly high standards of workmanship.

5.6 iect w: The loan was initially intended to finance 5 1 % of the Civil works and related supervision charges by consultants. However following the changes introduced by the Government in the exchange rates policy in 1982, and the rapid devaluation of the Uruguayan peso, there was a general drop in the costs (See para. 5.7). Therefore as the project progressed there were lower withdrawals from the Bank loan than forecast, resulting eventually in the request of MTOP for loan financing of 60% of the project cost instead of 51 96. This was approved by the Bank in May 1983. Proposals were also made by h4TOP for f b n c h g certain additional works which were reviewed by the Bank and the following items were selected for addition to the main project:

i) Access to Soca, comprising a bypass and rehabilitation of a 12 Km. section of the old Route 8. ii) I m p m v m of Route 11 between Route 7 and Route 8, but to somewhat more modest . standatds than proposed by the borrower. iii) Rehabilitation of a 20 Km. section of Route 13, a major feeder from the rice-growing area in NE Uruguay to Route 8.

Tht additional projects added approx. US$4 million to the project of which USS2.2 million was in foreign exchange.

5.7 -: Retails of the estimated and actual project costs are given in Table 4 (part III). 'Ihe total cost of the project togetha with the additional works (para. 5.6) worked out to USS52.8 million as against the estimated cost of USS61.2 million. The reduction in cost came about mainly due to the substantial devaluation of the Uruguayan peso following the

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economic crisis in 1982 and subsequent exchange rate adjustments in the following years. Substantial savings were achieved in the Civil Works, which cost USW9.6 million as against the estimated US$55.5 million (including contingencies), as well as the Consultant Services for supervision of Route 8 and the improvement of Transport Planning which together cost US$3.2 million against the estimated $4.4 million. Overall, the project cost at US$52.8 million was about 86% of the original cost with the foreign exchange component at US$29.6 million being about 94% of the original estimated cost. The local content at US$23.2 million was just a little over 78% of the original estimate of US$29.7 million, due to the rapid devaluation of the Uruguayan peso. Of the foreign exchange component of WS$29.6 million, US$24.6 million was financed from the Bank loan and US$5.0 million equivalent by the Bank of Nova Scotia.

5.8 Disbufsements: Table 5 (Part III) gives the position of the Estimated and Actual Schedule of Disbursements. Disbursements actually started in the quarter ending March 3 1 of FY81 as against the Appraisal estimated start nearly a year earlier. By the estimated closing date of June 30, 1983 only about $14 million out of $26.5 million were disbursed. Two extensions of the loan closing date became necessary, first in January 1984 to June 30, 1985 and then again in June 1985 to June 30, 1986. Of the loan of $26.5 million, $24.6 was disbursed, and the remainder $1.9 million cancelled.

The objectives of this project in a sense were modest, to reestablish a working relationship with regards to the highway seaor, to initiate improvements in the highway sector so as to better Uruguay's integration with its neighbors, and to strengthen management of the transport sector planning in general. An important start was made in the achievement of all these goals. The reconstruction of Route 8 and the connections (additional works added later) improved access to Brazil, an important and, over the recent years, increasingly larger trading partner. The technical assistance for the Transport Planning Unit (TPU) helped d- a long- term development plan for highways and bridges which has formed the basis of the subsequent two projects in Uruguay. As a matter of fact preparation and appraisal of the Third Highway Project was started midway through the implementation of this project and a Transport Sector project is currently being implemented. Technical Assistance also strengthened the Transport Planning Unit, in particular in regard to the role of the Railways in Uruguay. As a matter of fact the pattern for the restructuring of the A.F.E. in the following years has been based largely on the recommendations of the study financed under this project.

The economic reevaluation performed with the fairly straight forward and standard methodology followed during Appraisal shows that the internal rate of reburn is on maage slightly more than 2 percent than appraisal e s a , for the nine road sections under xwiew, in apite of the fact that benefits from reduced accidents, which were taken into account at appraisal, were not taken into account in post-appraisal. As can be seen in table 7, seven of the nine mad sections had considerably high rates of returns and only two sections had rates

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of return of less than 10 percent, which was also the case before appraisal. With Traffic levels' ranges from 5844 to 642 vehicles per day, with up to 50 percent trucks, actual traffic was higher than the projected traffic in 6 out of 9 cases. The combined IRR for the whole project was 17.4%.

7.1 Although some aspects of Uruguay's economy deteriorated during the period, the country was able to maintain, since the inception of this project, a fair degree of macroeconomic and political stability. This, coupled with the fact that the project was generally well- implemented, resulted in the subsequent realization and maintenance of the projected benefits of the project. The work started in this project for updating the National highway network and for improvement of sector planning has been continued in the following projects.

8.1 With 107 man days spent in the field on the preparation and Appraisal of this project (Table 8, Part Ill) this was a carefully prepared project. Two major factors deserve attention in the preparation and implementation of this project. The fitst is the scrutiny of designs and standards of the project by the Bank, resulting in some down-sizing of the road and pavement designs proposed to the Bank, which tended to be over-ambitions. The second factor was the introduction of exchange rate adjustment by the Government of Uruguay in 1982 which resulted in a significant drop in project costs. This was made up by including a few additional works which would otherwise have appeared in the following projects, and by increasing the percentage of Bank participation from 5 1 % to 60% (Para. 5.6).

8.2 The project helped establish a close liaison between the Bank and the Borrower. This was rdected in the fact that preparation of the Third Highway Project started in May 1981, hardly 17 months after the Second Highway Loan became effective, with the Project Brief issued in August 198 1.

9.1 The MITIP was formed in 1967 by combining the Ministry of Transport 0 and the M i of Obras Publicas (MOP), and had, in principle, responsibility for development of a National transport policy, transport coordination, and establishment of tariffs for the transport services. However, in e&ct MTOP had only nominal jurisdiction over the policies practices and i n v m of the modal agencies, AFE (Railways), ANP (Ports), Pluna (Airlines) and AIGAN (Aiirts). The National Directorate of Transportation (DNT) created in 1975 within MIlIP began to provide some kind of a formal channel of contact between the operational agencies and SEPLACODI (Secretaria de Planificaci6n, Coordinacidn y Difusi6n) the National p h h g body responsible for the social and economic planning of the country at the macro- level. However until the formulation of this project Transport Planning and intermodal c o o r d ~ n temained tasks that were neglected rather than wellardinated.

9.2 In recognition of this deficiency and as a first step towards improving transport planning and coordination, the Transport Advisory Council was created which was led by DNT and included APE, PLUNA, DIGAN, ANP and SEPLAODI and was followed by the creation

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of the Transport Planning Unit (TPU). Technical Assistance to strengthen the TPU was a high-priority component of this project. In effect therefore the reorganization and strengthening of the transport planning function in the government was started in this project. (See also para. 11 below).

9.3 Largely due to the improvement of the transport unit the government in general cooperated well with the Bank in the implementation of the project, notwithstanding the initial delays in bidevaluation (Para. 5.3) and the protracted hold up in obtaining land appropriations and the relocation of public utilities (Para. 5.5). The drop in Project costs elicited several proposals from the Borrower leading to the inclusion of additional works and other proposals to utilize Bank funds (Para. 5.7).

Bank relationships with the Government and the various agencies dealing with the implementation of the project were generally satisfactory.

The main consulting services for this project were provided for Supervision of the Civil Works and in connection with the Technical Assistance for strengthening the Transport Sector Management. The contract for the Supervision was awarded to Consortia 8 a joint venture of the four firms which originally designed Route 8 and these consultants also did the bid evaluation for the civil works in addition to the Supervision of the Civil Works. The Bank insisted on the appointment of an outsider (in this case Ing. Arturo Panzarini, an Argentina) as the Chief Engineer. The Plan for strengthening Sector Planning essentially had two components: (i) the preparation of a Four Year Plan for the Rehabilitation and reconstruction of highways and bridges, including detailed engineering for the first 2-year tranche and (ii) Technical Assistance for the strengthening and improvement of the TPU. The preparation of the Rehabilitation/Reconstruction program was entrusted to Consorcio Vialur Engevix who got the contract in 1982 and delivered their report in 1983, which served as a basis for future investments in highways. A french Transport Economist M. Alain Wartel led the techuical assistance to the TPU which included, inter alia, a study by "Ferroplan" of the economic role of the railways (A.F.E.). This study has formed the basis for the restructuring of the national railway system.

12. Roiect Documentation and D m

12.1 The Staff Appraisal Report was the basis for framiug the legal documents and provided the tale-off point for providing the detailed terms of reference for the consulting services and for the supervision of the civil works. Given the long duration of the project, changes in Bank Supervision teams, changes in the Government and the Borrower's management, the SAR also provided in a sense an on-going the frame of reference concerning the project origins, and for additionslalterations to the project content which ensured that the basic scope and format of the project were maintained.

12.2 Periodic reports from the borrower were received regularly although often with delays. As this PCR has been written almost five years after completion of the project, it has h e n

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difficult to obtain some of the data required. However the "Informe de Finalizaci6nM of the Project provided by the borrower in May 1987 gives some of the data and figures pertaining to the project, which together with the supervision reports and the correspondence in the project fires, enabled the preparation of this report.

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URUGUAY - S E C O O

The Borrower's Comments and Data relating to the Project, given in a brief PCR sent by the Borrower in May 1987, have been included in Parts I and III of this report. Due to the fact that in the intervening years several changes have taken place in the Government and the mauagement of the entities responsible for the execution of the project, it was not considered necessary to send parts I and II for the preparation of Part. II.

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URUGUAY - an 1689-URJ

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URUGUAY

wav Lpan (Loan 1689-UR)

11Source: IBRD Statement of Loans

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III - Table;!

URUGUAY

~/SOIVCU: IBRD Project Files

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13 URUGUAY

Proiect Comuktion Reuort Second Hkbwav Roiect b a n 1689-UR1

3. Estimated Actual W u l e of Disbursements N S S million)

Part III - Table 3

1 h a n Appraisal Report 22396-UR, Cumulative figurea

2/From Supervision Reports (Revised estimatm were updated several times)

w r o m Statement of Loans 1981 to 1986

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URUGUAY PROJECT COMPLETION REPOBT

SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECI' 1689-UR) Estimated - (US$ million)-

part 111 - Table 4

TITLES

1 Recommaion of Route 8 a) Civil works Rt. 8 b) Access to Soca c) Connection Rt. 1 1 d) C o d o n Rt. 13 Sub-Total

2 Consultants for Supervision and Studies a) Supervision of Rt. 8

Civil Works b) Prepamtion of Four

Year Plan c) Detail Engineding first

two years d) Technical Assistance for

Transport Planning Unit Sub-Total

3 Contingencies Physical Price

Sub-Total

4 TOTAL

Appraisal Estimates

Local Foreign Total

Actual Costs Actuals as Percentage of Estimated Costs

Local Foreign Total I ~ o c d Foreign T O ~ I

Bank Participation

Amount %

I/lhe percentages of Bank disbursements for Civil works was raised from 51 % to 60% on May 19, 1983

ZOf the Foreign Exchange cost of $27.76 million for the Civil Works, $5 million was contributed by the Bank of Nova Scotia

3 m e Actual Cost Figures are taken from the Borrower's "Informe de Finalizacibn". The break-up between the local and foreign costs (not given in the Borrower's Report) is based on the Appraisal Estimates as amended by (i) the variations in the Exchange Rates from year to year and (ii) the increase in the percentage of bank financing referred to in 11 above.

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Part I11 - T W

Source: Borrower's 'Informe de Finalizacidn del Segundo Proyecto de Cmderas', May 1987

l l ' l l e additional works were not included in the original project appraised

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Part III - T w

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECI' (Loan 1689-UR)

of Loan CovenanQ

Two extensions of Closing Date became necessary and project

Sec. 3.01 (b)

Sec. 3.01 (c)

Sec. 3.02

Sec. 3.03 (c)

Sec. 3.03 (d)

Sec. 4.03

Sec. 4.06

Appointment of Project Coordinator

Appointment of Civil Works Supervisor

Appointment of Consultants for Part B of project

Preparation of Quarterly Reports

Preparation of Project Completion Report

Preparation of Annual Plans of Action for Planning Unit of DNT

Control of dimension and weights of vehicles using national roads

September 1, 1979

-

-

Quarterly

Six months after completion of project

Annually

-

was closed as June 30, 1986

Complied. Project Coordinator was appointed on due to late start of project

Complied

Complied

Complied, although with frequent delays

Complied

Complied

Started under this project

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a copy of study under Part B (c) of h j e a

U IntaDodrl amparbon study to serve as a bash for coordination of the B O ~ W C D ' S transport policim rad inv-

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Part III - Table 7

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

RESULTS OF ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION

U Average A d Daily Traffic (AADT) in Vehicles per Day (vpd).

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URUGUAY

Use of Bank Resources - Mission Data

PAKT I11 - Table 8 Page 1

11 Consuitan1 provided rpwialisl 4vic.u: on [he likcly economic impact of the Route 8 project an the agricultural and pastoral activities and on [ha n 4 lilt imprtW!Itp lt)cn\ tmtlrl in ill^! 14r18:1 of' irrtl~rrncc r ~ f the hiphwav prnl~v'f

Transport Seaor Mission October 4 6 ECO, ENG, ENG 1 9 n DC

Project Preprntion April 1978 4 7 ECO, ENG, FA Mission CON l', ENG

Supervision of Route 8 May 1978 I 2 ECO Ecommic Study

- - - -

A P P ~ August - 2 7 ENG, ECO StP*

1978

n- - Negatiations March 1978

Board Appnnrd April 1979

Project aad agreement on Terms of Reference for Highway Economic Study-

Project Brief outlined project and issues

Mission reviewed preparation of Port and Highway Rojects

Issue/Decision Memorandum Oaober 27, 1978. Appraisal Report April 5, 1979

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URUGUAY an 1689-UR)

Yse of B a n l r - - Mlsslon . . Data

PART 111 - T a b u Page 3

Through Appraisal 107 mandays Appraisal to Board Approval nil Board Approval to Effdvenes 9 months Supervision 80 mandays

Y Time spent on preparation of Highway III has been excluded

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