withstanding multimillion-node botnets colin dixon arvind krishnamurthy, tom anderson affiliates...

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Withstanding Withstanding Multimillion-Node Multimillion-Node Botnets Botnets Colin Dixon Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007 Affiliates Day, 2007

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Page 1: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

WithstandingWithstandingMultimillion-Node BotnetsMultimillion-Node Botnets

Colin DixonColin DixonArvind Krishnamurthy, Tom AndersonArvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson

Affiliates Day, 2007Affiliates Day, 2007

Page 2: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

BotnetsBotnets

A botnet is a large group of infected A botnet is a large group of infected computers controlled by a hackercomputers controlled by a hacker

Used toUsed to Send spamSend spam Steal personal informationSteal personal information Launch DDoS attacksLaunch DDoS attacks

Extortion/Protection RacketsExtortion/Protection Rackets Attack rivalsAttack rivals

Page 3: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007
Page 4: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Botnets are BigBotnets are Big

Total bots:Total bots: 6 million [Symantec]6 million [Symantec] 150 million [Vint Cerf]150 million [Vint Cerf]

Single botnets have numbered 1.5 Single botnets have numbered 1.5 millionmillion

Average upload bandwidth: 3 Mb/sAverage upload bandwidth: 3 Mb/s Back of the envelope: 4.5-450 Tb/sBack of the envelope: 4.5-450 Tb/s

Flood many core links, small-medium ISPsFlood many core links, small-medium ISPs

Page 5: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

How DoS WorksHow DoS Works

Page 6: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

How DoS WorksHow DoS Works

Page 7: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

How DoS WorksHow DoS Works

Page 8: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Our ApproachOur Approach

Swarm of Swarm of machines machines forward trafficforward traffic

Explicitly Explicitly request each request each packetpacket

Attacks must Attacks must down all down all mailboxes and mailboxes and thus all pathsthus all paths

Page 9: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

MailboxesMailboxes

A large number of machines offer to A large number of machines offer to carry traffic for certain destinationscarry traffic for certain destinations

Rather than immediately forward it, Rather than immediately forward it, they buffer traffic until a request is they buffer traffic until a request is receivedreceived

This building block provides two key This building block provides two key advantagesadvantages Filtering logic is left at the destinationFiltering logic is left at the destination The system as a whole is fail-stopThe system as a whole is fail-stop

Page 10: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

The MailboxThe Mailbox

Page 11: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Many MailboxesMany Mailboxes

Send traffic Send traffic randomly among randomly among mailboxesmailboxes

Page 12: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Many MailboxesMany Mailboxes

Send traffic Send traffic randomly among randomly among mailboxesmailboxes

Botnet can take Botnet can take down one mailboxdown one mailbox

Page 13: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Many MailboxesMany Mailboxes

Send traffic Send traffic randomly among randomly among mailboxesmailboxes

Botnet can take Botnet can take down one mailboxdown one mailbox

But communication But communication continuescontinues

Page 14: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Many MailboxesMany Mailboxes

Send traffic randomly Send traffic randomly among mailboxesamong mailboxes

Botnet can take Botnet can take down one mailboxdown one mailbox

But communication But communication continuescontinues

Diluted attacks Diluted attacks against all mailboxes against all mailboxes failfail

Page 15: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Remaining DetailsRemaining Details

Attackers can Attackers can ignore the ignore the mailboxes and just mailboxes and just attack the server attack the server (Filtering Ring)(Filtering Ring)

Page 16: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Remaining DetailsRemaining Details

Attackers can ignore Attackers can ignore the mailboxes and the mailboxes and just attack the just attack the server (Filtering server (Filtering Ring)Ring)

Before a connection Before a connection starts, the server starts, the server has no idea to has no idea to request packetsrequest packets(General Requests)(General Requests)

Page 17: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Filtering RingFiltering Ring

Keeps a list of Keeps a list of requested packetsrequested packets

Drops all Drops all unrequested packetsunrequested packets

Protects thin access Protects thin access linkslinks

Deployed in depth to Deployed in depth to counter “insider counter “insider attacks”attacks”

Page 18: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

General RequestsGeneral Requests

First packets unexpected => can’t First packets unexpected => can’t requestrequest

Filtering ring prevents unrequested Filtering ring prevents unrequested packets from reaching the serverpackets from reaching the server

Solution: Issue some small number of Solution: Issue some small number of general requests to the mailboxesgeneral requests to the mailboxes Allow “first packets” through the filtering ringAllow “first packets” through the filtering ring Provides admission controlProvides admission control Limit access by auth tokens & crypto-puzzlesLimit access by auth tokens & crypto-puzzles

Page 19: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Complete SystemComplete System

Lookup mailboxes for a server from a Lookup mailboxes for a server from a distributed name service (CoDoNs)distributed name service (CoDoNs)

Contact one mailbox for a puzzleContact one mailbox for a puzzle Present a solution and waitPresent a solution and wait Mailbox forwards solution to the Mailbox forwards solution to the

serverserver Server responds and begins to Server responds and begins to

request packetsrequest packets

Page 20: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Key FeaturesKey Features

Unilaterally DeployableUnilaterally Deployable Pay Akamai for mailboxesPay Akamai for mailboxes Pay upstream ISP to install filtering ringPay upstream ISP to install filtering ring

Server is in complete controlServer is in complete control Explicitly asks for each packetExplicitly asks for each packet Is not required to trust any given Is not required to trust any given

mailboxmailbox System is fail-stopSystem is fail-stop

Page 21: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

LatencyLatency

Page 22: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

DoS ResilienceDoS Resilience

Established Established connectionconnection

Page 23: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

DoS ResilienceDoS Resilience

Established Established connectionconnection

Attack kills some Attack kills some mailboxesmailboxes

Page 24: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

DoS ResilienceDoS Resilience

Established Established connectionconnection

Attack kills some Attack kills some mailboxesmailboxes

““Goodput” Goodput” decreasesdecreases

Page 25: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

DoS ResilienceDoS Resilience

Established Established connectionconnection

Attack kills some Attack kills some mailboxesmailboxes

““Goodput” Goodput” decreasesdecreases

Client sends faster Client sends faster (more redundantly) (more redundantly) to compensateto compensate

Page 26: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

DoS ResilienceDoS Resilience

Page 27: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

ConclusionsConclusions

We have presented a system to We have presented a system to mitigate Denial of Service attacks which mitigate Denial of Service attacks which can be unilaterally deployed todaycan be unilaterally deployed today

Performance is reasonable with few Performance is reasonable with few optimizations, still room for optimizations, still room for improvementimprovement

Can scale to deal with the massive Can scale to deal with the massive botnets of today and tomorrowbotnets of today and tomorrow

Page 28: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy, Tom Anderson Affiliates Day, 2007

Questions?Questions?