Dolar vs. Diancin

Facts:

The deceased Paulino Diancin made will, and signed it by his thumbmark. When the will was presented for probate, the parties presented a document wherein Diancin’s thumbmark was affixed in order to compare it with the thumbark on the will. Another witness also testified that he saw Diancin placed the same on the will. The trial court denied the probate on the ground that there were differences between thumbmark on the will and the documentary evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not the will must be probabated?

Ruling:

Yes. The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not only the customary written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix' thumbmark .Expert testimony as to the identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course admissible. The method of identification of fingerprints is a science requiring close study .Where thumb impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic marks far from clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated by experts as showing the identity or lack of identity of the impressions, the court is justified in refusing to accept the opinions of alleged experts and in substituting its own opinion that a distinct similarity in some respects between the admittedly genuine thumbmark and the questioned thumbmarks, is evident .This we do here. (Emperor vs. Abdul Hamid [1905], 32 Indian L. Rep., 759, cited in 3 Chamberlayne on the Modern Law of Evidence, sec. 2561, notes 3.)

There is another means of approach to the question and an obvious one. The three instrumental witnesses united in testifying concerning the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. It was stated that in addition to the testator and themselves, on other person, Diosdado Dominado, was present. This latter individual was called as a witness by the oppositors to the will to identify Exhibit 8. He was later placed on the witness stand by the proponent on rebuttal, and thereupon declared positively that he was the one who prepared the will for the signature of Paulino Diancin; that the thumbmarks appearing on the will were those of Paulino Diancin, and that he saw Paulino Diancin make these impressions. The testimony of a witness called by both parties is worthy of credit.

We reach the very definite conclusion that the document presented for probate as the last will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was, in truth, his will, and that the thumbmarks appearing thereon were the thumbmarks of the testator .Accordingly, error is found, which means that the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the will ordered admitted to probate, without special finding as to costs in this instance.

Yap Tua vs. Yap Ka Kuan (See Full Case)

Facts:

Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, who was very sick at that time, executed a will (August 11, 1909). At the time she signed the will, some of the witnesses was on the other room although it appears from the record that the testator and the instrumental witnesses could see each other at the time

of the signing of the will. During the probate, the same was opposed on the ground that Tomasa executed another will (August 6, 1909). A comparison of the two wills would show that there were different signatures affixed on them. In the August 11, 1909 will, the testator merely affixed her signature by signing the name “TOMASA”.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the will was made in the presence of the testator and the instrumental witnesses?

2. Whether or not the signature written on the will dated August 11, 1909 is a valid signature?

Ruling:

1. Yes. With reference to the fourth assignment of error, it may be said that the argument which was preceded is sufficient to answer it also.

During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their names in their presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that question there is considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two steps below the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.

In cases like the present where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is very difficult for the courts to reach conclusions that are absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must be given by appellate courts who do not see or hear the witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunity.

Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A). Therefore the judgment of the lower court admitting said will to probate is hereby affirmed with costs.

2. Second. There appears to be but little doubt that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute the will of August 6, 1909. Several witnesses testified to that fact. The mere fact, however, that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new

will fails to expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did not make the new will.

Third. In said third assignment of error there is involved in the statement that "The signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, in her first will (Exhibit 1) was not identical with that which appears in her second will (Exhibit A)" the inference that she had not signed the second will and all the argument of the appellants relating to said third assignment of error is based upon the alleged fact that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign Exhibit A. Several witnesses testified that they saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses testified that she had written her full name. We are of the opinion, and we think the law sustains our conclusion, that if Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her name tot he will, with the intention to sign the same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been held time and time again that one who makes a will may sign the same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make and execute a will, then certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of her intention to execute the will. (Re Goods of Savory, 15 Jur., 1042; Addy vs. Grix, 8 Ves. Jr., 504; Baker vs. Dening, 8 Ad. and El., 94 Long vs. Zook, 13 Penn., 400; Vernon vs. Kirk, 30 Penn., 218; Cozzen's Will, 61 Penn., 196; Re Goods of Emerson, L. R. 9 Ir., 443; Main vs. Ryder, 84 Penn., 217.)

We find a very interesting case reported in 131 Pennsylvania State, 220 (6 L. R. A., 353), and cited by the appellees, which was known as "Knox's Appeal." In this case one Harriett S. Knox died very suddenly on the 17th of October, 1888, at the residence of her father. After her death a paper was found in her room, wholly in her handwriting, written with a lead pencil, upon three sides of an ordinary folded sheet of note paper and bearing the signature simply of "Harriett." In this paper the deceased attempted to make certain disposition of her property. The will was presented for probate. The probation was opposed upon the ground that the same did not contain the signature of the deceased. That was the only question presented to the court, whether the signature, in the form above indicated, was a sufficient signature to constitute said paper the last will and testament of Harriett S. Knox. It was admitted that the entire paper was in the handwriting of the deceased. In deciding that question, Justice Mitchell said:

The precise case of a signature by the first name only, does not appear to have arisen either in England or the United States; but the principle on which the decisions already referred to were based, especially those in regard to signing by initials only, are equally applicable to the present case, and additional force is given to them by the decisions as to what constitutes a binding signature to a contract. (Palmer vs. Stephens, 1 Denio, 478; Sanborne vs. Flager, 9 Alle, 474; Weston vs. Myers, 33 Ill., 424; Salmon Falls, etc. Co. vs. Goddard, 14 How. (U. S.), 446.)

The man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark simply therefor, upon the will, is held to "sign" as effectually as if he had written his initials or his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a signature by the person making a will, to make his mark, to place his initials or all or any part of his name thereon. In the present case we think the proof shows, by a large preponderance, that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong,

if she did not sign her full name, did at least sign her given name "Tomasa," and that is sufficient to satisfy the statute.

Avera vs. Garcia

Facts:

The will of Esteban Garcia was presented for probate by Entiquia Avera; it was opposed by Garcia and Rodriguez on the ground that the signatures of the testator and the instrumental witnesses were written on the right margin contrary to what the law requires that it be written on the left margin.

Issue:

Whether or not the will is valid?

Ruling:

Yes, the will is valid. The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.

It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment appealed from will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.

Nayve vs. Mojal

Facts:

The will of Antonio Mojal was presented for probate which was opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased on the ground that (a) it was not signed on the left margin; (b) the sheets of documents not being paged with letters; (c) the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d) it was not signed in the presence of the three witnesses and attested and signed by the said witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.

Issue:

Whether or not the will is valid notwithstanding that (a) it was not signed on the left margin; (b) the sheets of documents not being paged with letters; (c) the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d) it was not signed in the presence of the three witnesses and attested and signed by the said witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other?

Ruling:

(a)As to the signatures on the margin, it is true, as above stated, that the third page actually used was signed by the testator, not on the left margin, as it was by the witnesses, but about the middle of the page and the end of the will; and that the fourth page was signed by the witnesses, not on the left margin, as it was by the testator, but about the middle of the page and at the end of the attestation clause.

In this respect the holding of this court in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), is applicable, wherein the will in question was signed by the testator and the witnesses, not on the left, but right, margin. The rule laid down in that case is that the document contained the necessary signatures on each page, whereby each page of the will was authenticated and safeguarded against any possible alteration. In that case, the validity of the will was sustained, and consequently it was allowed to probate.

Applying that doctrine to the instant case, we hold that, as each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not detract from the validity of the will.

(b)Turning to the second defect alleged, that is to say, the fact that the sheets of the document are not paged with letters, suffice it to cite the case of Unson vs. Abella (43 Phil., 494), where this court held that paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.

(c) As to the proposition that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages of the will, which is the third defect assigned, it must be noted that the last paragraph of the will here in question and the attestation clause, coming next to it, are of the following tenor:

In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig, Albay, Philippine Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and eighteen, composed of four sheets, including the next:

ANTONIO MOJAL

(Signed and declared by the testator Don Antonio Mojal to be his last will and testament in the presence of each of us, and at the request of said testator Don Antonio Mojal, we signed this will in the presence of each other and of the testator.)

PEDRO CAROSILVERIO MORCO

ZOILO MASINAS

As may be seen, the number of sheets is stated in said last paragraph of the will. It is true that in the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), it was held that the attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages composing the will; but when, as in the case before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end of the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then there can be no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the will from being unduly increased or decreased.

(d)With regard to the last defect pointed out, namely, that the testator does not appear to have signed on all the sheets of the will in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed on all the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other, it must be noted that in the attestation clause above set out it is said that the testator signed the will "in the presence of each of the witnesses" and the latter signed "in the presence of each other and of the testator." So that, as to whether the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a requirement was clearly and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is whether the testator and the witnesses signed all the sheets of the will.

(e)The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one which cannot be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is expressly stated in the attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the mere examination of the document, although it does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.

Therefore, as in the instant case the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will is proven by the mere examination of the signatures in the will, the omission to expressly state such evident fact does not invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.

The order appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Johnson, Malcolm, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Pilapil vs. CA

Facts:

The will of Pilapil was presented for probate. It was opposed on the ground that they were not prepared and signed in accordance with the law, saying that their pages are not numbered with letters; and because in its clause witnessing not expressed that they were signed by the three instrumental witnesses, in the presence of the testator.

Issue:

Whether or not the will is valid?

Ruling:

it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that the bottom of the first page there are lyrics on the note clearly states: " Go to the 2nd page. "; and the fact that, at the bottom of the second page, there is this other note: "Go to the 3rd page.";sufficient and also draw attention to the first two lines of the third page is the last, where, to complete the arrangement that is contained in the last paragraph of the previous page, or second, it is stated:

. . . consists of two items; CONTAINS sixteen provisions and is written on three pages,

which agrees closely with the true facts as they appear in the aforementioned two exhibits, for indeed contain two articles and sixteen provisions, not more, not less.

In an attestation clause and another copy of the object in question Testament, by the three instrumental witnesses who signed it states that

the pre-insert Testament and Last Will, has been subscribed and sworn declared by the Testator, Rev. Eleuterio P. Pilapil in the presence of us all;

and row followed by the same witnesses who also says:

to beg of the testator, signed each of us, here in Cebu, Cebu, IF, for today November 27, 1935.

The fraze "said Testator to pray" that attached to the signed and signed his will in the presence of the attesting witnesses, permits and justifies the inference that the testator was present when the last alli affixed their respective signatures.

The purpose of the law to establish the formalities required authenticity is undoubtedly ensure and guarantee their authenticity against bad faith and fraud, to prevent those who are not entitled to succeed the testator, and you happen to win-win legalization of same. It has fulfilled that purpose in the event that there has been talk that, in the same body of the will and the same page where the attestation clause appears, or the third, expresses the will consists of three pages and why one of the first two takes note partly lyrics, partly the same and second pages.These facts evidently excludes all fear, suspicion, or any hint of doubt has been replaced some of its pages to another.

Something more in the case of Nayve against Mojal and Aguilar (47 Phil., 160), which was clarified by the cause of Gumban against Gorecho and others (50 Phil., 31), there is in this case because there there was but notes: "Pag 1"; "Pag 2"; "Pag 3"; and "Pag 4" on the respective side of the four pages that include, and in this there is the aforementioned data and there is also the record inserted in the first two lines of the third page of the exhibits A and C, that they are composed of three pages, and contain two articles and sixteen provisions.

They are therefore the perfect application if it is what we said in the causes of Rodriguez against Yap, GR No. 45924, May 18, 1939; Blessed

and against De Gorostiza (57 Phil., 456). We said in these cases, respectively, as follows:

The wording of the attestation clause in this will not technically free repairs, but is substantially a law enforcement.

We maintain the view that should be required strict compliance with the substantive requirements of the will, to ensure its authenticity, but at the same time we believe that defects that do not affect the order should not be taken into account and the other part , be taken into account, could thwart the will of the testator.(Rodriguez against Yap, supra .)

It should not be allowed to hinder the legal formalities employing good common sense in the consideration of wills and to frustrate the wishes of the deceased solemnly expressed in their wills, as to which there is not even granting shadow of bad faith or fraud. (Blessed against De Gorostiza, supra .)

For these reasons, finding according to law the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, hereby confirm it sentenced the appellants to pay the costs. So is ordered.

Avanceña, CJ, Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno Moran, MM., are compliant.

Separate Opinions

MORAN, M., disidente:

The attestation clause is as follows:

We who signed below, we state: That the pre-insert Testament and Last Will, has been subscribed, and sworn to by the said Testator, Rev. Eleuterio P. Pilapil in the presence of us all pray and said Testator, each signed of us in the presence of us, here in Cebu, Cebu, IF, for today November 27, 1935.

There is nothing in this clause that the attesting witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and, therefore, the will can not be probated. But the majority argues that "the phrase 'a prayer of said testator,' attached to it signed and signed his will in the presence of the attesting witnesses, allowed and justified inference that the testator was present when the last stamped their alli signatures. " But we have said repeatedly that the formalities required of a will by law can not be established by evidence aliunde . Therefore, inference tests are inadmissible, mostly if the inference is not quite adjusted to the logic.

For these reasons, I dissent from the opinion of the majority.

Abada vs. Abaja (See Full Case)

Facts:

The will of Abada was presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Caponong filed an opposition on the ground that the attestation clause did not comply with the requirements of the law because fails to state the number of pages on which the will was written, and failed to state expressly that the testator signed the will, that it is not stated that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will, failed to state the number of witnesses and its every page in the presence of the three witnesses. Both the RTC and CA granted the probate on the will and used the doctrine of liberal interpretation.

Issue:

Whether or not the will is valid? (See Other Issues)

Ruling:

The will is valid.

The Attestation Clause of Abada’s Will

A scrutiny of Abada’s will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of Abada’s will reads:

Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS’ en la parte superior de la carrilla.28

Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.

The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo" which means "in the left margin of each and every one of the two pages consisting of the same" shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the phrase "las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS."

Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the Court of Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809 of the New Civil Code.29

The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo." The English translation is: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.

However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.

This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New Civil Code. InDichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,30 the Court recognized that there are two divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted thatAbangan v. Abangan,31 the basic case on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.

In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,32 the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of applicable laws, enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the respondent, contending that the rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long series of cases to support his view. The Court, after examining the cases invoked by the parties, held:

x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.

An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. x x x 331a\^/phi1.net

We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:

[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision.They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself.l^vvphi1.net They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.34 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence" coupled with the signatures appearing on the will itself and after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and professed before the

three witnesses that the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed the will and the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses.

Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled:

Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.35

The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness, every one of us also signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in the presence of one another and of the testator.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644.

SO ORDERED.

Caneda vs. CA

Facts:

Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a will and designated as voluntary heirs different persons who do not appear to be related to the testator. He presented the same for probate before the court, but before the case was set for hearing after several postponements, Caballero died. As a result, one of the devisees petitioned and was appointed as executor. Meanwhile, petitioners herein, nephews and nieces of the testator, filed a second petition for intestate proceedings, and this case was later consolidated to the probate proceedings wherein petitioners opposed the said will. The trial court granted the probate, thus, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals wherein they argued that the attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure of the attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another is a fatal defect that warrants the invalidity of the will?

Ruling:

In this case, yes, because the court is required to resort to extrinsic evidence. The Court said, In Taboada vs. Rizal, 32 we clarified that attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator

exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. As it involves a mental act, there would be no means, therefore, of ascertaining by a physical examination of the will whether the witnesses had indeed signed in the presence of the testator and of each other unless this is substantially expressed in the attestation.

In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from with such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by the indirection what in law he cannot do directly.

It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.

Codoy vs. Calugay (See Full Case)

Facts:

Calugay, Salcedo, and Patigas presented the holographic will of the deceased Ramonal for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis, Oriental. On the other hand, Codoy and Ramonal filed an opposition with the said proceeding on the ground that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same was illegible, i.e., that a “third hand” of an interested party other than the “true hand” of Ramonal executed the holographic will. The oppositors filed a demurrer to evidence that was granted by the trial court, but which was reversed by the Court of Appeals; it held that the requirement that three witnesses must be presented in case the holographic will is contested is only permissive. Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Calugay and Binanay, the said court sustained the authencity of the holographic will.

Issue:

Whether or not the presentation of three (3) witnesses is mandatory in case the holographic will is contested?

Ruling:

Yes, the rule is mandatory. In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.1âwphi1.nêt

We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation

and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.

It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that of the deceased.

From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.

In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.

However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.

Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978,33 and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978,35 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous

flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal.1âwphi1.nêt

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ajero vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

In the holographic will of Annie Sand, she named petitioners as devisees, thus, the latter presented the same for probate before the court. On the other hand, Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court granted the probate, but, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision and held that the deceased failed to comply to Art. 813 and Art. 814 of the New Civil Code, thus, the holographic will is invalid.

Issue:

Whether or not failure to comply to Arts. 813 and 814 will render the entire holographic will invalid?

Ruling:

No. In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.

For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.

In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:

Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic will.

Azaola vs. Singson

Facts:

Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the petitioner; that on September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be the last residence of said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the said holographic will (Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson. An opposition was filed on the ground that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence; and that the testator did not intend the instrument to be her last will and testament. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix." The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

Issue:

Whether or not the presentation of three (3) witnesses is mandatory in case the holographic will was contested?

Ruling:

No, it is not mandatory. Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:

ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (691a).

We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —

in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.

And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed, no unfavourable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.

Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.

Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents. In the course of the intestate proceeding, Romeo discovered that Lot 3-B was sold to Natividad by their parents. The said lot had been occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and Maximino Jr. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold the same to Maximino Jr. Romeo, on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr., filed a case for annulment of sale against Natividad and Maximino Jr. Romeo presented evidence that the property was held by Natividad only in trust for her siblings, and it was not intended by their parents to sell the same to Natividad. He presented a Deed of Partition and Distribution executed by Maximino Sr. and Aurea. On the other hand, Natividad and Maximino Jr. denied the said allegations and told the court that there was a valid sale between them and it is for a consideration. After trial, the court ruled that the sale void, and held that the TCT over Lot 3-B

cancelled and restored in the name of Maximino Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete. On appeal, the Court of Appeals party affirmed and made a modification of the trial court’s decision.

Issue:

Ruling:

Fifth. As to the third-party complaint concerning Lot 3, we find that this has been passed upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As Romeo admitted, no consideration was paid by him to his parents for the Deed of Sale. Therefore, the sale was void for having been simulated. Natividad never acquired ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being without consideration and title to Lot 3 cannot be issued in her name.

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only "female and the only unmarried member of the family."34 She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor.1âwphi1 Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states:

There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof.

There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states:

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. on April 20, 197935 will have to be upheld for Ros-Alva Marketing is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad. The rule is settled that "every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property."36

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Rivera vs IAC

Facts:

Venancio Rivera died. Two opposing-alleged heirs alleged that either of them is the one who should inherit from him. The said alleged heirs are Jose Rivera, and Adelaido Rivera. The former argued that Venancio died intestate, while, Adelaido, presented a holographic will before the court for the purpose of probate. Jose Rivera filed an opposition thereto. The RTC and

CA held that Jose is not an heir of Venancio, and also, the holographic will is valid on the basis of testimonies of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr.

Issue:

Whether or not there is need to present three (3) witnesses on the ground that the holographic will was opposed by Jose Rivera?

Ruling:

Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them to have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

Labrador vs. CA

Seangio vs. Reyes

Facts:

Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio. On the other hand, on account of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio, petitioners filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo. In the said will, the deceased Segundo disinherit his eldest son Alfredo Seangio. Private respondents filed

a motion to dismiss on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not if the will did not provide a disposition of property, but only a disinheritance can be considered a (holographic) will?

Ruling:

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14

With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in

accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.

Capitle vs. Elbambuena

Facts:

A Certificate of Land Ownership Award was issued to Cristobal Olar, who is now a deceased. Prior to his death, respondents Fortunata and Rosalinda alleged that Olar transferred to them the said land awarded to Olar; that on petitioner’s request, respondent allowed petitioners to possessed the said property. Since then, petitioners did not pay the rentals to them, and that upon demand to return possession, petitioners did not heed to such request. Thus, respondents filed a recovery of possession and payment of back rentals against petitioners before the DARAB. On the other hand, petitioners argued that Olar executed a waiver of rights in favor of them; they further claimed that since 1959, respondent Fortunata was already separated from Olar and she even remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit from Olar. PARAD ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, DARAB reversed the said decision, and the DARAB’s decision was affirmed by the CA; it held that: Fortunata and Rosalinda being the heirs of Olar are entitled to the said possession since all of the rights of Olar were transmitted from the moment of Olar’s death.

Issue:

Who must possess the disputed property?

Ruling:

Private respondents are entitled to the possession of the property. Petitioners concede that although Olar’s death passed all his rights and interest over the lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing them to his estranged wife but to a relative, who helped him in tilling the lot and who took care of him, should be accorded respect over the intent of the law on hereditary succession.

Finally, petitioners claim that respondents are not qualified to become farmer-beneficiaries under the CARP as they did not till or cultivate the property nor help Olar in his farming activities.

The petition fails.

Petitioners’ argument that "[i]t would be absurd for [Olar] to bequeath his property to his estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him in tilling the property and [took] good care of his needs,"15 is a virtual admission that their possession was not in the concept of owners, they having merely "helped" in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that Olar was the actual possessor and tiller.

Absent evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the public officers who issued the CLOA to Olar regularly performed their duties, including adhering to the provisions of Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) which provides:

SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. – The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:

(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(b) regular farmworkers;

(c) seasonal farmworkers;

(d) other farmworkers;

(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and

(g) others directly working on the land.

Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of this Act shall be given preference in the distribution of the land of their parents; And provided further, That actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.

Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries under this Program.

A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record of performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.

x x x x,

thus stands.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers of the lot, their petition for the cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor of Olar would not bind respondents as they were not impleaded.

Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.16Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olar’s son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be injured or benefited by the judgment on the cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olar’s name.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Guerero vs. Bihis

Paz Samaniego-Celada vs. Abence

Facts:

Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedent’s lifelong companion since 1929.

On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.

Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament where she bequeathed her properties to respondent, thus, the latter filed a petition for the probate of Margarita’s Will. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent, and, on appeal, the said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses and of one another, whether or not the signatures of the witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on the same day, and whether or not undue influence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to sign the will, are all questions of fact.

Issue:

Whether or not the will is valid?

Ruling:

Yes, the will is valid. Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal that petitioner’s arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:

With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization…. Not one of the oppositor’s witnesses has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.

Anent the contestants’ submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the

subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:

"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805."

The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the testator were affixed on different occasions based on their observation that the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the signatures, the court does not share the same observation as the oppositors. The picture (Exhibit "H-3") shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.

Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will (See Exhibit "H").

In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will.14 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 88715 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedent’s estate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.