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T he Internet is not simply a set of intercon-nected links and protocols—it is also a construct of the imagination, an inkblot testinto which everyone projects their desires,fears, and fantasies. Some see enlightenmentand education. Others see pornography andgambling. Some see sharing and collabora-tion. Others see spam and viruses. Yet when

it comes to the impact on the democratic process, the answer seemsunanimous. The Internet is good for democracy. It creates digital citi-zens active in the teledemocracy [1] of the Electronic Republic [2] inthe e-nation [3]. But this bubble, too, needs to be pricked.

Why the Internet Is Bad for Democracy

By ELI M. NOAM

Skepticism about the Internet as a pro-democracy force is not based on its unevendistribution. It is more systemic. When itcomes to the Internet, observers often com-mit a so-called error of composition. Theyobserve a “micro” behavior and jump to a“macro” conclusion. They think that ifsomething is helpful to an individual orgroup, it similarly affects society at large,when everyone uses it. To draw an analogy:it might be faster for an individual to driveto work in the morning. But if everybodydoes the same, they all may well be late for

work, and the environment is worse offthan before due to mass motorization.

A second error is that of inference. Justbecause the Internet is good for democracyin places like North Korea, Iran, or Libyadoes not mean that it is better for Ger-many, Denmark, or the U.S. Just because10 TV channels are better than three doesnot mean that 3,000 are better still.

So let us consider the principal claims forthe Internet’s strengthening of democracy.

“The Internet will facilitate politicalparticipatory action.” Of course, the

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Internet makes some political activity easier andcheaper. But it does so for everyone. And if everybodyspeaks, who will be listened to? Thus, any effective-ness of early users will soon be matched by their rivalsand simply lead to an expensive and mutuallystalemating political arms-race of investment in cus-tomization techniques and new-media marketingtechnologies.

The early users of the Internet experienced a gainin their effectiveness, and messianically extrapolatedthis to society at large. The gain was trumpeted as theempowerment of the individual over Big Govern-ment and Big Business, but much of it has simplybeen an initial strengthening of individuals andgroups with computer and online skills (who usuallyhad above-average income and education) and a rela-tive weakening of those without such resources.

On top of that, the low cost exists primarily for thetraditional narrowband Internet, which is largely text-based. But the broadband Internet will first permitand soon require fancy video and multimedia mes-sages. “Netcasted” politics will be customized to bemost effective. Extensive databases will be needed.None of this will be cheap.

“The Internet will raise the level of the politi-cal dialogue.” Just because the quantity of informa-tion increases does not mean its average quality rises.On the contrary, as the Internet leads to more infor-mation clutter, it will become necessary for any mes-sage to get louder. Much of the politicalinformation, therefore, will inevitably become dis-torted, shrill, and simplistic.

One of the characteristics of the Internet is “dis-intermediation.” For politics, disintermediation ofinformation is a mixed bag. True, gatekeeping poweris bad news, but so is disinformation. Screening andbranding of information helps audiences. Wheninformation comes unfiltered, it will create commu-nity-based media but also lead to rumor and last-minute political ambush.

“Direct access to public officials becomes possi-ble.” Yes, anyone can send email messages to publicofficials and perhaps even get an automated reply,and this may provide an illusion of access. But thelimited resource will still be scarce: the attention ofthose officials. By necessity, only a few messages willget through. If anything, the greater flood of mes-sages will make power brokers that can provide accessmore important than ever. Not to mention the factthat an ostensible outpouring of public opinion canbe mass-produced. Ironically, the most effectivemeans of communications to an elected official—other than a campaign contribution check—becomes the handwritten letter.

“The Internet provides more information,which is good for democracy.” Access to informa-tion is indeed helpful, which is why the Internetundermines totalitarianism. But it underminespretty much everything else, too, including politicalparties and stability. It also creates new tools for elec-tronic Big Brother surveillance. More fundamen-tally, perhaps, the value of information to peace andharmony is overrated. Civil war situations are nottypically based on a lack of information. Democracyrequires stability, and stability requires a bit of iner-tia. The most stable democracies are characterizedby a certain slowness of change. Examples areBritain and Switzerland.

It is easy to romanticize democracy’s past as Athen-ian debates in front of an involved citizenry, and tobelieve in its return by electronic means. A quick lookin the rearview mirror—to radio and television—issobering. Here, too, the then-new media were her-alded as harbingers of a new and improved politicaldialogue. But the reality has been one of cacophony,fragmentation, increasing cost, and declining value of“hard” information.

Of course, the Internet can mobilize hard-to-reachgroups, and help individuals and groups to expressthemselves. It has unleashed much energy and cre-ativity. Large segments of society are disenchantedwith a political system that is often unresponsive,frequently affected by campaign contributions, andusually slow; and many look to the Internet as thesilver bullet that will change it all. Others cling tothe image of the early Internet—open and free—thatcreated new forms of community. They will bedisappointed.

The Internet does not create a Jeffersonian democ-racy. It is not Athens, nor Appenzell, nor Lincoln-Douglas. It is, if anything, less of a democracy thanthose low-tech places. But, of course, none of theseplaces really existed either, except as an ideal, a goal,or an inspiration. And in that sense, the expectationsvested in the Internet are a new link in a chain ofhope. Maybe naïve, but certainly ennobling.

References1. Etzioni, A. Communities: Virtual vs. real. Science 277 (July 18, 1997).2. Grossman, K.L. The Electronic Republic: Reshaping Democracy in the

Information Age. Viking, NY, 1995.3. Katz, J. The digital citizen. Wired (Dec. 1997).

Eli M. Noam (noam@columbia.edu) is a professor of finance and economics, and the director of the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information at Columbia University in New York.

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