T T U2003 -2014

WHICH KINDS OF FRIGATES FOREUROPEAN NAVIES ?

2

After a TTU special issue in 2002 devoted to the threat of theatre bal-

listic missiles, another exceptional topic warranted a new supplement.

The vast frigate and destroyer renewal phase, which mainly involves

the British, French and Italian navies, with some 70 ships planned over

the next 20 years, gives rise to many questions.

What is the best way to manage such an undertaking, given very

tight budgets? How to benefit from this window of opportunity for

multinational collaboration, knowing that such an opportunity will not

come along again before at least another 30 years? And how to

design these frigates, the mainsprings of modern navies, while taking

into account the redefinition of the navy’s role since the end of the

Cold War?

Today, discussions seem more geared around the way of designing

frigates, which play a very different role now than they did during the

Cold War. As ships are increasingly “systems of systems,” a new

global approach appears more appropriate.

Technologically speaking, onboard data processing and modern wea-

pon systems offer a modularity and a versatility that was until now uni-

maginable, but which is essential in order to face unpredictable

threats. Moreover, a new fact is that the choice of specific systems has

an impact on the overall architecture of the ships. Fitting a multi-

function radar on the mast or vertical launchers on the bridge has

consequences on a ship’s design. Should we not take advantage of this

forced breakaway in the definition of frigates to rethink the process of

design, construction, repair and modernisation during the overall

life span of a ship? Only concrete possibilities for cost reduction can

allow the acquisition of important classes of ships as planned.

Guy Perrimond

French La Fayette-class frigate (DCN)

Supplement of TTU International

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© TTU - Certes 2003 - All rights reserved

E D I T O R I A L

ON THE EVE OF A MAJOR ERA OF RENEWAL P3

THE WORLD HAS CHANGED P4

OPPOSING CONCEPTIONS P6

CHALLENGE OF COOPERATION P8

FINANCING A SHIP P11

CHALLENGE OF INTEROPERABILITY P14

VERTICAL LAUNCHERS P16

CONTROLING ACCESS TO THEATRE OPERATIONS P18

LAND ATTACK OPERATIONS P20

S U M M A R Y

3

Among European

navies there will be

a need for

87 frigates over the

2008-2020 period

European navies have recently resumedmajor investments in large air defenceship programmes. These include 12 Type45 destroyers for the Royal Navy, eightHorizon/Orizzonte frigates for the Frenchand Italian navies as well as the entry intoservice of the first German (F-124) andDutch (LCF) anti-air warfare (AAW) fri-gates. Still, behind these emblematic pro-grammes, it appears that Europeannations will need no less than 87 multi-mis-sion frigates over the period 2008-2020.

The British, French and Italian naviesaccount for the lion’s share of these renewal orders, with total requirementsfor 47 frigates, i.e. one-half of theEuropean forecast. Of these, France andItaly are driven by a strong desire tocooperate, as revealed by the FREMMEuropean multi-mission frigate program-me (a new name bringing together theFrench FMM and the Italian FNG desi-gnations). The British FSC programmewill certainly offer some opportunities forcooperation with regards to systems, buton a slightly different schedule.

Regarding other European countries,Germany and the Netherlands have alsoexpressed a need for multi-mission ves-sels equipped with ATBM capabilities.These are expected to be based on theAmerican doctrine, and a cooperation between the two countries sounds pos-sible. The strong implantation of American

On the eve of a major era of renewal

The Limburg is destroyed by fire. This attack underlines the need to protect maritime routes, on which 80 per cent

of commercial trade is transported.(AFP)

industrials in the Spanish naval sectorover the past year considerablydecreases the feasibility of any coope-ration with Spain. As for the 27 remai-ning frigates in other European coun-

tries, most of them appear to have alighter tonnage compared with the FMM,FNG and FSC. However some technicalparts, such as systems or sub-systems,could be jointly developed.

Needs within Europe

SS (surface-surface), ATBM (anti ballistic missile) ASW (anti-submarine warfare), DS (deep strike), AD (air defence),

GP (general purpose)

Number Name Principal Missions Service Date

GERMANY 8 F 125 SS + ATBM > 2014BELGIUM 4 - ASW -DENMARK 6 - 2 GP & 4 ASW -SPAIN 5 F 100 AD > 2009FRANCE 17 FREMM 8 ASW, 9 DS > 2008GREECE 4 - - -ITALY 10 FREMM 4 ASW, 6 GP > 2008NETHERLANDS 4 Q ASW + ATBM > 2010PORTUGAL 3 - 2 AD, 1 ASW -UNITED KINGDOM 20 FSC DS > 2013SWEDEN 2 - - -TURKEY 4 FS 2000 AD -

TOTAL = 87

4

The world has changed...

80 per cent of the

world’s industries

are located within

100 nautical miles

of a coast

The new vocation of European navies is to shiftfrom the Cold War scheme of fighting in openseas to “green water operations” and, in particu-lar, air-land operations. For the world’s majornavies, this involves shifting from preparation ofengagements in the high seas to a littoral warfa-re environment.

In a changing world with rapidly evolving threats,the best starting point for “attacking land,” appearsto be the sea and its international waters, whichcover three quarters of the earth. It should benoted that 75 per cent of the world’s populationlives less than 300 nautic miles from the coastand 80 per cent of the world’s industries are loca-ted within 180 km of a shore.

Naval platforms have the advantage of offeringmobile launching pads, less vulnerable to airattacks than land bases and not burdened bydiplomatic complications such as overflight and

access authorisations. Combat ships are both avaluable means of gathering information for situa-tion analysis (radar monitoring, COMINT...) and aneffective means of command offering the possibilityof immediate action with onboard armaments.Naval platforms can be pre-stationed in high riskzones or be quickly deployed, with the benefit ofconsiderable flexibility and strong political andmilitary significance. The Afghan and the Gulfexperiences underline the need for naval forcescapable of carrying out long-term operations any-where in the world on short notice, since today acrisis can very quickly escalate into a conflict thatis costly both in resources and in human terms.

The redirecting of naval missions to coastal wateroperations entails a change in the type of threatsthey may face. Although different from threatsfaced on the open sea these new threats arenonetheless dangerous. Finally, engagement inland attack actions requires embarked capabilities.

The USS Stark, severely damaged by an Iraqi Exocet. This demonstrates the need for escort ships to be equipped with protection against all kinds of air threats. (AFP)

A new role One of the consequences of the end of the Cold War is the appearance throughout the world ofendemic crises, which call for close monitoring before they turn into armed conflicts.

5

This redefinition of naval missions towards forceprojection operations affects the size of combatfleets.

The diversification of missions such as long-termembargo or surveillance missions, pre-positio-ning in high-risk zones, relief units... requireshaving a significant number of ships.

This implies halting “structural disarmament,” aphenomenon due to the exponential increase incosts which, in Western countries, made it impos-sible during the Cold War to replace entire arse-nals of weapons with newer versions, consideringthe higher costs of successive generations ofequipment. Today, navies must find a way toreplace the older generation equipment with thesame number of newer ships, without having todramatically increase their budgets.

Moreover, the only reasonable answer to the unpre-dictability of threats lies in the acquisition of meansoffering the most versatility and modularity pos-sible. The flexibility and the adaptability of ships

Almost all cooperation projects undertaken to developcompletely identical ships fitted with the same systemshave failed (notably NATO’s NFR 90 frigate and thetripartite Horizon project) due to the difficulty of rea-ching an agreement between the various industrialsinvolved regarding their differing operational needs. Onthe other hand, cooperation projects based on thedefinition of a standard “propelled hull” built in eachcountry have been successful, with each participantchoosing its own systems and equipment. Examplesof these are the tripartite mine hunter programme(France, Belgium and the Netherlands) and theGerman-Dutch frigate programme.

Consideration must also be given to the method usedin designing ships. Upstream integration, i.e. the defi-nition of ships, as well as operating, maintenance,repair and modernisation constraints, represent vastopportunities for possible savings over the life of the

vessels. However this presupposes a concerted poli-cy allowing the navy to jointly redefine the plannedlifespan, midlife updates and the number of times avessel must undergo modernisation to determine theinitial military capabilities necessary and plan thoserequired over time.

Similarly, the development and ownership costs fornew weapon systems are so high that it is muchmore favourable to have a maximum of multi-pur-pose systems, declined in joint-forces and Europeanvariations. The British, French and Italian navieshave clearly paved the way with SAAM and PAAMSnaval systems of the Aster family of systems. Thesehave been jointly developed by three Europeannations and have the possibility of declining the ScalpEG/Storm Shadow into a family of air-to-ground missiles, already in service in the three air forces,which have a naval land attack missile version.

The damaged hull of the USSCole, in Aden. This terrorist

attack illustratesthe need to

reinforce securitymeasures for

ships in high riskseaports.

(AFP)

The cargo liner Winner,transporting drugs, is apprehended by

a French navy aviso.This success, thanks

to internationalcooperation,

illustrates a new rolefor the French navy.

(AFP)

A quantitative and qualitative problem

General remarks on frigate development

according to need must enable them to meetrequirements that differ from one conflict to ano-ther. Their multi-purpose aspect also permitsregular adaptation to evolving threats throughoutthe ships’ lifespans. But how do you build moreships with increasingly powerful and versatileweapon systems with limited budgets? This is achallenge faced by all European navies.

6

Regarding surface combat, the U.S. navy todayplans to build its future around three new classesof ships: CG(X), DD(X) and LCS. Future classcruisers CG(X) or CG21 will ensure the replace-ment of the current Ticonderoga-class Aegis crui-sers, i.e. both for area air defence and anti-ballisticmissile theatre defence. Regarding the DD(X) ofthe Zumwalt class, they will ensure land attackmissions (against coastal areas), now consideredessential. Finally, the LCS, will handle battles in lit-toral zones. The current schedule gives a priorityto the DD(X) programme. This programme willprovide a 12,000-tonne multi-mission ship prima-rily developed for blue- to green-water operations(the vessel’s weight is 25 per cent less than theinitial DD21 project abandoned few months ago).The ship also features electric propulsion (podsare inside the hull) with a speed of 30 knots.Fitted with an integrated underwater warfare sys-tem, DD(X) will be capable of receiving an AGS(Advanced Gun System) of 1,200 shells for thesupport of land troops, as well as some 128 ver-tical cruise missile launching cells. These tubeswill be scattered around the hull in order to redu-ce the degree of destruction in case the ship is hit.In addition, the hull will be designed to stronglyreduce EM and IR signatures. The DD(X) will be simultaneously capable of car-rying on its quarterdeck two helicopters or drones.The studies and development phase has beenunderway since 29 April, under the responsibilityof Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, assistedby Raytheon. However, the contract provides thatBath Iron Works, the competitor which lost theinvitation to tender, will participate as a majorsubcontractor. This choice was made in order tomaintain a competition for the attribution of the

next phases of construction. For now, theconstruction of a first section of eight DD(X) isplanned by 2005. The first will be delivered by2009 and brought into service in 2011. The currentstudies refer to a total series of 32 ships. By 2014, about 30 CG(X) are expected to beordered. Thus, the U.S. acquisition is expected toinvolve almost 70 ships between 2005 and 2025.

The third unit of the “family,” the Littoral CombatShip (LCS), is expected to be ordered in the longer run, with the acquisition of 30 to 60 units.The similarities among the LCS and the Europeancorvettes of the Visby and Skjold classes areobvious. Last summer these ships took part, alongwith the American catamaran HSV-X1 andLockheed Martin’s Sea Slice, in experiments organised on the behalf of the U.S. navy nearSan Diego. The LCS, according to the U.S. navy’s wishes,should be a fast combat ship (between 50 and 60 knots in order to improve its survivability and toreduce its transfer times to the theatre of opera-tions) weighing between 1,500 and 4,000 tonnes.Stealthy, highly automated and of small dimensions,it is designed to handle operations close to shore,which are risky for heavier ships. Among the mis-sions planned for the LCS, American admirals havementioned the war against mines in shallow water(remotely-piloted machines), surveillance/recon-naissance (underwater drones) and the fight againstsmall vessels carrying out offensive actions usingrapid fire gun radar-guided Phalanx. The LCS will constitute the advanced units of the C4ISR information and command network of a land attacknaval force or even of a joint-theatre command.

For now, a prototypeis scheduled to be ma-nufactured by 2005.The LCS programme,like the JSF, is a sortof Trojan horse, attrac-ting various Europeaninvestments. With therisk of seeing the U.S.resolve European diver-gences regarding theLCS concept, thus killingother programmes.

It is via stealth,

land attack operation

and the integration of

all of its ships in

a real time

communications

network benefiting

all that the U.S. navy

hopes to maintain its

operational advantage

over all potential

enemies

The futureCG(X), DD(X)

and LCS of theU.S. navy.

This illustrationshows the

technologicalleap that will be

made by the U.S.with this newclass of ship.

Opposing conceptions

Three different classes of ships for the U.S. navy

7

The trend towards greater ship tonnages has beco-me generalised alongside the move towards leng-thening vessels, in particular to allow ships to beequipped with a hangar as well as a bridge forhelicopters. This explains why future 12,000-tonneU.S. DD(X) destroyers are classified in the crui-ser category. Regarding the 7,000-tonne Horizon fri-gates, they are, according to NATO standards,considered destroyers, similar to former light crui-sers. Although an increase in a ship’s weight—which affects the organisation of the internalvolume—comes at a higher cost, it is compensatedby easier repairs and subsequent modernisation.

The second important trend lies in the new platformdesign (FREMM, DD(X), K-130, F-125…) with newdeep strike capabilities. Within this framework, thechallenge for naval armament is to combine defen-sive systems designated to establish a “protectionsphere” against enemy weapons capable of rea-ching the ships, and offensive systems capable oftaking part in ground operations, based on navalartillery, ground attack missiles, UAV monitoring…in addition to aircraft carrier capabilities. The conceptof use of future frigates, cornerstones of the navy,can be declined over a broad spectrum going fromthe use of a single ship to a complete air and seaforce deployment. In addition, France and the U.K.have the additional task of supporting StrategicsSSBN (FOST) missions. To meet the needs ofthese different scenarios, several kinds of res-ponses are necessary.

The first solution is to come up with severalclasses of ships adapted to each scenario.However, this choice does not allow any largescale production benefits and presents difficultiesin sizing each class.

On the other hand, it is possible to design onlyone class of general-purpose ship, by equippingthem with all the weapons systems they need to fulfil any kind of mission during a single ope-ration. This solution leads to ships greater than 10,000-tonnes, such as the American DD(X), which far exceeds European budgets.

The option of smaller ships, with the same hulland combat system, and which can be reconfiguredthanks to specific mission “kits” according to differentscenarios is feasible. Although interesting, thisoption entails many difficulties in terms of advanceplanning required according to the time neededfor reconfiguration time as well as the storage andmaintenance of unused capabilities…

The solution chosen by France and Italy with theFREMM is the result of the balance between stan-dardisation and specialisation, with the design of asingle class of ship of the 5,000-tonne class, basedon the same hull and having as many commonelements as possible regarding the combat system,and declined in only two versions: “Anti-Submarine-Warfare” (ASW) on one hand, and “Deep Strike”(DS), or “General Purpose” (GP), to use the Italianterm, on the other. The clear intention, in particularfor the French navy, is to benefit from a rapid deve-lopment of major series, and to move away from thecostly mistakes made with ships of former classes,built in small series that were more or less suc-cessful, prototypes, or series that were reduced toonly two ships.

This new concept of industrialisation in series willallow, regarding French-Italian cooperation, theconstruction of 27 units, including 17 FrenchFREMMs (eight ASW and nine DS) and 10 ItalianFREMMs (eight ASW and six GP), to replace fiveclasses of ships: two F-67s, six F-70s and nine A-69s in France, two Lupos and eight Maestrales in Italy. It is logical to think for the FREMM design,that maximum use will be made of development studies already carried out on the ambitious Horizonprogramme, from its origins as a British-French-Italian programme —before the Royal Navy decidedto develop its Type 45 destroyer.

In the same way, for the post-2015 British FutureSurface Combatant (FSC) programme, studiesalso plan to take advantage of developments onthe Type 45 destroyer, itself inspired from Horizonstudies, and decline around a “common core” ashortened general purpose version with ASWspecialisation, and a lengthened land attack version with additional vertical launchers, alarge–calibre gun as well as more space toembark helicopters and UAVs.

The requirement for modularity in Europe

A FrenchLafayette frigate.

Its radar signature is

equivalent to thatof a trawler.

(Marine nationale)

European navies : cloning or organ bank ?

The Horizon frigate programme, which began with three countries, has been declined in aFranco-Italian version and a British version. It reveals thepitfalls of cooperation in developing similar ships. (DCN)

8

European navies, faced with reality, appear todaymore open to the idea of acquiring ships and weapons systems within the framework ofinternational cooperation. With programmes such as Horizon or the future FMM, thisis now a reality. Nevertheless, multilateral cooperation presents certain challenges.

Challenge of cooperation

Within the context

of a multinational

naval action,

having ships of

the same class,

as opposed to

having to align

diverse forces,

is obviously

a major operational

advantage

The advantages of European cooperation in thedevelopment of combat ships are obvious andwell known (major differences with regards tomissions and technological choices makes aEuropean-American cooperation in this field high-ly unlikely) . In fact, conceiving of and building withseveral partners a single class of ships allows thesharing of both complementary skills and thefinancing of development costs. It also allowspartners to benefit from economies of scale due tolarger series. Beyond that, one could even ima-gine, for future programmes, decreases in ope-rating costs made possible by common training ofcrews and support personnel. Finally, within thecontext of a multinational naval action, havingships from the same class, rather than havingto align diversified forces, is obviously a majoroperational advantage. However, even if coope-ration is likely easier in the naval field than inother areas, it is often risky, especially in terms ofschedule differences. The potential partners mighthave different schedule priorities, either for bud-getary reasons or for reasons to do with a ship’slifespan, For example, the British FSC programmelags the FMM programme by seven to eightyears. In addition, on-board life is frequently dif-ferent from one navy to another as a result of cen-turies-old traditions, especially in Europe. Anotherfactor is the availability or not of conscriptresources. While the Italian navy would like tohave a crew of 130 men for its futuremulti-mission frigates

(FMM), its French partner, whose humanresources have become rare since conscriptionwas abandoned, wants only 90 men in its crew.Furthermore, for the same class of ships, themissions and concepts of use can vary signifi-cantly from one navy to another. Taking the FMMas an example, the Italian navy aims to use it inthe Adriatic Sea while the French navy plans touse it in seas and oceans worldwide. This is notwithout consequence on the end product. The Italian navy would prefer from the start astrongly armed ship whereas the French, to gua-rantee the acquisition of the number of requestedvessels, would be satisfied with reduced wea-pon systems, with allowances for upgrades(volumes, wiring, etc), to be fitted with new sys-tems later on during a mid-life modernisationoperation. Obviously, these differences in approa-ch are not without impact. They influence thedesign of the ship’s interior and the volumes assi-gned to each function. This obliges the partners toreach a more or less satisfactory compromise...!Nevertheless, these differences in approach existand weigh heavily on the success or failure ofpotential cooperation projects. This explains, forinstance, the British withdrawal from the Horizonprogramme or the incompatibility of Franco-ItalianFMM and British FSC programmes. In this case,the incompatibility was both in terms of scheduleas well as capabilities: the British consider, forexample, naval support for land operations to aninland distance of 180 km instead of 100 km bythe French. Finally, even when cooperation issuccessful, such as the Franco-ItalianHorizon/Orizonte programme, the implementa-tion of common state and industrial structures(which does not facilitate a simplification, andobviously increases the costs) and learninghow to work together despite different

methods and industrial traditions still remain.The challenge for this specific program-

me appears likely to be won.French and Italian

9

anti-aircraft frigates will be very similar.Nevertheless, in the longer term, it could end upbeing more judicious to take into greater accountthe concept of modular cooperation, i.e. structuredaround certain systems or major subsystemswithout resulting in identical ships in terms ofhulls, interior installations and capabilities. This is,for example, the case of the PAAMS anti-aircraftsystem, core of the Horizon/Orizzonte frigates butalso of the future British Type 45, in spite of theirsignificant differences regarding the hull, instal-lations, capabilities and missions. It is also the

route chosen by Berlin, Madrid and The Hague,for their new anti-aircraft frigates (4 LCF for theNetherlands, 3 F-124 for Germany and 4 F-100for Spain). Having a common “bank” of systemsand equipment in which each could pick andchoose what they need to build a ship best suitedto its national needs, offers interesting prospectsfor the future. The respect of traditions and needsof each partner would thus be ensured whileguaranteeing the division of development costs formany systems and the undeniable benefits ofseries production.

Electric propulsion, which has only recentlyappeared in the naval military field (it originatedin the civil sector with large cruise liners at the endof the 1980s), breaks away from the traditionalarchitectural design of combat ships. Electric pro-pulsion allows the mechanical division of theenergy generation and propulsion functions, andthus the removal of the long shaft, which takes upa lot of space and is noisy. While energy gene-ration (thermal engine) remains in the centre ofthe hull, the “steering” function can be integratedwith external moving pods fixed to the hull whichinclude the electric engine as well as the propel-ler. Consequently, naval architects can moreeasily organise the hull’s inside volume. Moreover,energy efficiency appears much better. For the

same quantity of fuel, electric propulsion allows ahigher autonomy compared with traditional pro-pulsion. Other advantages: improved securityand a reduction in the size of the crew. Naturally,this technology transfer was first fitted on amphi-bious ships (Dutch LPD Rotterdam-class, BritishALSL Albion-class and American LHD), whichhave an architecture similar to civil steamers.France will adopt electric propulsion for the firsttime on the BPC (batiment de projection et decommandement) Mistral and Tonnerre, whichwill enter in service in 2005 and 2006 respectively.Requiring no particular reinforcement in terms ofsound proofing or shock resistance, civilian podsneed to be adapted only slightly. However milita-ry forces are currently studying the adaptation

Fortunately,

the trend towards

an increase in

tonnage offers a

better adaptation,

making it easier

to satisfy the

contradictory needs

of navy partners

Electric Propulsion: Following the path of the civil sector

French and Italian cooperation on the same ship programme will allow a 27- ship class of frigate. (DCN)

10

Challengeof cooperation

France

will adopt

electric

propulsion

for the

first time

on the PBC (LHD)

Mistral and

Tonnerre

A Royal Navy Type 45 AAW destroyer (DR)

of this sort of propulsion for combat ships. Hence,the future British Type 45 Daring-class navy des-troyers will be equipped with it (Alstom engineproviding 20 MW). In France, it could equip-ped on the FREMM. However, this kindof pod raises several problems. Thefirst one concerns the pod’s mass. Onthe FREMM frigate, in order to reach aspeed of 30 knots, the pod must provi-de 20 MW and weigh 250 tonnes.Hence the ratio between the pod’s massand the ship’s speed is very different

between a LPD and a frigate. In addition, poddesign must be well adapted to the hull, and the

pod needs to have good shock resistance. Inother words, while electric propulsion

undoubtedly offers many advantagesand constitutes a true technologicalbreakthrough that military naval archi-tecture must take into consideration,the specific use of warships preventsthe simple transposition of civil pods tofrigates. Significant adaptation workmust first be realised.

Illustration showing the rear view of a multi-mission frigate.An electric propulsion pod would have an impact on the hull design.(DCN)

The Dutch navy’sDe ZevenProvincienfrigate. Whereasthis class was initially a joint programme with Germany, in the end, cooperation dealtonly with common systems.

11

The French navy often encounters difficulties in theproduction of complete series because of poorfinancial estimates regarding the true manufactu-ring costs or because of budgetary cuts arisingduring the course of the programme. A review ofescort ship classes launched during the last 30 years is very revealing. The only series com-pleted is the A-69 with 17 vessels. Proof of thisrecurring difficulty is the fact that the last class ofLa Fayette frigates was reduced to five ships ins-tead of six as initially planned.

The impoverishment of a class of ships, in terms ofequipment, due to budgetary reasons, is the otherdanger faced by the major frigate programmes.The case of the La Fayette frigates is a particularlygood example. Whereas the Saudi La Fayettesare equipped with Aster missiles and vertical launchers, French ships do not have even one. Even if the plan is to fit this combat system atmid-life, the high cost of such a modernisation islikely to push it aside.

The French navy is not the only one to sufferfrom this phenomenon. During the Falklands war,the Royal Navy stressed that budgetary cuts expe-rienced over several years had reduced the defen-sive capabilities of its ships. The Sheffield class(Type 42) thus saw its tonnage go from 3,500 tonnesto 3,880 tonnes in order to be able to offer a betterstability but also to embark and store more Sea Dartmissiles.

Today, 50 per cent of the overall cost of a ship liesin its operations: the cost of manpower is highfor modern navies. The French navy has alreadymade significant efforts in this field, having fewermen aboard its preceding generation ships thanRoyal Navy vessels of the same tonnage. Thetype 42 had a crew of 280 men, against 230 forthe F-70. This effort was reinforced for the nextgeneration of ships: the Horizon, which will weigh5,500 tonnes, will have only 190 men aboard,whereas equivalent ships, such as Tourville, hada crew of nearly 300.

The other lesson lies in the need to quickly com-plete the ship series in order to minimise produc-tion costs and to ensure a maximum of commu-nality. A closer look at the F-70 class (seven unitsbrought into service between 1979 and 1990)shows that due to a long production time (morethan 10 years), even the major systems fitted onthese vessels are different. Taking the radar as anexample, George Leygues, as well as the threeships which followed it, are equipped with a DRBV26 A, whereas the next three in the series, startingwith the Primauguet, are equipped with a DRBC33 A. It is possible to save nearly 5 per cent on theoverall manufacturing price if the 17 FMM arebuilt over ten years. In addition, DCN, the Frenchshipbuilder, and its partners, associated in the definition of this programme study, are currently preparing proposals for the staffs on this subject. The defence allocation plan over 2003-2008 provides for the delivery of these fri-gates from 2008 until 2017. DCN’s capability toproduce between three and four ships per year ishowever limited by budgetary constraints.

Today, 50 per cent

of the overall cost

of a ship lies in

its operations.

The cost of

manpower is high

for modern navies

The truth about prices!

The Sheffield destroyer, hit in a deadly strike by an Exocet missile duringthe Falklands war in May 1982. The British navy issued a statementsaying that budgetary cuts on this programme had a detrimental effecton the Type 42’s self defence capabilities. (AFP)

Budgetary issues are atthe heart of the majornavies’ concerns. Once the expression of need has been made, the budgetary aspect remains the most determining factor in the development of a combat ship. This will certainly be the case for multi-mission frigates.

Financing a ship

The French Motte-Piquet

frigate returning toToulon from the

Herakles mission,at the beginning of

July 2002. Built over a

15-year period,production of theF-70 did not allow

cost reduction.(DR)

12

Combat systems

represent

50 per cent of

a ship’s total

manufacturing

costs

Cassard, an air defence frigate,on its way back to Toulon

from the Herakles mission in July 2002.

The non-revalorization of the U.S. SM1MR missile,

will considerably reduce the life span of this class.

(DR)

The French navy has also chosen to improve themanagement of its ships in terms of revalorization.Previously, the ships underwent a complete refit oftheir equipment at mid-life. This is very expensive,though, particularly considering the regular upgra-ding of data processing, which resulted in entireparts of the combat system architecture beingcompletely transformed. Combat systems repre-sent 50 per cent of the total manufacturing costsof a ship, which gives a fairly accurate idea of the mid-life revalorization costs. A visit to thecommand centre of a Tourville frigate class, andthen a La Fayette, is enough to realise the impactof the revolution in telecommunications and dataprocessing. As a result of this rapid progress,some ships cannot be updated sufficiently to meetthe new standards, the obsolescence of a systemcondemning the entire platform. This is notably thecase of the two anti-aircraft Cassard-class fri-gates, whose SM1 MR surface-to-air system will

not be modernised, following an American deci-sion. As a result, since they cannot be adequate-ly upgraded, the ships will end up being quicklywithdrawn from service, even though they onlyhave about twenty years of service in the navy.Thus, because it was not planned during theconstruction phase, it is economically impossibleto fit a PAAMS system with the A50 vertical laun-cher due to lack of space. This example illus-trates the need to provide for modularity in theships during their development. This is the onlyway to manage technologies which have muchfaster improvement cycles. Whereas the hullsand the propulsion system are generally opera-tional over more than 30 years, the combat sys-tem’s elements must be changed every ten yearsin order to remain interoperable with other navies.The only solution, inspired from the British modelof "incremental approach", is to provide at thebeginning of the ship’s development, for conti-

Financinga ship

13

nuous innovations and to take care in choosingsystems and not effectively rule out too manyfuture options so as to be able to adapt new solu-tions. This approach presupposes the integra-tion, from the very beginning of the project, ofmajor equipment suppliers in industrial studies. Renault’s technical centre in Guyancourtis a reference regarding the dialogue between asystem architect and its suppliers. This model isundoubtedly serving as inspiration for the partnersof the multi-mission frigates definition study: several workshops have been set up betweenArmaris, which brings together Thales and DCN,and the Orrizzonte joint venture, regroupingFinmeccanica and Fincantieri. The Paris work-shop is in charge of managing the project, whilethat of Lorient is elaborating the design.Concerning the Italian part of the project, Genoais working on the platform while Rome is dealing with the combat systems.

The Maestrale Frigate is a good example of the Italian

navy’s difficulties. The Lupo-class had

to be completely revised before it could be fitted with

more efficient equipment.(AMS)

Upgrading

Logistic support

ExploitationDevelopment

Design

Contactorship and development

53%

29%

3%

1%

5%9%

Overall cost of ownership (in %)

14

The setting-up of an efficient data exchange network among the various sensors of an air and sea force increases the operational effectiveness of the force.However, with the current development of land attack missions, as well as the direct fire support of land forces, more and more Western navies will express the need to integrate a landcomponent in their tactical situation’s real time presentation. It is an objective still far frombeing achieved.

C4ISR’s interoperability challengeThe operational effectiveness of a combat shiplargely relies on the crew’s awareness of the tac-tical situation in which it finds itself. A self-evident

truth worth recalling. However, this awarenessis obviously restricted by the performance of theship’s embarked sensors as well as by the earth’sroundness, and, —in particular within the frame-work of littoral operations—by the “masks” thatislands and coasts can constitute. Admittedly,for about 30 years, Link 11 allowed Westernships to jointly operate and exchange tacticaldata. But Link 11 (HF and UHF) suffers from vul-nerability to jamming, reduced flow, positioningerrors of the detected studs generated as well asthe lack of capability allowing the setting up of areal time network opened to a large number ofplayers. This is why Link 16 or JTIDS are currentlybeing considered within NATO. Less vulnerable tojamming, this UHF data’s automatic transmis-sion appears definitely more precise and, in par-ticular, allows a more significant number of playersto operate in a common network. Equipped withsuch a system, ships and aircraft are capable ofcommunicating the data collected by their sensorsto the network while at the same time benefitingfrom information coming from other players.

The embarked data processing and fusion system —SENIT on the French ships, CEC onAmerican ships and several British ships—allowsthe on-board operations room —OR— to show atactical situation opened to the entire zone cove-red by air and sea forces. In addition, target loca-tions, thanks to the reshuffling of detection datacoming from various distributed sensors, offermore precise configuration settings on ORscreens. The network is also less vulnerable tojamming effects. It is even possible to carry outinterceptions of air and sea targets from a platform(ship or aircraft) with sensors shut off so as toavoid detection. However, the platform’s OR hasall the necessary fire data provided in real time bythe various sensors of other network players.Although this concept does restrict the platform’sown independence, it gives the force commandera precise, real-time tactical vision, optimisingevery means of the force. Moreover, the com-mand of such a naval force could be carried outfrom a ground-based OR located thousands ofkilometres from the operations zone, connectedby a high-speed satellite connection—a morecomfortable and efficient OR, with more numerousstaff and equipment, far from any military risk.Moreover, this OR could be in the same loca-tion as the joint theatre HQ. Here lies one of themain future challenges. Although the current infor-mation processing systems offer an air and seatactical situation, it will be necessary, on the lon-ger run, within the framework of amphibious ope-rations or ground forces support, to integrate theair/land tactical situation on the coast and evenbeyond, on land. However, this integration pre-sents a danger: having a system overloaded bytoo much data. The same problem will be rai-sed with the digitalisation process underway in theland forces. In France, two BPCs—ships designedto allow an on-board joint HQ to ensure the forcecommand, even on land—, will soon enter in ser-vice, raising the question of the compatibility withthe army CIS systems (SICF, SIR and SIT), evenwith those of the air force (SCCOA). The major

The challenge of interoperability

Illustration showing theoperationalroom of a latestgeneration frigate. These largescreens arerevolutionarycompared withcurrent ones.(Thales)

15

CEC: Cooperative

Engagement

Capability,

the new embarked

data processing

system developed by

Lockheed Martin

challenge is to develop the connection betweenthese systems in order to enable them to com-municate. The same kind of connection will need tobe developed in order for a multinational navalforce to be able to reduce differences among thevarious information processing systems and thus towork in an optimised network. These challengesare still far from being completely overcome.

London and Washington agreedon the CEC network The Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy reached an agreement in July 2000 to use the sameCooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), the new embarked data processing systemdeveloped by Lockheed Martin. Considered by its architects as the most advanced sys-tem of its kind in the world, CEC, which integrates all the targets of an air and sea taskforce into a dense data exchange and processing network, allows a near real-timepresentation of an air and sea and air-surface tactical situation with a nearly perfect glo-bal-positioning correlation of detected targets. In other words, CEC would eliminate a well-known phenomenon: namely, that which results from the detection of the same target byvarious sensors, each one having a sufficient margin oferror in the positioning so that a traditional system ofdata processing shows an uncertainty with regards tothe actual numbers plotted. This can appear awkwardwhen the plotting board in question involves missiles orplanes... In addition, CEC offers the advantage ofbeing able to achieve tracking by amalgamating packetsof detection from various sensors, data which, consi-dered individually, would not justify the presentation ofa tracking path. In April 2002, the Pentagon gave itsgreen light for the integration of CEC on approximate-ly 250 ships, surveillance aircraft and testing bases. A CEC Block 2 is being studied in order to allow col-lected data regarding detection of ballistic missiles to beintegrated into the JCTN (joint communication theatrenetwork). Raytheon and Lockheed Martin are in com-petition to obtain the prime contractorship of Block 2. A decision is expected at the end of this year. The U.K. will fit CEC Block 1 on its Type 23 frigates by 2008, and on its Type 45 AAW destroyers four years later. The resultis that British and American ships will be able to integrate within an allied operational net-work, well adapted for littoral operations and ground forces support, as well as within anti-aircraft and antiballistic missions. In France, the DGA (French procurement agency) hasjust launched a study on a cooperative combat system.

Thales’s ARBB-36on a Cassard-classfrigate. Electronicwarfare plays anincreasingly important role innaval operations. (Thales)

Frigate Lafayette’sOR allows a reducedcrew compared with the precedinggeneration of ships.(Marine nationale)

16

The American Mk 41 launcher

Two approaches to vertical launching exist today.The first is to design vertical single-missile laun-ching modules to launch existing self-defenceanti-aircraft missiles by adapting them for verticalfiring. This formula was developed by Raytheon forthe Sea Sparrow (Mk 48 launcher), by MBDA forthe Sea Wolf and by IAI/Rafael for the Barak. Itrelies on a specific technique, wherein the conduitfor outflow is integrated into each container-laun-cher. This solution can be set up rapidly but doesnot allow much versatility.

The other approach is to develop a multi-missilelauncher that is both modular and evolutionary,and well adapted to the greatest possible numberof future missiles over the long term. Technicallybased on a hot launch, it has a conduit for gasesconsisting of, in the lower part, a receptacle forgases common to all container-launchers (called“plenum,”) and in the upper part, a centrally posi-tioned chimney in the vertical launching module.

Developed in 1977 by Lockheed Martin NavalElectronics and Surveillance Systems (NE&SS),the Mk 41 launcher is composed of eight cellmodules. The line includes three types of modules:

• A “Self-Defence” version, 5.2 metres tall, to launch Sea Sparrow or ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile) anti-aircraft self-defencemissiles,

With the Mk 41 launcher, the U.S. wasthe forerunner of this type of installation

• A “Tactical” version, 6.7 metres long, welladapted to the Standard medium-range surface-to-air missile SM-2 Block III and to the ASROCanti-submarine missile,

• The “Strike” version, 7.6 metres long, designed to launch the Tomahawk cruise missile,as well as preceding missiles.

The main customer is obviously the U.S. Navy,which in 1986 began to equip its AEGISTiconderoga class anti-aircraft cruise mis-siles, then its DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Commercially manu-factured for over 15 years, the Mk 41has become a reference in the field.According to Lockheed Martin, it is foundon nearly 160 ships in 16 differentclasses. Production in Baltimore has rea-ched a rate of 5 to 6 modules per month.

The Bundesmarine’sBrandenburg frigate. Launchedin 1994, this ship is fitted withMk 41 missile launchers,capable of firing 16 Sea Sparrow missiles.

Vertical launch systems (VLS) are increasinglypart of new programmes. Of equal tonnage,

they reinforce a frigate’s armament, help clear the bridges, improve stealth, flexibility and adaptation to the mission, thanks to an assortment of missiles fitted.

Vertical launchers

17

The Aster 15 and 30

missile programmes

allowed the

development of an

alternative to the

near-monopoly of the

American situation

The Aster 15 and 30 missile programmes allowedthe development of an alternative to the near-monopoly of the American situation, thanks tothe development by DCN of the Sylver VLS witheight missiles, very similar to the Mk 41. Since itsdevelopment, it has been provided in differentvariants.

The first variants, known as A 43 (for missiles upto 4.3 metres length), is dedicated to self-defenceof combat ships. Its development is closely rela-ted to MBDA’s Aster 15 missile, intended forclose anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence. It isthus part of the vast Franco-Italian cooperationsurrounding the SAAM surface-to-air anti-missilesystem. The Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier isequipped with four A 43 modules (each with eightmissiles). It embarked its first missiles on 1 December 2001 and carried out its first Aster 15operational firing from an A 43 launcher on30 October 2002, on its return from the Héraklèsmission in the Indian Ocean.

The A 43 launcher also equips the three F 3000 Sfrigates in the Sawari 2 programme, built by DCNfor the Royal Saudi Naval Forces at a rate oftwo modules per frigate (each with eight mis-siles). The second Italian aircraft carrier, AndreaDoria, will be equipped with four A 43 modules.

The new version of the Sylver A 50 is a lengthe-ned variant intended to fire missiles of 5 meters inlength or less. It offers a dual missile capacity withthe Aster 15 and Aster 30. Its development isrelated to the PAAMS programme (Principal Anti-Air Missile System), a trilateral project intended forthe Royal Navy’s Type 45 AAW destroyers andfor the Franco-Italian frigates Horizon and Orizzonte.

The A 50 thus marks the extension of Franco-Italian cooperation within the United Kingdom.

This launcher was selected for the PAAMS at theend of a competition between various launchers.Developed more recently than the Mk 41, theSylver benefits from a higher firing rate as well asa lighter weight per module.

The design of the Sylver A 50—currently an Aster15 and 30 twin-missile variant—, also takes intoconsideration the capability to fire different typesof missiles, such as the Naval Polyphem or thefuture Aster developments regarding the ATBM in Block 1 or Block 2 versions. The eight-missile A 50 launcher already equips frigates alreadyordered in the PAAMS programme. Upcomingorders will allow a faster rate of production.

The Sylver family will soon be upgraded with thenew A 70 launcher, capable of firing a 7-metrelong missile, while still being capable of laun-ching munitions of the A 43 and A 50 launchers.MBDA and DCN are currently studying the thirdmember of the Sylver family, notably intendedfor future FREMM frigates, capable of launchingnaval missiles such as Scalp Naval.

A50 launcher.Fitted on Horizon frigate, it will becapable of firing

Aster 15 and 30 missiles .

The Sylver family of launchers

DCN’s corvette. Vertical launchers can

even be adapted on ships of small tonnage.

A European alternative to the Mk 41

18

Implementing atotal protection in circles, with:

• in the first circle,the requirement forany combat shipbeing the capabilityfor self defenceagainst both missiles and aircraft

• in the secondcircle, “local areadefence”

• in the third circle,“naval area defence”

Although the Falklands war is slowly fading frommemory, its scenario is still relevant today. Eventhough the Argentinean air force suffered toughlosses, the Super Etendard, with air-to-sea Exocetmissiles, sank two major ships: the AAW des-troyer HMS Sheffield, and the Atlantic Conveyor,a container ship transformed into an aircraft car-rier, which went down with almost all the U.K.’sheavy transport helicopters. A preventive attackcannot guarantee the destruction of the entireenemy fleet either. Fired by some “courageouscaptains” or coastal batteries, as the Falklandsalso revealed with the surprise attack of the HMSGlamorgan, anti-ship missiles represent a dan-gerous residual threat.

Lessons from the Falklands showed the pres-sing need to beef up anti-missile defences, byimplementing a total protection in circles, with, inthe first circle, the requirement for any combatship being the capability for self defence againstboth missiles and aircraft, either in isolated ope-ration (crisis prevention mission or active mis-sions) or within a group of vessels.

In the second circle, every frigate should havethe capability to ensure the anti-missile defence of

unarmed ships located nearby (which was thecase of the Atlantic Conveyor) according to theconcept known as “local area defence.” Finally, inthe third circle, the “naval area defence,” a mission

entrusted to AAW frigates, the capability to coverthe entire fleet within a medium- long-range mustabsolutely be renewed.

Technically starting from a “clean slate,” the deve-lopment of the Aster missile family, a tri-nationalprogramme involving France, Italy and the UnitedKingdom, allows a conceptual and technologicalleap. Aster-based systems are optimised in theirdesign to intercept all kind of missiles and aredesigned to destroy them by direct impact (“Hit-to-Kill”) to ensure destruction of their warheads. In addition, they can engage all types of aircraft.

With the SAAM “surface-to-air anti-missile” sys-tem, based on the Naval Aster 15, the traditionalSHORAD mission, called “point defence” (PointDefence Missile System, or PDMS), is having itsrange extended up to 30 km (i.e. two or threetimes the maximum range of preceding systems)and widened by the possibility, for the first timeever, of protecting neighbouring ships againstlow-level anti-ship missiles in a 7-km circle aroundthe launching ship.

The SAAM system has been ensuring the pro-tection of the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier

since December 2001. It will alsoequip the second Italian aircraft carrier, Andrea Doria by 2008. Itsinstallation is underway on three F-1300S Sawari 2 frigates of theSaudi naval forces, Al Riyadh,Makkah et Al Dammal.

The Franco-Italian FREMM shouldreceive an Aster 15 missile system.The dangers of littoral warfare(coastal batteries of Chinese anti-ship missiles in the Persian Gulf,for instance) make “local area defen-ce” missions imperative as they arethe only ones capable of protectingcommercial vessel convoys or lan-ding ships in the closed waters of aGulf.

With the “Principal Anti-Air MissileSystem” (PAAMS), based on the

Aster 15 and 30 missiles, the former medium-range defence (“Medium Range-Surface-to-AirMissile,” or MR-SAM) mission is strengthenedby a multi-layered defence, ensuring defence by

Anti-aircraft defence

The Saudi navy’s Al Riyadhfrigate. This ship is the first

non-European vessel equippedwith an Aster system.

Controling access to theatre operations

19

integrating Naval Aster 15’s additional capabilitiesfor “self-defence” and “local area defence” andthose of the Naval Aster 30 (navalisation of theground version of the Aster 30) for a “naval areadefence” exceeding 120 km range with a ceiling of 20 km.

PAAMS has been adopted by air defence ships ofthe British, French and Italian navies. A PAAMS(S) version with Sampson radar, will be fitted onthe Royal Navy’s 12 Type 45 Daring Class destroyers. A PAAMS (E) version with theEMPAR radar will equip the AAW horizon/Orizzonte frigates.

The French and Italian navies share the samevision of a frigate version specialised in ASW. Theirmain mission will be the protection of an air and seagroup against the threat of the nuclear attack sub-marines (SSN) or even modern diesel propulsionsubmarines (SSK), the main threat today.

The problems of ASW action have changed a lotsince the Cold War. Submarine threats havedecreased without totally disappearing in openseas. On the other hand, today the prolifera-tion of modern and silent SSKs are a majorthreat: there are approximately 350 SSKs in 40 navies. The innovation lies in the fact that agrowing number of countries are willing to acqui-re SSKs, in particular among those wishing “tocontrol” a maritime area, such as a strait. Themost frequently exported models are those ofRussia (Kilo class) and Germany (209 or 1700family). New technologies (anaerobic propul-sion AIP, acoustic and stealth radar) make theirdetection more difficult. Shallow coastal watersare acoustically difficult for passive means ofdetection, mainly due to significant interference.Regarding active means, the propagation ofwaves varies from one place to another, depen-ding on the coastal environment: currents, varia-tions in temperature and salinity, interference,sea-bed reverberation…

ASW detection either in open seas or coastalwaters, requires specific equipment in order to

meet SNA and SSK threats. Since the mid-1990s, low frequency active sonar (LF), whichare under development, appear particularlyadapted to shallow waters. Their energy benefitsfrom better propagation than high frequency(HF), offering better remote echoes. However,the definition, which allows the classification ofecho, is better with HF and fake echoes with LFare more frequent. The perfect combinationappears to be a passive sonar for panoramicmonitoring and an active sonar for classifying thedetected subject.

All French-Italian frigates are expected to befitted with a hull-sonar, the ASW specific equip-ment being a towed LF sonar. ASW armamentresults from long-standing cooperation betweenFrance and Italy. The light MU 90 Impact torpe-do, which will equip embarked NH 90 helicop-ters, was developed by the two countries withinthe Eurotorp JV. The MILAS torpedo carryingmissile is derived from the Otomat French-Italiansea-to-sea missile, whose warhead and anti-ship homing head have been replaced by a MU90 (or Mk 46 Mod 5). This weapon system pro-duced by MBDA can strike from up to 30 nauti-cal miles (55 km) at Mach 0.89, with a very fastreaction time, while allowing the surface shipto remain out of the range of torpedoes fromthe enemy submarine, offering protection anddissuasion.

Illustration showing a Type 45 destroyer launching its Aster missiles. Cooperation with

the British on the PAAMS system offers many further possibilities

for cooperation in this sector.

Anti-submarine action confronted with a renewed threat

20

A new dimension at the core of frigate programmes is land attack operations. The coastal operation is divided betweennaval support fire, where naval artillery and tactical missiles play a role, and

deep strikes with cruise missiles.

Land attack operations

A renewed interest in artillery systems

Effect of Bonusshell on armouredunits. The interest in having a 155-mmcalibre is the possibility to usethe wide variety of existing ammunitions.

The first conceptualdebate relates to themaximum range of“naval fire support,”as the Royal Navycalls it. The figures

put forth run from 100 kilo-metres to 100 nautical miles

(180 km). On a technical level, naval fire support in these littoral missions is twofold: naval artillery, for heavy saturating fires with future guided shells with a lengthened range and the new sea-to-ground missiles, for specific surgical strikes.

The existing calibres are characterised by theirmodest range (27 km for the 127-mm) in hori-zontal direct shooting but have a rapid firing rate(45 fires/minute for the 127-mm), as they aremainly descendants of the anti-aircraft artillerywhich equipped older ships.

The current debates relate to range, precisionand killing potential in order to optimise the currentnaval artillery for a role in littoral fire support.The U.S. Navy has adopted the most ambitiouspath with the Advanced Gun System (AGS). The 155-mm (AGS) is a unit which weighs nearly300 tonnes—turret and 750-round magazineincluded. Each DD(X) will be capable of embar-king two AGSs! With regular ammunition, theAGS will be able to strike from 40 km. By 2012,the development of the Long-Range Land AttackProjectile (LRLAP) should be able to reach 180 km,featuring rocket propulsion and a GPS guidancesystem. However, the AGS will not find its placeon ships other than 10,000-tonne DD(X)s.

This explains why a new version of the Mk45127-mm turret, known as Mod4, is also underdevelopment. Italy is the other large supplier of127-mm turrets with OtoMelara, which is develo-ping a new 127/64 LW with lengthened andstrengthened tube for the 10 Italian FREMM fri-gates. Two new types of ammunition are underdevelopment: an unguided one with a 70-kmrange, plus a sub-calibre GPS guided ammunitionwith 120-km range, called Vulcano. The latter isthe product of a cooperation with the Netherlands.In addition, while Giat Industries has undertakena feasibility study for a naval version of its 155/52 mm-gun and is working on a GPS-guidedammunition called Pelican, BAe Systems is studying a naval version of the Braveheart AS90self-propelled 155/52-mm gun for fitting aboardDaring class (Type 45) destroyers. The 155-mmcalibre, however, appears difficult to implement onEuropean ships, mainly due to size. Hence, thereis little chance of a 155-mm gun being fitted onthe FREMM.

This renewal of naval artillery raises many techni-cal questions, such as the overheating of chambersdue to the more powerful energy powders used ortube wear caused by sub-calibre sabot ammunition.Moreover, even with an inertial/GPS guidance,the best CEP (Circular Error Probability) offered forthe next decade is about 20 m at 120 km, whichmakes it necessary to use fragmentation shellsfitted with sub ammunitions. The need for long-range precision (a CEP of 700 metres at 120 kmfor a 127-mm calibre shell is too imprecise to beefficient) has a strong impact on the system andammunitions. Upgrading the 127-mm gun to thenew standard seems more appropriate, consideringthe high number of turrets and classic shells alrea-dy in service to engage targets of lesser interest.

Tactical naval fire supportin littoral warfare

21

The immediate suppression of an enemy’s meansof command is a powerful way to paralyse anenemy force and to change the local forces ratio.In this respect it appears particularly necessary tobe able to engage widely differing targets with asingle weapon .

To meet these operational requirements,Germany, France and Italy are jointly elabora-ting a project concerning a fibre-optic missile sys-tem called Polyphem, intended for both navaland ground missions.

Polyphem’s ability to strike a target from a dis-tance of 60 km largely exceeds the capabilities ofcurrent naval artillery (27 km for a 127-mm gun).The decimetre precision is obtained thanks tonavigation by hybridisation of both the inertialand GPS guidance. The operator at the groundstation receives infrared images made by a came-ra in the tip of the missile via the optical fibrelocated behind the missile. Its purpose is to moni-tor the engagement phase as well as to validatetarget identification before impact in order toconfirm or modify the target. Contrary to what iscommonly thought, the operator does not controlthe missile—its flight is completely automatic.Finally, the warhead can be adapted dependingon the “selected target.” This extreme precisionallows the size of the warhead to be reduced,while guaranteeing its efficiency for a wide rangeof targets, thanks to its multiple effects (hollow-charge and blast-fragmentation).

For navies, Polyphem offers an identical systemthat can fulfil two missions: littoral fire supportfrom ships as well as new generation light anti-ship missiles fired from helicopters. In this latterrole, Polyphem is capable of destroying or neu-tralising small and medium naval targets in littoralwater (fast attack ships, patrol vessels...) evenwithin intense sea traffic, thanks to its ability to

confirm the identificationof the target on “sight” viathe optical fibre.

The Polyphem systemwas selected by theGerman navy to equip itsfive K130 corvettes, optimised for littoral war. Aprogramme was launched to study the possibilityof integrating the Polyphem launcher aboard theFREMM.

The installation of GPS guidance on next-gene-ration anti-ship missiles (Exocet Block III, Harpoon2000, RBS 15 Mk3...) will give these missiles a lit-toral striking capability against ships or targetslocated in seaports, roads or targets along thecoast (such as radars or coastal batteries) aswell as against fixed inland-based installations.

Fire support missiles

The British navy’s HMS Iron Dukefrigate with its helicopter. This tandem will be on the

front lines for littoral actions.

Illustration showingthe Polyphem missile.Its main advantage lies in its extreme precision, whichallows the disarming of an enemy holed upin a bunker, for instance.

22

Europe has been slower than the United Statesin embarking on the revolution taking place inlong distance precision strike capabilities, main-ly for budgetary reasons, but also because theCold War focused European countries on tac-tical problems. New dimensions of conflicts,either operative or strategic, have been pro-gressively discovered in the various crisesthroughout the 1990s. But their implicationshave not yet given birth to well-adapted pro-grammes and realities. Cruise missiles havebeen identified as a capability need within theframework of a European Fast Reaction Forcelaid out in the European Capability Action Plan.

The most advanced European cruise missileprogramme is undoubtedly the Franco-BritishScalp-EG/Storm Shadow, with nearly 2,000units acquired by the United Kingdom, France,Italy and Greece in the airborne version.Conflicts such as the Gulf war, Kosovo,Afghanistan, have confirmed the interest in aprogramme for cruise missile with a lengthe-ned range and a military charge. Already in ser-vice within the Royal Air Force, this missile hasbegun its entry in service in the French air force.With the Scalp EG, MBDA has reached a keyposition in this strategic missile segment and

appears as the only one offering a Europeanchoice as an alternative to the U.S. offer.

Recent conflicts have also emphasised theneed to be able to launch cruise missiles fromnaval platforms. This capability gives thosecountries which have it a major political andmilitary role in key areas, such as planningand targeting functions in commanding anallied operation—from the start of operations tocompletion. As the key point of the futureFrench navy programmes (FREMM, Barracudasubmarine) the need for a navy cruise missilewas expressed in 2001. The Scalp Naval fea-sibility study was thus launched in February2002 by the French minister of defence.

The Scalp Naval is a very long-range cruisemissile with autonomous cruise capabilitythanks to the combination of inertial guidance,terrain following system and GPS. Its mainasset is to offer a very high terminal accuracy,independent of the GPS system, thanks to ahoming head with infrared imagery. Its warheadenables it to neutralise various types of tar-gets. This missile is based on technologiesdeveloped for the airborne version Scalp-EG/Storm Shadow. It has the same key functiona-

lities, such as infrared finalguidance, the warhead,motorisation, mission prepa-ration... These functions arefitted in an airframe within acircular segment well adap-ted to firing from naval plat-forms, i.e. vertical launchingfrom frigates as well as firefrom torpedo tubes forBarracuda submarines.

The feasibility phase isunderway (over the period2002-2004), with a demons-tration and risks reductionprogramme (PDRR) gearedtoward new aspects: verti-cal firing from both a multi-missile Sylver A70 launcherand a submarine’s torpedo

Europe on time for “Deep Strike”

The most advanced

European cruise

missile programme

is undoubtedly

the Franco-British

Scalp-EG/

Storm Shadow

The Scalp Naval willenter service within the

French navy in 2011.

Land attackoperations

23

tube. MBDA benefits from the experience ofboth the Aster 15 and 30 for the vertical laun-ching and from the Exocet SM 39 for firingfrom submarines. Technical demonstrationsare expected to take place during this riskreduction phase.

The full development will follow this phase andis expected to give FREMM deep strike capa-bilities by 2011. The Naval Scalp will equip allFREMM frigates, (8 F-ASM and 9 F-AVT).However only the F-AVT will be equipped withmission preparation systems. The acquisition of250 Scalp Navals, including 50 adapted tofiring from a submarine, is provided by theDefence allocation plan, with an entry in servi-ce by 2011 for the FREMM and 2013/2015 forthe Barracuda.

Considering the similarities between the Frenchand Italian capabilities need, as well as thecooperation on the FREMM, the same navalcruise missile should equip all frigates. In this

respect, the Scalp is open to internationalcooperation.

The Royal Navy is looking for a long-rangecruise missile to equip its FSC, in a slightlydelayed schedule compared with the Franco-Italian FREMM. At the same time, it will alsoseek to replace the Tomahawks equipping itssubmarines. Hence, the selected cruise missi-le could meet both needs.

The evolution of the TACTOM concept of use

The Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM), or theTLAM Block IV is expected to enter in servicewithin the U.S. Navy by 2004 (1343 missilesover 5 years). This new version is aimed atreducing the cost as well as offering more flexi-bility in its tactical use, thanks to a data link,which allows the TACTOM to change its targetduring flight, allowing it to engage “time-criticaltargets,” i.e. mobile target. The first demons-tration flight took place from the ground inAugust 2002, after the programme experiencedsome problems with the propulsion, resulting inthe replacement of the Teledyne J402 turbojetby a Williams F-122.

Another objective of TACTOM is cost reduction.

Within this context, the U.S. Navy decided tolimit the submarines capacity to the verticallaunching of TACTOM. But this unilateralAmerican decision effectively prevented theUnited Kingdom from acquiring additionalTomahawks, the British submarines beingcapable of firing only Tomahawk Block IIIshorizontally from a torpedo tubes. Under pres-sure from the British MoD, the American DoDgranted a contract to Raytheon to validate aTorpedo-Tube Launch version (TTL) that couldbe fired from Los Angeles- and Seawolf-classsubmarines of the U.S. Navy, as well as theBritish SSN Trafalgar and Astute. This valida-tion of a horizontal launcher will undoubtedlyincrease the cost.

Multi-mission frigate firing a

Scalp Naval cruise missile. This armament

gives a strategicdimension to this

class of ship.

Pho

tos

: AF

P -

DC

N -

AM

S -

D.R

-©

TT

U -

Cer

tes

2003

Type 45

La Fayette

La Fayette

Corvette C1200

Corvette C1800

Sawari 2