what the nikayas say about nibbana

8/10/2019 What the Nikayas Say about Nibbana

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Equinox Publishing Ltd 2009, Unit 6, The Village, 101 Amies Street, London SW11 2JW

BSRV 26.1 (2009) 3366 Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (print) 0256-2897doi: 10.1558/bsrv.v26i1.33 Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (online) 1747-9681

What theNikyas Say and Do not Say aboutNibbna1

Bhikkh Bahi

Bodhinyana Buddhist Monastery, Perth, [email protected]

The only way of moving towards consensus on the controversial subject ofthe nature of Nibbnais by appealing to the sole source of authority com-mon to practically all Buddhists: the Nikyas/aas. In the present paperI will rst give n overview of the usge of the term Nibbnain the Nikyas.I will then argue that, according to the Nikyas, Nibbnacannot be regard-ed as a self. Next, I will point out that the Nikyas do not see Nibbnaasa form of consciousness, including such exceptional kinds of consciousness

as anidaana viaand appaihia via. Nor can Nibbnaberegrded s equivlent to mind, or ny prticulr stte of mind. In the nlsection I aim to show that the most reasonable interpretation of the Nikyasis tht nl Nibbnais no more thn the cesstion of the ve khandhas.

INTRODUCTION

Ninis the goal of Buddhist practice. As such it is only natural that there isgreat interest in understanding what it might mean to achieve it. At the sametime, Ninis the most profound of Buddhist concepts. It is perhaps not surpris-

ing then that the concept of Ninhas given rise to a large number of interpre-tations, some based on meditative experience and others on scriptural study andlogical deduction, and that many of them are mutually contradictory.2

Given this confusing situation, the purpose of the present paper is to try to pindown what the Buddha himself meant by Nin.The only satisfactory way ofachieving this is to turn to thesuttas, for it is thesutta ha a h na abiin any Dhammadispute:

Suppose a monk were to say: ... this is the Dhamma, this is the discipline (vinayo),

1 I hav bnd h kindn Vn. Bhikkh Bdhi and P. P Havy wh bh

offered their careful comments and invaluable suggestions on a draft version of the presentpaper. Despite our disagreement on certain issues, the paper is considerably improved asa result of their generosity. My thanks are also due to a number of monks at BodhinyanaMonastery for their proofreading.

2 I will provide references for these interpretations during the course of the paper.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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34 What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

this is the Masters teaching, then, monks, you should neither approve nor disap-prove his words. Then, without approving or disapproving, his words and expres-sions should be carefully noted and compared with the Suttas and reviewed in lightof the discipline. If they, on such comparison and review, are found not to conform

to the Suttas or the discipline, the conclusion must be: Assuredly this is not theword of the Buddha, it has been wrongly understood by this monk, and the matteris to be rejected. But where on such comparison and review they are found to con-form to the Suttas or the discipline, the conclusion must be: Assuredly this is theword of the Buddha, it has been rightly understood by this monk. (DN II 124)3

In the following discussion on the nature of NinI will therefore base myargument, as far as possible, on the complete contents of theNikys.4More spe-iay, I wi inqi in h ainhip bwn tt, viand cittaon theone hand and Ninon the other. An understanding of this relationship, as Iintend to show, is critical for a proper understanding of Nin. In h na -

tion of this paper, I will discuss Ninitself in greater detail. But to prepare thend h nin diin, i i nay a ak a piinaylook at how thesuttas employ the term Nin.

AN INItIAl INVestIgAtIoN INto tHe refereNts of tHe term NIbbNa

There are three frequently mentioned referents of Nin: (1) Ninas thedestruction of lust, hatred and delusion upon the attainment of arahant-ship;(2) Ninas the state that occurs after the death of the arahant; and (3) Ninas the object of consciousness in a special kind of smdhi. I wi biy dieach one of these in turn.

(1) Whenever Nini dnd in hsuttas, it is always in the same way: Thedestruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this,friend, is called Nin.5It is sometimes argued that this destruction only refersto the actual event of becoming an arahant(Havy 1995, 182185). Hwv,since the destruction is permanent it would seem more likely that Ninhererefers to the destruction of lust, hatred and delusion as a general and fundamentalcharacteristic of arahant-ship.6Moreover, the event of becoming an arahant, that

3. Most of the quotes found in this paper are taken from existing translations (see thebibliography at the end of this paper). Occasionally, where existing translations did not seem

satisfactory, I have supplied my own. I have indicated all such instances. I have sometimesppid Pai wd and pha aiain.

4. With the exception of most of the Khuddk-niky. I use the terms suttas and Nikysthroughout this paper to refer to the four mainNikys of the Pali Canon, the Viny-pikand some of the works of the Khuddk-niky, piay h Udn, the Itivuttaka, theDhammapada and the Thergth. I have also occasionally consulted parallel passages in theChinese Buddhist Canon.

5. See in particular SN IV 251 and SN IV 261, but cf. also SN IV 362373, SN V 8, SN V 2527 and AN I158159.

6. This would thus include the actual event of becoming an arahant. A pind by Havy1995, 183, at SN IV 252 arahant-hip i xpiiy dnd a h din , had anddelusion. This shows the close relationship between Ninand arahant-ship in general.Havy i hw a nh ha Ninhere refers to the event of attaining arahant-ship, not an aspect of the general state of arahant-hip. Hi an i ha h Paiterminology points to an event rather than an ongoing reality. Without going into detail, itseems to me that the terminology is open to either interpretation, but most likely it refers bh. Hi nd and ain an i bad n h a ha Ninis the end of dukkha


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i h na din h dn, i paby inanan: ihone is an arahantor one is not. But the narrow focus on momentary events, usu-ally known as mind moments, is a characteristic of theahidhmm and later Paliliterature, not thesuttas. Thesuttas normally refer to realities that are extendedin time. That this is the case also for the Ninattained at arahant-ship is clearfrom the following passages:

When lust is abandoned (rge phne) when hatred is abandoned when delu-in i abandnd n d n innd n wn aiin, h aiin h, h aiin bh and n d n xpin na pain anddejection. It is in this way, brahmin, that Ninis visible in this very life.

(AN I 159, my translation)

N inndin n wn h aiin, and n xpinin n-tal pain and dejection, cannot be momentary. Nor can Nibbnabe momentary in

the following description:And wha, nk, i h Nibbna n wih idu ainin? H, a nk ian arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, who has lived the holy life, done whathad to be done, laid down the burden, reached his own goal, utterly destroyed the xinc, n cpy ibad huh na knwd. Hwv, hiv n ain unipaid, by which h i xpinc wha i aab anddisagreeable, still feels pleasure and pain. It is the destruction of lust, hatred, andduin in hi ha i cad h Nibbna n wih idu ainin.(It 38)

Thus I take Ninin h abv dniin ha nhanin andpermanent aspect of the general state of arahant-ship which is the destructionof lust, hatred and delusion.7In this sense Nin is an ever-present reality forthe arahant.8mv, in h din h h dn i hstandardNikyexplanation of Nin, it seems reasonable to assume that when-ever Nini d wih h qaiain i hi ap hstate of arahant-ship. This will be my assumption throughout this paper.

whereas the arahantstill has some dukkharemaining and thus the general state of arahant-ship cannot be called Nin. But Nin at arahant-ship is called Nin with residueremaining (It 38), the residue being the experience of what is agreeable and disagreeable

pleasure and pain (dukkha). It seems clear enough, therefore, that the presence of a residue ofsuffering does not bar the absence of lust, hatred and delusion in an arahantfrom being calledNin.

7. The literal meaning of Ninis extinguishment. (Alternatively, Nincould perhaps beanad a xinin. Hwv, xinin ha h naiv nnain in enih connotations that obviously do not pertain to Nin ha xinihn appropriate). Ninas the destruction of lust, hatred and delusion is therefore simply thepann xinihin h h dn. In a, Nin is a relative term inthe suttas, its precise connotation depending on what is being extinguished. At AN IV 454each jhnand each immaterial attainment is said to be provisional Nin (nin priyyen). Non-provisional Nin is reached at arahant-hip, and na Nin at thedeath of the arahant(see below). In each case something is extinguished (either temporarily

panny): in jhn h v hindan and h v n a paiyextinguished, in the second jhnvitkk-vicr.. A na Nina v aa apermanently extinguished.

8. The arahants destruction of lust, hatred and delusion is unconditioned, since it is permanent.f hi an Ninis also known as skht, not conditioned.


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(2) Occasionally Nin is used to describe the state that occurs after thedeath of an arahant:

And wha, nk, i h Nibbna n wih id ainin? H a nk

is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, who has lived the holy life, donewhat had to be done, laid down the burden, reached his own goal, utterly destroyedh xin, n py ibad hh na knwd. fhim, here in this very life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become coolih h [i.. a dah]. tha, nk, i ad h Nibbna n wih i-due remaining. (It 38)

In h win I wi hi a na Nin.9In thesuttas, only veryrarely does the word Ninnabiy na Nin.10

(3) In a few places thesuttas mention a type ofsmdhithat is attainable onlyby ariyas:11

J a, ind, in a bnin wd-, n a ai and anh a a,so too the cessation of existence is Nin, the cessation of existence is Nin(hvnirodho nin,hvnirodho ninn ti), one perception (s) arose inme, friend, and another perception ceased, the cessation of existence is Nin;and yet, on that occasion I was percipient (s). (AN V 910, my translation)

Thissmdhiis sometimes said to take Ninas its object,12i.e. taking theqivan na Nin a i bj. Hwv, I ann hw hi xpa-nain an b . fina Ninby dniin i h han ssr, whichmeans it is other than the six sense bases and their six corresponding classesof objects. In theNiky, nin i away dnd by h bj i ak

9. N ha y phai in hi pap i n n na Ninas the event of the death of thearahantbut on that which happens beyond the arahants death.

10. In a, i di nd any nabi n apa h n qdhere.

11. That it is attainable by all ariyas is the commentarial interpretation. In contrast to this, averse at AN I 133 seems to say that this smdhi h ppin in hi samdhiis given asThis is peaceful, this is sublime, that is Nin, but it seems to be equivalent to the oneqd abv i aainab ny by arahants, i.e. one who has crossed over birth and oldage, tri so jtijrn ti. Whatever the correct interpretation, the broader argument remainsunaffected.

12. f inan in h Prmtthdpn-k: ev sutdinm nin rmm ktvpvttni mggphlnipi rmmvsenpi sutdinm lhti, Thus having madeNin, which is called emptiness etc., the object, the resulting path and fruit obtain thename emptiness etc. on account of the object. It is noteworthy that this statement is foundin a modern (19th century) commentarial work. In his translation and explanation of theahidhmmtth Sgh, in which he refers extensively to the above mentioned k, Bodhi(1993, 363) states that: the attainment of fruition (phlsmptti) is a meditative attainmentby whih a nb diip n in pandan abpin wih Nibbna a bj.

I i di aain wih any piin whn h ida Nin as an object ofnin appa in Pai ia. I ih b aid ha i appa aady inthe Canonicalahidhmmwhere the skhtdhtuis included in the dhmmytn(Vibh72). Hwv, h skhtdhtu i hn dnd in xay h a way a in h suttas,namely, as the destruction of lust, hatred and delusion (Vibh 73). There is no indication thatNinis an existing entity which is taken as a direct object of consciousness. Exactly howthe commentaries understand Ninis also a moot point. I am not able to discuss this here,since it would be a major study in itself to trace the historical development of how Ninisunderstood in Pali literature.


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and nqny h a piy ix a nin. f Nintobe an object of consciousness, an entirely new class of consciousness would berequired, going beyond the establishedNikytaxonomy.13

Indd, h abv qu cnain ucin pin ak i uniky hathis is a direct reference to Nin. fiy, pcpin i pcicay aid bpresent. As in the case of consciousness, perception in thesuttas is restricted to sixclasses, all of which are bound up with ssr(SN III 63). There is no room for adirect perception of Ninin hi y caicain. scndy, h pcp-tions are said to arise and cease, one after the other. Arising and ceasing is a char-acteristic ofssr, not Nin: Nini pcicay aid b ab (dhuva; SNIV 370). One would expect a smdhithat takes Ninas its object to be stable,much like the stability of perception found in other deep states of smdhi.14

I would therefore propose an alternative interpretation of this passage. It isnot Ninas such, but a perception that is based on the ariyas direct knowledgeof the nature of Nin. That is, it is not a perception of Ninbut a percep-tion out Nin.15f nvnin I wi hismdhias riy-smdhiin the remainder of this paper.16

Of these three referents of the term Nin, h n i aivy aih-forward: it refers to the arahant a havin xinihd a dn.17InNikyusage this is the usual meaning of Nin. The third referent, ariya-smdhi, does not seem to be a direct reference to Ninat all, but a particular

13. Ninann ipy b aid a a ind bj wih h pndin nin

being mind-consciousness since all mind objects and their corresponding objects are saidto be impermanent and suffering; see eg. SN IV 25. Indeed, the Slytn-syutt containsa large number ofsuttas that directly state that mental phenomena (dhammas) are suffering.These statements often have an almost equational quality. And there is no clear statementanywhere in the suttas that there are any exceptions to this. In fact the six senses togetherwith their six objects are called the all (SN IV 15), clearly indicating that there are no furthersenses or sense objects apart from these. These statements taken together make it impossible,to my mind, to accept the idea of Ninas a mind object cognized by mind-consciousness.(The post-canonical literature, however, sometimes seems to take a different position, seee.g. the Milindapaha, p.270).

14. Deep states ofsmdhi, in particular thejhns, consist of completely stable and uninterruptedperceptions, until one emerges.

15. This interpretation hinges on understanding hvnirodho nin to be an equationalsentence: the cessation of existence isNin. On this reading, the expression is clearly anidea aboutNin, not a direct reference to it. If instead one were to translate this phrase as twowords in apposition, the cessation of existence, Nin, then this would be a direct reference toNinand one would have to conclude that the phrase concerns a direct perception of Nin.

There are othersuttas (AN I 132-33, AN V 7-8 and threesuttas at AN V 318-22), however, thatspeak of the same sort of smdhibut whose interpretation is unambiguous. In these suttasthe relevant perception is given as this is peaceful, this is sublime, that is Nin(etsnt, et pt, yd id ninn ti). H h wdin i h i.. h vb bi qid ha h an b n db ha w a dain wih a nn n j wdin apposition. It seems quite clear, therefore, that this concerns a perception of an idea, anidea about Nin i.. hi i pa, hi i bi n a di xpin Nin.

f hi i i nay nd ha h xpin hvnirodho ninshould alsobe understood as a sentence, not just two words in apposition.

16. This is equivalent to what the commentaries callphlsmptti/phlsmptti-smdhi; seeMp V 2, 23and Mp V 80, 14.

17. Extinguishment being the literal meaning of Nin(see footnote 7 above).


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perception based on the full understanding of what Ninis. It is the secondn ha whih pvn a h dah an arahant whih i h profound and most often misunderstood. It is Ninin hi n, na Nin,which will be the main focus of this paper.

Is fINAl NIbbNa A PermANeNt self?

It is not uncommon to come across attempts to justify the existence of an tt(inthe sense ofa permanent self) using the Buddhas teachings and the claim thatthe end of the Buddhist path is the freeing of this ttfrom suffering.18But theevidence quoted to support such claims is often weak, and it frequently relies on

suttaq wh inpain i di.So let us go through some of the Buddhas more straightforward statements

concerning tt:

Whether there is an arising of Tthgtsor no arising of Tthgts, that elementstill persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, h xd h Dhamma, thatall formations (skhr) are impermanent ... that all formations are suffering ...that all things (dhmm) are non-self. (AN I 286)19

I would suggest that the Buddha uses dhmm in the last phrase to counter anymisunderstanding that there might be an ttoutside of conditioned phenomena(skhr). In this context consider the following:

Monks, as far as there are things (dhmm) conditioned (skht) or not condi-tioned (skht), dispassion (virgo) is reckoned best of those things, that is to

say ... Nin. (AN II 34, my translation)Dhmmis thus a wider term than skhr. It includes anything that might falloutside of conditioned phenomena, in particular Nin.20

Another way of making the same point is as follows:

Bhikkhus, you may well cling to that doctrine of self (ttvdupdn updiyeth)that would not arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one whoin i. B d y any h din , bhikkh? N, vnabi. gd, bhikkh. I d n any din ha wd n asorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one who clings to it. (MN I 137)

Clinging causes suffering because the object of clinging sooner or later changes.If there were such a thing as a permanent self, clinging to it would not give rise tosuffering, and the Buddha would not have seen any problem with such clinging.21

18. s Havy 1995, 1719 a h vy h ap, wd by a iiq h.oh han Havy n, h ha a bn h in ha h ntt doctrineis a strategy of spiritual development that is not meant as a metaphysical position on theexistence of an tt(hnia, 1993).

19. The translation is based on Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhis translation of a similar passage at SN II 25.

20 See also Norman 1991, 207.

21 This does not mean that one may cling to Nin. Theputhujjanaby dniin knw nhinb h v khandhas. Since he does not know what Ninis he cannot possibly cling to it.(H d phap in ida Nin, but such an idea would still be includedwihin h v khandhas.) Once one becomes a stream-enterer, i.e. once one understands theDhamma, one knows that the nature of Ninis such that it cannot be clung to (see the lastsection of this paper).


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But the fact is that the Buddha did not recommend any sort of clinging:

Whn, Nia, n dw npain h i and a in ad h vaggregates affected by clinging, repulsiveness in respect of clinging (updne

pikklyt) is established. (AN III 32, my translation)In fact, thesutta d n ak a dnia na Ninbeing a permanent

self:

Bhikkhus, since a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true andestablished, then this standpoint for views, namely, This is self, this the world;after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change; I shallnd a n a niy wd i n b an y and py ihahin? (mN I 138)

Then the Blessed One took up a little lump of cow-dung in his hand and said tothat bhikkhu: Bhikkhu, there is not even this much individual existence (tthv-

pilho) that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that willremain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much individual existencethat was permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living of the holylife for the complete cessation of suffering could not be discerned. (SN III 144) 22

I i, nanda, ba i i py (suam) of self and of what belongs to self thatit is said, Empty is the world. (SN IV 54)

There is no permanent ttin id h v khandhas:

find, I d n pak a I a, n d I pak I a apa .I do not speak of feeling as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart from feeling. I do

not speak of perception as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart from perception. Ido not speak of volitional formations as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart fromvolitional formations. I do not speak of consciousness as I am, nor do I speak ofI am apart from consciousness. (SN III 130)

Bhikkhus, I am is a conceiving (maitam); I am this is a conceiving; ...Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. Therefore,bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: We will dwell with a mind devoid ofconceiving. Bhikkhus, I am is a perturbation (ijitam) a palpitation (phanditam) a proliferation (papacitam) an involvement with conceit (mngtm) Wewill dwell with a mind in which conceit has been struck down. (SN IV 202)

The arahantknows of no permanent tt: With the fading away of ignoranceand the arising of true knowledge, I am does not occur to him; I am this doesnot occur to him (SN III 47). If arahants discovered their true tt, would it not h ha I a and I a hi?

Is fINAl NIbbNaA form of coNscIousNess?

It is sometimes argued that even if there is no tt, the purpose of the Buddhisttraining is to attain a permanent form of consciousness (vi).23But if there

22. There is no reason to see the denial here of individual existence as implying the existence of

a universal self or any other non-individual permanent entity.23. s in paia Havy 1995, 198214 and Jhann 1969, 111. Havy d n in a

h wd pann nin in dibin na Nin. Inad, h ay na Nini a ppd dinn (Havy 1995, 201; dinn bin Havy anain vi) nin bynd i (208). (H a a ha hi i Nin


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were such a thing as a permanent consciousness devoid of suffering, that wouldbe precisely the sort of phenomenon that the Buddha would describe as a self: itis the characteristics of impermanence and suffering that make the descriptionof something as tt impossible.24If this argument is accepted, it follows thatthe idea of a permanent consciousness that is ntt is inherently self-contra-dictory.25

It might also be noted here that the mere absence of the thought or percep-tion I am in certain states of deepsmdhidoes not mean that by attaining thosestates one has penetrated the Buddhas teaching of ntt. When one emergesfrom these states the notion I am will reappear, often taking that very state ofsmdhias its object.26 As long as the underlying tendency to the view I am has

can be periodically experienced by the arahantduring life, 208). But the idea that nirodhacanbe understood as a stopped state rather than just cessation is not supported by the use of

nirodhain theNikys. Wherever its meaning is unambiguous it means ending, cessation;there is never any sense that it refers to a state.

t ak hi pin Havy a py h db anin in enih h wd ppd.f hi a ppd dinn i h a nin ha and i, ninin wihchange, not a consciousness that has ended. In Pali, however, nirodha/niruddhahas no suchdouble meaning, it only means stopped as in ceased or ended.

A Havy h pha nin bynd i, a ppd pannnin, i i di ha i ak any din. A a na interpretation, it seems clear that theNikys cannot possibly refute every single formulationthat constitutes a contradiction to their outlook. In many cases, such as the present one, onehas to make reasonable assumptions as to the implications of the suttas statements. As faras I can see, a consciousness beyond time would for all practical purposes be the same as a

permanent consciousness, since it is change that gives rise to a perception of time. Moreover,since Nini piay aid b dhuva, stable (SN IV 370), which in the suttas is usedas a synonym for nicca, permanent, the idea of consciousness beyond time as opposed topermanent consciousness seems to be a red herring. (Editor: though, beyond theNikys, wesee that Dhmmsg1416 and Milindph270 and 323 say thatNinis neither past,present nor future. The meaning of this is a matter of debate.)

24. See in particular thePaca Sutta(which is identical to theanttlkkh Sutt) at SN III 6668.This does not mean that Ninis a permanent self, since Ninis not a phenomenon. Seethe last section of this paper for why this is so.

25. Again, since Nin i niy din nin ( any h v khandhas),this does not mean that Ninis not ntt.

26. Deep states ofsmdhiwill be particularly attractive to grasp as a self because of their qualitiesof peace, stability, contentment, bliss, etc. If one has not heard or properly understood theBuddhas teachings, it seems there will be an almost irresistible pull towards seeing thesestates as ones true tt.

An inin paa in hi nx i nd a DN II 6668. H h Bddha ak hfollowing semi-rhetorical question: Where nothing at all is felt, could there be any sense ofI am with reference to that (tattha)? (DN II 67, 19). f h bqn nvain i iclear that the correct answer is no and therefore that such a state cannot be regarded as aself.

Havy (1995, 31) inp hi an ha i h i n xpin I a atthe timeone abides in a particular state, i.e. that there is no self-awareness in that state, thenha i in hw ha ha a ann b add a a pann . I hi wcorrect, then any deep state ofsmdhi, during which there is no perception I am, could alsonot be taken as a self. Yet, as I have argued above, it is perfectly possible to regard such statesas an ttonce one emerges from them.

B h paa a DN II 6668 d n hav b inpd a Havy d. I in-pretation hinges on the import of the word tattha, whih Havy ana a h. B, ais implied in my translation above, tatthafrequently has a locative sense, meaning in this


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not been abandoned, the perception I am will always return in spite of suchperiods of temporary absence.27

Let us now turn to what the Buddha said about consciousness:

Is consciousness (vi) pann ipann? Ipann, vn-ab i. I wha i ipann in happin? sin, vnabi. I wha i ipann, in, and bj han b addh: thi i in, hi I a, hi i y ? N, vnab i. (sN III 67)

f in any di I hav ad nin b dpndny ain(piccsmuppnn) since without a condition there is no origination of con-sciousness. (MN I 259)

And what are the conditions for the arising of the various types of conscious-n?

Bhikkhus, consciousness is reckoned by the particular condition dependent uponwhich it arises. When consciousness arises dependent on eye and forms, it isreckoned as eye-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on ear andsounds, it is reckoned as ear-consciousness; when consciousness arises depend-ent on nose and odours, it is reckoned as nose-consciousness; when consciousnessai dpndn n n and av, i i knd a n-nin;when consciousness arises dependent on body and tangibles, it is reckoned asbody-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on mind and mind-objects, it is reckoned as mind-consciousness. (MN I 259)

In a, by dniin, nin xi ny h wih i bj cognition:

It cognises, it cognises (vijnti), friend; that is why consciousness (vin)i aid. Wha d i ni? I ni: [thi i] paan; i ni: [thi i]painful; it cognises: [This is] neither-painful-nor-pleasant. It cognises, it cog-nises, friend; that is why consciousness is said.28(MN I 292)

Objectless consciousness does not exist:

fin, ppin and nin, ind h a a njind(ssh), not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states fromh h in d dib h din bwn h. f wha n ,that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one cognises.29(MN I 293)

case, about this, with reference to this. If this is the intended meaning also in the presentcase, then the passage means there can be no sense of I am with reference tothat state. Inother words, one is incapable of taking that state as a permanent self even after one emergesfrom it, which is precisely what one would expect of a state where nothing at all is felt,where nothing at all is experienced.

27. f h ndyin ndny h viw and ni I a (sm ti dihimnnusy), seeMN I 47.

28. This statement seems to be absolute. No allowance is made for a stopped consciousness.

29. In other words, at the very least feeling together with some sort of perception, no matterhow subtle, would be the object of consciousness. Usually the situation would be much morecomplex, but feeling and perception would always be present with consciousness.

I will discuss passages that may seem to refer to an objectless consciousness in the sectionbelow on unestablished consciousness and in the last part of this paper.


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o h v aa,it is most commonly vithat is grasped as a selfbecause, although all the other mental factors change continuously, conscious-ness or awareness can appear to be an independent, unchanging, and ever-present reality. But as we have already seen, the Buddha said that consciousnessis impermanent. Indeed, there is no such thing as a permanent consciousness:

Consciousness that is permanent (nicc), stable (dhuv),30eternal (ssst),not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and Itoo say that it does not exist. (SN III 139)

There is no consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change,and that will remain the same just like eternity itself.31(SN III 144)

Indeed, the eightfold path leads to the ending of consciousness, not to a stateof permanent consciousness:

With the cessation of name-and-form there is the cessation of consciousness(vinirodho). This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation ofconsciousness.32(SN III 64)

Bhikkhus, whatever desire there is for consciousness, whatever lust, delight, crav-in abandn i. th ha nin wi b abandnd, a h ,made like a palm stump, obliterated (nhvkt) so that it is no more subjectto future arising. (SN III 161)

By the utter destruction of delight in existence,By the extinction of perception and consciousness (s-vi-skhy),By the cessation and appeasement of feelings:It is thus, friend, that I know for beings Emancipation, release, seclusion. (SN I 3)

The body disintegrated, perception ceased,All feelings were utterly consumed,Mental activities were extinguishedAnd consciousness came to an end (tthm gm 33). (Ud 93)34

I a, hn, ha na Ninis not a state of consciousness. But ifthis is so, how is one to understand some of the exotic forms of consciousness

30. Nin i piay aid b dhuva at SN IV 370, in direct contrast to how vi isdibd h. thi any ink bwn na Ninand consciousness.

31. It is hard to imagine a statement more explicit and clear than this one that a permanentconsciousness does not exist. There is no consciousness that is stable (dhuva) is again indirect contrast to the description of Ninat SN IV 370.

32. Aain, pa Havy, nirodha means ceased in the Nikys. There is no place where itunambiguously refers to a (stopped) state.

33. Johansson (1969, 77) suggests gone to rest and gone home as translations of tthm gm.But the only meaning in theNikys of attha-gamand its cognate forms is come to an end.See in particular CPD which lists disappear, cease, destroyed, gone out of existence and

annihilated and DP which adds end. (Though attha-gamis also used for the setting of thesun, the sun doesnt go home or go to rest; but it certainly disappears, at least temporarily.If there were any other clear cases where such metaphors were used of the sun, then perhapsgo home could be accepted as a rendering.)

34. thi paa dib h na Ninof the arahantDabba Mallaputta.


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sometimes mentioned in thesuttas, which some commentators take as equiva-n na Nin?35

Anidaana via,non-manifest consciousness36

One often discussed passage which only occurs twice in the Pali Canon refersto a form of consciousness known as nidssn vi:37

Wh d ah, wa, and ai n in nd?Wh a n and h, a and a, ai and Wh d na-and- why a?

And the answer is:

Where consciousness is non-manifesting (vi nidssn), boundless(nnt), all-luminous (sto ph38),

tha wh ah, wa, and ai nd n in,th bh n and h, a and a, ai and There name-and-form wholly cease.With the cessation of consciousness this all ceases. (DN I 223)39

Consciousness non-manifesting (vi nidssn), boundless (nnt), all-luminous (sto-ph). (MN I 329)

35. See references below.

36. Havy anain, nn-aniiv, by whih h an ha nhin an appa n in this consciousness (1995, 206), in my opinion stretches the meaning of anidassanabeyond

what is reasonable. At the very least such a meaning would require a causative constructionand probably something more involved (e.g. the consciousness with which nothing elsemanifests), not just the simple adjective. The straightforward meaning of nidssn viis that the consciousness itself is non-manifest.

Havy pp hi ndandin by in a paa a mN I 127 wh anidassana,together with rp, is used to describe space: no picture can be drawn on space (ks) sinceit is anidassanaand rp. But one cannot deduce the exact meaning of anidassanasimply bygiving it the meaning best suited to the simile. If this were possible then rpwould alsoan nn-aniiv (in Havy n h wd), whih i ay d n.

It also seems worth noting that this consciousness must be non-manifest with reference tosomething; that is, it is a relative non-manifestation, not an absolute one. At the very least itis not non-manifest for the person who experiences it.

37. f xap in Havy 1995, 199-201; ai 2001, 1249; Jhann 1969, 76.38. Although the PTS version at DN I 223 has the readingph, I understand the correct reading

here to be ph. The reading phseems to be unique to the Sinhalese tradition and isexplained by Norman (1992: 189) as likely to be an error in the Sinhalese scribal tradition,where haand bhaare very similar and easily confused. Moreover, the reading phalsoseems to be the basis for the Chinese version of this sutta, which has a reading meaningshining (T I 102c17).

39. Ktth po c phv tejo vyo n gdhtiKtth dgh c rss c u thl suhsuh,Ktth nm c rp c ses uprujjht tiTtr veyykr hvti:

Vi nidssn nnt sto phEtth po c phv tejo vyo n gdhti,Etth dgh c rss c u thl suhsuhEtth nm c rp c ses uprujjhti,Viss nirodhen etthet uprujjht ti.

(My translation, based on Walshe 1995).


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It has been suggested that nidssn virefers to a state of conscious-n ha i qivan na Nin(.. Havy 1995, 201),40but in light ofthe discussion of viin the previous section, such an interpretation is unten-ab. Hwv, abih h inpain anidassana vi isa ay. fiy, in h wh Pai cann h xpin nidssn vionly appears in the above two passages.41Secondly, Pali verse is notoriously dif- ana: h Pai adin i n di abih and pilicence etc. can complicate matters further.42Moreover, as in poetry in general,the exact meaning of Pali verse is often vague as its emphasis is on appealingto emotion and intuition rather than on making precise doctrinal statements.43finay, Pai v n nain a wd and pha ha i nowhere else in the tipik.44

Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, and to show that there are otherinterpretations of nidssn vithat are just as good as or even better thanthat of a permanent consciousness, I shall put forward an alternative interpreta-tion. To this end, it is necessary to analyse the above quotes in more detail.

th hin n i ha, du h quai anantaandph, anidassanavi is described in a way that resembles the description of certain states ofsmdhi. anntis closely connected to smdhi, and i i pcicay ud in h

40. Aain, Havy a i a nin bynd i. Hwv, a I hav xpaind abv,I cannot see how this in practice is distinguishable from a permanent consciousness Moreover,

Ninis itself called dhuva, permanent. Havy a au ha hi cnciun can b aaind by harahantwhile he is still alive.

41. Only two seemingly identical occurrences in the entire Pali Canon makes anidassanavia aina np. thi in i i a in an hi xpin aid and nallow it to affect our understanding of the relationship between viand na Nin.

Apart from its use with vi, anidassanai a nd n i wn, piay a mN I 127,36; DN III 217, 23 and SN IV 370, 12. In the last of these three, anidassanais used as a descriptionof Nin. But this does not mean that the word anidassanais equivalent to Nin. Of thealtogether 32 synonyms for Nin found at SN IV 368373, a large number are ordinaryeveryday words which are much more frequently encountered in contexts other than that ofNin. In other words, just because anidassanais used as a synonym for Ninat SN IV 370does not in any way mean that it is not used with very different connotations elsewhere.

42. See Warder 2001, viii and Bodhi 2000, 13. The following passage in Norman 1996, 157, commentingn h dicuy in anain Pai v, i paicuay inuciv: Whn Jhn Buh, nof the greatest British Sanskrit scholars of this century [i.e. the 20th century], had just spentva ya pducin hi udy h gndh Dhaapada, and had h wh hDhammapada-ad iau a hi nip, h wa akd i h wud pduc a anainof the Dhammapada h Pai tx sciy. H pid: I cann. I i dicu .

It is not immediately clear whether the second passage quoted above, MN I 329, is verse orprose: MLDB treats it as verse but most Pali versions of the same passage seem to treat it aspa h p. Hwv, Vn. Bhikkh Bdhi in (piva niain) hathe passage at MN I 329 is in meter and therefore clearly verse.

43. Moreover, both of the above passages are spoken to non-monastics (the householderKevaddha and Baka the rhm), neither of whom seems particularly well-versed in the

Buddhas teachings. Generally, at the time of the Buddha it was the monks and nuns whowere the experts on the Buddhist doctrine. Mostsuttas spoken to lay Buddhists are simple andstraightforward practical instructions. It seems quite possible, therefore, that the usage hereof anidassanai ipy vaiv, n a pi n a pi a.

44. i.e. vi nidssn in the present case.


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andad dcipin h w iaia aainn.45Equally important isthat ppm, immeasurable, which is semantically very close to ananta,46is veryfrequently connected withsmdhi. In particular, it is used in the standard passageon the divine abidings (rhm-vihrs; e.g. at MN I 38), but it is also employed as ana quai smdhi.47A h cnd quai,ph, it does not seemto be used elsewhere to directly qualify smdhi. Hwv, h cy adtermpabhassara, shining, is often used to describe the mind without hindrances(nvr), the most obvious example of which is the mind insmdhi.48Thus, giventhe usage of anantaandphin the above quotes, it seems plausible, perhaps evenlikely, that nidssn virefers to a state of smdhi.

Next, it is necessary to look more carefully at the structure of the above verses.f h pn pp, an ipan a whih i ay pind i ha h v (h qin v) in h abv DN I 223 paa naintwo questions rather than one.49When we turn to the second verse (the answerverse), it seems that we are again dealing with two separate answers: other-wise there would be a contradiction between the viwith various attributesdibd in h in and h ain videscribed in the last line consciousness cannot be described as nnt sto phand at the sametime be said to have ceased. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the in h qin v i anwd by h w in h anwverse, and the last two lines of the question verse are answered by the last threelines of the answer verse.50If this structural analysis is accepted, then it becomesclear that anidassana vi is simply a form of consciousness where earth,

45. th w iaia aainn a knwn pivy a ksncytn, the base ofunlimited (ananta) space, and vicytn, the base of unlimited (ananta) consciousness(e.g. at MN I 436).

Moreover, it seems that anantais never used with mind or consciousness apart from describ-ing states ofsmdhi. It never seems to be used to describe the normal consciousness of thearahant, for example.

46. This semantic closeness becomes particularly important with verse. Due to metricalconstraints, words which may have slightly different import in prose often becomeinterchangeable in verse.

47. E.g. with ksimeditation at MN II 14, and with smdhimore generally at AN III 51.

48. Of course, the mind without hindrances could also be a reference to the mind of the arahant,butpabhassaradoes not seem to be used in this sense. See for example SN V 92 and AN III 16.

49. o h h in h v, h and h hid in nd wih pn n indiaivverbs. Thus we seem to have two separate sentences, each being a question. Moreover, whilethe Pali is ambiguous as to whether the response gives one or two answers, the parallelpassage in the Chinese Canon (see below) seems to give two.

It might be objected that the lead-up to the verses at DN I 223 only contains one question.Why wd h Bddha a a in qin in w? Adin AN II 46 hare four ways of answering a question, one of which is using analysis. In the present case, theoriginal question clearly has more than one answer (as will become clear below), and thus the

Buddhas reformulation may simply be a response to this fact.50. Note the this, et, in the last line of the answer verse. This would seem to refer back to

nm c rp cof the previous line; that is, these lines are connected. Thus the last linecannot simply be regarded as an add-on which does not refer to any of the questions in thequestion verse.


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wa, and ai nd n in;51it is not related to the cessation of name-and-form.52

At this point we must consider the second passage quoted above (MN I 329).The wider context of this verse makes it clear that nidssn vi is notcommensurate with the allness of all (sss stten nnuht; MN I330), that is, not the same nature as all. If all here is to be understood as all ofssr, then nidssn vimust be based on an awareness or knowledgeof what lies beyondssr.53In other words, nidssn vimust refer to astate of consciousness, perhaps a form ofsmdhi, possessed by a person who hasan outsiders perspective onssr, one who has seen the potential forssrto cease.54This potential is only known to the ariyas.55

51. Taking this verse in isolation, the most obvious candidate for this would be the immaterialaainn. B h wh h pha wh ah, wa, and ai nd

no footing (see in particular Ud 9 and SN I 33) indicates that it refers to something moreprofound than the immaterial attainments. It is perhaps a poetic way of expressing a fullescape fromssr. See also the discussion below.

52. I take long and short, small and great, fair and foul to be poetic examples of name-and-form and thus to be included within name-and-form. In the suttas name-and-form is usuallyunderstood to encompass all phenomena apart from consciousness.

I i inian ha h chin vin h v (a t I 102, 1419) pp habove analysis. The question verse of the Chinese is virtually identical with the questionverse of the Pali. (In both versions, this verse is the Buddhas reformulation of the originalsingle question into two questions.) The answer verse is as follows: One should answer(): Consciousness without form (); inni, -iinain (); when this ceases then the four great [elements] cease (); gross, subtle,beautiful, ugly cease (); therefore name-and-form cease ();consciousness ceases, remainder also ceases (). H i i qi a ha whav w anw. th n i nin wih , inni, -iinain.thi wd hn b h anw h qin ab wh h n a nd n in. sin h nd in bin whn hi a , hi paby inbak h nin wih h pvi in (i i di wha imight refer to), this must be a second answer. This answer would correspond to the secondquestion, concerning where name and form wholly cease. (Admittedly, the Chinese is a bitconfusing here, since it starts the second answer with then the four great elements cease. Itake this mention of the four great elements as simply an elaboration on some of the aspectsof name-and-form.) Moreover, it is clear in the Chinese that the consciousness without formcannot be a reference to Ninsince it ceases together with all other phenomena.

53. If, on the other hand, all is not to be regarded as equivalent tossrin its entirety, thennidssn vipniay b pndiny bad. f xap, i a hinad ny vyhin wihin Baka h Bah knwd (Baka h Bahbeing the Buddhas interlocutor in the passage at M I 329), then nidssn vicould be areference to the immaterial attainments.

54. This does not require this consciousness to exist outside of ssr. Rather, it is a type ofconsciousness which is based on the full understanding of the Dhamma.

55. There are, in fact, good reasons for questioning whether this passage should be included inour analysis at all, since the reading in the above MN I 329 quote is very uncertain. Accordingto the Burmese version of this verse (Be: MN I 405), it is the Buddha who speaks it, referring hi wn pia ndandin. Hwv, adin h si lankan (ce: MN I 770), theThai (Se: mN I 596), and h Pts vin hi v, i i pkn by Baka h Bah,referring to hispia ndandin ( Anay, hin, n 162 mN 49). thii bviy hihy inian, ba i hi Baka h Bah knwd, hnnidssn vimust refer to a state of consciousness that he can access, i.e. most likelya jhnstate. This interpretation is further reinforced by the Chinese version of this sutta,a adin whih i wa Bah wh pk, t I 548b, 11. (I i a inian ha


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givn h abv anayi, w a nw in a piin b qi pi in understanding of nidssn vi. We have seen that nidssn vi is:(1) a form ofsmdhi; and (2) that it is a type of consciousness accessible only tothe ariyas.56thi dipin w wih h yp smdhiI have called ariya-smdhiin the introduction to this paper.57This then becomes our interpretationof nidssn vi.

In sum, it may never be possible to pin down the exact meaning of anidassanaviwih p ainy. Hwv, ivn h bad a hsuttasconcerning vi, and given that there is at least one solid explanation of ani-dssn viwhich does not contradict this broader message, one is forced toreject the idea that nidssn vii qivan h a na Ninin the form of a permanent (or timeless) consciousness.58

Appaihia Via,unestablished consciousness

Thesuttaphrase pptihit vi, unestablished consciousness, is sometimesakn a in naNin. In hi way na Nin is again seen as aa nin ( in paia Havy 1995, 201203).59The followingthreesuttapassages are sometimes used to support this assertion:

If, bhikkhus, there is no lust for the nutriment edible food, or for the nutrimentcontact, or for the nutriment mental volition, or for the nutriment consciousness,if there is no delight, if there is no craving, consciousness (vi) does notbecome established (pptihit) there and come to growth ... Suppose, bhikkhus,there was a house or hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, south-

ern, and eastern sides. When the sun rises and a beam of light enters through awindow, where would it become established (ptihit)? on h wn wa,vnab i. I h w n wn wa, wh wd i b ab-ihd? on h ah, vnab i? I h w n ah, wh wdi b abihd? on h wa, vnab i. I h w n wa,wh wd i b abihd? I wd n b abihd anywh(pptihit), vnab i. (sN II 102; . Havy 1995, 202)

But, bhikkhus, when one does not intend, and one does not plan, and one doesnot have a tendency towards anything, no basis exists for the maintenance ofconsciousness. When there is no basis, there is no support for the establishing

in the Chinese there is no equivalent of anidassana.) Given this uncertainty in the reading, itwould be quite reasonable, maybe even preferable, to leave the passage at MN I 329 out of thepresent discussion. In spite of this, I have decided to incorporate the passage at M I 329 in myargument.

56. This may also explain the usage of the term anidassana. According to our analysis, beingaccessible only to ariyas, nidssn vi is non-manifest (i.e. inaccessible) to allputhujjanas,including the devas of the very highest realms.

57. This is thesmdhireferred to at AN I 132134, AN V 79, and AN V 318326. As mentioned in the introduction, and contrary to the view of some, I do not regard this

consciousness as taking Ninas its object. Rather, I see this as asmdhigained through aparticular perception that is based on the knowledge of what Ninis.

58. Nor would it refer to an ariyas direct experience of Nin during life: see my discussion ofriy-smdhiin the introduction.

59. Havy a hi a nin a xpinab by arahants during life, butdin hi dinay nin (1995, 201203). H, hwv, I wi nh ap na Nin.


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of consciousness. When consciousness is unestablished (pptihit) and doesnot come to growth, there is no descent of name-and-form. With the cessation ofname-and-form ageing-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, anddespair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

(SN II 66; cf. Havy 1995, 202)

Monks, with consciousness unestablished (pptihiten), the clansman Godhikaha aaind na Nibbna. (sN I 268; . Havy 1995, 209210)

In h q abv (sN II 102), h i n d an why pptihitvihd b ndd a in naNin. Consciousness is saidto be unestablished if there is no delight, if there is no craving. The referenceto absence of craving seems to make it fairly straightforward that this concernsthe ordinary consciousness of the livingarahant.60

The second passage (SN II 66) concerns a person who does not intend, does

n pan, and d n hav a ndny wad anyhin. Hi ninis then unestablished and there is no descent of name-and-form. If, as seemslikely, descent of name-and-form refers to future rebirth, then the unestablishedconsciousness must refer to the living arahant. Indeed, the suttas immediatelypreceding and following this one, which are direct parallels to it, explicitly men-tion future rebirth (yti punhvhinittiand yti jtirespectively)where the presentsuttamentions descent of name-and-form. This leaves littledoubt that pptihit vialso in the presentsuttarefers to the consciousnessof the living arahant. Moreover, the expression when consciousness is unestab-lished there is no descent of name-and-form seems to indicate that this con-

n nin in na, n a pi a. th, aain, hi ba reference to an rhnts general state of consciousness.

The third passage (SN I 268) is more ambiguous, but it can easily be understoodto mean that Godhikas consciousness was unestablished at the timeof death. Inh wd, h i n nd bin in any hy naNinconscious-ness that, in my opinion, clearly contradicts thesuttas general message on thesubject.61

finay, h a i h paa in h suttas where pptihit viclearly refers to the general consciousness of the living arahant:

When that consciousness is unestablished (ptihit),62not coming to growth,nongenerative, it is liberated. By being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, itis content; by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personallyaain Nibbna. (sN III 53 and sN III 55)63

60. I understand this passage to be another way of saying that consciousness is not attached toanything; it does not grasp at anything or take anything up. Because of being unestablishedin this way, it does not get established in, i.e. commence, a new existence. That is, the passageconcerns the cessation of the source of consciousness. Upon the attainment of arahant-ship, consciousness becomes devoid of the kind of desire that would otherwise have causedh abihn nin in a nw bih. f h arahant, the source ofconsciousness has ceased, but consciousness itself only ceases when he dies.

61. See the general discussion on consciousness above.

62. The spelling ptihitseems to be an error for pptihit.

63. The expression being unagitated, he personally attains Nin, is a common way in thesuttas to describe Ninin this life, i.e. the attainment of arahant-ship as opposed to nl


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In sum, all the available evidence suggests that pptihit vi is a ref-erence to the ordinary consciousness of the living arahant. Although the sut-tas do not seem to contain an outright denial that this consciousness applies na Nin, there is no passage that unambiguously states that it does. Inthese circumstances, it seems to me little more than speculation to suggest thatnabihd nin a a na Nin. And given thatthe existence of a permanent consciousness is explicitly denied elsewhere (seeabove), it becomes untenable.

COULD CITTa(mIND) Be A refereNt of fINAl NIbbNa?

Is it reasonable, as is sometimes done, to use the term citta(mind), or a particularstate of citta, as a synonym for Nin?64There is no clear evidence in thesuttasof cittaever being used in this way and, as I shall now try to show, the evidenceto the contrary is compelling.

Cittarefers to what in English one would understand by mind. In theNikys,cittaoften has a broader scope than vi, sometimes referring to intentionfor example and at other times to thought.65Despite this distinction between thetwo terms,66they are nevertheless closely related. In fact, they are often usedynnyy. f xap, h a va inan in hsuttas where one appa wh n wd nay xp nd h h: Whn ha

Nin. See for instance MN III 244, where Nini dibd in iia , b naNin clearly happens later. Also note that in this case consciousness in fact becomesunestablished immediately prior to the attainment of arahant-ship. This strengthens the

argument further.apptihitalso recurs at Ud 80 where it seems to qualify a particular state (of smdhi,

perhaps) of the living arahant. Since it concerns an arahant, hi nin i by dniinpptihit, nabihd, a did abv. f h diin ud 80 in nNinbelow.

64. Johansson (1969, 131) states that The new, transformed state of citta isNibbna H hnclaims that this cittacontinues after the death of the arahant: But when an Arahant dies the stillness and emptiness of the cittamakes it survive, free and anonymous (133).

Johansson evidently takes a particular state of cittaa qivan na Nin. A iia piin b akn in mah Bwa (1980, 23): th cia by i vy na i

mt- Undying ; Oncephas totally shattered and cleared the kilesas away, the Cittawi b and in h a piy Hw an i vanih? hi n i h nin

mt(the Undying). Immortal by way of purity This is the real and true substance oressence which is in the midst of our khandha (45); The kilesas cant destroy the Citta Thisnature is unassailable, absolute and permanent. It cannot be annihilated (76). It must be keptin ind, hwv, ha h ahin ivn by thai diain ah a n di inp. th a va an hi. fiy, h idi thai diain ah,particularly those associated with the Thai forest tradition, is notoriously idiosyncratic. Theyrarely use the expressions and words found in the Nikys, and if they do, they sometimesgive these expressions new meanings. Secondly, the language they use is often not veryprecise, at least compared with that of the sutta, and h h a inian pb inpain. th i i pib ha Vn. Ajahn mah Bwa ay b in hinother than the English translation appears to show. Still, the translation as it stands is hard tosquare with the descriptions of Ninand cittain thesuttas.

65. In the Viny-pik the Buddha typically asks a monk who thinks he may have committedan offense, kicitto, wha (wa y) innin?, .. a Vin III 116, 23. Cittaseems to meanhh in h andad dipin hh-adin, .. a DN I 214. f a h nof the wide use of the term cittasee PED.

66. Cf. CDB, 769, n.154.


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consciousness (vi) is unestablished, not coming to growth, nongenera-tive, it is liberated (vimutt) (SN III 53 and 55). Usually it is the cittawhich issaid to be liberated.

Another example of this is as follows: With the origination of name-and-form(nmrp-smudy) there is the origination of mind (cittassa samudayo). Withthe cessation of name-and-form there is the passing away of mind (SN V 184). Itis usually viwhich is said to be thus conditioned by name-and-form. But asthe context here is the fourstiphns, the third of which is mind contempla-tion (cittnupssn), cittais used instead.

Where the suttas analyse the mind into mental factors, vi usuallyforms part of the list. In the following passage, however, cittais used in place ofvi:

And h a in h jhn the applied thought, the sustained thought, the

ap, h pa, and h niain ind; h na, in, ppin,volition, and mind (citt); the zeal, decision, energy, mindfulness, equanimity,and attention ... (MN III 25)67

Elsewhere, cittaand viare used together to refer to the same thing: Whenin hi h wb h hh (citt) ha ain, h nin(vi) appeared, his birth is (to be reckoned) from that time (Vin I 93).68

This interchangeability of cittaand viis not surprising when one consid- h a ay. f hsuttas it can be seen that, although viasa technical term only refers to consciousness or awareness, videvoid ofother mental factors is merely a theoretical construct which in actual experience

does not occur. Thus citta,even in its broadest sense, is implied by vi:fin, ppin and nin, ind h a a njind(ssh), not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states fromh h in d dib h din bwn h. f wha n ,that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one cognises. (MN I 293)

So whenever there is consciousness, the other mental factors will also bepresent (cf. MN III 2529), and thus viis in effect no different from citta.69Cittain turn cannot exist without vi:mind without consciousness is surelyan unintelligible concept. Thus, where there is citta, there is also vi; and

where there is vi, there is also citta. In practice they are inseparable andvery closely related: But, bhikkhus, as to that which is called mind (citt)

67. The use ofcittahere, in place ofvi, d phap b nd h inn hahidhmm.

s Vn. Anay dy hanupd Sutt, mN 111, in Anay hin.68. Citta which is usually translated as mind is here translated as thought because mind does

n ay h nx. Phap na a wd b a b anain.

69. It seems clear that cittais often regarded as including other mental factors apart from vi.See discussion above.


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and mentality (mano) and consciousness (vi) (SN II 94)70; But what iscalled thought (cittan), or mind (mano), or consciousness (vin) (DN I 21).71

Therefore, if vi is not permanent and eternal, the same must be truefor citta:

H, a ain ai Bahin i a iian, a an. Hain i byreason, following his own line of thought, he argues: Whatever is called eye orear or nose or tongue or body, that self is impermanent, unstable, non-eternal,liable to change. But what is called thought (cittan), or mind (mano) or conscious-ness (vin), that self is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, thesame for ever and ever! (DN I 21)72

But, bhikkhus, as to that which is called mind (citt) and mentality (mano) andconsciousness (vi) h nind wdin i nab xpinrevulsion towards it, unable to become dispassionate towards it and be liberated i. f wha an? Ba a n i hi ha bn hd by hi,

appropriated, and grasped thus: This is mine, this I am, this is my self. Thereforethe uninstructed worldling is unable to experience revulsion towards it, unableto become dispassionate towards it and be liberated from it. It would be better, bhikkhus, for the uninstructed worldling to take as self thisbody composed of the four great elements rather than the mind (citt). f whaan? Ba hi bdy pd h a n i n andin n ya, w ya, h, , v, n ya, wny, hiy, y, y ya, a hndd ya, vn n. B ha whih i ad ind(citt) and mentality (mano) and consciousness (vi) arises as one thingand ceases as another by day and by night. Just as a monkey roaming through a for-est grabs hold of one branch, lets go and grabs another, then lets that go and grabs

still another, so too that which is called mind and mentality and consciousnessarises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night. (SN II 94)

Thus, according to thesuttas, holding the view that cittain some way can beregarded as permanent, is a mistake. Moreover, when one gains the full ariyaninsight into the impermanent and suffering nature of the mind, one feels revul-sion (niid) and dispassion (virg) towards it. And when the arahantattainsna Nin,the cittacomes to an end:

Like the deer roaming at will in the variegated grove, having

70. In both this quote and the one below the singular y c kho et/id, and that/thiswhich, is used. Thus citta, mano, and vi refer to the same entity. Also note that Ven.Bhikkhu Bodhi here has translated itipiwith and, a translation normally used for c. Amore literal translation of itipi might be also or too: But, bhikkhus, as to that which isad ind, a naiy, a nin. I i inian ha hi pha i a ndin h chin and h Bddhi Hybid sanki vin hisutta, cf. respectively T II 81c,7 and tiph, i 5 V3.

71. Apparently the Tibetan counterpart to thissuttahas the equivalent phrase; cf. Weller, 1934:26.

MN138 provides another striking example of viand cittabeing used interchangeably.In the summary at the beginning of thesutta, at MN III 223, 10+12, viis used. Later on inthe samesutta, in the section explaining this vi, cittais used in its place; see MN III 226, 9f

and MN III 227, 1f. fh, in h xpanain i, viand cittaare used together. f h n h inhanabiiy viand cittain non-Pali Buddhist

x (i.. piaiy chin and sanki ), Anay hin, n 168 MN 138.

72. This passage refers to a wrong view.


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entered the delightful mountain, wreathed in clouds, I shallrejoice there on the uncrowded mountain; you, mind (citta), willcertainly perish (prhvisssi). (Thag 114344)73

You are seen, housebuilder, you will not build a house again.All your rafters are broken your gables are torn asunder. Themind (citt), made free of boundaries, will blow away (vidhmisst) in this veryexistence. (Thag 184)74

It [the citta] remains steady, attained to imperturbability, and he observes itsvanishing (vy cssnupssti). (AN III 377)

With the cessation of name-and-form there is the cessation of mind (cittassa).(SN V 184)

Pabhassara Citta,the radiant mind

A AN I 10 w nd h win -qd paa: thi ind (citt), bhikkhus,is radiant (phssr), b i dd by dn whih aiv. mih hi

pabhassaracittab an na, adian, and p ind? I a hfollowing that this cannot be the case:

s , bhikkh, h a h v pin h ind (cittassa), corruptedby which the mind is neither malleable nor wieldy nor radiant (pabhassara) butbi and n ihy nnad h din h ain. Wha v?Sensual desire ... ill will ... sloth and torpor ... restlessness and remorse ... doubt isa corruption of the mind, corrupted by which the mind is neither malleable nor

wieldy nor radiant but brittle and not rightly concentrated for the destruction ofthe taints. (SN V 92 and A III 16, cf. AN I 257 and MN III 243)

This appears to be the only unambiguous usage ofpabhassarain thesuttas. It fol-lows that the only reasonable interpretation ofpabhassara cittais that it is theind d h v hindan, h bvi xap whih i hmind injhn.75

Does the Term Cittahave two Fundamentally Distinct Referents?

I, a d by Havy (1995), n hNikys as including a doctrineof two fundamentally different types of consciousness, i.e. asmsricconscious-ness and a timeless Ninicconsciousness, then, in view of the close relationshipbetween viand citta, one would expect theNikys to make a similar dis-

73. Although I have argued in the above section concerning anidassana vi that theinpain v i n di, hi b paiay van i a v iinterpreted in a way that is contrary to what can be established from Canonical prose passagesalone. In the present case, the verses merely reinforce what can be established elsewhere.

74. The translation is based on the alternative reading vimriydiktin the last line. Normans translation of vidhmissti, will blow away, can probably be improved upon.

Other possible translations include: will be demolished (cf. CDB, p.985), will be ruined, willfall away, and will be destroyed.

75. s a Anay 2003: 191, n.39. My understanding is that the radiance is always available, it is only matter of overcoming

h hindan. B whn h dn a pn h ind i n adian: hwi wwould be able to observe that radiance, since the mind can only be known through directexperience.


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tinction between two fundamentally different types of citta. Thus the term cittawould sometimes refer to the ordinary cittaof theputhujjanaand at other timesrefer to a permanent cittaknown to the arahant.76A phrase such as cittvimuc-cti (e.g. atMN I 348), the mind is liberated, would then refer to the liberatedeternal mind, or original pure mind, known to the arahant.77

But there is no evidence to support making this distinction. Nowhere in thesutta d w nd ha w h din aii d bh b d acitt. Considering the centrality of this issue for the proper understanding of theDhamma, it seems highly unlikely that the Buddha should have used the termcittain such distinct ways without clearly commenting upon it.78

In my opinion, the only possible meaning of such phrases as cittam vimuc-cati i ha h dinay ind i ibad h dn (sv). Thereis no indication that this mind is somehow permanent. Indeed, one would haveexpected cittato be used synonymously with Ninif this thesis were correct.But cittais never used in this way in thesuttas.79

Cittaand Mano(Mind)

Cittaand manoare even more closely related than cittaand vi:80

What is mind (citt), that is mentality (mano); what is mentality (mano), that ismind (citta). (Vin III 74, my translation)

Thus is your mind (mano), and in this way is your mind (mano), and thus is yourmind (cittan). (DN I 213, DN III 103 and AN I 170, my translation)81

Always frightened is this mind (citt),

the mind (mano) is always agitated. (SN I 123)82

76. Whether the other ariyas would know of such a citta seems unclear. See my discussion ofriy-smdhiin the introduction.

77. fwin Havy appah, n ih anaivy a hi a i (d ) ind. Ihave already discussed why the idea of timelessness, in my opinion, does not add anythingnew. See discussion of viabove.

78. Moreover, consciousness (vi) is also occasionally said to be freed; see in particular SNIII 53 and 55, above. If mind has a distinct meaning in the phrase the mind is liberated, thenthe same would have to be true for viin this parallel construction. But we have alreadyseen that the Buddha rejects the idea of vias a permanent entity.

79. See for example the askht-syutt (SN IV 359373) where there are 32 synonyms forNin, none of which is citta or any particular state of citta.

80. As with viand citta, manoand cittahave their own more or less distinct spheres of usagein thesuttas. Sometimes in the analysis of mental processes the Buddha uses manoto describeh ind in ain ind-nin b n in ain h h v yp consciousness. In this analysis, manois the sense through which mind-consciousness arises.Citta, on the other hand, apparently encompasses all six types of consciousness. Outside suchtechnical usage, however, manoand cittaseem to be used synonymously.

81. This passage concerns mind reading.

82. Both manoand cittaare usually translated as mind. When the words are used together in thesutta, ana n nd a nd enih wd ha a an ind

(cf. CDB, 769, n.154). The following two examples are also instructive of the close relationship between cittaand

mano:A mind of ill-will (vypnn-citto), mental intention of hate (pduh-mn-skppo). (SN III 93, my translation)


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Given this close relationship, even identity, between cittaand mano, a wholenew line of argument against the idea of a permanent cittacould be developedby showing the impermanent, non-self nature of mano.Hwv, a I habv an a aady in, I wi j q a w paa h

suttas to illustrate:

The mind (mano) is subject to disintegration (palokadhammo). (SN IV 53)

The mind (mano) is non-self. The cause and condition for the arising of the mindis also non-self. As the mind has originated from what is non-self, how could it be? (sN IV 130)

If anyone says, the mind (mano) is self, that is not tenable. The rise and fall ofmind are discerned, and since the rise and fall of mind are discerned it would fol-low: my self rises and falls. That is why it is not tenable for anyone to say: themind is self. Thus the mind is not self. (MN III 283)

The arahants maintain that when the mind exists (mnsmi sti) there is pleas-ure and pain, and when the mind does not exist (manasmim asati) there is no pleas-ure and pain. (SN IV 124)

The mind (mano) is yours, Evil One, mental phenomena are yours, mind-contactand its base of consciousness is yours; but, Evil One, where there is no mind, no men-tal phenomena, no mind-contact and its base of consciousness (-viytn) h i n pa y h, evi on. (sN I 256)

Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is beyond training (an arahant) understands thesix faculties the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty,the body faculty, the mind (mano) ay. H ndand: th ix ai wicease completely and totally without remainder, and no other six faculties willarise anywhere in any way. (SN V 230)

A wih nin, n ha nd ha na Ninhas nothing todo with mind.

fINAl NIbbNa

The discussion so far has emphasized that, according to theNiky, na Nincannot be regarded as some sort of permanent or timeless consciousness or mindand that it cannot be regarded as a self (tt). B hihihin wha na Nini n bviy b h qin: Wha hn i na Nin? Indd, i ihb akd, i i anyhin a a apa h ain xin?83

Before I attempt to answer this question, it is necessary to investigate anumber of suttapassages that concern Ninmore directly. These passages

An undaunted mind (ptitthn-citto), a non-dejected mind (dn-mnso), amind without ill-will (vypnn-cetso).

(SN V 74 but cf. CDB, 1904, n.69; my translation) In the above manoand citta, as well as ceto, seem to be used as synonyms. Yet another example of this close relationship is the use of ky(body), vc(speech), and

mano(mind) to denote the three doors of wholesome and unwholesome actions; occasionally

the three doors are denoted as ky, vc, and citta; cf. SN II 231, SN II 271 and SN IV 112. Seea Dhp 348 wh n nd vimutt-mnsoin place of the standard ceto-vimutti.

83. tha i, h ain h v aa. thi d n ipy anyhin xp h ainof an entirely impersonal process. This is very different from the annihilation of a permanententity. See discussion below.


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a n d a vidn ha na Ninis some sort of state84(seefor instance Bodhi 2005, 318).85But I would contend that they do not need to beinterpreted in this way.

Sometimes Ninis called Nindhtu, e.g. at SN V 8.86The word dhtuisoften translated as element. Basing ones understanding on this translation itis natural to conclude that Nin b hin. Hwv, hi wdbe to ignore the range of meanings of the word dhtu.87In addition to meaningelement, it also has the sense of property (see PED).88This meaning is prom-inent in such compounds as nirodh-dhtu (It 45), the property of cessation,and nekkhmm-dhtu (SN II 152, 21), the property of renunciation.89 Indeed,Nindhtu itself is explained at SN V 8 as nothing other than the removal(vinayo) , h va had and h va din. H, aain,it is the property aspect which is to the fore, and the best translation would per-haps be the property of extinguishment.90

Another set of suttas, at SN IV 368373, present 32 synonyms for Nin.thi d aiy b add a vidn na Ninas an existing state.Hwv, in hi a w nd b a diinih bwn Ninas anaspect of arahant-hip (i.. h din , had and din) and naNin. Because all thesesutta a ab h din h dn hywould seem to concern arahant-ship.

Twosutta van h pn diin a nd a ud 80. th these reads as follows:

Monks, there is that base (ytn) wh h i n ah, n wa, n , n

ai; n ba niin h inniy pa, n ba niin h inniy consciousness, no base consisting of nothingness, no base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; neither this world nor another world; neither sunnor moon. I say, bhikkhus, it is not coming, going or remaining, not passing away

84. I use quotes here and below to emphasize that such a state, or existing entity, would becompletely different from anything that can normally be experienced by human beings. Thusthe word state is only used for lack of suitable terminology.

85. hnia Bhikkh (1993, 4) a pp h ida ha na Ninis more thanmere cessation: As for the question of how nibbana is experienced after death, the Buddhasays that there is no limit in that experience by which it could be described. Note in particularthe words that experience, referring to Ninafter the death of the arahant.

86. Or it may be called skhtdhtu, see MN III 63, 13, or mtdhtu, see AN III 356,14.

87. It also ignores the distinction between Nin and na Nin. f h dniin Nin-dhtuat SN V 8, see below, it seems clear that it refers to the state of arahant-ship,n na Nin.

88. That is, property in the sense of quality.

89. The point of these expressions is presumably simply to point out that there are such things ascessation and renunciation.

90. tha i, h xinihn h dn , had and din. Moreover, dhtu is used for svedyitnirodh,the cessation of perception and feeling

(SN II 150). In this case it can clearly not refer to an element as something existing. Rather, itseems to refer to the existence of the possibility of the cessation of the mental khandhas.

The word pada, i. , ha a iiay bad appiain. f xap, h xpinmt pd(e.g. at AN II 51, 29), which is used as a synonym for Nin, might perhaps berendered the characteristic of freedom from death; see PED. (See discussion of Ud 80 below(secondsutta) for why mtis better rendered as freedom from death than the deathless.See also CPD.)


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or reappearing. It is unestablished, not moving, without basis. Just this is the endof suffering.91(Ud 80)

th pa hi q, wh h i n ah nih n n n,

is identical to the standard description of what I call riy-smdhi.92

That weare here dealing with a state ofsmdhiwd w wih h h wdbase, ytn, which is often used ofsmdhiattainments.93

The second part of the quote, it is not coming, going or remaining, not passingaway or reappearing; it is unestablished, not moving, without basis (nev gti n gti n hiti n cuti n upptti, pptihit ppvtt nrmmmev t), seems to be nothing other than a description of arahant-ship. The initialphrase, no coming or reappearing, elsewhere refers to arahant-ship (see Ud81, MN III 266 and cf. SN II 67): there is no future coming, going, passing away, orreappearing for the arahantas he has cut these things off. They cease here and

now because their cause has been removed.94

That unestablished, pptihit,also refers to arahant-ship, I have already shown in the above section on unestab-lished consciousness. Without basis,nrmm,95is often found together withunestablished (SN II 6567) and would therefore also seem to refer to arahant-ship. Not moving, appavatta, does not seem to be encountered elsewhere in theNikys, but it appears to be a simple reference to not moving inssr, beingthe opposite ofpavatta, moving on/going on. Again, it seems natural to iden-tify this with arahant-ship.

th na in h v, j hi i h nd in, wd nayrefer to the living arahant. Just this is the end of suffering, or more commonly

the end of suffering, is a standard way of describing the attainment of arahant-ship, e.g. at MN III 266. In sum, the above passage at Ud 80 seems to describesomething related to both riy-smdhiand arahant-ship. It seems clear thereforethat it must relate to Nin, wih na Ninperhaps being the most likelycandidate.96But even if this is the case, the word ytn, like the word dhtu, isused so broadly in theNikys that this would still not be decisive in showing thatna Ninis a state. At AN IV 426, AN IV 452, 16and AN IV 453, 18, for exam-ple, ytn is used to describe svedyitnirodh, an attainment where the

91. My translation, based on Bodhi 2005.

92. See introduction. This smdhiis described at AN V 79 and AN V 318326. (AN I 132134 isalso closely related.) The only difference is the absence of neither sun nor moon in the ANpassages. The sun and moon seem to have been regarded as belonging to another world inancient India (see DN II 319, 23), and thus the inclusion of this expression does not seem toadd anyhin nw. I wd ad i addiin ud 80 ipy a pi ih.

93. E.g. the immaterial attainments are all called ytn.

94. But note that the Ud 80 verse includes the word hiti which is not found in the parallelpassages. It seems likely that this refers to the remaining in a particular existence, betweenones arising there and ones subsequent passing away.

95. Or an equivalent formulation such as rmme sti, e.g. at SN II 66, 1. Havy (1995, 203) ana nrmma wih bj. Hwv, in ain sN II

6567 the commentary glosses the term with paccaya, condition or basis. I cannot see anyreason why the commentarial explanation should be rejected. (In theahidhmm, however,rmm-pccy, seems to have the sense of object-condition.)

96. Alternatively, or additionally, it might refer to svedyitnirodhor perhaps even ariya-smdhiitself. This being verse, the ambiguity could be deliberate.


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whih w ad h pn in: I na Ninanything at all apart fromh ain xin?

Might Final Nibbnae n Existing Entity Entirely Different from the FiveKhandhas?

The reason why the above analysis has not produced any decisive result regard-in h na na Ninis simply that thesuttas very rarely seem to speak na Nin; their emphasis is on Ninduring life, the experience of ara-hant-hip. Nvh, w hav n ha na Nincannot be equated witha form of consciousness or mind. Indeed, it is clear that it must be other than thev khandha. thi bin h a, d na Ninbe a state, some sort ofxiin niy, qi paa h v khandha?

th ida ha na Ninis an existing entity is usually matched with the

idea that this state can be experienced while the arahantis still alive.105

In fact,h w ida niy h: i h na Ninstate was not expe-rienceable by living arahants, they would not know of its existence and conse-qny h d b n d i piy. B h ida ha na Nincan be experienced by the living arahantis doctrinally problematic. An experi-n hin wih whih n ann knw ha i xi by d-iniin ind nin. th, an xpin h qivan naNinwhile alive must involve consciousness. Indeed, this is also the standardexplanation for how Ninis said to be experienced: the mind or conscious-ness takes it as its object.106

th pb wih hi ida i ha i d n h Nikys explanation ofconsciousness. As I have already pointed out in the introduction to this paper,nin i away dnd by h bj i ak and h h a p-iy ix a nin, n ah h v n and n hmind (e.g. at SN III 64). There is no indication anywhere of any further classes ofnin. Y h ida na Ninas an object of consciousness wouldqi a vnh a nin: i d n in any h ix amentioned in thesuttas.107th, nin a akin na Ninasi bj i bynd xdsuttacategories and therefore a baseless extensionof what appears to be a full description of reality in theNikys.

m nay, i i nib pak a na Ninstate that is entirelyh han h v khandha? I nin a n and a, wha dna Ninpiby b? I ak n n pak a a whih by dni-tion cannot be known. Such a state becomes a mere cipher, something completelydevoid of meaning. It is tantamount to not existing at all.

105. Or that it can be experienced by any ariyan. s inan Bdhi (2005, 318) and Havy(1995, 210).

106. See for instance Bodhi (2005, 379): his mind focuses upon the deathless element,

Nibbna. s a n 12 abv.107. In the Nikys, on a large number of occasions, the six senses, their objects, and the six

corresponding classes of consciousness are all said to be impermanent and suffering (e.g. atSN IV 25). No exception is ever explicitly mentioned. Clearly Nincannot be part of thisscheme.


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tha h ida na Ninbeing a state is a weak one, is also clear fromthe principle of Occams razor. This philosophical principle states that the fewestpossible assumptions are to be made in explaining things.108In the present case,a ida na Ninbin an xiin aiy pd piain andtherefore a need for further assumptions109 ha ak h ida -pelling according to Occams razor. The simplest explanation of what happensa na Nini ipy ha h v khandhas cease. The simplicity and direct-n hi ida and i , a I hav id hw, wih a ap h ah-ings found in theNikys, makes it by far the strongest candidate for explainingna Nin.110

finay, I wih pin n ainin dan wih iniin ha naNini a a hin. f aputhujjanasuch a state would be quiteliterally unimaginable.111 In trying to understand it, he would quite naturallypy vin h v khandhas. Anyone who accepts the Buddhasahin ha na Ninis the highest happiness would therefore almost una-vidaby ap a aah ha vin h v khandhas. Because the khand-ha an ani in xy b way inan, anyn wh ha nexperienced it, it would be virtually impossible to imagine what the experience h ba nhinn i ik n wd qi iky n vn b awa ones attachment. In this way one ends up grasping thekhandha ha i, ap-in wha i in aiy in hinkin i b na Nin. And instead ofahin na Nin one ends up perpetuating ssr. th viw ha naNinis just cessation is thus not only the one that seems most in tune withtheNikys but also the one that quite pragmatically is most likely to lead to anexit fromssr.112

If Final Nibbnais Mere Cesstion, How is this Different from annihiltion?

A AN V 63, w nd h win vain paa:

Monk, among the views of outsiders, this is the highest: I might not be and itmight not be mine; I shall not be and it will not be mine (no css, no c me siy,n hvissmi, n me hvisst ti). f n, nk, wh ha h a viw, i an bexpected that he will not feel attracted to existence and will have no aversion tothe cessation of existence. (AN V 63; adapted from NDB 246)

108. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1995, ninth edition.

109. Such as a timeless consciousness or a seventh class of consciousness.

110. I ih b bjd ha oa az i piaiy appiab ini xpanain.B ini xpanain a xpanain a and bvab phnna, and aBddhi pin viw h xinihn ha happn a na Ninis also a real and (insome ways) observable phenomenon.

111. And i, a d abv, h a a na Nin cannot be experienced even byarahants, the same would be true of all ariyas.

112. cd h a viw na Ninlead to vihv-th, a avin annihiain? Piby icould. But it seems to me that it is far more common for people to hold an eternalist view thanan annihilationist view. Moreover, the Buddha himself considered the annihilationist viewsuperior; see my discussion immediately below. In other words, although ideally one shouldrealize that the Buddha taught neither eternalism nor annihilationism (see next section), it ispreferable to err on the side of annihilationism.


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th viw nind h i idnid a annihiaini a sN III 99, 6. Sinceannihilationism is always contrasted with eternalism in theNikys, this suttain effect states that the annihilationist view is superior to the view of eternal-i. Aain, hi ndin any ai ha na Ninexists in some sense orother.113

The above quote also makes it clear that the Buddhas teaching is not annihi-lationism.114Wha hn i h diinin bwn ain and annihiain? AsN III 109 w nd asuttathat deals precisely with this question:

[Vn. sipa:] I i , ind Yaaka, ha h a pnii viw a hi haarisen in you: As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhuwhose taints are destroyed is annihilated (ucchijjati) and perishes (vinassati) withthe breakup of the body and does not exist after death (n hoti prm mr)?

[Ven. Yamaka:] Exactly so, friend. (SN III 110111)

H Yaaka piay hd h viw ha an arahant is annihilated atdah and i i a h naaiv and sipa bqn qininof Yamaka that this is contrary to the Dhamma. sipa qinin Yaakaestablishes that anything one might take a Tthgt/rhnt to be115 ha i,anyhin an h v khandha i a ipann and in. th his no permanent self and therefore no real person/arahant/Tthgtto be anni-hiad in h pa:

What do think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form feeling perception voli-ina ain nin a h tahaa? N, ind. Wha d

hink, ind Yaaka, d y ad h tahaa a in in pp-in viina ain nin N, ind. D y adh tahaa a apa in ppin viina ain nin ? N, ind. Wha d y hink, ind Yaaka, d yregard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness [takenh] a h tahaa? N, ind. Wha d y hink, ind Yaaka,d y ad h tahaa a n wh i wih , wih in, wihppin, wih viina ain, wih nin? N, ind. B, ind, whn h tahaa i n apphndd by y a a and aain this very life (dihev dhmme sccto thetto nuplhiymno), i i in you to declare: As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu

whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of thebdy and d n xi a dah? (sN III 111112)

A Yaaka ha ndd sipa ahin,116w nd h winexchange between them:

I, ind Yaaka, hy w ak y: find Yaaka, whn a bhikkh i anarahant, one whose taints are destroyed, what happens to him with the breakup h bdy, a dah? bin akd h, wha wd y anw?

113.sin h ida ha na Ninis an existing entity would seem to be closer to eternalismthan annihilationism.

114.Because annihilationism is the view of outsiders.

115. The words arahantand Tthgtappear to be used synonymously in this sutta.

116.tha i, a h ha y pnad i wih inih. H hav aaind anywhi sipa wa ahin hi.


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I hy w ak hi, ind, I wd anw h: find, i ipa-nent; what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering has ceased (niruddh)and passed away (tthgt). fin i ipann; wha i ipann i -fering; what is suffering has ceased and passed away. Perception is impermanent;

what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering has ceased and passed away.Volitional formations are impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; whatis suffering has ceased and passed away. Consciousness is impe

what the nikayas say about nibbana

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