JournalofBuddhistEthicsISSN1076-9005http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/The Criteria of Goodness in the PaliNikayas and the Nature of Buddhist EthicsDr. AbrahamVelezdeCeaTheology DepartmentGeorgetown UniversityEmail: av82@georgetown.eduCopyright Notice: Digital copies of this work may be made anddistributed provided no change is made and no alteration is madetothecontent. Reproductioninanyother format, withtheexception of a single copy for private study, requires the writtenpermission of the author. All enquiries to: d.keown@gold.ac.ukTheCriteriaofGoodnessinthePaliNikayasandtheNatureofBuddhistEthicsDr. AbrahamVelezdeCeaAbstract: I start by discussing Damien Keowns important con-tributiontotheeldofBuddhistethics, andIpointoutsomedicultiesderivedfromhiscriterionofgoodnessbasedontheidenticationof nirvanawiththegoodandtheright. Inthesecondpart, IexpandKeownsconceptionofvirtueethicsandovercomethedicultiesaectinghiscriterionof goodnessbyproposing a heuristic distinction between instrumental and tele-ological actions. In the third part, I explore the early Buddhistcriteria of goodness and argue that they do not correspond to aform of virtue ethics as Keown denes it, but rather to a partic-ularsystemofvirtueethicswithfeaturesofutilitarianismandmoral realism. That is, a system where the goodness of actionsis determined not only by the mental states underlying actionsas Keown claims, but also by the content and the consequencesof actions for the happiness of oneself and others.DamienKeowns Buddhist Virtue Ethics andItsDicultiesKeownswork, TheNatureofBuddhistEthics(1992)isperhapsthemostcomprehensivediscussionofBuddhistethicaltheorythatcanbefoundinthe market today. Keown rejects utilitarian readings of Buddhist ethics andadvocatesvirtueethicsasabetterinterpretativeframework. TheclosestwesternanaloguetoBuddhistethicsisnotutilitarianismbutAristotelianvirtue ethics. Aristotles ethical theory is an illuminating guide to an un-derstanding of the Buddhist moral system. (1992: 21). As in Aristotelianethics, in Buddhism there is a teleological summum bonum(eudaimoniainAristotle,nirvanain Buddhism)tobeachieved throughthecultivationofvirtues.AccordingtoKeown, actions inBuddhismarenot, as utilitarianismclaims, good or evil because they lead to good or evil consequences. Rather,actionsgenerategoodorevil consequencesbecausetheyareintrinsicallygoodorevil. Theintrinsicgoodorevil of actionsderivesfromthemen-talstatesmotivatingandaccompanyingactions. Specically, theintrinsic123124 JournalofBuddhistEthicsevilofactionsderivesfromthethreerootsoftheunwholesome(akusala).The three roots of the unwholesome are greed (lobha) or passion (raga), ha-tred (dosa), and delusion (moha). Conversely, the intrinsic good of actionsderivesfromtheoppositementalstates, thethreerootsofthewholesome(kusala), a term that Keown translates as the good. The three wholesomeroots are the source of all the wholesome mental factors (kusaladhamma),whichhetranslatesasgoodqualities.Similarly, thethreerootsof theunwholesomearethesourceof all unwholesomemental factors(akusala-dhamma), which he translates as bad qualities, also known as delementsoraictions(kilesa,Skt. klesa). Goodandbadqualities,wholesomeandunwholesomemental factorsareperhapsbestunderstoodascorrespond-ing to the Western notion of virtues and vices (1992: 63). In fact, Keowncalls the three wholesome roots the three Buddhist cardinal virtues, namely,nongreed (alobha) or nonpassion (araga), nonhatred (adosa), and nondelu-sion (amoha),which he translates as liberality, benevolence, and un-derstanding. The summum bonumof nirvana is achieved by purifying themental stream(santana)fromvicesandbadqualities, andbycultivatingthe three cardinal virtues and good qualities.However, unlike Aristotle, Keown identies the summum bonum with thegood and the right: Nirvana is the good, and rightness is predicated of actsandintentionstotheextentwhichtheyparticipateinnirvanicgoodness.TherightandthegoodinBuddhismareinseparablyintertwined. If anactiondoesnotdisplaynirvanicqualitiesthenitcannotberightintermsof Buddhist ethics whatever other characteristics (such as consequences) itmight have (1992: 177).Keownsidenticationofnirvanicvirtueswiththegoodandtherighthasfarreachingandcontroversial implications. Therstoneisthatthegoodnessof actionsdependsexclusivelyonthemotivationorthementalstates underlying actions. Moral actions are clear cut: When they display orparticipate of nirvanic good, they are right and virtuous, and when they donot display or participate of nirvanic good, they are wrong and nonvirtuous.This is so from the inception of action in the mind, and nothing can change itlater. As Keown puts it, An action is right or wrong from the moment of itsinception its nature is xed by reference to nirvanic values, and it cannotsubsequentlychangeitsstatus.. . . InBuddhistethicsitisthemotivationwhichprecedesanactthatdeterminesitsrightness. Anactisrightif itisvirtuous,i.e. performedonthebasisofLiberality(araga),Benevolence(adosa) and Understanding (amoha) (1992: 177-178).ThesecondimplicationisthattheBuddhistcriterionof goodnessex-cludesfromthemoral domainactionsnotparticipatingornotdisplayingVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 125nirvanic virtues. The problem is that many Buddhists,at least at the be-ginningof theirspiritual practice, actmorallynotsomuchmotivatedbynirvanicvirtues, butratherbynonnirvanicvirtuessuchascravingforaproximate goal such as a good rebirth. Even practitioners who act ethicallyaimingattheultimategoal ofnirvanadoso, atleastonsomeoccasions,motivated by subtle forms of spiritual greed. Aiming at nirvana out of spir-itual greed and observing the ve precepts out of craving for some worldlyreward or fear of punishment after death cannot be said either to participateor display nirvanic virtues. However,it is problematic to suggest,like Ke-owns criterion does, that such actions are morally wrong, evil, and outsidethe moral domain.Keowns identication and subsequent criterion of goodness lead him tomarginalizetheproximategoalsofBuddhistethics. Proximategoalssuchasalargefortune, goodreputation, enteringcondentintoanyassembly,unconfused death, and rebirth in heaven are no longer part of the moral do-main unless actions leading to them participate or display nirvanic virtues.In Keowns words, the proximate goals are just non-moral consequences ofethical action. . . secondary, contingent, consequences of moral actions, andapartfromthenal one[heavenlyrebirth] thereisnothingparticularlyBuddhist about them (1992: 125). This marginalization of the proximategoalsofBuddhistethics, however, isalsoproblematic. Itistruethatac-cording to the Pali Nikayas, it is considered wrong to state that whateverapersonexperiences, whetheritbepleasantorpainfulorneither-painful-nor-pleasant, all that is caused by what was done in the past (SN IV.230).Because not everything is due to past moral actions or karma, it is also truethat the proximate goals one experiences are not necessarily the fruit of pastmoral actions. However, this does not justify Keowns marginalization of theproximate goals for several reasons.First, BuddhisttextsandBuddhistpractitionersdonotseetheproxi-mate goals as nonmoral. On the contrary, in all cases it is understood thattheyaremoralconsequencesofmoralactions, andinsomeoccasionsitisexplicitly said that they are so. For instance, in (SN I.92) it is said that as aresult of a moral action (providing a Buddha with almsfood), a person wasreborn seven times in a good destination, in the heavenly world. Similarly,it is also said that as a result of that moral action, he obtained the positionof nancier seven times. That is, after being reborn seven times in heaven,hewasbornanotherseventimesasahumanbeingwhoobtainedineachlife a good job and the material prosperity that goes with it.Second, not all Buddhist traditions followwhat thePali Canonsaysabout karma, and accept that Canon as the authority to dene what is or126 JournalofBuddhistEthicswhat is not moral in Buddhist ethics. In fact, there are Buddhist traditions,for instance Tibetan traditions, that believe that everything, including theproximategoals,arealwaystheconsequenceofpastactionsorkarma. Soat least from the point of view of these Buddhist traditions, the experienceof proximate goals is necessarily a moral consequence of past moral actions.IntheseBuddhisttraditions,whereeverythingisseenasbeingtheconse-quenceof pastkarma, Keownsmarginalizationof theproximategoalsisunjustiable.Third, even if one were to ignore other Buddhist understandings of karmaandconcedetoKeownandtheTheravadaorthodoxythattheproximategoalsarenotalwaysandnecessarilyconsequencesof moral actions, itistrue,as we have already said,that according to the Pali Nikayas they aresoonsomeoccasions. Consequently, evenif itisadmittedthattheyarecontingentconsequencesofmoralactions,therearenogroundstocharac-terizethemasnonmoral. Whentheyareconsequencesof moral actions,theyarenecessarilymoral, asmoral astheactionsthatproducedthem.Onlywhentheproximategoalsarenotcausedbymoral actionscanoneproperly say that they are not moral consequences. However, according tothe Pali Nikayas, the workings of karma, and therefore whether or not theproximate goals are moral consequences of ethical actions, is something thatonly Buddhas can know (MN I.74), not scholars of Buddhist ethics.Furthermore, Keownsmarginalizationof theproximategoalsisques-tionable from a descriptive point of view. Buddhist ethics in practice seemsto unanimously consider the proximate goals as part of the Buddhist moraldomain. It has been extensively documented that the proximate goals playan important ethical role in actual Buddhist practices. The proximate goalsare the most common pattern of validation in traditional Buddhist commu-nities. In Theravada communities, the proximate goals of prosperity, fame,accumulation of merit, wholesome karma, and a happy rebirth usually val-idate moral and religious actions independently of the validation based onthe ultimate goal of nirvana (Swearer, 1995; Gombrich, 1971; Bunnag, 1973;Keyes, 1983). Similarly, in Tibetan Buddhist ethics, even though the bod-hisattvaideal isprevalentamongmonks, nuns, andlaypeople, themostcommonpatternof validationof ethical conductisnottheultimategoalof Buddhahood, or nonabiding nirvana (apratis.t.hita nirvan.a), but the moreproximate goals of merit, wholesome karma, and a good rebirth (Tucci, 1980;Ekvall, 1964; Samuel, 1993; Tatz and Kent, 1977; Lichter and Epstein 1983).Keowns marginalization of the proximate goals is also questionable ontextual grounds. Already in the Pali Nikayas, it is possible to detect textswherethejusticationof ethical conductbasedonproximategoalsfunc-VelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 127tions independently of the justication of ethics based on the ultimate goalof nirvana. (DNII.85; MNIII.165; MNIII.203f; MNI.400f; ANIV.247-248; ANV.306-308). Similarly, greatBuddhistthinkersusethedoctrinesof karma and rebirth to justify moral behavior without mentioning nirvanaorthedisplayofnirvanicvirtuesasanecessaryrequirementformoralac-tions. See for instance Nagarjunas Precious Garland(I. 12-23; IV.310) andSantidevas Bodhicaryavatara(I. 17; IV 5, 9, 12, 14; V. 20; VI 72-74). Eventhe Dalai Lama discusses the doctrines of karma and rebirth and uses themas a justication of ethical conduct, without speaking about nirvana or theneed to display nirvanic virtues (1994: 68-69).Becausethemarginalizationof theproximategoalsandtheexclusionofnonnirvanicactionsfromthedomainofthegoodarenotwarrantedbyearlyBuddhistsources, classical Buddhistthinkers, orBuddhistethicsinpractice,IdonotseeenoughempiricalgroundsforKeownsidenticationand subsequent criterion of goodness.OnemightdefendKeownbysayingthatheisengagedinnormativeethics. That is, he is not trying to describe Buddhist ethics as it is or as ithas been commonly practiced,but rather as it ought to be practiced. Ke-owns criterion of goodness would be intended to apply only to certain idealtypesofBuddhistethicsbutnottoalltypesofBuddhistethicalpractice.Therefore, it would be unfair to reject his ideal view of Buddhist ethics froman empirical point of view.It is true that Keown wants to go beyond simple descriptive ethics, butit is also true that following a methodology inspired by Little and Twiss, heclaims to be doing both description and analysis (1992:5-6). To state thattheproximategoalsarenonmoral consequencesthatarenotparticularlyBuddhist, as Keowndoes, is animprovement fromsayingthat theyareaconcessiontospirituallyretardedindividuals(LittleandTwiss1978:244). Nevertheless, I believe there is still room to improve our descriptionsandanalysisof Buddhistethics. Forinstance, thereisnothingwronginsaying from a descriptive point of view that there is a gap between the idealpractice of virtue ethics and the actions of Buddhists aiming at proximategoals without displayingnirvanicvirtues. However, I donot thinkit isaccuratetoidentifyideal types of practicewiththenatureof Buddhistethics, especially when that natureentails the marginalization of importantaspects of Buddhist ethics and the exclusion from the moral domain of lessideal types of ethical practice.128 JournalofBuddhistEthicsExpandingKeownsConceptionofVirtueEthicsKeownsrejectionofutilitarianreadingsofBuddhistethicsisintendedtoovercomewhathecallsthetranscendencythesis,thatis, theviewac-cording to which morality is a preliminary stage of the Buddhist path to betranscended once the goal of nirvana is attained. Keowns major contribu-tion to the eld of Buddhist ethics is perhaps his conclusive refutation of thetranscendencythesis. Aparticularexampleofthetranscendencythesisiswhat Keown calls the King-Spiro hypothesis, that is, the understanding ofBuddhist ethics as composed of two originally independent and ultimatelyincompatible ethical systems, karmatic and nirvanic Buddhism (King 1964;Spiro1970). AccordingtotheKing-Spirohypothesis, karmaticBuddhismis primarily practiced by lay people and nirvanic Buddhism by monks andnuns. Whereas the aims of karmatic Buddhism are the accumulation of goodkarma and happy rebirths, the aims of nirvanic Buddhism are the cessationof karmaandrebirth. KarmaticBuddhismisrelatedtoethical practice,andbecausekarmaticBuddhismisameanstonirvanicBuddhism, itfol-lows that ethics is also a means to nirvana and not a constitutive part of theultimate goal. In other words, ethics is merely instrumental and transcendedin nirvanic Buddhism.Buildingupontheworkof HarveyAronson(1979; 1980)andNathanKatz (1982) Keown challenges the anthropological studies of King and SpiroandshowshowkarmicBuddhismandnirvanicBuddhismareintegrated;they are neither separable nor incompatible. Comparing Buddhist ethics toAristotelian ethics, Keown argues that moral virtues are constitutive partsof the ultimate goal of nirvana. According to Aristotle,human ourishingincludesnotonlythecultivationof intellectual virtuesbutalsoof moralvirtues. Similarly, the Buddhist ideal involves both cognitive and aectivevirtues, wisdom as well as love and compassion. I agree with Keown on this,andhiscomparisonof BuddhistethicsandAristotleisveryilluminating.However, the price to pay for Keowns excellent refutation of the transcen-dencythesisand theKing-Spirohypothesisisacriterion ofgoodnessthatgenerates several diculties from a descriptive point of view, specically, theexclusionofnonnirvanicactionsandthemarginalizationoftheproximategoals.I believe there is a way to avoid the trancendency thesis and the King-Spirohypothesis without generatingthesedescriptivediculties. I alsobelievethat that wayis moreconsistent withtheAristotelianmodel ofvirtue ethics than Keowns criterion of goodness.The diculties that Keowns criterionof goodness generates canbeVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 129solved by introducing a heuristic distinction between instrumental and teleo-logical actions. By instrumental actions I mean actions leading to favorableconditions for cultivating nirvanic virtues and by teleological I mean actionsactually displaying nirvanic virtues or virtues characteristic of the Buddhistideal of sainthood.Actionsnotdisplayingnirvanicvirtues,suchasobservingthepreceptsoutofcravingforaproximategoal, participateinthegoodbecausetheyare instrumental for attaining the highest good of nirvana. The nonnirvanicmoral actions are also good because they accord with the Dharma. Whenthe proximate goals are the consequence of good actions leading to favorableconditions to cultivate nirvanic virtues or good actions actually displayingnirvanic virtues, they are part of the moral domain of the good. Even whenthe proximate goals are not the consequence of moral actions, they are partof thegoodbecausetheyarefavorableconditionsforthecultivationandactual display of nirvanic virtues.Keownsidenticationofthegoodwithnirvanicvirtuesisinconsistentwith the Aristotelian model of virtue ethics on which he explicitly bases hisviewof Buddhistethics(1992: 21). Aristotleidentieseudaimoniawiththehighestgoodofhumanourishing, butnotwiththemoraldomainofthe good. Aristotle speaks about a variety of intrinsic goods, some of themconstitutiveof thehighestgoodof humanourishing, suchasmoral andintellectual virtues, andothersexternal orinstrumental, suchashonors,fortune, sensual pleasures, andfriendship(Kraut 1999: 82-83; Sherman1989: 125-127). Similarly, inBuddhismthegoodisneveridentiedwiththe summum bonum of nirvana. As Keown himself acknowledges, the termskusala and pu n na, which denote the good in a wide sense, are predicated notonly of good moral actions and dispositions, but also of the consequences ofmoral activity (1992: 123), which include the proximate goals.Keownscriterionimpliesthatinstrumental goods(nonnirvanicmoralactionsandtheproximategoals)arenotpartofthemoraldomainofthegoodandnotcharacteristicofvirtueethics. ForKeown, onlyteleologicalgoods (actions participating or displaying nirvanic virtues) seem to qualifyas good and characteristic of virtue ethics. However, it is important to noticethatwithKeownscriterionofgoodnessnoteventheAristoteliansystemwould qualify as virtue ethics because Aristotle speaks of both instrumen-tal andteleological goods. If Aristotleistheparadigmaticrepresentativeof virtueethicsandhehimself admitstheexistenceof bothinstrumentaland teleological goods, I do not see why Buddhist virtue ethics cannot haveinstrumental goods. How does the acceptance of instrumental goods com-promise virtue ethics?If the acceptance of instrumental goods does not so130 JournalofBuddhistEthicscompromise the virtue ethics of Aristotle, why would such acceptance com-promise Buddhist virtue ethics?The acceptance of instrumental goods doesnot make Aristotle a utilitarian or an advocator of the transcendency thesis.Similarly, the acceptance of instrumental goods within Buddhism does notentail a commitment to utilitarianism or the transcendency thesis.In dierent ways, the two kinds of actions that I am distinguishing hereare related to the highest good of nirvana. While actions leading to favorableconditionstocultivatenirvanicvirtuesareinstrumental, actionscurrentlydisplaying nirvanic virtues are teleological. In other words, whereas actionsleading to favorable conditions to cultivate nirvanic virtues are good becauseof their consequences, actions actually displaying nirvanic virtues are goodbecause of their participation in mental states characteristic of the Buddhistideal of sainthood.The distinction between actions leading to favorable conditions to culti-vate virtues and actions actually displaying virtues is inspired not only byAristotelian ethics, but also and primarily by the early Buddhists conceptsof kusalaand pu n na.According to Premasiri, the terms kusalaand pu n nain early Buddhismrefer to dierent types of actions with dierent soteriological consequences:the term that is invariably used in specifying the good actions which leadto the spiritual bliss of nibbanais kusala, whereas the term more frequentlyused for specifying the good actions which lead to sensuous enjoyment andhappinessinsam. saraispu n na(Premasiri, 1976: 69, quotedbyKeown1992:122). Keown rejects Premasiris distinction between kusala and pu n naactionsbecausebothtermsoverlapinearlyBuddhismandbecausethereisnotscriptural evidenceforthedistinction. Inhiswords, If theywereopposed in some way and had such dierent soteriological implications thereis little doubt that the Buddha would have taken care to point it out. Inopposition to Premasiris view, Keown contends that pu n na and kusala donot describe two kinds of actions but emphasize dierent aspects of one andthesameaction(1992: 123). However,eventhoughtheBuddhadidnotliterally distinguish between kusala and pu n na actions, Lance Cousins studyof kusalainthePali traditionshowstheexistenceof textual groundsforPremasirisdistinction. Cousins states explicitly that he essentially agreeswith Premasiri in this point and although there is some overlapping, pu n nais most often used in regard to actions intended to bring about results of apleasant kind in the future. It is almost exclusively kusalawhich is used inrelation to the Buddhas path (1996: 154). Using Keowns own argument,if it were true that pu n naand kusalareferred to one and the same actionthereislittledoubtthattheBuddhawouldhavetakencaretopointitVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 131out.Becausetheearlytexts donot sayexplicitlythat pu n na andkusalarefer either to two actions or one and the same action, one has to analyze thedierent usages of the terms to reach a conclusion. The most comprehensivestudy of these usages seems to indicate that the terms refer to two dierentkindsof actions. AtleastthisiswhatCousinsconcludes, agreeingwithPremasiri. IprefertofollowtheirviewanddisagreewithKeownonthispoint.TheravadaBuddhistethics, inpractice, seemstomaintainacleardis-tinction between actions leading to the accumulation of pu n na and the expe-rience of pleasant consequences within sam. sara, and kusalaactions leadingto nirvana. This fact could be interpreted as an indication of the canonicalorigins of these two kinds of actions. One might dispute whether or not thecontemporary Theravada emphasis on pu n naover kusalais consistent withthe Pali Canon, but one cannot deny that there are early textual grounds forspeaking about two kinds of actions, at least when the meanings of kusalaand pu n nado not overlap. What can be denied, in agreement with Keown,is that the soteriological outcome of the two actions is unrelated. Keownsrejection of the distinction between pu n naand kusalaactions presupposesthat the two kinds of actions are opposed to each other and that they leadto two qualitative dierent soteriological goals. This, however, is not neces-sarily the case because kusalaand pu n nacan also be interpreted as leadingin dierent ways (teleological and instrumental) to one and the same sote-riological goal, namely, nirvanicvirtues. Thatis, onecanconsiderpu n naand the proximate goals as stepping stones towards kusala and the ultimategoal of nirvana.However, in order to avoid the exegetical issues around the terminologyofkusalaandpu n na,Iprefertheheuristicdistinctionbetweeninstrumen-tal actions (leading to favorable conditions to cultivate nirvanic virtues) andteleological actions (actually displaying nirvanic virtues). In fact my distinc-tion is not exactly equivalent to the distinction between pu n naand kusala.Actionsactuallydisplayingnirvanicvirtuesaresimilartokusalaifkusalasigniesactionsparticipatinginwholesomementalstatescharacteristicofthe Buddhist ideal of sainthood. However, they are dissimilar if kusalaac-tionsinearlyBuddhismdenotesprimarily, asCousinshasshown, actionsassociated with special states produced by wisdom and related to a medita-tional context (Cousins 1996: 145). Actions leading to favorable conditionsto cultivate nirvanic virtues are similar to pu n naactions in that they bothlead to pleasant or happy results in the future. However they are dissimilarin that pu n naactions arenotexplicitly subordinated to thecultivation of132 JournalofBuddhistEthicsnirvanic virtues in the future.Mydistinctionhighlightstheunityandcontinuitybetweenthesetwokinds of actions,and between instrumental and teleological goods in Bud-dhist ethics. Instrumental and teleological actions have the same soteriologi-cal goal, both lead to nirvanic virtues and the cessation of suering. Strictlyspeaking,itcouldbemaintainedthatthesoteriologicalgoalsaredierentbecause favorable conditions for cultivating nirvanic virtues is not the sameas the actual display of these virtues. However, I prefer to emphasize thatboth kinds of actions ultimately converge in one and the same goal.Like Keown, I do not support the King-Spiro hypothesis. The distinctionbetween instrumental and teleological actions should not be confused withthedistinctionbetweenkarmaticandnirvanicBuddhism. ThedistinctionI am proposing between these two kinds of actions is precisely intended torender the categories of karmatic and nirvanic Buddhism unnecessary. Ac-cording to my distinction, both kinds of actions are karmatic and nirvanic atthe same time. Both kinds of actions generate karma either instrumentallyorteleologicallyrelatedtonirvanicvirtues. Liberatedbeingscouldbein-terpreted as performing actions that are only nirvanic in nature, but this ismisleading because liberated beings are not beyond the moral domain of thegood or beyond the karma of other living beings. The actions of liberatedbeings display nirvanic virtues, and in this sense they are part of the moraldomainofthegood. Similarly,actionsofliberatedbeingscanleadothersto favorable conditions by teaching or inspiring them to cultivate or displaynirvanic virtues.Like Keown, I do not support the transcendency thesis, and my distinc-tiondoesnotimplythatethicsinBuddhismisapreliminarypracticetobe transcended in advanced stages of the spiritual path. Keown is perfectlyrightonthispoint, andI sharehisviewof moral virtuesasaconstitu-tive part of nirvana, together with cognitive virtues. In order to avoid thetranscendency thesis, Keown proposes a version of virtue ethics where onlyteleological actionsarepartof themoral domainof thegood. However,the acceptance of instrumental actions does not necessarily entail the tran-scendenceof ethicsoncenirvanaisattained. Ethicsisnevertranscendedin Buddhism. Although actions leading to favorable conditions to cultivatenirvanic virtues are instrumental, they are never transcended. In fact, lib-erated beings and perhaps all practitioners are supposed, at least ideally, toact to generate favorable conditions for the cultivation or display of nirvanicvirtuesinothers. WhatistranscendedinBuddhistethicsistheneedtoaccumulatemorekarmatoattainawakening, butnottheperformanceofactionsdisplayingnirvanicvirtues, noractionsleadingotherstofavorableVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 133conditions to cultivate nirvanic virtues.TheEarlyBuddhistCriteriaofGoodnessAt rst sight, Keowns analysis of morality in the Digha Nikaya seems to begrounding his account of Buddhist ethics in the Pali Nikayas. However, thethird chapter (Ethics and Psychology) and the refutation of utilitarian read-ings of Buddhist ethics in chapter nine, make clear that Keowns criterion ofgoodness is inspired by Abhidharma thought. In his words, For utilitariansthere are not intrinsically good motives, while for Buddhism action inspiredbythethreeCardinal Virtuesisintrinsicallygood. IntermsofBuddhistpsychology, aswesawwhendiscussingtheAbhidharmainChapter3, thelocusof goodandevil istobefoundinthehumanpsychenotintheconsequences of actions in the world at large. (1992: 179).However, isAbhidharmapsychological ethicstheyardsticktomeasurethe nature of Buddhist ethics? Can Abhidharmaethics be generalized andextrapolatedtoallmanifestationsofBuddhistethics? HereIlimitmyselftodiscusswhetherornotKeownsAbhidharmiccriterionofgoodnesscor-respondstothecriteriaofgoodnessfoundinearlyBuddhism, bywhichImean the Buddhism of the Pali Nikayas.PerhapsthemorestraightforwardearlyBuddhistcriterionofgoodnesscanbefoundin(M.I.415-419) withintheAmbalat.t.hikarahulovadaSutta.There the Buddha advises his recently ordained son Rahula to reect before,during, and after performing a bodily, verbal, or mental action: whether ornot an action may lead to my own aiction, or to the aiction of others,ortotheaictionof both; itisanunwholesomebodilyaction. . . verbalaction. . . mental action with painful consequences, with painful results. . . itis a wholesome bodily action. . . verbal action. . . mental action with pleasantconsequences, with pleasant results (Bhikkhu Nan.amoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi1995: 524-526).The criterion has two parts. The rst one is clearly utilitarian because itexplicitly states that one should consider whether or not the consequences ofan action might lead (sam. vatteyya) to ones one aiction (attavyabadhaya),to the aiction of others (paravyabadhaya), or to the aiction of both (ub-hayavyabadhaya). Inotherwords, therstpartof thecriteriontriestominimize suering for the greatest number, which here is referred to as theaictionofoneself, others, andbothoneselfandothers. Thesecondpartof the criterion, which Peter Harvey does not mention in his own discussionof this text (1995), can be interpreted as characteristic of either moral real-134 JournalofBuddhistEthicsism or virtue ethics, depending on how the terms unwholesome (akusala) orwholesome(kusala) are understood.The standard denition of the unwholesome and the wholesome appearsin(MNI.47), withintheSammadit.t.hi Sutta. There, theunwholesomeisdenedasthetenunwholesomeactions: killing,takingwhatisnotgiven,misconduct in sensual pleasures, false, divisive, harsh, and frivolous speech,covetousness, ill will, and wrong view. The roots of the unwholesome are saidto be greed, hate, and delusion. The wholesome is dened as the opposite ofthe ten unwholesome actions, and the roots of the wholesome as the oppositeof the three roots of the unwholesome.Becausetheunwholesomeandthewholesomerefertobothcertainex-ternal bodily and verbal actions and certain internal mental actions or men-tal states, itisnotclearwhichistheprimarymeaning. If unwholesomerefers primarily to the intrinsic proprieties of certain external actions suchas killing, stealing, lying, and so on, then the second part of the criterion ischaracteristic of moral realism. If unwholesome refers primarily to internalmental actionsormental statessuchascovetousness, ill will, andwrongview, then the second part of the criterion is characteristic of virtue ethics.The fact that the three roots of the unwholesome and the three roots ofthe wholesome are mental states does not preclude the existence of certainexternal actions that are intrinsically unwholesome or wholesome. Certainlymental states addunwholesomeness or wholesomeness toactions, but itisimportanttohighlightthat(MNI.47)doesnotstatethattherstsixexternal bodily and verbal actions are unwholesome or wholesome dependingonjustthemental rootfromwhichtheyoriginate. ThisideaappearsinAbhidharmaliterature but not in the Pali Nikayas.Because the referent of unwholesome is external bodily and verbal actionsas well as internal mental actions, I interpret the second part of the criterionas a combination of moral realism and virtue ethics; moral realism becausecertainexternalactionsareunwholesomeorwholesome, andvirtueethicsbecause certain internal actions are unwholesome or wholesome.The second part of the criterion also states that unwholesome and whole-some actions have respectively painful or pleasant consequences, painful orpleasantresults. However,thismentionofconsequencesinrelationtothewholesomeness or unwholesomeness of actions is not a sign of utilitarianism.Thepointhereisnottoconsidertheconsequencesinordertominimizesuering, but rather realizethat certainactions producecertainkindofconsequences.The second part of the criterion does not refute my characterization oftherstpartasutilitarianbecauseitisnowherestatedthatthewhole-VelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 135someness or unwholesomeness of actions is what leads to pleasant or painfulconsequences. The second part of the criterion is not to be universalized butsupplemented by a consideration of the consequences of actions. If what thecriterion conveys as a whole were that the good or evil of actions dependsexclusivelyontheirwholesomenessorunwholesomeness, thenitwouldbeunnecessarytoconsidertheconsequencesof actions; atbestitwouldberedundant. Because the criterion as a whole does require a consideration ofthe consequences of actions and not just of their wholesomeness or unwhole-someness, I think it is better to interpret it as implying that the goodnessof actions depends not only on their wholesomeness but also on their con-sequences.Itistruethatthewholesomenessorunwholesomenessof actionsisavery important factor to determine the goodness of actions. However, thisdoes not mean that all the good or evil of actions derives from their whole-someness or unwholesomeness. In the Pali Nikayas, the consideration of thewholesomenessorunwholesomenessof external bodilyandverbal actions(moral realism) and internal mental actions (virtue ethics) is to be supple-mented by the consideration of the consequences of actions for the happinessof oneself and others (utilitarianism).If something can be inferred from the criterion found in the Ambalat.t.hi-karahulovada Sutta, it is not that the good or evil of actions depends exclu-sively on their wholesomeness or unwholesomeness. What the Ambalat.t.hi-karahulovada Sutta indicates is that before, during, and after performing anaction one has to take into account two basic things: the wholesomeness orunwholesomeness of actions,and the consequences of these actions for thehappiness or suering of oneself, others, or both self and others. The moralrealism and the virtue ethics of the second part of the criterion is combinedwith the utilitarianism of the rst part. The second part of the criterion em-phasizes the pleasant or painful consequences of wholesome or unwholesomeactions, and in that way restates from a dierent angle (moral realism andvirtue ethics) the rst utilitarian part of the criterion. While the utilitarianparttriestominimizesueringforthegreatestnumber, themoralrealistand virtue ethics part remind the practitioner the intrinsic good or evil ofcertain actions.I believe that the complexity and richness of this early Buddhist criterionof goodness is seriously compromised when one tries to reduce it to a formofvirtueethicswhereonlytheintentionsorthemental statesunderlyingactions count. Similarly, I believe that reducing this early Buddhist criterionof goodness to utilitarianism is equally reductionistic because consequencesarenottheonlythingthatmatters. FollowingRoyPerret, Ibelievethat136 JournalofBuddhistEthicsthe opposition between intentionalism and consequentialism in Western eth-icaltheorydoesnotgureinBuddhistethics(1987). Inotherwords, thegoodnessofactionsdoesnotdependexclusivelyoneitherthegoodnessofintentions or the goodness of consequences. Virtue ethics is certainly presentinearlyBuddhism, andevidentlytheinternal mental stateormotivationunderlying actions is very important to determine the overall goodness of ac-tions, perhaps the most important from a Buddhist point of view. However,the intrinsic wholesomeness of certain external bodily and verbal actions, aswell astheconsequencesoftheseactionsforthehappinessorsueringofoneself and others, are also extremely important and necessary to assess thegoodness of actions.Another text indispensable to understand the early Buddhist criteria ofgoodnessappearsin(ANI.186-187)withintheKalamaSutta. There, theBuddhanotonlyproposesacriteriontoacceptthetruthofadoctrineasitiscommonlyinterpreted, butalsoacriteriontoascertainthegoodorevil ofapractice. TheBuddhaadvicestheKalamapeoplenottoacceptsomething because it is tradition, hearsay, a sacred scripture, a logical rea-soning, somethingsaidbyacompetentspeaker, orevenbecauseitissaidby one of their teachers. Then the Buddha says, But when you know foryourselves, These things are unwholesome, these things are blamable; thesethings are censured by the wise; these things, if undertaken and practiced,leadtoharmandsuering. Thenyoushouldabandonthem.ThentheBuddha asks whether greed, hatred, and delusion lead to welfare or harm,and he says that a greedy, hating, and deluded person will kill, steal, sexu-ally misbehave, and lie. The opposite is said about what is wholesome andthe three roots of the wholesome.Like the criterion of the Ambalat.t.hikarahulovadaSutta,the criterion ofthe Kalama Sutta does not advise one to consider only the unwholesomenessof actions, literally of things (dhamma), which can refer to doctrines and/orpractices. Besidestheunwholesomeness(akusala)of things, theBuddhaadvisestoconsiderthreemorethings: whetherornottheyareblamable(savajja),censuredbythewise(vi n n ugarahita),andifpracticed andun-dertaken lead to harm and suering (samatta samadina ahitaya dukkhayasam. vattanti ). The opposite is also to be considered, that is, the wholesome-ness of actions, whether or not they are blameless, praised by the wise, andlead to harmless and happy results.Thersttwoitemstobeconsidered, namely, whetherornotactionsare wholesome or unwholesome,blamable or blameless,are similar in thatthey all refer to the intrinsic goodness of certain bodily, verbal, and mentalactions. The Kalama Sutta, like the criterion of the Ambalat.t.hikarahulovadaVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 137Sutta, mentions internal and external actions, that is, mental actions such asgreed, hatred, and delusion; and external bodily and verbal actions such askilling, stealing, sexual misconduct, and lying. Again, it is nowhere statedin the Kalama Suttathat the four external actions are unwholesome due tothe three mental roots of the unwholesome. Strictly speaking, the text onlysaysthatagreedy, hating, anddeludedpersonwillperformfourkindsofexternal actions, and that a nongreedy, nonhating, nondeluded person willabstain from these actions. The unwholesome or the wholesome can refer toeither the three roots or the four external actions. That is, it can be arguedthat the criterion combines features of moral realism (intrinsic good or evilexternal actions) with features of virtue ethics (intrinsic good or evil mentalstates).Thethirditemtobeconsidered,namelywhetheractionsarecensuredor praised by the wise,can be interpreted either as virtue ethics (virtuouspersonsdeterminewhatisgoodorevil)orasasocialconvention(societyoraparticulargroupofsocietydecideswhatisgoodorevil). Thefourthitem to be considered clearly refers to the consequences of actions. Again,theharmful andpainful consequencesareneithersaidtobederivedfromthe unwholesomeness of actions, nor from greed, hatred, and delusion. So,it can be argued that the fourth item of the criterion is utilitarian becauseit takes into account the resulting happiness or suering of actions.Another Pali text relevant for our discussion of the early Buddhist cri-terion of goodness can be found in (MN II.114), within the Bahitika Sutta.There the king Pasenadi of Kosala asks the monkAnanda whether or notthe Buddha performs actions censured by wise recluses and brahmins. Theking asks what action is censured by the wise,Ananda replies that unwhole-someaction, whichisfurtherexplainedinsubsequentquestionsasactionthatisblamable, actionthatbringsaiction, actionwithpainful results,and action that leads to ones own aiction, or to the aiction of others,ortotheaictionof both, andonaccountof whichunwholesomestatesincreaseandwholesomestatesdiminishes. Suchbodily. . . verbal. . . mentalbehavioriscensuredbywisereclusesandbrahmins(BhikkhuNan.amoliand Bhikkhu Bodhi 1995: 724-726).It seems possible to interpret the text as suggesting a criterion of good-ness characteristic of virtue ethics. The goodness of actions derives from thewholesome virtue or root mental motivation associated with them; it is duetothisintrinsicunwholesomenessofactionsthattheyareblamable,bringaictionandpainful resultstooneself andothers, andthatiswhytheyarecensuredbythewise. Idisagreewiththisinterpretationbecausethetextdoesnotsaythattheconsequencesderivefromtheunwholesomeness138 JournalofBuddhistEthicsof actions. The three roots of the unwholesome are not mentioned, and, as Ihave already said, the term unwholesomerefers not only to internal mentalactions (the last three of the ten unwholesome actions), but also to externalbodily and verbal actions (the rst six of the ten unwholesome actions, andthe four precepts).Itseemsalsopossibletointerpretthetextassuggestingacriterionofgoodnesscharacteristicof consequentialism. Infact, thisispreciselytheinterpretation of Premasiri (1987). I also disagree with his consequentialistinterpretation because the text does not explicitly state that the unwhole-someness of actions derives from their consequences.In my view, neither a consequentialist nor a virtue ethics reading of thetext do justice to this early Buddhist criterion of goodness. If it were truethatonlytheconsequencescount,Idonotseewhythetextmentionstheunwholesomenessandblamefulnessofactions. Conversely, ifonlytheun-wholesomeness and blamefulness counts, why are the consequences so muchemphasized?I do not think that the point of the text is to justify any exclu-sive interpretation of Buddhist ethics,be it virtue ethics or consequential-ism. I prefer to interpret this criterion as the other criteria I have discussed,that is, as advising the consideration of actions from dierent angles. Theseangles generate diverse but complementary perspectives of the goodness ofactions. Fromonepointofview,onecalculatesthehappinessorsueringresulting from actions. From another point of view, one assesses the moti-vation or mental states underlying actions. From still another point of view,one ponders the kind or content of actions. The overall goodness of actionsdepends on several factors, not just on one of them, be it the consequences,the mental states, or the nature of actions.In conclusion, the criteria of goodness in the Pali Nikayas does not cor-respondtoaformof virtueethics as Keowndenes it, but rather toaparticular system of virtue ethics with features of utilitarianism and moralrealism. This does not mean that early Buddhist ethics is a form of moralparticularism with a plurality of moral theories, namely, virtue ethics, util-itarianism, and moral realism (Hallisey, 1996). Early Buddhist ethics is suigeneris, that is, one of a kind, dierent from other traditions of virtue ethicsknown in the West. As Peter Harvey rightly says the rich eld of Buddhistethics would be narrowed by wholly collapsing it into any single one of theKantian, Aristotelian or Utilitarian models. (2000: 51).Early Buddhist ethics considers mental action as more important thanbodilyandverbal action(MNI.373): Idescribemental actionasmorereprehensiblefor theperformanceof evil action, for theperpetrationofevil action, andnotsomuchbodilyactionandverbal action.Similarly,VelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 139early Buddhism equates intention (cetana) and karma (AN III.415), whichdoes not mean that only intention or motivation constitutes moral actions,but rather that without intention actions do not generate karma. That is,intention is the basic requirement for speaking about moral actions withinBuddhism. ThisprimacyofthemindandintentioninearlyandclassicalBuddhism seems to indicate that the mental states behind actions are themost important factor to determine the goodness of actions. I do not denythisclassical tenetof Buddhistethics. However, thisprimacyof mentalactionandintentiondoesnotmeanthatwithinearlyBuddhistethicstheconsequencesorthecontentof actionsareirrelevantfordeterminingthegoodness of actions. Generally speaking, it might be said that Abhidharmaethics tend to emphasize the mental states behind actions, Mahayana ethicsthe consequences of actions for the suering of all living beings, and Vinayaethics the rules and the content of actions. Early Buddhist ethics, however,tend to integrate in its criteria of goodness the three factors: motivation andcontentof actions(wholesomeness, blamelessness)andtheirconsequences(harmless and happy results for oneself and others).EarlyBuddhist ethics canbeconsideredasystemof virtueethics ifvirtue ethics is understood more in keeping with the Aristotelian model andChristian traditions of virtue ethics. That is, as a system where the summumbonumisnotidentiedwiththemoraldomainofthegoodandtheright,where there are both instrumental and teleological goods, where observingcertainsetsofpreceptsorlawsismorallygoodevenwhenthemotivationisnotvirtuous,andwheretheconsequencesofactionsarealsotakenintoaccount to assess the overall goodness of actions. However, if virtue ethicsis understood as Keown does, that is, as an ethical theory where the goodandtherightisidentiedwithnirvana, whereonlyactionsdisplayingorparticipating in nirvanic virtues are good, and where motivation or intentionistheonlyfactortodeterminethegoodnessofactions, thenIthinkthatcalling early Buddhist ethics a system of virtue ethics is problematic.I believe that the interpretation of the early Buddhist criteria of goodnessI have developed in this article has important consequences for our under-standingof Buddhistethicsasawhole. First, if whatIhavesaidaboutthe early Buddhist criteria of goodness is plausible, then Keowns view, ac-cordingtowhichactionsinBuddhismaregoodorevil dependingonjustthe agents motivation, has to be modied. Besides motivation, Buddhists,atleastthosewhoconsiderauthoritativethePali Nikayas, havetotakeintoaccounttheconsequencesof actionsforthehappinessof oneself andothers,as well as the intrinsic good or evil of certain actions. Second,thewidespread belief according to which Mahayana ethics constitute a radical140 JournalofBuddhistEthicsdeparturefromearlyBuddhistethicshastobequalied. ItistruethatMahayana ethics is more consequentialist than earlier Buddhism,but it isalso true that Mahayana ethics builds upon the utilitarian features of earlyBuddhism. Like the utilitarian features of early Buddhism, the consequen-tialist features of Mahayana ethics do not imply that the goodness of actionsdependsexclusivelyontheconsequences. Thecontentofactionsmatters,andthebadkarmaassociatedtocertainactionsisacknowledgedeveninMahayana texts where someone is killed in order to preserve the happinessof the greatest number (Harvey 2000: 135-136).Similarly, IbelievethattheheuristicdistinctionIhaveintroducedinthisarticlehasalsoimportantrepercussionsforourdescriptionsof Bud-dhist ethics. First,the distinction privileges ideal types of ethical practicewithout excluding or marginalizing less ideal but equally important types ofBuddhist practice. Second,the distinction expands Keowns conception ofvirtueethics, makingitevenmoreconsistentwithAristotelianethicsandother Western traditions of virtue ethics.0.1 AbbreviationsAll referencestothePali textsaretotheeditionof thePali TextSoci-ety,Oxford. ReferencestotheA nguttara,Digha,MajjhimaandSam. yuttaNikayasare to the volume and page number.AN A nguttara NikayaDN Digha NikayaMN Majjhima NikayaSN Sam. yutta Nik ayaBibliographyAronson, H.B. 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