what happens to viññāṇa in the cessation attainment - an exegesis of m.i. 295-296 (ocr)

8/17/2019 What Happens to Viññāṇa in the Cessation Attainment - An Exegesis of M.I. 295-296 (OCR)

1/27

Pieris, Aloysius 2003. “What Happens to Viññāṇa in theCessation Attainment? An Exegesis of M.I. 295–296.”

Bukkyō Kenkyū 31:43–68.


2/27

What Happens to

VinniiTJ Q.

in the Cessation Attainment

?

An

Exegesis of M.I. 295-296

Aloysius Pieris, s.j.

1. The State of the Question: The Twofold Controversy a>

The t ~

of nirodha-samapatti or

'cessation

attainment

(hence forward

NS) is consistently referred

to

in the

Suttas as saiiiiii-uedayita-nirodha

(henceforward SVN ) , that is to say,

as

cessation of ideation and

sensation . Both expressions designate a very special meditative state

about which there is an unresolved dispute among scholars, both ancient

and modern. The disagreement is about the question implied in the

title

of

this article, namely, Does uiniuu ia cease or does it persist in the person

who

attains NS

? .

Furthermore, this question is

of

such a nature

that

whoever

attempts to

answer

it

on the basis

of the

texts is invariably

co

nfr

onted with another related issue which is equally debated among

scholars today, namely, whether or not

NS

( SVN ) and Nirvana refer

to

the same thing. This second question needs to

be

resolved before

discussing the first question, which, of course, remains the main focus of

this

investigation .

The Canon

as

well as the Commentaries are clear that uinii.dr.ia is

arrested in the attainment of

Nirvana. Whatever causes

dukkha

must

cease in that state

in

which dukkha is totally eliminated. Since the arising

of dukkha is conditioned by uiiiiiiin.a, it follows that dukkha would not

arise

with the cessation

of

consciousness

uiMlu).a-n

ir

odhena

n atthi

dukkhassa

sambhauo)

Thus, those

who

identify Nirvana with SVN have

t

co

nclude quite logically

that uiiiiia.TJ a

ceases in

the state of

SVN. Those

- 43 -


3/27

What

Happens

to

Viiiiial a n

the Cessation Attai nment ?

who do

not mab

that equation , such as for ins

tan

ce Buddhaghosa, have

to find

another

mode of reasonmg to answer the question implied in the

title

of

this

paper,

as

we shall demonstrate later.

As already stated above, there s no consensus

of

opinion among

contemporary scholars as to whether

Nirvana

is

th

e sa me

as

SVN

or

is

something totally other. A preliminary assessment of the two opinions

about

it

could be quite helpful

in

achieving the main focus

of

our

investigation, which is

to

ascertain

whether the canonic

al texts

say

anything

definite

about the survival or cessation of

uihnarJa

in the s tate

of

SVN .

Although the

ultimate

answer

to

this

question

must

come

from

practice and experience patipatti

and

patiuedha) , we haue euery right

to

probe

into

the

matter

within the

restricted

area

of

scriptural

study

pariya

tti

).

Hence, 1 in

sist that

SVN is

not the object of my study because

it is beyond

my

competence.

My focus, I repeat, is on

what the

texts

say

or do

not say

about

what happens to

uiimiirµi

in the SVN. This invariably

includes

also

the dispute

about what the texts say or do not

say

about

the

identity or the difference between Nirvana and SVN.

2.

Nirvana and the NS

: The Position

of

the Pali Exegetes

The Pali exegctea when commenting on the relevant texts have subscribed

to

the theory that Nirvana a

nd

SVN are entirely two

different

things.

They have

also

discovered two sharply defined conceptual tools which

would serve them

as

"precision instruments" to present t heir case with

absolute

clarity

(a) the notion

of sabhlluadhamma

(a positively existing reality) as

opposed

to asabhlluadhamma

(a privative state defined by the

absc nce

of

a positive existing

reality

) ;

(b) the notion

of nipphann.a,

namely, that which s produced or created

-

-


4/27

What Happens to Vi.iiiUm a in the Cessation Attainmen t ?

by var ious causes (including human endeavour) , as opposed to

anipphanna

(unproduced

). J

Employing these

terms

, the exegetes demonstrate

that

SVN and

Nirvana are mutua

lly exclusive. The former is a privative state asabhaua-

dho.mma) which is produced nipphanna) by var ious causes, whereas

Nirvana, by contrast,

s

a posi tively existing entity sabha.uadhamma)

which is unproduced

anipphan.na)

by any cause Quite understandably,

therefore, the scholiasts insist

that

such categories

as

sarrikhata

(composed) and

asarrik/lata

(uncomposed)

or

lokiya (cosmic) and

lokuttara (metacosmic) cannot

be

predicated of Nirodha Samapatti, since

it does not exist

as

a real thing

sabbha.uato natthitaya).

Thus any

equation of Nirvana with SVN ( = NS) is ruled out by this scholastic

argument.

I am obliged to parenthesize, here, that Paul Griffiths, in his

otherwise excellent study of relevant texts from differ

ent

Buddhist

traditio

ns dealing with NS '' has failed to notice this scholastic distinction

and has also misread a text of Buddhagosa

as

seemingly identifying NS

wit

h Nirvana . Besides

mistranslating

an impor

tant

exegetical passage

of

Buddhaghosa, thus missing the point of the

latter's argument

(see nt.33

below) , he has failed to notice the set of clearly defined scholastic terms

wh

ich, as I explained above,

ar

e utilized by Buddhaghosa, Ohammapala

and all t he

Pa

li scholiasts to demonstrate

that

Ni rvana and the NS cannot

be the same

th

i ng.

Besi

des, in each context, one

must

decide whether

nirodha

(cessation)

refers to Ni rvana or simply to the NS. Th

us

in Vsm 705, Buddhaghosa

clearly uses the phrase nirodhaT l. nibbana11t which clearly means

"that

cessation wh

ic

h is Nibbana ; the implication is

that

ho is not alluding to

"that cessa t ion which is SVN .

Hence

Griffith's doubt that , here,

Buddhaghosa might seem to identify Ni rvana with NS is not only not

warranted by the t

ext

itself, but runs counter to the clear and consistent

differentiation that Buddhghosa makes between tho two states elsewhere

- 45 -


5/27

What Happens to ViiiMl ia in the Cessation

Atta

inme

nt?

in his writings. Note also how Nagasena answers Milinda's question,

Nirodh-0 nibbtznan ti? . After

answering in the

affirmat

ive, ( Yes, Great

King, Cessation

is

Nibbana ) he

immediately

clarifies

what

kind of

Nirodha Nibbana is.• Thus, the

Pali

Abhidhammika writers have left

no

room whatsoever for anyone

to

conclude

that

they identify SVN with

Nibbana

3. Nirvana and the

NS

: The

Posit

ion

of the

Canonical Authors

Hence

this

c

ritical

comment made on

Griffith's

opinion

must

be directed

also against

Wijesekera

's

equivocal understanding

of nirodha I nirujjhati

( in a passage l am going

to

quote below) , where

he

does

not

seem to have

perceived

the

difference between

nirodha

predicated

of Ni

rvana and

nirodha predicated

of

SVN.

The same observation may be valid with regard

to

other

contemporary scholars who rigorously maintain that in the

Pali

Canon

Nirvana and

NS

are considered

to

be one and the same thing. The late Ven.

Yakka(juve Pai'inaramall and the late Ven. Palahane Vajiran8.Qa, .., can e

cited as two eminent examples. This shows

that

the

two

opinions

on

this

matter continue to divide the sc

holars of our

own times.

How does one account

for

the persistence

of this

disagreement to this

da

y? One exp

lanati

on would

be to take 0.C.

Panda's lead and suggest

that

it is

the

ambiguity

in the Canonical

texts

themselves that allows for

both

interpretations.

For instance, in M.1.295 ( the Sutta passage under

investigation, ~

as

also in S.IV.294 (and Vsm 703-704 , according to

Pande,

t

he

description

of

'nirodha

-samapat

ti ' comes nearer

that

of

catalepsy than of sambodhi .'

0

But elsewhere, e.g. in S.U.146,

NS

seems to

presuppoae the attainment of the

andgdmi as

well

as

the arahan st.ate, the

implication being that it could

also

occur

after

Ni rvana or Full Release. If

ln other passages, however, Pande thinks that the tendency is to eq

uat

e

Nirvanic experience to Nirodhasamipatti .

6

-


6/27

What Happens to Viiiiial la in the Cessation Attainment?

How valid is

this

conclusion ? I have

the

impression that the

observation I made above with reference

to

the

commentaries

dealing with

this

question is valid also in the case

of

the Suttas :- a confusion, if any,

is not

in the texts as such but in the failure to note where nirodha

(cessation) is use as a term for SVN and where it stands for Nirvana.

Let

us study a typical instance of alleged ambiguity, e.g.,

the

experience of Sariputta described by the Buddha himself in the Anupada

Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya. In all the trances that precede SVN, one

hears the Buddha saying that Sariputta emerging from each

stage

of

attainment

realizes

that

There is a further escape [meaning

that

liberatio

n is not complete

as yet

]

and

therefore, There is zealous practice

for him concerning that [meaning

that

the practice

of

mental

development bas to continue further towards that

further

goal

of

liberation).1-0 But what happens after reaching and ~ i d i n g in SVN is

explicitly described as follows:

on realizing [the goal] by wisdom paniiiiya) his cankers are

destroyed

iisauti parikkhiTJii honti) .

But

as

he adses

from that

attainment tiiya samiipattiyii) , he is detached and freed with no

need to

practise further,

as

now there is no further escape.

ll

Now

the doubt is about

that

attainment from which he rose

mindful. Since

he is

said

to

have

been

abiding

in

SVN, does

that

attainment refer

to

SVN ? Does not the

text

also

say

very clearly

that

while in that state of SYN, Saripu

tta's

cankers were destroyed (which

means he attained Ni rvana) on seeing

with

wisdom ? Hence, is not the

Nirvanic experience associated with intuitive wisdom which dawned on

him

while abiding in the SYN ? The least we can

say

is that there is no

way of inferring from the text that SYN is Nirvana. This, in fact, is the

way the Commentary also understands the text:-

On

seeing with wisdom, his cankers were destroyed means this:- on

seeing four truths through the wisdom of the Path,

the

four cankers

- 7-


7/27

What Happens

to

iiii i} in lhe Cess

at

ion Attainme

nt?

were destroyed. For Sariputta i t is

also

the occasion for

attaining

Arahatship

by r

esorting

to the

harm

onious combination of

Tranquility and Insight; here

the

occasion of

tai

ning

NS

is regarded

as

the occasion

of

attaining

Ar

ahantship

for,

th

ey

say

that

cessation

is

reached

in

successive stages

thanks to

o

ne

s mas tery gained through

practice. Here when [the practice] is aimed at NS the occasion comes

for NS while the attainment of the fruit is hidden, just as when the

aim

of

the practice is the

attainment of

the

Fru

i t , then the occasion

comes

for

the attainment of the fruit while the

NS

remains hidden.

But

the

Indian Elders say this: The Elder Sariput

t.a

,

by

resorting

to

the

combined method

of Tranquillity

-Insight reali

zed the fruit

of the

non-returner and then attained Cessation CNS), a

nd

arising from

Cessa

tion

C

NS

)

he attained

Ara

hat

ship. lll

Thus neither Buddhaghosa nor

the

Indian Theras whom he quotes as

holding

another

opinion

treat

th

e

attainm

e

nt

of

arhatta

(i.e. Nirvana) as

if it. were the same as the cessation trance.

Would

i t not

be

safe

r , then,

to

conclude

that ne

i

th

er

this

Canonic

al

text

n

or

the Commentary on it can make us say that NS and Arahatship

are identical

attainments

though they could happen

at

the same time?

That

the

two attainments

are,

de

facto

two

and

not

one ?

Once we accept this conclusio

n

namely, that

the

Canonical

texts

clearly

differentiate

between

Ni

rvana and NS we can proceed with the

main theme of this investigation:- What happens to uiiiiilLTJ4 in a Nirodha

Samapanna (i.e . in the one who

has attained

the cessation

attainment

)?

What

does the

~ o n

say

about it

?

4.

Vinnsos

nd NS : the Tacit Intent in M 1 2 9 5 ~

The lOCU cla.&&icu in the Canon, which seems

to

deal with this question is

M.1.295-6. Though this text seems ambiguous at first sight, a closer

-

48

-


8/27

What Happens to

niial;la

in the Cessation Attainment ?

scrutiny reveals t hat the S

utt

a compilers

ha

ve exe rcised a discreet silence

on the matter we are discussing: textus tacet. This silence, presumably, is

an eloquent testimony to a

pr

e-textual history yet to

be

discovered.

The way I read M 1 .295-296,

as

explained be low, has suggested to me

tha t the controversy

about

the fa

te of

uiiiiilif}a in t he cessation

attainment, in

aU

probability, predates the compilation of

that pa

ssage.

This

remote

origin of the controversy, however,

li

es beyo

nd

the present

state of scholarship.

Bu

t one can qu

ite

co

mfortably

locate the

proximate

origin

of

the controversy

in

the S

utta

itself. This distinct ion between the

immediate and the remote co

nt

ext wi ll not sound overly speculative wh en

our investigation is completed.

The

technical

ph rase for

th

e cessation

attainment

,

as

I have already

noted, is saiiiid-uedayita

-n

irodha, namely, cessation of idea

ti

on and

sensation.

Now

s iiiid an

d

ue

dan

ii

a re

not

identical with

uifliiar)a

(or

cit ta

, but are said to be aspects of t he

latter

and

hen

ce they are

classed as cetasikii. concom

ita

nt constituents

of

citt

a ,

that is to say,

phenomena associated

with

consciousness, a

nd

not the phenomenon of

consciousness as such. Thus the technical phrase for cessation attainment

consistently mentions only the arrest

of

ideat ion and sensation, and not

that of consciousness

as

such. The cessation of uinnlu )a is therefore not

explici

tl

y

mentioned

in

t his scriptural phrase. Does the Mahavedalla Sutta

(M .

1 296

) offer an explicit teaching about it ?

This

text

mentions three kinds of activities that cease at the NS:

kii.ya

sarrr.khii.rii.

(bodily activities), uaci-sarrik

hii.r

ii (verbal activities) and mano

sarrr.khii.rii. (mental activities

.

In the very next Sutta (Cu llavedalla

Sutta,

M.l.301) , these thr

ee

terms are explained as follows :-

1. bodily activit ies = asstisa-passasa (breathing in and out)

2. verbal activities = uitakka-u icltra (i.e. deductive and

di

scursive

processes [

of

the mind] which a re implied in verbal formulations)

- 49 -


9/27

What Happens

to Viiiii.dl}a in

the Cessation Attainme

nt

?

3. menta l activities =

saiiiUi

and uedana (ideation and sensation)

Here again, consciousness is not explicitly mentioned as an item that

ceases in

the

cessation

trance

.

The

same Sutta

(M.

1 302

) also

says

that

in

someone who attains SVN verbal

activities

cease first, then the bodily,

and finally

the mental.

Hence it is quite

legitimate

to raise the question whether the cessation

of mental activities cetasika) implies also the a rrest of the mind (citta

or uiiiiia Jli)

it.aelf. Buddhaghosa's answer

s

unambiguous in bis

declaration that NS is a state in which there 1s cessation of

citta

together

with the ~ t a s i k l i The question, nevertheless, has to be asked because

there seems

to have

been a school of thought

that

dcmed this implication.

According to that school of

thought,

the mind seemed to have continued 10

the NS unaccompanied by the mental activities. It is precisely against this

t h

eo

ry tha t Buddh

aghosa

seems

to

be

arguing,

in the course of his

exegesis, as will be indicated later .

This theory, so severely censored by Buddhaghosa finds a couple

of

advocates even

among

contempora ry Buddhist scholars. The late Prof.

H de A Wijesekera

was

cer tainly one of them,

at

least in the forties,

though there is evidence o f a ret

r

action

in the sixties. Apparently the first

in recent timea to recognize the crucial importance of

the

Sutt.a passage

examined here (M.l.295-296) , as he himself has insinuated, he had

interpreted it

to

mean

that

only

the

mental activity , i.e.,

saiiiia

and

ued.oAfi ceaee at the cessation t rance, and n

ot ui.iiii.arµi

this latter being a

proceaa other than mere mental activity .

11

• A variation

of

the same view

had been put forward by Rune Johansson for whom uinniil a is only an

aspect

of

citta, and would cease completely only in Nirvana, but seemed to

he

dormant

n the state

of

nirodha-sam Jpatti •

The Pali scholiasts, led by Buddhaghosa, firmly held the opposite

thesis that a

Ni

rodha-samapanna is ac

i

tt ko (Vsm

708

),

fo

r his uin.nti.r a

too

ceaeoa with

the

cessation of mental factors. This is also the position

-so-


10/27

What Happens to Viiiiial;l a in the Cessation Attainment?

taken

by Theravadins

in

o

ur

own day who

ha

ve identified Nirvana with

SVN.11>

Such polarization

of

opinion could

not

have occurred

if

M.1.295 296

had been explicit with regard to

this

point. As it stands the text lends no

support

to

either theory. Neither the survival nor the suspension of

uiiiiilu}a is asserted there. What

we

notice is not textual ambiguity of

any

sort but the impression

that

the Sutta compilers

have

chosen to be silent

with regard

to

this

matter.

Such would be the conclusion

that

dawns upon

us when we examine the

literary structure of

t his

Sutta

passage.

It

should

be

noted in advance

that

this passage is not concerned

directly

with

the question we are studying namely

th

e fate of uiiiiilu a in

the cessation tran

ce.

The immediate intention of its compilers is to

determine

t

di/

erence between a de d person

and

a Nirodha S4mapanna.

The reason for

this

in

terest

could have been the belief

that

untrained

observers

as

clearly testified in another S

utta

could mistake a Nirodha

samapanna

for a dead person with r

athe

r dangerous consequences such as

for

instance attempting

to

cr

emate

such a person while being alive.Ill

Since however there

is

no

uiniUir} a

in a dead person the canonical

authors

could hardly avoid the question

about th

e

fate

of

uiniiiir;la

in a

Nirodha-samapanna; for the whole purpose of this Sutta passage is to

s

how

the difference between the

two

states. A comparative study

of

death

and

NS cannot evade this issue. Yet the

st

range fact is

that

this obvious

question

has

actually

been left out of

considera tion

by

the authors of the

Sutta, and this

is

precisely wh

at

the

literary stru

cture of t he Sutta

reveals.

5. The Literary Structure of M.1.296 296 .

In

view of this hypothesis which I am

about

to establish I wish

to

recall

tha

t the Mahavedalla

Sutta

as

also

the Cullavedalla

Sutta

that

follows

- 51 -


11/27

What Happens to Viiina a in the Cessation Attainment ?

it

) belongs

to genre liter ire

of a catechetical nature, and therefore,

to

a

later

stratum of the

Pali Canon,

as Pande suggests.•

The

statements are

not

attributed

to

the

Buddha ; and the way

the

y are orgaruzed into

questions

and answers

indicate an incipi

ent

Abhidhammic tendency

to

spell

out unclarified questions with the aid

of

categories

al

ready existing

or

developed by the early systematizers

for

that. purpose.

Therefore, this

Sutla

allows us

t

presume that

its authors

were

aware

of the

difference of opinion

re

sulting from unclarified questions,

and were

probably reluctant to take

a

partisan

view.

It

would seem

that

their

task was to

make a pedagogically clear presentation

of

the common

doctrines

of the

Elders without. unnecessar ily pushing sectarian theories

into what was

deliberately intended

to be

a catechesis. Hence

the

impo

rtan

ce

of

studying

the

literary

structure.

This

literary struct

ure which serves t he catechetical methodology

of

the compil

ers,

revolves round various 'categories

of

phenomena' organized

into three

pa

radigms . Each

of

these

th

ree paradigms consists

of

a cluster

of

three inter-related phenomena

or

factors

of

experience ( and existence).

In the order

of

their appearance, they can be listed as follows:

Paradigm A : ayu, usma. indriyani life,

heat

and senses

Paradigm

B : ayu, usma viiinAr:ia = life, heat and consciousness

Paradigm C : kaya-. vaci-, citte-sarrikhara

=

physical, verbal and

mental activities

It is in terms

of

these three

paradigms

that the Sutt.a compares death

and

NS.

We have already noted above that in paradigm C, physical

activities kaya-sarnkhara) usually refers mainly to respiration , while

verbal

activities


12/27

What Happens to

Viiiiial;ia

in the Cessation

Attainment

?

Sutta

begins the discussion on

the

difference between death and

the

cessation trance

almost

immediately

after

establishing the

mutua

l

dependence between iiyu,

usm

ii and

the

paiicindriyan.i. The mind

is

explicitly excluded here. Hence

th

e triad

O.yu

-usmii-indriyimi m

Paradigm

A) , taken in the context

of

the S

utta,

clearly refers

to

life

, heat

and

the

five physical

senses.• Th

is

observation

is important

because

if the

mind

had also been includ

ed

among the senses in

Paradigm

A, then one would

have to conclude that the Sutta holds the mind to be present during

NS

·

PARADIGMS AT DE TH

I

DURING

NS

I

LIFE ayu )

EXHA

USTED

NOT EXHAUSTED

parikkhir)il.)

aparikkhu)a)

A

HEA

T

usma)

COOLED NOT COOLED

uipasanna

) auipasanna )

SENSES indriyan

i

DISINTEGRATED BR I

GHTENED UP

pasddani)

uiparibhinnani)

uippasanna)

LIFE

ayu)

I

ayu-usma-

uiiiMJµi

ARE

THE THINGS

B

HEA

T

iuma) dhamma )

7

THAT

LEAVE

pajahanti )

CONSCIOUSN ESS

THE BODY AT DEATH

uiMal:ia)

BODILY

ACTIV

ITIES

kii.ya-

8afTl/thlud

)

VERBAL

CEASE ANO SUBSIDE

CEASE AND SUBSIDE

c

ACTlVIT

IES

uaci-

arfl/thiira

) Niruddhb., patippassaddhb.

NiruddM, patippassaddM

MENTAL

ACT IVITIES

citta-

lafTl/chiira)

I

- 53 -


13/27

What Happens

to

iiiiiat}a in the Cessa tion Attainment

?

have tabulated, here, the manner in which these

three paradigms

have been

employed as terms of compariso

n bet ween death

and

the

cessation

attainment.

Here, the following three features are

noteworthy.

The first is

that only paradigms A

and

C are employed as terms

of

comparison between

death and the cessation

trance.

Pa

rad

igm

A singles

out the

thr

ee

a r

eas in

which death

and

NS

di er fr

om each other, while

Paradigm

C enumer

ates the

three

areas

in which

they converge What

is

significant is that uiiiiial:la is

conspicuous ly lef t

out as

a term

of

comparison in these two paradigms As we have already indicated the

mind is not

included

among the

senses. In other wo

rc

ts, de

ath

and NS

are

compared without

any

direct reference to vinMTJ a

The other feature is even

more

significant:

the

Parad igm B

the

only

paradigm

which

contains

vinna1;1a

as

one of

its

components, is exclusively

used for describing death,

and not

for

comparing

it

with

the nirodha

state f

the

compilers of this

catec

hism wished to

clarify

the issue, they

had

a

tool in

their hands,

but

they seem reluctant to use it for this

purpose.

The

third

f

eature is

equally

int

ri

guing. In

Paradigm

B,

the

question

is

n

ot

what ceases

at death, but

what

leaves the body at

death.

Fo

r ,

uinnti rµ;i

does not cease but leaves when the body dies. The non-existence of the

other

two elements heat

and

life)

in death

and

their survival

in

the

NS

has

been clearly affirmed in Paradigms A

and

C. Thus the

question has

been changed in Paradigm B in such a way that neither the cessation

nor

the

continuance

of viiiiia r;ia

is implied

in

answering

it.

To sum up: the paradigms which compare the two states do

not

include viiiiiar;ia

as

a term of comparison; conversely, the only paradigm

which includes viiiiiar.la

is

n

ot

utilized

for

comparing the two states. This

means

that

the compilers

of

the Sutta left the question out of

their

consideration This observation becomes ll

the

more clear when we

compare Paradigms A

and

B. The senses in A)

and

consciousness (in B)

-

54

-


14/27

What Happens to Viiiiial,la in the Cessation Attainment ?

do not function in the dead. But in the cessation

attainment,

senses

accompanied

by

heat and life are said

to

survive (see

A) but

there is an

eloquent silence about consciousness accompanied

by

heat and life (see B) .

What then should be the conclusion ? To the question,

What

happens

to uiiiiiiu}a n the nirodha

state

?", the answer implied in the Sutta seems

to be: •No comments• If the literary structure

of

this Sutta allows us to

conclude

that [t

he answer

to]

this question has

bee

n carefully avoided

in

M.1.295-296 any speculation on this matter

must

be founded on

othe

r

grounds than on an exegesis

of

M.1.295-296. This conclusion is inevitable.

As a matter of fact, Buddhaghosa quite rightly, does not have recourse to

this Sutta to maintain his position that uiiiiulr)a ce ses in the NS, as we

shall

soon see. He

argues u aliun.d.e.

6. A Note on

Two Contemporary

Interpretations

In othe

r wo r

ds

, Wijesekera's (earlier] thesis

that uinnal).a

pers

ists

in the

NS

has

no

scriptural foundation, because this very Su

tta

passage [M I

295-

296]

which be cites

as

the basis for this theory, evades the question,

as

I

have shown. Actually his own words, which I quote here in full , clearly

indicate that

be

bas confused paradigm A

iiyu-usmii-indriyani)

with

paradigm B

ayu-usma-uiMar.la)

For, citing this same Sutta-pasage,

where both paradigms occur, Wijesekera concludes

rather

hastily

that

In the state of death, the body is devoid of

ayu, usmii

and

uiiiiiiil).a

(consciousness) whereas ID the samiipatt i) State of sannii

uedayitanirodha, the individual's mental activity such as perception

and feelings, has ceased, the three processes of

ayu,

usmii

and

uiiiiiiu}a continue to function.•>

He also makes a further inference from this same text: "This would

clearly indicate

that co

nsciousness uiiiiiiil).a) is a process

other

than mere

mental

activity•.111>

- 55 -


15/27

What Happens to ViM Ja in the Cessation Attainment

?

Though this second inference cannot be directly derived from

M.I.

295-

296

but demonstrable from

other

scr iptural loci, Wijesekera seems

to

mean much more

than

what

he says

in the sentence above. He is probably

assuming another theory which is

not

evident in this Sutta-passage. This

other theory which seems to have influenced his

eisegesis

[ reading into a

text ) of M.1.295-296 is that uiiliiarµJ is a process other than mental

activity• n such a way as to be

sep

arab

le

from the latter. Put n another

way, what he understands by wother than seems to e that the mind is so

distinct from mental activities as

to

be able

to

continue in a 'pure' st.ate

in the NS where

th

e mental activities have ceased. If transposed into the

Abhidhammika terminology,

what

this theory presumes is that there can

be a citta without

cetasikii.

For without implicitly accepting this

presupposition, one cannot interpret the

text

the way Wijeseke

ra

has done.

Whether or not Wijesekera has r

ev

isited

M.I.295-296

n his later

writings I cannot say for the moment. But one notes

that

two decades

later

he

had undertaken a study

of th

e canonical occurrences of uin.Tiiir a,

and has reached the conclus ion

that

there

are thr

ee clearly distinguishable

senses in which

the

Canonical writers have employed this

te

rm: a) in the

cognitive

se

nse, b) as a medium of re-becoming and c) as a medium of

meditative trances. Referring

to

this third meaning, he demonstrates

that

all the jhanic states prior to the cessation attainment are each a uinfulr -

thiti,

i.e., an abiding place or a foot-hold of consciousness a nd therefore

cannot be equated with the Mfina l state of emancipation or Nibbana .

Then - apparently implying that the cessat ion t rance is equivalent to

Ni rval)a- he concludes as follows:

The Vii'liiiil)a ceases to manifest itself altogether

n irujjhati)

only in

the final s

tate

of ' the cessation of all conceptual

and

empirical

experience (s

aiiiia-ueda

yi ta

-nirodha). Nirujjhati

literally means

c

hecked' and this can best be taken as referring t the checking of the

flow sota

)

of Vini'lal)a, that is

to

say,

th

e

stopp

ing of t he continuity

of Vii'li\aoa. In the prev ious states the ViiiiiS(la could find some

abiding place (thiti) but in the state of Nirodha

it

obtai

ns

no such

-

56

-


16/27

What Happens

to Viniial}a

in the Cessation Attainment?

foothold.m

Interestingly, Wijesekera makes no direct reference to M.I.295 296 in

this

later

study.

Rune Johansson, on the other

hand , does not seem

to

have changed his

position. Viiiii .la, according

to

him, is • the st

ream

of differentiated

conscious processes•, and therefore something

that a

ffects

citta or

is

•simply a name for the activities of the

citta (citta-sarrtkhlua) .

111

Consequently, he

is

able

to

maintain that it is uiiiiilu} that ceases at

Nibbana, and not cit

ta

since Nibbana is a state of cit a

•

Now the

Nirodha state, according to his analysis of the Nikaya evidence, is

to

be

clearly differentiated from the Nirvanic

state.• Jn

the former, uiiiiiiirµi

[being in some way identified with the

citta-Saf1lkhara]

is dormant rather

than

absent, while

citta

continues

to

function. The implication

again is

that citta

can exit without

citta-sankhara.

But, more cautious

than

Wijesekera had been in his earlier position, Johansson,

it

appears to me,

has recognized that the Mahavedalla

Sutta

is silent with regard

to

this

question, for, he seems to have derived his thesis from an overaJJ study of

the occurrence of citta and uiniiiir .a in the Nikayas and not from M.1.295

296 which he quotes only once, and

that

, too, in quite another context. His

conclusion

is

recorded in a passing statement:

What

happens to

uiMiir;a

on

the level

of

nirodha

is not

explicitly

stated

[

in

the Nikayas]

•. >

Therefore,

Jet

me insist once more t

hat

beneath Wijesekera's exegesis

of M. 295 296 in his earlier article as well as Johansson's more nuanced

position, there lurks a belief in the possibility

of 'an

inactive

mi

n

d'

-

an

acetasika-citta,

so to say. One is inclined to think

that

th is belief which is

presupposed in any theory

that

advocates the persistence

of

uiiiiia.TJ.a

in

the

NS,

is

precisely what is confronted in Buddhghosa s exegesis

of

t he same

Sutta.

Buddhaghosa cannot accept a citta minus cetasikll. Consciousness is

either

active

or

it is nil. Hence the two schools read the text. with two

different presuppositions in mind. A discussion of these two

presuppositions is not within the ambit.

of

my investigation here, but I

_ c ; _


17/27

What Happens

to

i ~ in the

Cessation Attainme

nt ?

mention it in order

to

place the controversy in what I tenta tively propose

as

its remote, i.e. its original

pr

e-tex

tual

context. That this surmise

is

not

farfetched will appear plausible when we analyze Buddhagosa s exegesis on

M.

1.295

-296.

7. MA

.

11.351

:

Buddheghosa s Exegesis of

M.

1.295-296

.

In thia part

of

his exegesis, Buddhaghosa consistently employs the word

citta in place of viiiiial a when

refuting

the thesis

of

his opponents. Hence

I am constrained to use

the

same term m this section where I wtsh

to

discuss his refutation of

the

survival theor

y.

It is clear from the way he argues out his case, that this master

exegete, has recognized

the

silence of the Majjhima

text

[M.I.

295

-

296

)

with regard to the question in dispu te. He o s not - because,

presumably, he knows that he cannot derive his position directly

fr

om

this

Sutta

. For, he proves his position (cessation

of

citt with the

cessation

of

mental activities) by showing the incongruity

of

the opposite

thesis, i.e.

the

endurance

of

citta minus mental activities in the Cessation

Tra

nce. If

he

had held that the MahAvedalla Sut

ta

had supplied the

answer, he would not have taken

this ci

rcuitous

path

.

Note carefully the manner in which I phrased the

two

questions which

are implicitly presupposed in this dispute. The one is whether

coneciouaneN ceases at the

nirodha

state. This is evaded in the Sutta, as

we have teen. The other, which Buddhaghosa tries to settle,

is

whether

or

not coneciouaneu should cease when the mental activities cease. Thus

Buddhaghoaa has clearly aeen that the dispute really lies in

the

way

coneciousneaa and other conacious activities are related

t

each other.

Buddhaghosa a argument is focused on paradigm

C

and consists

of

a

rtductio d absurdum. This he does on two counts.

The oppone

nt

• view impliea for Buddhagbosa

that

mental

activities

8


18/27

What Happens to

Viiiiidna

in the Ce11ation Attainment?

(c

itta-14171AMra)

could cease

without

the citta ceasing. In that case.

argues Buddhaghosa, the same should apply to u i sar{l khdrfJ which ought

t

oeue without u c ceasing If that were true, a

Ni

rodhasam panna

should

be

aeen

to

be

reciting

and

preaching the

Dhamma

deapite the

fact

that verbal activities have ceased

His second argument is of the same nature. Here, he takea the case of

the dead person in whom i t is agreed that

citta-8tJl1lAhdra

completely

cease. If, in the cessation trance, the citta can continue without citta

sarriltJ&4rd,

as

hia opponents maintain, then in

the

dead person,

too,

this

same phenomenon should be observed. Th11 means, that the dead person

should

be

regarded as possessing consciousness though not the activities

of

the mind [and therefore as living

rather than

dead] n

that

case, insists

Buddhaghoaa, to cremate a 'dead'

parent

or a 'dead' aralaan would

amount, respectively, to parricide and •arahanti-cide" which

are

•immediately retributable

crimes·

(anantariya-Juvnma)

[i.e. crimes

leading

to rebirth in hell in the very next life] .

Here again, the focus of

his reasoning is the impossibility of there being a consciousneu which is

unaccompanied by mental activities. The citta ceases t

eiiat

when

cetasikd

cease.

A further confi

rmation

of

this position

of

Buddhaghoaa is his

altogether logical corollary that

SYN

cannot e attained in the •four

constituents existence" where the physical basis [actually the body, the

fifth

constituent] is

not

obtained. Dhammapala's comment

on

this

statement presupposes

the

theory that all mental phenome.na cease

at

SYN:

Since, in tbia four-constituent existence, the

citta

and the tasiJt4 alone

exist

and

since

SYN

is

the

cessation

of

both

citta

and

ceuuiJta,

it

would

follow

that

, if

SYN

were poasible, the reault would be something

•inconceivable" (apaM.a tti.ko, mentally not deaignatable) , namely that

the hypothetical attainer of SYN would be similar

to

one who has

attained

(J Wpadi.sesa

nibbano,

because no

upadi

is left behind

,.,

Thia

re u

ctio ad absurdum.

by which Ohammapala demonstrates

that SVN

cannot

be

attained

in a sphere

of

becomini where only

citta

and

~ t a s i t d

9 -


19/27

What Happens to

ViniW Ja in

the Cessation

Attainme

nt?

exist ,

s

based on the conviction that they both cease at SVN.

Hence we have every

reason

to conclude as follows: The Pah exegetical

tradition has implicitly acknowledged that neither the cessation nor the

continuance of uinnar).ii in the cessa

ti

on trance can e dtrectly proved from

the

scriptu

res, although Wijesekera s second article does insinuate that a

scriptural

proof

is

not that far to seek if the canonical reference to

viiiiiiirJ.a-thiti are subjected to a proper exegesis. However, Buddhaghosa s

rat

iocination, which reflects a long Pali scholastic tradition, revolves

round

quite

another issue:- whether or not citt can exist without

citta-stlJ11)thlzrii.

Further

more, Buddhaghosa urges

his

opponents to

go

beyond the

letter

uyanjana)

and comprehend the spirit or the meaning

of

the text

attha)

by being fi

rm ly

rooted in the

traditional

exegetical method

of

the

Teachers

acariyanaf1l naye thatua

). The implication

of

this appeal to

trad

i

tion,

I suggest, is as follows: since M.I.

95

-296 is sile

nt

with regard

to the disputed question, it needs to be interpreted correctly. i.e. in

accordance with the ancient doctrine of the teachers. Now what could this

teaching be? Perhaps that

cit

ta cannot persist in a

state

wherein citta-

saf1lkhdra cease ? Could this be the pre-textual context which explains the

non-committal approach adopted in the Mahavedalla Sutta?

8. The Remote Context of

the

Controversy.

Our inveati1ation would not e comp

le

te

without

a reference to an

elucidation made in non-canonical Theravadin sources. The Milindapai\ha

Mp

),

an

apologetical

treatise or about the first

century

CE,

ran

ks high

among theae sources, for, not only does it antedate the Pali Commentaries

but it

hu

also been accorded a aemi-canonical status by the Theravada

Schohula themselves. In this work, the Indian Buddhist Recluse, Naga

sena, makes a paasing but vital reference to the Cessation Trance, in the

course

or

explaining the phenomenon

of

dreams to his Greek interlocutor,

60


20/27

What Happens to

Vinndl}a

in

lhe Cessation

Allainment?

Milinda Menander) .

Dreams, according

to Nagasena, are

seen only when one

has

reached

the

state

of

a monkey-nap

( kapiniddO.pareto),

i.e., someone in

the

intermediary state of

drowsiness

which lies between

the

waking

stage

when consciousness is

functioning

)

and sound

sleep when the

consciousness is

functionally

nil) .

n other words

, a person sees

dreams

neither when fully awake

nor

when fully

asleep, but

in the interval

between falling asleep

and

reachmg the Unconcious (bhavail6a)

State:

okkante

middhe

asampatte

bhauaitge etthantare

supin.arr

passati

(M

p.

299). Nigasena adds

that

consciouness ceases in

the

bhauan.,a state,

wherein cognition is nil

n.a

pat11fJniiti and

therefore, the possibility

of

dreaming is ruled

out.

The impltcataon is that

the

citta should be

functioning for dreams to be seen, as he insists.

Even

though

in deep sleep

the

mind

[citta]

is

in

the

Unconscious

State

(middhasamarulhe citte bhauangagate titthamane pi , it (the mind)

ceases [

to function

]

in the

body

(

sanre

cittaJTl appauattam

hoti

, and

sinoe the mind ceases,

it

would not see

dreams (appauatte citte

supinalp na passati) .

Note, here,

that

the

ceased

mind•

(

cittam

appavattal (l)

as

equated

with the mind in the Unconscious State (citte bhauahgagate). This

a r

gu

ment is

elaborated

with such lucidity in subsequent paragraphs Mp.

299-301) that there

is

no room for any doubt

that cessation

of

co

nsciousness is

equated

with

the

noetically inactive

mind

known

as the

Unconscious Mind

(bhauangagata-citta).

It is after having established

this

poaition

that

Nagasena makes this

significant

statement about the cessation attainment:

ln

two

situations, O King, does the citta become non-

active

non

existent, non-functioning) even while the body

conti

nues to be [alive]:-

The mind

of

the one

who has

fallen i

nt

o deep sleep

and

has [ therefore]

-

-


21/27

What Happens

to

Vifiiidr ia

in the Cessation

Attain

ment?

reached the Unconscious State, ceases even while the body remains

(alive

);

the mind of the one who

ha

s reached cessation [attainment]

ceases even while the body continues to

be

[alive] .

171

The

implication

is too obvious

to

restate here. The appauatta-citta in

the cessation

attainment

is put

on

a par with the appauatta-citta

identified as bhavaitgagata citta. This would mean

that the

Mind of a

Nirodhasamapanna is in a fully dormant or noetically inactive

state

. lo

other words,

the

mind of such a person per

sists

in the body minus the

me

ntal activities

.

In th

e dead per

so

n,

as

we havo seen from t

he

canonical

texts, not even

an

inac

tiv

e mind c

an

exist; in death the

uiiiiWJJ a

simply

leaves the body.

f this conclusion is valid, we have to admit that there was a school

of though that

adv

ocated the

existe

nce

of

an inactive mind, a

state of

consciousness citta

) ,

wherein the concomitant phenomena

cetasi/ca

,

which constitute the manifold

activation

of the mind, do not function at

all. According to this view, the phrase sanna-uedayita-nirodha would

point to a mind which is noetically

and

conat ively inactive, i.e., a

dormant mind

or

a mind

that

has ceased to function appau

atttJ/Tl

cittarri) as

' Nagasena puts it. In other words, the possibility of an inactive

mind, an

acetesika

citta, so to say,

cannot

be

ruled out

from

the theory

of

consciousness advocated ih t he Milindapai'lha. This,

as

I have shown

above, is exactly the position

that

Buddhaghosa had rejected as absurd

and, therefore, untenable.

This may also explain

wh

y Buddhaghosa does

not cite

the Milinda

pai'lba, a text revered in the Southern

Sc

hool

of

Buddhism, when

arguing

against that

very position upheld there. To hold

an

opinion that

militates against such an authoritative source as the Milindapai'iha would

have been temerarious. After all, the same Buddhaghosa does allude to

this Milindapai'lha passage

in AA

Ill 316

3

18 while discussing the

phenomenon of dreams in a context where

Nigasena's

reference to

NS

s

not relevant, and , therefore, does not require to

be

cited. The other locus

- 62 -


22/27

What Happens to

iiiiilu}a

in

the Cessation

Attainment ?

where this happens is VinA III 520-522 where he explains how the release

of

sperm by a person who

is

dreaming does

not

amount to a

·conscious

release of sperm"

(sa-cetanikii sukkha-uisatthi).

Here, too, Nagasena is

quoted in

support of

this position in a context where the reference

to

NS

does not come in

By

cont

rast, MA I 351

(discussed above) where Nagasena's equation

of the

bhauanga-gata

citta with an

appauatta-citta

requires to

be

quoted

at least

as

an

opinion

to

be

refuted, there

is

a deafening silence on the

part of

Buddhaghosa Does this suggest

that

there is a remote pre-textual

context wherein the possibility of an

acetsi.aka-citta

has been a moot

point, which may account for the persistence of two divergent opinions in

later times, with Nagasena representing one

stream

within the Pali

Abhidhammika tradition, and Buddhaghosa the

other

?

In the Vibhanga Commentary, attributed to Buddhaghosa,

we

once

more see the same approach as

the

one adopted by Buddhaghosa in a

variant

version in

AA

III 317

There is a

rather

long excursus on the

nature

of

the wakeful

state,

the dreaming

state

and dreamless sleep in VibhA 406-

409

( repeated verbatim also in VinA

III

521). We are warned

that

to say

sutto supati ( the

person who is sound asleep sees dr

eams )

would run

cou

nter

to the teaching

of

the Abhidh

amma

because "one sleeps

with

the

Unconscious Mind

(bhauangacittena supati)

while, on the

othe

r hand,

to

say

patibudd.ho [supinam] passati ( one

who

is

awake sees dreams")

would contradict the teaching of the Vinaya where what one does during

dreams

is

not

regarded

as

morally imputable

s

upinafTI

passantena pana

hate uitikkame ekantaJTI aniipatti eua).

Now,

the

Abhidhammika basis for

this

position, as explained

by

the Commentator, is that during the dream

state

the mind

has

not

reached the noetic level

of

jauana

or

perception

which

is

required for any action to

be

ethical

(kusliikusala).•

1

Therefore, deep sleep is a

tota

l absence of consciousness where even

the anoetic sentience or mere sensation (s

uch

as dassana-matta)

is nil.

f

that

is

so, then Nagasena's statement cited above

certai

n

ly

ensures that

6


23/27

What Happens to Viiinm}a

in

the Cessallon Attainment

?

NS

is such a state. But an inference

to

that effect is absent

in

the

Vibhanga Commentary. What is intriguing is that in VibhA 406 409 the

Milindapaiiha is quoted with refe

ren

ce to dreams, without making any

allusion

to

its state

ment

about

the NS, while

at

the same t ime, in VibhA

29 where NS is directly discussed, Nagasena 's allusion to NS is

not

cited

Hence one is compelled to conclude th

at

t he Pali CommentariaJ tradition

strongly maintains the complete absence of Viiii iiloa in the Cessation

Trance in opposition to

another tradition represented by the

Milindapai'iha.

9. Two Corollaries

There are two corollaries

that

issue from this discussion. The

first

is the

following. If the

citta

ceases in the

state

of NS while the one who has

attained that

state remains a

'living

being'

(i

n th

at

he or she s endowed

with ayu and usmii) as the Pali exegetes

maintain

, then it follows that

there could be a "living being" (satta) having "a non-conscious existence",

that

is to say, a material existence. • This runs co

ntr

ary to the general

t rend in the Pali exegeti

ca

l

traditio

n that life and h

eat

always accompany

consciousness, and consequently, there cannot

be

a "non-eonscious life

,

or

a living being who is not endowed

with

consciousness '°>This contradiction

does not arise in the position taken

by

the author

of

the Milindapanha.

For, consciousness is believed to persist in a dormant state in such a

being, who, therefore, would necessarily have

to be

a

tta

a "living

being."

Secondly, the striking parallel, which exists between the niro lh -

samApan.na and the asaiiiia-

tt

, raises a similar que

st

ion with regard to

the vit.alistic not.ion of consciousness upheld by the Pali scholiasts who

disagTee with Nilgasena

:-

Does the term

asaiiii.a-satta

imply merely the

absence

of

ideation (saiiiia) and

other

concomita

nt

factors in a dormant

oonaciousneas appauatta-citta as an equivalent of bhauahgagata-citta)

?

Or, as the Pali oxeget.es seem

t

maintain, are they to

be

regarded as a

species

of

non-conscious beings,

that

is to say, "material beings" that

- 64 -


24/27

What Happens to

ViMai:ta in

the Cessation Attainment ?

have a life-faculty wi tho

ut

consciousness ?

In t he first case, their re-becoming in a another sphere of existence is

explainable, because, re-concepti

on patisandhi)

presupposes the existence

of viiiiiar a in such

anoe

tic beings. But the Pali exegetes, who hold the

latter position, are compelled to

treat

the re-conception

of

such beings as

a drastic exception to that rule. They have

to

concede, in the words of

Abhldhammatthasangaha ,

23

, that the [means of] re-conception of

anoetic beings, indeed, is

matter"

asaiiiiasattclnal7l pana

rupam

eva

patisandhi ho

.

1 ) All references

ar

e to the

PTS

editions, except the

Paramatthamafljus

which is

qu

oted from the

Burmese

ChaUhasamrAyana edition, Rangoon

1960

(

two

volumes)

and abbreviated Pm (Bes

).

2 ) E.g. Sn . 143 (v.734 ) : Yaqin kiii

ci

dukkharra sambhoti, sabbaJTI uiiiiidl)a-

paccaya; uiiiiiar)assa nirodhena, n atthi dukkhassa sambhauo. The

commentary (Sn .A.

506

)

further

specifies uiniial}a as kammasahajata

bhisaTT1khara uiiiiifuJa .

3 ) See

my forthcoming arti

cle, • Sa.bhiuadhamma :

an Abhdhammika

Neologism

and

Its Probable Meaning• . As

regards

the Abhidhammika

concept of nipphanna, see Y Karunadasa, Buddhist nalysis of Mat.ter,

Department

of

Cultural Affairs, Colombo 1967

42

ff.

4) VibhA 29. See also Bhikkhu ~ u a m o b (Tr.) , The Path

of

Purification,

Buddhist

Publication

Society, Kandy,

1956 Fifth

Edition, 1991

856

nt.

18

5 ) Vsm709

6 )

Pau

l

Grif

fiths, On

Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation

and

the Mind-

Body Problem, Open Court, Lasalle, Illinoiso, 1986.

7 ) Ibid., 29. I shall return to this text and Griffith's interpretation towards

the end of this

essay

8 ) Mp, 68-69 .

9 ) Y. PaMarAma, PAliye

hA Sinhalaye Vik

s

anaya"

in V.

Kuaaladhamma

(editor) ,

Yakkaduve Ndhimiyilnangl Dharma§astriya Lipi, Vidy lamk -

ra Press,

Kelaniya, 1983

, 94, 95 .

10

) P. Vajirai'IAQa,

Buddhist Meditation in Theory Q/ld Practice,

Gunaaena

-

65

-


25/27

What Happens to VlnnW}a in the Cessation

Attainment?

Co.,

Colombo,

1962,

464.

11

)

G.C.

Pande

, udies

in

tlae Origim of

Buddhism

, Motilal

S.naraidaa,

Delhi, 3' Ed1t1on,

1983,

537.

12) Cr.

Nyanatiloka,

Buddhist Dictionary

(

1946 , 3' revised and enlarged

edition by Nyanaponika, Frawlin and Co. Ltd, Colombo,1972, s.v.

nirodhasamapatti.

13

) Pande, 536-537. For the relevant

passages

from the Majjhima

Niklya,

see

ibid., 537, nt.

142

.

14) M 25-28.

15) M 11128.

16

)

MA IV 9 ).91.

17

)

Varn 702: Tattha Ira nirodhasamflpatu t yd anupubba-nirodha·IJCJ tna

cittaceuu1Jrtuia1Tl dhamm{J/l(; .fTl appauaw.

18)

0.

H.do A. Wijesekera, •vitalism and Bocoming• . Umvtrsity of Ceylon

Review, April

1943,

57:- "But on the question or a vital pr inciple in the

sa1T1sAric

individual, tho position

of early

Buddhism is made

clear

in a

passage which has never so far boon discussed in this connection.•

19)

Ibid.

20) Rune Johansson, The Psychology of Nirvana, George, Allen and Unwin

Ltd ., London,1969,

105.

21) E.g.,

Vaj1rai'l6.Qa, 465.

22) The

ins

tance ia recorded in the Marataj1an1ya Sulla (M .

1.333

. Some

cowherds and

wayfarers

attempted, unsuccessrully,

to

cremate Sanjiva

who was thou1rht

dead

while in the Cessation Trance

23) Pando, 134-

135.

24)

Accordin1r to Varn,

142, 530-53

1, etc., vitalcka and uicdra are conative

functions cet nd or the mind occurr ing in the spoech·door, the

former

d rivinii the mind to the object, the latter fixing it on that object.

25)

Wiieaekera,

loc.aupra cit.

26) Ibid.

27) 0.H.de A.

Wi1eae

kera, •The Concept of Vifti\loa in Theravada

Buddhism•.

Journal of American Oriental Society, 84

/3,

July-

September

1964,

257.

28) J ohanuon, 132.

- 66 -


26/27

What Happens to

Viii IWJ}a

in tho Ceaaation

Attainment ?

29) Ibid., 107.

30) Ibid

•

49-50; 108.

31 ) Ibid

•

105.

32} Ibid

•

105.

33} This is a text quite clear in itself, but has been grossly mistranslated by

Paul Griffith

(op.cit. 7) t.o

mean

something

u i ~ absurd: lhat the

person

who had attained

the

NS

would

incur immediate retribution for

killinr

a

parent or

arahan

I

34)

Pm (Bea},

J

525

:Yadi hi

aruppt

nirodharri samfJpajjeyya,

cittactuuikdna

7l

aiiiiaua ca kassaci abhliuato apailna.U1ko ua bluweyya

anupddutsaya

nibbdbadhdtuya parinibbwa·sadiso. K L ~ a y a up&Uzya nirodharri sam4

panno ti wcceyya7Kirrt114 tt4ya

ua.Uhu

·cintdya1 Angcwdall4to ua

nauhi

{lrUppc

nirodhasamapatti-sal'Mpajjana111.

35}

Mp, 299-300

36) Mp, 300

37)

Ibid. :·

DvinnQ 7l

Maharaja

santt

pi

sarire ciuarri appcwattarri

hoti

:

middhcuamarulhassa bhavangagatassa

santt

pi

11wre

citta111 appavoJta111

hoti; nirodhasamapannassa sante

pi sanre

cittarri hoti)

38) VibhA, 405 . For the question of moral

imputability

associated with

j


27/27

What Happens

to Vinii&}a

in lhe Cessation Attainment?

Biographical Note

on

the

Author

Sri Lanka

alypOalt .lk

Rev . Fr Aloysius Pieris,s

.j.

is a Roman Catholic Priest with doctorates

in both Buddhist Philosophy (Sr1 Lanka Univ, Vtdyodaya Campus) and in

Christian

Theology

Univ. of

Tillburg).

He is the rounder-d1recl0r of the

Tulana

Research Centre where researches into both Buddhism and

Chiristianity are undertaken.He

is also

the

editor

of

Dialogue

an

international

review for Buddhists and

Christians

begun l l 1

974

His research

articles

on Buddhism include: Colophon

l

the

Paramatthamai\Jusi and the Date of Aacariya Dhammapala • (GoUingen

1978); The notions of Citta AttA and ttabhiua in the Pali Exegetical

Writings ( W. Rahula Felicitation Volume,1980) ; the Re

alism

of tho Pali

Scholiasts

as

Reveled in

Their

Discussion of the Notion of DhamrrW

(Ananda Guruge Felicitation Volume, 1990) ; •Life, Death and Murder : An

abhidharmika

Analysis

in

Simhala, in Abhidharma

Adhayama,

Colombo,

1996

) ; CahkhuuirVtdl).a

as

Dassanamatta: Visual perception or Non

Perceptual Vision? (Karunadasa Felicitation Volume, 1

997

) ; Vatthu and

Dhammd' A

Lexicognphical Clarification

(Journal

of

the PIPBS, Colombo,

1999

).

what happens to viññāṇa in the cessation attainment - an exegesis of m.i. 295-296 (ocr)

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