wetenschappelijke verhandelinglib.ugent.be/fulltxt/rug01/001/895/282/rug01... · from: home again...
TRANSCRIPT
UNIVERSITEIT GENT
FACULTEIT POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN
Wetenschappelijke verhandeling
RAGNA FRANS
MASTERPROEF MANAMA CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT
PROMOTOR: PROF. DR. ANNE WALRAET
COMMISSARIS: DR. KAREN BÜSCHER
ACADEMIEJAAR 2011 - 2012
BURUNDIAN REFUGEES BECOMING TANZANIAN CITIZENS: CONCEPTUALISATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS OF IDENTITY AND HOME
aantal woorden: 24380
i
i
Home again
Home again
One day I know
I'll feel home again
Born again
Born again
One day I know
I'll feel strong again
I left my head
Many times I've been told
All this talk will make you old
So I close my eyes
Look behind
Moving on, moving on
So I close my eyes
Look behind
Moving on
From: Home Again by Michael Kiwanuka
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In first instance I would like to thank my promotor, Prof. Dr. Anne Walraet, for her support during the
realization of this dissertation. Her help in defining the subject, her useful suggestions with regard to
scientific articles and the provision of contacts in Tanzania proved essential to this work. Furthermore I owe
great gratitude to all my respondents. I would especially like to thank the (former) refugees who were
willing to share their experiences and thoughts with relation to a sensitive issue. Key respondents as well as
government officials and representatives of UNHCR have also been very helpful and provided me with
extensive information. Of enormous help has been Dr. Deo Baribwegure, Director of Kigoma Community
College by Radio (KICORA). I would like to express my thankfulness for introducing me to many of his
contacts, for sharing his insights and giving recommendations, for his enormous hospitality and constant
feedback. Asante sana! Last but not least I wish to thank my parents, family and friends for their support
and interest.
To conclude, I would like to mention that I would not have been able to do fieldwork in Tanzania without
the support of a VLIR-UOS scholarship.
ii
ABSTRACT
Objective: This dissertation focusses on conceptualisations of identity in a particular situation of protracted
displacement, that of the 1972 Burundian refugees in Tanzania. Specific but often implicit presumptions
about identity, as embedded in international and Tanzanian refugee policy and practice, are clarified and
confronted with conceptualisations of the (former) refugees. Pivotal to this work are therefore the
interpretations and perspectives of the (former) refugees themselves. Three highly interrelated aspects of
identity are addressed: citizenship, notions of belonging and home.
Method: A combination of primary and secondary literature reviews, interviews and fieldwork conclusions
was used. Interviews were conducted with former Burundian refugees from Ulyankulu settlement and with
Burundian refugees who settled spontaneously in Kigoma region. Moreover, there were some key
informants interviewed, as well as UNHCR staff and Tanzanian and Burundian government officials. The
interviews were transcribed whereafter a combination of inductive and deductive encoding methods was
utilised.
Results: International and Tanzanian refugee policy rested on static and territorialized concepts of identity
and home. There was a strong tendency to pin down (refugee) identity by linking it to a state through the
institution of citizenship or a certain home(land). Compared to refugees’ conceptualisations, this proved
not the most accurate nor fair approach. Rights and citizenship were essential but not primordial to identity
and the respondents negotiated a sense of belonging in a flexible way, contesting the linking of belonging
to a home country. They emphasised the multi-levelness of home and made reference to multiple
belongings and identies. The rather contradictory approach towards the refugees partly ignored the multi-
leveled and fluid character of their conceptualisations and left little room for their own experiences. In
order to stimulate their future integration and realize a better understanding of their needs, a more
nuanced and de-territorialized approach of (refugee) identity and notions of home imposes itself.
iii
SAMENVATTING
Doel: Deze verhandeling richt zich op conceptualiseringen van identiteit in een welbepaalde situatie van
langdurige ontheemding: deze van de 1972 Burundese vluchtelingen in Tanzania. De specifieke, maar vaak
impliciete, veronderstellingen met betrekking tot identiteit die ingebed zijn in het internationale en
Tanzaniaanse vluchtelingenbeleid, worden verduidelijkt en afgezet tegen de conceptualiseringen van de
vluchtelingen zelf. Er wordt gefocust op drie nauw verweven aspecten van identiteit: burgerschap, noties
van (een) thuis en ergens thuishoren. Dit werk wil de (voormalige) vluchtelingen aan het woord laten en
vertrekt uitdrukkelijk vanuit hun interpretaties, observaties en perspectieven.
Methode: Er werd gebruik gemaakt van een combinatie van literatuurstudie, veldonderzoek en interviews.
Er werden interviews afgenomen bij voormalige Burundese vluchtelingen vanuit Ulyankulu en bij
Burundese vluchtelingen die zich spontaan in Kigoma-regio vestigden. Daarnaast werden ook een aantal
sleutelinformanten bevraagd en werden staff-leden van UNHCR, Tanzaniaanse en Burundese
overheidsfunctionarissen geïntervieuwd. De gesprekken werden getranscribeerd en gecodeerd.
Resulaten: Het internationale en Tanzaniaanse vluchtelingenbeleid stoelt op statische en ‘ge-
territorialiseerde’ invullingen van identiteit en een thuis. De tendens om identiteit vast te pinnen op een
thuisland of te linken aan een staat via burgerschap, bleek in vergelijking met de conceptualiseringen van
de (voormalige) vluchtelingen, echter weinig accuraat en herkenbaar. De respondenten onderhandelden
hun noties van ‘ergens thuishoren’ op een flexibele manier en koppelden deze niet expliciet aan een
thuisland. Ze benadrukten daarentegen de ‘meerlagigheid’ van een thuis en verwezen naar de
meervoudigheid van identiteit en ‘ergens thuishoren’. De manier waarop de vluchtelingen in Tanzania
benaderd werden, negeerde grotendeels dit meervoudige en weinig afgelijnde karakter van hun
conceptualiseringen en liet zeer weinig ruimte voor de perspectieven van de vluchtelingen zelf. Om hun
toekomstige integratie te stimuleren en een beter begrip van hun noden te ontwikkelen, is er nood aan een
meer genuanceerde en ‘gedeterritorialiseerde’ invulling van identiteit en een thuis.
iv
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................ i
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................................. ii
SAMENVATTING .................................................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 2
1.1 Contextualising the subject ................................................................................................................ 2
1.2 Previous research ............................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Objectives and methodology ............................................................................................................. 5
1.3.1 Research questions ..................................................................................................................... 5
1.3.2 Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 6
1.3.2.1 Data collection ........................................................................................................................ 6
1.3.2.2 Data analysis ........................................................................................................................... 7
1.4 Limitations and gaps ........................................................................................................................... 8
1.5 Short Overview ................................................................................................................................... 9
CHAPTER 2: DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT ........................................................ 10
2.1 Protracted refugee situations .......................................................................................................... 10
2.1.1 Situating and definition ............................................................................................................ 10
2.1.2 Ending situations of protracted displacement ......................................................................... 13
2.1.2.1 Durable solutions .................................................................................................................. 14
2.1.2.2 Durable solutions, identity and home .................................................................................. 17
2.2 Tanzanian situation .......................................................................................................................... 19
2.2.1 Towards a refugee free zone .................................................................................................... 19
2.2.2 The Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy .................................................................... 22
2.2.2.1 Pillar 1: Voluntary repatriation and reintegration ................................................................ 22
2.2.2.2 Pillar 2: Naturalization .......................................................................................................... 24
2.2.2.3 Pillar 3: Local Integration ...................................................................................................... 26
v
2.2.2.4 Mobilization of International support .................................................................................. 30
2.2.3 Some concluding remarks: Refugees, identity and belonging within the Tanzanian context . 31
CHAPTER 3: IDENTITY ........................................................................................................................... 34
3.1 Granting of citizenship and sense of identity ........................................................................................ 34
3.3.1 Lack of rights, undermining feelings of belonging and being controlled ................................. 34
3.3.2 Gaining rights, securing protection and ending uncertainty .................................................... 36
3.3.3 Getting rid of a label ................................................................................................................. 36
3.3.4 Future uncertainty .................................................................................................................... 37
3.3.5 Pragmatic Citizenship ............................................................................................................... 38
3.2 Defining home and sense of belonging ............................................................................................ 39
3.2.1 Bonds, rights and positive contributions .................................................................................. 40
3.2.2 Hiding backgrounds and undermining a sense of belonging ................................................... 41
3.2.3 Roots and homeland ................................................................................................................ 42
3.2.4 Identity-in-between .................................................................................................................. 44
3.2.5 Relocation ................................................................................................................................. 45
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 47
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 50
ANNEXES.............................................................................................................................................. 59
1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CSFM: Centre for the Study of Forced Migration
CPA: Comprehensive Plans of Action
DANIDA: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DAR:
Development Assistance for Refugees
DLI: Development through Local Integration
IRRI: International Refugee Rights Initiative
KANERE:
Kakuma News Reflector
NNTs:
Newly Naturalised Tanzanians
NASCIP:
National Strategy for Community Integration Programme
PRSs:
Protracted Refugee Situations
RSC:
Refugee Study Centre
SAHRiNGON: Southern Africa Human Rights Non-Governmental Organization Network
TANCOSS:
Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy
UN:
United Nations
UNDAP:
United Nations Development Assistance Plan
UNDP:
United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR:
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA:
United Nations Relief and Works Agency
4Rs: Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction
2
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Contextualising the subject
Stimulated by an advancing peace process in Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania, a time-honoured
host of large refugee populations, requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
to support the transformation of the country into a ‘refugee-free zone’ by the end of 2006 (Danish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs [DANIDA] and UNHCR, 2010). For over more than four decades, Tanzania has repeatedly
received large influxes of refugees, mostly from neighbouring countries out of the Great Lakes Region. One
of the populations of concern also exemplified one of the most protracted refugee situations in the world.
In the wake of the 1972 genocide, an estimated 218 000 Burundians fled to Tanzania. Most of them have
been living in the so-called old settlements in north-western Tabora and Rukwa regions ever since
(UNHCR,2011a; United Republic Of Tanzania, 2011). However, there was also a considerable group of
refugees who settled spontaneously outside the settlements, generally in Kigoma region (Kasulu, Kibondo
and Kigoma Districts). The exact size of this group of self-settlers is questionable as they never went
through some kind of formalised asylum procedure and are highly invisible for authorities and international
organizations (Malkki, 1995b). 22000 self-settlers registered for durable solutions in 2010 (UNHCR, 2011d)
but the number of self-settlers that have not registered or maybe have left Kigoma or Tanzania in the
meantime remains unknown1.
In the first instance, a Tripartite Commission composed of the Burundian government, the Tanzanian
government and UNHCR focussed on the situation of the Old Settlements. In order to develop a
comprehensive solutions strategy for this situation of prolonged exile, a Task Force organised a census and
individual registration of the population in the settlements. Based on the results of this census and a study
about the demographic, social and economic situation of the settlements, the Task Force elaborated the
Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS). On the one hand, the final strategy rested on
voluntary repatriation, traditionally presented as the most preferable durable solution by the Tanzanian
government, the international community and UNHCR alike (Legal and Human Rights Centre, 2008; Fielden
2008, UNHCR, 2007a). On the other hand, the 1972 Burundian refugees and their descendants could also
chose to naturalise and integrate. Some 162 000 former refugees opted to do so, allowing them to live
among the general population and seek a livelihood independent from the settlements in the future. The
Tripartite Commission also aimed at creating opportunities for durable solutions for the self-settlers. It is
still undecided what package of solutions will be available for this group, but 22 337 self-settlers have been
registered and verified for durable solutions in 2010 (UNHCR, 2011d).
The Tanzanian pursuit to look into a durable solutions package for the 1972 Burundian refugees coincided
more or less with the commitment of High Commissioner for refugees, António Guterres, to make
protracted refugee situations a priority protection issue. In order to raise international awareness, improve
the life of populations in situations of long-term displacement and promote comprehensive and durable
solutions, he launched the Special Initiative on Protracted Refugee Situations (UNHCR, 2008a). The High
1 Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011.
3
Commissioner’s Special Initiative focused on five situations of protracted exile, including the Tanzanian
1972 caseload. The naturalisation and local integration initiative was lauded for looking into new
opportunities to end decades of uncertainty for a large group of refugees (UNHCR, 2008b). As the
Tanzanian refugee policy evolved from a receptive, open door policy to a more restrictive, sometimes even
repressive one (L’Ecluse, 2010; Chaulia, 2003; Washoma, 2003; Rutinwa, 2002), the resumption of a more
generous attitude and the decision to offer the possibility of permanent residency on such a large scale
were widely applauded (Loescher and Milner, 2011; European Union, 2011; The Citizen, 2011, June 16;
2010; Panapress, 2010; UN News Centre, 2010; Daily News, 2010, November 7; The Guardian on Sunday,
2009, October 25; UNHCR, 2009a; Afrol News, 2008).
The naturalisation and local integration process however, was and is not without issues. Burundian
refugees who arrived more recently in the country were excluded from the process, leaving them with no
more options than to repatriate (Hovil, 2010; Centre for the Study of Forced Migration [CSFM] and
International Refugee Rights Initiative [IRRI], 2009a). The limited availability of independent legal advice, a
lack of clear information about the situation in Burundi and the consequences of a naturalisation or
repatriation, the pressure put on the refugees to return rather than to opt for naturalisation, the many
delays and uncertainties, the confusion about the status of those born in Tanzania and the fact that the
Burundian citizenship should be renounced when choosing to become Tanzanian all have been under
discussion (Hovil, 2010; CSFM and IRRI, 2008). Of much contestation is the planned closure of the
settlements and the compulsory relocation of the Newly Naturalised Tanzanians to 50 selected districts
(DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010; Hovil, 2010; CSFM and IRRI, 2009a). Besides challenges concerning livelihood-
access, the NNTs might face (local) resistance once they leave the settlements behind. The relocation and
local integration plans already stirred up parliamentary meetings (The Citizen, 2011, June 16; Personal
email conversation informant B3, August 2011). Local leaders in Tanga region pronounced their reluctance
towards receiving the former refugees, referring to security issues, a lack of preparation, limited local
resources and the government’s top-down approach (The Citizen, 2011, April 30). The pending situation of
the self-settlers caused concern as well, especially since the final decision about their future seems to
depend on how the relocation and integration process of the Newly Naturalised Tanzanians from the
settlements progresses2. Given the before-mentioned resistance and challenges concerning the relocation
and integration, the self-settlers’ patience might be severely tested.
Even if the process would have been without any controversy, it is undeniable that it already had and will
have a major impact on the lives, self-esteem and identity of the (former) refugees. They had a specific
status, faced shifting policies and attitudes towards their presence and are now presented as a group able
to shed off the refugee label and ‘truly integrate’. The route from refugee to citizen, from Burundian to
Newly Naturalised Tanzanian has affected and will mark their self-concept, their sense of belonging and the
way they position themselves. This dissertation will focus on the experiences of the (former) 1972 refugees
on a moment their life is at a crossroad.
2 Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011.
4
1.2 Previous research
The Tanzanian refugee situation did not remain un-discussed in literature and research. One topic receiving
extensive coverage is the (shifting) Tanzanian refugee policy (DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010; L’Ecluse, 2010;
Morel, 2009; Loescher and Miller, 2005; Kamanga, 2005; Chaulia, 2003; Whitaker, 2002; Rutinwa, 2002).
The human right situation of the refugees seeking protection in Tanzania (Amnesty International, 2005;
Human Rights Watch, 1999) as well as the impact of the refugees on the surrounding communities, local
economies, development and governance also attracted attention (Alix-Garcia and Saah, 2009; CSFM, 2003;
Landau, 2003). Moreover, scholars have been describing the social, health and security aspects of life in the
refugee camps and settlements (Turner, 2006, 1999; Rutta et.al., 2005). Although the issue of identity is
well-covered within the discipline of refugees studies, it has not been the main research angle within the
Tanzanian context.
Despite the fact that most refugee studies about Tanzania have not been focusing on identity-matters, the
topic intertwines and intersects with all aspects of life as a refugee and consequently has been touched
upon (e.g. Landau, 2003; Turner, 1999). A standard work comprehensively dealing with the matter
however, is Lisa Malkki’s ‘Purity and Exile’ (1995b). The author compared the experiences of 1972
Burundian refugees living in a settlement with the experiences of those living nearby Kigoma town. The
self-settlers were reluctant to define themselves as refugees and articulated flexible, ‘cosmopolitan’
identities, allowing for a certain invisibility. The settlement experience raised a strong retaining of
‘refugeeness’ and reference to a Hutu ethnic- and refugee identity. More recent, the International Refugee
Rights Initiative published a series of working papers focusing on identity and citizenship in situations of
forced migration in the Great Lakes region (e.g. CSFM and IRRI, 2009a, 2009b, 2008). One of the studies
focused on the future expectations of the 1972 Burundian refugees who applied for citizenship or awaited
registration within the framework of the TANCOSS strategy (CFSM and IRRI, 2008). The study unveiled
some of the refugees’ concerns about the implications of the naturalization and called for policies better
reflecting the realities of multiple identities. It was conducted at a moment when the refugees were making
life changing decisions but were still awaiting a verdict about the naturalization and their future (CFSM and
IRRI,2008:13). By now, they are officially recognized as New Naturalized Tanzanians or they have been
registered in order to find durable solutions for their situation. Hence, in order to explore the impact of
naturalization and (planned) integration on the identity construction and conceptualisations of home, the
current Tanzanian situation is a case-study of utmost interest.
Naturalisation and local integration are traditionally presented as durable solutions to end situations of
displacement but large scale naturalizations are rather exceptional. A recent publication about protracted
refugee situations of the Refugee Studies Centre (2010) considered durable solutions as an important
current and future trend of the forced migration research and policy. The authors petitioned for more and
thorough research about the possibilities, limitations and implications of the traditional and possibly other
solutions. Although there seems to be some reviving of policy discussions and research about (local)
integration (Fielden, 2008; Crisp, 2004), it is a rather unexplored area. The report stated:
“Researchers need to continue to explore the dynamics relating to the frequent failure of forced
migrant groups to integrate into host communities. Such work should focus on Northern as well as
Southern responses and obstacles to integration and must consider the political, social and economic
dimensions of integration (2010:20)”
5
Many works about displacement and identity focused on situations of resettlement and integration in a
third country (int.al. Ager and Strang, 2010; Kebede, 2010; Kumsa, 2006; Mosselson, 2006; Coker, 2004;
Ghorashi, 2004; Ahmed et.al., 2003; Bisharat, 1997). This dissertation looks into the ways how (former)
refugees identify and position themselves, what impact a naturalization and an announced relocation
process have on this positioning and how this may influence their future integration as ‘New Naturalized
Tanzanians’ into local communities. Their current and past experiences, their self-sense and notions of
belonging, as well as the way they are perceived by the host community, affect how they interact with their
(new) environment and will influence their integration. This work will address the psycho-social dimensions
and impact of a specific protracted refugee situation, therefore responding to Crisp’s observation
(2003:129) that relatively little has been written about this aspect and to Hyndman’s call (2008:26) to focus
on the impact of prolonged waiting on the physical, mental, economic and especially social aspect of
refugees’ lives. The work intends to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of
(ending) a particular protracted refugee situation. It provides information about possibilities, challenges or
obstacles to local integration that can be useful to policy makers responsible for assistance programs for
protracted refugee communities and planning and implementing local integration. This dissertation
emphasizes the experiences of the (former) refugees, in compliance with the appeal to fully acknowledge
refugees autonomy and capacities within the framework of durable solution and recognise their position as
primary social actors in processes of home-making (KANERE (2009) in RSC, 2010:20; Ager and Strang,2010).
1.3 Objectives and methodology
1.3.1 Research questions
This dissertation will try to clarify the impact of a protracted refugee situation and a package of durable
solutions on discursive practices and conceptualisations of identity and home. Since identity will be
considered as a fluid, multiple and heterogeneous process (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; Hall, 1996, 1990),
this dissertation contests the idea of identity as a fixed essence. As a social construction, identity is subject
to permanent re-interpretation and negotiation. Identities are thus “unstable points of identification, (…)
not an essence but a positioning” (Hall,1990:226). Consequently it is inevitable to also take into account the
specific socio-political context with which it interacts. This work therefore explores conceptualisations of
identity and notions of home in a situation of displacement, how they might evolve over time but also how
they relate to social perception and specific (although often implicit) presumptions about identity and
belonging comprised in refugee policy and practice. Not only do these practices and policies entail certain
notions of ‘refugee identity’, highly interconnected with an ubiquitous normalisation of nationality and the
nation state (Malkki, 1995a, 1992). The so-called durable solutions aiming to end the protracted situations
of the 1972 refugees also rely on a specific link between citizens and home-states, equally comprising
certain assumptions about being and belonging. The ways in which refugees are understood and
represented in refugee policy and practice, produce them as specific subjects, having an impact on their
experience. This work focuses on refugee policy and practice of UNHCR, the UN-key body dealing with
refugees and the policy and practice of the Tanzanian government.
These presumptions of and within the international and especially Tanzanian refugee policy and practice
will be compared to the experiences of the 'Newly Naturalised Tanzanians' and self-settlers themselves. We
6
intend to gain insight in the way the (former) refugees live(d) and experience(d) their identity during the
naturalisation process and what impact this might have on the future integration exercise. How do they
define themselves (now)? In what way do they construct their identities? In what way do certain labels and
presumptions about refugees have an impact on their sense of self and belonging? How do they position
themselves as Newly Naturalised Tanzanians?
This dissertation will therefore focus on three, highly interrelated, aspects of identity: citizenship, notions
of belonging and home. What determines identity is the way a person perceives himself, the way he relates
to the world and his sense of belonging to a certain community. Moreover, Dixon and Durrheim (2000:27)
state that questions of 'who we are' are often intimately related to questions of 'where we are'.
Conceptualisations and experiences of home and place are an essential part of identity. Certain rights are
allocated or restrained, based on these conceptualisations, perceptions and feelings of belonging. These
rights allow or obstruct individuals to access the means and opportunities of a community. Notions of
citizenship and the rights that come along with it, relate to identity and also shape feelings of belonging.
The before mentioned intentions are thus translated into the following questions and sub-questions:
1) Does the granting of citizenship and therefore the allocation of certain rights and plights,
influence the sense of identity of the (former) refugees? If so, how?
2) How do (former) refugees define belonging and home and has the process of naturalization and
future integration an influence on this conceptualisation?
3) How do (former) refugees’ conceptualisations of home and identity relate to notions of identity
embedded within refugee policy and practice?
1.3.2 Methodology
1.3.2.1 Data collection
This study tries to balance literature and theories on the one hand and specific lived experiences and
stories on the other hand. In order to collect secondary data, a broad range of literature, research,
newspaper articles and policy documents was used. This work, however, is also the product of information
gathered during 6 weeks of field research in Dar Es Salaam, Kigoma and Tabora regions. In first instance,
interviews were conducted with former Burundian refugees who are or have been living in Ulyankulu
settlement and with Burundian refugees who settled spontaneously in Kigoma town and Kigoma rural.
The first group was granted Tanzanian citizenship in 2008 but still awaits official papers and a planned
relocation (‘Newly Naturalised Tanzanians’). The second group could register already but has no certainty
about their future options yet. The Tanzanian government still has to decide on solutions concerning their
situation (‘self-settlers’). The interviewees were asked about their identity construction by reflecting upon
their notions of self, home and belonging within the context of the naturalisation/registration process. They
were also asked about the role that social perception might play in this identity formation process. Special
attention was paid to the possible impact of identity construction on the (future) local integration. In both
groups, there were respondents represented from the first as well as the second generation. The first
7
generation respondents were all born in Burundi and had at least some memories of the country. The
second generation respondents were all born in Tanzania and none of them had been in Burundi before
(overview of the respondents, Annex 1). Although many authors focus on displacement and identity in
specific situations of resettlement in a third country (Kebede, 2010; Kumsa, 2006; Mosselson, 2006), their
observation that the experiences and identification process of different generations may differ
considerably, seemed to be extendable to a situation of naturalisation and local integration in a country of
asylum. Crisp (2003:122) emphasises the importance of paying attention to demographic information and
especially the situation of children and adolescents in PRSs since many of them were born and brought up
in exile and therefore have very different experiences compared to people who did see the ‘homeland’.
Moreover there were also some key informants interviewed. These were respondents who, because of
their background and/or professional activities, were well-informed about and felt connected to the
situation of the (former) Burundian refugees. They were all born in Burundi and have been living in
Tanzania between 5 and 40 years. Some of them received the Tanzanian citizenship, others were staying in
the country as residents. The key informant interviews were conducted to collect contextual information as
well as to ascertain their experiences, opinions and attitudes to the naturalisation process. There have also
been taking place more informal talks and discussion about the topic with Tanzanians. Finally, UNHCR staff,
Tanzanian and Burundian government officials were interviewed in order to give a clear notion of their
policies and plans as well as to offer their perspective.
The selection of the interviewees was based and so-called snowball and purposive sampling. The semi-
structured interviews were conducted in English, French or Swahili, with support of a translator in the latter
case. The starting point for each conversation was a list of questions, but depending on the input of the
respondents the interviews covered different topics. On general request and given the sensitivity of the
topic, the interviews remain anonymous.
1.3.2.2 Data analysis
After transcribing the interviews, the computer program NVivo 9© was used in order to organise and
analyse the collected information using a combination of inductive and deductive encoding (cfr. Annex 2).
In first instance the interviews of refugees, key informants and officials were ‘scanned’ on interesting
similarities and returning topics. In order to approach the data in an unprejudiced way, there was no
reference to an encoding list in this phase. Later, the experiences of the (former) refugees, as embedded in
the interviews, were compared to theories and concepts used in (refugee) policy documents. Secondly the
interviews were compared to each other: What are similarities, differences, patterns and what could be the
reasons behind this? Are there for example differences between the experiences and positioning of the first
and second generation respondents? The interviews were screened, making use of a list of codes based on
theoretical concepts and notions. This list has been completed with themes and categories which were
mentioned in the interviews. An important source for developing the final encoding list has therefore been
the phrasings used by the respondents themselves. After linking parts of the interviews with specific codes,
the codes were categorised and connected to each other (cfr. Annex 3).
8
1.4 Limitations and gaps
It is important to recognise that the limited number of people interviewed during the fieldwork, may not be
a representative sample of all the (former) Burundian refugees and does not allow for generalisation. The
small group of respondents only renders a partial perception of reality. The results and conclusions of this
work should therefore be read with the necessary caution. Nevertheless, the primary data in combination
with data from secondary sources, should be able to provide some valuable insights.
Another possible shortcoming is the selection method of snowball and purposive sampling. When asking
respondents to suggest other interviewees, the researcher risks ending up with a rather homogenous group
that does not represent the population of concern. However, the rather spontaneous and personal
selection method proved valuable in selecting people with a different background in order to talk about a
sensitive issue. A lot of time was invested to find and addressing possible respondents, getting to know
them and reassuring them about the confidentiality of the interview. Although most interviews were
preceded by (at least) one preliminary talk, this proved impossible for the interviews in Ulyankulu due to
time pressure.
This research offers ‘a snapshot’ on certain conceptualisations of identity and home within a context of
naturalization and planned integration. It would have been a surplus-value if a group of these refugees
would have been followed over time. Given the fluidity of a concept as identity and the upcoming changes
intervening in their lives, it would have been of great interest to track a more evolving picture of the
changing conditions, social structures and the way the refugees have been experiencing them over time.
This was however beyond the reach of this dissertation.
Given none of the interviews were conducted in the mother tongue of the respondents and some
interviews were translated, language and communication problems should be mentioned here as well.
Although most respondents had sufficient knowledge of English, one might speculate on whether the
sensitivity and personal character of some questions did not require a conversation in the person’s mother
tongue. This might have been more comforting and easier to express oneself. When respondents were not
able to communicate in English, the interviews were conducted with the support of a translator. This
implies that literal registrations were not always possible since there was already some interpretation and a
probable loss of information.
Finally, within the framework of qualitative research, the position of the researcher cannot be ignored. As a
researcher you always position yourself in a specific way and interpret the data accordingly. There is a
permanent interaction between the researcher and the objects and subjects of the research, inevitably
determining the content and results of the research. A recurrent theme during the interviews was my
position as European and the possibility of me having an influence on policy (makers) in favour of their
case. This perception might have influenced certain responses as well.
9
1.5 Short Overview
This first chapter introduced the subject of this work and clarified the research questions and research
method. The coming section focusses on notions of identity and home as embedded in international and
more specifically Tanzanian refugee policy and practice (chapter 2). Thereafter the focus shifts to
experiences and conceptualisations of the (former) refugees themselves (chapter 3). Finally, both
approaches will be related and opposed to each other (chapter 4).
10
CHAPTER 2: DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT
2.1 Protracted refugee situations
“There’s nothing more permanent than the temporary”
2.1.1 Situating and definition
Refugees are a problem to the inter-national world since they are forced outside the system of nation state
membership and do not belong anywhere (Malkki, 1992,1995a). Generally they are seen as temporary
inhabitants who lack civil rights and are supposed to return to their country of origin as soon as possible.
When they do not have to fear prosecution anymore, when conflict is over, when the situation in their
country stabilizes, they should give up their refugee status and go back home. The 1951 Refugee
Convention (Article1/2) for example, mirrors this conception: ‘A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-
founded fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality’. International (legal) protection is intended to be
limited in time and ultimately aims to secure the bond between a citizen and a nation. It intends to restore
the membership of a certain community, either by going home or by integrating in another country.
International aid organisations concerned with displacement situations usually apply a care and
maintenance model within the same frame of mind, directed at temporary containment of persons in a
state of limbo (Adelman,2008).
Notwithstanding this preferred situation of ‘refugeeness’ being a temporary condition, a majority of the
refugee population has been living in chronic and stagnating situations of exile, paradoxically facing a
situation of permanent temporariness (Loescher and Milner, 2006a; Cheng and Chudoba, 2003:1-2; Crisp,
2003). The average duration of a refugee situation dramatically increased over the years, from 9 years in
1993 to 17 years by the end of 2003 up to almost 20 years in 2011 (http://www.prsproject.org/ consulted
on 2011 December 22th; Loescher and Milner, 2006a:109). By the end of 2006 the number of refugees
worldwide stood at 9.9 million and more than half of them were living in a situation of prolonged
displacement (UNHCR, 2007b:4). By 2010 about two third of the total refugee population of 10.55 million
people were living in a protracted situation of displacement (Loescher and Milner, 2011:3; UNHCR
2011b:2).
Based on a range of case-studies, the UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit described protracted
refugee situations (PRSs) as those where refugees have been living ‘in exile for more than five years, and
when they still have no immediate prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight by means of
voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement (Crisp, 2003:1). The High Commissioner for
Refugees later defined PRSs as situations ‘in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and
intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social,
and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. The refugees are unable to break free from
enforced reliance on external assistance’ (UNHCR, 2004:1). UNHCRS’s figures before 2008 only took into
11
account groups that were larger than 25 000 persons and excluded the Palestinian refugees under UNRWA
mandate (UNHCR, 2004:2). This description of PRSs has been questioned as being arbitrary, static and
exclusionary. Nowadays the organisation uses a more flexible approach. For example, one of the situations
identified within the framework of the High Commissioner’s Special Initiative on PRSs, that of the Rohingya
refugees in Bangladesh, represents a population of some 20 000 refugees. Nevertheless, there remain
some serious gaps, making it hard to form an accurate picture of the extent of PRSs worldwide (Loescher
and Milner, 2011:3; Feller, 2008:14). Since there is no focus on internally displaced people facing prolonged
exile, one of the largest number of refugees in a protracted situation are excluded. There is also little
known about the situation of self-settled refugees.
Although circumstances in PRSs are very different from the injustices and horrors refugees went through
before fleeing, conditions are usually very poor and far from promising. Given the enormous heterogeneity
of PRSs, generalizations are rather problematic. Not all refugees are sheltered in camps for example and
camp is a fluid concept in itself (Deardorff, 2009:8). Some refugees stay in less restricting settlement-
conditions, while others opt for the anonymity of towns and cities. Nevertheless, there are some features
that characterise, to a smaller or bigger extend PRSs. Most striking is probably the massive impact on
human rights and livelihoods of protracted exile. Hyndman (2008:27) argues ‘the on-going suspension of so
many other human rights in the context of protracted refugee situations is not warranted simply because
protection against non-refoulement is provided’. The places where refugees are settled are often remote,
insecure and poor, with very harsh climatic conditions. The refugees risk to suffer material deprivation, to
face psycho-social problems and to be exposed to acts of violence. The combination of poor living
conditions, poverty and a lack of freedom and opportunities may urge refugees to revert to negative
survival tactics, affecting the local host populations as well (Loescher and Milner, 2005:165). Moreover, a
large majority of PRSs is to be found in development countries, struggling to fulfill the basic needs of their
own citizens (Feller, 2008). The impact of the long-term presence of large groups of refugees on the host
community is therefore not to be underestimated. (Crisp, 2003:120-133). The prolonged presence of
refugees is increasingly viewed as a burden to hosting communities and a possible threat to local or even
national and regional stability and security. Host states are generally holding on to more restrictive asylum
policies (Loescher and Millner, 2011).
Protracted refugee situations have generally been attracting little media attention and donor interest.
Attention and money are mostly directed towards a few, high profile cases, responding to (inter)national
security concerns and focusing on direct aid and relief needs. The longer the situations last, the more the
international interest seems to decline (Loescher and Milner, 2006a). In combination with ceasing bipolar
tensions and diminishing strategic importance of groups of refugees since the fall of the Berlin wall, the
commitment of donor governments to find solutions and invest in long-term supportive programs seriously
diminished. Therefore, refugees in protracted situations may have a bleak outlook for the future. A lack of
means and commitment not only creates a situation where refugees receive less support (as food aid) and
face tougher living conditions but also diminishes the chances to find solutions within a limited timeframe.
The refugees risk falling into the much-discussed gap between short-term humanitarian aid and long-term
development aid. Refugees in PRSs are stuck: they cannot return because of long-lasting conflicts,
instability or insecurity in their country of origin, they cannot stay as citizens in the host country and they
cannot move to a third country (Crisp, 2003:3). Despite the recognition that PRSs risk to end in
unacceptable situations of indefinite encampment, solutions seem hard to find. Different authors stress the
12
complexity and highly sensitive and political character of situations of long term displacement and
emphasise the importance of involving a broad range of actors in order to realise solution (Ambroso et.al.,
2011; Allen et.al, 2010; Loescher and Milner, 2006a; Crisp, 2003).
Situations of protracted exile are no new phenomena, demonstrated for example by the dragging situations
of displacement in the aftermath of the Second World War. However, it is only recently they reappeared on
the international research and political agenda (Loescher and Milner, 2011). As part of the superpowers’
stakes during the Cold War era, PRSs were addressed to fulfil strategic and political interests. In the 1990-
ies however, there was hardly any interest for refugees in prolonged situations of exile, resulting in some
collective inertia. Feller (2008:11-12) argues that the international community was absorbed by three high-
profile situations, diminishing interest for situations where refugees had been stuck for years or even
decades. The refugee flows stemming from ‘new’ conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Somalia,
Iraq, Kosovo and so on, the facilitation of the repatriation of post-cold war refugees and the growing
number of economic migrants seeking asylum in the industrialised world claimed all attention. It was only
in 2001 that UNHCR found new donor support and initiated a number of studies covering the topic and
stirring up the debate3. The UNHCR Executive Committee dealt with the matter during its meeting in
October 2001 and the Standing Committee of the organization published a paper on the topic three years
later. Protracted Refugee Situations also came more to the fore thanks to UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection4.
In 2008, the High Commissioner launched his Special Initiative on PRSs, focusing on five exemplary cases
out of more than thirty PRSs worldwide. The initiative intended to illustrate the complexity of the
situations, stimulate re-prioritization of the often forgotten cases and boost efforts in finding solutions or
improving the lives of the refugees in PRSs. The targeted priority situations were the Afghan refugees in
Pakistan and Iran, the Eritrean refugees in Sudan, the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, the Bosnian and
Croatian refugees in Serbia and the Burundian refugees in Tanzania (UNHCR, 2008b). Why exactly these five
situations were selected as illustrative and inspiring is hardly motivated.
During the same year a High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges focused on protracted
refugee situations, examining ‘challenges and opportunities for refugees and other stakeholders in camps,
rural and urban contexts’ (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a12a4016.html, consulted 4 December 2011;
UNHCR, 2008a). Representatives from the political, research and NGO communities discussed the necessity
to expand efforts in finding durable solutions, the role of the international community, the importance of
cooperation and coordination between partners involved and the mandate of UNHCR. Although the High
Commissioner’s Dialogues are informal meetings and deliberations and conclusions stemming from it are
not legally binding, they are an important tool in stimulating debate, realizing consensus about certain
topics and shaping UNHCR’s refugee policy. After a difficult consultation and negotiation process in order to
reconcile different concerns and realise a compromise, UNHCR adopted an ExCom Conclusion on the
3 Those included, among others, studies about Sudanese refugees in Kenya, Sierra Leoneans in Guinea, and Liberians
in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana (http://www.unhcr.org/4a1d43986.html consulted on 12 December 2011) 4 The Agenda for Protection (UNHCR, 2003) is an ‘ambitious, yet practical program of action to improve the protection
of refugees and asylum seekers around the world’ (Feller, 2008:11). It incorporates a Program of Action based on six
key objectives: strengthening implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention; protecting refugees within broader
migration movements; sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably; addressing security-related concerns
more effectively; redoubling the search for durable solutions and meeting the protection needs of refugee women
and refugee children. The Agenda is available online: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4714a1bf2.html.
13
matter (Loescher and Milner, 2011). The organization’s strains to raise awareness about the topic, seem to
(start) paying off, as more donor governments concentrate on PRSs and new initiatives are launched within
research and advocacy communities.
2.1.2 Ending situations of protracted displacement
Besides providing protection for refugees, UNHCR’s mandate also comprises the responsibility to search for
durable solutions for (protracted) refugee situations. As mentioned before, PRSs are complex and sensitive
situations, involving a broad range of actors and touching upon core state interests as security and
sovereignty. PRSs are caused by ‘a range of economic and social factors and political action and inaction
that occurs in the country of origin, the country of asylum and among international actors’ (Loescher and
Milner (2005) in Deardorff, 2009:7). UNHCR emphasizes the political character of PRSs: ‘protracted refugee
situations are symptomatic of political failures, neglect and unequal distribution of resources’ (UNHCR,
2004:9) and claims that responses are to be found at the political level. Any solution is therefore highly
dependent on the spirit of times and one of the reasons PRSs can drag on for years is exactly the difficulty
to find a (political) agreement on solutions. PRSs reflect different interests of diverse parties concerning a
range of topics as development, security and migration that are often hard to merge into a comprehensive
and durable solution framework. There are for example huge differences between the way host countries
and donor countries approach PRSs (Loescher and Milner, 2011). Refugees overflowing border areas of
already weak states are often seen by the hosts as a serious security threat, undermining the own regional
and international position. Meanwhile, industrialized countries have been developing restrictive asylum
policies. They are reluctant to receive refugees themselves and increasingly raise pressure to locally shelter
and even integrate refugees (Toft, 2007; Betts and Milner, 2006). Host states, generally poor countries and
situated in the South, accuse rich and mostly western donor countries of undermining their ability to take
sovereign decisions, dodging responsibility and not equally sharing the burden (Morel, 2009). The lack of an
international legal framework to make states share responsibility for solutions adds to the complexity of
the situation. The 1952 Refugee Convention recognized the need for international cooperation in its
Preamble but there is no legally binding instrument operationalizing the idea of burden sharing (Morel,
2009:110). In order to stimulate the development of durable solutions and bring the burden-sharing
principle into practice, UNHCR developed a whole range of actions and tools that fall under the before
mentioned Agenda For Protection (UNHCR, 2003a).5 Nevertheless, states can chose to use those tools or
undertake certain actions but they are in no way obliged to do so.
5E.g. The Convention Plus initiative provides the tools to implement special agreements, including comprehensive
plans of action (CPAs) that will bring together a mix of durable solutions in a strategic manner. The Framework for
Durable Solutions focuses on promoting durable solutions for refugees and persons of concerns through repatriation
to the country of origin, local integration in the country of asylum or resettlement to a third country and brings
together three initiatives developed in recent years: DAR (Development Assistance for Refugees), the 4Rs
(Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction) and DLI (Development through Local Integration)
(UNHCR, 2003, framework for durable solutions, available at: http://www.unhcr.org)
14
2.1.2.1 Durable solutions
Traditionally, policies aiming at ending situations of protracted displacement focus on three strategies:
repatriation to the country of origin, local integration in the country of asylum and resettlement to a third
country. All three of these so-called durable solutions intend to restore a protective link between a refugee
and a nation state. They ought to end the need for international protection and assistance by renewing
access to citizenship and ensuring integration into a community. (Refugee Studies Centre, 2010: 17;
Loescher and Milner, 2006b:129).
The attractiveness and viability of the solutions have varied greatly over time because of geo-political,
practical and financial considerations (Chimni, 2004). However, repatriation has always been the
international community’s preferred solution (RSC, 2010; Long, 2008; Fielden, 2008; Jacobsen, 2001). Local
integration and especially resettlement, solutions that were strategically used during the Cold War, faded
into the background throughout the 1990s (Loescher and Milner, 2011; Hyndman, 2008; Toft, 2007).
Nowadays and despite efforts of UNHCR to revitalize both as durable solutions, their actual use still pales in
comparison to the practice of repatriation. The attempts of UNHCR, for example by the Agenda for
Protection, to expand resettlement opportunities, use resettlement more strategically and consider it as a
means of burden sharing, did not have a great impact on states’ willingness and ability to absorb large
groups of refugees.6 Only a very low percentage of refugees worldwide is offered a resettlement place. In
2010, there were 80 000 resettlement places available, meaning only about 1 per cent of the world’s
refugees directly benefited from this solution (UNHCR, 2011b:36-39). Moreover, the organization’s
attempts to revive the strategy also had to compete against the effect of 9/11 and the war on terrorism.
The focus on security has had a reverse impact on the available settlement places, the diversity of the
refugee groups accepted and the duration and type of screening procedures (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil,
2003:1).
Local integration regained research and political attention during the past decade, especially given the
increased recognition that repatriation is not always possible and renewed dedication to find solutions to
PRSs (Ager and Strang, 2010, 2008; Fielden 2008; Hyndman, 2008; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, 2003;
Jacobsen, 2001). Albeit the revival of academic and political attention for this solution, Kibreab (2011)
stated that local integration is no longer operative in practice. The Refugee Study Centre (2010:18-19)
claims that there remain significant local and national political as well as practical obstacles to permanent
integration. Generally, host and asylum states are rather reluctant about local integration compared to
donor states. They fear getting saddled with burdens they cannot bear as they often cannot answer the
economic, political, social, environmental and security implications that processes of local integration might
bring along. Local integration not only implies closer social and economic links between the host society
and (former) refugees but it also demands the possibility to provide for a livelihood and to attain self-
reliance, the acquisition of citizen rights and the membership to a new political community (UNHCR,
6 In a Standing Committee Paper (UNHCR, 2003: 2) the strategic use of resettlement is described as: “The planned use
of resettlement in a manner that maximizes the benefits, directly or indirectly, other than those received by the refugee
being resettled. Those benefits may accrue to other refugees, the hosting State, other States or the international
protection regime in general.” Underlying idea is that the strategic use of resettlement, as part of a comprehensive
solutions approach, can create opportunities beyond the actual number of persons resettled and therefore realizes
protection on a broader scale. For example, offering settlement places for those with the largest protection needs, can
create willingness to consider offering permanent residence to refugees.
15
2008b:16). As most states receiving refugees seriously struggle with providing education, health care,
infrastructure and job opportunities to their own population, they are reluctant to welcome new residents
who need (at least some) support and might create tensions with the local population. Offering permanent
residence or citizenship to refugees might also act as a pull-factor, attracting other refugee groups and
therefore making host states think twice about their hospitality. Moreover, local integration is a sensitive
political issue, reflecting concerns about government ownership and possible interferences in internal state
affairs. Host states insisted on including the clause that ‘Local integration is a sovereign decision’ in an
EXCOM Conclusion on the issue (UNHCR 2009b: paragraph h). This clause reflects that possible efforts to
stimulate local integration by rich donor countries, usually receiving a very small amount of refugees
themselves, can be experienced by host countries as an assault on their sovereign decision-making
authority and a way to evade their own responsibility. If local integration is to be taken into consideration,
the necessary incentives as well as a long negotiation process with the host state, the country of origin and
UNHCR are imperative (Hyndman, 2008:24).
Nevertheless, resettlement and local integration always had and will have to compete against the ‘most
natural solution’. Especially since the end of the Cold War and the demise of colonialism, serious emphasis
has been placed on repatriation to the country of origin. Refugees were no longer of strategic significance
but were seen as passive subjects in need or, at worse, intruders threatening security and/or seizing
welfare systems (Eastmond, 2002; Loescher and Milner, 2006a). Refugees had gone from ‘diamonds’ to ‘a
virtual plague of locust’ (Toft, 2007:143-145). In general, states anticipated a negative political, economic
and socio-cultural impact of refugees and a return to the country of origin appeared to be the best answer
to the problem. It would bring refugees back where they belonged, renew state protection, relieve the
burden to host communities and donor countries and avert pressure on the asylum space in the West
(Bakewell, 2002:44). About 12 million refugees have been repatriated during the 1990s, a decade that
former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Ogato declared ‘the decade of voluntary
repatriation’ (Druke, 2011:7). Until today, voluntary repatriation seems to keep its status of most feasible
and preferred solution. The High Commissioner for Refugees described voluntary repatriation as the most
viable solution for the majority of people in a PRS in his Dialogue on PRSs (UNHCR,2008b:9) and a recent
compilation of EXCOM conclusions (UNHCR, 2011c) reflects the pool position of the strategy:
“… voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement are the traditional durable
solutions, and all remain viable and important responses to refugee situations; reiterating that
voluntary repatriation, in safety and dignity, where and when feasible, remains the most
preferred solution in the majority of refugee situations” (EXCOM Conclusion No. 104 (LVI),
2005, p298, p553)
“… voluntary repatriation should not necessarily be conditioned on the accomplishment of
political solutions in the country of origin in order not to impede the exercise of the refugees’
right to return” (EXCOM Conclusion No. 109 (LX) – 2009, p420, p480, p549 and EXCOM
Conclusion No. 101 (LV), 2004, p480, p538, p550)
UNHCR claims it is the organization’s responsibility to respect refugees’ right to return. Therefore it
promotes and advocates voluntary repatriation when conditions are, according to the organization,
beneficial and safe. But even when a return is considered not entirely safe for most refugees, UNHCR
16
facilitates voluntary repatriation when refugees themselves signal they want to return or started to do so
on their own initiative (UNHCR, 1996:14-15). Scholars however raise objections against the apparently
beatifying of the right to return and UNHCR has been criticised for its complicity in (promoting)
repatriations that were not always fully voluntary in nature (Loescher and Milner, 2011; Adelman, 2008;
Toft, 2007; Harrel-Bond (1989) in Collins, 1996). On top, there has been critique on the naturalisation of
repatriation and equating repatriation to return (Long, 2011, 2010, 2008; Adelman, 2008; Bakewell, 2002;
Eastmond, 2002; Malkki, 1995a). UNHCR has been challenged to review the hierarchy of the three
traditional durable solutions, as well as the solutions themselves and to look into new means of solving
situations of long term displacement. The conceptualisations of durable solutions as sedentary, sequential,
mutually exclusive and permanent have been criticized as too narrow, inflexible and rigid, urging for a
review of the strategies’ possibilities and limitations (Monsutti (2008) in Kaiser, 2010:57).
A growing body of opinion claims the three traditional durable solutions should at least be integrated into a
more comprehensive and development-oriented approach. As a so-called integrated approach, the
Tanzanian solution strategy focusing on the 1972 Burundian refugees met general support of UNHCR and
other stakeholders. The strategy recognized the unlikeliness of one solution meeting the needs of the
whole group of refugees and intended to integrate different sustainable solutions. The characteristics of
this approach, as well as the challenges and strengths will be discussed later (cfr. 2 Tanzanian situation).
Although UNHCR seems to favor repatriation as durable solution, the organization also emphasizes the
importance of a comprehensive, collaborative and coordinated response to situations of prolonged
displacement. Since searching for durable solutions involves a whole range of issues as security,
development, migration and peace-building, UNHCR tries to mainstream the refugee issue into a wider
international response (Loescher en Milner, 2006b: 151). The agency also strives, in correspondence with a
tendency characterising the whole UN system7, for a long term approach that reconsiders the traditional
distinction between humanitarian and developmental aid. UNHCR stresses that after decades in exile,
refugees’ needs and concerns have evolved and differ compared to their needs at the time of arrival in a
camp or settlement. They can no longer be considered a strictly humanitarian issue and a solution to their
situation will have to comprise a developmental as well as a humanitarian focus. Feller (2008:13), at the
time UNHCR assistant high commissioner, claimed that one of the reasons PRSs lack resources for solutions
and consequently keep dragging on, is the complete separation of developmental and (humanitarian)
refugee issues at government level in both host and donor states. UNHCR exerts itself to promote
coherence and cooperation between organizations and agencies and brings the issue of PRSs and its
possible solutions onto the agenda of relevant interagency meetings as the UN Inter-Agency Standing
Committee and the Delivering As One Panel (UNHCR, 2011c:60). Moreover, it launched certain programs
and initiatives intending to better integrate refugees into development planning and improve burden
sharing, for example the already mentioned Framework for Durable Solutions (UNHCR,2003b).
7 A UN-wide reform was undertaken in 2006 and has focused on strengthening the UN’s ability to respond to the
reality of the 21st
Century. The emergence of the ‘UN Delivering as One’ initiative is an important outcome of this
process and required that the UN development system accelerated its efforts to increase coherence and effectiveness
of its operations in the field through the establishment of joint offices, realizing more cooperation and exchange. The
‘Delivering as One’ initiative, promised to generate some important new opportunities in the search for solutions to
protracted refugee situations. For more information: http://www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/
17
2.1.2.2 Durable solutions, identity and home
The analytical and policy framework that is used to approach refugees theoretically and in practice
comprises certain presumptions about refugee identity and elaborations of (a) home(land). Inherent to the
description of refugee situations and the (hierarchy of) durable solutions intended to bring them to an end,
are certain assumptions about what a refugee is or should be, how they relate to their country of origin,
and what should –ideally- be done to bring their situation back to normal. Refugees represent an anomaly,
a ‘problem to the entire community of nations’ (UNHCR, 1996:preface). They are dis-placed, out of place,
not where they belong and therefore they challenge a certain world order, an inter-national order of things
(Malkki, 1995a). Refugees do not belong to the country of origin (anymore), nor to a country of asylum
(yet). People derive a ‘natural’ identity from being rooted to a certain place, implying that ‘the identity
people gain from their association with a particular place is in some way fundamental or 'natural' and that
to be deprived of that identity is to lose some part of one's very humanity’ (Turton (1996) in Kibreab,
1999:97). Within line of this approach, the bond between a certain group of people and a certain place
allows for a historical, cultural and social identity and assures membership of a certain community and
nation. Through this membership and the attachment to a specific country, people identify themselves and
find themselves protected. Displacement is thus an international problem exactly because it is an obstacle
to root people to a certain territory, homeland or nation. All three durable solutions reveal a tendency to
re-root people and a preference to reinstate an international order. The (re)installation of a protective link
between an individual and a state is seen as prerequisite for a successful re-rooting and (re)integration. The
most straightforward way to realize such a link is through the institution of citizenship, bringing along
certain rights and duties but also influencing feelings of belonging and conceptualisations of identity.
The favoring of repatriation as ideal solution unambiguously shows an intend to restore a certain bond
between a particular ‘people’ and a particular territory (Long, 2010:5, following Malkki’s line of thought,
1992,1995a,1996). Voluntary repatriation reflects some kind of a moral idea of a return to a non-political
‘home’, as well as a restoration of a bond between a community and a place within an international
framework. Communities are understood in a sedentary way and refugees are presented as missing parts
of a disrupted and dismembered national body that just need to retake their natural place upon return
(Eastmond, 2002:3). However, the idealization of repatriation-as-return strips the process of its political
character. It neglects that refugees and returnees permanently have to negotiate their place in new
contexts of power and inequality and that they built multi-faceted and cross-border connections (Long,
2010). It is believed that refugees who had to leave a specific geographical location, home, will always be
drawn to that place ‘where one belongs’ (Malkki, 1995a:509). Refugees, as all people, are considered to be
emotionally attached to a home(land) and to identify themselves through this attachment. They identify
with a former home country and returning there would mean a restoration of a specific bond and a
reimbursement of what was lost while being in exile. In this regard, home not only represents a material
entity but especially a symbolic one, and both are believed to be restorable upon return. A loss of a home,
not only means material loss but also a symbolic loss of who we are. Home therefore represents a strong
connection with issues of identity, status and human security. Accordingly, notions of home are
territorialized and being a refugee is reduced to some kind of non-identity (Malkki, 1992).
Repatriation is considered the most natural solution, also getting preference of the refugees themselves.
Once the causes of their flight have disappeared, refugees ought to opt for a return, aroused by general
‘feelings of nostalgia and homesickness’ (Warner, 1994) or a certain ‘universal desire to return home’
18
(Bakewell, 2002:42). It might indeed seem natural that people who were forced to leave a certain place,
wish to reclaim it once circumstances allow for it. It is understandable that many refugees do long for what
they call(ed) home, feel homesick and strive for their right to return. It is however risky, especially in
situations of protracted exile, to suppose that all refugees share the same desire to return home, that all
have a certain attitude towards being a refugee and that all have the same notion of what home has been,
should and will be. Consequently, durable solutions for refugees are not single, uniform, fixed, nor static
and refugees do not necessarily want to return, even if they can (Kaiser, 2010:26). The longing for an
idealized homeland and the craving for a return is not at all a straightforward process that can be
generalized (Zetter, 1999). Neither is it possible to claim all refugees experienced the same kind of loss
caused by their flight. The before mentioned research of Malkki (1995b) in Western Tanzania is exemplary
in this regard. Although the two groups she focused on both originated from the same place, they had a
different attitude towards their refugee status and their so-called homeland. Their expectations concerning
a return home were very distinct: the self-settled refugees were trying to melt into Tanzanian society and
did not organize their lives in order to return to a mystified, idealized, ancestral homeland. The refugees in
Mishamo settlement idealized their past life in Burundi and saw their situation in the settlement as a
necessary hardship that would eventually result in a return to their promised land. Notions of home and
conceptualisations of identity are thus shaped, defined and redefined depending on specific lived
circumstances of exile, also influencing the wish to return to the country of origin. As protracted refugee
situations can drag on for years and even decades, notions of home evolve over time but so does the actual
situation referred to as home.
It is claimed that to refugees, the concept of home comprises strong reference to an often idealized past
and a way of life people identify with. It somehow is a ‘physical and symbolic representation of what has
been lost in exile’ (Zetter,1999:9). Refugee identities are characterized by the inheritance of a certain
idealized past, representing and meanwhile confronting a loss of continuity with the past. Many refugees,
more or less stimulated by others, try to maintain continuity with the past by complying with or
constructing a ‘myth of home’ and/or ’a myth of return’ (Zetter, 1999). Warner (1994) stated that these
idealized concepts of home usually do not acknowledge the context and underlying power relations, nor
mirror the situation as it is. Feelings of nostalgia and homesickness are, according to the author, distorted
by memory and are mostly an expression of the denial of the gap between people’s concepts of home and
the actual soil, group and place being referred to.
A critical analysis of what is conceived as home by organizations urging for return as well as by the refugees
themselves is often missing (Bakewell, 2002:42). What exactly is considered home and what the concept
symbolizes stays largely un-clarified. Home however has multiple meanings, representing a whole range of
realities, feelings, beliefs, customs, memories and attachments. The concept is intertwined with social,
economic and political life. It can be an actual place of everyday lived experience, related to a network of
significant others as family, kin, friends, neighbors: home as a sense of ‘feeling at home’. It can also be an
abstract, symbolic entity expressed through narratives and symbolic exchange: home as a sense of
belonging to a certain place, community or nation (Black, 2002; Fog Olwig, 1998; Brah, 1996). Home as a
negotiated sense of belonging can thus easily give rise to processes of inclusion and exclusion:
19
“Belonging is activated when there is a sense of exclusion, so that the experience of ‘sameness’
in one space is associated with estrangement from another, highlighting the emotion that is
attached to belonging.“ (Tomlinson, 2010:280)
The idea that refugees need to be re-rooted to a homeland does not recognize these processes of power at
play. It rests on static and territorialized concepts of identity and home, partly ignoring the fluid and
transnational character of the refugees’ conceptualisations and the importance of lived experiences.
2.2 Tanzanian situation
2.2.1 Towards a refugee free zone
In the early seventies, Burundi was startled by what Lemarchand (1974 in Malkki, 1992) has called a
selective genocide against the Hutu population. The conflict forced more than 200000 Burundians to flee to
neighboring Tanzania, where most of them have been living in three designated settlements: Ulyankulu in
Tabora Region and Katumba and Mishamo in Rukwa Region. Jacobson (2001:7) described these kind of
settlements as segregated villages specifically created to receive refugees and intended to promote self-
sufficiency. The Tanzanian government, within line of Nyerere’s ujamaa philosophy (Loescher and Milner,
2005:155), provided each household with a few hectares of land, allowing the refugees to take up their
former rural life. UNHCR and its implementing partners assisted with infrastructural support and provided
for basic needs, the district authorities organized different services such as education and health care.
(UNHCR, 2010:33-34). The settlements achieved agricultural and economic self-sufficiency within a few
years, international assistance was stopped in 1985 and by then a considerable amount of taxes returned
from the settlements to the government administration8.
The self-sufficiency of the refugees has probably influenced the general perception towards them. During
interviews and random talks, many Tanzanians referred to the former refugees as ‘hard workers’, ‘good
farmers’ and ‘true workmen’, acknowledging their efforts to become independent from aid and assistance.
On top, the 1972 refugees were considered as linguistically and ethnically related and somehow culturally
integrated. Children began following the Tanzanian schooling system in English and Kiswahili, there were
many mixed marriages and no major incidents occurred with the Tanzanian population. The perception of
the settlements’ population as rather integrated communities, able to look after themselves, has probably
also slowed down the process of searching for durable solutions. More pressing situations, pushed the
1972 refugees into the background. The rather positive attitude towards this group of Burundian refugees
and the perception of a more or less peaceful living together with the surrounding communities, does not
mean the refugees did not suffer from limited rights, restricted freedoms, a lack of opportunities and
discriminations (DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010; CSFM and IRRI 2008, 2009a). They have for example been
confronted with serious restrictions on their freedom of movement, also restraining their economic
activities and intensifying feelings of isolation: ‘This limitation reveals the contradiction inherent in the local
8 Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011.
20
settlement policy, which, instead of generating local integration, in reality has fostered difference and
exclusion from mainstream Tanzanian society’ (CSFM and IRRI, 2008:14). They still remained refugees
instead of citizens, as an official from the Tanzanian refugee department postulated: ‘it could not be
expected we provided a full range of rights to refugees when our people were not even able to enjoy the
same range of freedoms. Even after a long time in our country, they were still different, requiring a different
approach and different rights’9. Nevertheless, the 1972 refugees probably would not have gotten the
choice to naturalize if they would not have been considered as more or less integrated10. They have been
regarded as a special group of refugees, especially compared to a second major group of Burundians who
sought refuge in Tanzania in the wake of the 1993 crises. After the arrival of this group of hundreds of
thousands of displaced people, the Tanzanian government remarkably hardened its position towards
refugees and their policy became increasingly restrictive (L’Ecluse,2010: CSFM and IRRI, 2009a). The 1998
refugee act for example installed a system of refugee encampment, making it a crime to live outside a camp
without a special permit (Asylum Access Tanzania, 2011). The 1993 refugees were sheltered in camps:
designated areas, separated from the general population, resting on a care-and-maintenance model
(Landau, 2003). Refugees were denied the right to work, forbidden to move outside the camps and did not
get any land allocated. Basically, they were forced to rely on aid and assistance while awaiting their return
home. Over the years, the public opinion towards refugees also seems to have become more negative, with
refugees presented as a burden rather than an affiliated group of people.
Since the Tanzanian government announced its intention to become a refugee free zone, the 1993 refugees
have never been mentioned as possible beneficiaries of a naturalization. The Tanzanian government has
instead repeatedly emphasized its intention to close all camps and has put the remaining refugees under
serious pressure to return to Burundi. Intimidations and round-ups became a customary practice (L’Ecluse,
2010; CSFM and IRRI, 2009a). Notwithstanding the attempts and pressure of the Tanzanian government
and UNHCR to make them return to Burundi, some 38000 refugees remained in Mtabila camp at the time
this research was conducted. Initially, the Tanzanian government set the deadline for the closure of Mtabila
camp at the 30th of June 2009 and the announcement of the closure was fortified by a range of restrictions:
all official educational activities were stopped, religious services were limited, market and shops were
closed and agricultural activities were restricted (CFSM and IRRI, 2009a: 9-10). A large group of refugees
however was and still is reluctant to repatriate, fearing an unsafe return and problems upon arrival. A
tripartite commission of UNHCR and the governments of Tanzania and Burundi on the other hand, has
emphasized the stability of Burundi and the possibility to return in safety for years. They claim the
circumstances which led to the exodus in 1993 and onwards are no longer evident in Burundi (UNHCR
2011e). After several postponed deadlines since 2009, the commission set the end of 2012 as final deadline
for the closure of Mtabila. The decision came after a study at household level in the camp, assessing the
protection needs of the remaining refugees. A large majority of the refugees was found to be ‘not in need
of international protection’ (UNHCR bulletin 2012:4) and therefore the tripartite commission declared that
9 Interview Tanzanian Government officials, Refugee Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar-Es-Salaam, October
2011. 10
Interview Tanzanian Government officials, Refugee Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar-Es-Salaam, October
2011; Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011;
21
campaigns are going to focus on persuading refugees to return home in security and dignity between April
and August 2012:
“We do not want a situation where they are forced out but they must understand that refugee
status is not indefinite and if they do not have well-founded reasons they must reflect and return
home.”(UNHCR Burundi representative Clementine Nkweta–Salami cited in IRIN News, 2012)
Given the past suspensions, it is hard to tell when Mtabila camp will actually be closed, under what
conditions and what a definite closure will implicate for possible remaining refugees. Moreover, the closure
of Mtabila does not only concern the group of remaining 1993 refugees, but also a specific group of the
1972 refugees: the so-called self-settlers. This group of refugees settled amongst the Tanzanian population
in local communities, without assistance or protection from the Tanzanian government or international
(aid) organizations. There are no recent estimations of the actual number of self-settled refugees and it is
hard to track them down as they often make themselves invisible to local authorities and organizations as
UNHCR (Loescher and Milner, 2011:5; Malkki, 1995b). Some 22 000 of this spontaneously settled refugees
registered for durable solutions in 2010, but the actual number is probably higher (UNHR, 2011d). The
group that registered, did not know what their future would look like. Although all self-settlers interviewed
presumed they would get the same offer as the refugees from the settlements, the option to naturalize,
government officials and UNHCR officers were more careful about taking a naturalization for granted. A
UNHCR protection officer from the Kigoma office stated for example:
“Right now, it is not clear what durable solution will be applied for this group. What will be
decided? Will they be able to stay? And if so, under what conditions? They might get the
possibility to stay but rather as permanent residents than as citizens. If they can stay, do they
have to relocate, do they have to resettle? (…) Certain security precautions and -issues remain
alive. So the situation of this group is still pending, the decision is still on hold, making a close
follow up necessary.”(September 2011)
Causing anxiety and adding to the uncertainty, was the postponement of any decision about the situation
of the self-settlers till the final closure of Mtabila camp. A decision that might provoke serious misgivings as
the Tanzanian government and the Tripartite commission always emphasized the difference in profile and
situation of the 1993 and the 1972 refugees and plead for a distinct approach and package of solutions.
Moreover, the self-settlers’ fate will also depend on the relocation and integration exercise of the
settlement-refugees (DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010:37). The progress of the process, the actual time span, the
way the settlement-refugees are received by local communities, the access to livelihood activities and so on
will determine what the self-settlers are up against. A report of IRRI and CSFM (2009a:12) made notice of
increasing pressure from the government to return to Burundi and even of previously self-settled refugees
who have been forced to leave their homes and move to Burundi. Needless to say that statements about
the future of the self-settlers are largely a matter of conjecture.
22
2.2.2 The Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy
So far the only elaborated package of solutions seems to be aimed at the 1972 settlement-refugees. The
Tripartite Commission launched the ‘Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy’ (2008). Prior to the
elaboration of TANCOSS, between July and November 2007, UNHCR and both governments consecutively
organized a population census, an individual registration, an intention survey and an independent socio-
economic study in the settlements (UNHCR,2011e). The strategy intends to be comprehensive, cooperative
and collaborative and includes key elements of the before mentioned Framework for Durable Solutions
(DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010:29). The strategy is based on a three-pillar approach of voluntary repatriation,
naturalization and local integration, in combination with an extra umbrella objective in order to mobilize
international support. Within the framework of TANCOSS, the targeted refugees could opt for voluntary
return or for remaining in Tanzania and naturalize11. More than 55000 of the 1972 Burundians returned to
Burundi between 2008 and 2010 and some 162000 refugees opted for naturalization (UNHCR, 2011d). The
implementation of TANCOSS was originally planned to take place between January 2008 and December
2009 but has been extended up to 2014. The feasibility of this new timespan is questionable as well since
the process is already seriously delayed. In the following parts the main components of the strategy and the
current situation will be shortly clarified.
2.2.2.1 Pillar 1: Voluntary repatriation and reintegration
“Burundian refugees who opt for voluntary return will repatriate by September 2009 and will be
successfully reintegrated in their areas of return.”
Both Tanzanian and Burundian government and UNHCR committed themselves to support a safe and
dignified repatriation of all those who declared a wish to return to Burundi. The whole operation required
an intense planning process and close cooperation in order to realize the necessary infrastructural and
logistical arrangements (UNHCR, 2010) The repatriation process per se has proved to run rather smoothly
and efficiently, allowing some 55000 people to return to Burundi by 2010. The challenges and tasks of the
reintegration however seem to have been seriously underestimated during the planning process as well as
during the implementation phase12. Many problems, that were not sufficiently anticipated on, have
aroused. The recent evaluation by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Policy Development and
Evaluation Service of UNHCR (2010: 9,42) claims that ‘the complications of settling the returnees appear to
have been underestimated by UNHCR and (…) the unsolved situation for a large number of returnees in
Burundi and the fact that families continue up to the present to be placed in reception centres could possibly
have been lessened’. A first problem relates to the lack of clear information about the situation in Burundi
11 The initial TANCOSS strategy did not include reference to resettlement as a solution but resettlement has been used
in a strategic manner to complement voluntary return and local integration. Some 8,000 refugees of the 1972
caseload were identified for resettlement, mostly to the USA (Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Kigoma,
September 2011). 12
Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011; Interview UNHCR Officer Durable
Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011.
23
and the consequences of a return to the country (CSFM and IRRI, 2009b). Key informants interviewed
stated that the refugees in the settlements heard a seriously biased story, emphasising the good life in
Burundi, pushing for a return ‘home’ and therefore creating expectations that could not be met13. Access to
land proved to be a critical and controversial issue, causing considerable problems to re-establish
livelihoods (CSFM and IRRI, 2009b). Setting up a livelihood in Burundi largely depends on access to arable
land since non-agricultural options for making a living are very limited. However, after decades of absence
many of the returnees have found their land occupied by other families, companies or the government.
Many of them have lost certain legal rights and entitlements or are unable to prove their legal title to the
land. Others did not even know where their family originated from and basically had nowhere to go.
UNHCR provided an assistance package that contained among others construction materials, plastic sheets,
soap, a bicycle and a cash grant of 45 dollar per person but the package proved insufficient to allow
returnees to take a new start14. Supported by the international community, the Burundian government
created so-called Peace Villages (villages rureaux intégrés) to shelter landless returnees and it established a
National Commission on Land and Other Possessions in order to mediate on land-disputes. So far the Peace
Villages have provoked serious critiques. They do not seem to realize reintegration into the social fabric of
the Burundian society and there is still a lack of permanent solutions for (reclaiming) lost land. People living
in the Peace Villages suffer from physical, social and political isolation, they denounce the quality and size
of the available land and the lack of basic services (CSFM and IRRI, 2009b: 8, 14, 37).The Land Commission
played an important role in resolving conflicts over land but it struggled to meet the demand for its support
and lacked capacity to respond to the complex land and property issues facing Burundi (Thomson,
2009:35). Other challenges concerned educational and language problems as many returnees have been
born in Tanzania, have followed the Tanzanian curriculum in Kiswahili and English and have had only limited
contact with the home communities (DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010:47). Burundi, being a country in transition,
also struggles to attract the attention of bilateral and multilateral development programs that might
benefit the returnees. While developmental programs have not been (fully) established, humanitarian
programs have been phasing out, causing a gap between relief and development aid with returnees risking
to fall into this gap.
The repatriation and especially sustainable reintegration of the returnees is a crucial part of the TANCOSS
strategy. If this part of the solution strategy fails to be effective and sustainable, if returnees face a long
term unsolved situation, an effective transition from war to peace in Burundi may be delayed or even
obstructed. This may potentially lead to new situations of displacement, with new flows of refugees
heading to Tanzania or other neighboring countries and another prolongation of a refugee situation already
lasting for decades.
13 Informant 1, Kigoma, September 2011; Informant 2, Tabora, September 2011; Burundian Government Official,
Consul General, Burundian Consulate Kigoma, August 2011. 14
Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011.
24
2.2.2.2 Pillar 2: Naturalization
“Burundian refugees who chose to remain in Tanzania will be naturalized under the Tanzanian citizenship
law by the end of 2008 or early 2009.”
The landmark decision of the Tanzanian government to offer the 1972 settlement refugees the option to
initiate a procedure to receive Tanzanian nationality and therefore claim certain civil rights, reflected an
unprecedented generosity and an intention to finally find a lasting solution for the refugees. A large
majority of the group (about 80%) opted for naturalization and by the end of 2009, more than 155,000
refugees were granted citizenship by the Minister of Home Affairs. This number rose to almost 162,300 by
early 2010, almost 98 per cent of the total number of applicants (DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010:36). It was not
so much the gesture of naturalizing a group of refugees an sich that attracted international attention and
was complimented. Tanzania granted citizenship to other groups of refugees, for example the Rwandan
and Burundian refugees that were naturalized on a group basis during the late 1950ies and early 1960ies or
more recently (2005) the 1423 Somali Bantus who stayed in Tanga Region (UNHCR, 2011d). It was the size
of the 1972 group offered citizenship that was rather exceptional. Probing why the government decided to
naturalize such an unprecedented number of refugees, government officials referred to: the intention to
become a refugee free zone; the perception of existent social, economic and cultural links between the
host population and the refugees and concerns about peace and security in the region. About the last
aspect it was stated:
“I also think the size of the group had an impact on the decision to give them the choice to stay
or return. If we would have send them all back, we might have created problems in Burundi. I
don’t think the country was ready to receive almost 200 000 people (…) It might have caused
tensions that could have easily sparked unrest and violence in the whole of the country, causing
new waves of refugees. It’s of course speculation… what might have happened, I mean, it
might have been a successful operation but we couldn’t afford taking a gamble on
it.”(Interview Tanzanian Government officials, Refugee Department, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011)
The UNHCR officers interviewed emphasized the importance of the government’s policies at the time of the
refugees arrival. The integration of the refugees in the ‘villagization’ policy positively influenced their
relation to surrounding communities and this had a positive impact on the decision to naturalize. They also
mentioned the growing international reluctance to receive refugees, the more restrictive refugee policies
and the more or less direct pressure to find an answer to refugee problems in their region of origin.15 These
motivations were also pointed out in the DANIDA and UNHCR evaluation report (2010:26-28).
The naturalization exercise and especially the processing of the naturalization applications was a logistically
complex process but was finalized without major difficulties. IRRI and CFSM however point out some
problems during the process: the vulnerable or unclear position of certain groups as elderly people, people
15 Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011; Interview UNHCR Officer Durable
Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011.
25
who were not present in the settlements during the registration and Burundians married to Tanzanians; the
lack of flexibility after declaring oneself in favor of either one of the solutions and the lack of opportunity to
appeal rejection (CSFM and IRRI, 2008:20-25). Initially the process was planned on a group level, as a mass
naturalization by decree. During implementation this was changed to an ‘expedited’ procedure, meaning
every individual had to apply for citizenship but after individual registration and acceptance of the
application, all applicants were treated as a specific group16. The 1972 refugees had to take the general
steps of an individual naturalization but some steps were modernized and expedited. UNHCR supported the
Tanzanian government and immigration officers with the digitization of application forms, setting up
naturalization centres, deploying registration, organizing trainings and so on. Implementing partners and
UNHCR assisted the refugees in, among others, completing the electronic citizenship application forms, in
the identification of witnesses for declarations about residence and in the renunciation of previous
citizenship (UNHCR, 2010).
Although almost every applicant was officially called a ‘Newly Naturalized Tanzanian’ by April 2010, the
naturalization process was not finalized at that time. The government decided to link pillar 2 and pillar 3 of
the TANCOS-strategy by postponing the distribution of the citizenship certificates until relocation had taken
place (cfr 2.2.3). Once they arrive in their region of destination, the relocating citizens will have to collect
their certificates in certificate issuance centers that still have to be opened. The linking of both pillars was
announced in the Intention Survey (2008). It stated: “if you are successful in your application for
naturalization, you will be required by the Government to leave the Settlements. Where will you go? Name
two places”. Every head of household that applied for citizenship, had to complete the survey. That the
linking of pillar 2 and 3 would imply the holding back of certificates until people left the settlement was not
mentioned (DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010:33). By the end of 2011 it was not clear when exactly the relocation
would take place, how it would be organized and how and under what conditions the NNT would be able to
collect their certificates. The whole process is to be completed at an unknown time, causing a lot of
confusion and uncertainty. The initial timeframe has been seriously delayed already and this comes with
some considerable risks. Donors are getting tired of the many postponements and tend to shift their focus
to other (more urging) situations as the food insecurity in North-Kenyan refugee camps or reconstruction in
Libya. Donor-fatigueness would be detrimental for the long term integration and local integration process.
The delays have of course a major impact on the NNT’s themselves. They did not know what they were up
to. Many of the former refugees for example were dependent on small-scale agriculture but did not know
whether they had to invest in their fields or not. If they did not invest they might have ended up without
food, if they did invest they might have lost their investment17. Human right organizations refer to the
former refugees’ ambivalent feelings about the implications of naturalization and have been condemning
their state of limbo (CSFM and IRRI, 2009a, 2008). Although government officials and UNHCR officers
stressed that it was generally known that one of the conditions to become Tanzanian was to relocate and
that the certificate-issue is mainly a legal one and nothing to worry about, the former refugees seem to be
more suspicious about the decision. Other instances questioned the effectiveness of TANCOSS given the
non-issuance of the citizen-certificates:
16 Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011.
17 Interview Informant 2, Tabora, September 2011
26
“The uncertainty with regard to when in the process the NNTs are likely to become “real” citizens
could, in a worst-case scenario, result in the creation of a group of internally displaced
persons.”(DANIDA and UNHCR,2010:44)
The decision to make the completion of the naturalization process depend upon the relocation, seems to
have been taken somewhere en route and largely seems to stem from political issues at play (DANIDA and
UNHCR, 2010:12,28). Key informants and a UNHCR officer also mentioned that the politics behind the
process caused serious delays18. Refugees became for example an important theme in political campaigns.
There seemed to be growing critique and resistance at a local and regional level, with for example local
MP’s complaining that they have not been involved properly in the decision to naturalize and relocate.
Despite investments of UNHCR in informing and sensitizing the different actors involved, the resistance by
local and regional officials urged the government to put the whole operation on hold. Internal consultations
concerning the further organisation of the relocation and integration process were to be organized. When
exactly the government would decide on further steps and what these steps will be, remained unclear.
2.2.2.3 Pillar 3: Local Integration
“Naturalized refugees will be integrated in their new host communities by the end of 2010.”
It was only in June 2010 that the Tanzanian government launched the last pillar of TANCOSS with the
announcement of the National Strategy for Community Integration Programme (NASCIP), spelling out the
modalities for the relocation and integration of the NNTs (UNHCR, 2011e). As already mentioned, the
perception that they were already somehow integrated stimulated the decision to offer citizenship and
introduce local integration as a solution to the refugees’ plight. Their integration was largely situated on
what Crisp has called the socio-cultural dimension of local integration (2004:1-2). He distinguishes three
interrelated dimensions and defines local integration as a process whereby refugees progressively receive
certain rights and entitlements (legal dimension) and therefore are also able to reach a higher degree of
self-reliance and improve their potential to establish a sustainable livelihood (economic dimension). As
refugees and local host communities gradually acclimatize and accommodate, they get to live amongst or
alongside each other. Refugees learn the language, engage in cultural and religious meetings and share
(parts of) a way of living (socio-cultural dimension). Notwithstanding the refugees being perceived as
(partly) integrated on one or more dimensions, they themselves made objections to this observation (cfr.
Chapter 3) and respondents were also in the conviction that living in remote settlements was an
obstruction to full integration19. Besides giving the refugees the chance to leave remote and isolated areas
with harsh conditions behind, the intention of the government to relocate the 1972 refugees from the Old
18 Interview Informant 1, Kigoma September 2011; Personal email conversation Informant B3, September 2011;
Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011. 19
Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011; Interview UNHCR Protection
Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011, Interview Informant 1, Kigoma, September 2011; Interview Informant 2,
Tabora, September 2011; Burundian Government Official, Consul General, Burundian Consulate Kigoma, August 2011.
27
Settlements to 16 regions throughout the country20 was also influenced by security precautions. The
government wanted to avoid a Burundian enclave in a border region and therefore intented to stimulate
former refugees to mingle with the Tanzanian population21. Government officials also referred to the
importance of being able to shed of the refugee label:
“There is a more or less explicit link between the settlements and being a refugee. We think it’s
important to be disconnected from the place, to be able to leave the feeling of being a refugee
behind and integrate in Tanzanian society. We don’t want them to stay in the settlements, they
should live in other communities and mix with other Tanzanians.”(Interview Tanzanian
Government Officials, Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar es Salaam, October 2011)
The possibility to create new functions or re-establish some of the previous functions of the settlement-
areas, was also mentioned by officials. Before they were allocated as a place for refugee-settlement some
parts were for example designed as game reserves and it was suggested the government might strive for
restoration of these reserves22. Other sources however suggested the government was planning to use
state land for commercial agricultural purposes, taking advantage of the international rush for available
land after the 2008 food crisis (DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010; The Citizen, 2011, July 26; The Guardian on
Sunday, 2011, July 31). Critics of possible giant commercial agricultural projects saw the planned move of
the NNT as ‘just another calculation aimed at evicting the Burundian refugees in order to pave the way for
the massive commercial farming to take place in the area’. (The Guardian on Sunday, 2011, July 31).
Originally, NASCIP stated that the relocation would start in 2010 but the process has been seriously delayed
and it is rather unlikely the initial deadline of 2014 will be met23. The naturalized households, 8677 in
Ulyankulu, chose their priority regions during a registration for relocation early 2011 but they are still
awaiting the notification of their final allocation (see preliminary relocation graphic p28) (UNHCR, 2011e).
Once they have been informed about the receiving regions and the reception formalities in the respective
areas has been finalized, they will have a period of 4 months to prepare for their exit from the settlements.
Households already settled in other parts of the country outside the settlements are allowed to continue
living in their current location.
20 Tanzania has 26 regions and 127 districts. NASCIP shows the relocation will affect about 50 districts in 16 regions:
Tabora, Rukwa, Kigoma, Kagera, Ruvuma, Shinyanga, Morogoro, Dodoma, Mtwara, Iringa, Lindi, Tanga, Manyara,
Mbeya, Coast and Singida (Personal email conversation Informant 5, 2011 August 23th). 21
Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011; Interview Tanzanian Government
Officials, Refugee Department, Ministry of Home Affairs; Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-
Es-Salaam, October 2011. 22
Interview Tanzanian Government Officials, Refugee Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar es Salaam, October
2011 23
Interview Tanzanian Government Officials, Refugee Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar Es Salaam, October
2011; Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011
28
Mara
Zanzibar
Kilimanjaro
Dar Es Salaam
Mwanza
Kigoma
TangaSingida
Manyara
Mbeya
Tabora
Kagera
Pwani
Morogoro
ShinyangaLindi
Mtwara
Rukwa
Ruvuma
Iringa
Dodoma
Preliminary Reloaction Graphic - Families per
region
SOURCE: United Nations Delivering As One Tanzania -
UNHCR Durable Solutions Office Tanzania (2011), Local
Integration Programme April 2010- May 2011 (p4)
REGION FAMILIES
Mara 1
Zanzibar 1
Kilimanjaro 1
Dar Es Salaam 52
Mwanza 118
Kigoma 1015
Tanga 1199
Singida 1260
Manyara 1279
Mbeya 1292
Tabora 1349
Kagera 1395
Pwani 1474
Morogoro 1637
Shaniyanga 1659
Lindi 2217
Mtwara 2396
Rukwa 2547
Ruvuma 2580
Iringa 2608
Dodoma 2942
TOTAL 29022
A task force will facilitate the relocation-process and UNHCR and partners will support the movement of
the relocating citizens with assistance packages. The organization will also provide local integration support
at district level and will seek to engage development actors (UNHCR,2011e). NASCIP provides for an
individual assistance package (including transport, start-up capital and land access) and a community-based
component in order to strengthen the absorption capacity of the receiving communities (UNHCR, 2010:33-
34). In preparation of the relocation, UNHCR and the Tanzanian government established field presence by
creating three additional zonal coordination offices in Iringa, Mwanza and Dodoma24. These are temporary
offices that will close once the process is finalized and the Tanzanian government takes over full protection
of the new citizens’ rights. Their function is dual; coordinate the integration and relocation process and
guarantee the protection of the NNTs by organizing information sessions with local authorities, conducting
a needs assessment, sensitize potential partners and so on25. Regional Immigration officers already got a
training on citizenship certificates in November 2010 and information sharing sessions about the relocation
and integration process were also organized for local authorities in 13 receiving regions early 2011 (UNHCR,
2011e). Notwithstanding these preparatory and supporting initiatives, it remains unclear where, how and
24 There were already two local integration support offices, one in Dar Es Salaam and one in Mtwara. Besides UNHCR
has: a representation office in Dar Es Salaam, Field Offices in Kigoma, Kasulu and Mpanda, Field Units in Mishamo and
Ulyankuluu, and logistical outposts in Mwanza and Isaka (UNHCR 2011d) 25
Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011.
29
under what timeline the NNTs will have to relocate. A lot of practical challenges and questions concerning
the conditions and impact of the process still stand firm: When will the former refugees be asked to leave?
How will transport be organised? What about vulnerable persons- how will they be supported? How and
when will the NNTs be able to collect their certificates? What if they cannot secure access to land? Will the
cash grant be enough to support people to the extent they can go on with their life or start a new one?
How will the government deal with resistance of local communities and possible social exclusion of the
refugees? The requirement to relocate and the coincided speculations and questions, raised anxiety among
the former refugees and caused human right organisations to question the whole relocation-process
(UNHCR, 2012; CSFM and IRRI, 2009a:7-8; DANIDA and UNHCR, 2010:41). Most of the NNTs have been
living their entire lives in the settlements and are dependent on land to realize a living. Relocation might
undermine their access to a livelihood, their sense of identity and it is seen as a violation of their rights:
“To follow a grant of nationality immediately with severe restrictions on movement, risks not
only a violation of rights, but also creating a tiered notion of citizenship – will create different
classes of citizenship.”(CSFM and IRRI, 2009a:8)
The many delays and uncertainties also seemed to contribute to all kind of speculations that are hard to
either confirm or invalidate. A former refugee living in Ulyankulu for example mentioned in an email-
conversation (2012, February 28th) that ‘the closure of Ulyankulu is still unknown but it will not be closed
since it is going to be one of the Districts of the country’. It proved impossible to get more information nor a
formal confirmation of this intent. Another hurdle to overcome was the local resistance and xenophobic
sentiments towards the NNTs, challenging their future integration26. Government officials put on record:
“… rather problematic is the local resistance against receiving the former refugees in the own
community. Local MPs and community leaders stimulate this, they make reference to a lack of
land and they also mention security issues. It is too bad but the refugees don’t have a good
name – they are connected to all kind of criminal activities. Especially in the border areas the
rate of criminal activities has increased since the refugees arrived. The statistics prove that at
least a minority of the refugees has been involved in criminal activities as robberies. Many of
them also own weapons. They are not seen as good people, Tanzanians are scared of them. If
they want to integrate and get the chance to integrate, a change of mind-set is definitely
needed. Tanzanians need to be well-informed and supported and the former refugees need to
be willing to participate in society, in a positive way, as well.”(Tanzanian Government Officials,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar es Salaam, October 2011)
Feelings of resistance refered to the ‘otherness’ and ‘unreliability’ of the former refugees as well as to
topics as security. Feelings and topics that were exploited by local authorities. Local authorities at regional
and district levels doubted the effectiveness and desirability of the relocation and local integration exercise,
claiming that repatriation should be the only suitable solution to the situation of the 1972 refugees27. They
26 Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011; Interview UNHCR Protection
Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011. 27
Personal email conversation informant B3, 2011 September 13th
.
30
also stated that successful integration would be highly challenging given the lack of support for health,
agricultural, education and social services in the receiving communities. UNHCR planned on and partly
raised budgets for community development projects as water supply, schools, road networks, agriculture
and so on. Local authorities however predicted problems because of insufficient infrastructure and a lack of
available resources and land. UNHCR was aware of the necessity of sufficient resources for developmental
projects and the necessary involvement of other developmental actors if the local integration was ever to
be successful. It seemed however a balancing act between the humanitarian focus of UNHCR’s mandate
and the more developmental one of other agencies and partners:
“Of course UNHCR’s final concern is the rights and well-being of refugees. The refugees are still
under UNHCR protection in the settlements. So it’s indeed a difficult exercise right now; how far
does the mandate of UNHCR go? What is our role concerning the New Tanzanians – if they are
not refugees anymore? Of course UNHCR wants to monitor the relocation so it can take place
in a safe way and in dignity. More challenging is what will happen after that. How can you
monitor and follow up local integration, which is a long term process and which involves so
many people? It’s important that other partners will be involved, like UNDP, UNICEF, NGOs,
community programs…”(Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-
Salaam, October 2011;
Important in this regard is that Tanzania is one of the pilot countries for the UN delivering As One Program.
The program is expected to create better opportunities to integrated joint-planning and improved
cooperation between different agencies and programs with regard to the local integration. Under the
UNDAP 2011-2015 framework, UNHCR cooperates with UNDP to ensure the sustainability of the
integration of the relocating citizens. The cooperation also aims to guarantee support after the estimated
phase-out of UNHCR (UNHCR, 2011e). Both agencies developed a joint program focusing on the transition
from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development in western Tanzania. It is however too early to
strike a balance on the common approach and cooperation within Tanzania. UNDP and UNHCR have had
regular meetings and discussed plans and responsibilities but the actual cooperation is rather limited since
the relocation and integration process is still on hold28.
2.2.2.4 Mobilization of International support
“International support will be mobilized, with UNHCR playing a catalytic role, to ensure burden and
responsibility sharing in the implementation of the comprehensive solution”
As Crisp and Fielden (2008:78) noted, the success of the strategy would and will largely depend on the
response of donors to UNHCR’s appeal to collect the necessary financial means. For example, the
realization of the third pillar alone will demand an estimated 144 million dollar but the amount proved hard
to collect so far29. Government officials criticized the position of donor countries who pushed for local
28 Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011.
29 Interview UNHCR Protection Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011
31
reception of refugees and local (or regional) solutions for refugee problems but seem to step back when
they are asked to share the burden. TANCOSS was developed at a time when asylum space in developed
countries was shrinking and the strategy was well-received as it largely focused on ‘local solutions’ in host
countries rather than on resettlement.30 It is probably not completely incomprehensible that officials
expressed their concerns and disappointment and the Tanzanian government might feel somehow
exploited by an international community that applauded the strategy and assured its financial commitment
at the time of development but now shows many signs of donor fatigueness. UNHCR officers also
mentioned the growing difficulty to find sufficient financial support, especially with regard to the last pillar
of integration. At the time of the research only about 10% of the needed 144 million had actually been
raised.31 They saw different reasons for the poor financial commitment of donor countries: more urging
and eye-catching situations as the famine in Somalia; the many delays and changes in implementing the
strategy and reservations to invest in long-term developmental programs.32
2.2.3 Some concluding remarks: Refugees, identity and belonging within the Tanzanian context
Within this Tanzanian context, the same mechanisms and approaches that were described more generally
within the chapter on durable solutions can be distinguished. Despite the possibility to opt for either
repatriation or naturalization, the singularity of the situation of the 1972 refugees was repeatedly
emphasized, as well as the fact that repatriation is and will be the most natural and preferred solution.
Different key informants denounced the lack of information or the biased character of information about
the situation in Burundi and the possibilities upon arrival33. Central focus was on the causes of the flight and
on the idea that once these causes have disappeared the 1972 refugees could return to ‘their country’:
“The best option in a refugee situation is always voluntary repatriation. If people have to move
out of their country of origin because of security reasons, they should, well they should also be
able to return when there’s no longer a security threat. It was decided that… or the decision to
give the refugees the option to choose between naturalization and repatriation is rather
exceptional, especially since we’re talking about a very large group. (…) But of course the
situation of the 1972 refugees is also exceptional, as we told you already, because it’s so long, I
mean, after almost 40 years they have built their lives here. I think it was a very humane
gesture of our government to offer citizenship.”(Interview Tanzanian Government Officials,
Refugee Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar es Salaam, October 2011)
30 Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011.
31 Major investors are the UK, Japan and the European Union. The European Union for example invested 1,5 million
euro for projects in the educational area in 2011. Projects supported aimed at the expansion of schools or the
acquisition of necessary equipment such as furniture or laboratory items (UNHCR, 2011e). 32
Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar-Es-Salaam, October 2011; Interview UNHCR Protection
Officer, Sub-Office Kigoma, September 2011 33
Informant 1, Kigoma, September 2011; Informant 2, Tabora, September 2011; Burundian Government Official,
Consul General, Burundian Consulate Kigoma, August 2011.
32
“The most preferable solution is voluntary repatriation. If people can manage to go home it’s
always the best. The second best option is local integration. In the case of the 1972 refugees
almost 75% opted for naturalization because of different reasons. This case is of course quite
specific since the Burundians have been living in the country for such a long time, most of them
were born here. But still – it would have been better if 100% of the refugees could return.
Repatriation is just the most logical solution.”(Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions
Department, Dar Es Salaam, October 2011)
The instigation to root people, to pin them down to a specific place or assign them to a certain state also
seemed to determine the search for solutions for the 1972 refugees. Nostalgic references to the place
where the refugees came from, a beloved homeland, were exerted to stimulate repatriation. The history of
the (former) refugees, their experiences living in Tanzania, the (cross-border) relations they may have been
building, their own feelings of belonging and their notions of home were not taken into consideration. For
example, on a UNHCR lorry used to repatriate 1972 refugees from Tanzania to Burundi, the following
quote, referring to sentimental and nostalgic feelings of a homeland, could be read:
“Home is where the heart is and the heart is in Burundi”
(Picture in UNHCR Kigoma sub-office)
Another striking aspect within the Tanzanian context is the somehow contradictory attitude of the
government towards the 1972 refugees. On the one side they were presented as thé example of an
integrated group of refugees, therefore ‘earning’ recognition by becoming official Tanzanian citizens.
Especially their self-reliance, their mastery of the Swahili language, the parallels in cultural background,
intermarriages and the interaction with Tanzanian society were essential to this. At the other side however,
they were seen as not fully part of Tanzanian society given their isolated position, their minimal interaction
with the Tanzanian population and their limited rights and freedoms. Although the settlements were
largely organised in the same way as other villages in Tanzania, they were still seen as temporary
residencies for refugees, slowing down and obstructing integration.
It was exactly their ‘otherness’, their lack of integration and possible negative impact on Tanzanian society
that was accentuated. One of the arguments justifying the much-contested relocation of the settlement
refugees, responds to this otherness and lack of belonging to Tanzanian society. Leaving the settlements as
they were, was believed to enlarge the risk to create a Burundian enclave within Tanzania, possibly
threatening the political and social harmony within the country and even region. Moreover, the 162 300
refugees who were officially recognized as Tanzanians, do not have the same rights as other Tanzanians.
They are not equal citizens (yet). They are left in limbo about their future, they are barely heard in any
decision concerning their lives and they still cannot invoke fully the right of freedom of movement and the
right to live where they want. Their newly acquired citizen rights are constrained before they can actually
be applied.
This paradoxical situation is even more striking with regard to the self-settlers. Although they are living
amongst the general Tanzanian population for years, doing business, speaking the language, going to the
same schools and so on, they have no certainty whatsoever about their future rights and official position.
They seem to be more integrated than the settlement refugees as they were not restricted to remote and
isolated areas, were more engaged in economic activities and mingled with the Tanzanian population.
33
However, their ‘invisibility’ as a specific group also seemed to have been a thorn in the flesh of government
officials and politicians as this group of ‘non-Tanzanians’ was hard to track and control, leading to regular
round-ups and harassments (Malkki, 1995a; L’Ecluse, 2010). Most of them kept quiet about their
background out of fear of repercussions. Their background was perceived in a negative way and still seems
to be an obstruction to truly belonging, despite being at least partly integrated. This focusing on otherness,
as mirrored by certain political decisions, also trickles down to and enforces public sentiments and (local)
political programs. They are for example often accused of all kind of criminal acts, provoking feelings of
insecurity. Notwithstanding research suggesting that refugees only commit a very small percentage of
crimes in Tanzania and that regions not hosting refugees have equally high or higher rates for murder,
armed robbery and possession of illegal arms and ammunition (SAHRiNGON, 2007), the linking of refugees
and criminality proves to be very persistent. In this regard, refugees are approached as one, more or less
homogenous category of others, who are a threat to the social cohesion and security of the ‘own
community’. This approach leaves little room for other or multiple identities.
The negative images and approaches towards refugees stimulated feelings of reticence and were staged for
political interests as well. Refugees and especially the exploitation of negative sentiments towards refugees
became political residue, intended to mobilize electoral support based on negative sentiments towards
refugees. The refugee-free pledge by the end of 2010 was part of the 2005 election manifesto of the ruling
party (CCM) and the former minister of Home Affairs also made it a campaign theme during the
preparation rounds for the elections in 2009-2010. Although the ruling party has expressed its commitment
to successfully finalize TANCOSS, the strategy lacked support on a local level. Politicians at district and
regional level exploited negative feelings and fears concerning the possible arrival of groups of former
refugees. Their attitude risked turning fears into a much more problematic phobia towards refugees and by
extension everybody being different. The strategy seemed to be seriously politicized, causing delays and
paling the actual intend to find solutions for a protracted situation of exile.
34
CHAPTER 3: IDENTITY
The previous chapter focused on protracted refugee situations and durable solutions as they are
approached by the international community and more specifically UNHCR. It further concentrated on
Tanzanian refugee policy and practice concerning a specific situation of protracted exile, that of the 1972
Burundian refugees. More specifically, the explicit and implicit assumptions about and conceptualisations
of identity and home, as embedded in international and Tanzanian refugee policy, were elucidated. The
central focus of this chapter are the experiences and conceptualisations of the refugees themselves. After
exposing their notions of identity and home, these conceptualistions will be confronted with the
presumptions about identity and belonging comprised in refugee policy and practice (cfr. conclusion and
discussion, p47). The first part of this section focusses on the following questions: Does the granting of
citizenship and therefore the allocation of certain rights and plights, influence the sense of identity of the
(former) refugees? If so, how?
3.1 Granting of citizenship and sense of identity
3.3.1 Lack of rights, undermining feelings of belonging and being controlled
The concept of citizenship refers to being part of a certain community and, linked to this membership, the
ability to claim the rights and plights of that community. Citizenship includes more than the exercise of
political rights, it also comprises social, cultural and economic rights. Moreover, as a citizen you are allowed
presence in public space, you can claim your position in order to be listened to. Citizenship comprises a
protective link between an individual and an authority or a state. Kaiser (2010) points to the risk of refugees
falling into a protection gap when not being able to solidify citizenship, especially in situations of protracted
exile. Their refugee status should guarantee international protection and UNHCR strives for their rights, but
as already mentioned, refugees in PRSs often suffer from a lack of rights and protection.
As the official membership to a particular community secures access to and protection of certain rights for
members, it deprives non-members of those rights. One of the aspects the (former) refugees have been
suffering from, was exactly the exclusion from a collective body of citizenry and correspondingly a lack of
rights and freedoms. As refugees instead of citizens they were restricted in their political rights, the right to
work, the right to own property, the access to livelihood-sources and social services, the freedom of
movement and so on. They felt discriminated against, especially after living for decades in Tanzania without
getting any recognition for their hard work and contributions to the Tanzanian state. They were not heard,
as only others- mostly international agencies and organizations- have been speaking for them. They did not
feel part of Tanzanian society. They experienced their lives in the settlements as very secluded and
limitative, having almost no chances and opportunities:
“We’re restricted in all our movements and freedoms. We’re controlled, we can’t just do what
we want. Even when you’re sick you can’t go wherever you want to get a treatment. We are
not part of society, we are at the margin.”<Internals\\Interview 18>
35
“Until now I’ve never had real rights. (…) I was born in this country but I had no rights, no
freedoms. I couldn’t leave Ulyankulu, I couldn’t live where I wanted to, I couldn’t travel, I
couldn’t vote. Because I was born in Ulyankulu and not in Tabora, I was supposed to live as a
refugee”.<Internals\\Interview 6>
The second generation respondents frequently mentioned that they should have the same rights as other
people born in Tanzania, making reference to the principle of ‘jus soli’ or birthright citizenship. The 1995
Tanzanian citizenship act applies partly and with some exceptions the jus soli principle, as those born on
Tanzanian territory after April 26th 1964 may access citizenship. Whether this principle also relates to
refugees is however not clear. In a publication of IRRI and CSFM (2008:38) it is stated that there seem ‘to be
no other residency or status requirements or exceptions for refugees’ but a UNHCR officer mentioned some
official documents stated that newborns in the country can only get citizenship if their parents or at least
the father is Tanzanian34.The second generation refugees attached more importance to the fact they were
born in Tanzania than to their Burundian background because of their parents.
Something both settlement-refugees and self-settlers pointed to, was the permanent burden of possibly
being checked and controlled on. Refugees not living in the settlements said many of them could not
present official papers and have been harassed in the past by immigration officers and policemen.
Settlements refugees mentioned difficulties to get permission to travel and the problems they used to
meet on the road, for example when they were stopped by policemen.
“I know stories of people who had serious problems with immigration or police– not only
Burundians. You’ll always be a ‘foreigner’ – so they can make your life difficult or expensive,
especially if you don’t have the right papers.”<Internals\\Interview 10>
“Somehow the mother fears to be chased all the time – she has not the right documents that
might help her. She’s not a refugee but neither is she Tanzanian so it is unclear who’s
protecting her.”<Internals\\Interview 7>
“I had some problems in the past yes. At some point it was a big struggle to keep my business.
(…) As mkimbizi [refugee] you have no real rights. If you stay quiet and don’t disturb anybody,
there’s no problem. But my business was going very well and this might have attracted their
attention. If I wouldn’t have been a refugee, it would have been easier to defend
myself.<Internals\\Interview 11>
The settlement refugees referred to UNHCR in a rather positive way. They mentioned that UNHCR was not
very present in the settlements but nevertheless was more of a protector to their rights than the Tanzanian
government has ever been. Many of them stated that the granting of citizenship was only a possibility
because of extensive lobbying and pressure of UNHCR. The self-settlers had almost no contact with the
organization and referred to a lack of organisations or institutions protecting their rights.
34 Interview UNHCR Officer Durable Solutions Department, Dar Es Salaam, October 2011
36
“I’ve always felt more protected by UNHCR. If they wouldn’t have lobbied for our rights, I don’t
think I would be able to call myself Tanzanian right now. They have been striving for the
protection of our rights, making sure the Tanzanian government didn’t violate certain
agreements.”<Internals\\Interview 13>
“But I do not feel protected by UNHCR. I was not in the camps, I took care of myself and the UN
and also other organizations focus on the situations in the camps.”<Internals\\Interview 11> -
3.3.2 Gaining rights, securing protection and ending uncertainty
Consequently, the (former) refugees considered the granting of citizenship an important act as they would
finally get assigned the same rights as Tanzanian citizens and would feel more part of society. As Ager and
Strang (2010) note, notions of citizenship partly reflect processes of belonging. Getting political rights, the
right to own land and properties, the freedom of movement and the freedom to participate in
manifestations were raised in this regard. Getting Tanzanian citizenship and official papers made the
(former) refugees hope that mistreatments would belong to the past and that they finally would get more
and fair chances so they could improve their standard of life and (re)gain dignity. Especially with regard to
education, access to social services, entitlements and jobs, life was expected to be much easier with
papers. The restriction of their freedom of movement for example proved a serious barrier to start or
extend businesses. The younger generation and especially those who have been or were studying, even
dreamt of traveling to and studying in other countries. They all hoped for an equal treatment, a better
protection of their rights, more recognition of their work and contributions and the chance to make their
own future according to their own needs and wishes.
“Getting citizenship is the starting point for developing and building the rest of my life. I will
have certain rights, I will have freedoms, I will have possibilities. For me the freedom to go
where I want to go is important – not only within Tanzania, but also abroad. Also that I will be
able to have a job that I like, that I can earn money, buy land and built a house… that are things
I find important”.<Internals\\Interview 13>
“Once we have our papers we can at least invoke certain rights and we will be protected by the
law. We’ll have the freedom to go where we want. The most important change for me will be
the possibility to work freely in accordance with my diploma and the fact that our official status
as Tanzanians will stop harassments from immigration. The citizenship is a possibility to
develop ourselves and our environment. Using the citizenship is also a matter of gaining self-
respect by getting certain rights and responsibilities.”<Internals\\Interview 17>
3.3.3 Getting rid of a label
Another element that was connected to becoming citizens was getting rid of the refugee label. Labels have
an impact on processes of self-identification and can cause ambiguities. Many (former) refugees mentioned
they were still seen as and called refugees, even after living in Tanzania for decades and notwithstanding
37
their attempts to integrate or to keep quiet about their background.
“Being called a refugee, mkimbizi, is really an insult here in Tanzania. It’s a word with a specific,
negative meaning that people use against you. As a refugee you lose a number of rights and
actions are taken against you. You can’t for example work or share words, participate in
meetings. You’re not a complete human being cause you’re denied rights and
freedoms”<Internals\\Interview 9>
“Besides we’ll get rid of the ‘mkimbizi’ name– which has been a constant struggle. It’s used in a
negative way– to violate us. Now we’ll have an official prove of us being Tanzanian instead of
just being refugees”<Internals\\Interview 18>
Most respondents mentioned they did not expect they would no longer face negativity, suspicion or
resistance but at least they would have legal grounds to fight it, if necessary. It was clear to them that a
certain legal status would not automatically mean that they would be socially accepted. They anticipated
on future problems as they would still be ‘different’ to many Tanzanians. Different because they were not
born in the country or had a different background. Some even mentioned they feared that the term ‘Newly
Naturalized Tanzanians’, as used by officials and in the media, would just become another label to get rid
of. Possible future problems were however not seen as some kind of personal quest against ‘them,
Burundians’ but more as a result of a typical human reluctance towards change and difference, as the
following quote shows:
“Problem here- and I suppose it’s the same in many other countries- is that you are treated
differently as a foreigner, especially by officials. Once a foreigner – always a foreigner, you
know. It doesn’t really matter that you have been working here a very long time, that you
speak the language, that you live your life the way everybody does – if they want they can
make your life difficult. But I think this exists everywhere. There will always be general
negativity towards difference – it’s somehow a natural thing.”<Internals\\Interview 12>
3.3.4 Future uncertainty
The respondents also referred to the length of their stay in the settlements as refugees, and the
uncertainty that came along with it. They hoped the formalization of their new status as Tanzanian citizens
would bring an end to this dragging situation of uncertainty. However, the linking of the distribution of
official certificates to the relocation in combination with the many delays and uncertainties concerning the
process, created a lot of anxiety amongst the settlement-refugees. They had many questions and felt they
were not treated as real citizens, partly undermining their position as NNTs. The self-settlers all assumed
the registration exercise would automatically lead to Tanzanian citizenship within a short period of time.
The Tanzanian government however has still to decide what status they will offer the self-settlers. The
decision is pending and may drag on for months, but so far a naturalization is not a certainty.
38
“The naturalization process was not easy because it took such a long time before this decision
was taken. We had to wait a very long time and still have to wait – right now it’s still not clear
when we will get citizenship”.<Internals\\Interview 12>
“Very different stories [are circulating] but we don’t really get official information. It’s all ‘I
heard from’, ‘they told me that’… There’s a lot of confusion. It would be a relieve to finally get
the necessary papers and start living our life the way we want to”.<Internals\\Interview 13>
“We had to wait a long time before they also gave us the chance to register – they first focused
on the settlements. When the registration in the camps ended we could also register but right
now it’s still not clear what will happen – we don’t know when we will get citizenship and what
they will ask us. They first want to finish the relocation of the people form the settlements but I
don’t know how long that will take. We have to be patient”<Internals\\Interview 11>
3.3.5 Pragmatic Citizenship
Citizenship strongly relates to identity but the two do not necessarily coincide. The holding of a Tanzanian
certification does not necessarily mean that the paper match the identity of the holder. Some of the
respondents explicitly mentioned they felt Tanzanian, identified with Tanzanian society and therefore had
applied for naturalization. They had been waiting for a recognition of their situation and considered the
naturalization as a confirmation of their unofficial but real Tanzanian background. Finally becoming
Tanzanian citizens was a relief to them:
“Most important to me is the, sema, feeling I have. I never felt Burundian and I hate the
refugee-title. You have no idea how hard it is to feel, how do I say this, to feel lost, like being in
some kind of no man’s land, trying to claim your spot but not knowing how. It was confusing,
what was I? Whom was I? Why couldn’t I just live freely? For me it’s a relieve to finally get this
status – being recognized as a citizen of this country”.<Internals\\Interview 1>
Others however did not converge citizenship to the persons they considered themselves to be. They saw
the offering of Tanzanian citizenship as an opportunity that allowed for chances they would not have
gotten without becoming official citizens. They however did not really feel ‘Tanzanian’, nor would they
refer to themselves as Tanzanians. They saw the naturalization in first instance as the granting of rights and
plights claimable in Tanzania rather than the recognition of their belonging to Tanzania. They opted for
naturalization after weighing advantages and disadvantages so it was more of a rational than an emotional
choice. They shaped citizenship in a pragmatic way, separating identity and citizenship. The following
quotes are illustrative in this regard:
“Getting citizenship is an opportunity. Becoming an official citizen brings along certain rights
and possibilities, it will allow me to do things that you can’t do as a refugee. But citizenship is
well, a bit artificial– a government recognize you as its citizen and you get certain rights. On
the other hand you’re expected to follow the laws of the country, like pay taxes. It’s not
because you get a certain paper, you are or feel Tanzanian or Burundian or something else. You
know, it doesn’t determine who I really am.”<Internals\\Interview 13>
39
“As Tanzanian I’ll have more chances. Besides I don’t think my life will change a lot. I’ll have a
paper protecting me and giving me certain rights that I can invoke if
necessary.”<Internals\\Interview 12>
If dual citizenship would have been a possibility in Tanzania, some respondents would consider having two
nationalities, but only if this would not have an impact on their rights and entitlements. The same
pragmatic approach dominated with regard to this topic. It was more a matter of weighing their best
options rather than treasuring their Burundian roots. Most respondents did however not have a problem to
renounce Burundian citizenship as they expected they would have more chances as Tanzanians than as
Burundians.
“Dual citizenship for my children? I don’t know. As long as they would have the same rights and
possibilities here in Tanzania, why not? They can do something with it, if they want to, but they
don’t have to.”<Internals\\Interview 4>
“Would it make a difference? Would it give me more opportunities? Would I have more
chances? I’m not planning to live there, at all. It’s an unknown place for me and if I had to move
somewhere else, I think I’d prefer another country. I don’t think I’d go to Burundi – if I had to
leave Tanzania.”<Internals\\Interview 1>
3.2 Defining home and sense of belonging
The following part focusses on two highly interrelated aspects that are important to develop and shape
identity: home and belonging. Pivotal in this part will be the questions how (former) refugees define
belonging and home and if the process of naturalization and future integration has (had) an influence on
this conceptualisations. As already mentioned, home not only represents a physical place and a sense of
feeling at home. It also reflects a sense of belonging to a place or group of people. Although it is suggested
that a sense of belonging is in essence a subjective, emotional response to a place or community of people
(Fail et.al. (2004) cited in Hiruy, 2009:102) the interviews indicated that the notion of belonging is not
unidirectional and exceeds the level of subjectivity and emotionality. Belonging can be stimulated or
obstructed and has to do with processes of inclusion and exclusion. One of the respondents (interview 4)
referred to this by using a Swahili saying: ‘Kukaa muda mrefu ndani ya maji si kutakata’. Literally this
means: ‘Staying long in water does not guarantee cleanliness’. It mirrors the idea that in order to belong it
is not enough to live a long time in a certain place, to get to know the population and her habits and to
have a positive attitude towards the place and community. As Brah (1996:193) stated, it is possible to feel
at home in a place and at the same time not being able to claim the place as one’s own because of
processes of exclusion. Belonging implies processes of negotiation and power and home may be a disputed
domain. During the interviews, different facilitators as well as barriers to processes of belonging and home-
making came to the fore. Some were within reach of the (former) refugees’ influence, others were not.
They were mostly situated in the present, revealing the importance of the current lived experiences of the
refugees, but some were also connected to the past.
40
3.2.1 Bonds, rights and positive contributions
Feelings of belonging are highly interrelated to people’s bonds and networks. Especially proximity of family
and kinship ties played an important role. The respondents also spoke of the importance of respectful
relations with others: neighbors, people they met in church, co-students, peers etc. The way they were
treated and approached during day-to-day contacts was decisive to their notions of belonging. Being close
to the people they cared about and having a supporting network within reach, were mentioned as much
more important factors in determining belonging and feeling at home than having a link with a certain
background or birth country.
“I have been told my home is in Burundi -the place where I was born– and not in Tanzania. But I
think it’s more complex than that. (…) It has to do with what you and the people around you
make out of it.”<Internals\\Interview 4>
“I’m living in this country for almost 40 years now, much longer than I’ve lived in Burundi. I met
my husband here, we have a family now, I have my house here. I have a good contact with my
neighbors and people from church. My children have grown up here, they went to school here,
they have their friends here. My life is here. (…) My heart is in Tanzania, it is with my family. My
husband, children and grandchildren.”<Internals\\Interview 10>
Since home partly refers to a place of everyday lived experience it cannot be separated from all kind of
rights and freedoms, as already mentioned in the previous part on citizenship. Being at home implies being
able to invoke certain rights and appeal for protection of these rights. Consequently, the refugees’ lack of
rights or at least the serious limitation on rights and freedoms was a serious barrier to a sense of belonging.
Limited rights emphasized the temporariness of their situation and obstructed processes of identification.
Some respondents stated they would have felt more part of Tanzanian society if they would have gotten
the chance to make a positive contribution, for example by performing a job. Participation in different kind
of activities (religion, politics, sports…) was also described as prerequisite to avoid feeling out of place. The
fact they could not perform any job, could not participate in manifestations or were not involved in
decision making processes made them feel as being put outside Tanzanian society. Most of the
respondents mentioned the importance of being able to have a job in order to be self-sufficient, integrate
and (re)gain dignity. They saw themselves as hard workers that had an impact on the development of the
region but were not recognized as such.
“Ulyankulu was too, well, limited for me, I couldn’t build the life that I wanted there. It’s like we
were locked away and we didn’t have a choice but struggle to survive. I felt so meaningless, in
a way. Me and my life just didn’t matter.”<Internals\\Interview 1>
“If you can’t work, it’s very hard to be part of society.”<Internals\\Interview 20>
“Work was always very important – we proved we’re hard workers, we developed the
environment. (…) People created different jobs and business. It’s also something of self-respect.
We did not have anything else so we try to be good in this.”<Internals\\Interview 17>
Education also proved an important factor. It was presented as a means to face future challenges and to
safeguard economic possibilities. Parents considered education as a means for their children to improve
41
their lives compared to their own. The younger generation saw education as a means to leave the
settlements and their life as a refugee behind. Education was however not only presented as a means to
improve someone’s social position but also as a way to claim a place within society. By putting emphasis on
their own contributions and realizations, the (former) refugees contested certain images of belonging and
identity that occurred in refugee policy and in the public opinion. They wrested their notion of belonging by
proving wrong to the traditional linking of belonging to roots and nation of birth:
“I work hard, I study hard to prove I can do better than what people think a ‘refugee’ can do. I
have the capacities to make it.”<Internals\\Interview 2>
“I also, I really feel like I had to prove myself sana [a lot]. I tried to be the best in school so they
would judge me on that rather than on me coming from Ulyankulu.”<Internals\\Interview 1>
Being able to invoke certain rights and freedoms and to make a positive contribution were also described as
having an indirect impact on feelings of belonging. People mentioned they would feel more secure as they
would have easier access to all kind of livelihood activities for example, while feeling secure has a positive
impact on people’s sense of belonging. Respondents linked having rights to having possibilities and
consequently having a good, or at least better, life. They connected the idea of having a good life to notions
of home:
“Home is where you can live a good life – so home for me is Tanzania. I won’t be able to live the
same way in Burundi – life will be a struggle there. This is where I can offer my children a future
– not there.”<Internals\\Interview 11>
“I know it [home] is not Ulyankulu. Home cannot be a place where you feel locked, like you’re a
prisoner. I cannot feel at home in a place where I have to explain every step I take. Home is
where I feel free and respected.”<Internals\\Interview 13>
3.2.2 Hiding backgrounds and undermining a sense of belonging
On the one hand the (former) refugees contested their refugee-status. They reacted against images of
being out of place and being less than ‘real’ citizens by trying to excel in certain areas as education. On the
other hand, many told stories about hiding their background or at least keeping quiet about it. Many of
them, especially the self-settlers, have been trying to avoid being seen or known as a (former) refugee:
“I think there are also people telling they are Tanzanian but they are really from another
country. We don’t say, ‘hello I’m from Burundi’. We do not present us as
Burundian.”<Internals\\Interview 10>
“It’s not something I talk about often. I had serious problems already, with immigration
officers. Why would I make it even more complicated? I don’t mention it if I don’t have to.
Police and government officials have been treating me badly and unfairly because I’m not
Tanzanian so you learn to shut up.”<Internals\\Interview 12>
42
Malkki (1995b) described this process more positively, suggesting the self-settlers developed a certain
cosmopolitan identity allowing them to melt into Tanzanian society. Although the self-settlers questioned
during this research also wished to be part of society, their strategy seemed more the result of a negative
than a positive choice. They have been concealing their background because they had to, rather than
because they wanted to. It was more of a survival strategy than a positive identification with a
cosmopolitan identity. This observation is in line with Kibreab‘s (1999:397) reaction towards Malkki’s
approach: “the cosmopolitanism the refugees exhibited was nothing more than a facade devised to enable
them operate in an environment that did not allow them to be themselves”. Not only the self-settlers were
reluctant to talk about their background. The settlement-refugees did not talk openly about their roots
either, not even after being naturalized. Many stated they still feared to provoke negative reactions when
mentioning they were former refugees, living in a settlement.
“I’m living here [Ulyankulu] but it’s not something you mention in public – at my job only the
coordinator knows I’m Burundian refugee. If more people knew- I wouldn’t have been able to
do this job.”<Internals\\Interview 17>
The fact that most of the respondents have been hiding their background or did not talk about it, shows
there was still a negative attitude towards refugees. Tanzanian officials as well as the general population
seemed to consider refugees, and even people who used to be refugees, as out of place, not belonging to
Tanzania. Although key informants stated the host community had at least some affinity with the (former)
refugees, they were mostly perceived as members of an ‘out group’, not at home. Even after living such a
long time in the country and attempts to be part of society, the (former) refugees still struggled to
negotiate their sense of belonging. This negative attitude was often translated into mistreatments and
harassments, creating an uncertain and unsecure environment and causing feelings of exclusions and not-
belonging.
“No I don’t feel integrated (…) We proved we are not parasites. But still we are not Tanzanians.
We have always been wakimbizi [refugees] with different rights and possibilities. We have been
excluded from many things.”<Internals\\Interview 6>
“I’ve been harassed by policemen and there have been incidents with Tanzanians. For example
Tanzanians who let their cattle graze in our maize fields. They knew we couldn’t do or say
anything. There also have been refugees who were beaten up without any punishment of the
guilty one, because officials don’t listen to refugees.”<Internals\\Interview 15>
3.2.3 Roots and homeland
One might expect that having to hide one’s background and being confronted with feelings of exclusion
might stimulate sentiments of belonging elsewhere. From an essentialist perspective, this ‘elsewhere’
would be equated to Burundi. However, except for one respondent, no one made reference to sentiments
of belonging to Burundi rather than to Tanzania. Respondents definitely struggled with being treated as
outsiders and having to keep quiet about their origins, especially since they did not want to wipe out their
background. Yet, they tried to integrate their roots into their current life rather than claiming they should
return to where they (ought to) belong to (re)start their lives. Although current life experiences seemed to
43
have a great impact on feelings of belonging, the past of the (former) refugees could not be erased and has
been of influence as well. Unsurprisingly, certain nostalgic and sentimental feelings of a past came to the
fore during the interviews. This might easily be linked to an essentialist perspective on displacement, as
such an approach focusses on the past, exploits sentimental feelings and aims to restore a disrupted bond
between a people and a native land. The respondents’ approaches were however more balanced. They did
refer to feelings of equality and belonging to ‘their’ community, certain habits, cultural customs and social
constructs as weddings and funerals. While being in Tanzania, they also maintained certain of these habits
and hold on to a historical sense of connection to their former home. They made reference to eating
Burundian dishes, organizing and attending Burundian weddings, singing Burundian songs, having contact
with people living in Burundi, telling stories about their past lives and so on:
“They [parents and grandfather] talk a lot about Burundi and how life used to be. My mom
likes to cook Burundian dishes, she sings Burundian songs.”<Internals\\Interview 13>
“I still know many people living there. We stay in touch. And I've been living there a long time.
You don't forget 20 years of your life”.<Internals\\Interview 20>
They did not want to erase their roots and might have romanticized certain memories and practices. They
however did not attempt persistently to sustain a certain continuity with their roots and to obstinately
conserve an idealized past. What used to be home in Burundi was seen as a place of no return but
influenced what was considered home in the present. This relates to the observation of Ahmed et.al.
(2003:9) that ‘making home is about creating both pasts and futures through inhabiting the grounds of the
present’. The (former) refugees integrated sentimental memories, specific habits and usages they retained
from their lives in Burundi into their daily lives but they did not exclusionary stick to them. They were not
trying to continue their Burundian life in Tanzania, while waiting a return. Many made reference to the
impossibility to restore their past home because of their long absence, their lack of network in Burundi, the
current situation of instability and so on. This does not mean they never had mixed feelings about being in
Tanzania, neither that they did idealize their past home and the way of life it represented nor that aspects
of this way of life (for example marriages, funerals) may have been experienced as unifying.
“It’s intriguing to notice that your parents are still talking a lot about the life there, that they
still miss the place, that they have mixed feelings about being in
Tanzania.”<Internals\\Interview 3>
“Those origins will always be there (…) You can’t just delete or ignore these connections and
memories. Tanzania is my country for a long time already, because I made my life here, but I
also have a connection with Burundi.”<Internals\\Interview 10>
“I’ve been here a very long time, but I don’t forget where I came from. It’s a part of who I am.
Right now I don’t think Burundi is my country, my home, my life is here now, but I carry this
background with me.”<Internals\\Interview 4>
There was only one respondent who described Burundi as his promised land, clinging to idealized images of
home and creating feelings of alienation while being in Tanzania. He did not apply for naturalization and
awaited a return to the place where he and his family truly belonged. This respondent was the only one
who explicitly linked home and belonging to country of origin.
44
“I didn’t chose for the Tanzanian citizenship because my heart is in Burundi. Even my family- my
wife and children, their bloodline is in Burundi. We belong there, so I’m waiting till the good
moment to return.”<Internals\\Interview 19>
“I can't understand the people who applied for the citizenship. I think they made a mistake. Ils
se sont trompés. They don’t belong in Tanzania but in Burundi. Tanzania is temporary, Burundi
is home.”<Internals\\Interview 19>
3.2.4 Identity-in-between
Those respondents who were born in Tanzania but have been called Burundian refugees all their lives,
struggled most with their roots and positioning. They inherited a certain status from their parents and got
to know their history and background through narratives and habits. Since they never lived in Burundi nor
experienced the terrors of the war, they had no direct connection with their so-called place of origin and
history. They felt increasingly distanced from the cultural, political, social and economic situation from
which their parents were exiled. Repatriation to an unknown and unfamiliar country did, according to the
second generation refugees, not represent a solution to their situation. On the contrary, a return was
linked to integration problems, feelings of alienation, difficulties to access livelihoods and so on. Zetter
(1999:18) used the term ‘reverse refugees’ to describe returning second generation refugees. He pointed to
the many problems they would face trying to integrate in an unfamiliar and unsympathetic social structure.
UNHCR’s and the Tanzanian government’s preference to repatriation was criticized by the respondents as
ignoring the specificity of the situation of those born in Tanzania. The second generation refugees also
lacked confidence in the ability of the Burundian government to guarantee their security, rights and
development. They expected to have more possibilities in Tanzania than in Burundi.
“For me and my generation I think it is, the option to repatriate to Burundi wasn’t really an
option. It’s not we can ‘re-turn’, ‘go back home’. That’s how it was presented, but it never was
my home, so where do I have to go?”<Internals\\Interview 6>
“Burundi has nothing to offer – it’s overpopulated, there are troubles all the time, I don’t speak
the language, I know nobody there.”<Internals\\Interview 13>
“I’ve been born in Tanzania and I have no real ties with Burundi. I’m used to living in Tanzania, I
have my family here, I work here, I have my network here. In Burundi I would have had to start
all over again.”<Internals\\Interview 16>
The second generation refugees preferred to use their own experiences as point of reference and seemed
to connect to a social framework more or less independent from their background. Of much importance to
shape a sense of belonging and notions of home were experiences in the ‘here and now’, for example
academic achievement or participation in working or sporting activities. Their school-related identity for
example seemed to outweigh their ‘native’ identity. It was already mentioned that networks and daily
contacts were of great importance in this regard.
45
“We didn’t receive any official papers yet, so officially I’m still Burundian. But since I was born
here, since I have been living here all my life, since my husband and children are here, since I
have no real contact with Burundi. I consider myself to be Tanzanian.”<Internals\\Interview
15>
“I have much more connections with Tanzania than with Burundi. I was born here, have been
living here, studying here. Many of my friends are Tanzanian. But I can’t and won’t deny that
my parents were born in Burundi, are proud to be Burundian and want to leave me some of this
background. But it’s more symbolic in a way – we have a family history but I would rather say
I’m Tanzanian with Burundian roots than that I’m Burundian.”<Internals\\Interview 2>
Although the second generation refugees saw themselves in first instance as Tanzanians, they did not feel
recognized as such. It was a struggle to negotiate their position of belonging as they did not have official
rights and freedoms. They did not see themselves as refugees waiting to return but neither did they see
themselves as complete Tanzanian citizens. Many referred to feelings of in-between-ness: not feeling
complete Tanzanian nor complete Burundian; not feeling refugees awaiting a return nor official citizens.
These feelings of in-between-ness affected the way they constructed their identity and how they shaped
their attitudes towards living in the settlement:
“Seriously, I don’t know what to answer if they ask me where I come from. Am I from Burundi? I
don’t think so- I’ve never been there. Am I from Tanzania? Not really, I’ve never been
recognized as a part of the population or community. So then, should I introduce myself as
coming from Ulyankulu? Like it’s some kind of special empire within
Tanzania?”<Internals\\Interview 13>
“We are a bit of a lost generation, belonging nowhere really. We were born in Tanzania but
are not Tanzanians. Our parents are Burundians but we’re not really Burundians. I think for
many of us it’s not clear who we really are or want to be. Where should our heart be? Neither
Tanzania nor Burundi treated us as their citizens, how can I leave my heart in either one of
them?“<Internals\\Interview 6>
3.2.5 Relocation
For some of the respondents, mostly the second generation refugees, the relocation was considered an
opportunity to move on and start a life as citizens instead of refugees. They connected the settlements to a
lack of possibilities, isolation and mistreatment. Leaving all that behind would allow for a better life.
Moving out of the settlements and mingling with the Tanzanian population across the country would
facilitate integration processes and make them feel more part of society:
“I think the people from the camps have a harder life- they are more isolated, have less
opportunities. So in a certain way I think it’s good they get out of that context – that they get
the chance to really start over again.”<Internals\\Interview 10>
46
“Nothing, really nothing would be able to keep me there- I think the place has nothing to offer.
It’s where I’ve grown up yes, but I only have very little good memories of my childhood there. I
wouldn’t see it as a problem if I had to leave the place.”<Internals\\Interview 1>
On the other hand, many feared that the relocation would lead to a loss of network and family ties, subvert
traditions, invoke feelings of resistance at local level and have negative economic consequences. Relocation
might therefore create obstructions and undermine facilitators of processes of belonging. The relocation
plan was experienced as a one way decision, imposed by the Tanzanian government without respecting the
rights of the Newly Naturalized Tanzanians. They also feared a lack of support and xenophobic reactions of
receiving communities, while local politicians were considered incapable to adequately answer these
negative reactions.
“I’m not optimistic about the closure and relocation, I think it will be traumatizing for some
people, especially older people. And they will have a very hard time building a new life,
again.”<Internals\\Interview 3>
“It’s very difficult to be obliged to move – we have no free choice. They told us we will be real
Tanzanians, but we can’t choose where we’ll be living. There’s no preparation- we have to
leave everything, all the things we’ve built up in the past.”<Internals\\Interview 18>
Another factor influencing the refugees’ attitude towards a relocation was what Hernandez et.al. (2007)
called ‘place attachment’. After having stayed in the settlements for decades, the refugees developed a
certain affective bond with the place where they lived, worked on the land, raised their children and buried
their dead. This affective bond affects people’s behavior and notions of self. Notwithstanding the fact that
the settlements mirrored a hard and isolated life, people connected to the place, making them reluctant to
leave for other places and start a new life.This also had an impact on their notions of belonging and home.
“Having to leave the settlements is very hard for me – it means we’ll have to start all over
again. At my age a complete new beginning is difficult, we’ve been here so long, our home is
here, we want to stay. I don’t have the energy and means to find a new place – where will I find
the money, materials… ?”<Internals\\Interview 20>
“For the older people I can imagine it’s tougher, more difficult. They have to leave everything
they build behind to start all over again, in a place they don’t know, again. It must be, tiring
and discouraging, emotional as well.”<Internals\\Interview 1>
47
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The previous chapter allowed the (former) Burundian refugees to speak themselves. In this concluding
section, we confront their conceptualisations of identity and home to the ones described in the chapter on
refugee policy and practice: how do refugees’ conceptualisations relate to notions of identity embedded
within refugee policy and practice? We also try to reflect on a possible direction for future research.
There is a tendency in refugee policy to pin down (refugee) identity by linking it to a certain place (a
homeland where one belongs) and by connecting it to a specific state (through the institution of
citizenship). Compared to the refugees conceptualisations this proved not the most accurate approach.
Rights and citizenship were an essential part of identity and determined (former) refugees’ feelings of
belonging. These could however not be seen as primordial to either identity or feelings of belonging, since
citizenship was mostly addressed in a pragmatic way. Notwithstanding, citizenship and especially the rights
and freedoms that came along with it, were considered vital to end mistreatment, feelings of exclusion and
to create more equal opportunities and chances. Being officially recognized as citizens would, according to
the (former) refugees, help them to get rid of the negative refugee label that has been a serious burden.
Respondents therefore attributed a great impact to becoming a citizen to their future lives, feelings of
belonging and notions of self. However, daily experiences of living together were assigned a greater impact
on notions of belonging and feeling at home than a certain legal status. (cfr. 3.1)
Origins and (territorial) roots remained important elements of identity, especially to the first generation
refugees (cfr.3.2). Nevertheless, in line with Said’s observations (in Gupta and Feruguson, 1997: 37),
identities were becoming increasingly deterritorialised and notions of home and belonging mirrored a
greater complexity than might be derived from refugee policy. Notions of belonging could not be equated
to attachment to a certain place of origin. Refugees referred to their background and they considered their
roots as an essential part of who they are. They however did not simply describe themselves in terms of
belonging to a past homeland. Roots were treasured and maintained but they were only one factor
amongst many others influencing a sense of belonging and notions of home. As already mentioned, the
refugees’ daily experiences had a great impact on their feelings of belonging. Their contacts with
Tanzanians, the proximity of family members, the ability to work or study proved essential to feel part of
society. The respondents negotiated a sense of belonging in a more flexible way and also contested the
linking of belonging to a home country. The assumption that the (former) refugees were still and mostly
rooted in a certain so-called homeland, was not widely acknowledged. The second generation refugees
exposed the relativity of their inherited refugee-status, pinning them down to a country they did not know.
They made reference to the possibility of ‘multi-levelness’ of home, attachment to multiple places and
situations, as well as to multiple belongings:
“I’m attached to Burundi because of my past but I’m also attached to Tanzania because of the
present and future.”<Internals\\Interview 3>
“Do you know this song from Diddy Dirty Money, Coming home? At some point they sing: ‘I’m
back where I belong. I never felt so strong. I feel like there’s nothing that I can’t try’. That is the
meaning of home for me – it doesn’t really matter where it is. What matters is how it makes
you feel.”<Internals\\Interview 2>
48
The (former) refugees’ notions of home extended the idea of a fixed and durable place. They competed
against an essentialist and sedentary interpretation of the concept. For them, home did not necessarily
refer to (restoring) a bond with an idealized country of origin. It is imporant to keep in mind that multi-
placed-ness of home does not equal rootlessness (Brah,1996:197). As Ahmed and others (2003:1) stated:
“Being grounded is not necessarily about being fixed, being mobile is not necessarily about being detached.
The overall project is to call into question the naturalization of homes as origins, and the romanticization of
mobility as travel, transcendence and transformation”.
Processes of belonging and home-making also evolved over time and were highly affected by daily
experiences and contacts with the Tanzanian community, including officials. Therefore, notions of home
and belonging will probably be affected strongly by the future relocation and integration exercise. Given
the rather negative attitude of receiving communities and local leaders, one might expect a long and
difficult negotiation process for the NNTs.
Although the (former) refugees’ conceptualisations competed an essentialist and sedentary interpretation
of identity and home, their presence still seemed to nurture the idea of natural belonging and a preference
of a return to a territorialized home. The 1972 Burundian refugees were addressed in a rather paradoxical
way. On the one hand, the Tanzanian government and (international) refugee organizations were
presenting the 1972 Burundian refugees as integrated and belonging to the Tanzanian society. This
perception proved one of the central reasons to grant them citizenship and mirrored an approach that at
least partly weakened the naturalizing of a link between a certain home(land) and a group of people. It
nevertheless also reflected an intend to pin people down to a formal identity. Thereby, the Tanzanian
government risked to ignore the fact that formal citizenship does not equal social acceptance and the
actual possibility to claim rights. On the other hand, the (former) refugees did not have the same rights and
freedoms as other members of society, they were isolated and discriminated against and they were more
or less explicitly urged to return to where they truly belonged. Even after receiving official citizenship, they
did not have the same rights and plights as other citizens. Striking in this regard is the situation of the
second generation refugees who were born in Tanzania and all claimed to have very little bond with
Burundi. Nevertheless, they were all seen as refugees, not completely belonging to Tanzanian society.
Somehow there seemed to exist a hierarchy of belonging, reverting to territorialized notions of identity that
apparently were also believed to be inherited by second generation refugees. This situation made it very
difficult for the (former) refugees to negotiate their identity and notions of home. With regard to their
future relocation and integration it is of great importance that the (former) refugees can claim the right to
negotiate identity and belonging. Especially since integration is often understood as a process of
negotiating new identities (Ager and Strang, 2010).
In order to stimulate their future integration and realize a better understanding of the (former) refugees
and their (future) needs, a more nuanced and de-territorialized approach of (refugee) identity and notions
of home imposes itself. It should be recognized that (refugee) identity is multi-levelled and that notions of
home and belonging are complex and extend the idea of a fixed and durable place. This approach should
also integrate more prominently notions of movement. Movement is essential to people’s lives and shapes
processes of home-making and belonging. Home is permanent in the making: it is a destination rather than
an origin; it is a transnational and historical field rather than a fixed spot (Rapport and Dawson, 1998;
Gupta and Ferguson,1997). In this regard, different authors make a plea to integrate mobility into the
framework of durable solutions. Long (2008, 2010) suggested to consider mobility as a right in itself, making
it possible to split citizenship-rights from residency and so stimulate movements like labor migration.
49
Others, as Van Hear (2003), modeled mobility as transnationalism, acknowledging links across time and
space and recognizing that forced migration can transmute into other forms of movement. Bakewell (2002)
opposed migration as a survical strategy to imposed institutions of refugeeness. With regard to the
Tanzanian situation, it might be valuable to invest in research focussing on the possibility of integrating
ideas of mobility into durable solutions. With respect to the situation of the self-settlers, where a decision
on solutions is still pending, it might be of great importance to take into account refugees’ experiences and
conceptualisations and to try to translate notions of mobility into future packages of solutions. Instead of
persistently trying to link the self-settlers’ future to the three traditional durable solutions and pin them
down to a certain place and exclusive state-citizenship relationship, it might be more worthwhile to
aknowledge their multiple belongings and allow for more flexible routes as dual citizenship, mobile
livelihood strategies, the possibility of cross-border migration and so on. The future situation of the former
settlement refugees, not only depends on the way they are approached by policy, politicians and Tanzanian
population. The way their mobility might be obstructed or respected will greatly influence their notions of
belonging and the succeeding of their future integration. This brings us back to the appeal of the Refugee
Studies Centre in the first Chapter of this dissertation: “Researchers need to continue to explore the
dynamics relating to the frequent failure of forced migrant groups to integrate into host communities. Such
work should focus on Northern as well as Southern responses and obstacles to integration and must
consider the political, social and economic dimensions of integration (2010:20)”. The ways in which refugees
define themselves and conceptualise notions of home and belonging generally do not coincide with
conceptualisations in refugee policy and practice. Tensions, uncertainties and contradictions deriving from
these differences might cause problems to successful implementation of ‘durable solutions’, for example
processes of integration. It is therefore essential to nuance ideas about refugee identity and home in
refugee policy and value the approaches and interpretations of (former) refugees themselves.
50
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adelman (2008, October). Protracted Refugee Situations and the Right of Return. Metropolis World Bulletin,
8, 16-19.
Afrol News (2008, August 18). EC helps restore Burundian refugees. KrØderen. Available at:
http://afrol.com/articles/30333. Last consulted on 27 September 2011.
Ager, A., Strang, A. (2008). Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework. Journal of Refugee
Studies, 21(2), 166-191. doi:10.1093/jrs/fen016
Ager, A, Strang, A. (2010). Refugee Integration: Emerging Trends and Remaining Agendas. Journal of
Refugee Studies, 23(4), 589-607. doi:10.1093/jrs/feq046
Ahmed, S., Castañeda, C., Fortier, A.M., Sheller, M. (2003). Introduction: Uprootings/Regroundings:
Questions of Home and Migration. In: Ahmed, et al. (eds.). Uprootings/regroundings: questions of home
and migration. New York: Berg. pp1-20.
Alix-Garcia, J., Saah, D.(2009). The Effect of Refugee Inflows on Host Communities: Evidence from Tanzania.
The World Bank Economic Review, 24 (1), 148-170. doi:10.1093/wber/lhp014
Allen,R., Li Rosi, A., Skeie, M. (2010, December). Should I stay or should I go? A review of UNHCR’s response
to the protracted refugee situation in Serbia and Croatia. Geneva: UNHCR Policy Development and
Evaluation Service.
Ambroso, G., Crisp, J., Albert, N. (2011, November). No turning back. A review of UNHCR’s response to the
protracted refugee situation in eastern Sudan. Geneva: UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service.
Amnesty International (2005, June). Refugee Rights at Risk: Human Rights Abuses in Returns to and from
Burundi. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR16/006/2005/en. Last consulted 24
October 2011.
Asylum Access Tanzania (2011, November). A Report on Urban Refugees Living in Dar-es-Salaam. Dar- es-
Salaam: author. Available at: http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94945/BURUNDI-TANZANIA-Refugees-face-
mounting-pressure-to-go-home. Last consulted 22 February 2012.
Bakewell, O. (2002). Returning refugees or migrating villagers. Voluntary repatriation programmes in Africa
reconsidered. Refugee Survey Quarterly,21(1-2), 42-73.
Betts, A., Milner, J.(2006). The Externalisation of EU Asylum Policy: The Position of African States. Working
Paper No. 36. Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford.
51
Bisharat, J. (1997). Exile to compatriot: Transformations in the Social Identity of Palestinian refugees in the
West Bank. In: A. Gupta, J. Ferguson (eds.). Culture, power, place: exploration in critical anthropology.
Durham (N.C.): Duke university press. pp203-233
Black, R. (2002). Conceptions of ‘home’ and the political geography of refugee repatriation: between
assumption and contested reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Applied Geography 22, 123–138.
Brah, A. (1996). Diaspora, border and transnational identities. In: author. Cartographies of diaspora:
contesting identities. London: Routledge. pp178-210.
Centre for the Study of Forced Migration (2003). The impact of the presence of refugees in Northwestern
Tanzania. Dar Es Salaam: University of Dar Es Salaam.
Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, International Refugee Rights Initiative (2008, November). Going
Home or Staying Home? Ending Displacement for Burundian Refugees in Tanzania. Citizenship and Forced
Migration in the Great Lakes Region. Working Paper No. 1.
Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, International Refugee Rights Initiative (2009a). I Don't Know
Where to Go: Burundian Refugees in Tanzania Under Pressure to Leave.
Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, International Refugee Rights Initiative (2009b, November). Two
people can’t wear the same pair of shoes: citizenship, land and the return of refugees to Burundi. Citizenship
and Forced Migration in the Great Lakes Region. Working Paper No. 2.
Chaulia, S.S. (2003).The Politics of Refugee Hosting in Tanzania: From Open Door to Unsustainability,
Insecurity and Receding Receptivity. Journal of Refugee Studies, 16(2), 147-166.
Cheng, C., Chudoba, J. (2003). Moving beyond long-term refugee situations: the case of Guatemala. New
Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper N°. 86. Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit.
Chimni, B.S. (2004). From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: towards a critical history of durable
solutions to refugee problems. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 23(3),55-73.
Coker, E.M. (2004). Dislocated Identity and the Fragmented Body: Discourses of Resistance among
Southern Sudanese Refugees in Cairo. Journal of Refugee Studies, 17(4), 401-419.
Collins, J.S. (1996). Chapter 4: A typology of repatriation. In: Author. An analysis of the voluntariness of
refugee repatriation in Africa. Unpublished master thesis. University of Manitoba.pp 52-71.
Crisp, J. (2003). No solutions in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa. Refugee Survey
Quarterly,22(4), 114-150.
52
Crisp, J. (2004). The local integration and local settlement of refugees: a conceptual and historical analysis.
New Issues in Refugee research. Working Paper No. 102. Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis
Unit.
Crisp, J., Fielden, A. (2008, April). Local integration: reviving a forgotten solution. In: Forced Migration
Review,30,78-79.
Daily News. (2010, November 7). Why Dar es Salaam deserves a medal for hosting refugees. Daily News.
Available at: http://www.dailynews.co.tz/feature/?n=14321. Last consulted on 27 September 2011.
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [DANIDA], UNHCR Policy Development & Evaluation Service (2010,
October). Evaluation of the protracted refugee situation (PRS) for Burundians in Tanzania. Copenhagen:
Author.
Deardorff,S. (2009). How long is too long? Questioning the legality of long-term encampment through a
human rights lens. Working Paper Series N°54. University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre.
Dixon, J., Durrheim, K. (2000). Displacing place-identity: A discursive approach to locating self and other.
British Journal of Social Psychology, 39(1),27-44
Druke, L. (2011, December). Mobilizing for refugee protection: reflections on the 60th anniversary of UNHCR
and the 1951 Refugee Convention. New Issues in Refugee Research. Research Paper No. 227. Geneva:
UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service.
Dryden-Peterson, S., Hovil, L. (2003, September). Local integration as a durable solution: refugees, host
populations and education in Uganda. New Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper No. 93. Geneva:
UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit.
Eastmond,M. (2002, April). Reconstruction and the Politics of Homecoming: Repatriation of Refugees in
Cambodia. Working Paper N°1. Göteborg University. Department of Social Anthropology.
European Union. (2011, September). EU Tanzania News. Dar Es Salaam: Delegation to the United Republic
of Tanzania.
Feller, E. (2008). Trapped in Exile: UNHCR’s Evolving Response to the Problem of Protracted Refugee
Situations. Metropolis World Bulletin, 8, 11-15
Fielden, A. (2008). Local integration: an under-reported solution to protracted refugee situations. New
Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper No. 158. Geneva: UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation
Service.
Fog Olwig, K. (1998). Epilogue. Contested Homes: Home-making and the making of Anthropology. In: N.,
Rapport, A. Dawson (eds.). Migrants of identity, perceptions of home in a world of movement. New York
and Oxford: Berg. pp225-236
53
Ghorashi, H. (2004). Identities and the sense of belonging: Iranian women activists in exile. In: P. Essed,
G.Frerks, J. Schrijvers (eds.). Refugees and the transformation of societies. Agency, policies, ethics and
politics. Oxford: Berghahn books. pp106-120
Gupta, A., Ferguson, J. (1997). Beyond “Culture”: space, identity and the politics of difference. In: A. Gupta,
J. Ferguson (eds.). Culture, power, place: exploration in critical anthropology. Durham (N.C.) : Duke
University Press. pp33-51.
Hall, S. (1990). Cultural Identity and Diaspora. In Jonathan Rutherford (ed). Identity: Community, Culture,
Difference. London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp222–237.
Hall, S. (1996). Introduction: Who needs identity? In: S. Hall, P. Du Gay. (eds.). Questions of cultural identity.
London: Sage.pp1-17.
Hernandez et.al (2007). Place attachment and place identity in natives and non-natives. Journal of
Environmental Psychology, 27(4) ,310–319.
Hiruy, K. (2009). Finding home far away from home: place attachment, place-identity, belonging and
resettlement among African-Australians in Hobart. Unpublished Master thesis. School of Geography and
Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, Australia.
Hovil, L. (2010, April 29). Naturalization of Burundian refugees in Tanzania: A new home? Pambazuka News.
Available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/64063. Last consulted on 2 July 2011.
Human Rights Watch (1999). In the name of security: Forced rounds up of refugees in Tanzania. Human
Rights Watch, 11(4A), July.
Hyndman, J. (2008). Waiting for What? The Humanitarian Dilemma of Protracted Refugee Situations at
Home and Abroad. Metropolis World Bulletin, 8, 24-28
IRIN News. (2012, February 24th). Burundi-Tanzania: Refugees face mounting pressure to go home. Dar Es
Salaam/Bujumbura. Available at: http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94945/BURUNDI-TANZANIA-Refugees-
face-mounting-pressure-to-go-home. Last consulted on 15 March 2012.
Jacobsen, K. (2001). The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries. New
Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper No. 45. Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit.
Kaiser, T. (2010). Dispersal, division and diversification: durable solutions and Sudanese refugees in Uganda.
Journal of Eastern African Studies, 4(1), 44-60. doi: 10.1080/17531050903550116
Kamanga, K. (2005). The (Tanzania) Refugees Act of 1998: Some Legal and Policy Implications. Journal of
Refugee Studies, 18(1), 100-116. doi:10.1093/refuge/fei005
54
Kebede, S.S.(2010). The struggle for belonging: Forming and reforming identities among 1.5-generation
asylum seekers and refugees. Working Paper Series NO.70. Refugee Studies Centre, Department of
International Development, University of Oxford.
Kibreab, G. (1999). Revisiting the debate on People, Place, Identity and Displacement. Journal of Refugee
Studies, 12(4),384-410
Kibreab, G. (2011, June 22). How Durable are the ‘Durable’ Solutions to the Refugee Problem? Think
Africa Press. Available at: http://thinkafricapress.com/refugees/how-durable-are-
%E2%80%98Durable%E2%80%99-Solutions-refugee-problem. Last consulted on 4 February 2012.
Kumsa, M.K. (2006). No! I’m Not a Refugee!’ The Poetics of Be-Longing among Young Oromos in Toronto.
Journal of Refugee Studies, 19(2), 230-255. doi:10.1093/jrs/fel001
L’Ecluse, W. (2010). Refugee Politics in Tanzania: Receding Receptivity and New Approaches to Asylum.
Unpublished Master thesis. Manama of Conflict and Development. University of Ghent, Belgium.
Landau, L.B. (2003). Beyond the losers: transforming governmental practice in refugee-affected Tanzania.
Journal of Refugee Studies, 16(1),19-43.
Legal and Human Rights Centre (2008). Tanzania Human Rights Report 2007. Dar Es Salaam: author.
Loescher, G., Milner, J. (2005) The Long Road Home: Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa. Survival,
47(2),153-174.
Loescher, G., Milner, J. (2006a). Protracted refugee situations in search for practical solutions. In: UNHCR.
The State of the World's Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium. Geneva: UNHCR. pp 105-
127.
Loescher, G., Milner, J. (2006b). Rethinking Durable solutions. In: UNHCR, The State of the World's
Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium. Geneva: UNHCR. pp129-151.
Loescher, G., Milner, J. (2011).Responding to protracted refugee situations. Lessons from a decade of
discussion. Forced migration policy briefing 6. Refugee Studies Centre. Oxford University.
Long, K. (2008, August). State, Nation, Citizen: Rethinking Repatriation. Working Paper Series N° 48.
Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University.
Long, K. (2010). Home alone? A review of the relationship between repatriation, mobility and durable
solutions for refugees. Geneva: UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service.
Long, K (2011). Refugees, repatriation and liberal citizenship. History of European Ideas, 37, 232–241
55
Malkki , L. (1992, Feb). National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National
Identity among Scholars and Refugees. Cultural Anthropology, 7(1), 24-44.
Malkki, L. (1995a). Refugees and Exile: From "Refugee Studies" to the National Order of Things. Annual
Review of Anthropology, 24, 495-523.
Malkki, L. (1995b), Purity in Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in
Tanzania. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press.
Malkki, L. (1996, Aug). Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization. Cultural
Anthropology, 11(3), 377-404.
Morel, M. (2009), The Lack of Refugee Burden-Sharing in Tanzania: Tragic Effects. Afrika Focus, 22 (1), 107-
114.
Mosselson, J. (2006, December). Roots & Routes: A re-imagining of refugee identity constructions and the
implications for schooling. Current Issues in Comparative Education, 9(1), 20-29.
Panapress (2010, April 20). Burundi hails Tanzania for granting citizenship to refugees. Dakar. Available at:
http://www.panapress.com/Burundi-hails-Tanzania-for-granting-citizenship-to-refugees--12-535496-101-
lang2-index.html). Last consulted on 27 September 2011.
Rapport, N., Dawson, A. (1998). Home and movement: A polemic. In: N., Rapport, A. Dawson (eds.).
Migrants of identity, perceptions of home in a world of movement. New York: Oxford Berg, 19-38.
Refugee Study Centre (2010). Forced Migration Research and Policy Overview of current trends and future
directions. Oxford: University of Oxford Department of International Development.
Refugee Studies Centre (2011). Information about the Protracted Refugee Situations Project. Available at:
http://www.prsproject.org/. Last consulted 5 November 2011
Rutinwa, B. (2002). The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa. Refugee Survey
Quarterly, 21(1-2), 12-41.
Rutta, E., Williams, H., Mwansasu, A., Mung’ong’o F., Burke, H., , Gongo, R., Veneranda, R., Qassim, M.
(2005). Refugee perceptions of the quality of healthcare: findings from a participatory assessment in Ngara,
Tanzania. Disasters, 29(4), 291-309. doi: 10.1111/j.0361-3666.2005.00293.x
Southern Africa Human Rights Non-Governmental Organization Network-Tanzania Chapter [SAHRiNGON]
(2007, October). Research Report on Socio-Economic Impacts of Refugees in Tanzania: A Case study of
Kasulu district, Kigoma region. Available at: http://www.sahringon.or.tz/. Last consulted 6 February 2012.
56
The Citizen (2011, April 30). Process of refugee integration criticised by leaders. Dar Es Salaam. Available at:
http://thecitizen.co.tz/news/51-other-news/10439-process-of-refugee-integration-criticised-by-
leaders.html. Last consulted on 12 September 2011.
The Citizen (2011, June 16). Government says decision to naturalise refugees in country will stay. Dar Es
Salaam. Available at http://thecitizen.co.tz/news/4-national-news/11983-govt-says-decision-to-naturalise-
refugees-in-country-will-stay.html. Last consulted 12 September 2011.
The Citizen (2011, July 26). Camp opposes land licence to investor. Dar Es Salaam. Available at:
http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/5-political-news/13180-camp-opposes-land-licence-to-investor.html.
Last consulted 12 September 2011.
The Guardian on Sunday (2009, October 25). Tanzania Earns Kudos in Refugee Handling. Dar Es Salaam.
Available at: http://www.ippmedia.com/. Last consulted on 27 September 2011.
The Guardian on Sunday (2011, July, 31). Green revolution or Green plunder? Dar Es Salaam. Available at:
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=31766. Last consulted on 12 October 2011
Thomson, J. (2009, Sept). Durable solutions for Burundian refugees in Tanzania. Forced Migration Review,
33, p35-36.
Toft, M.D. (2007). The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and Repatriation Policy. Conflict
Management and Peace Science, 24: 139-157.
Tomlinson, F. (2010). Marking Difference and Negotiating Belonging: Refugee Women, Volunteering and
Employment. Gender, Work & Organization, 17: 278–296. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0432.2008.00399.x
Turner, S. (1999). Angry young men in camps; Gender, Age and Class relations among Burundian refugees in
Tanzania. Working paper N° 9. New Issue in Refugee Research.
Turner, S. (2006). Negotiating Authority between UNHCR and "The People". Development and Change,
37(4), 759-778. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2006.00500.x
United Nations General Assembly (1951). Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951.
United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html
Last consulted on 21 October 2011.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1996, January). Handbook - Voluntary Repatriation:
International Protection. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3510.html. Last
consulted 4 January 2012.
UNHCR (2003a, October). Agenda for Protection. Third edition. Geneva: author. Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4714a1bf2.html. Last consulted 6 January 2012.
57
UNHCR (2003b, May). Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern. Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4124b6a04.html. Last consulted 4 January 2012.
UNHCR (2004). 30th
Meeting of the EXCOM Standing Committee on Protracted Refugee Situations. Geneva:
author. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/40c982172.html Last consulted 23 October 2011.
UNHCR (2007a, October). Opening Statement by Mr. António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. Fifty-eighth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme
(ExCom), Geneva. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/4700eff54.html. Last consulted 22
October 2011.
UNHCR (2007b, July). UNHCR’s 2006 Global Trends. Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally
Displaced and Stateless Persons. Geneva: author. Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4676a71d4&query=global
trends 2006. Last consulted 5 February 2012.
UNHCR (2008a, December). Protracted Refugee Situations: High Commissioner’s Initiative. Geneva: author.
Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4937de6f2.html. Last consulted on 14 January, 2011.
UNHCR (2008b, November). A discussion paper prepared for the High Commissioner’s Dialogue on
Protection Challenges. Geneva: author. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=492ad3782&query=protracted%20refugee%20situations. Last
consulted 5 February 2012.
UNHCR (2008c, June). Protracted Refugee Situations: Revisiting the Problem. Executive Committee of the
High Commissioners’ program. Geneva: author. Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/486903142.html. Last consulted: 22 September 2011.
UNHCR (2009a, Dec). UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011 - United Republic of Tanzania. UNHCR Fundraising
Reports. Geneva: author. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c736.html. Last consulted on 27
January 2012.
UNHCR (2009b). EXCOM Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations: No. 109 (LXI) – 2009. Geneva:
author. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4b332bca9.html. Last consulted on 25 January 2012.
UNHCR (2010, October). Chapter III: Durable Solutions and New Displacement. In: Statistical yearbook
2009. pp29-34
UNHCR (2011a). Global appeal 2011 update: United Republic of Tanzania. pp40-44. Available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4cd926ea9.html. Last consulted on 20 October 2011.
UNHCR (2011b, June). 60 years and still counting: UNHCR’s 2010 Global Trends. Geneva: author. Available
at: http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html Last consulted on 4 November 2011.
58
UNHCR (2011c, June). A thematic compilation of executive committee conclusions. UNHCR Division of
International Protection Services.
UNHCR Tanzania (2011d, September 1). UNHCR Operations in Tanzania, Fact Sheet 1. Dar Es Salaam:
author.
UNHCR Tanzania (2011e). Tanzanian Local Integration Programme. April 2010 to May 2011. Dar Es Salaam:
author.
UNHCR Tanzania (2012, February). UNHCR Bulletin Tanzania, N°6. Dar Es Salaam: author.
United Nations News Centre (2010, April 16). UN agency lauds Tanzania’s move to naturalize ‘1972
Burundian refugees’. Available at:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34388&Cr=burundi&Cr1. Last consulted on 27
September 2011.
United Republic of Tanzania (2012). Information about the Refugee Service Department. Available at:
http://www.moha.go.tz. Last consulted on 14 March 2012.
United Republic of Tanzania (s.d.) Compilation of TANCOSS 3: 19723 Burundian refugees in the Old
Settlements in Tanzania. Dar Es Salaam: author
Van Hear, N. (2003). From Durable Solutions to Transnational Relations: Home and Exile among Refugee
Diasporas. UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper No. 83. Geneva: Evaluation and Policy
Analysis Unit.
Warner, D. (1994). Voluntary Repatriation and the Meaning of Return to Home: A Critique of Liberal
Mathematics. Journal of Refugee Studies, 7 (2-3): 160-174.
Washoma, K.L.K. (2003). Impact of refugees in North-western Tanzania: Executive summary. Dar Es Salaam:
Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, University of Dar Es Salaam.
Whitaker, B.E. (2002). Refugees in Western Tanzania: The Distribution of Burdens and Benefits Among Local
Hosts. Journal of Refugees Studies, 15(4), 339-358. DOI: 10.1093/jrs/15.4.339
Zetter (1999). Reconceptualizing the Myth of Return: Continuity and Transition Amongst the Greek-Cypriot
Refugees of 1974. Journal of Refugee Studies, 12(1), 1-22.
59
ANNEXES
Annex 1: Overview of the respondents
Interview Setting Generation Sex Location of interview Date Translator
Interview 1 Settlement Second F Dar Es Salaam 05/10/2011
Interview 2 Settlement Second F Dar Es Salaam 05/10/2011
Interview 3 Settlement Second M Dar Es Salaam 24/09/2011
Interview 4 Self-settler First M Kigoma 10/09/2011
Interview 5 Self-settler Second M Kigoma 12/09/2011 x
Interview 6 Settlement Second F Kigoma 14/09/2011
Interview 7 Settlement Second F Kigoma 16/09/2011 x
Interview 8 Self-settler Second M Kigoma 16/09/2011 x
Interview 9 Self-settler First M Kigoma 28/08/2011 x
Interview 10 Self-settler First F Kigoma 06/09/2011 x
Interview 11 Self-settler First M Kigoma 06/09/2011 x
Interview 12 Self-settler First M Kigoma 07/09/2011
Interview 13 Settlement Second M Morogoro 24/09/2011
Interview 14 Settlement Second F Morogoro 24/09/2011
Interview 15 Settlement Second F Ulyankulu 01/09/2011 x
Interview 16 Settlement second M Ulyankulu 01/09/2011 x
Interview 17 Settlement First M Ulyankulu 01/09/2011 x
Interview 18 Settlement First M Ulyankulu 01/09/2011 x
Interview 19 Settlement First M Ulyankulu 01/09/2011 x
Interview 20 Settlement First M Ulyankulu 01/09/2011 x
Interview Location Date With
Interview B1 Kigoma 06/09/2011
15/09/2011
Informant 1
Interview B2 Tabora 02/09/2011
03/09/2011
Informant 2
Interview O1 Kigoma 25/08/2011 Burundian Government Official, Consul
General, Burundian Consulate Kigoma
Interview O2 Kigoma 08/09/2011 UNHCR, Protection Officer, Sub-Office
Kigoma
Interview O3 Dar Es Salaam 07/09/2011 UNHCR, Officer Durable Solutions
Department, Representation Office Dar
Interview 04 Dar Es Salaam 04/10/2011 Tanzanian Government Officials,
Refugee Department, Ministry of Home
Affairs
Private Email conversation
23/08/2011
13/09/2011
06/10/2011
05/04/2012
Informant B3
Private Email Conversation 19/10/2011
03/02/2012
28/02/2012
Interviewee 17
60
Annex 2: In illustration of NVivo 9©
61
Annex 3: Encoding lists
Does the granting of citizenship and therefore the allocation of certain rights and plights, influence the
sense of identity of the (former) refugees? If so, how?
General category Sub- categories
Rights, possibilities,
freedoms
References to:
⋅ Official certificates - papers
⋅ Specific rights and freedoms (political rights, owning property and land,
freedom of movement – travel, education, health care…)
⋅ Livelihoods -access
Recognition and equal
treatment
References to:
⋅ Getting rid of a label
⋅ Ending uncertainty
⋅ Ending discrimination
⋅ Being part of a community
⋅ Belonging
⋅ Protection
⋅ Active involvement
Pragmatic Citizenship References to:
⋅ Opportunities and chances
⋅ Assimilation of identity and citizenship
Dual Citizenship
How do (former) refugees define belonging and has the process of naturalization and future integration an
influence on this conceptualisation?
General descriptions of
belonging
References to:
⋅ Feelings of belonging
⋅ Feeling at home
⋅ Feeling part of society
Facilitators and
obstructions to
belonging
References to:
⋅ Facilitators
- Networks, bonds, links
- Proximity of family
- Belonging to a group
- Cultural habits and customs
- Everyday life interaction and activities
- Rights and freedoms
⋅ Obstructions
- Labeling
- Harassment
- Exclusion
62
- Lack of rights and freedoms
Roots References to:
⋅ Origin and background
⋅ Burundi
⋅ Return to roots
⋅ Unclear roots- Identity in between
⋅ Sentimental feelings – hearth
Integration References to:
⋅ Past experiences of integration
⋅ Future integration
⋅ Resistance
Attachment to places
Reference to:
⋅ Place-connectedness through lived experiences of farming, working,
burying dead, raising children… at a certain place
Contributing and
participating
References to:
⋅ Commitment – realizations
⋅ Feelings of dignity –respect
Negotiating belonging References to:
⋅ Contesting non-belonging
⋅ Claiming feelings of belonging
⋅ Keeping quiet – hiding background
⋅ Multiple identities
How do (former) refugees define home and has the process of naturalization and future integration an
influence on this conceptualisation?
General descriptions of
home
Feeling at home References to:
⋅ Lived experience of home
⋅ Facilitators
- Social and economic rights
- Social capital, network, bonds
- Feeling safe and secure
- Realizations
⋅ Obstructions
- Mistreatment and discrimination
- Resistance
- Isolation
- Uncertainty
Home- Feelings References to:
⋅ Belonging to a certain place
⋅ Homing desire
63
Real and imagined home References to:
⋅ Making and remaking of home
⋅ Personal space of identification
⋅ Physical place
⋅ Symbolic place (narratives, symbols, customs…)
⋅ Homeland
Boundaries References to:
⋅ Processes of exclusion and inclusion
64