west virginia judiciary - supreme court of appeals of west ...€¦ · a few months later (around...

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

NO. 101581

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,

Plaintiff Below, Respondent,

v.

BEN SKIDMORE,

Defendant Below, Petitioner.

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POilY l. ,lPRY II ClEHh SUPREI"E COuRT OF APPEALS

Of WEST ViRGiNIA

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

DARRELL V. McGRAW, JR. ATTORNEY GENERAL

BENJAMIN F. YANCEY, III ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL State Bar No. 7629 State Capitol Complex Building 1, Room W -435 Charleston, West Virginia 25305 (304) 558-2522 [email protected]

Counsel for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 1

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................. 9

III. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION ............. 10

IV. ARGlTMENT .......................................................... 11

A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY GRANTING THE PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE PETITIONER'S TRIAL INTO GUILT AND PENALTY PHASES, WITH THE PROSECUTION BEING PERMITTED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S PAST CRIMINAL HISTORY DURING THE PENALTY PHASE ................................... 11

1. Standard of Review ......................................... 11

2. At the Time of the Penalty Phase of the Trial, the Trial Court was not Required to Conduct an Analysis Under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence Before Admitting Evidence of Petitioner's Prior Criminal Record at the Penalty Phase ................... . . . . . . . . 11

B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON PETITIONER'S VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION BY ALLOWING THEM TO FIND THAT TWO NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER, PREMEDIT ATION AND DELIBERATION, COULD BE NEGATED BY THEIR FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAD BEEN "GROSSLY INTOXICATED" AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME ........................................ 18

1. Standard of Review ......................................... 18

2. Based on the Evidence and Law, the Trial Court's use of the Terms "Grossly Intoxicated" and "Gross Intoxication" When Instructing the Jury was Proper. The Court's Use of These Terms Correctly Informed the Jury on the Degree of Intoxication Necessary to Show That Petitioner was Incapable of Premeditating and Deliberating the Murder of the Victim, Steve Yarborough ......................................................... 19

V. CONCLUSION ........................................................ 25

- 1 -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Elswickv. Holland, 623 F. Supp. 498 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14

Patton v. State, 25 S. W.3d 387 (Tex.App.2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14

State ex rei. Dunlap v. McBride, 225 W. Va. 192,691 S.E.2d 183 (2010) . . . . . .. 13, 14, 15, 16

State v. Brant, 162 W. Va. 762,252 S.E.2d 901 (1979) .............................. 23

State v. Bush, 191 W. Va. 8,442 S.E.2d 437 (1994) ................................. 22

State v. Combs, No. CA2000-03-047, 2005 WL 941133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) . . . .. . . . . . .. 14

State v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 224, 43 S.E. 99 (1902) ................................... 22

State v. Derr, 192 W. Va. 165,451 S.E.2d 731 (1994) ......................... , ..... 17

State v. Dolin, 176 W. Va 688, 347 S.E.2d 208 (1986) .............................. 13

State v. Fox, 207 W. Va. 239, 531 S.E.2d 64 (1998) ..... , ................ " ......... 11

State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657,461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17, 18, 19

State v. Hager, 204 W. Va. 28, 511 S.E.2d 139 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11

State v. Keeton, 166 W. Va. 77,272 S.E.2d 817 (1980) .............................. 22

State v. Kidwell, 62 W. Va. 466, 59 S.E.494 (1907) ................................. 23

State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996) .... " ........ '" . . . . .. 12, 14, 17

State v. McGinnis, 193 W. Va. 147,455 S.E.2d 516 (1994) ................... 9, 13, 14, 16

State v. McLaughlin, 226 W. Va. 229, 700 S.E.2d 289 (2010) ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15, 16

State v. Sugg, 193 W. Va. 388,456 S.E.2d 469 (1995) ......... , ... '" . . . . .. . .. . . . . .. 17

OTHER

R. App. Proc. 19( a) .......................................................... 10

-11-

Ru1es of Evid., Rule 104(a) ..................................................... l3

Rule 401 ........................................................ 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

Rule 402 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14

Rule 403 ........................................................ 11, 13, 14, 15,16

Rule 404(b) ..................................................... 10,11, 13, 14, 15

- 111 -


NO. 101581



v.

BEN SKIDMORE,


BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 26, 2009, Ben "Chase" Skidmore ("Petitioner") intentionally, deliberately and

premeditatedly murdered Steve Yarbrough. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this murder

are as follows:

In November 2007, leffMullenax ("Mullenax") met Petitioner in Hagerstown, Maryland,

where he and Petitioner worked construction jobs together. Trial Tr. 97, 98, 369-370, Mar. 16-19,

2010.

In the summer (around July) of2008, Mullenax returned to Morgantown, West Virginia,1 as

the Company he was working for in Maryland had ajob opening in Morgantown. Id. at98, 153-154.

In Morgantown, Mullinax began living with Tommy and Sherry LeFevers,2 who he knew through

1 Mullenax is a native West Virginian, originally from Shinnston. Id. at 97. Petitioner is originally from Los Angeles, California. Id. at 367.

2 Tommy and Sherry are husband and wife. Id. at 98.

Tommy's brother, Timmy LeFevers.3 Id. at 98-99, 153-154.

Later in the summer (around August) of2008, Petitioner also came to Morgantown to work

construction4 and began living with the LeFevers. Id. at 99-100, 154,369-370,372.

A few months later (around January or February 2009),5 Charles "Willie" Stafford

("Stafford") returned home to Morgantown from North Carolina bringing with him the victim Steve

Yarborough. In Morgantown, Steve and Stafford began working construction jobs6 and staying with

the LeFevers.7 Id. at 100-101, 155-156, 180-181, 182,209,375.

At the time, all of these men - Steve Yarborough, Petitioner, Mullenax and Stafford - were

working, got along for the most part, and shared in the household chores and expenses while living

at the LeFevers. Id. at 102, 103, 155, 159, 168, 183-184,373, 374, 375-376. Later, however,

Petitioner was laid off from his job while Steve, Mullenax and Stafford continued to work on a full-

time and/or part-time basis. Id. at 103, 156, 185. After a few weeks and with the LeFevers' trailer

3 Mullenax knew Timmy from working construction with him in Maryland. Id. at 99, 154,371.

4 In Morgantown, Petitioner did not work at the same construction company as Mullenax. Id. at 99, 156.

5 Please note that the record is a little unclear on these January and February 2009 dates, as it could have been in December 2008. See generally Id. at 209, 374.

6 Steve and Stafford worked at different construction firms than did Petitioner and Mullenax. Id. at 101. Prior to moving to Morgantown, Steve was living and working in North Carolina. Steve also had a wife, Barbara Yarborough, and a son, who he was living with and supporting for much of the time, 26 - 28 years, that he was in North Carolina. Steve also continued to provide this support after he moved to Morgantown. Id. at 121, 155, 572-575, 582.

7 Stafford is Sherry LeFevers' brother. Id. at 101, 117, 180.

2

too crowded, Steve, Mullenax and Stafford moved out and into their own house.8 Petitioner,

unemployed, continued to stay at the LeFevers.9 Id. at 104, 105, 157, 159, 186, 187,211,380-381.

Several days before (Thursday or Friday) murdering Steve Yarborough on April 26, 2009

(Sunday), Petitioner was allowed to move in with Steve and Mullenax.10 When Petitioner left the

LeFevers and moved in with Steve and Mullenax, Stafford, for the most part, moved back in with

the LeFevers. Id. at 108, 110, 158, 187, 188, 212, 382, 384. As a condition of living there,

Petitioner, who was unemployed, had to find a job and help out with the household chores and

expenses. Id. at 109, 158, 216. To help him gain employment, arrangements were made for

Petitioner to call Mullenax's employer about ajob, which was to start on the same day that he was

to make the call- April 25, 2009 (Saturday). All that was required for Petitioner to obtain this job

was to call Mullenax's boss. Id. at 109-110, 160-161, 188-190,213. However, Petitioner never

made the call. See generally Id. at 111-115, 161, 189-190,580. Petitioner also failed to keep his

"end of the bargain" of helping out with the household chores as well. See generally Id. at 579.

On the morning of April 25, 2009 (Saturday), Petitioner and Steve Yarborough, who did not

get along, were arguing with one another. Id. at 116-117, 168, 171-172. Later that same afternoon

and evening, for the most part, Steve, Petitioner, Mullenax and Stafford sat around the house talking,

drinking beer and watching television. Id. at 119, 120, 121. That night, Steve, Petitioner and

8 This house was located in the Sabraton area of Morgantown. Id. at 104, 187.

9 For a 2 to 3 week period at the end of February and the beginning of March 2009, Petitioner went to Toledo, Ohio to visit a girl he knew in the area. Id. at 156-157, 184-185, 210-211,378-379.

10 This move came about because of a disagreement between Tommy LeFevers and Petitioner over Petitioner not having a job and contributing to the household expenses. Id. at 108, 158. See also Id. at 187,383,411.

3

Mullenax stayed at the house; Stafford spent the night at the LeFevers and returned to the house the

next morning (Sunday) around 9:00 - 10:00 a.m. II Jd 121, 190-191.

On the morning of his death, Apri126, 2009 (Sunday), Steve Yarborough and Mullenax left

the house to take a drive and returned around 11 :00 a.m. -12:00 p.mY Jd at 121-122. Once they

got back, Steve began to clean the house, during which time Petitioner threw a cigarette butt on the

floor, which caused an argument between him and Steve. Jd at 122-123. Around 12:30 - 1 :00 p.m.,

Steve, Petitioner, Mullenax and Stafford began watching a NASCARrace on television. Jd at 123,

191. After about a half an hour, Steve and Mullenax left the house13 because Steve and Petitioner

were continuously arguing with one another about Petitioner throwing the cigarette butt on the floor,

not having any money, and not having his own place to live. Jd at 123, 191-192. Petitioner and

Steve were also arguing about Petitioner's failure to call Mullenax's boss about ajob on Saturday.

Jd at 124. During this argument, Steve informed Petitioner that he needed to find a job or find

another place to live. Jd at 123-124. See also Jd at 190.

Steve and Mullenax returned to the house around 2:30 - 3 :00 p.m. and began watching the

NASCAR race again with Stafford. Jd at 125, 193, Mar. 16,2010. While they were watching the

race, Petitioner, for the most part, stayed out on the porch drinking beer and talking on his cell

phone. Jd at 125-126, 195,216-217,394,395,397.

II Again, the record is a little unclear on this point, as it indicates that Stafford stayed at the house on Saturday night. See Jd at 169,390.

12 Steve and Mullenax actually drove over to Cooper's Rock. Jd at 121.

13 When they left the house, Mullenax and Steve drove to the Suncrest Pub, where they played pool for about 1 to 1 \Ii hours. Jd at 124.

4

Following the race,14 Steve, Mullenax and Stafford continued to sit around, talk and drink

beer. 15 Id. at 126-127. Throughout this entire time, Petitioner would occasionally come in the house

to get a beer out of the kitchen refrigerator, use the restroom, stop and talk for a while, and then go

back out on the porch, where he would talk on his cell phonel6 and drink beer. Id. at 127, 128, 195-

196,216-217,394,395,396,397. During the times that he came into the house, Petitioner and Steve

did not argue with one another. Id. at 127.

Around 6:30 - 7:00 p.m. of this same day, April 26, 2009, Mullenax and Petitioner went to

the store to buy some more beer. Id. at 128-129,386. When they returned, Mullenax rejoined Steve

and Stafford in the living room; Petitioner put his beer in the refrigerator and went back out on the

porch. Id. at 129. During this time period, Petitioner called for Mullenax to come out on the porch,

which he did. Id. at 129-130, 172. There, Mullenax told Petitioner that he would talk to Steve later

about working things out so that Petitioner could stay at the house until Apri127, 2009 (Monday

night) - Petitioner seemed fine with this idea. Id. at 129-130, 172, 174, 175. However, Mullenax

never had a chance to actually talk to Steve. Id. at 174.

Following this conversation, Mullenax came back in the house to the living room where he

rejoined Steve and Stafford; Petitioner remained on the porch where he continued to talk on his cell

phone. 17 Id. at 130-131. While on the porch, Petitioner was overheard on the phone saying that "I

14 The race ended around 5:00 p.m. Id. at 126.

15 All of the men - Steve, Petitioner, Mullenax and Stafford - consumed a considerable amount of beer on the day before as well as the day of Steve's death, April 25 and 26, 2009. Id. at 165, 169,214-215.

16 While talking on the phone, Petitioner sounded calm. Id. at 128.

17 Again, Petitioner sounded calm while talking on the phone. Id. at 131.

5

got a place to stay now." Id. at 132. Petitioner was also overheard saying something about having

"three hots and a cot" now. 18 Id. at 196-197, 217.

Thereafter, Petitioner came in the house to get another beer out of the kitchen. Id. at 132,

197, 217. On his way out of the kitchen, Petitioner approached Steve Yarborough from behind, who

was sitting in a living room chair, and struck him several times with a hammerl9 on the top of his

head and killing him.20 Id. at 133-134,146,147,163,197,199-200,217,228-229,236, 256, 265-

266,277,278, 284, 313, 326, 334. Both Mullenax and Stafford witnessed this attack. Id. at 133,

134, 135.

Shocked by what he had just seen, Mullenax asked Petitioner, "Chase, what are you doing?

What did you do?" Id. at 135, 139. Petitioner then pointed at Mullenax and said "don't come no

farther," "you'll be next." Id. at 135. Petitioner also stated to Mullenax and Stafford, "I love you

guys to death, but I'll kill you too." Id. at 200-201. When Mullenax tried to help Steve, Petitioner

angrily told him, "don't bother him, he's dead," "don't touch him, he's dead." Id. at 138. See also

Id. at 201,204. Referring to Steve and that he was "fed up" with him, Petitioner also commented

that "I hope the motherfucker's dead."21 Id. at 204, 208.

Unable to find his cell phone, Mullenax could not call the police. Id. at 138, 139, 140.

18 Again, when he made this statement, Petitioner sounded calm and was not screaming. Id. at 132. In fact, throughout the entire afternoon and evening of April 26, 2009, Petitioner spoke in clear and understandable tone. Id. at 152.

19 Petitioner struck Steve with the hammer as many as 3 to 4 times. Id. at 134,282,283.

20 The autopsy revealed that Steve died as a result of a blunt force head injury intentionally inflicted by a hammer. Id. at 277, 278, 284.

21 On the day of or day before killing Steve, Petitioner commented that he was going to "fuck" him up. Id. at 168, 171.

6

Knowing that he wanted his phone to call the police, Petitioner told Mullenax, "don't call the cops

on me yet, just give me a few hours," to which Mullenax agreed. Id. at 140, 143. See also Id. at

167. Mullenax finally located his phone in his bedroom and called the police, during which time

Petitioner was on the porch.22 Id. at 140, 141, 163-164,201. Petitioner then came back into the

house, grabbed some beer out of the refrigerator, and then left; Mullenax remained at the house

waiting on the police and EMS workers to arrive; Stafford left the house and went to the LeFevers.23

Id. at 142-143, 147-148.

Thereafter, the police located and arrested Petitioner just after midnight on April 27, 2009.24

Id. at 243,260,263,264,316. During this arrest, Petitioner again commented numerous times about

now having "three hots and a cot." Id. at 248, 266, 268, 316, 319, 320, 321-322. Petitioner also

asked the police whether West Virginia had the death penalty; when he was informed that it did not,

Petitioner commented that was good and he would just have to spend the rest of his life injail. Id.

at 266. When the police asked him what he meant by that comment, Petitioner stated, ''well, I did

what I did, so I gotta get caught for it."25 Id. at 266.

22 In order to locate his phone, Mullenax asked Petitioner to call his phone so that he could determine its location by listening to it ring; Petitioner obliged by calling Mullenax's phone. Id. at 139-140,203,343,420.

23 While Mullenax was at the police station being interviewed, Petitioner called him; again, his voice was clear and understandable. !d. at 151, 341.

24 Petitioner was actually found behind a nearby gas station. See generally Id. at 243-245, 260.

25 After he was taken into custody by the police, Petitioner's demeanor was calm, he spoke with a clear and understandable voice, he understood and was answering appropriately to the officers' questions, and he did not have any trouble standing or controlling his movements. Trial Tr. 247-248, 262-263, 317, 318, Mar. 17,2010. In fact, Officer leffWells of the Morgantown Police Department indicated that if he had encountered Petitioner on the street that

7

On May 15,2009, the Monongalia County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for the first-degree

murder of Steve Yarborough. Indictment No. 09-F-125, May 15,2009. Arraignment Hrg, 2, May

21,2009.

On February 18, 2010, the prosecution moved the Circuit Court ("court") to bifurcate

Petitioner's trial, in order that it could introduce evidence of Petitioner' s prior criminal history during

the penalty phase of the trial, which would not have been admissible during the guilt phase. State's

Mot. for Bifurcation, Feb. 18,2010; Pre-Trial Motions Order, 1, Mar. 10,2010; Pre-Trial Motions

Hrg, 2, 3, 4, Mar. 8, 2010. On March 8, 2010, following a hearing, the court granted the

prosecution's Motion to Bifurcate Petitioner's trial. Pre-Trial Motions Order, 1, Mar. 10,2010; Pre-

Trial Motions Hrg, 4, Mar. 8, 2010.

The guilt phase of Petitioner' s bifurcated trial began on March 16,2010, and ended on March

18,2010, with the jury convicting him of first-degree murder. Trial Tr. 541, Mar. 18,2010; Verdict

and Sentencing Order, 1, Mar. 19,2010. The penalty phase of Petitioner's trial took place on March

19, 2010, with the jury returning a supplemental verdict of no recommendation of mercy. Trial Tr.

593, Mar. 19,2010; Verdict and Sentencing Order, 1, Mar. 19,2010. On this same day, March 19,

2010, the court sentenced Petitioner to life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole. Trial

Tr. 597, Mar. 19,2010; Verdict and Sentencing Order, 1, Mar. 19,2010.

Following his trial and sentencing, on May 20,2010, Petitioner moved the court to set aside

the jury's verdict or, alternatively, to grant him a new trial.26 Mot. to Set Aside Verdict or Grant

night, he would not have arrested him for public intoxication. Id. at 319.

26 As discussed more fully below, the basis for Petitioner's Motion, which is also his basis on appeal, was twofold - (1) that the court improperly instructed the jury by allowing them to find that premeditation and deliberation could be negated by their finding that Petitioner had

8

New Trial, Mar. 31,2010; Post-Trial Motions Brg, 2, May20, 2010; Post-Trial Mot. Order Denying

Mot. to Set Aside Verdict or Grant New Trial, 1, May 24, 2010. Following a hearing on this same

day, May 20, 2010, the court denied Petitioner's Motion. Post-Trial Motions Brg, 13-18, May 20,

2010; Post-Trial Mot. Order Denying Mot. to Set Aside Verdict or Grant New Trial, 3, May 24,

2010. Thereafter, Petitioner brought the current Petition for Appeal.

II.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The penalty phase of Petitioner's bifurcated trial took place on March 19,2009. At that time,

it was unnecessary to conduct a McGinnis hearing to determine the admissibility of Petitioner' s prior

voluntary manslaughter conviction at the penalty phase of the trial. Thus, although no McGinnis

hearing was held, the court correctly admitted Petitioner's previous conviction during the penalty

phase of the trial.

"Simple intoxication" was not sufficient to prevent Petitioner from forming the necessary

elements for first degree murder - premeditation and deliberation. Thus, the court correctly

instructed the jury that if they found that Petitioner was "grossly intoxicated" so as to make him

incapable of deliberating and premeditating the murder of Steve Yarborough, then they must acquit

Petitioner of first -degree murder and then deliberate his guilt on the lesser included charge of second-

degree murder.

been "grossly intoxicated" at the time of the commission of the crime; and (2) that the court impermissibly granted the prosecution's Motion to Bifurcate his trial into guilt and penalty phases, with the prosecution being permitted to introduce evidence of Petitioner's past criminal history during the penalty phase. Mot. to Set Aside Verdict or Grant New Trial, Mar. 31, 2010; Post-Trial Motions Hrg, 5-6, May 20, 20 1 0; Post-Trial Mot. Order Denying Mot. to Set Aside Verdict or Grant New Trial, 2-3, May 24, 2010.

9

III.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION

Pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State believes that oral

argument is necessary in this case for the following reasons:

1. This is a first-degree murder case resulting in Petitioner being convicted and

receiving a life sentence without the possibility of parole;

2. Petitioner's assignments of error concern the application of settled law - the

admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence during the penalty phase of the trial, as well

as the Circuit Court's intoxication instructions to the jury;

3. The Circuit Court has discretion as to the admissibility of evidence and jury

instructions and Petitioner claims that it committed an unsustainable exercise ofthis

discretion; and,

4. This case involves narrow issues of law.

See R. App. Proc. 19(a).

Because Petitioner has been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in the

penitentiary without the possibility of parole, the State believes that this case is not appropriate for

a memorandum decision. The State does not believe that additional time is needed for oral

argument. However, the State will defer to the discretion and wisdom of the Court on both these

points.

10

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY GRANTING THE PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE PETITIONER'S TRIAL INTO GUlL T AND PENALTY PHASES, WITH THE PROSECUTION BEING PERMITTED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S PAST CRIMINAL HISTORY DURING THE PENALTY PHASE.

1. Standard of Review

On appeal, legal conclusions made with regard to suppression detenninations are reviewed de novo. Factual determinations upon which these legal conclusions are based are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. In addition, factual findings based, at least in part, on determinations of witness credibility are accorded great deference.

Syl. pt. 7, State v. Hager, 204 W. Va. 28, 511 S.E.2d 139 (1998) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). "The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of its

discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such action amounts to

an abuse of discretion." Syl., State v. Fox, 207 W. Va. 239, 531 S.E.2d 64 (1998) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

2. At the Time of the Penalty Phase of the Trial, the Trial Court was not Required to Conduct an Analysis Under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence Before Admitting Evidence of Petitioner's Prior Criminal Record at the Penalty Phase.

Although it virtually is impossible to outline all factors that should be considered by the trial court, the court should consider when a motion for bifurcation is made: (a) whether limiting instructions to the jury would be effective; (b) whether a party desires to introduce evidence solely for sentencing purposes but not on the merits; (c) whether evidence would be admissible on sentencing but would not be admissible on the merits or vice versa; (d) whether either party can demonstrate unfair prejudice or disadvantage by

11

bifurcation; (e) whether a unitary trial would cause the parties to forego introducing relevant evidence for sentencing purposes; and (f) whether bifurcation umeasonably would lengthen the trial.

Syl. pt. 6, State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996).

With these, if you will, LaRock factors in mind, the court correctly bifurcated Petitioner's

trial and permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence, during the trial's penalty phase, of

Petitioner's previous conviction for voluntary manslaughter. To begin with, the prosecution, in

moving the court for bifurcation, sought the introduction of Petitioner' s previous conviction solely

for sentencing purposes, rather than as evidence to establish his guilt. Furthermore, Petitioner was

not unfairly prejudiced or disadvantaged by the court's decision to bifurcate his trial into guilt and

penalty phases. As discussed more fully below, the jury's recommendation of no mercy was justified

alone on the evidence it heard during the guilt phase of the trial. Additionally, again as discussed

more fully below, a unitary trial would have forced the prosecution to forego relevant evidence for

sentencing purposes of Petitioner's previous voluntary manslaughter conviction. Finally, the

bifurcation of Petitioner's trial did not delay or lengthen the trial "one bit," as the penalty phase took

place immediately after the guilt phase.

On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the court committed error by allowing the prosecution to

introduce evidence during the sentencing phase of Petitioner's trial of his prior conviction for

voluntary manslaughter.27 Petitioner takes particular issue with the court's admission of this prior

27 This conviction occurred in 1987 in California and resulted in Petitioner being sentenced to 12 years in the penitentiary. Trial Tr. 568, Mar. 19,2010. The homicide took place in a Los Angeles laundromat when the victim approached Petitioner and asked him for a drink of his beer. Id. at 564. Petitioner found the victim to be an "obnoxious mother fucker" and refused him a drink of his beer thus resulting in an altercation between Petitioner and the victim, during which the victim was killed. Id. The autopsy on the victim revealed that he died as a result of a blunt force trauma to his head. Id. at 567. Interestingly, like here, Petitioner was drinking prior

12

conviction without first conducting a McGinnis hearin!f& to determine the prior conviction's

admissibility under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of evidence. See generally

Pet. for Appeal, 5-11. However, at the time of penalty phase of Petitioner's trial, March 19,2010,

the admissibility of Petitioner's previous conviction for voluntary manslaughter was governed by

State ex reI. Dunlap v. McBride, 225 W. Va. 192,691 S.E.2d 183 (2010) (per curiam), which was

decided on March 4,2010.29 Even Petitioner admits this to be the case:

By the time the trial began, the Dunlap decision had been reviewed by everyone and its decision governed the procedural

to this altercation and claimed that he was "an alcoholic" and "blacked out" during the fight between himself and the victim. Id. at 565.

28 As the Court is well aware, a McGinnis hearing consists of the following:

Where an offer of evidence is made under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court, pursuant to Rule 1 04( a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, is to determine its admissibility. Before admitting the evidence, the trial court should conduct an in camera hearing as stated in State v. Dolin, 176 W. Va. 688,347 S.E.2d 208 (1986). After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or conduct occurred and that the defendant committed the acts. If the trial court does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or conduct was committed or that the defendant was the actor, the evidence should be excluded under Rule 404(b). If a sufficient showing has been made, the trial court must then determine the relevancy of the evidence und~r Rules 401 and 402 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and conduct the balancing required under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. If the trial court is then satisfied that the Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible, it should instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which such evidence has been admitted. A limiting instruction should be given at the time the evidence is offered, and we recommend that it be repeated in the trial court's general charge to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence.

Syl. pt. 2, State v. McGinnis, 193 W. Va. 147,455 S.E.2d 516 (1994).

29 The March 4,2010 Dunlap decision was also the controlling law during the hearings on the prosecution's Motion to Bifurcate the trial and Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Verdict or Grant New Trial, respectfully held on March 8, 2010 and May 20,2010.

13

aspects of the penalty phase of the bifurcated trial and the introduction of the Defendant's prior criminal record into evidence. Consequently, Dunlap set the back drop for the sentencing phase of the Defendant's trial.

Pet. for Appeal, 7.

Under Dunlap, "'[a] trial court has discretionary authority to bifurcate a trial and sentencing

in any case where a jury is required to make a finding as to mercy. '" Syi. pt. 6, Dunlap, supra

(quoting Syi. pt. 4, LaRock, supra. Furthermore, and more to the point, as found by the Dunlap

Court:

As a general matter, "[tJhe rules of evidence, including Evid.R. 404(b) regarding 'other acts,' do not strictly apply at sentencing hearings." State v. Combs, No. CA2000-03-047, 2005 WL 941133, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). See Patton v. State, 25 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex.App.2000) ("It has been held that Rule 404(b) does not apply to the penalty or punishment phase of a bifurcated trial."). Moreover, "[a] trial court has wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed. And a sentencing court is not restricted by the federal constitution to the information received in open court." Elswick v. Holland, 623 F.Supp. 498, 504 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (citations omitted).

Dunlap, 225 W. Va. _,691 S.E.2d 193 (emphasis added).

Clearly, under Dunlap, a McGinnis hearing, which requires the trial court to conduct an

analysis under Rules 401, 402, 403 and 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence before it

allows prior bad acts and crimes to be admitted into evidence, does not apply to, as in this case, the

penalty phase of a trial. Based on Dunlap, the court correctly admitted Petitioner's previous

conviction for voluntary manslaughter during the penalty phase of his trial, despite not having

conducted a McGinnis analysis. In doing so, the court found as follows:

[BJ ased on my reading of. .. [Dunlap] you don't have to go through

14

a 404(b) McGuinness [sic] analysis, that that only applies during the guilt phase of the trial.

It would appear that the rules of evidence are relaxed in a sentencing proceeding. We very often hear matters in sentencing hearings that would not be admissible in the trial itself. And, in fact, the reason that the Court bifurcated the issue of mercy from the issue of guilt in this case is because of the fact that the State intended to offer evidence at this proceeding that would not have been admissible during the guilt phase, and that is, Mr. Skidmore's prior conviction.

Trial Tr. 553, Mar. 19,2010 (emphasis added).

Petitioner argued below, and continues to argue on appeal, that the court's use of Dunlap in

admitting his previous conviction for voluntary manslaughter is error, as Dunlap failed to provide

him with "the safeguard of [ a] McGinnis 404(b) and Rule 403 balancing analysis of its prejudicial

vs probative value." Pet. for Appeal, 9. In support this argument, Petitioner relies on Syl. pt. 7, State

v. McLaughlin, 226 W. Va. 229, 700 S.E.2d 289 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1056 (2011)

wherein this Court found that:

The type of evidence that is admissible in the mercy phase of a bifurcated first degree murder proceeding is much broader than the evidence admissible for purposes of determining a defendant's guilt or innocence. Admissible evidence necessarily encompasses evidence of the defendant's character, including evidence concerning the defendant's past, present and future, as well as evidence surrounding the nature of the crime committed by the defendant that· warranted ajury fmding the defendant guilty of first degree murder, so long as that evidence is found by the trial court to be relevant under Rule 401 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and not unduly prejudicial pursuant to Rule 403 ofthe West Virginia Rules of Evidence.

Obviously, McLaughlin counsels that, although the type of evidence that is admissible during

the sentencing phase of a bifurcated trial is broader than the type of evidence that would be

admissible during the guilt phase, the evidence still needs to be "run" through the relevancy

15

requirements of Rule 401, as well as the balancing test of Rule 403. However, McLaughlin did not

overrule Dunlap - rather, it refined it. Equally important, McLaughlin was decided on June 8, 2010,

well after the penalty phase of Petitioner' s trial, which took place on March 19,2010. Furthermore,

there is nothing in the McLaughlin decision indicating that the Court intended that it be applied

retroactively.30 Even Petitioner readily admits that McLaughlin applies prospectively only: "the

McLaughlin . .. decision is to be applied prospectively as stated in Footnote 16.,,31 Pet. for Appeal,

10.

Finally, assuming that a McGinnis hearing was required in this case, which it was not, before

the court allowed the jury to hear evidence concerning Petitioner's prior conviction for voluntary

manslaughter during the penalty phase, the result would have been the same - the evidence would

have been admissible. First, there is no doubt, and Petitioner does not dispute, that he was

previously convicted for voluntary manslaughter and that he received a 12 year sentence on this

conviction.

Secondly, Petitioner's prior conviction is very relevant to the issue of whether he should

receive a recommendation of mercy in his sentencing for first degree murder. As with this case,

Petitioner's prior conviction also involved a homicide. Obviously,the fact that Petitioner was

previously convicted for a homicide is relevant to the type of sentence that he should be given in this

30 Understandably so, as a retroactive application of Mclaughlin would create a real mess. Applied retroactively, McLaughlin would require all previous convictions where evidence of prior bad acts and/or convictions of criminal defendants that were admitted during the penalty phase of their first·degree murder trials be revisited to determine whether these prior bad acts and/or convictions were relevant and not unduly prejudicial under Rules 401 and 403.

31 Footnote 16 of McLaughlin, as referenced by Petitioner, states that "[t]his holding is to be applied prospectively." McLaughlin, 226 W. Va_ n.16, 700 S.E.2d 295 n.16.

16

case, which involves his conviction for first-degree murder. "To satisfy the relevancy requirement

under Rule 401 ofthe West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the offered evidence merely needs to make

a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." State v. Sugg,

193 W. Va. 388, 404, 456 S.E.2d469, 485 (1995) (citing State v. Derr, 192 W. Va. 165, 178,451

S.E.2d 731, 744 (1994)

Third, the pro bative value of Petitioner' s prior conviction is not substantially outweighed by

its prejudicial effect. That is, there is nothing to indicate that the jury was inflamed by hearing about

Petitioner's prior actions that led to his earlier homicide conviction, and that the jury did not

recommend mercy because of this previous conviction, rather than basing their decision not to

recommend mercy based on Petitioner's guilt in this case. "Unfair prejudice does not mean damage

to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers

to evidence which tends to suggests decision on an improper basis." LaRock, 196 W. Va. 312,470

S.E.2d 631 (citations omitted). Stated in a different manner, evidence causing unfair prejudice

relates to evidence tending "to lead the jury, often for emotional reasons, to desire to convict a

defendant for reasons other than the defendant's guilt." State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657,683,461

S.E.2d 163, 189 (1995). Prior to the jury being presented with evidence of Petitioner's prior

conviction for voluntary manslaughter during the penalty phase, the jury, during the guilt phase,

heard direct evidence showing that Petitioner, in an intentional, deliberate and premeditated manner,

beat the victim, Steve Yarborough, to death with a hammer. The jury's decision to not recommend

mercy was warranted by this evidence alone, and Petitioner's prior voluntary manslaughter

conviction did not inflame the jury in making its decision. Rather, the jury's no mercy

recommendation was based on all the evidence presented to it during the guilt and penalty phase of

17

Petitioner's trial.

B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON PETITIONER'S VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION BY ALLOWING THEM TO FIND THAT TWO NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER, PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION, COULD BE NEGATED BY THEIR FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAD BEEN "GROSSLY INTOXICATED" AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME.

1. Standard of Review

A trial court's instructions to the jury must be a correct statement of the law and supported by the evidence. Jury instructions are reviewed by detennining whether the charge, reviewed as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so they understood the issues involved and were not mislead by the law. A jury instruction cannot be dissected on appeal; instead, the entire instruction is looked at when determining its accuracy. A trial court, therefore, has broad discretion in formulating its charge to the jury, so long as the charge accurately reflects the law. Deference is given to a trial court's discretion concerning the specific wording of the instruction, and the precise extent and character of any specific instruction will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.

Syl. pt. 4, Guthrie, supra.

"The basis of the obj ection determines the appropriate standard of review." Guthrie, 194 W.

Va. 671, 461 S.E.2d 177. "In this light, if an objection to a jury instruction is a challenge to a trial

court's statement of the legal standard, this Court will exercise de novo review." Id.

[W]hen an objection to a jury instruction involves the trial court's expression and formulation of the jury charge, this Court will review under an abuse of discretion standard. Therefore, we review jury instructions to determine whether, taken as a whole and in light of the evidence, they mislead the jury or state the law incorrectly to the prejudice of the objecting party. So long as they do not, we review the formulation of the instructions and the choice of language for an abuse of discretion. We will reverse only if the instructions are incorrect as a matter of law or capable of confusing and thereby misleading the jury.

18

Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 671-672,461 S.E.2d 177-178 (footnote omitted).

2. Based on the Evidence and Law, the Trial Court's use of the Terms "Grossly Intoxicated" and "Gross Intoxication" When Instructing the Jury was Proper. The Court's Use of These Terms Correctly Informed the Jury on the Degree oflntoxication Necessary to Show That Petitioner was Incapable of Premeditating and Deliberating the Murder of the Victim, Steve Yarborough.

In their entirety, the court's instructions to the jury on intoxication are as follows:

The Court instructs the jury that although voluntary intoxication or drunkenness will never provide a legal excuse for the

commission of a crime, the fact that a person may have been grossly intoxicated at the time of the commission ofa crime, may negate the existence of premeditation and deliberation, which is an element of the offense of murder in the first degree. So, the evidence that a defendant acted while in a state of gross intoxication is to be considered in determining whether or not the defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation.

If the evidence in this case leaves you with a reasonable doubt that the accused was capable of forming premeditation and deliberation to commit the crime of murder in the first degree because of gross intoxication, then you should acquit the defendant of the offense of murder in the first degree and deliberate on the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree.

Trial Tr. 480, Mar. 18,2010 (emphasis added).

On appeal, Petitioner essentially asserts that the court committed error in giving the jury this

instruction, as the court's use of use of the terms "grossly intoxicated" and "gross intoxication"

placed a greater burden of proof on him of showing that due to the amount of alcohol that he

consumed prior to killing Steve Yarborough he did not have the requisite elements of premeditation

and deliberation to be convicted of first-degree murder. See generally Pet. for Appeal, 11-18.

Petitioner expands this argument by asserting that the court failed to provide the jury with more

19

guidance on the meaning of the term "gross intoxication." Petitioner even goes so far as to point to

a proposed jury instruction from the West Virginia Homicide Jury Instructions Project, and further

asserts that this proposed instruction should have been given by the court. However, this instruction

also uses the term "grossly intoxicated" to which Petitioner objects, but argues that it more fully

explains or gives guidance to the jury on what is "gross intoxication." See generally Pet for Appeal,

16-18.

Below, Petitioner essentially made the same arguments to the court to which the court

responded as follows:

With respectto the issue of intoxication and its effect on those elements of the crime of first-degree murder which require some specific intent. And, generally speaking, we would be talking about the elements of premeditation, deliberation. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence to present that defense to the jury. It was then the Court's responsibility to charge the jury with regard to when intoxication would amount to a defense, or when intoxication would negate those elements of the crime. The Court went to the case law of the State of West Virginia and crafted the instruction and jury charge that was given to the jury on the issue of intoxication straight out of the language of the court in those cases. Ifthat's wrong, then, basically, the Court is going to have to overturn prior precedent And that's the Court's prerogative. It's not mine. It's my job to try the case based upon the law as it stands in the State of West Virginia at the time the case is tried.

The Court believes that its instructions with regard to the issue of intoxication and its possible effect on the verdict was proper and appropriate and not error.

Post-Trial Motions Hrg, 14-15, May 20,2010 (emphasis added).

The defendant claims that the Court erred in giving an intoxication instruction that allowed the jury to find that premeditation and deliberation could be negated by their finding that the defendant had been "grossly intoxicated" at the time of the commission of the crime. At trial, the Court found from the evidence

20

presented by the defendant and by the State, that the defendant and others had been- drinking alcohol on the day of the murder, was sufficient to support an instruction regarding intoxication as a defense to first degree murder. However, having determined that an intoxication instruction was justified, the Court was obligated to correctly charge the jury regarding the degree of intoxication that could eliminate the elements of premeditation and deliberation. The Court's instruction was derived from the W. Va. Supreme Court's case law.

Post-Trial Mot. Order Denying Mot. to Set Aside Verdict or Grant New Trial, 2, May 24,2010

(emphasis added).

The State agrees that Petitioner drank a considerable amount of beer, as did Steve

Yarborough, Mullenax and Stafford, on the day before as well as the day of Steve's murder.

However, despite his drinking, Petitioner knew exactly what he was doing before, during and after

murdering Steve - more about this later. "Simple intoxication" is not sufficient to prevent a criminal

defendant, including Petitioner, from forming the necessary elements for first degree murder -

premeditation and deliberation. Hence, the court's inclusion of the terms "grossly intoxicated" and

"gross intoxication" in its instructions. Simply put, the court's instructions on this point are in

keeping with the law as well as the evidence in this case.

Voluntary intoxication, as the Court is well aware, is no excuse or justification for

committing any crime, including murder. However, voluntary intoxication can reduce first degree

murder to second degree murder. In reducing murder from first to second-degree, this Court, in its

various decisions, has found that simple intoxication, for lack of a better phrase, "just doesn't cut

the mustard." The common thread running through these cases seems to be that the intoxication

must be so great or "gross" as to render the defendant incapable of forming the necessary elements

offirst-degree murder, that being premeditation and deliberation. The following cases illustrate this

21

point:

Voluntary drunkenness is generally never an excuse for a crime, but where a defendant is charged with murder, and it appears that the defendant was too drunk to be capable of deliberating and premeditating, in that instance intoxication may reduce murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree, as long as the specific intent did not antedate the intoxication.

Syl. pt. 2, State v. Keeton, 166 W. Va. 77, 272 S.E.2d 817 (1980) (emphasis added).

A person guilty of homicide may reduce his crime from murder in the first degree to murder in the second by showing that he was so intoxicated at the time the offense was committed as to render him incapable of doing a willful, deliberate, and premeditated act, and that he did not voluntarily become intoxicated for the purpose of committing the offense. All this may be shown by his own and the state's evidence, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Syl. pt. 1, State v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 224, 43 S.E. 99 (1902) (emphasis added).

Voluntary drunkenness is generally never an excuse for a crime, but where a defendant is charged with murder, and it appears that the defendant was too drunk to be capable of deliberating and premeditating, in that instance intoxication may reduce murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree, as long as the specific intent did not antedate the intoxication.

Syl. pt. 2, State v. Bush, 191 W. Va. 8, 442 S.E.2d 437 (1994) (internal quotations and citations

omitted) (emphasis added).

Again, it is clear from these cases that merely being intoxicated or drunk will not do - rather,

in order to have his charge reduced from first to second-degree murder, a criminal defendant must

be "so intoxicated" or "too drunk" so as to be incapable of deliberating and premeditating the killing.

These tenns, "so intoxicated" and/or "too drunk," are synonymous with the tenns "grossly

intoxicated" and/or "gross intoxication," which this Court has also found to be necessary in reducing

22

murder 1 to murder 2:

[1]f a sane man, not having voluntarily made himself drunk for the purpose of committing crime, does, while in a state of such gross intoxication as to render him incapable of deliberation, commit a homicide, he is guilty of no higher offense than murder in the second degree.

State v. Kidwell, 62 W. Va. 466, _,59 S.E. 494,496 (1907) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The State would argue that the degree of intoxication necessary to reduce murder 1 to murder

2 must be such that the defendant is literally in a state of "blackout." This may seem extreme, but

there is authority from the Court requiring as much:

[I]ntoxication can never be used as a defense where it is alleged that there was Diminished capacity except where previous exceptions apply, but can only be used when there is demonstrated a Total lack of capacity such that the bodily machine completely fails. Furthermore, where a weapon is involved it must affirmatively appear that the defendant had no predisposition to commit the crime or to engage in aggressive anti-social conduct which the voluntary intoxication brought to the forefront.

State v. Brant, 162 W. Va. 762, 767,252 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1979) (emphasis added).

As noted above, Petitioner, along with Steve Yarborough, Mullenax and Stafford, drank a

considerable amount of beer on the day before (Saturday, April 25,2009) as well as the day that

Petitioner murdered Steve (Sunday, April ~6, 2009). However, the alcohol consumed by Petitioner

did not "cloud" his mind in the least in planning and carrying out this murder. In other words,

despite his drinking, Petitioner knew exactly what he was doing before, during and after picking up

a hammer and viciously beating Steve to death with the same.

Petitioner and Steve were not, to put it mildly, fond of one another. On the day before as weIl

as the day of his death, Steve and Petitioner had several heated arguments due to Petitioner not

23

"pulling his weight" as far as helping out with the household expenses and chores. Because of this,

Steve informed Petitioner that he would have to fmd another place to live. This angered Petitioner

and, in fact, on the day of or day before killing Steve, Petitioner commented that he was going to

"fuck" him up.

On the day of his murder, Steve, along with his two friends Mullenax and Stafford, sat

around in the living room watching television and drinking beer while Petitioner stayed out on the

porch drinking beer and talking on the telephone. While talking on the phone, Petitioner sounded

calm rather than as ifhe were "talking out of his head." At one point, Petitioner was overheard on

the phone saying that "I got a place to stay now" and that he would now have "three hots and a cot."

Again, in making these statements, Petitioner sounded calm and rational. In fact, throughout the

entire afternoon and evening of April 26, 2009, Petitioner spoke in a clear and understandable tone.

After killing Steve, Petitioner threatened Mullenax and Stafford, telling them "don't come

no farther," "you'll be next" and "I love you guys to death, but I'll kill you too." When Mullenax

and Stafford attempted to help Steve, Petitioner angrily told them, "don't bother him, he's dead,"

"don't touch him, he's dead." Petitioner then commented "I hope the motherfucker's dead."

When he was arrested, Petitioner told the police"over and over" that he would now have

"three hots and a cot." Petitioner even asked the police whether West Virginia had the death penalty

and, when he was informed that it did not, he commented that was good and he wouldjust have to

spend the rest of his life in jail. When he was asked what he meant by this comment, Petitioner

responded "well, I did what I did, so I gotta get caught for it." Throughout the entire time that he

was in police custody, Petitioner's demeanor was calm, he spoke with a clear and understandable

voice, he understood and answered appropriately to the officers' questions, and he did not have any

24

trouble standing or controlling his movements.

It is obvious on these facts that Petitioner intentionally, deliberately and premeditatedly

murdered Steve Yarborough and, at the risk of sounding too blunt, his actions were cold, callous and

cowardly. It is also obvious on these facts that, despite his alcohol consumption, Petitioner knew

exactly what he was doing before, during and after murdering Steve. Finally, the jury, and correctly

so, did not "buy" Petitioner's so-called alcohol induced "blackout" story.

V.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner's conviction should be affmned.

DARRELL V. McGRAW, JR. ATTORNEY GENERAL

Office of the Attorney General State Capitol Complex Building 1, Room W-435 Charleston, West Virginia 25305 (304) 558-2522

25

Respectfully submitted,


Respondent,

By counsel


NO. 101581



v.

BEN SKIDMORE,


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned counsel for Respondent hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the

foregomgBRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA was mail ed

to counsel for the Petitioner by depositing it in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid,

on this 28th day of April, 2011, addressed as follows:

Raymond H. Yackel, Esquire 162 Chancery Row

Morgantown, West Virginia 26505

west virginia judiciary - supreme court of appeals of west ...€¦ · a few months later (around...

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