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TheSchoolthatDisappeared

ByPaulCroxson

It was a simple enough request, ‘What did I know about the Intelligence schools and theirnumbering?’‘Notalot,’wastheanswer.Thetitle‘schools’seemeddesignedtoconfusetheenemy.TheirprimaryfunctionwastodirectthesearchforspecificGermansignals.Notmuchmorethanthiswasrecorded.

Tobehonest,Ihadn’tlookedatthissubjectforanumberofyearsduringmySigintsearchesandsojust sentoff some scramblednotes that I happened tohave following some research for the lateAlanEdwards.WhenIlaterreadthem,Irealisedthattheywereinsomewhatofamessandsospentsome timesorting thevarious schools into somesemblanceofnumericalorder.All the schoolsofintelligence I had details of, seemed to be numbered.One thingwas apparent though, I had notbeenabletotracewhereNo.1IntelligenceSchoolwaslocatedandwhatwentonthere.Iwaswellawareoftheschoolsnumbered2to7butno.1appearedtohaveevadedme.Idecidedtospendanhourorsotryingtofindtheanswertothe‘missing’School.Ididfindtwoun-numberedschoolsbutthesewerecipherschools,oneinHerneHill,SELondonandtheotherinYorkshire.NotwhatIwaslookingfor;theyweremainlyRoyalSignalstrainingestablishments,itseemed!

Inmysearchforclues,Ifoundmyself,onceagain,buriedinwhatIconsidertobepossiblyoneofthebest-informed books on Enigma, The Hut Six Story written by Gordon Welchman, one of theforemostmembersofB.Pandcertainlywithouttheapprovaloftheauthorities. Inpassing. I find itquiteextraordinarythatsomuchcredit isgiventoAlanTuringforthebreakingofEnigmaandthedevelopmentoftheBombes,whilstthemajorcontributionmadebyGordonWelchmanisvirtuallyignored. Inmy view, which is now becoming the accepted view,Welchman’s contribution to thesolving of Enigma and the creation and development of the system of Huts 3, 6 and 8 was ofparamount importance: equalling Turing. One might say that he ‘industrialised the extraction ofEnigmaintelligence’. Inaddition, it is impossibletoputavalueonhis immensecontributiontothedevelopment of the Bombe which resulted in there being some disagreement between him andTuring–which is,again,oftenglossedover.TheBombeswouldhavebeenmuchweakerunlessoruntil someoneelsehadhis flashof inspirationabout thediagonalboard turning them intopotentindispensableweaponsinthefightagainstEnigma.

As Peter Calvocoressi, who also worked at B.P, pointed out, in its pre-war incarnation theGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolundertheForeignOfficewasexactlywhatitsnameimpliedandno more. ‘Intelligence’ played a very small part, it being left to SIS, their neighbours in London.Welchman’s great contribution was to ‘marry a scarcely formed intelligence process to code-breaking, forming a sophisticated system for Sigint exploitation’, which in parallel withWinterbotham’scontributionenabledthesafedisseminationofthe‘product’,worldwidetoallthreeServicesandtheSIS.

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The three armed services had each built up their own interceptnetworks;some,asearlyas thetwenties,butseparateandmoresecret still were those operated by the Foreign Office, MI5 andMI6 who were listening to the highest levels of German SecretServicecommunications.FortBridgewoodsnearChathamwasoneofthese,withitscivilianstaffofoperators.

When I first readHut 6 some twenty-odd years ago I knew verylittle of the story of Bletchley Park and Enigma and so wasdelightedtobere-acquaintedwiththestory,knowing,asIdo,somuchmore now aboutwhatwent on there; particularly readinghis accounts, sadly not very lengthy or detailed, of the workcarriedout at FortBridgewoods. I hadheardof its existencebut

littleofitsroleinthedevelopmentofinterception.Welchmanmentionsitseveraltimesandpraisesit–inparticularthecommandingofficer,CommanderEllingworth-asbeinganimportanttoolinhissearch for the solution of Enigma. There are just tantalising glimpses. Itwas another piece that Icouldputinplaceinthepuzzle.

TheFortplayedseveralvitalroles intheEnigmastory,not least inthetrainingofcivilian interceptofficerswho,ascivilianswouldformthebackboneoftheinterceptserviceintheUK.(Couldthisbethen themissingNo. 1 School)? Theseoperatorswereof a standardunmatchedanywhereat thetime. Since accuracy – particularly when recording the preambles – was vital in the search forEnigma, theirworkwasgreatlyprized.As theworkload increasedandtheymoved fromChatham,theywouldgoontotrainarmypersonnelatbothChicksandsandBeaumanor.

What again was interesting andworthy of further investigationwas the battle for control of theinterceptsetsbetweenEllingwworthandWelchmanandColonel (Arcedekne)Butler,HeadofMI8.MI8hadretainedresponsibilityforwhatisoftencalledthe‘steering’oftheintercept,despiteeffortsby the growing GC & CS to take it over. In correspondence fromWelchman to Travis, the thenDeputyHeadatGC&CShespecificallyreferstothisproblem,pointingoutthat‘hisviewtherewasnoneedfor‘anotherintelligenceschool’!(IhadbeendivertedfrommysearchforNo.1IntelligenceSchool but was this a clue to leadme back to the straight and narrow?)What new school beenproposedandbywhom?

WelchmanhadbuiltupwhatwasaverygoodandfruitfulworkingrelationshipwithEllingworthandhis interceptteam.This,however,didnotapplytoButler, theheadofMI8: far fromit!On1April1941, Welchman wrote what is by any standards a highly critical and inflammatory letter toCommanderETravis,atthetimedeputydirectorofB.P.regardingtheHeadofMI8.Hewrote,

Unfortunately, Col. Butler has continually tried to take away thework of the Chatham IntelligenceSchoolandtointerferewithour(GC&CS)closeco-operationwithCdrEllingsworth.HehasfoundedunnecessaryorganisationsinLondonandelsewherewhichheattemptstoplacebetweenusandthe(intercept)stations.WeandCdrEllingsworthhavehadtowasteaconsiderableamountofenergyinfighting changes which we knew to be against the national interest. The latest danger lies in theformationofIntelligenceSchoolNo,VIunderanewcolonelwhoknowsnothingabout‘E’trafficfromthecryptologicalorfromthewirelesspointofview.Wearetobedeprivedofthegreaterpartofthevaluable intelligencework thathasbeendoneunderEllsworthand insteadweareasked toaccept

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intelligence from another party whose reliability we do not trust’. . . ‘the clash is between CdrEllingsworth’s intelligence school (so, it was an Intelligence School at Chatham) and Col. Butler’sintelligenceSchool.Wesaywithouthesitationthattheformerisessentialtouschieflyowingtotheexperience of Cdr Ellingsworth himself and that Col. Butler’s school is not only unnecessary but anuisance. Thework that has been done by Col. Butler’s party could have been done better underEllingsworthatGC&CS.

And this was at what was possibly one of the most dangerous periods in our history! This wasextremely strong – almost venomous –criticism of the man who headed up MI8 and a seriouscommentontheunitshewasresponsiblefor,notleast6I.S.,whichwentontoperformavitalrolefinally forming the backbone of what would become known as ‘SIXTA’ at B.P. At this pointWelchman’spatiencewithButlerseemstobeexhaustedto theextent thathisdissatisfactionwasrecorded inwritingatthehighest level! It is importanttoappreciatethatthesedisputeswerenotalwaysaboutthesameproblemwhichinretrospectisalmostunbelievableatsuchacriticaltimeinthe war. Although he, Welchman, had clearly lost patience and trust with Arcedeckne-Butler hecertainlywasverymuchinfavourofwhatcouldbeachievedwithinhisMI8organisation.

Gordon Welchman undoubtedly was one of the greatest contributors to the success of ULTRAintelligence,havingfirstestablishedcontactwithitinDecember1940.Farsightedly,hecertainlysawthe presence of the log-readers in the future lay at B.P. rather thanBeaumanor or London as hemadeveryclearinHutSix.1On17July19416I.S.movedfromLondontoBeaumanor.Shortlyafterthis, on June161941,ColonelArcedeckne-Butler leftMI8 andwas succeededbyColonelNicholls(laterBrigadierFWNicholls),RoyalSignals.Althoughnothingissaidintherecords,nodoubttherewasprobablyanalmostuniversalsighofreliefathisdeparture.

Tomakemattersworse,therewerestillproblems;thequarrelsbetweenGC&CSandMI8whichhadprecipitatedtheinquiryinthewinterof1940/1941stillhadnotdieddowndespitethedepartureofButler.Thesequarrelseruptedagain,mainlycentredonthefactthat,whileMI8wasresponsibleforinterceptingGermanArmyandGAFtrafficandforsubjectingittotrafficanalysis,GC&CScontrolledCryptanalysis separately and independently from intelligence. It was this dichotomy that wouldalwaysbeacausefordiscussionanddissent,untilresolvedwhenit laterbecameanacceptedfactthatcryptanalysisandtrafficanalysisareinseparable,oratleast,noteasilyseparated:butthiswasinthefuture.

PerhapsapottedhistoryoftheFortwouldnotgoamiss.Itwasbuiltinthelate19thcenturyasoneofthefortsthatdefendedthelandwardapproachtoChathamDockyard.ItprotectedtheapproachfromMaidstoneand the flankofFortBorstal. Itwaspolygonal in shapeandhadadeepdryditcharoundit.Theentrancewasviaarollerbridgeandeithersideoftheentrancegateweremachine-gun loops,whichwasthefirstappearanceof this featureatChatham.Thefortwas firststarted inabout1879byconvictlabour,butduetolackofmoneyandafadingenthusiasmforbuildingforts,workstoppedanditwasn'tuntil1892thatFortBridgewoodswasfinallycompleted

A War Office Y (intercept) station had been based at Fort Bridgewoods since 1926, initiallyresponsibletoGC&CSandthen,followingitscreationin1938,toMI8.Thefirstfiveoperatorsnotonlycarriedoutoverseasinterceptionworkofwhichtherewasverylittletodointhoseearlydays;but alsoother tasks; for example, in their very earlydays at one time theywereevenon loan to1 The Hut Six Story, W.G. Welchman, McGraw Hill, 1984

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Chelsea Barracks where they provided point-to-point communications with other governmentstationsaroundthecountryduringtheGeneralStrike.

Although by then, nominally a Royal Signalsestablishment,fromJanuary1935thestationwasstaffedbycivilianoperatorscommandedby Lieutenant Commander (retd) M J WEllingworth RN, and responsible to GC& CS.ThestationwasthefirsttoregularlyinterceptGerman wireless traffic recognised as beingsentinthehigh-gradeEnigmacipherandwas,for a time, the mainstay for providingintercepted wireless traffic for the fewcodebreakerswhowouldeventuallyendupatBletchley Park. By 1933/34 the Enigmamachine had been adopted by the Germansasabasicunitaryciphersystemforthethree

armed forces, aswell asmilitary intelligence (theAbwehr), SS formations,Nazi Party security andpolitical intelligenceservice(S.D.).EvenotheragenciesoftheThirdReichsuchastherailwaysandpoliceeventuallyadopteditinvariousformats.WhatwaskeytothesuccessoftheEnigmamachinewasthat,withminormodifications,Enigmacouldbeusedindependentlyandintotalsafetybyalloftheseorganisations.

Therewasnotthatmuchtrafficto intercept.Fromtheoutbreakofwaruntil the invasionfirstlyofNorwayandDenmarkandthenFrance,virtuallycompleteradiosilencewasinitiallyadoptedbytheGermans. Following the invasions with landlines not being initially available, German wirelessactivities greatly increased. A hutted encampmentwas built in thewoods adjacent to the fort tohouse the increase in operators, and also other buildingswere built inside the fort to house theteleprinteroperatorsandotherclericalstaff.

Itmight seemanelementaryquestionbuthowdid the interceptors know that themessages thatthey were intercepting came from German sources and how did they recognise them as beingEnigma? Direction finding had made the origin of the messages obvious very quickly. Tocryptologists,anEnigmacipherwaseasilyrecognisablebyitsnearlyperfectdisposalofletterswiththemessages inneatfive-lettergroups. Itdidn’tcorrelatewithnatural language– inany languagesome lettersoccurmore frequently thanothers–andstatistical calculationsof frequenciesof theletterswerecompletelyuseless. Ithadtobeamachinecipherthatwasbeingused;somethingUKcryptologistshadbeenfearingforsometime.

Fortunately,mostmessages had two characteristics besides thewireless frequency inwhich theywerebeing transmitted.Aswell as thegeographicalpointoforiginwhichcouldbeestablishedbydirectionfindingtheycarriedthecallsignofthesenderwhowouldidentifyhimselfatthestartofamessage;theequivalentofstartingwiththeirnameandaddress.Byacombinationoftheseitwaspossible to establish that a unit using such-and-such frequency was located at or near X. Evenwithoutreadingtheactualmessagetherewasintelligencetobegained.Militaryintelligence,under

FORTBRIDGEWOODS

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MI8hadworkedforsometimeontheassumptionthatanymachine-encipheredmessageswouldbeimpossibletodecrypt.Thisshouldhavebeenthecase!

MostoftheBritish-interceptedEnigmamessageswhichwerebeingstudiedbyGC&CSwerebeing‘pluckedoutoftheether’bythethenveryexperiencedcivilianoperatorsatChatham.Unbeknownto them, they were also being intercepted by both the Poles and the French. Each day’saccumulationofmessages,painstakinglyandaccuratelyhandwrittenbytheoperators,wasregularlybundledupandsenttoB.P.,togetherwithareportontheday’straffic.Theoperatorswereundertheimpressionthatthemessageswerebeingdecipheredwhichaccountedforthecarewithwhichtheywererecordingthem.AlexKendrick,acivilianmemberof‘Dilly’Knox’s2staffatB.P.hadbeengiventhetaskofindoctrinatingWelchmanonhisarrivalintothelittlethatwasknownaboutEnigma.Itwasthesereports,notthemessages, thatGordonWelchmanandKendrickworkedonatB.P. inthe early days with very little guidance from Knox the nominal Head of the department. Theyconcentratedonwhatweretobeknownas‘callsignsanddiscriminants’,workingatB.P.inwhatwasthen referred toas the ‘School’basedon ithavingbeenoriginallypartofElmersSchool. (No, thiswasnotthemissingNo.1IntelligenceSchool).Intheearlydaystherewaslittleorganisationandco-operationbetweenthestaffatB.P.; this levelofworkhadneverbeenenvisaged. Forexample, intheearlydayswhenWelchmanmadewhathethoughtwasanimportantbreakthrough,herushedtotellDillyKnox.Hewasmorethanalittledisappointedtobetoldthat‘theyalreadyknewaboutit’.Surprisingly,despitethis,WelchmanwasverykindinhiscriticismofKnox.

The work at B.P. was entirely independent from what was going on withinMI8 in London eventhough, inevitably there was some duplication; not surprisingly, bearing in mind the haphazardnatureofMI8inLondon.Inthoseearlydays,beforethedecryptionofmessagesallthattheycoulddo both in London and B.P. was to record all the characteristics in a methodical manner, notknowingwhere thismight lead. Sadly, Chatham, this highly efficient and very secret organisation,hadbeenproducingthislittle-usedoutputforsometime.Beingindecipherable,theactualmessagesthat they were intercepting and painstakingly recording were useless although the interceptoperators did not know this rather the reverse. (Later on more than a million un-decipheredmessages–allpainstakinglyrecorded–wouldbedestroyed).

Welchmanpaidat leastonevisittoChathamearlyonhistimeatB.P., infacthisfirstoutsidevisit,afterjoiningB.P.wastoChatham.HeimmediatelymadefriendswithCommanderEllingworthwhowentontoteachhimmanythingsthatasheputit,he‘badlyneededtoknow’.However,WelchmandidnotgiveawaythefacttoEllingworththatB.P.hadanumberofdecodedmessagesthathadbeenhandedoverbytheFrench,provingthatitwaspossible,althoughhediddiscussFrenchinterceptsingeneral.TherearetantalisinghintsthattherewasmoregoingonattheFortthanjustinterceptioninWelchman’sbook.Ondescribingthisfirstvisit,hementionsthat‘thetrafficanalystsatChathamhadother(sadlyunspecified)tasks’.

In 1940, the services,mainly theWar Office, and not the user of the product, Hut 6 as it wouldbecomeknown, controlled the tasksundertakenby the intercept stations. Thiswasa contentiousissue. Around 1940, presumably on Butler’s instructions, Chatham even removed six sets fromEnigma cover without notifying or consulting with GC & CS. Hut 6 protested but received little

2Alfred Dillwyn ‘Dilly’ Knox CMG, was originally a British classics scholar and papyrologist at King's College, Cambridge and chief codebreaker at B.P.

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sympathyfromthemilitaryandairforceauthoritieswhoconsideredittobesomethingofanActofGraceontheirparteventoallowGC&Csanyvoiceintheallocationofthesets.HutSixhadevenhad to battle to prevent Enigma coverage being transferred from highly skilled civilian armyoperatorstounskilledRAFoperatorswithpotentiallydisastrousresults.3

OnethingthatwedoknowisthatEllingworthhadthehighestofsecurityclearances,havingbeenindoctrinatedintothesecretsofEnigmabythetimehevisitedB.P.’sHut6earlyin1940.Welchmanhadbecome ‘deeply suspiciousofColonelButler’smotivesandhadwatched several small set-upsspring up in London in an effort to expand his control over theW/T traffic and to gain asmuchintelligenceaspossible.

GroupCaptainBlandy,headoftheRAFYServicecouldnotresistjoininginthedispute.AlthoughtheRAFYServicehadnotatthisstagestartedtomonitoranyLuftwaffegroundtoairtraffic,hewrotepatronisinglythat ‘Hutsixwhohadbeencomplaininghadnotbeguntounderstandthenicetiesofinterceptionandthat theircomplaintswouldnothavebeenvoicedhadtheyattendedacourseatChathamorCheadleontrafficanalysis’whichwaspossiblytruewhileEnigmahadnotbeenbroken.

ORIGINALSTAFFOFFORTBRIDGEWOODS

Whilst interceptionworkofficiallyendedatBridgewoodsinMarch1941followingonfromitbeingbombedwhenatleastonewoman(WRAC)killed.ThebulkofthestaffmovedtoChicksandswhichwas followed by a move to Beaumanor due to the discontentment of the female staff whocomplainedbitterlyaboutthepresenceofbatsinthesetroomsatthePriory.3 The Bletchley Park Codebreakers, Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith (eds.), Bantam Bletchley Press, 2001

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A groupof senior EWAs (ExperimentalWirelessAssistants)was unofficially stillmaintained at theFortas trainersand theyundertook the trainingofmany local schoolboyswhowere recruited forthissecretwork.EllingworthwasachurchwardenatStMary'sStroodwherethevicarwastheRevdDonald Brand. Ellingworth put Brand towork as a recruiter for youngmenwhowere consideredsuitable for secret war work. Recruitment amongst Boy Scouts was particularly successful. BrandalsoprovidedinitialaccommodationforthemwhilsttheyunderwenttheirtrainingasExperimentalWireless Assistants. Training took some three months and involved a daily grind of Morse codetuition.Weekly testwere taken and thesewere administered by Albert Stevenswho had been achiefinstructorintheRoyalSignals.Otherinstructors,HadlerandBlundell,werefromthefirstfiveoperatorsrecruitedasearlyas1926.

Therewasaratherbizarreendtothisstory.Attheendofthewar, in1945,despitetheinvaluablework that they had done as civiliansworking in amilitary capacity, the 'schoolboys'would all beconscripted into the Royal Signals to undertake their national service. Most went on to end upworkingforGCHQinvariouscapacitiesandatleastone,SandyLeGassick,wentontoattaintherankofLieutenantColonelandwasawardedtheMBE.

There is no doubt that these operators were probably amongst the finest in the ‘business’. OnememberoftheFortstaff,ChiefPettyOfficerAlbertStevensRN,issaidtohavetakenaperfectcopyofthelongsignalsenttoGroupNorthbyBismarckanditisclaimedthatitwasfromthissignalthattheAdmiraltywereabletopinpointthelocationofBismarckafterinitialcontacthadbeenlost.ThisclaimshouldbetreatedwithsomecautionastherewasnoD/FfacilityattheFortandtheFortwasnotusuallyinvolvedinnavaltraffic.Itwasshortlyafterthis,though,thatBismarckwassunkbyshipsoftheHomeFleet.Asimilarclaim–probablybaseless–ismadeforChicksands.ThestorygoesthatStevenswascalledtoseeEllingworthinhisofficeshortlyafterthiseventundertheimpressionthathewas inforarollickingforsomeerror,but insteadwasgivenagenerousmeasureofwhiskyandtoldthathehad‘playedavitalpartinthesinkingoftheBismarck’.

It was during a night watch at Bletchley Park, a year or so later, that Ellingworth introducedWelchmantooneofhissecrets;thefactthat,completelyunknowntoB.P.,hehadmaintainedacoreofoperatorsatBridgwoodsafter themove toChicksands (and thenBeaumanor).TheyprovidedadiversityofinterceptionsowhatcouldnotbeheardatChicksandsorBeaumanorcouldpossiblybeintercepted at Fort Bridgewoods. This small force would be maintained until the end of WWII,provingitsvalue.

With Butler eventually out of theway,Welchman established a closer personal relationshipwithLieutenantCommander(retd)EllingworthRNtheofficerinchargeatBridgewoods,whichcontinuedthroughoutthewarparticularlyafterthemovetoBeaumanorwhenEllingworthbecameinchargeoftheoperatorsthere.ThisrelationshipbroughtaboutavitalinterplaybetweenHut6atBletchleyandtheheadsofwatchatBeaumanorandBridgewoodsWhilstatBridgewoods,WelchmanhadtalkedtoEllingworthaboutcertainmessagesbeinggivenpriority.Asaresult,themessageheadings,includingmessage disciminants, for certain intercepted priority trafficwere sent by teleprinter to BletchleyPark so thatmessages thatwere likely to be capable of a break could be transmitted to themaspriority. These became known at Bridgewoods as ‘Welchman Specials’. Initially Welchman wasconcernedatthesecurity implicationsofhisnamebeingusedbuttherewasnoneedforconcern.Therewasanothergroundforconcerninthattheoperatorswereundertheimpressionthatallthe

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messagesthattheywerepainstakingly loggingwerebeingdecrypted.Wouldtheyhavebeenquitesodiligenthadtheyknownthattheirworkwasdestinedforthewastepaperbaskets?

ItappearsthattheFortwasnotdedicatedentirelytoEnigma.Thereisevidencefromex-membersofthestaffthatinterceptionworkatBridgewoodswasalsolinkeddirectlywiththeworkundertakenbyProfessor R V Jones and his battle of the beams and the Knickerbein beacons. Bridgewoods wasdefinitelytakingGermanAirForcetrafficfromtheexperimentalunitthatwasworkingonthebeamtransmittingstations,andthereafterfromthebeamstationorganisationsomeofwhichwasin‘plainlanguage’dueto the incompetenceof theoperators. By then,somesecretsofEnigma(Red)hadbeenbrokenand thisenabledProf ‘Bimbo’Norman inHut3 toalert Jones to vitalmessages thatallowedhimto‘breakthebeams’asChurchillwastoputit.4

MI8wasnotonlyconcernedwithEnigmaalso; infact,Butlerandthemajorityofthoseconcernedinitiallywere of the opinion (correctly) that itwas, as amachine cipher, unbreakable. The signalsintelligencedepartmentoftheWarOfficerantheYstationnetwork.Additionally,foran18-monthperiod,fromlate1939untilmid1941italsorantheRadioSecurityService,underthedesignationofMI8c.AtthestartofWWII,VernanKelltheheadofMI5hadintroducedacontingencyplantodealwiththeproblemof illicitradiotransmissions.Anewbodywascreated,theRadioSecurityService(RSS), headed by Major J P G Worlledge. He was not new to the intercept world. Until 1927,Worlledge had commanded aMilitaryWireless (intercept) Company at Sarafand in Palestine. Hisbriefnowwasto;intercept,locateandclosedownillicitwirelessstationsoperatedeitherbyenemyagentsinGreatBritainorbyotherpersonsnotbeinglicensedtodosounderDefenceRegulations,1939’.Asa securityprecaution,RSSwasalso initiallygiven thecoverdesignationofMI8.Workingfrom cells at Wormwood Scrubs, Worlledge selected Majors Sclater and Cole-Adams as hisassistants,andWalterGillashischieftrafficanalyst.GillhadbeenengagedinwirelessinterceptioninWorldWarIandrecommendedthatthebestcourseofactionwouldbetofindthetransmissionsoftheagentcontrolstationsinGermany.HerecruitedaresearchfellowfromOxford,HughTrevor-Roper, who was fluent in German. Working alongside them, at Wormwood Scrubs, was JohnMasterman, who later would runMI5's double-agent XX program.Masterman already had agentSNOW,5andGillusedhiscodesasthebasisfordecryptingincomingagenttraffic.

RSSassignedthetaskofdevelopingacomprehensivelisteningorganisationtoRalphMansfield,4thBaronSandhurst,anenthusiasticamateur radiooperator.Hehadservedwith theRoyalEngineersSignal Service duringWorldWar I and had been commissioned as amajor in the Royal Corps ofSignalsin1939.SandhurstwasgivenanofficeintheSecurityService'stemporaryaccommodationinWormwood Scrubs prison. He began by approaching the president of the Radio Society of GreatBritain(RSGB),ArthurWatts.WattswasnotnewtotheSigintworldhavingservedasananalyst inRoom40duringWorldWarIfollowingthelossofalegatGallipoli.Wattsrecommendedthatforastart, Sandhurst recruit the entire RSGB Council, which he did. The RSGB Council then began torecruitthesociety'smembersasvoluntaryinterceptors(VI).RadioamateurswereconsideredidealforsuchworkbecausetheywerewidelydistributedacrosstheUK.4 Most Secret War, R V Jones, Penguin, 2009, pp. 127 5ArthurGrahamOwens,laterknownasArthurGrahamWhite(14April1899–24December1957)wasaWelshdoubleagentfortheAlliesduringtheSecondWorldWar.HewasworkingforMI5whileappearingtotheAbwehr(theGermanintelligenceagency)tobeoneoftheiragents.OwenswasknowntoMI5bythecodenameSNOW,whichwaschosenasitisapartialanagramofhislastname.

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TheVIsweremostlyworkingmenofnon-militaryage,workingintheirowntimeandusingtheirownequipment.Theirtransmittershadbeenimpoundedontheoutbreakofwar,buttheirreceivershadnot. They were ordered to ignore commercial and military traffic and, to concentrate on moreelusive transmissions. Each VI was given aminimum number of intercepts tomake eachmonth.Reachingthatnumbergavethemexemptionfromotherduties,suchasfirewatching.ManyoftheVIs were issued a special DR12 identity card. This allowed them to enter premises which theysuspected to be the transmission source of unauthorised signals. There is no record of whetherthesewereused.RSSalsoestablishedaseriesofradiodirectionfindingstationsinthefarcornersoftheBritishIsles,toidentifythelocationsoftheinterceptedtransmissions.

The recruitmentofVIswas slow, since theyhad tobe skilled, discreet, anddedicated.Butwithinthreemonths,50VIswereatworkandhadidentifiedover600transmitters–allfirmlyontheothersideoftheEnglishChannel.ItsoonbecameapparentthattherewerenoenemyagentstransmittingfromtheUK.Infact,allGermanagentsenteringtheUKwerepromptlycapturedandeitherinternedorturnedtooperateasdoubleagentsunderthesupervisionoftheXXCommittee.Insomecases,aBritishoperatortookovertheirtransmissions,impersonatingthem.TheGermanmilitary,itappears,didnotrealisethis.ByMay1940,itwasclearthatRSS'sinitialmissiontolocateenemyagentsintheUKwascomplete.

Initially,messagesloggedbyVIsweresenttoWormwoodScrubs.But,asthevolumebecamegreatand as Wormwood began to suffer German air attacks, RSS sought larger premises. They choseArkleyView,alargecountryhousenearthevillageofArkleyintheLondonBoroughofBarnetwhichhadalreadybeenrequisitionedforaninterceptstation.ItwasgiventhecrypticpostaladdressofBox25,Barnet.There,astaffof IntelligenceCorpsanalystsandcryptographersbegantheirduties.TheRSShad ineffectbecome theciviliancounterpartof themilitary'sYService interceptnetwork.Bymid-1941,uptoastaggering10,000logs(messagesheets)adaywerebeingsenttoArkleyandthenforwardedtoB.P.

Although itwasnot intheirremit, inearly1940,Trevor-RoperandEWB.Gillhadthetemeritytosuccessfullydecryptsomeoftheseinterceptswhichdemonstratedtherelevanceofthematerial,butsucceeded in annoying both B.P. and MI6 in the process. In May 1941, RSS's success and thisresentmentresultedincontroloftheorganisationtobetransferred.Therewasbriefbattleoverwhoshouldcontrolitbut,intheend,itbecamethecommunicationandinterceptionserviceofMI6.Priortothistheyhadnosuchdedicatedcapability.Fromthis,Trevor-Roperformedalowopinion,whichhelaterexpressed,ofmostpre-warprofessionalintelligenceagents.

The new controller of RSSwas Lieutenant Colonel E FMaltby and from 1942, Lieutenant ColonelKennethMortonEvanswasappointedDeputyController.RolandKeen,authorofWirelessDirectionFinding, was the officer-in-charge of engineering. By now, the service was well financed andequippedwithanewcentralradiostationatHanslopeParkinBuckinghamshire(designatedSpecialCommunicationsUnitNo.3orSCU3).TheAbwehrwasnowbeingmonitoredaroundtheclock.Thevolume and regularity of the obtained material, enabled Bletchley to achieve one of its greattriumphs inDecember 1941,when it broke theAbwehr's Enigma cypher, giving enormous insightintoGermanintelligenceoperations.

Atitspeakfrom1943to1944,RSSemployed–apartfromVIs–morethan1,500personnelmostofwhomhadbeenamateurradiooperators.Overhalfoftheseworkedasinterceptorswhileanumber

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investigatedthenumerousenemyradionetworks.Thisrevealedimportantinformation,evenwhenitwasnotpossibletodecodemessages.FewtransmissionsbysecretagentsofGermanIntelligencewere believed to have evaded RSS's notice. Changes in procedure, which the Germans used forsecurity,wereinmanycasesidentifiedbeforetheenemyhadbecomefamiliarwiththem.Followingtheendofthewar,RSSHQmovedtoEastcoteandwasabsorbedbyGC&CS,bythenGCHQ.

OneonlyhastomentionBletchleyParkandinevitablyyouwillgettheresponse,Enigma.Bearinginmindhowmuchof Enigmawasunreadable formuchof theearlydaysof thewar it is somewhatsurprising that othermethodsof extracting intelligence and their product, have in themainbeenignoredoroverlooked.Thesemethodsotherthanbydecryption,have,overthe60-oddyearssincetheendofthewar,receivedfarlessattentionthantheactualbreakingofEnigmaanditsproduct–decryptedmessages.Probablywiththetacitapprovaloftheauthorities,possiblyadeliberateploytohelpmaintainthestorythatoperatedproperly,Enigmawasunbreakable?

OneaspectofEnigmawedoknowofisthatmuchofthematerialthatRVJoneshadtosupporthisbeatingthebeamsbattlewasderivedfromGermanhigh-gradeEnigmatraffic,probablyinterceptedat theFort. Inhismemoirs,Professor Jonesmentions the fact thathewasaregularandwelcomevisitortoB.P.andwasaclosefriendofWinterbotham,(possiblyduetotheseniorRAFpositionheheld within MI6) but unfortunately, nowhere in his bookMost Secret War: The Story of BritishScientific Intelligence 1939-1945 does he reveal anything of the co-operation with Bridgewoods;though, interestingly,hemakes severalmentionsof ‘thecontributionsmadeby theRAF InterceptStations’. Could Jones have been confused or misled, one wonders, about the origins of theinformation?ButisthislikelyalthoughChicksandswithitsmaleoperatorsdidnotopenuntil1941;almostayearafter‘Freya’?6Thebeamtrafficwasquiteremarkable,asBridgewoodshadmanagedtofindtheradiotrafficoftheGermanexperimentalunitthatwasdevelopingthebeamstationsandbeam flying. These were not well-trained radio operators but scientists and consequently theyinnocentlybetrayedtheirradiofrequencyschedulesandEnigmasettings.Ononeparticularday,oneof theoperatorsatBridgewoodstooktraffic inplain language fromthisgroupwhoweretrying tosortoutanEnigmasettingproblem,andduringthecourseoftheexchange[allinMorsecode]theygavethewheelsettingandplugsettingsontheEnigmamachineonthatday,agodsendtoBletchley!

At B.P. before Enigma was broken, what little intelligence that could be obtained apart fromdirectionfindingcamefromtheanalysisofwhatwereknownasthepreamblesofwhat,bythen,hadbeen recognised as Enigmamessages.Unknown to them, coincidentally, similarwork as going onwithinMI8inLondon.InitiallyformedonMay161918,MI8’sroleatthattimewasthecensorshipoftelegraphiccabletraffic.ConvenientlyitwashousedinElectraHouse,London,homeoftheEasternTelegraphCompany,(latertobemergedintoCable&Wireless).Ithadaveryshortpost-warlifeasitwasabolishedin1919aspartofthepost-warreorganisations.AfewdaysaftertheoutbreakofwarinSeptember1939,anoffshootofMI1(X),wasformed,calledMilitaryIntelligenceBranch8(MI8).7Itsrolewasto‘collateandpassontotheproperquartersintelligencederivedfromstudyofenemycommunication systems and to recruit and administer the military personnel needed for signalintelligence’.Itwasgivenresponsibilityforallthearmyinterceptstations,theso-called‘YService’in

6One of the first to give British Intelligence any details about the Freya radar was a young Danish flight lieutenant. Thomas Sneum who at great risk to his life, photographed the radar installation on the Danish island of Fano in 1941, bringing the negatives to Britain in a dramatic flight7 (WO165/38)

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theUK.ItwasplacedunderthecommandofthenewlypromotedColonelArcedeckne-Butlerwho,from1934upuntil then,hadbeenscientificofficerandsuperintendentofaunitknownasSignalsExperimentalEstablishmentatWoolwich inLondon,wheretheyweredevelopingradioequipmentfor thearmy. It includedearlyworkonwhatcametobeknownas radar. Itwouldappear thatherapidly gained the view that developing traffic analysis could provide valuable intelligence. MI8would be the channel through which Sigint would pass to the branches doing substantiveintelligence andwould also become the centre for all army traffic analysis. In this organisation asmall group of analysts was beginning to study the German radio networks which could beconstructed from the Chatham intercept reports. Their objectives were very different fromWelchman’s.Whilsthewasstill concernedwith theirhopes forbreakingEnigma traffic, they,MI8had startedwith the assumption that the Enigma trafficwasunbreakable. Their objective insteadwastoderiveintelligencefromadetailedstudyoftheseradionets.

TheEnigmamessagesastransmittedbytheGermanoperatorwouldconsistofwhatappearedtobeanunencipheredpreamblefollowedbyanencipheredtext.Thepreamblewasquicklyestablishedasbeing part of the procedure for encoding and decoding the encrypted part of the text. A typicalmessagecontainedsixpotentiallyvaluableitemsofinformation

Thecallsignsoftheradiostationsinvolved:firstthesendingstationthenthedestination(s).

Thetimeoforiginofthemessage

Thenumberoflettersinthetext(infive-figuregroups)

Anindicationofwhetherthemessagewascompleteorwasaspecifiedpartofamulti-partmessage

A three-letter group which Welchman and Kendrick called the discriminant which enabled thedifferenttypesofEnigmatraffictoberecognised;and

Asecondthree-lettergroupwhichbecameknownastheindicatorsetting.

Thiswouldallbe followedby theoperatormakinganoteof the timeof the transmissionandthefrequencyonwhichithadbeentransmitted.

Atitssimplest,T/A,asitisusuallyreferredto,istheinvestigationandanalysisofwirelessnetworks,who is involved in them, the examination and analysis of operating frequencies, callsigns andoperatorchatinwhatisgenerallyreferredtoasplainlanguage.Withoutthiswhoissayingwhatandtowhom, the efforts of Bletchley Parkwould have beenwasted as a source of intelligence. As ameasureperhapsofitsimportancetotheintelligenceworldtheofficialhistory,aB.P.,departmentknownasSIXTA,with its appendices, isoneof themost important componentsofT/Aduring thewar–hasstillnot(asat2016)beenreleased.

TherewascertainlyanMI8presenceas canbe seen in thephotographof theFort’sHomeGuardThere in the front row is Captain (laterMajor) Jolowicz of the Intelligence Corpswhowould alsoworkinNo.6I.S.Thiswasthefirst–possiblytheonly–indicationofanyCorpsmembersbeingbasedatChatham.ItisinterestingthatheiswearingtheCorpscapbadgeverysoonafterthefoundingoftheCorps,havingbeen transferredas temporary captain from theGeneral List to the IntelligenceCorps.HewasoneofthekeypeopleworkingintheCompilationandRecordsRoom(CRR)z.Hewas

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lateremployedintheNo.6IntelligenceSchool,formedon25March1941,whichwasknown,firstly,asIntelligenceSchoolVIandthenasIntelligenceSchoolNo.6.Thisschoolwaspossiblythesourceofthe controversy between Welchman and Butler. Lieutenant Colonel Thompson opened theheadquarters of No. 6 I.S (6I.S) His instructions were to ‘concentrate on research into Germanmethods of signals andwireless procedure’ at Beaumanor, known asWarOffice Y Group. In July1941.Itsrolewasredefinedas‘toteachandcarryoutanalysisoftheenemysignalstraffic(inotherwords, traffic analysis), building up a picture of the enemy’s communications’. On 1 August, theschoolwasformallyopened‘tocontrolWOYG(WarOfficeYGroup).Fromhere,theoriginalFusionRoomwouldoperate.Later, itmovedto57NetherhallGardensHampstead in1943underColonelLithgowwithMajorJolowicz,amemberofthestaff,hisownhousebecomingtheofficers’mess.ThenameoftheunitwaschangedtoSpecialW/TTrainingandResearchWing.Courseswouldlastaboutsixweeks andweremixed courses for intelligence officers andNCOs of the British and CanadianarmieswhoweretostaffS.W.SectionsfortheinvasionofWesternEurope.FollowingthemovefromBeaumanor, No. 6 Intelligence School Merged into B.P. and would later become part of whatbecameknownasSixta.Jolowyczwentwiththemtobeemployedinthemilitarywing.

Togobacktothephotoforamoment;nexttoJolowyczisa‘CaptOwen(CRR).WeknowthattherewasaCaptainW.JOwenwhowasintheCorpsandwhoisknown,likeJolowycz,tohaveworkedintheMilWingofGC&CS.CRR(Compilation&RecordsRoom)wasofcoursethedepartmentinwhichJolowyczwasemployedwhilstattheFort.

BridgewoodshadplayedapivotalpartintheinitialEnigmabreaks,asthequalityoftheinterceptionwas so good. Indeed some of the B.P. codebreakers wrote to Churchill, complaining, when theyfoundthatBridgewoodswastobeclosedandtheservicemovedtoChicksandswheretheoperatorswere notoriously slipshod and then, even worse, to the unknown Beaumanor. The move toChicksandswasalmostcertainlyprecipitatedbyabombingincidentinOctober1940whenastrayoilbombmade a direct hit on the bridge over themoatwhere several vehicleswere parked at thechangeoveroftheshift.Severalpeoplewerekilled,includingthreeATSteleprinteroperators.ASubLieutenantConnelyRNVRdivedforcoverunderoneofthevehiclesandfortunatelychosetheonethatwasnotdirectlyhit!SidneyWort,laterMajorWort,andsecond-in-commandtoEllingworthhadtoattendthemortuarythefollowingdayandidentifythebodies.

It isa shame thatBridgewoodsdidnot survive in the sameway thatBletchleyParkhasand,untilnow,hasnotbeengiventhecreditforthevitalworkthatwasdonethere.WhilstthestoryofEnigmahas becomepart of the national history, thework of the interception stations is still shrouded insecrecyasin1945,theydidnotstopbutmerelychangingtheirfocustothe'BearintheEast’.Effortswere made to introduce the monitoring of French traffic but this disloyalty caused such angeramongstB.P.staffthattheideahadtobedropped!

In 1953 Ellingworth retired from Beaumanor, then an intercept station and training centre foroperatorsoutsideofLeicester,hereceivedanOBEforhiswarwork.TheschoolboyswereallpostedintotheRoyalSignalsin1945toundertaketheirnationalservice.MostendedupworkingforGCHQin various capacities and at least one, Sandy Le Gassic, went on to attain the rank of LieutenantColonelandwasawardedtheMBE.ThesearchforNo.1IntelligenceSchoolgoeson.

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Iwassitting, thinkingas IdoaboutvariousSigintpuzzleswhensuddenlyathoughtcametomind.B.P.asGC&CSdescribeditasa‘School’.Wasitpossiblethatithadbeenknownatsometimeas‘No.1’?

Ifso,Ineednotlookanyfurther

TheHutSixStory,WGWelchman,McGrawHill,1984

TheBletchleyParkCodebreakers,RalphErskineandMichaelSmith(eds.),BantamPress,2001

Pursuit:TheSinkingoftheBismarck,LudovicKennedy,Fontana,2001.

MostSecretWar:TheStoryofBritishScientificIntelligence1939-1945,RVJones,Penguin,2009

WirelessDirectionFinding,RolandKeen,Illife&Sons,1938.