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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY

v. Criminal Division

Stephanie Tarapchak, No. 14-CR-550

Defendant

DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT COUNSEL, BERNARD BROWN, DUE TO INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL, VIOLATIONS TO THE RULES

OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR DISHONEST AND UNETHICAL CONDUCT, ORAL AND WRITTEN DECEPTIONS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS TO THE DEFENDANT

AND THE COURT; WILLFUL, KNOWING AND DEBLIBERATE VIOLATIONS OF DEFENDANT’S DUE PROCESS AND LIBERTY RIGHTS, AND CONSPIRACY WITH

OTHERS TO DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF HER DUE PROCESS AND LIBERTY RIGHTS

NOW COMES, the Defendant, Stephanie Tarapchak, incarcerated, on this 15th day of

September, 2015, by and through Joseph Pilchesky, her lawful “Next Friend”, with her Brief in

support of Motion to Supplement Counsel, Bernard Brown, due to ineffective counsel, violations

to the Rules of Professional Conduct for Dishonest and unethical conduct, oral and written

deceptions and misrepresentations to the Defendant and the Court, and his willful, knowing and

deliberate violations of Defendant’s due process and liberty rights, and conspiracy with others to

Deprive the Defendant of her Due Process and Liberty rights, and submits as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defendant, who is a Doctor of Osteopathy and political activist, has been charged with

various and serious crimes relating to her management of her medical practice in Ashland, PA.

Upon her arrest, she was incarcerated for failure to make bail that was set at $100,000.00 cash.

Upon incarceration, she applied for counsel through the Public Defender Office, which was

denied until a judge ordered reconsideration, which resulted in Joseph P. Kalinowski being

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appointed as counsel. On May 2, 2014, the Defendant’s bail was modified and she was released

on bail, which included supervision under House Arrest. On July 16, 2014, the Defendant filed a

voluminous Petition to Remove Kalinowski for various acts of misconduct and disturbingly

ineffective counsel. Eventually, Kalinowski was removed on January 23, 2015. Simultaneous to

Joseph P. Kalinowski being removed, Judge Geroulo recused himself. Judge Barrasse was

assigned and he appointed current counsel, Bernard Brown, to represent the Defendant.

However, back on October 23, 2014, House Arrest staff arrested and committed the

Defendant to prison for alleged bail violations, notwithstanding the fact that there is no

Application for a Bench Warrant on the record by any member of law enforcement, nor is there a

Bench Warrant or Return of Service on the record. In fact, there is no document on the record

supporting what commitment authority was used to incarcerate the Defendant and keep her

incarcerated for nearly eleven (11) months. There is no transcript or court order on the record

that supports that the Defendant was adjudicated by a judicial officer, after a hearing in open

court, to have violated bail conditions and within such order, punishment was assigned in the

nature of continued incarceration in perpetuity. No such order was ever served on the Defendant.

The record does not support that the Defendant was given a (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing for

bail violations as required under Pa. Code 234 § 536 and § 150, et seq. The record does support,

however, by way of exhibits attached to the Commonwealth’s Answer to the Defendant’s Motion

to Modify Bail, that the Defendant was never taken before a judicial officer within (72) hours on

allegations that she violated bail conditions, but rather, the adjudication of her guilt was

determined by non-judicial staff members of House Arrest and the Prison. The exhibits

referenced in the Commonwealth’s motion included documents referred to as a Misconduct

Hearing Report, an Incident Report and a letter from House Arrest Director, Patrick Lynn, to

Judge Vito Geroulo, who was the judge who modified the Defendant’s bail. The Misconduct

Hearing Report expressed a conclusion by House Arrest staff that the Defendant should remain

incarcerated. It was not filed on the record or served upon the Defendant. The Incident Report

was authored by House Arrest staffer, Jack Werner, which provided a summary of events that

reflected that the Defendant went off electronic surveillance on October 22, 2014, which report

was also not filed on the record. The letter from Patrick Lynn to Judge Geroulo advised that the

Defendant was given a hearing at the prison by prison staff, which the Defendant did not attend,

and she was found to be in violation of House Arrest Program rules, and therefore, terminated

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from House Arrest and incarcerated. The letter recommended that the Defendant remain

incarcerated without reference to a timetable. The letter was not filed on the record, nor served

upon the Defendant. It was served upon Warden McMillan, Adult Probation, Judge Geroulo and

the prosecuting attorney for the Commonwealth, but not the Defendant. The record is silent on

what, if anything, Judge Geroulo did when he learned via letter that the Defendant’s adjudication

of guilt of bail violations was determined by non-judicially-authorized prison staffers, and the

decision to continue her incarceration was determined by non-judicially authorized prison

staffers.

Subsequent to Atty. Brown being appointed, two pre-trial hearings took place, one on April

10, 2015, and another on August 6, 2015. At both hearings, the issue of the Defendant never

having had a Bench Warrant hearing on bail violations surfaced, but the issue was not raised by

Atty. Brown at either hearing. Brown not only ignored that the Defendant never had a hearing

before a judicial officer within the time required, but he ignored that there is no Bench Warrant,

or any other commitment document on the record to authorize incarceration and continued

incarceration for nearly eleven (11) months. Worse than ignoring the issues of deprivation of the

Defendant’s due process and liberty rights relating to her Bench Warrant arrest, Atty. Brown lied

to the court by saying that those issues of deprivation of rights were included in a Writ of Habeas

Corpus that he filed, and the court had already heard them and disposed of them. Even worse

than that, Atty. Brown remained silent when other judicial officers were indicating that the issues

of deprivation of rights relating to the Defendant’s Bench Warrant arrest and incarceration were

already presented, argued and disposed of. Worse than anything, when the Court concluded that

the Defendant never had a Bench Warrant hearing before a judicial officer, Brown said he knew

nothing about it; and, he never pointed out to the Court at any time since his appointment that the

Bench Warrant used to arrest and incarcerate the Defendant, if one ever existed, had expired last

October 27, 2014, so his client should automatically be released, since no authority is in place to

hold her. Those are mere samplings of Brown’s designed ineffectiveness and his complicity in a

conspiracy with others to keep the Defendant in prison until her trials begins, which depreciated

her participation in her defense to practically nothing, which otherwise would have been

valuable. Finally, among other things, Atty. Brown never provided the Defendant with the

Discovery he promised she’d have in June and did not keep her informed of the Investigator’s

accomplishments.

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Statement of Questions Involved

A. Has Attorney Brown made numerous false statements of material facts before the

Court regarding his knowledge of events relating to the Defendant’s arrest and

incarceration on October 23, 2014, for allegations of bail violations to the detriment

of the Defendant’s best interests?

Proposed answer: Affirmative

B. Did Atty. Brown repeatedly withhold from the Court that the Bench Warrant used to

arrest and incarcerate the Defendant expired on October 27, 2014?


C. Did Atty. Brown repeatedly withhold from the Court that no document exists on the

record to support authorization for Warden McMillan to hold the Defendant after

October 27, 2014?


D. Did Atty. Brown act, by writing or word, or by his silence, to conceal that the

Defendant never had a Bench Warrant hearing within (72) hours of arrest and that

said Bench Warrant expired after (72) hours?


E. Did Atty. Brown act, by writing or words, or by his silence, to conceal that the

Defendant was adjudicated to be in violation of bail conditions by non-judicial prison

staff and has been held in prison for nearly eleven (11) months on the

recommendation of non-judicial prison staff, and with no judicial intervention or

court order?


F. Did Atty. Brown lie to the Court on August 5, 2015, when he claimed he never

received a copy of the Defendant’s civil petition for habeas corpus relief that was

filed on July 6, 2015, when, in fact, he was served via email with a complete, true and

correct copy of the Rule and the Petition on July 6, 2015?


G. Did Atty. Brown lie when he told the Court that the Defendant’s re-incarceration on

bail violations was the result of her paramour, Joseph Pilchesky, contacting House

Arrest and reporting her missing?

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H. Did Attorney Brown visit the Defendant at the prison and engage her in a screaming

match, making physical and aggressive gestures to her, and say, “If it wasn’t for Joe

Pilchesky ratting you out to House Arrest you wouldn’t be in here.”?


I. Does the record support that Joseph Pilchesky never made contact with House Arrest

to inform them that she was missing?

Proposed Answer: Affirmative

J. Did Atty. Brown provide the Defendant with the Discovery he received from the

Commonwealth, as he promised he’d provide in June, 2015?

Proposed answer: Negative

K. Did Atty. Brown lie to the Court when he stated that everything that was filed pro se

by the Defendant has been deemed “hybrid representation”?


L. When Atty. Brown was served with the Defendant’s civil filing of a “Rule to Show

Cause and Petition in support of why Habeas Corpus relief should not be Granted” on

July 6, 2015, did he contact the Defendant to discuss the merits of her claim that she

never received her (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing and that the Bench Warrant

expired after (72) hours?


M. Did Atty. Brown file a Writ of Habeas Corpus and intentionally, with deliberate

indifference to his duty and his client’s best interest in terms of being released from

prison, omit that his client did not receive her (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing

before a judicial officer and that the Bench Warrant had expired, thereby clearing the

way for her release?


N. Did Atty. Brown file a Writ of Habeas Corpus and intentionally, with deliberate

indifference to his duty and his client’s best interest in terms of being released from

prison, omit that his client has been incarcerated for more than six months and has a

right at law to nominal bail?


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O. Did Atty. Brown intentionally withhold a court order from the Defendant dated July

31, 2015, that scheduled a hearing on her civil Motion for Rule Absolute, relating to

her civil filing of a petition for habeas corpus relief, for August 5, 2015, resulting in

the Defendant appearing in Court on August 5, 2015 absent notice that her Motion

was going to be argued?


P. Did Atty. Brown intentionally withhold from the Defendant a copy of the

Commonwealth’s Motion to Deny and Dismiss the Defendant’s petition for habeas

corpus relief that was filed and served upon him on July 22, 2015, resulting in the

Defendant appearing in Court on August 5, 2015, unaware of the contents of the

Commonwealth’s Motion and having no answer to said Motion on the record or being

able to respond to its assertions and allegations?


Q. Did Atty. Brown advise the Defendant in writing that if she challenges the revocation

of her bail in any manner, it may result in her civil filing being unsuccessful?


R. Did Atty. Brown remain silent when Atty. Nick Kravitz appeared at the August 5,

2015 hearing and argued in opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Rule Absolute,

relating to her civil Rule and Petition for habeas corpus relief having never entered an

appearance on the civil record and having never filed an answer to the Defendant’s

Rule and Petition for habeas corpus relief, and did he remain silent on advising his

client that Kravitz was going to appear to present opposing argument, resulting in the

Defendant being ambushed by Kravitz’s appearance and argument?

Proposed answer: affirmative

S. Did Atty. Brown conceal his political and close friendship ties with Kenneth

McDowell, former Tax Collector and County Controller, whom the Defendant’s

paramour, Joseph Pilchesky, repeatedly exposed publicly as notoriously incompetent

and corrupt, and a deadbeat father, and a well-known town drunkard, and filed a Quo

Warranto action to remove him from office citing failure to qualify to hold office, to

the benefit of McDowell losing re-election, which if disclosed, the Defendant would

have immediately filed a Motion to Supplement Counsel?

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T. Has Atty. Brown repeatedly violated the Rules of Professional Conduct at 8.4 relating

to his requirement to provide honest and ethical representation?


U. Did Atty. Brown acted to ensure that the Defendant fully participated in her own

defense and understood any and all strategies he intended to present to a jury?


V. Has the communications between Atty. Brown and the Defendant irreconcilably

broken as the result of Atty. Brown’s unethical and dishonest representation of the

Defendant’s best interests?


W. Is the Defendant in fear of Atty. Bernie Brown as the result of his repeated acts of

dishonesty and unethical conduct?


X. Should Atty. Brown be immediately removed as Defendant’s counsel for the reasons

articulated, all of which exist on the record?


Y. Will the Defendant be extremely and unfairly prejudiced and punished if Atty. Brown

is permitted to continue to represent her?


Z. Has the Defendant’s right to effective, honest and ethical representation been

compromised by the dishonest and unethical conduct of Atty. Brown?


AA. Has the Defendant’s confidence and faith in Atty. Brown’s ability to represent her

any further been destroyed by the dishonest and unethical conduct of Atty. Brown?


Relevant procedural history

1. On April 28, 2014, Judge Vito Geroulo modified Tarapchak’s (Defendant) bail from

$100,000.00 straight cash to $25,000.00, 10% permitted. See Exhibit “A”.

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2. On or about May 5, 2014, $2,500.00 was deposited with the Clerk of Court of the

Criminal Division on the Defendant’s behalf.

3. On May 5, 2014, Judge Vito Geroulo issued an IP Order directing the Defendant to be

placed in the Lackawanna County House Arrest Program. See Exhibit “B”

4. Paragraph three (3) of the IP Order dated May 5, 2014, states as follows: “Pursuant to

#61 P.S. Section 2141, if you fail to abide by all conditions set forth by the House Arrest

Programs or fail to return to Official Detention, a Bench Warrant will be issued for your

arrest and Escape Felony Charges will be filed. See Exhibit “B” at ¶ (3).

5. Paragraph four (4) of the IP Order dated May 5, 2014, states as follows: “This Order will

serve as a temporary Bench Warrant until Formal Charges for Escape are filed by the

County District Attorney’s Office. See Exhibit “B” at ¶ (4).

6. On October 23, 2014, the Defendant voluntarily appeared at House Arrest for the purpose

of discussing her whereabouts on the previous evening when the electronic monitoring

equipment indicated she stepped beyond electronic surveillance, at which time the

Defendant was subjected to extensive interrogation by House Arrest Director, Patrick

Lynn (Lynn), without the benefit of counsel, even after she repeatedly demanded that her

counsel, Joseph P. Kalinowski, be summoned before speaking, and, she was interrogated

absent a Miranda warning.

7. On October 23, 2014, after the Defendant was interrogated, she was arrested, handcuffed,

taken into custody and re-incarcerated in the Lackawanna County Prison by the

Lackawanna County House Arrest Program at the direction of the prosecutor, Deputy

Attorney General, Mr. Robert LeBar, who was on the phone with Lynn during part of the

interrogation.

8. On October 24, 2014, House Arrest Director Lynn and L.C.P. staffer, CO Kelly,

conducted a Misconduct Hearing at the prison regarding allegations that the Defendant

violated bail relating to House Arrest conditions, absent the presence of the Defendant at

the hearing because she requested counsel to be present, but was denied.

9. On October 24, 2014, Lynn created and signed a document entitled, “MISCONDUCT

HEARING REPORT” (Report), within which it was recommended that the “Defendant

remain incarcerated pending action by Attorney General Office”. The Report bears no

docket number, file number, incident number, reference number, commitment authority

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number, exhibit number, time stamp or certificate of service. The Report not addressed to

any judicial officer of any court, or chief administrative agent or agency. The Report does

not include a reference to an Application for a Bench Warrant, a Bench Warrant for bail

violations, or a Return of Service. The Report does not include any notice to the

Defendant of an appeal or review process. The Report does not refer to or cite any legal

authority which authorized and controlled the Misconduct Hearing, or authorized Lynn to

conduct said hearing. The Report was not entered into the record. The Defendant was

never served with a copy of a “Misconduct Hearing Report”, either by Lynn or her

counsel, Joseph Kalinowski. The Report does not indicate that the Defendant was given

notice of the Misconduct Hearing’s time and date, nor notice of a right to counsel, nor

notice of the right to call witnesses. See Exhibit “C”, the Misconduct Hearing Report,

included with a related letter to Judge Geroulo and an Incident Report by Jack Werner.

10. On October 24, 2014, the Office of the Attorney General faxed a Motion to Revoke Bail

to the Defendant’s counsel, Joseph Kalinowski, and Judge Geroulo, within which its sole

request was that the Defendant’s bail be revoked. The Motion was not accompanied with,

nor incorporated or referred to, a Detainer. See Exhibit “D”, the Motion to Revoke.

11. At page page (3), ¶ (3), of the Motion to Revoke, the Commonwealth stated as follows:

On October 23, 2014, Defendant was terminated from the House Arrest Program and

returned to the Lackawanna County Prison, but without naming the judicial officer who

terminated the Defendant from House Arrest.

12. On October 27, 2015, via letter (Letter), Lynn advised Judge Geroulo, the Probation

Office and the Office of the Attorney General that he had:

a. Committed the Defendant to the Lackawanna Prison on October 23, 2014;

b. Terminated the Defendant from the House Arrest Program;

c. Conducted a Formal Misconduct Hearing and determined that the Defendant was

guilty of violating House Arrest rules;

d. Advised that her termination from the House Arrest Program was warranted and

justified; and

e. Advised that the Defendant should remain incarcerated.

13. The Letter did not include reference to an Application for a Bench Warrant for bail

violations, a Bench Warrant or a Return of Service.

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14. The Letter did not cite or refer to the legal authority Lynn relied upon to conduct the

Misconduct Hearing, adjudicate the Defendant’s guilt and recommend and/or enforce

continued incarceration. See Exhibit “C”, the letter, which is combined with a copy of the

Misconduct Hearing Report and a Special Incident Report.

15. The Letter bears no time stamp from the Lackawanna County Clerk’s Office, nor is it

addressed to a Lackawanna County Clerk’s Office, nor indicates that a Lackawanna

County Clerk or the Defendant received a copy, and it was not entered on the docket

under 14-CR-550.

16. By October 27, 2014, a Monday, as required in Bench Warrant arrests for bail violations,

the Defendant had not yet received a (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing on her alleged bail

violations, as required by 234 Pa. Code, Rule 536 (A) (1) (b) and Pa. Code 234 § 150

(A) (5), (a) and (b).

17. Pursuant to Pa. Code 234 § 150 (A) (7), the Bench Warrant expired after seventy-hours

of the Defendant’s incarceration.

18. At no time was the Defendant served with a Bench Warrant or a Detainer, and neither

exists on the record.

19. The Defendant has remained incarcerated since October 23, 2014.

Attorney Bernard Brown’s failure to address the Defendant’s deprivation of due process and

liberty rights as relates to her re-incarceration on October 23, 2014 on a Bench Warrant for bail

violations

20. Paragraphs (1) through (19) are hereby incorporated by reference as if set forth in full.

21. After several months of torturously ineffective counsel by Kalinowski, on July 22, 2014,

the Defendant filed a lengthy Petition to Supplement Counsel seeking to remove

Kalinowski, within which she cited a litany of acts of unethical and ineffective

representation and conduct by Kalinowski, which caused her severe suffering and also

severely prejudiced her rights to effective counsel and a fair trial. Kalinowski was

ultimately removed as counsel on January 23, 2015. See Exhibit “E”, the Petition.

22. On or about March 23, 2015, Atty. Bernard Brown (Brown) was appointed by Judge

Barrasse to represent the Defendant.

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23. The Defendant asserts that the first duty Brown owed to her was to get her released from

confinement by and through reviewing the record for any existing circumstances which

could operate to have her released from confinement, to include verifying that a Bench

Warrant existed, that she did not have a Bench Warrant hearing within (72) hours of

incarceration, and that the Bench Warrant, if it exists, had expired on October 27th, 2014,

which duty Brown breached by failing to take action to secure the Defendant’s release for

want of a Bench Warrant or other commitment authority that authorized the prison to

continue to hold her, or for violation of her due process rights to a (72) hour hearing,

which resulted in the Bench Warrant expiring.

24. The Defendant avers that Brown had a duty to affirm that she was committed to prison,

and continued to be held there, under proper commitment authority, executed by proper

due process, and executed by the proper authorities, which Brown failed to do, resulting

in harm and injury to the Defendant in the nature of continued incarceration, and all

negative suffering attendant thereto, as further discussed below.

25. The Defendant further avers that Brown never advised her that she had a right to a Bench

Warrant hearing on bail violations within (72) hours of being re-incarcerated, and that her

constitutional rights to due process were violated.

26. The Defendant further avers that Brown never advised her that she had a right to her

liberty after the Bench Warrant for bail violations had expired after (72) hours of being

re-incarcerated.

27. The Defendant further avers that Brown never advised her that there was no Application

for a Bench Warrant by any law enforcement officer on the record, and that no Bench

Warrant exists on the record, and that no Return of Service regarding the service of the

Bench Warrant exists on the record.

28. The Defendant avers that Brown never advised her that there isn’t any document on the

record from any judicial officer that operated as lawful commitment authority for the

prison to hold the Defendant since October 27, 2014.

29. The Defendant avers that Brown never advised her that Lynn had no judicial authority to

arrest her absent a Bench Warrant, or to adjudicate her guilt on bail violations or to

recommend or enforce her continued incarceration.

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30. The Defendant avers that upon Brown’s appointment as counsel, he had a duty and

obligation to the Defendant to review her file for any ineffectiveness by previous counsel,

Joseph Kalinowski, and raise them on the record accordingly, pursuant to the Rules of

Criminal Procedure, which he failed to do.

31. The Defendant avers that Brown knew, or should have known, that the Rules of Criminal

Procedure provide that a bailee who was arrested and re-incarcerated on a Bench Warrant

for a bail violation was required to have a Bench Warrant hearing before a judicial officer

within (72) hours of arrest and incarceration. See R. Crim. P. at Pa Code 234, § 150, et

seq.

32. Brown knew, or should have known, that a Bench Warrant for a bail violation expires

after (72) hours. See R. Crim. P. at Pa Code 234, § 150, et seq.

33. Upon Brown’s review of the Defendant’s file, he knew, or should have known, that

Prison Warden Robert McMillan failed to act to release the the Defendant after she didn’t

have a Bench Warrant hearing on bail violations within (72) hours of re-incarceration,

and/or after the Bench Warrant expired, and Brown stayed silent.

34. Upon Brown’s review of the Defendant’s file, he knew, or should have known, that the

former judge who presided over the case, Judge Geroulo, was properly notified that the

Defendant was arrested and incarcerated on alleged bail violations and he failed to have

her summoned to the Court for an appropriate hearing within the time required under the

law, and Brown stayed silent.

35. Upon Brown’s review of the Defendant’s file, he knew, or should have known, that the

former judge who presided over the case, Judge Geroulo, failed to act to ensure that the

Defendant was released from confinement for failure to have a Bench Warrant hearing

within (72) hours of re-incarceration, and because the Bench Warrant had expired,

particularly in light of the fact that the Defendant appeared in front of Judge Geroulo on

the Commonwealth’s Motion to Revoke Bail on November 7, 2014, and he didn’t

address the Bench Warrant hearing issue, or order another judge to address it, and neither

did the Commonwealth or Defendant’s counsel, Kalinowski, raise the issue that no Bench

Warrant hearing occurred within (72) hours, and Brown stayed silent.

36. The Defendant avers that Brown was in possession of Lynn’s Misconduct Hearing

Report, Incident Report and letter from Lynn to Judge Geroulo and the Attorney

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General’s Office shortly after being assigned, which should have trigged his duty to act

regarding the Defendant’s deprivation of her constitutional rights to due process to a (72)

hour Bench Warrant hearing, and her rights to liberty after the Bench Warrant expired

after (72) hours, but instead, Brown remained silent and took no action on those issues.

37. The Defendant avers that Brown knew that Lynn had no judicial authority to determine

whether or not the Defendant violated bail, nor had any authority to determine that the

Defendant shall remain incarcerated; that Lynn’s letter and report were fatally defective

as a judicial document of any nature, that the letter or report had no commitment

authority; that the letter or report are not an appealable legal document, and that the

Defendant was not served a copy of the letter or the report; in response to which, Brown

did not provide the Defendant with the letter, Misconduct Hearing Report or Incident

Report, nor did he take action to get the Defendant appropriate and immediate relief

based upon Lynn’s lack of judicial authority.

38. On March 30, 2015, Brown filed a Petition for Modification of Bail, which cited the

Defendant’s intent to be compliant with bail conditions moving forward; instead of filing

a Writ of Habeas Corpus citing the failure to give the Defendant a (72) hour Bench

Warrant hearing on bail violations, that the Bench Warrant has long expired, that no

commitment authority document is on the record to continue to hold her, and that Lynn,

having no judicial authority, arrested her without a Bench Warrant, adjudicated her guilt

relating to alleged bail violations, and illegally enforced control over her continued

incarceration. See Exhibit “F”, Brown’s Petition for Bail Modification.

39. Brown’s Petition for Modification of Bail cited the Defendant’s bail history, to

include the day she was arrested, her appearance before a magistrate to set bail, her

granting of reduced bail by Judge Geroulo, her filing of another Motion to Modify

Bail on July 16, 2014 and the Commonwealth’s filing of a Motion to Revoke Bail on

October 24, 2014, however, Brown omitted all information relating to the

Defendant’s arrest on October 23, 2014, on allegations of bail violations, largely

because of the illegal nature of her arrest, adjudication of guilt for bail violations

and continued incarceration by Lynn as a non-judicial officer. In fact, without the

October 23, 2014 arrest information cited, the Commonwealth’s Motion to Revoke

Bail appears unjustified.

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40. The Defendant avers that she was never served with any kind or type of commitment

authority document, i.e., Bench Warrant or Detainer.

41. The Defendant avers that Brown’s failure to act timely, professionally, ethically and

effectively to properly address her illegal incarceration since October 23, 2014, was

patent and blatant ineffective counsel that resulted in her continued severe suffering

through the deprivation of due process and liberty rights, and being denied the

opportunity to participate in her defense in a substantially complicated case involving

numerous charges, among other things.

42. The Defendant avers that Brown’s failure to act timely, professionally, ethically and

effectively to properly address her illegal incarceration since October 23, 2014, was

the preference of Brown to instead protect the judiciary and its judicial officers,

Warden McMillan, Patrick Lynn and Lackawanna County from the disclosure of

illegal and unlawful management of defendants who are on the House Arrest

Program, to include arresting them without a Warrant, incarcerating them without

a Warrant, keeping them incarcerated without a Warrant or Court Order;

interrogating them without giving them Miranda warnings; searching them without

a Warrant; conducting non-judicial hearings with non-judicial prison staff, called

Misconduct Hearings, for defendant’s alleged bail violations; failing to provide legal

counsel to defendants for the Misconduct Hearings; failing to give proper notice of

misconduct hearings, failing to provide defendants with copies of Misconduct

Hearing reports, failing to provide defendants with copies of letters to the courts

and other judicial officers regarding the result of Misconduct Hearings; all of which

has been a scheme to relieve the court’s docket and Lackawanna County of work,

but to the deprivation of the affected defendant’s due process and liberty rights.

43. Brown has failed to provide the Defendant with the discovery that was provided to him

by the Office of the Attorney General, thereby severely compromising her defense. On

June 29, 2015, Brown wrote the Defendant a letter advising that he was in the process of

having all Discovery delivered to her, but it never showed up.

44. While the Defendant was out on Bail, she went to her Medical Office in Ashland, PA and

methodically selected thousands of documents that could assist in her defense, but

Brown, nor the appointed investigator, has made any attempt to acquire and review them.

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45. Brown has repeatedly failed to provide updates to the Defendant on the progress of the

court-appointed investigator.

46. As more fully discussed below, Brown has threatened and intimidated the Defendant

verbally, with physical gestures, innuendos, and in writing, thereby placing her in fear of

him and extreme fearful of his agenda and intentions, resulting in her experiencing

heightened anxiety, depression and stress, which will have a seriously detrimental impact

on the Defendant during trial. In fact, the Defendant twice refused to meet with Brown on

July 21, 2015, due to his oblivious complicity with obstructing her right to a fair trial.

47. Brown has repeatedly failed to preserve bail and Bench Warrant issues on the record for

review purposes.

48. Brown has repeatedly failed to preserve issues of ineffective counsel by previous counsel.

49. In fact, except for a continuance and appointment of an investigator, Brown has lost

every argument in Court on her behalf.

50. Brown’s filings on behalf of the Defendant are replete with misrepresentations of facts on

the record, like when he cited bail history facts of record in his Motion to Modify Bail,

and replete with grammatical errors, and they suffer from sub-par comprehension and

construction consistent with achieving the full preservation of issues for meaningful

review.

51. For the valid reasons stated above, Brown repeatedly breached the ethical and

professional duties under the Rules of Professional Conduct that he owed to the

Defendant, much to her severe harm and injury, and prejudice, resulting in a complete

and irretrievable breakdown in communication, deprivation of constitutional rights

relating to due process and liberty, and complete loss of trust and confidence in his ability

to represent her best interests.

52. See Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, relating to Misconduct, which

provides:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or

induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness

or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

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(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to

achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or

(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable

rules of judicial conduct or other law.

53. Brown has violated Rule 8.4 (c) and (f), because he willfully, knowingly, intentionally,

and maliciously chose not to protect the Defendant’s rights to due process and liberty as

relates to her incarceration on October 23, 2014, and being held since that time, absent a

(72) Bench Warrant hearing for bail violations and that the Bench Warrant, if one even

exists, expired on October 27, 2014, but the Defendant was never released. Furthermore,

Brown’s misconduct was clearly to protect Judge Geroulo, Patrick Lynn, counsel for the

Commonwealth and Lackawanna County from being exposed as complicit to deprive the

Defendant of her due process and liberty rights, as more fully discussed below.

Brown’s complicity in a conspiracy with others to deprive the Defendant of her rights to

effective counsel, a fair trial, due process and liberty

54. Brown’s Petition for Modification of Bail also omitted that on November 7, 2014 the

Defendant appeared with counsel, Kalinowski, before Judge Geroulo on the issue of the

Commonwealth’s Motion to Revoke Bail, and neither Kalinowski, Judge Geroulo, or the

Commonwealth raised the issue that the Defendant was deprived of her mandatory (72)

hour Bench Warrant hearing for a bail violation; that the Bench Warrant had expired and

that the Defendant was being deprived of her constitutional right to liberty by Warden

McMillan. This omission by Brown was again blatantly unethical and ineffective

counsel, and imported the color of complicity to conspire with others to keep the

Defendant locked up, which benefitted the Commonwealth’s best interests

55. Brown’s Petition for Modification of Bail was denied on June 26, 2015, and on July 9,

2015, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration, within which he again cited the

chronological history of the Defendant’s bail events, and again he omitted any reference

to the Defendant’s October 23, 2014 arrest and re-incarceration on a Bench Warrant for

16

to bail violations, thereby again treating the incident like it never happened and to the

benefit of the Commonwealth.

56. On July 27, 2015, Brown filed a Petition for Permission to file an Interlocutory appeal,

where he again cited the Defendant’s bail related history and again omitted any reference

to the Defendant’s October 23, 2014 arrest and re-incarceration on a Bench Warrant.

57. On April 10, 2015, a hearing was held before Judge Barrasse on Brown’s impotent

Motion for Bail Modification, which generated the following exchanges between Brown,

the Court and Mr. LeBar (LeBar), the Senior Deputy Attorney General prosecuting the

Defendant, regarding whether the Defendant violated bail:

(See Exhibit “G”, the April 10, 2015 transcript)

Page 11, lines 6 through 19:

LeBar: So the first question, I think, that needs to be addressed is, did she violate her

bail? And I think that answer is unequivocally yes. The question becomes to Your Honor

then, what happens at this point?

The Court: There was a judicial finding, wasn’t there?

LeBar: Pardon me?

The Court: Was there a judicial finding by Judge Geroulo that she violated House

Arrest?

Brown: I don’t know

LeBar: We never had a hearing on it, your Honor.

In the exchange above, LeBar offered that the Defendant violated bail conditions, but

she didn’t get a hearing. LeBar didn’t, however, offer that the Defendant didn’t get a

Bench Warrant hearing on bail violations within (72) hours. That could have led to her

immediate release on an expired Bench Warrant.

Brown knew the same facts as LeBar regarding the hearing on House Arrest violations

that never happened, but opted to lie to the Court when he responded, “I don’t know”.

Brown had already prepared at least four documents that cited the Defendant’s bail

history, so it was impossible for him not to know the Defendant never got a hearing on

her Bench Warrant arrest for bail violations. Furthermore, the Commonwealth’s answer

to his Motion to Modify Bail at Exhibit “M” included the Prison’s Misconduct Hearing

17

Report and a letter to Judge Geroulo telling him that Patrick Lynn, a non-judicial officer,

adjudicated the allegations of the Defendant’s bail violations based upon a written

Incident Report unsupported by testimony from its author, i.e., hearsay.

When LeBar said, “the question is…did she violate her bail”, Brown had an obligation

to his client to respond, “the right question is, did she get a Bench Warrant hearing on

bail violations within (72) hours?” Brown’s silence was furtherance of his complicity to

conspire to keep the (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing issue off the record. This exchange

was a golden opportunity for Brown to state on the record that the Defendant never got

her (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing and the Bench Warrant expired, and demand that

she be immediately released. Brown also should have told the Court that the Defendant

was adjudicated to be in violation of House Arrest by Pat Lynn, a non-judicial officer,

and that Judge Geroulo knew it, but did nothing, suggesting it happens all the time in

Lackawanna County in some cases with public defenders.

Judge Barrasse’s two questions in the courtroom exchange illustrated above on April

10, 2015, said it all. He knew there should have been a hearing before a judicial officer,

as did Brown and LeBar. The Defendant’s lost due process right to (72) hours Bench

Warrant hearing was swept under the carpet again, along with her lost right to liberty

after the Bench Warrant expired.

See page 12, lines 4 – 9:

The Court: I have down here that a - - criminal misconduct hearing was held at the

prison.

LeBar: Yes

Brown: (Stayed silent)

The Court: And then there was no hearing before the Court.

For the third time, Judge Barrasse raised the issue that there was no hearing before a

judicial officer. For the third time, with his client standing alongside of him, Brown was

silent, again failing to seize the opportunity to get his client out of jail on an expired

Bench Warrant that had expired 167 days ago.

For the third time, in open court, three officers of the court knew the Defendant was

deprived her due process right to a (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing on a bail violation,

and she was further deprived of her liberty after the Bench Warrant expired 167 days ago,

18

and all three chose to be dishonest and dishonorable by either staying silent or or

changing the subject. The Commonwealth had no duty to the Defendant to raise issues

for her, but Brown and the Court owed a duty to the Defendant to speak up on her behalf

and they intentionally, with deliberate indifference to justice and the Defendant’s best

interests, stayed silent. That was complicity to conspire to deprive the Defendant her due

process and liberty rights.

(Still at April 10, 2015 hearing)


The Court: Before we go any further, are you denying the allegations in regard to the

violations?

Brown: I didn’t know that they didn’t have a full hearing. Your Honor, we’re not

challenging the findings of house arrest at that time. It would be akin – again, we’ll just

go there – because I…

(continued on page 13, lines 1 -5)

…would say it would be akin to something similar to a Gagnon I or Gagnon II hearing:

am I correct.

The Court: Correct, that’s what I’m saying.

Discussion: In the brief exchange above, Brown again stated that he didn’t know

there was no hearing on the bail violations, but the record speaks for itself in that record.

There is no record of a Bench Warrant hearing that was held within (72) hours, or for that

matter, the record is silent on an Application for a Bench Warrant, a Bench Warrant and a

Return of Service if one was issued and served on the Defendant.

Brown said he likened the Defendant’s bail violation hearing to a Gagnon I and

Gagnon II hearing, which are probation violation procedures, but the Defendant was not

on probation, she was pre-trial bail. This was yet another opportunity for Brown to have

raised the issue that the Defendant did not get a Bench Warrant hearing within (72) hours,

and that the Bench Warrant had expired on October 27, 2014, so she should be released,

but he skirted around it by making references to irrelevant Gagnon hearings so he

wouldn’t have to use the words “(72) hour Bench Warrant hearing on bail violations”.

Furthermore, this was another opportunity for the Court to announce that it was apparent

19

that the Bench Warrant hearing never took place within (72) hours, and the Bench

Warrant had long expired, therefore, the prison had no authority to hold her another day.

Notwithstanding Brown’s repeated claims of not being aware of the events that had

occurred on October 23, 2014, and those that didn’t occur, he also made the following

statements on the record at the April 10, 2015 hearing:

(Still at April 10, 2015 hearing)


Brown: There is two copies of the actual informal hearing in which it’s admitted that my

client’s paramour is actually the one that contacted Pat Lynn to – that contacted house

arrest to say that Stephanie wasn’t home and….

(continued to page 18, lines 1 – 3)

Brown: …..he didn’t know where she was at. That’s how the initial process of looking

into this potential violation even occurred.

Discussion: Brown was aware of the copies of the informal hearing that was held at

the prison because they were appended to the Commonwealth’s answer to his Motion to

Modify Bail, so he was well aware before April 10, 2015, that no (72) hour Bench

Warrant hearing took place. A review of the copies of the informal hearing clearly shows

that no hearing took place before a judicial officer.

To dispute Brown’s claim to the Court that the Defendant’s paramour, Joseph

Pilchesky, initiated contact with House Arrest and turned in the Defendant, see Exhibit

“C”, the Special Incident Report by House Arrest staffer, Jack Werner, dated October 22,

2014. Warner reported that the TOR alert went off for Stephanie Tarapchak at 7:17 pm,

which indicated that she left the electronic perimeter. The report clearly states that it was

Werner who contacted the Defendant’s paramour, Joseph Pilchesky, and not the other

way around.

In an extremely heated verbal exchange with the Defendant at the prison on August

14, 2015, Brown screamed at the Defendant, so loud and out-of-control that he was

spitting on the glass panel, while ominously pointing at her, that, “if not for Mr.

Pilchesky ratting you out you wouldn’t be in here.” That statement was a clear and

obvious effort, together with his false statement in open court that her paramour turned

20

her in to House Arrest, to cause a rift between the Defendant and Joseph Pilchesky to

encourage separation and cause the Defendant to lose Pilchesky as a valuable resource

for various elements of prison survival and trial support.

(Still at the April 10, 2015 hearing)

See page 13, lines 8 – 23

Brown: …..I had talked to my client and we are not denying those allegations made by

house arrest at this time.

The Court: Miss Tarapchak, do understand you have a right to a hearing in which Mr.

Lynn would have to testify and the Commonwealth would have to prove the allegations

of what you did wrong on house arrest, and I have to make a finding and by admitting it,

you’re waiving your right to that hearing?

Defendant: Yes, yes, Your honor.

The Court: As such, I find that you are in violation.

Discussion: The courtroom exchanges above caused the Defendant’s Get-of-Jail card

to instantly vanish for the prison depriving her of her right to liberty for failure to release

her when the Bench Warrant expired. When Judge Barrasse asked the question regarding

her guilt to bail violations, Brown whispered to the Defendant to admit to the allegations

of violations to house arrest, which she did, but without her opportunity to explain why

she violated.

The Defendant unwittingly waived a hearing that she had a due process right to have

167 days ago within (72) hours pursuant to Bench Warrant procedures for bail violations.

Brown certainly could have argued with the Court that the Defendant had a right to a

Bench Warrant hearing on bail violations within (72) hours of incarceration, and

furthermore, the Bench Warrant had long expired and she should have her liberty

restored, but he said nothing to protect his client’s best interests or getting those issues on

the record as to preserve them.

(end of April 10, 2015 transcript references)

The Writ of Habeas Corpus frauds upon the Defendant

21

58. On April 2, 2014, Brown filed an Omnibus Motion and Brief in support thereof. See

Exhibit “H”, the Brief in support of Omnibus Motion. Brown’s Brief included a Writ of

Habeas Corpus, which, albeit inappropriately introduced in a Brief, rather than in the

Omnibus Motion, raised the issue of whether the Commonwealth has presented sufficient

prima fascia evidence to detain the Defendant.

59. Brown’s Brief, under the caption Writ of Habeas Corpus, did not raise the issue that the

Defendant has been illegally detained on a Bench Warrant for a bail violation that had

expired approximately one-hundred and sixty (160) days ago. Again, Brown skirted the

issue that the Defendant never had a (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing, which was clearly

ineffective representation that was deliberately intended to do harm and injury to the

Defendant’s rights, and again advanced his complicity in a conspiracy with others to

keep her locked up so she would continue to suffer a deprivation of liberty and not be

able to effectively participate in her own trial, all to the benefit of the Commonwealth’s

best interests.

60. On July 6, 2015, the Defendant, totally disgusted and disappointed with Brown’s

incompetent and ineffective representation, abusive treatment and participation in a

conspiracy against her to avoid the issue of her deprivation of due process rights to a

Bench Warrant hearing within (72) hours of arrest for alleged bail violations, pro se filed

a civil Rule to Show Cause and Petition why she should not be granted habeas corpus

relief in the nature of release from confinement, citing that she never had a Bench

Warrant hearing within (72) hours on bail violations, and that the Bench Warrant, if one

exists, had expired on October 27, 2014. See Exhibit “I”, the docket entry for 15-CV-

4207.

61. The docket entry for 15-CV-4207supports that Brown did not make an appearance on the

record and was not the Defendant’s civil counsel.

62. The Honorable Judge Terrance Nealon, presiding in Motion Court on July 6, 2015,

signed and issued a Rule to Show Cause upon the Warden of the Lackawanna County

Prison, Robert McMillan (McMillan) that directed him to file an answer to the

Defendant’s supporting Petition for Habeas Corpus relief within three (3) days. See

Exhibit “J”, the Rule to Show Cause.

22

63. On July 16, 2015, because Warden McMillan did not file an answer to the Defendant’s

Petition why she should not be granted habeas corpus relief, the Defendant filed a Motion

to make Rule Absolute. See Exhibit “I”, the docket entry for 15-CV-4207.

64. On July 16, 2015, the Defendant filed a Brief in support of Motion to Make Rule

Absolute and Grant Habeas Corpus relief in the nature of immediate release. See Exhibit

“I”, the docket entry for 15-CV-4207.

65. On July 16, 2015, the Defendant had her Motion to Make Rule Absolute served upon

Judge Nealon for consideration, however, Judge Nealon advanced the Motion to Judge

Barrasse, as he is presiding over the Defendant’s case, however, Judge Barrasse referred

it to Judge Geroulo because he issued the Defendant’s bail modification and IP orders,

who referred it back to Judge Barrasse for consideration and disposition.

66. On July 31, 2015, Judge Barrasse issued an order directing that oral argument will be

held on the Defendant’s civil Motion to Make Rule Absolute, but not on the Defendant’s

civil Petition for Habeas Corpus relief, and the Defendant’s Petition for Permission to

File Interlocutory Appeal, will be held on August 5, 2015 at 10:30 am. See Exhibit “K”,

the order.

67. The parties who were copied in on Judge Barrasse’s order dated July 31, 2015 were

Bernard Brown, Robert LeBar, Stephanie Tarapchak and Warden McMillan, which

indicated that the Court understood that the Defendant was acting pro se on her civil

Motion. See Exhibit “K”, the order.

68. The Defendant is unaware when the other parties named in the order were served with it,

but Judge Barrasse’s office placed the Defendant’s copy in the mail to her on August 4,

2015, the day before the hearing, which the Defendant received on August 6, 2015, a day

after the hearing, notwithstanding the fact that Brown was directed by the Court to

provide a copy to the Defendant on July 31, 2015, which Brown did not provide. See

Exhibit “L”, the envelope that contained the order from Judge Barrasse’s chambers.

69. As the direct result of the Defendant not being served with a copy of the order through

Brown or the Court, she appeared in Court on August 5, 2015, completely unaware that

her Petition for Rule Absolute was also going to be argued. For that reason, she entered

the courtroom without her file containing documents relating to 15-CV-4207.

23

70. A complete and full copy of the transcript for the oral argument held on August 5, 2015,

is appended hereto at Exhibit “M”. (It is misdated August 6, 2015)

71. On July 22, 2015, LeBar filed a “Motion to Deny and Dismiss the Defendant’s Attempt

for Civil Habeas Corpus Relief filed against Warden Robert McMillan No. 15-CV-4207”,

but he filed it at docket No. 14-CR-550, the Defendant’s criminal docket number, and not

at the appropriate civil docket number, 15-CV-4207. See Exhibit “N”, the Motion by

LeBar.

72. LeBar did not serve a copy of his “Motion to Deny and Dismiss the Defendant’s Attempt

for Civil Habeas Corpus Relief filed against Warden Robert McMillan No. 15-CV-4207”

upon any of the parties captioned in 15-CV-4207, the civil Petition for Habeas Corpus

relief, instead, he only served Judge Barrasse and Brown on July 22, 2015, knowing that

Brown did not represent the Defendant in the civil Petition for Habeas Corpus relief. See

the Certificate of Service attached to LeBar’s “Motion to Deny and Dismiss..” at Exhibit

“N”.

73. Despite Brown having been served with a copy of LeBar’s “Motion to Deny and Dismiss

the Defendant’s Attempt for Civil Habeas Corpus Relief filed against Warden Robert

McMillan No. 15-CV-4207”, on July 22, 2015, and despite the Certificate of Service

indicating that the Defendant, who is the pro se Plaintiff in the civil Habeas Corpus

action, was not served with the Motion by LeBar, Brown did not provide the Defendant

with a copy of LeBar’s Motion, nor did he inquire of her if she was served with it prior to

the hearing.

74. Due to LeBar not serving the Defendant with a copy of his “Motion to Deny and Dismiss

the Defendant’s Attempt for Civil Habeas Corpus Relief filed against Warden Robert

McMillan No. 15-CV-4207”, and his choice to file it at docket number 14-CR-550, which

did not appear on the docket until July 28, 2015, the Defendant was unaware that the

Motion was filed and therefore unable to file a response to said Motion, as the record

supports.

75. The Defendant not only didn’t know that oral argument was going to be held on her

“Motion to Make Rule Absolute” on August 5, 2015, she didn’t become aware that LeBar

had filed his “Motion to Deny and Dismiss the Defendant’s Attempt for Civil Habeas

24

Corpus Relief filed against Warden Robert McMillan No. 15-CV-4207” until LeBar

announced in open court that he had filed it on July 22, 2015.

76. Judge Barrasse did not ask LeBar if the Defendant was served with a copy, since she was

not included on the Certificate of Service, and he didn’t ask Brown if he provided a copy

to the Defendant.

77. Judge Barrasse did not at any time ask the Defendant if she was properly served with

LeBar’s Motion to Deny and Dismiss the civil Petition for Habeas Corpus relief.

78. LeBar’s “Motion to Deny and Dismiss the Defendant’s Attempt for Civil Habeas Corpus

Relief filed against Warden Robert McMillan No. 15-CV-4207” made the following

statements:

a. ¶ 14: “Contrary to the assertions made by the Defendant, she is not being illegally

detained in the Lackawanna County Prison and should not be granted the release that

she is seeking in this latest pro se filing.”

b. ¶ 15: The matter of detainment has been extensively argued, briefed and decided by

this Honorable Court numerous times and the Commonwealth respectfully requests

the motion is denied.”

79. Regarding LeBar’s statement at ¶ 14, while he included eight (8) irrelevant exhibits in

support of his Motion, none of them were a transcript for a Bench Warrant hearing that

was provided to the Defendant within (72) hours of incarceration, as required by law

pursuant to 234 Pa § 150, or a copy of an order issued by any judicial officer that

disposed of a Bench Warrant hearing that dealt with the alleged bail violations that

caused the Defendant to become incarcerated, or an order that revoked the Defendant’s

bail to keep her incarcerated. The only thing that was on the record was Patrick Lynn’s

determination that the Defendant violated House Arrest and she should remain

incarcerated, and judicially speaking, Patrick Lynn is a nobody with no power or

authority to make any decisions regarding bail violations and incarceration.

80. Regarding LeBar’s statement at ¶ 15, while he included eight (8) irrelevant exhibits in

support of his Motion, none of them were a Writ of Habeas Corpus that was filed by the

Defendant’s current or previous counsel, Brown and Kalinowski respectively, within

which it was averred, alleged, asserted or believed that the Defendant’s due process rights

were violated when she didn’t get her (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing, or that she was

25

not released from the custody of the Lackawanna County Prison after the Bench Warrant

had expired.

81. Furthermore, LeBar’s “Motion to Deny and Dismiss the Defendant’s Attempt for Civil

Habeas Corpus Relief filed against Warden Robert McMillan No. 15-CV-4207”, did not

defend why Warden McMillan failed to file an answer or objections to the Defendant’s

Rule and Petition to show why Habeas Corpus relief should not be granted, which the

Defendant could have pointed out, among other things, if she had the opportunity to

respond.

The hearing was held on August 5, 2015 on the Defendant’s civil Motion to make Rule Absolute

for Warden McMillan’s failure to respond

Note: Prior to the hearing, Brown, LeBar and Attorney Nick Kravitz, a solicitor for the prison,

entered the courtroom from Judge Barrasse’s chambers.

See Exhibit “N”, the transcript for the Aug. 5, 2015 oral argument at page 7, lines 3 – 25:

See pages 5, lines 11 – 25 and page 6, lines 1 – 21

Within these pages are arguments entered by Atty. Nick Kravitz (Kravitz), who appeared on

behalf of Warden McMillan. Kravitz did not enter an appearance in 15-CV-4207. Kravitz did not

file an answer or objections to the Defendant’s pro se civil “Rule to Show Cause and Petition in

support why Habeas Corpus relief should not be granted”.

Some of Kravitz‘s argument raised issues that were preliminary objections in nature, to

include that the Defendant’s civil filing should have been by a Complaint or Writ of Summons

and not by petition. See page 5 at lines 23 – 24. He argued that service should have been by the

Sheriff. See page 6 at lines 13 – 16. Those arguments are patently preliminary objections that

Kravitz did not file of record. Kravitz then twice argued that the issues raised in the Defendant’s

civil Rule and Petition for Habeas Corpus relief were already raised and argued in the criminal

matter, which, if true, would be an affirmative defense of res judicata that’s properly raised in

New Matter included in an Answer. See page 5 at lines 17 – 19 and page 6 at lines 18 – 21.

Kravitz only had to produce any filing by any of the Defendant’s lawyers where they raised the

issue that she didn’t get her (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing and that the Bench Warrant had

26

expired, and attach it the Warden’s answer to the civil Rule and Petition to support his New

Matter, but he didn’t, because he couldn’t.

Absent Kravitz entering an appearance on the record, and absent the filing of an answer or

objections on the record, Judge Barrasse severely abused his authority and severely prejudiced

the Defendant in allowing Kravitz to appear and argue the issues he raised without having an

answer or objections on the record.

The Defendant was completely blindsided by Kravitz’s appearance and presentation of

arguments sounding in preliminary objections and affirmative defenses. The Defendant

had no idea that Kravitz was appearing on behalf of Warden McMillan and no idea what

he was going to present as argument in opposition to her Rule and Petition for Habeas

Corpus relief.

When Kravitz was finished speaking, Judge Barrasse did not turn to the Defendant and give

her an opportunity to object to Kravitz appearing and arguing his objections and affirmative

defenses, or answering them. Instead, Judge Barrasse completely ignored the Defendant and

turned the floor over to Brown, who offered no rebuttal or counter-argument to Kravitz’s

comments on behalf of the Defendant.

See page 6 at lines 22 – 23.

The Court: You want to make some semblance of normalcy on this?

Brown: I will, I’ll try to clarify it as much as I can. I filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion

addressing all of the issues including bail. That was filed on April 2. It was heard before this

Court in May. Since then I filed a motion for reconsideration of bail issue. That was denied as

well based on the pleadings, which was the motion itself for reconsideration. An order was

entered by Court with an opinion saying why the Court felt that it was going to be denied. From

there, since then, I followed the Rules of Appellate Procedure and Criminal Procedure which

brings us here today at least on my portion that Petition for Interlocutory Appeal under the

proper rule and also for both issues actually, and the issue for Habeas was filed on July 1515 and

the issue for bail was filed on July 27 which would have been in accordance with the Rule within

the proper time.

27

(continued on page 8, lines 1 – 18)

Brown: So I would suggest, not knowing that the Civil Rules are filed because, as has been

stated, I wasn’t cc’d or anything on that because I represent Ms. Tarapchak in the criminal case

and any filing by anybody else or by Ms. Tarapchak herself has been commonly denied by the

Court’s as hybrid representation, especially given the fact that I’m addressing all of the issues in

my criminal filings, so I don’t see how any of the civil filings would be relevant or appropriate.

Now, whether or not Ms. Tarapchak and I addressed that with her let’s just way when I visit

her in and our communications. Whether or not, you, how she wants to proceed, I mean, every

time…..

(end of citations at pages 5, 6, 7 & 8)

The courtroom exchange above was the sixth opportunity Brown had to speak up for the

Defendant and tell the Court that she was arrested on a Bench Warrant on October 23, 2014 and

did not get a hearing within (72) hours on bail violations, among all the other related issues.

Brown lied to the Court when he said, “I’m addressing all of the issues in my criminal filings, so

I don’t see how any of the civil filings would be relevant or appropriate”. None of his filings

raised the Bench Warrant related issues.

At that point in the exchange with the Court, Brown only had to point out specifically where

he had raised the issue of the Court’s failure to provide the Defendant with a Bench Warrant

hearing on bail violations within (72) hours anywhere, in any petition or motion that he filed on

behalf of the Defendant, but he couldn’t do that, because he never raised it in any petition or

motion. Brown couldn’t point to where he raised any issues relating to the October 23, 2014

arrest and incarceration of the Defendant. Brown’s actions and words were his continued

complicity in a conspiracy with others to keep the Defendant in prison while awaiting trial to the

benefit the Commonwealth, and that’s whose best interests Brown was representing when he

again lied to the Court when he stated on the record that he raised all the issues in his filings.

Brown again lied to the Court when he stated that he wasn’t notified, or cc’d, as he put

it, about the civil Rule for habeas corpus relief that the Defendant filed on July 6, 2015. On

July 6, 2015, at 12:50 pm, Brown was emailed a copy of the Rule to Show Cause and the

28

Petition in support of why Habeas Corpus relief should not be granted. The email included

the letter of introduction to Warden McMillan. See Exhibit “O”, the email that was sent by

Joseph Pilchesky to Bernie Brown.

Brown had full and proper notice and service of a true and correct copy of the Defendant’s

Rule to Show Cause and the Petition in support of why Habeas Corpus relief should not be

granted. The Petition speaks for itself. See Exhibit “P”. It clearly states the material facts, i.e., the

Defendant never had a (72) Bench Warrant hearing, that the Bench Warrant expired after (72)

hours, that no Application for a Bench Warrant exists on the record, that no Bench Warrant

exists on the record and that no Return of Service exists on the record. Brown has known from

the day he was appointed that the Defendant was being held illegally without commitment

authority and did nothing to get his client out of prison on the errors related to the Bench Warrant

hearing and expiration issues.

Notwithstanding the fact that Brown had full notice of the Defendant’s Rule and Petition in

support why Habeas Corpus relief should not be granted, he never contacted the Defendant about

the merits of the claims she made within the Petition, and he never offered her any assistance or

alternatives to get relief, i.e., an offer to file a Writ of Habeas under the criminal docket number

using the same material facts articulated in the civil filing as grounds for her release.

Brown has intentionally ignored the fact that the Defendant never had a (72) hours Bench

Warrant hearing on bail violations because it was her “get out of jail” card and he wanted her to

remain incarcerated to the benefit of the Commonwealth’s case against her, which were actions

of fraud, a complicity with others to deprive his own client of due process and liberty rights.

(Still at the August 5, 2015 hearing)


The Court: At this time the Court will grant the Commonwealth’s motion to deny and

dismiss the defendant’s attempt for sole habeas corpus relief filed against Warden McMillan, at

15-CV-4207. All those issues were addressed by this Court in 14-CR-550. This Court finds it not

only to be a procedural defective motion, but it finds it to be a dilatory tactic in regard to

discouraging the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

29

(end of citation)

Notably, the Defendant’s civil “Rule to Show Cause and Petition in support of why Habeas

Corpus relief should not be granted” was a perfectly legal civil filing. The Defendant’s brief in

support of her Petition provided case law to support it was a proper civil filing. If it were not a

perfectly legal civil filing, Judge Nealon would not likely have signed the Rule. Even if there

was a procedural or construction defect in the Defendant’s Rule and Petition for Habeas Corpus

relief, the proper response would have been for Warden McMillan to file preliminary objections

raising the defects, thus giving the Defendant an opportunity to cure the defects. Failure to

answer, as McMillan did, generally results in some type of default. That’s how it’s done in every

courthouse in the Commonwealth. As the docket for 15-CV-4207 undisputedly indicates, there

was no answer or objections filed to the civil Rule and Petition. See Exhibit “I”, the docket sheet.

It was ripe for a Motion to Make Rule Absolute, and it was appropriate that the Motion should

have been granted.

A review of the transcript supports that Judge Barrasse never gave the Defendant an

opportunity to respond to any of the issues raised in Atty. LeBar’s Motion to Deny and Dismiss

Petition for Habeas Corpus relief. A review of transcripts from previous hearings will support

that Judge Barrasse knew that no other judicial officer heard argument on whether or not the

Defendant had a Bench Warrant hearing within (72) hours. In a previous hearing, he asked if

there was a judicial finding. LeBar told him there wasn’t. In a previous hearing, Judge Barrasse

asked if the Defendant had her hearing. LeBar told him she didn’t. In a previous hearing, Judge

Barrasse told the Defendant she had a right to a Bench Warrant hearing, but not that she had a

right to a hearing within (72) hours, so when was supposed to get a hearing?

In a previous hearing, Judge Barrasse asked the Defendant if she violated House Arrest, to

which she answered in the affirmative at Brown’s insistence, and then Judge Barrasse told her

that because she admitted to the violation she waived her right to a hearing. That was a clear

waiver trap. Brown was present at all of those previous hearings. Brown knew that when Judge

Barrasse said, “At this time the Court will grant the Commonwealth’s motion to deny and

dismiss the defendant’s attempt for sole habeas corpus relief filed against Warden McMillan, at

15-CV-4207. All those issues were addressed by this Court in 14-CR-550”, he was not speaking

the truth, but Brown again stayed silent, staying loyal to the conspiracy with others to keep the

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Defendant locked up until trial, and staying complicit in a conspiracy with others to deny the

Defendant her due process and liberty rights.

Hybrid Representation


Brown: I represent Ms. Tarapchak in the criminal case and any filing by anybody else or by

Ms. Tarapchak herself has been commonly denied by the Court’s as hybrid representation…”

That was another blatantly false statement. First and foremost, the Defendant’s civil habeas

corpus filing was exactly that, a civil filing. She was not represented by counsel in the civil

filing; therefore, it cannot be deemed hybrid representation. Furthermore, the Defendant has filed

numerous other legal pleadings in both state and federal courts by and through her legal “Next

Friend”, Joseph Pilchesky, while she was incarcerated, and no other Court has deemed any of the

filings as hybrid, and no pleadings were rejected as improper or unlawful, or frivolous filings.

Furthermore, it was Joseph Pilchesky who appeared in Motion Court on behalf of the Defendant

as her “Next Friend” regarding the civil Habeas Corpus action, because she was incarcerated,

and Pilchesky presented the Rule to Show Cause and Petition in support thereof to Judge Nealon

in Motion Court, who heard an explanation and the purpose of the Rule and Petition, and he

forthwith signed the Rule. See Exhibit “J”, the Rule. The Rules of Civil Procedure provide any

judge with the discretion to deny a Rule and Petition upon the showing of anything improper.

(end of all citations to the August 5, 2105 oral argument)

Brown previously represented the Defendant in a civil matter while simultaneously representing

her in her criminal matter

The Defendant is the Plaintiff in Tarapchak v. Schuylkill County, et al; 13-CV-1895, Middle

District. The Defendant was scheduled for a deposition on April 22, 2015, at which Brown

appeared and represented the Defendant. See Exhibit “Q”, excerpts from the deposition taken at

the Lackawanna County Prison.

See page 11, lines 9 – 15

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Brown: I am going to object at this time. This is a domestic relations. And I just would like

for the record to reflect that is it – I would say it is outside the scope of the four corners of the

Complaint and the reason why we are here.


Brown, (responding to a question about the Defendant’s bail status): It has not been revoked

at this point. We filed a petition. There has been a bail violation filed in which she became

detained; so there is a detainer for a violation of bail.” [Emphasis added]

(end of citation at pages 11 and 14)

There is no detainer on the record. At no time during arguments in criminal matters regarding

whether the Defendant was given a Bench Warrant hearing within (72) hours on alleged bail

violations did Brown, or the Commonwealth, or the Court state that the Defendant was being

held on a Detainer. The Defendant was never served with a Detainer. The showing of a proper

Detainer would have been an appropriate response to the Defendant’s civil Rule and Petition

seeking habeas corpus relief and release, to settle the issue of detainment since October 23, 2014,

but it was never presented by Brown, LeBar, for the Commonwealth, or Kravitz, for the Warden.

When Brown was served with a copy of the Rule and Petition for Habeas Corpus relief via

email on July 6, 2015, he only needed to present the Detainer to the Defendant to explain to her

why she is continuing to be incarcerated since October 23, 2014. The Defendant was never

served with a Detainer. In response to the Defendant’s civil habeas corpus petition, the

Commonwealth did not attach a copy of a Detainer to its Motion to Deny and Dismiss Petition

for Habeas Corpus relief, in order to defeat the Defendant’s request for habeas corpus relief.

Countless times in open court over the issue of the Defendant’s detainment, LeBar could have

dropped the Detainer on the table to end the discussion, but no Detainer was ever produced.

Brown or Warden McMillan could have delivered a Detainer to the Defendant to quell claims of

deprivation of liberty, but they never did.

The Defendant even filed a grievance with the prison on August 13, 2015 demanding release

citing that the Bench Warrant, if one exists, has long expired. She was not provided with a copy

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of a Detainer to support the prison’s authority to hold her. Instead, she was told the demand for

release was not a grieveable issue. See Exhibit “R”, the grievance.

(Still regarding the deposition)

See page 17, lines 22 – 25, all of page 18, all of page 19, and page 20, line 1

Within these pages, counsel for the Schuylkill County defendants, Mr. Tamulonis, questioned

the Defendant in depth about numerous legal papers that Joseph Pilchesky prepared and/or filed

for the Defendant. Brown made no objection to these totally irrelevant questions that are outside

of the scope of the four corners of the Complaint. The Defendant’s paramour, Joseph Pilchesky,

was charged with four counts of unauthorized practice of law and is awaiting trial. Clearly,

Brown was allowing the Defendant to place incriminating testimony on the record against

Pilchesky that could be used against him. Brown made no attempt to object to any of those kinds

of questions.

See pages 16 – 36, inclusive

Within these pages of the deposition, the Defendant, at Brown’s advice, plead the Fifth

Amendment to a battery of questions asked by counsel for the Schuylkill County defendants,

relating to the cause of action she plead within her Federal Complaint. Because the Defendant

took the Fifth on all of those questions, counsel for the Schuylkill County defendants filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that she cannot establish a cause of action upon which

relief can be granted.

Brown did not enter an appearance in the Federal Complaint at Tarapchak v. Schuylkill

County, et al; 13-CV-1895. His representation of the Defendant in the deposition may have

disastrous consequences to the Defendant if counsel for the Schuylkill County defendants has his

Motion for Summary Judgment granted. She’ll be out of court. However, had she answered

many of the questions to which she claimed Fifth Amendment privilege, she wouldn’t now be

exposed to dismissal of her Complaint by way of Summary Judgment.

The question begs asking; why did Bernard Brown go to the Defendant’s aid when she was

facing a civil deposition, but ignored her completely when she was trying to get herself out of

33

prison so she could benefit from her liberty in terms of having close family and friend contact for

familial support and more actively participate in her own defense?

Bail Revocation

First and foremost, there is no bail revocation order on the record signed by any judicial

officer. The only revocation-related document that has surfaced in this proceeding, which is not a

document of record, is a non-judicial document entitled a Misconduct Hearing Report, which

was authored and signed by House Arrest Director, Patrick Lynn. See Exhibit “C”. Lynn

conducted a misconduct hearing at the prison on October 24, 2015. Only Lynn and CO Kelly

were present at the hearing. As the result of that hearing, a letter was generated by Lynn to Judge

Geroulo advising him that Lynn determined the Defendant to be in violation of bail and he

advised the judge that the Defendant should remain incarcerated. See Exhibit “C”. Neither the

Misconduct Hearing Report nor the letter it generated were time-stamped into the record or

served upon the Defendant.

Patrick Lynn, House Arrest Director, has clearly been authorized to exercise judicial authority

and Brown conspired with others to protect Lynn’s judicial misconduct

1. There is no application on the record for a Bench Warrant by any law enforcement officer

to arrest the Defendant for bail violations;

2. There is no Bench Warrant on the record issued by any judicial officer; and

3. There is no Return of Service of a Bench Warrant relating to the arrest of the Defendant.

4. The only arrest and incarceration-related documents that have surfaced, which are not of

the record, are the Misconduct Hearing Report authored by Lynn, an Incident Report

authored by Jack Werner and a letter from Lynn to Judge Geroulo advising him that the

Defendant is back in prison and he determined that the Defendant violated House Arrest,

so he terminated her participation in House Arrest.

5. The Misconduct Hearing Report bears none of the typical judicial characteristics found

on all legal documents, the signature of a judicial officer, a time-stamp of the Clerk, a

certificate of service proving all parties were served, and a proper caption identifying all

the parties and the correct docket number.

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6. The Misconduct Hearing Report has no judicial credibility or quality and therefore, it has

no appelability, therefore, the persons subject to the impositions of a Misconduct Hearing

Report have no judicial relief available to them or a due process outlet for relief.

7. Patrick Lynn is not a judicial officer and he has been making judicial decisions reserved

for judicial officers that have affected the constitutional rights of inmates at the

Lackawanna County Prison.

8. Julie Kelly, Correctional Officer, is not a judicial officer and she has been making

judicial decisions reserved for judicial officers that have affected the constitutional rights

of inmates at the Lackawanna County Prison.

9. In his letter to Judge Geroulo, Lynn advised him that the Defendant was terminated from

the House Arrest Program that the judge ordered her into by way of a bail modification

order and IP order, which letter was not filed of record or served upon the Defendant.

10. The last sentence in the letter states, “If Your Honor has any questions or concerns

regarding this case, please contact me.”

11. It would seem judicially appropriate that Judge Geroulo should have many questions and

concerns when a non-judicial officer is modifying court orders with Misconduct Hearing

Reports that reflect that non-judicial officers are determining the guilt or innocence of

people charged with violating House Arrest and further determining that they will stay

incarcerated, all without notice to the subject of the non-judicial decisions.

What are the benefits to Brown conspiring to protect Pat Lynn’s obstruction and interference in

providing constitutional rights of those charged with bail violations, as was the Defendant?

1. A Misconduct Hearing Report is not an appealable document. It’s a dead end of due

process rights for an inmate, particularly if the inmate has a public defender;

2. No appeal means less work for some judges, public defenders, the prosecutors, the court

reporters or staff in the Clerk’s office and court administrator’s office; and

3. With reduced Bench Warrant hearings, or Gagnon hearings, there is less strain on the

Office of the Sheriff to transport inmates, which saves on fuel costs, wear and tear and

distribution of manpower.

The Defendant’s participation in the House Arrest Program was part and parcel to her bail

modification. A violation of any House Arrest Conditions was a bail violation. The Defendant’s

35

bail modification was determined by Judge Geroulo. Any bail violations were required to be

heard by Judge Geroulo pursuant to Pa Code 234 § 150, et seq. Patrick Lynn interrogated the

Defendant absent a Miranda warning, then arrested her and committed her to prison, then

appeared there and held an informal hearing with no witnesses, or even the Defendant, who

refused to appear before a non-judicial panel without her lawyer. A judicial officer would not

have permitted a bail violation hearing without the Defendant having her lawyer. When Judge

Geroulo got a letter from Pat Lynn advising the Defendant was back in prison and Lynn

determined she violated the program, Judge Geroulo did nothing. The Defendant’s lawyer at the

time, Joseph Kalinowski, did nothing. When Brown discovered this deprivation of due process

right owed to the Defendant, he did nothing.

When Brown was appointed to defend the Defendant, he became immediately aware that she

did not get her (72) hour Bench Warrant hearing and did nothing to raise the issue in any of the

pleadings her filed. He maintained his silence during court hearings. Brown was equally aware

that the Bench Warrant, if one even exists somewhere, it had expired three days after it was

issued, but he did nothing to put that argument before the Court. Instead, he either stayed silent

or lied during court hearings to keep the issues related to the October 23, 2014 arrest and

incarceration of the Defendant off the Court’s radar.

Brown made a conscious, knowing, willing and voluntary decision to participate in a fraud

against his own client to protect Patrick Lynn’s exercise of judicial authority to adjudicate

matters of bail violations and determine incarceration.

Brown knew that when Lynn was in the courtroom to give the appearance that he was going

to testify, the Court was not going to allow the matter of bail violation to be heard for fear that

Lynn would be asked his credentials and what authority he had to exercise judicial authority. To

that end, Brown contributed legal conclusions and theories designed to steer the Bench Warrant

controversy toward a harmless disposition to avoid disclosure of Lynn’s non-judicial status.

In addition to the above

83. Brown sent a letter to the Defendant on April 10, 2015, giving her legal advice regarding

her civil matters advising her that challenging any revocations may impede success with

her civil lawsuit.

36

84. In a letter dated July 30, 2015, Brown threatened and intimidated the Defendant with

criminal consequences if he discovered that she is being represented by someone other

than himself in any pro se legal matters.

85. On or about August 18, 2015, Brown visited the Defendant and advised her that all of her

difficulties with Judge Barrasse are because of her longtime involvement with her

paramour/political activist, Joseph Pilchesky. He also told her she was facing a maximum

of 4 – 12 more months if convicted, which seems in conflict with scaled sentencing

guidelines.

86. Brown never filed a Habeas Corpus for the Defendant’s release pursuant to Rule 600 E,

which provides for nominal bail after six months incarceration.

87. While the Defendant sat in a jail cell overwhelmed with the anxieties and fears that are

intimate to trials and their preparation, Brown conspired to seal the Defendant’s fate

when he repeatedly made false statements in open court regarding his knowledge of the

events of October 23, 2014, stayed silent when opportunity arose to raise issues that

could have accomplished release from confinement, stayed silent when the

Commonwealth made false statements, and stayed silent when the Court made false

statements regarding the presentation, argument and disposition of bail events as they

related to the Defendant’s Bench Warrant arrest on October 23, 2014 on alleged bail

violations.

88. Brown violated practically every canon and professional rules of conduct in the handling

of the Defendant’s case as relates to protecting her due process and liberty rights, and the

right to effective counsel and a fair, unbiased trial.

89. Brown’s actions and silence, whenever either were required, either on paper or verbally,

to advance an attack on the record, or advance an open-courtroom attack upon the

Defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and liberty, or to allow an attack to

advance without objection on the record or in open court, were at all times skilled

planning and scheming in cooperation with the Commonwealth’s and the Court’s agenda

to deprive the Defendant of a her due process and liberty rights to the benefit of an

obvious and overt agenda to deprive the Defendant of a fair trial.

90. Brown has been perpetrating a fraud upon the Defendant since the first day that he met

with her when he stayed silent on matters that appear on the record which, when

37

reviewed and interpreted, clearly indicated the intentional and deliberate deprivation of

her due process and liberty rights by previous counsel, the Court and County employees,

as relates to their conduct, or the absence thereof, relating to her arrest and incarceration

on October 23, 2014, and continued incarceration moving forward.

91. As the result of Brown’s mismanagement of preparation and his ongoing fraud, the

Defendant has been barred and deprived from effectively participating in the preparation

of her own trial, i.e., the Defendant has not yet seen the Discovery materials that have

been in Brown’s possession for over six months, notwithstanding his repeated promises

to deliver the same.

92. The Defendant is completely unaware of anything that the court-appointed investigator

has discovered or failed to discover.

93. Brown has not asked the Defendant for the names of witnesses who could testify to her

benefit.

94. Brown has not asked the Defendant to offer her interpretation of any conclusions by any

expert witnesses to the extent that she feels he understands the dynamics of an

conclusions offered by any expert.

95. In the Defendant’s opinion, from her view of Brown’s conduct as it accrued for six

months, as fully supported by the record, and her experiences with him in terms of the

absence of honesty, respect, dignity, professionalism and morality, he’s a judicial hitman,

hand-picked and hired by the court to undermine the Defendant’s defense and bolster the

Commonwealth’s case to the benefit of the Court and the Commonwealth enjoying the

most political retaliation possible.

96. The misconduct of Brown as relates to the misrepresentations and false statements he’s

made to her and the court as outlined above has caused irreconcilable differences, a

breakdown in communications and a full and complete deterioration of trust and

confidence. In fact, the Defendant does not want to even sit in the same courtroom as

Brown.

97. On September 14, 2014, the Defendant was summoned to Court to participate in a final

pre-trial hearing where certain stipulations were entered without discussion with the

Defendant or her knowledge of such stipulations. Brown did not provide the Defendant

with notice that she would be appearing before the Court on September 14, 2015, for the

38

purposes of entering into Stipulations. The Defendant is still unaware of what

Stipulations Brown agreed to on her behalf.

98. Brown never disclosed his political ties to former Tax Collector/County Controller

Kenneth McDowell, whom the Defendant’s paramour, Joseph Pilchesky, repeatedly

exposed publicly on the website Dohertydeceit.com as notoriously incompetent and

corrupt, a deadbeat father, and a well-known town drunkard and skirt-chaser, who seldom

appeared at work, and he devastated the function of the Office of the Tax Collector with

such poor supervision that two-million dollars disappeared under his watch. Pilchesky

also filed a Quo Warranto action to remove him from office of the County Controller

citing McDowell’s failure to qualify to hold office, all to the consequence of McDowell

losing re-election. Had Brown disclosed his close ties to McDowell, the Defendant would

have immediately filed a Motion to Supplement Counsel? See Exhibit “S”, Brown’s

Facebook pictures of he and McDowell socializing, and the cover of the Quo Warranto

action at 08-CV-0751.

99. It is believed, and therefore averred, that Brown made little to no use of the private

investigator hired to assist with the Defendant’s defense.

Law

Where a defendant has shown and demonstrated counsel’s clear and undisputed acts of

unethical and dishonest conduct, his intentional and deliberate ineffectiveness and various

deficiencies, and his indifference to the best interests of his client, the Court has a duty to remove

counsel and appoint new counsel, regardless of when the Defendant raises the issue, see Com. v.

Spotz, 756 A.2d 1139, 562 Pa 498, Sup. (2000); Com. v. Gardner, 389 A.2d 58, 480 Pa. 7, Sup.

(1978); Com. v. Shepard, 384 A,2d 234, 477 Pa. 429, Sup. (1977); Com v. Patrick, 383 A.2d

935, 477 Pa. 284, Sup. (1978); Com. v. Taylor, 360 A.2d 617, 468 Pa 193, Sup (1976); Com. v.

Newman, 555 A,2d 151, 382 Pa.Super, 220, Super.(1989); Com. v. Williams, 522 A.2d 1058,

514 Pa. 62, Sup. (1987).

In Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A. 2d 1125 - Pa: Supreme Court 2009, the Court wrote:

“It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective, and the defendant bears the burden of

proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 596 Pa. 119, 941 A.2d 655, 664 (2007) . To

39

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16644828858398968165&q=right+to+replace+appointed+counsel&hl=en&as_sdt=4,230,388

overcome this presumption, Appellant must satisfy a three-pronged test and demonstrate that: (1)

the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is being

challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or her actions or failure to act; and (3) the

petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's deficient performance. Commonwealth v.

(Michael) Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001) . A claim of ineffectiveness will be

denied if the petitioner's evidence fails to meet any of these prongs.”

Prong 1: The underlying substantive claim is well-supported by the record as articulated

above in the Defendant’s Brief. Atty. Brown’s dishonesty and unethical conduct is a matter of

record, captured in his own writings and the words that he spoke during hearings that were

transcribed into the record. His words and actions cannot be disputed. His actions, or selective

silence, speaks to his malicious intention to deliberately deprive his client of due process and

liberty rights, as well as deprive his client of her right to fully and effectively participate in her

own defense and a constitutional right to effective counsel and a fair, unbiased trial.

Prong 2: There is certainly no basis for the dishonest and unethical conduct of Atty. Brown as

relates to his role in conspiring to deprive the Defendant of various due process rights and her

right to liberty for the want of any legal commitment document that would support that Warden

McMillan had a right to keep her confined since October 27, 2014. There is no explanation for

why Atty. Brown would want to keep his client locked up when she could have had her liberty

restored to facilitate her active and effective participation in the preparation of her trial, and

benefit from close contact and support from friends and family members. Atty. Brown’s efforts,

or the intentional lack thereof, were harshly punitive in terms of imposing severe mental and

emotional suffering upon the Defendant while awaiting trial in a situation where she had already

endured similar punitive punishment from the ineffective counsel of Atty. Kalinowski.

Prong 3: The severe prejudice suffered as the result of Atty. Browns unethical,

unprofessional and dishonest conduct speaks for itself. Mere fact that the Defendant has not fully

and effectively participated in her own defense is severe prejudice. Fact that Brown participated

in keeping the Defendant, a medical expert in her own right, under lock and key when she could

have been effectively participating in the preparation of her defense is severe prejudice. Brown

has abundantly demonstrated that he has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct with is

dishonest and unethical conduct, and he is not to be trusted, that he cannot be trusted, and the

40



Defendant would be a fool to trust him with her fate at trial. The Defendant has suffered

complete loss of confidence and faith in Atty. Brown as the result of the dishonest, unethical and

unprofessional acts, or silence, that he intentionally and deliberate imposed upon her that have

accrued over the last several months, as thoroughly demonstrated above with citations from the

record. Communications with Brown are irreconcilably broken. The Defendant fears trusting

Brown with information.

WHEREFORE, for the numerous valid reasons comprehensively articulated above, as fully

supported by the record, the Defendant avers that Atty. Brown has repeatedly, willfully,

intentionally and deliberately acted in direct violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct at 8.4

through his dishonest and unethical actions, and in direct indifference to her best interests. The

Defendant respectfully requests that Atty. Brown is immediately removed as counsel moving

forward and new counsel is appointed and that all of his files are turned over to the Defendant.

Respectfully submitted,

____________________________

Stephanie Tarapchak, Defendant, currently incarcerated.

____________________________

Joseph Pilchesky, as the Defendant’s legal “Next Friend”

819 Sunset St.

Scranton, PA

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Certificate of Service

This is to certify that I, Stephanie Tarapchak, incarcerated Defendant, did cause to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief in support of Defendant’s Motion to Supplement

Counsel, on this 15th day of September, 2015, upon the parties listed below by either hand-

delivery or by placing the same into the U. S, Mail, first class prepaid postage, as indicated:

Judge Michael Barresse (hand delivered) Bernard Brown, Esq. (mail)

200 N. Washington Ave 58 8th Ave., Suite 60

Scranton, PA 18503 Carbondale, PA 18407

Robert LeBar, Esq., Senior Deputy Attorney General (mail)

Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General

Insurance Fraud Division

1000 Madison Ave., Suite 310, Norristown, PA 19403

_______________________________

Stephanie Tarapchak, incarcerated Defendant

1371 N. Washington Ave.

Scranton, PA 18509

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