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AbstractFinancing the future of green infrastructure planning: Alternatives and opportunities in the UK
With the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government
in 2010, the funding of local government in the UK changed fundamentally.
Through a development of an austerity approach to development, local planning
authorities (LPAs) have been required to make significant budgetary savings,
raising questions over what services are legally and morally dispensable. One
service severely impacted has been green space (green infrastructure)
management. In many locations, this has generated negative responses, as the
proposed cuts are perceived as decreasing the liveability of urban areas. In
response, LPAs are engaging in an examination of how they can manage
development to more effectively fund green infrastructure provision. Such
debates draw on a range of options from public, private and community funding
sources, creating further complexity within LPA financing. To explore these
options, this paper discusses the appropriateness of different funding
mechanisms proposing a multi-option approach for the long-term management
of green infrastructure.
Keywords: local government; financing; environmental planning; green infrastructure;
development
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Introduction
The outcome of the 2010 general election, saw the formation of a Conservative-Liberal
Democrat coalition government following a decade of New Labour administrations. In its
first year, the Coalition revoked the regional tier of planning, developed the Localism Act,
and embarked on a strategy of financial austerity. All of this was proposed to simplify
planning, encourage development and limit expenditure on public services reconfiguring
planning as a mechanism for implementing strategic policy-making and promoting financial
investment (Cullingworth et al., 2015).
Following the election of a Conservative government in 2015, austerity measures
were reinforced, leading local planning authorities (LPAs) to make further cuts to both
discretionary and statutory services (Kennett et al., 2015; Pemberton, Peel, & Lloyd, 2015).
Moreover, whilst a presumption in favour of sustainable development, aligned with economic
growth, is explicit in the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (Department of
Communties and Local Government, 2012), the lack of detailed guidance on environmental
management, coupled with financial instability, has made it increasingly complicated for
LPAs to balance strategic and localised development objectives (Clarke & Cochrane, 2013;
Pugalis & Townsend, 2013; Ward, 2011). Commentators also argue that the NPPF weakened
the ability of LPAs to generate income from developer contributions or set taxes to fund
capital investment, as this may negatively impact upon the viability of development
(Longlands, 2013).
Reductions in centralised funding and the ongoing restrictions on revenue generation
(i.e. council tax increases) have hindered the development of sustainable financing
mechanisms for green infrastructure, which is defined as:
“Green Infrastructure is a strategically planned and delivered network
comprising the broadest range of high quality green spaces and other
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environmental features. It should be designed and managed as a
multifunctional resource capable of delivering those ecological services and
quality of life benefits required by the communities it serves and needed to
underpin sustainability.
Natural England & Land Use Consultants (2009:5)
Green infrastructure includes parks, waterways, green spaces, street trees and the biodiverse
areas located across the local, neighbourhood and city-scale. In this paper, green
infrastructure focusses on parks and publically accessible greenspaces which promote access
to nature, connectivity, and multi-functional benefits for various human and ecological
communities (Mell, 2016a).
Due to the variation in what green infrastructure is LPAs have had to reconsider how
they manage resources, establishing the parameters for a wider exploration of alternative
funding options to support capital investment, and importantly to identify revenue streams for
long-term maintenance (Geoghegan, 2002). This illustrates the complexity of ongoing LPA
funding for discretionary services, such as green infrastructure, but also children’s and adult
social care, and libraries, which could be considered as “optional extras” compared to other
essential services, i.e. waste removal/recycling (CABE Space, 2004). Several commentators
highlighted the non-economic value of green infrastructure as a reason for its absence from
development consideration based on the experiential characteristics of “nature” (Austin,
2015). These discussions become increasingly complex as the legal and moral responsibilities
to deliver services become more acute during periods of austerity.
In response, a more in-depth assessment of the alternative funding options available to
LPAs, supporting both capital and revenue investment, is being undertaken across the UK to
limit the impacts of government cuts (Wilson & Hughes, 2011). This raises several questions,
including whether LPAs can align themselves with government financing mechanisms,
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community-led funding initiatives, corporate/commercial investments, and a broader set of
payments from the development sector. To appreciate the breadth of opportunity under
review requires an understanding of the parameters of available financing: what funding can
deliver and to what public/private stakeholders are willing to fund services (Dwyer, 2011;
Kambites & Owen, 2006). To investigate these issues, this paper examines a suite of options
open to LPAs to fund green infrastructure. By discussing the breadth of LPA/government,
community, and developer contributions, the paper argues that it should not be assumed that
decreased central government funding reduces the ability of LPAs to think innovatively.
Alternatively, this discussion is presented using a financial options framework which
examines the viability of existing/new mechanisms, legal/administrative complexities,
costs/benefits and stakeholder responses to illustrate the likelihood of use. To examine these
issues a discussion of current debates in Liverpool (UK) is used to illustrate how alternative
funding mechanisms are being explored (Liverpool City Council, 2015; 2016). Liverpool is
used as it is at the forefront of these debates in the UK and could be considered to be a front-
runner city in reviewing its financial options for green infrastructure.
The paper does not propose to be exhaustive in its assessment of all funding
mechanisms but represents an analysis of the most common approaches outlined in the praxis
literature. Moreover, the analysis presented takes a purposeful apolitical stance, thereby
assessing the value and trade-offs of different funding mechanisms, and the practicalities
facing LPAs to use them. Whilst this attempts to “depoliticise” the ongoing New
Labour/Coalition narrative the paper acknowledges the ways in which both administrations
have had substantial influence on planning praxis, and specifically investment in green
infrastructure (Jacobs & Manzi, 2013). Alternatively, the paper proposes a suite of options
whose utility is dependent on localised planning contexts. This is reported in a review of the
literature and discussions of the Liverpool Green & Open Space Review (Liverpool City
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Council, 2016), which debates a number of funding mechanisms in a location where fiscal
austerity has led to a 58% decrease in core funding. Finally, the paper provides insights into
the complexity of viability, fit with current policy, legal ramifications, and the potential
uptake from stakeholders to debate the options available to LPAs to fund green infrastructure.
Policy and funding changes post-2010
Post-2010, and following the release of the NPPF, the allocation of central government
funding to LPAs came under increased scrutiny. The Coalition government debated the
merits of extensive public spending under New Labour, arguing that, to ensure fiscal
sustainability, LPAs would need to make significant cuts (Clifford & Morphet, 2015). These
have extended beyond cuts to green infrastructure to include health and social care, highways
maintenance and educational facilities (Asenova, Bailey, & McCann, 2015). Whilst it was
acknowledged that some discretionary services would be rationalised, the scale of the
cutbacks was not fully realised (Kennett et al., 2015). For example, in Birmingham, funding
cuts have been between 12-20% (Butler, 2012); 12% in Newcastle (Hastings et al., 2013);
and by 58% in real terms in Liverpool since 2010/11 (Liverpool City Council, 2015).
There is, however, a pervasive view within academia that a disequilibrium exists
between the government’s approach to development (enacted through the NPPF) and the
needs of communities in the UK (Pugalis & Townsend, 2013). Whilst the presumption in
favour of sustainable development is the ‘golden thread’ of UK planning policy, the
actualisation of this rhetoric promotes economic growth as a primary development objective,
rather than as part of the social-economic-ecological triumvirate of sustainability (Rydin,
2013). Running concurrently is a debate examining the ethical ramifications of such an
approach to government, where the efficacy of economic development undermines
assessments of social needs and public service provision stating that growth will, inevitably,
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lead to social uplift. To date the attainment of such benefits has been limited, and has been
replaced by increased stresses being faced by individuals and communities who are
questioning the ethics of a “growth” first approach (Bulley & Sokhi-Bulley, 2014; Dowling
& Harvie, 2014).
A key contention throughout the reforms has, therefore, remained: that planning is
overly programmatic and bureaucratic, limiting efficiency and innovation due to the
constraints it places on LPA decision-making (Tewdwr-Jones, 2012). One issue with such a
position is the inherent vagueness within the NPPF, which enables stakeholders to interpret
its mandate in alternative ways. Consequently, we witness discussions examining how we
balance economic growth with a holistic delivery of ‘sustainability’ (Haughton,
Allmendinger, Counsell, & Vigar, 2013), which run counter to a number of New Labour
policies.
However, New Labour has been criticised for expanding the remit of public sector
service provision through a process of “politicisation” of planning without engineering
sufficient monitoring for the assessment of funding allocated or the success of investment
(Marshall, 2009). Consequently, although New Labour provided scope for planners, and
specifically green infrastructure advocates, to promote service provision within praxis, there
remain concerns over whether their policies increased the disparity between funding and
services. This, as discussed by Jacobs & Manzi (2013), can be thought of as a reflection of
the growing prominence of neoliberal approaches within planning, which is not a longer-term
failsafe for of the alignment of economic and socio-ecological development (Haughton et al.,
2013). Moreover, the archiving of Planning Policy Statements and Guidance (PPSs and
PPGs), as well as Natural England’s Green Infrastructure guidance (Natural England &
Landuse Consultants, 2009) has reduced both the visibility and utility of a detailed set of
policies that provided a framework to support green infrastructure planning (Mell, 2015).
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In an attempt to recast planning as a more collaborative process, the Coalition
developed the Localism Act 2011, which proposed to engender greater democracy for local
communities to shape the direction of development (Pugalis & Townsend, 2013). Whilst this
policy created a structural framework of engagement for LPAs and communities, a series of
commentators have argued that the Localism Act actually restricts the more strategic aspects
of planning (Cullingworth et al., 2015; Jacobs & Manzi, 2013). Thus, where New Labour
supported devolution as a mechanism to facilitate growth by different stakeholders at a
number of scales, the Coalition framed devolution as a method of reducing the responsibility
of government to deliver development and services (Wallace, 2010). Consequently, we have
witnessed a blurring between what is considered appropriate, and what is actually delivered
(Haughton et al., 2013). Developed in parallel to the devolution of power to communities, the
Coalition and the subsequent Conservative government placed further constraints on the
funding of strategic services/amenities, which became inculcated with calls to maximise
efficiency despite decreased capacity in terms of personnel and funding (Campbell, Tait, &
Watkins, 2013; Smith, 2013).
Ongoing austerity also required LPAs to reconsider their provision of legally required
‘statutory’ services and those ‘discretionary’ services not protected by legal agreements
(Kennett et al., 2015). Although we can argue that whilst all services are important, some,
including health and education are considered essential; green infrastructure is often
considered an optional extra (Rydin, 2013). Many commentators argue, though, that the
delivery of a functional socio-ecological landscape should be both a priority, and a moral
duty of government (Campbell & Marshall, 2000); it is not necessarily though a legal
requirement (Owens & Cowell, 2011).
Herein lies an inherent dilemma for LPA planners: how to align the perceived and
actual value (and costs) of green infrastructure in an era where political commodification
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downplays its socio-ecological benefits in favour of economic deliverables (Mell, 2016b). In
this context “commodification” is reflective of the ways in which government links the
economic benefits of green infrastructure within market-led discussion of growth, whilst
criticising those calling for greater social-ecologically focussed management (Matthews,
Bramley, & Hastings, 2014; Mell, 2016). This debate extends the complexity of multi-
stakeholder discussions focussing on what can be classified as appropriate, what green
infrastructure is required, and more broadly how urban landscapes should develop (Wilker,
Rusche, & Rymsa-Fitschen, 2016). Moreover, where strategic development objectives are
evaluated against the allocation of green infrastructure, there is a tendency for LPAs to target
city-scale economic uplift, rather than the more equitable protection of local resources
(Hangerman, 2007). We could therefore argue that the UK planning system has, over time,
evolved from a framework delivering equitable societal benefits, to one delivering a
predominately economically focussed agenda, although the economic liberalisation of New
Labour illustrates a lineage to such approaches between successive governments (Campbell
et al., 2013).
Diversity in approach, though, can obfuscate the focus of local governance leading to
contradictory interpretations of “planning policy” as a tool of strategic development rather
than a mechanism to deliver investment. Furthermore, the nature of green infrastructure
planning illustrates the complexity of urban governance, as LPAs are required to address
statutory/discretionary service provision dispassionately (Maruani & Amit-Cohen, 2007;
Tzoulas & James, 2010). How LPAs address their capacity to manage green infrastructure,
rationalise divergent stakeholder agendas, and maximise funding could therefore be
considered politically multi-faceted, and in some circumstances subject to institutional and
financial malaise (Mell, 2015; Roe & Mell, 2013).
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Financing options for the investment and management of green infrastructure
The costs of managing green infrastructure differs across the world making it is difficult to
identify a universal approach to successfully invest in landscape management. This is despite
the wealth of evidence highlighting the social, health, ecological and economic benefits of
investing in, and engagement with, green infrastructure (Andersson et al., 2014; Pretty et al.,
2005; Vandermeulen et al., 2011). Such evidence provides a robust business case for the
funding of green infrastructure (South Yorkshire Forest Partnership & Sheffield City Council,
2012). However, corresponding variability remains in how LPAs, private landowners,
environmental organisations and communities manage green infrastructure.
The most frequently used funding approaches remain local government financing
and/or management by private business. For example, in Suzhou (China) the Singapore
Industrial Park has been financed by the Singaporean government and local Chinese
institutions/businesses (Mell, 2016b); in Singapore the Garden by the Bay project is a
government-private consortium which delivers the site and promotes Singapore as a “garden
nation” (Auger, 2013). Moreover, large-scale investment in Chicago’s green infrastructure
has utilised a series of Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) between government, the US Army
Corps, Metropolitan Water Reclamation Districts and environmental organisation, to improve
the sustainability of water and biodiversity in the area (Chicago Metropolitan Agency for
Planning, 2014; Mell, 2016b). Further examples of such variation can be identified in
Australia (Beatley, 2009), South Africa (Schäffler & Swilling, 2012), and in Canada
(Macdonald & Keil, 2012), where the funds made available for green infrastructure delivery
are constantly evolving. These examples illustrate some of the complexities of aligning
public, private and community approaches to green infrastructure investment.
Several mechanisms do, however, exist which enable LPAs to charge, collect and
allocate funding to green infrastructure through the development and taxation process.
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Moreover, although the Localism Act provided scope for communities to influence
investment through Local Plans and referenda, LPAs have maintained their overarching
position as growth managers, working with developers to negotiate contributions through
planning consent (Cullingworth et al., 2015). These contributions range from approved
Community Infrastructure Levy/planning charges (CILs), Section 106 of the Town and
Country Planning Act 1990 (S106)1 development consent agreements, commuted sums,
central government grants (i.e. Housing Growth Funds), as well as financing from private
companies, such as Biffa awards (cf. Mell, 2012). Each funding mechanism differs in the
nature, and the projects, activities or amenities they can be used to fund (Wilson & Hughes,
2011). However, uncertainties remain surrounding the ability of each to meet local needs, as
‘development viability’ and the nature of payments to LPAs often differs substantially from
what is proposed in local policy or aspired to by communities.
LPAs can also utilise their suite of Local Plan documents to work with developers to
identify where funding can be generated. The process of negotiating payments is though
fraught with complications, as developers/consultants and LPAs are engaged in complex
discussions, where each attempts to achieve the most beneficial outcome for themselves (or
their clients), be it economic or service/amenity provision (Payne & Barker, 2015).
Unfortunately, many LPAs have limited capacity to extract contributions due to a pervasive
fear that enforcing planning obligations may jeopardise investment (Crosby, McAllister, &
Wyatt, 2013). Consequently, LPAs may generate lower incomes in spite of the need to
deliver additional services associated with increased delivery (Mell, 2012).
Alternative green infrastructure funding models
1 Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) provides a mechanism through which development proposals become acceptable in planning terms to LPAs. Known most frequently as S106 agreements, they relate to site specific contributions to mitigate of the impact of development. They are commonly referred to as 'developer contributions (Cullingworth et al., 2015).
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To assess whether and, if so, how, various public, private and community-based funding
mechanisms can be used to meet the financial needs of green infrastructure
investment/management requires the use of an evaluative framework that reflects several key
factors:
(1) Establishing the viability of options to fund green infrastructure,
(2) Establishing fit with existing funding mechanisms and the identification of which new
processes could contribute to the framework,
(3) Defining the legal and administrative changes associated with different funding
mechanisms,
(4) Establishing the costs-benefits to LPA/communities/developers of change, and
(5) Estimating or defining the stakeholder responses to development which influence this
process.
The use of such a systematic framework provides scope to assess the arguments supporting
and limiting the use of alternative funding mechanisms, illustrating the difficulties faced by
LPAs when deciding what approach to take to fund green infrastructure (Wilker & Rusche,
2013; Squires & Lord, 2012; Geoghegan, 2002). The framework presented in this paper
assesses the utility of each funding mechanism and is illustrated in Table 1. Table 2 extends
this analysis, providing a more directed exploration of the implications of each mechanism
using evidence from Liverpool, a city currently appraising its funding landscape to assess the
viability of these mechanism to finance green infrastructure development and management.
Four main areas of financing can be identified supporting the funding of green
infrastructure in the UK used to frame discussions of viability:
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(1) LPA-led funding mechanisms,
(2) Activities proposed and actioned by local communities,
(3) Developer-led funding associated with on-site green infrastructure investment, and
(4) Private/commercial sector funding for investment and maintenance of green spaces
Due to the significance of central government funding cuts, and the complexities of managing
viability, LPAs have attempted to identify feasible options for long-term investment in green
infrastructure. Unfortunately, their ability to generate income from existing mechanisms,
coupled with a reluctance in some parts of the development sector to meet agreed developer
contributions, has limited the ability of LPAs to fund green infrastructure (Payne & Barker,
2015). Subsequently, a significant difficulty faced by LPAs has been establishing balance
between what funding can be identified from public and private sources, and where funding
can be effectively sought from non-traditional sources. Managing this process is subject to
extensive political and economic influence, which is discussed in the following sections in
terms of fiscal applicability and the authority of LPAs to extract contributions from
development. Given the significance of the austerity cuts, it is becoming increasingly critical
for existing funding frameworks to be used effectively and, where possible, LPAs may be
required to adapt multi-faceted approaches to financing based on a combination of public,
private and community funding opportunities.
<INSERT Table 1. HERE>
<INSERT Table 2. HERE>
LPA and public financing models
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S106 agreements are the most frequently employed mechanism used to fund green
infrastructure through the following:
(1) Specific on-site provision of amenities/improvements
(2) Neighbourhood-scale facilities
(3) Funding of strategic investment (where appropriate and outlined in adopted LPA
policy)
Unfortunately, there is no coordinated framework linking such projects with the management
of a city-wide green infrastructure network. Additionally, LPAs continue to request
commuted sums from developers through planning obligations/consents, which can be
allocated to specific greening projects. However, the perceived need to fund ‘essential’ built
infrastructure generates difficult conversations, as green infrastructure is not a priority for
many LPAs (CABE Space, 2009a). Subsequently, contributions to green infrastructure are
often viewed as additional funded after investments in housing, transport and commercial
infrastructure is completed (Walmsley, 2006). Furthermore, there appears to be a reluctance
in the development sector to (a) meet S106 requirements, as it can lower viability, and
therefore profitability; (b) provide funding for revenue, as there is a limited visible return in
terms of what is being paid for; and (c) if provision is already being made for on-site
greening, some developers consider additional payments for green infrastructure the
responsibility of the LPA (Payne & Barker, 2015).
The nature of development also limits the extent to which S106 and commuted sums
can be used. Although a number of cities including Liverpool and Newcastle have benefitted
from regeneration programmes such as the Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder and the City
Deal, there remain areas where development is considered to be economically unviable
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(Wilson, 2013). Developers also continue to negotiate with LPAs to limit their contributions
using ‘viability’ as the legitimisation for decreasing S106 payments. Moreover, where
brownfield sites are available they may not be considered prime development sites.
Consequently, developers identify alternative locations, i.e. greenfield areas, as more viable
development options (Walmsley, 2006). LPAs are therefore being placed in a difficult
politico-economic position: they are required to identify potential development sites (which
are viable for developers), but these sites are often opposed by local communities, which can
delay investment and the receipt of developer contributions (Couch, Lord, & Cocks, 2015).
In addition to S106 payments, the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) is a more
overarching approach to generating income from development that funds projects as part of
an approved ‘investment’ schedule (Mell, 2012). Unfortunately two critical factors
undermine the use of CIL: first, they can be partial towards built infrastructure projects, such
as transport links, which limits the inclusion of green infrastructure, and secondly, not all
areas have adopted CIL schedules (Lord, 2009). Currently, many LPAs do not have approved
schedules, and there is a lack of political will to develop them due to the cost, timings and
need to establish a politically acceptable list of development priorities, which limit the scope
of LPAs to request additional investment funding.
The sale of assets is also being explored as it (a) facilitates a significant reduction in
maintenance costs, (b) raises capital through sale, and (c) increases development
opportunities which can fund services. However, sales are often unpopular with communities,
as there is a perception that LPAs are delivering land to developers to the detriment of local
people (Irwin, 2002). An alternative view posits that LPAs are taking steps to limit ongoing
costs, as well as meeting their legal responsibilities to identify/allocate housing sites through
the sale of vacant or underused spaces. One potential benefit of sale focusses on the potential
retention of green infrastructure by private organisations, third sector organisations or local
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communities, who may be appropriate custodians due to their vested interests in maintaining
the economic and social value of a site (CABE Space, 2005). Furthermore, where several
cognisant sites can be identified in a location, there may be opportunities to amalgamate them
as a ‘development portfolio’, thus increasing their viability for developers as obtaining
planning permission may become easier. Additionally, “land trades” between sites with
potentially higher development value and those with a high social-ecological capital could be
investigated depending on location, scale and financial implications for LPAs/landowners.
In addition to the existing mechanisms described above, the “park trust” model used
in Milton Keynes (UK) and the Central Park Conservancy (New York, USA) has been
proposed as an option to generate funding for green infrastructure (Dryson, 2014; McCulloch,
2012). Park trusts derive an endowment from the sale of land which is retained by a non-LPA
controlled organisation within a commercialised trust, which funds the management of the
remaining green infrastructure resource. The change in governance limits the impacts of
ongoing austerity by removing the management of green infrastructure from the public
sector, which could be identified as a positive step. Through the establishment of quasi-
governmental organisations, such as the Atlanta Beltline in the USA or the Land Trust in the
UK, the receipts from land sales are managed through umbrella endowment funds managed
by an independent body (Mell, 2016a). This would, however, require LPAs to (a) agree to the
sale of existing land assets, (b) establish a legal partnership with stakeholders and/or a Board
of Trustees to manage the endowment, (c) authorise the allocation of proceeds into a park
trust endowment fund, and (d) manage the negative reactions to the perceived trade-off of
land sales. Achieving each of these objectives has been difficult in many locations.
A further, and potentially more radical, proposal is a change to local taxation in the
form of specific housing, business or tourism charges, establishing a ‘parks tax’. This was
proposed, in part, by Policy Exchange (a UK think-tank) as a mechanism that could be
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applied spatially, i.e. those living or having businesses nearer to greenspaces would pay
higher local taxes (Dryson, 2014). Taxes of this nature are subject to government approval,
which is not always forthcoming, and are not universally popular, as many residents and
businesses consider landscape/city management as the legal and financial responsibility of
LPAs. Moreover, the establishment of a ‘parks tax’, as noted by Webster (2002), may be
considered an overt commodification of public space. Furthermore, where people have
purchased property proximate to green infrastructure, consensus exists that they have paid a
premium to do so and should not pay additional taxes to maintain public spaces (Crompton,
2001). To date such proposals have generated little political support; however, in 2016,
Liverpool’s Mayor called for a referendum to increase council tax contributions by 10% to
fund discretionary service. The outcomes of this call are not yet unknown.
Finally, LPAs could consider limiting their green infrastructure funding through more
strategic management programmes, including a renegotiation of service level agreements to
rationalise maintenance regimes. Cut-backs in management such as the use of re-wilding,
similar to the practices adopted in Knowsley District Council, can support such practices and
provide the platform for financial parity between the funding available and required for
maintenance (Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council, 2010). This reduces financial costs
but also provide opportunities to increase and/or diversify biodiversity in urban areas.
However, some commentators consider re-wilding negatively, as managed landscapes are
perceived as being safer and inclusive (CABE Space, 2009a). Regime change may also
compromise the status of existing Green Flag or Heritage Lottery funded sites, which have
conditions of their upkeep associated with funding, that could be jeopardised if sites are
managed in a more informal manner (CABE Space, 2009b).
Community-led activities
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Whilst LPA funding has the structural support of ‘development control’ to generate
contributions, it is becoming clearer within the academic and practitioner literature that local
communities are potentially an underused resource that can develop, fund and manage green
infrastructure (CABE Space & Asset Transfer Unit, 2010; Rosol, 2011). Unfortunately, due
to the variable capacity of such groups, there may be insufficient administrative/legal
expertise to facilitate the move from their desire to enact change, to taking responsibility and
ensuring delivery. The strength of such groups, however, is the breadth of their membership
(linked in some locations to demographic differences), which allows them to draw on
professional understandings of planning, development and landscape management
(Schmelzkopf, 2002). Questions though remain regarding the legal and personal capacity of
groups to undertake the role of landscape custodians. Furthermore, for smaller sites, the
capacity of the community is less well defined as a cohesive management unit – rather, they
may be dependent on individuals, which limit the opportunities for local groups to engage
effectively with legal, financial and administrative issues (Jerome, 2017).
A more formal way to engage communities has been through community asset
transfer. However, whilst both the Localism Act 2011 and the Community Right to Bid
(CRB) provides scope for local communities to take ownership of green infrastructure, the
actioning of this process is less straightforward. CABE Space described community assets as:
…assets that the local authority intends to hold in perpetuity, that have no
determinable useful life and that may have restrictions on their disposal.
Examples of community assets are parks and historical buildings.
(CABE Space, 2009, p. 15, emphasis added)
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In many cities, establishing ‘non-determinable life’ is, however, contested, with community
groups, residents and the environment sector stating that all green infrastructure are valuable
assets (Wolch et al., 2014). In addition, the transfer of land is subject to legal, financial and
institutional constraints (CABE Space & Asset Transfer Unit, 2010). Thus, although
communities highlight their desire to work with LPAs to facilitate transfers, many lack the
constitutional framework required in the government’s Community Asset Transfer guidance
to do so. Notwithstanding this communities believe in their capacity to manage the
maintenance of green spaces, questions arise over the long-term sustainability of such
assumptions given the technical, financial and legal responsibilities that are endowed
following transfers (Rydin, 2013). Therefore, despite calls for transfers to be made, there is
an aligned need to facilitate greater structural or organisational support (legally and
financially) if transfers are to be approved (de Havilland & Burgess, 2015).
An additional option championed by the environment sector has been the rise of
informal localised ownership or guerrilla gardening. Projects, including Incredible Edible in
Todmorden, rely on people greening their local environment without formal consent from the
LPA or landowners. This can be viewed as taking limited ownership over local sites and has
been proposed as a possible solution for the management of incidental/meanwhile spaces
(Jerome, 2017). Furthermore, where localised urban greening has developed, there are
reported increases in interactions and stewardship of local green infrastructure (Wolch et al.,
2014; Ward Thompson, Aspinall, & Bell, 2010). However, the small scale of such
interventions often go unreported by LPAs, limiting its value as a scalable practice within
wider green infrastructure management regimes (Rosol, 2011; Schmelzkopf, 2002).
Financially and logistically community groups may also be eligible for grant funding
from public or semi-public organisations from which LPAs are excluded. Examples include
Heritage Lottery Funding (HLF), financial support from Clinical Commissioning Groups
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(CCG) for health projects or quasi-governmental/not-for-profit agencies such as the National
Trust. These funding mechanisms can provide match funding for volunteer time/experience,
as well as funding in the form of capital investment. The developments of Ely Country Park
in Cambridgeshire (Roe & Mell, 2013), Birkenhead Park in Wirral (Heritage Lottery Fund,
2013), and Sefton Park in Liverpool are examples of how community funding can be
obtained to improve green infrastructure (CABE Space, 2004).
Private/commercial opportunities
Private investment is perhaps the least well defined of the options being explored by LPAs.
Due to the potential conflict of interests that occur when private funding is sought to meet
public service needs, where the outcome of investment could be perceived to be meeting the
development objectives of third parties rather than public needs (Cullingworth et al., 2015).
The facilitation of commercial or corporate financing for public services could be promoted
as a form of contemporary philanthropy replicating the long-standing history of investment in
landscape protection in the UK (Howard, 2009; Sykes et al., 2013). Moreover, where
commercial enterprises have established links to the host city, such as Unilever in Port
Sunlight (Merseyside) or Cadburys in Birmingham, the sponsorship of public services can
enhance the relationship between companies and communities. In the UK, the most
significant opportunities to develop such programmes would be high-profile sports teams,
commercial/industrial partners and large-scale developers.
For example, Liverpool’s soccer teams have historically been at the centre of
community activity in the Kirkdale, Everton and Anfield areas of the city. Moreover,
Liverpool has approximately 140 football fields which are managed at an annual cost of
£407,278: 3.39% of the green/space budget (Liverpool City Council, 2015). Corporate
sponsorship of the city’s sports facilities, specifically football pitches, could be a preferential
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option for long-term sustainable funding that would benefit local communities who would
retain their sports facilities, it would also establish a corporate legacy of support for the the
city’s sports infrastructure.
Secondly, the north-west of England is home to several major landowner/developers
involved with the proposed development of the Liverpool Waters, Wirral Waters and Atlantic
Gateway projects, which will have a significant regenerative impact on the social, economic
and ecological landscape of the region (Atlantic Gateway, 2015). Investment in green
infrastructure is outlined within these projects but could be extended through discussions with
LPAs to integrate the recommendations of the Mersey Forest Green Infrastructure strategies
(Mersey Forest, 2010, 2013). Although developers engage in development negotiations, if
they were to provide LPAs with additional funding to develop elements of a city-wide green
infrastructure network, i.e. the Green Web/Wheel proposed in the Liverpool Green & Open
Space Review (Liverpool City Council, 2016), communities may be more responsive to
proposed development. This could, however, still be viewed as an attempt to manipulate
people into accepting a ‘developer’s charter’.
To date there has been a limited discussion within the UK between corporate interests
and the funding of green infrastructure, with some commentators discussing the difficulties in
aligning developer and LPA requirements through development control (Payne & Barker,
2015). Contributions of this kind have though been shown to be effective mechanisms for
positive marketing, i.e. public hire bike in Paris (cf. Newman, 2015) or the creation of a
culture of corporate philanthropy of the Atlanta Beltline development (Kirkman et al., 2012).
Each of these options illustrates the variation in funding available to LPAs to finance
landscape management. However, we can argue that in many cities there remains a lack of
alignment between spatial planning objectives, the economic drivers of development and an
understanding of the finances of landscape management within strategic decision-making
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(Mell, 2016a). This can lead to short-termist approaches to management, which are being
exacerbated due to the UK government’s ongoing austerity measures.
Discussion
The previous sections illustrated the breadth of funding mechanisms available to LPAs to
generate financial support for green infrastructure in the UK. However, we must
acknowledge that no single approach to funding meets the nuances of city government in all
locations. Consequently, it has been difficult for LPAs to identify the most appropriate
approaches to finance ongoing landscape management. A combination of public, private and
community-led funding may promote the use of a complementary suite of approaches to
address this issue, although such alignment highlights the complexity faced by LPAs, as they
attempt to balance funding for capital projects with the identification of sustainable revenue
streams (Squires & Lord, 2012; Mell, 2012).
Deciding upon the most viable set of approaches to green infrastructure funding, as
discussed for example in the Liverpool Strategic Green & Open Space Review (Table 2)
(Liverpool City Council, 2016), engages a complex set of social, ecological and economic
influences, as well as the legal/administrative costs to LPAs and other stakeholders (Table 1).
What is often overlooked is the breadth of opportunity available to generate funding, which is
potentially beyond the institutional purview of LPA structures. Moreover, conflicting
expertise and development agendas exist within LPA decision-making regarding the
suitability and eligibility of some funding options. Questions also remain regarding the
institutional capacity or authority to negotiate developer payments effectively (Cullingworth
et al., 2015; Wilson & Hughes, 2011). We therefore see LPAs in the UK being placed in
financially vulnerable positions, as they discuss attempts to align the appropriateness of
alternative public, private and community-led funding mechanisms.
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The development of financing mechanisms under the New Labour government
attempted to address such debates by facilitating options for different stakeholders to engage
in the development and management process (Marshall, 2009); however, post-2010 and the
revocation of a series of strategic development policies and rescission of a number of funding
instruments, the financing landscape for LPAs has changed significantly, although
comparable language, i.e. devolution, remains in use (Cullingworth et al., 2015). Invariably,
such changes lead to conflicts within and between LPAs, communities, and external agents
who view the practicalities of funding differently (Clarke & Cochrane, 2013; Haughton et al.,
2013). How planning consent negotiations are undertaken, post-2010, is one example where
conflicts between stakeholders have had a significant impact upon the management of the
urban landscape. Development viability is central to such debates, and has led to investor
contributions being increasingly limited or focussed on specific projects/locations (Kambites
& Owen, 2006). Moreover, the legal understandings of management practices and/or the
capacity of stakeholders to manage the financial and time commitments of ownership are
often misunderstood (CABE Space & Asset Transfer Unit, 2010). Unfortunately for many
stakeholders, including local communities, they have insufficient capacity, financial
knowledge, or awareness of the legal liabilities associated with managing spaces in the long-
term. Therefore, although LPAs may not be perceived to be the most effective managers of
green infrastructure, they remain one of the most experienced (Wilson & Hughes, 2011).2
Thus, we can argue that because of the legal constraints placed upon LPAs that other bodies,
i.e. environment/third sector or private companies, could potentially substitute as effective
managers.
Reviewing the current situation in the UK, we propose that approaching the financing
of green infrastructure using a portfolio of complementary public, private and community-led
2 The proposal outline in the Housing and Planning Bill could undermine this process if ‘designated persons’ other than LPA officers are legally allowed to make judgements on planning applications (Department of Communties and Local Government, 2015).
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sources is a more appropriate approach to manage landscape resources than existing
mechanisms. This includes moving away from a reliance on central government financing,
and developer payments which have made significant contributions to green infrastructure
funding, and would require LPAs, politicians and developers in the UK to rethink their
commodification of landscape resources shifting from economic objectives to more
sustainable practices. Thus, longstanding options, such as S106 agreements, may gradually be
replaced by the CIL to the detriment of site-specific allocations. Furthermore, calls for LPAs
to sell assets to fund service provision is a further example of the financial pressures forcing
difficult choices to be made. Unfortunately, where resources are being sold, it is unclear
whether the receipts will be ring-fenced to provide funding for the maintenance of other
landscape resources. Where funding is not protected, we witness community dissent arguing
against the validity of sales, and alternatively calling for an increased number of community
asset transfers (CABE Space & Asset Transfer Unit, 2010).
As discussed previously, several of the options open to local government would
enable LPAs to offset the costs of management through sale, endowments or transfer.
Moreover, high-profile organisations could sponsor green infrastructure as a form of
corporate philanthropy. Similarly, the National Health Service (NHS), at a national level, or
the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG) more locally, could finance revenue spending on
maintenance as part of their green gyms and healthy living initiatives. Approaching financing
as a patchwork of funding opportunities could therefore lower the susceptibility of LPAs to
further funding cuts, as it generates funds from a variety of sources. It may also promote a
more inclusive form of governance as local communities and businesses would become
engaged custodians, especially if asset transfers or park trust models were pursued. Whether
this is ‘altruistic’ is open to debate; however, engaging stakeholders more directly could
increase the capacity of LPAs to safeguard green infrastructure by introducing diversification
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in both funding and responsibility for ongoing management. Unfortunately, it does not,
address the ethical considerations of maintaining green infrastructure for the good of society
(compared to economic development argues), which is outside the purview of this paper.
However, if the development of a suite of funding options can be created within an LPA co-
ordinated framework, we can promote increased diversity in the allocation of funding, which
would in turn enable stakeholders to attain greater control. It remains to be seen how best
such a diverse set of development objectives can be integrated within any reforms to ensure
that urban growth continues to generate financial contributions for green infrastructure.
Conclusions
Substantial cuts to local government funding have forced LPAs across the UK to reconsider
how they finance statutory and discretionary services. As one of the most vulnerable areas of
service provision, green infrastructure management has been severely affected, with further
cuts expected in 2017/18, to the extent where LPAs argue that they it will not be able to make
financial contributions to landscape management (Liverpool City Council, 2016). However,
despite these restrictions, LPAs are engaging with a complex suite of alternative funding
mechanisms drawn from public, private and community sources to balance the decline in
contributions made by LPAs. To understand which approaches are suitable requires an
analysis of how each form of funding can be used to address specific development and
management issues (see Table 1 and 2). Moreover, whilst it may be institutionally beneficial
to develop a universal approach that meets the myriad needs of cost-efficiency, continuity
and clarity in all locations, this is impractical in practice. Alternatively, ongoing discussions
in the UK illustrate that, by engaging with existing public sector financing models, as well as
with more business-orientated approaches a nuanced set of options can be generated that are
responsive to localised socio-economic influences. Using a range of complementary public
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and private sources, as employed in Paris, Atlanta and Chicago, therefore provides scope for
LPA decision-makers to identify funding streams which meet both immediate and more
strategic needs (Mell, 2016b). Furthermore, by working with businesses and the development
sector, we can facilitate a more refined dialogue between stakeholders to generate funding.
To achieve this requires a level of cooperation and understanding between LPAs, developers
and communities, acknowledging the fluidity of funding, and the legal, administrative and
financial constraints placed upon local government by changing financial circumstances. If
these alternative perspectives can be aligned, then more sustainable funding for green
infrastructure can be identified. Unfortunately, if such funding continues to be isolated from
development and community discussions, the limitations of previous local and central
government administrations will be repeated, forcing LPAs to reappraise where and how they
can obtain funding to meet the costs of green infrastructure investment and maintenance.
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Table 1. Financing mechanisms for green infrastructure planning
Financing mechanism Advantages Disadvantages Viability Fit with existing policy / funding structures
Legal / administrative changes
Stakeholder response
LPA orientated
S106 Existing process used by LPA to secure funding for specific investment related to obtaining development consent. Covers a range of investment options including built and green infrastructure.
Process of negotiation can be partial depending on the scale of the investment proposed, the client/developer, and the authority of the LPA to obtain the most appropriate level of funding for services.
Yes, as it would make use of current suite of Local Plan and development control policies/funding mechanisms.
Limited/none as existing processes are used.
Positive in terms of gaining funding for development of amenities/GI but less positive in development sector as it could affect viability of project.
CIL Can be used to fund identified large-scale/strategic projects that all development has to pay into. Aligns itself with strategic plan-making and the delivery of essential infrastructure over a wide geographical area.
Not all LPA have an approved CIL schedule. Can be partial towards a small number of identified projects, which can limit the inclusion of green infrastructure.
Variable depending on adopted CIL
schedule
Variable, as not all LPAs have CIL schedules and there is concern over the development of the strategic objectives outlined in the schedule and the role GI would play in this. Developing new CIL schedules is also a time-consuming and costly exercise which not all LPAs are prepared to undertake.
Variable depending on the existence of a CIL schedule and whether the development of one if cost-effective.
Positive from development sector as there is an identified set of strategic projects that funding goes towards. Less popular with communities as local funding can become limited as it is not classified as ‘strategically’ important.
Commuted sums Provides funding which is normally larger and more focussed that S106 agreements to fund specific projects.
Not as common as S106 payments and are not often used/agreed to fund green infrastructure.
Yes, as it would make use of current suite of Local Plan and development control policies/funding mechanisms.
Limited/none as existing processes are used.
Variable due to developers accepting the need to pay larger commuted sums for GI rather that S106 or CIL payments for other identified projects. Positive in LPAs and communities as it provides, potentially, greater levels of funding.
Sale Immediate financial gains from sales that can be used to fund capital and revenue services.
Short-term solution to funding as land holdings and the sale of assets can only draw on a finite level of resources.
Yes, but would require approval from LPA officers and elected officials.
Transfer of land would be subject to legal approval and administration/finance mechanism would need to be modified.
Positive for the balance sheets of LPAs, popular with developers as they would gain developable land, but unpopular with local communities as they would lose GI assets.
Park trust / endowments Long-term financial security that is managed outside of LPA control, which potentially helps the management team of a
Large upfront costs to set up the endowment. Lack of public support for sale of land to help establish the endowment fund.
Unclear due to changes in
ownership and
No, a new set of legal, administrative and financial processes independent to the LPA would be needed ensure
Major as a new set of legal, administrative and financial processes independent to the LPA would be needed ensure
Unclear due to the novelty of the approach in the UK. Potentially popular with stakeholders due to retention of GI and proposals for
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given space to manage the landscape and investment portfolio more strategically.
Political difficulties in promoting sale and management outside of LPA structures.
legal issues successful transition of to the model.
successful transition of to the model.
independent management in perpetuity.
Local taxation Spatially inclusive approach to generate income from council tax and/or business rates. Can be used for identified infrastructure provision/services.
Unpopular with local people and the business community and can be difficult to approve in LPAs due to government restrictions. Also difficult to allocate specific taxes to identified service provision.
X
Yes, although there are significant government constraints on changes to council tax rises and the imposition of new ‘parks/tourist’ taxes
Significant, especially if new taxes were levied. Changes to taxation would require government approval or a referendum to gain political and legal approval.
Unclear, increases in tax are unpopular but could be marketed as protecting assets. Proximity taxes near parks would be unpopular. Tourist taxes may lead to changes in visitor numbers but could also be a significant source of income.
Rewilding and cutbacks Cost and time-effective and can offer a broader range of ecological management options. Can provide more attractive/interesting urban landscapes.
Can be viewed negatively by communities who prefer highly managed spaces. Could also be seen as being dangerous, unattractive and not user-orientated.
Yes, it would require a change in management regime but minor other changes in LPA policy.
Yes, service-level agreements would require renegotiation and administration of contracts would need to be reviewed.
Variable, as changes management could be viewed negatively by communities unless educated/awareness was raised. Contractors may be unhappy with decreased service-level agreement contracts.
Community orientated
Community asset transfer Provides communities with opportunities to take ownership of green spaces and decreases the financial and legal responsibilities to LPAs.
Communities are often unaware of the financial, legal and managerial responsibilities of ownership. Enthusiasm for ownership can diminish over time if the composition of a group changes.
but difficult to enact in practice
Not directly. Each transfer would need to be assessed against the development objectives and legal/financial processes of an LPA to ensure fit. However, most transfers are ad hoc and will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Significant as LPAs and potential receivers of transfers need to be legally and financially responsible. There is also major paperwork needed to enact the legal transfer of land/ownership which is costly and time consuming.
Popular with local communities as they can gain control of assets and with some LPAs as they can decrease their liabilities and costs. However, the process and ongoing management needs to be carefully thought through to ensure it is done appropriately.
Guerrilla gardening Simple yet effective form of urban greening. No cost to the LPA and highly visible to local communities.
Issues over ownership and access which can lead to disagreements between local communities-activists, land owners and the LPA.
No, informal greening is not planned for within the Local Plan or development control documentation.
None for LPA, although informal management could have legal ramifications over access which could lead to LPA involvement.
Popular as local communities can engage in greening and witness the benefits without having to go through the formal processes of LPA engagement.
Informal greening / management
Limited or no cost to LPA and provides scope for local communities to take informal ownership of local spaces.
LPA become unpopular when spaces are redeveloped or communities are asked not to manage them.
No, informal greening is not planned for within the Local Plan or development control documentation.
None for LPA, although informal management could have legal ramifications over access which could lead to LPA involvement.
Popular as local communities can engage in greening and witness the benefits without having to go through the formal processes of LPA engagement.
Private/corporate orientated
Sponsorship Potentially significant funding Lack of desire to provide In places but No, private sponsorship is Legal agreements would be Potentially very high for both
from corporate sponsors with links to location. Positive publicity for sponsors with local communities, the LPA and other businesses.
funding and questions over the amount of funding that might be provided. Potential conflict of interests being sponsors and future development in the city.
lacks wider commercial support
outside of the parameters of the Local Plan and development control procedures and would be developed on a case by case basis between the LPA and private business/stakeholder.
needed between private stakeholders and the LPA to set the parameters of the sponsorship agreement and its tenure. This would require legal and administrative support.
private stakeholders who would receive positive publicity and for communities who would retain their local amenities. It would also lower the costs of management to LPAs.
Sale and endowment Gain of assets that can be used for development. Improvements in long-term financial viability through ownership of high quality development sites.
Initial costs of appropriation and the negative perceptions of the public to the sale of land to private businesses.
Potential to be widely used as cost-benefits to new owners can be defined
No, private sponsorship is outside of the parameters of the Local Plan and development control procedures and would be developed on a case-by-case basis between the LPA and private business/stakeholder.
Complicated as a new set of legal, funding and trust agreements would need to be developed and agreed by all responsible parties. Whilst this has the benefit of protecting sites in the long term, the legal changes would be significant and time consuming.
Variable. Sales are unpopular but the retention of GI assets would be popular. However, there would be concerns over the longer-term viability of such agreements and how much control the LPA would have on the management of GI resources. Private stakeholders could gain positive feedback if they manage the resources in consultation with LPAs and communities.
Private management for public use
Can be more cost-effective as commercial management models can be used. Private companies can have access to newer and more advanced techniques, technology and manpower.
Lack of control over services once the service-level agreements have been signed. Cost of sub-contracting can be higher than retaining in-house service provision and skills.
No, private sponsorship is outside of the parameters of the Local Plan and development control procedures and would be developed on a case-by-case basis between the LPA and private business/stakeholder.
Legal agreements would be needed between private stakeholders and the LPA to set the parameters of the sponsorship agreement and its tenure. This would require legal and administrative support.
Potentially very high for both private stakeholders who would receive positive publicity and for communities who would retain their local amenities. However, some stakeholders may feel uneasy about private business providing public services and the long-term transfer or privatisation of assets from the public to private ownership. It would also lower the costs of management to LPAs.
Table 2. Financing options under discussion in Liverpool.
Table 2 expresses the likelihood of each option being used by Liverpool City Council to fund green infrastructure. The data presented in Table 2 is derived from an in-situ analysis of Liverpool City Council, local business and environmental stakeholder responses during engagement with the Liverpool Strategic Green & Open Space Review (2015-16), which canvassed opinion within the city regarding the long-term funding of green infrastructure (Liverpool City Council, 2015, 2016). The appraisal has been populated through an 18-month engagement with the Green & Open Space Review by the paper’s author/s and is based on attendance and participation in four rounds of public consultations and the development of the project’s interim and final recommendations. Table 2 is not an in-depth or exhaustive analysis of this process but a reflection on the ongoing discussions held in Liverpool regarding the utility of each financing technique. The discussions of each financing option therefore included reflections on the viability of use from a council and public perspective, and the logistics of utilising any or each of these techniques, but would need more extensive research to highlight best-fit to meet stakeholder needs in Liverpool.
Financing option Viability
New
mechanism
Increased cost to LPA
Decreased cost to L
PA
Benefits to L
PA
Benefits to com
munities
Benefits to developers
Legal changes
Adm
inistrative changes
Positive stakeholder response - L
PA
Positive stakeholder response - com
munities
Stakeholder response - developers
S106 X X
CIL X X - X
Commuted sums - X -
Sale - - X X
Local taxation (homes) X - X X - X X -
Local taxation (business) X - X - X X X
Re-wilding / cutbacks - - X - - X X -
Community asset transfer - - X X - -
Guerrilla gardening - - - - X X - -
Informal greening / management - - - - X X - -
Sponsorship - - - - - -
Endowment - - - - -
Private management of public space
- X - X
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