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UGAMUNC XXIV

UNHCR

Greetings Delegates!

On behalf of the University of Georgia, I would like to welcome you to UGAMUNC XXIV and the committee for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. My name is Mariah Elliott, and I have the honor of serving as your chair for the conference. I am a third-year from Buford, Georgia studying International Affairs and Arabic, and minoring in Spanish. I am a fellow in the Institute of Leadership Advancement, the Finance Director for Camp for a Cause, and an alumni of the 2017 UGA Morocco program. Last year, I served as the co-chair for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and I look forward to hearing many innovative solutions in the UNHCR.

I will be co-chairing with the wonderful Elena Tothazan. Elena is a third-year International Affairs major with a French minor. This is her first year in Model UN,

and she is just as excited as you for this year’s conference! She has lived in Lawrenceville,

Georgia for almost eight years, but originally comes from Romania. As a migrant herself, she

looks forward to the discussions of the UNHCR panel delegations and all the ideas that will be

shared. Despite popular belief, Elena is not a vampire, even though she is from Transylvania.

In order to keep everything running smoothly, we request the upmost level of maturity in committee. The selected topics address pressing international issues that are not to be taken lightly. Of course, we look forward to having fun, however, please be mindful of your actions and refrain from discriminatory or offensive behavior. With that being said, we urge you to think creatively. Elena and I selected lesser-known topics with many dimensions to challenge you – use this to your advantage. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to reach out. We look forward to meeting you all come February!

Regards,

Mariah ElliottChair of the UNCHR

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mle55015@uga.edu

History of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

In 2015, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) celebrated its 65th anniversary since its foundation in 1950 after the end of World War II. Originally, this UN organization was created to help displaced Europeans after the atrocities of the last world war for three years, after which it was to be disbanded.1 However, other refugee crises rose up after World War II and this organ of the UN has continued to function and help refugees for almost a century now. The UNHCR is a branch of the United Nations that deals with refugee issues around the globe. According to the UNHCR’s official webpage, the UNHCR is “a global organization dedicated to saving lives, protecting rights and building a better future for refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless people.”2Currently, the UNHCR works in 130 countries with 10,966 staff members total; about eighty-seven percent of those staff members work on the ground.3 The labor of those members is of absolute importance; without it, many refugees and distraught individuals would suffer at the hands of civil wars, poverty, disease, statelessness and many other afflictions. Besides providing direct aid to refugees, the “UNHCR’s Statistics Database provides data, reports and other information essential for field operations. It also carries statistical reports on people of concern – refugees, asylum seekers, returned refugees, the internally displaced and stateless people. Detailed information on country of asylum, place of origin, gender, age, location and legal status of refugees is available.”4 This platform for acquiring and sharing data is also very important, as it provides crucial information of the world’s refugee migratory patterns so that states can deal with such refugee waves accordingly. It is also admirable to note that the UNHCR is “funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions, with 87% from governments and the European Union. [The rest] comes from other inter-governmental organizations and pooled funding mechanisms…[and] from the private sector, including foundations, corporations and the public. Additionally, we receive a limited subsidy (one per cent) from the UN budget for administrative costs, and accept in-kind contributions, including items such as tents, medicines and trucks.”5 While many other intergovernmental organizations are influenced by the interests of their donors, the UNHCR can operate with a smaller bias in its programs and decisions.

1 “History of UNHCR.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Web. 17 Oct. 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/history-of-unhcr.html 2 IBID3 IBID4 IBID5 IBID

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As delegates of this committee, you will discuss three topics that the UNHCR is dealing with today. These issues must be deliberated, as different ideas and views about the topics could bring forth solutions and inspiration that the world can use in navigating these hard problems. The UNHCR provides much of the essential boots on the ground forces that really make a difference. However, as globalization progresses in bringing the world closer together, the changing dynamics and nature of conflicts, politics, and economics will determine if the UNHCR’s work can continue to make a difference in the world.

Topic I: Environmental Impact of Displacement in the DRCThe Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, is the second most ethnically diverse country in the world. Out of around 200 ethnic groups, four major groups comprise 45% of the population: Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu), and the Mangbetu-Azande (Hamitic).” 6 The rich natural resources of the DRC have further exasperated the prolonged ethnic conflict. National unity and resource management are the only solutions to transition from years of conflict and instability. Historical Background

Following the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, approximately one million Rwandan Hutus migrated into Eastern DRC, amongst them group of Hutu extremists.7 Banyamulenge, Zarian Tutsi, incited violence against the refugees and partnered with the Allicance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) with the goal to overthrow Mobuto, the serving president – thus marking the beginning of the First Congo War. 8 The rebel group began to gain traction and controlled a sizable territory in Zaire. In attempt to slow the growth of the AFDL, the government began “the systematic removal of all Tutsis,” in November of 1994.9 By 1997, the AFDL held over half of the country and the leader, Laurent- Désiré Kabila, overthrew Mobuto in May.

Kabila renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo and worked to draft a new constitution for a directionless country plagued by a dysfunctional 6 "ETHNIC GROUPS." Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed October 14, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/print_2075.html. 7 “Political Conditions." Congo, DRC Country Review (July 2012): 8-36. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed October 14, 2017).8 IBID9 IBID

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government and a devastating war. In 1998, the rebel group the "Mouvement de Liberation Congolais" (MLC), supported by Uganda which once backed the AFDL, began fighting against Kabila.10 Despite attempts of making peace, the MLC remained a threat and, only a year after the first, the Second Congo War broke out between Kabila’s forces and the joint forces of the MLC and Ugandan army. Altogether, the Second Congo War, also referred to as the African World War, involved “foreign armies and investors from Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, Libya, and Sudan, among others,” and has had devastating social, economic, and environmental impacts on the region.11 An International Rescue Committee report released that the years of violence in the war of 1998-2002, along with the widespread rape, malnutrition, and high rates of internal displacement has caused an estimated 5.4 million deaths.12 A related study conducted by the Australia’s Burnet Institute calculated that the Second Congo War and its aftermath amount to the most deaths of any conflict since World War II. 13

During a coup attempt in 2001 a bodyguard shot President Kabila and his son, Joseph Kabila, took power. Like his father, Joseph Kabila had no prior leadership or military experience, but he attempted to attain peace for the DRC. He set out to hold the first national elections since 1984, but under the condition that all foreign militaries withdraw from the conflict.14 However, the Rwandan army reentered into the region as did the Ugandan army both of which stated “that their involvement in Congo D.R.C. was for the purpose of maintaining regional stability.” 15

The signing of the Pretoria Agreement, signed in 2002, nominally called the Second Congo War to an end in 2003. This mediated peace treaty greatly reduced the civil war violence, established a transitional parliament, and instituted democratic elections in 2006.16 The election was highly contested given that no 10 IBID11 Democratic Republic of the Congo: World Without Genocide -. Accessed October 14, 2017. http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/congo 12 International Rescue Committee. "Democratic Republic of Congo." International Rescue Committee (IRC). N.p., n.d. Web.13 Bavier, Joe. "Congo war-driven crisis kills 45,000 a month: study." Reuters. January 22, 2008. Accessed October 14, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-death/congo-war-driven-crisis-kills-45000-a-month-study-idUSL2280201220080122. 14 “Political Conditions." Congo, DRC Country Review (July 2012): 8-36. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed October 14, 2017).15 IBID16 Cordell, Karl, and Stefan Wolff. Ethnic conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Responses. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.

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party won a seat majority, but eventually the elected Joseph Kabila’s “People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy” (PPRD) won through creating a coalition with other smaller groups.17

Despite the end of the war in 2003, foreign militias continued to operate in the DRC. Fighting diminished during 2005-2007, however, after the election of 2006 the Tutsi in Eastern DRC, Congo’s Kivu region, saw their political representation disappear.18 In 2008 violence arose between a Tutsi rebel group led by General Laurent Nkunda (CNDP) and the Congolese army. The fighting resulted in a mass exodus from the area. As a primary battleground for three major groups, the Congolese army, Nkunda-led rebels, and the FDLR, the people of East Congo became caught in the crossfire and saw significant bloodshed as a result of clashes.19 In 2008, the UN negotiated a ceasefire, however, the fighting persisted. 20

In 2012, after the signing of the CNDP’s peace treaty with the Congolese government, a branch the March 23 Movement (M23), composed of ethnic Tutsis and some Mai-Mai community militias, took up arms against the Congolese government.21 Security Council Resolution 2098 in 2013 approved the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) - primarily composed of Malawian, South African, and Tanzanian troops - to “protect civilians and neutralize armed groups through offensive operations in eastern DRC”. 22

Since the recanting of the M23, many other armed groups have emerged “due to the general lawlessness, chaos, and weak governance in eastern DRC.” 23 Stronger militant groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) terrorize communities and hold power over

17 IBID18 Pulitzercenter. "The Roots of Ethnic Conflict in Eastern DRC." Pulitzer Center. January 05, 2017. Accessed October 14, 2017. http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/africa/roots-ethnic-conflict-eastern-drc. 19 IBID20 IBID21 McKnight, Janet. "Surrendering to the Big Picture: Historical and Legal Perspectives on Accountability in the Democratic Republic of Congo Following the Defeat of the March 23 Movement." Stability: International Journal of Security and Development. February 17, 2014. Accessed October 14, 2017. https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.de/. 22 IBID23 Council on Foreign Relations. "Global Conflict Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed October 14, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo.

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weakly governed areas – financed by the exploitation natural resources.24 The postponement of the 2016 election has furthered political instability and violence. DRC Refugee Crisis

The twenty years of ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has left many to face food insecurity, epidemic outbreaks, and displacement. The sudden escalation of intercommunal violence – due to clashes between the military and armed militia groups in the

Figure I: IDMC25

Kasai region – has vastly increased the rates of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). When considering refugees, the many people unable to leave the borders of their country (thus, subject to internal displacement) are not often forgotten. A mid-year figure reported by the IDMC discovered that new internal displacements (associated with conflict and violence) totaled to 4.6 million – 3.7 million of those located in the Democratic Republic of Congo.26 Of the 3.7 people displaced, over 1 million have been newly displaced since the start of 2017. 27 The remainder of those displaced are in North Kivu (837,000) and South Kivu (387,000).

The prolonged violence in the DRC has also displaced many of the ethnic groups. The Pygmies and the Nande, for example, have been specifically targeted by the armed violence and reports claim countless cases of murder, torture, and

24 IBID25 “Global internal displacement in 2016.” Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2017/pdfs/2017-GRID-DRC-spotlight.pdf26 IDMC. “Provisional Mid-Year Figures: Internal Displacement in 2017.” Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Aug 16, 2017. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2017/20170816-mid-year-figures-highlights.pdf27 NRC, and IDMC. "DR Congo has world's highest number of people fleeing conflict internally." Norwegian Refugee Council. May 22, 2017. Accessed October 14, 2017. https://www.nrc.no/dr-congo-crisis-sees-highest-global-internal-displacement.

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rape. 28 In October of 2002, rebel groups (including the MLC) began the “premeditated, systematic campaign of attack against the civilian population of Ituri in the area of Epulu, Mambasa, Teturi, Byakato and Erengeti” called “Effacer le Tableau” (Erase the Board) in which rebel groups aimed to gain territory for strategic purposes and plunder the resources.29 The violence against the Ituri population left over 60,000 dead 100,000 displaced – many being subject to slavery, executions, and cannibalism. 30 Environmental Impact

The Democratic Republic of Congo has large deposits of many valuable natural resources including gold, copper, cobalt, tin ore, coltan, timber, and oil. 31 Despite the economic opportunity these provide, the presence of the Congo’s natural resources has led to extreme exploitation, violence, and human rights violations. Of course, access to natural resources is important on a local level and has been the cause of some clashes in the region, however, these resources have played a significant role in financing and prolonging large-scale conflict. 32 The lack of financial aid for rebel militia groups leaves them to become dependent on a wide range of funding avenues such as easily extractable resources (i.e. tin, gold, and coltan). 33 According to the UN, most mining sites in the Kivus regions of DRC are under the control of armed militias. 34

Recent research has found that displacement also has significant ecological impact. The UNEP has noted that a characteristic of displacement in the DRC is that “over 90 percent of all IDPs live with host communities or in rudimentary shelters in makeshift camps.”35 Informal IDP camps have been set up around and

28 Minority Rights Group International. “Erasing the Board.” Minority Rights Group International. July 2004. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/MRG_Rep_Twa_ENG.pdf 29 IBID30 Penketh, Anne. "Extermination of the Pygmies." The Independent. July 06, 2004. Accessed October 14, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/extermination-of-the-pygmies-552332.html. 31 "Natural resource exploitation and human rights in the DRC, 1993-2003." Global Witness. December 17, 2009. Accessed October 14, 2017. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/natural-resource-exploitation-and-human-rights-drc-1993-2003. 32 Partow, Hassan. 2011. The Democratic Republic of the Congo : post-conflict environmental assessment : synthesis for policy makers. n.p.: Nairobi, Kenya : United Nations Environment Programme, 2011., 2011. UGA GIL-Find Catalog, EBSCOhost (accessed October 15, 2017). http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_DRC_PCEA_EN.pdf33 Partow, Hassan. 2011. The Democratic Republic of the Congo : post-conflict environmental assessment : synthesis for policy makers. n.p.: Nairobi, Kenya : United Nations Environment Programme, 2011., 2011. UGA GIL-Find Catalog, EBSCOhost (accessed October 15, 2017). http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_DRC_PCEA_EN.pdf34 IBID35 Partow, Hassan. 2011. The Democratic Republic of the Congo : post-conflict environmental assessment : synthesis for policy makers. n.p.: Nairobi, Kenya : United Nations Environment Programme, 2011., 2011. UGA GIL-Find Catalog,

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within the boundaries of World Heritage national parks, thus exacerbating deforestation (for firewood and housing) and wildlife poaching.36 Alternatively, the migration of IDPs into major cities has driven urbanization and, in turn, strained basic services (i.e. the solid waste management and the failing healthcare system).37 With weakened infrastructures, levels of displacement in the DRC often correlate with increased rates of epidemic diseases such as hemorrhagic fever, measles, and cholera. 38

The lack of environmental governance fuels further degradation and displacement in the DRC. Improper management of resources in forestry, mining, fisheries, and charcoal production is unsustainable (economically, socially, and environmentally) as it feeds an endless cycle of resource exploitation, poverty, and violence. Past UNHCR Action

In providing financial and technical support to the DCR’s government, the UNHCR proposed a plan in 2007 to aid “the return and sustainable reintegration of IDPs and Congolese refugees from neighboring countries” and “help reduce violence and human rights violations, build national institutions and civil society’s capacity to protect civilians.” 39 Given the weak socio-economic infrastructure, the UNHCR supports health and education services in areas of return. 40 In 2012, the UNHCR implemented a multi-year plan of action for resettlement of Congolese refugees from Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. 41 Aside from intervention brigade authorized in 2013, the UN Security Council has denounced the humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic with little furthered action. Overall, the support of the international community has waned, leaving humanitarian organizations to handle the dangerous situation with less resources. 42 Despite

EBSCOhost (accessed October 15, 2017). http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_DRC_PCEA_EN.pdf36 IBID37 Zeender, Greta, and Jacob Rothing. 2010. "Displacement trends in DRC." Forced Migration Review 1, no. 36: 10. Advanced Placement Source, EBSCOhost(accessed October 15, 2017).38 IBID39 UNHCR. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” UNHCR Global Appeal 2007. Accessed October 14, 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/uk/4554439a0.pdf 40 IBID41 UNHCR. “Congolese Refugees.” UNHCR Priority Situation Fact Sheet. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/558c0e039.pdf 42 Global internal displacement in 2016.” Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2017/pdfs/2017-GRID-DRC-spotlight.pdf

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being one of the longest standing conflicts and refugee crises, it has silently fallen out of the international spotlight and continues to deteriorate. Suggested Readings

I. Comprehensive document detailing the history of violence, displacement, and human rights abuses in the DRC from 1993 – 2003. https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/drc_exploitation_and_human_rights_abuses_93_03_en.pdf

II. Detailed report of the international response to the DRC: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/The-International-Response-to-Internal-Displacement-in-the-DRC-December-2014.pdf

III. More information on the environmental degradation of the region: http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/conflict-and-environmental-insecurity-in-the-north-kivu-province-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/

Food for Thought

I. Is there any foreseeable way to alleviate the poverty and displacement in the DCR through environmental peacebuilding?

II. Consider the regional dimension of the conflict and the environmental insecurity (specifically relations with Rwanda and Uganda).

III. Is an investigation of war crimes and trial of individual responsibility for the humanitarian atrocities a necessary first step to eventually overcome the conflict?

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Topic 2: Ethnic Conflict and Sectarian Violence in Myanmar 

Introduction

History is no stranger to human migration. However, this phenomenon has been increasing with the stronger impacts of push and pull factors that motivate people to cross state borders and immense bodies of water. To be able to accurately understand the multiple ongoing refugee and migration crises, one must first have a clear picture of who is considered to be a refugee. According to the United Nations High Committee for Refugees in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees document, a refugee is a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”43

A rapidly emerging refugee crisis today is that of the Rohingya people who are fleeing the state of Myanmar (Burma) because of ethnic and religious persecution by the state militia. Currently, an estimated half million Rohingya are considered refugees, a majority of which have fled to Bangladesh, a neighboring state of Myanmar, as well as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, while others remain internally displaced.44 The majority of Rohingya populate the Rakhine state in Myanmar, on the northwest side of the country, bordering Bangladesh, making the latter state the first location the minority group has fled to for safety. The majority of Myanmar people are Buddhists, while the Rohingya are a Muslim minority. Discrimination against the Muslim group runs deep into Myanmar’s history, so it was only natural for this group to become vulnerable to human rights abuses when conflict broke out between the state military and several armed ethnic groups in Myanmar.

In August of 2017, a militant group called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army claimed responsibility for attacks on police and army posts in the Rakhine

43 “United Nations, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” UNHCR. Accessed October 17, 2017.44 Albert, Eleanor. “The Rohingya Crisis.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 4, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.

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state of Myanmar. The state’s government retaliated by declaring that the militant group is a terrorist organization and having a military crackdown on ordinary Rohingya that had no affiliation to the group, except for

ethnicity. The military have burned down villages and brutally abused and killed many from the Muslim minority.45 Human Rights Watch has also stated that “Witnesses said that Burmese soldiers had beaten, sexually assaulted, stabbed, and shot villagers who had gathered for safety in a residential compound, two days after

Figure II: Council on Foreign Relations46

Rohingya militants attacked a local security outpost and military base.”47Since then, a massive wave of Rohingya refugees started fleeing Myanmar in fear of losing their lives. The government’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, leads the National League for Democracy which has recently come to power after many years of government military rule. Despite this turn towards democracy, she refuses to admit that these atrocities are taking place.

A Brief OverviewSimilarly, in 2012 and 2016, thousands of refugees fled Myanmar because of

persecution by the state. Two waves of skirmishes in 2012 escalated the conflict and really caused the beginning of Rohingya flight from Myanmar. In 2016, tensions escalated again over an attack that killed nine police officers and prompted several skirmishes in the Rakhine state. The attacks “appeared to be extrajudicial killings of Muslims by the army.”48

45 IBID46 Albert, Eleanor. “The Rohingya Crisis.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 4, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.47 “Burma: Military Massacres Dozens in Rohingya Village.” Human Rights Watch. October 4, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.48 Ives, Mike. “Violence Mounts in Restive Myanmar State, Leaving a Dozen Dead.” The New York Times. October 12, 2016. Accessed October 17, 2017.

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Sadly, this refugee crisis should come as no surprise since Myanmar is known for numerous ethnic conflicts throughout its history. When people started populating the territory of what is known as Myanmar today, they brought Theravada Buddhism along with them; over time, this became the dominant religion in the state and any other religious minority has been looked down upon. This deeply rooted resentment has lingered until modern day; the Muslim Rohingya have been outcasts of Myanmar’s civilization for many years. There are many government regulations imposed on the minority group, such as getting permission to marry and acquiring government approval to move to a new home or travel outside of one’s townships. The state of Myanmar does not recognize the Rohingya as citizens, which makes it very hard for this group to obtain jobs in the state.49 In effect, the Rohingya population is impoverished, and in the Rakhine state, competition for resources with the Myanmar Buddhist population makes the distinction between the minority and majority groups much sharper. Because these individuals do not have citizen status, they are considered a stateless nation. Thus, the Myanmar state government doesn’t see these people as their responsibility.

Myanmar is currently a transitioning democracy, which makes it a very unstable state. The military took over the government in a coup d’état in 1962 and the military junta ruled the state until it was dissolved in 2011. The military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party won the general election in 2010, which prompted many to question this progress towards democracy.50 The Burmese army still holds a significant amount of influence in the political and social life of the state. Many have argued that even though the military is not in charge of the government, it is allowing the country to democratize step by step, while they still hold on to their power and rule from the shadows. In the 2015 elections, the National League for Democracy party, which was the barred opposition party to the Union Solidarity and Development Party, won a majority of seats in both chambers of parliament. The following year, Htin Kyaw was elected as the first non-military president and Aung Sang Suu Kyi, the NDL’s leader, became State Counsellor. Kyi was prohibited from becoming president under the USD’s

49 Albert, Eleanor. “The Rohingya Crisis.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 4, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.50 Barany, Zoltan. “Armed Forces and Democratization in Myanmar: Why the U.S. Military Should Engage the Tatmadaw.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. September 13, 2016. Accessed October 17, 2017.

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constitution, as she led a non-violent opposition movement to end military rule in the state. However, she is now considered the de facto leader of Myanmar.

The emerging democracy is currently trying to contain many armed ethnic group insurgencies and gain favor with the military. As such, the Rohingya issue seems to be far from the government’s concerns.51 Aung Sang Suu Kyi has been accused of doing nothing while the Rohingya people suffer; she has denied such allegations. Tejshree Thapa said in an interview that “ Aung Suu Kyi is important as a moral and political authority but the reality on the ground in Burma is that she has little control over the army.”52 The transition of Myanmar from a military ruled government to a democracy is very fragile and has left the state unable to deal with a human rights crisis. The other reason the state cannot or will not deal with the Rohingya issue would be the pressure of the domestic constituency that the government now needs to respond to. The Council on Foreign Relations states that “Country-wide anti-Muslim sentiment makes it politically difficult for the government to take steps seen as supportive of Muslim rights…The Myanmar government has effectively institutionalized discrimination against the ethnic group through restrictions on marriage, family planning, employment, education, religious choice, and freedom of movement…In 2016, Myanmar’s first democratically elected government in a generation came to power, but critics say it has been reluctant to advocate for Rohingya and other Muslims for fear of alienating Buddhist nationalists and threatening the power-sharing agreement the civilian government maintains with the military.”53 In short, any attempts from the government to help the minority group would be perceived a sign of betrayal and alienate the very people that voted for the democratic government. Thus, it is much easier for the Myanmar government to turn a blind eye and allow the military to commit atrocities against the Rohingya people to create favorable relations between the state government and military, which would bring greater stability to the state in the long run.

51 “Sectarian Violence in Myanmar.” Council on Foreign Relations Conflict Tracker. October 17, 2017. Accessed October 17,2017. 52 “Ethnic Cleansing in Myanmar: Interview with Tejshree Thapa and Poppy McPherson.” Foreign Policy Interrupted. September 22, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017. 53 Albert, Eleanor. “The Rohingya Crisis.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 4, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.

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Other states have put pressure on Myanmar to stop these human rights abuses. Protests took place in “Pakistan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Bangladesh to condemn the killing and persecution of Rohingya.”54 However, “Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand—all ASEAN members…have been silent on the plight of the Rohingya and on the growing numbers of asylum seekers in member countries, largely because of its [ASEAN’s] members’ commitment to the principle of noninterference in each other’s internal affairs.”55 This is not to say that these states agree with the lack of intervention from the rest of the international community. Since Bangladesh is not an ASEAN member and is taking in the majority of the Rohingya refugee population, its government and civil society have been highly critical of Myanmar’s military action against the Rohingya. However, Bangladesh’s border with Myanmar is heavily patrolled against the incoming flux of refugees. This has prompted many to attempt getting to Bangladesh by water, which has increased the death toll of the Rohingya as many drown and cannot make it to Bangladesh’s shores. The neighboring state has also been accused of destroying around twenty vessels that carried Rohingya refugees under the pretext of combatting human trafficking and smuggling of methamphetamines. There is a large movement of human and drug trafficking in the Southeast Asia region, but refugees also reported being beaten at the border, which would indicate the weak validity of Bangladesh’s statement.56

In 2016,U.S. president Barack Obama lifted economic sanctions on Myanmar as it started to improve on human rights. Many declared this to be a premature action in light of Myanmar’s outburst of violence against the Rohingya right after the sanctions were lifted. In September 2017, the U.S. donated $32 million in aid to Myanmar and has very recently started to consider re-imposing sanctions. .57

UN and UNHCR ActionAn emergency UN Security Council meeting was held on September 2017,

where the Secretary General as well as many members called for more pressure on

54 IBID55 IBID56 Allard, Tom and Sagolj, Damir. “Bangladeshi Destroys 20 Boats Ferrying Rohingya Muslims Fleeing Myanmar.” The Wire. May 10, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.57 Albert, Eleanor. “The Rohingya Crisis.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 4, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.

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the Myanmar government to cease its crimes against humanity. Nikki Haley, the U.S. representative to the UN, called for countries to suspend provision of weapons to the Myanmar military, which could send a strong signal to the state’s armed forces about the consequences of their ethnic cleansing operations. Security Council members also mentioned the commander in chief of Myanmar’s armed forces, Min Aung Hlaing, who “is ultimately responsible for the army’s actions in Rakhine State. Yet his name has been barely mentioned in the international press as the crisis in Rakhine has escalated.”58 Ultimately, the UN Security Council took no immediate action, but many considered discussions about Myanmar as progress, since the last public discourse on Myanmar took place in 2009.59 UN leaders condemned the ethnic cleansing in the state, which the UN Secretary General called a “humanitarian and human rights nightmare.” Yet, the Council on Foreign Relations reports that “other Security Council members, like Russia and China, have resisted increasing pressure on Myanmar’s government because they say it is trying to restore stability.”60 Human rights abuses should not be ignored for the sake of state stability; instead, a much more secure stability can be achieved for the state if the issue of human security is addressed first.

Myanmar’s government has also made matters worse by denying foreign aid groups access to the Rakhine state where the crisis is most intense. Amnesty International stated that “fear of starvation, as well as the attacks by the military, is driving more people from their homes, as many Rohingya are stranded in villages with little or no access to food.”61 The international humanitarian aid group also demanded that the UN Security Council pressure Myanmar to offer “unfettered access for humanitarian aid groups.”62 A New York Times article stated that Aung San Suu Kyi’s government officials “accused international aid groups of

58 Kurlantzick, Joshua. “The UN Toughens its Myanmar Stance-Five Years into the Rakhine Crisis.” Council on Foreign Relations. September 29, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017. 59 Gladstone, Rick and Specia, Megan. “Pressure Rises at U.N. on Myanmar Over Rohingya Crisis.” The New York Times. September 28, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017. 60 Albert, Eleanor. “The Rohingya Crisis.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 4, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.61 “Myanmar: UN Security Council Must Impose Arms Embargo.” Amnesty International. September 27, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.62 “Myanmar: UN Security Council Must Impose Arms Embargo.” Amnesty International. September 27, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.

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abetting Rohingya militants.”63 Myanmar’s isolationist policies are a roadblock for solving the issue, as many of the internally displaced Rohingya that have stayed behind will die from lack of aid, if not killed by the state militia. The half million Rohingya refugees that did manage to reach Bangladesh live in disastrous conditions in refugee camps; aid is stretched thin by more incoming refugees and financial backing runs dry as foreign aid organizations try to supply for everyone’s needs.

In October 2017, the UN has taken more direct action to alleviate the crisis by releasing twelve million dollars in emergency relief funds for the Rohingya refugees.64 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has set up many refugee camps in Bangladesh and worked with authorities in that state to admit the Rohingya fleeing violence in Myanmar. The UN organization, along with UNICEF and other partners, have also delivered “food and water to the stranded refugees, among them children, women and the elderly who are dehydrated and hungry from the long journey.”65 They have also “airlifted to Bangladesh some 700 metric tonnes of life-saving aid, including tents, plastic sheets, blankets, mosquito nets, kitchen sets and jerry cans.”66 Kutupalong, one of two refugee camps in Bangladesh run by the government, will get an extension, which includes “a road to facilitate construction and refugee access, supporting site planning, building latrines and wells, improving the water and sanitation facilities and distributing shelter materials.”67 The UNHCR has also “installed nearly 500 latrines, 51 shallow tube wells and 8 deep tube wells to ensure access to drinkable water,” and planning to build more latrines to combat health problems related to drinking unsanitary water.68 Despite all these efforts, the refugee camps are overcrowding and the UNHCR has become overwhelmed. This was reflected when a lack of clean water supplies in the refugee camps led to a cholera outbreak, which prompted the

63 Gladstone, Rick and Specia, Megan. “Pressure Rises at U.N. on Myanmar Over Rohingya Crisis.” The New York Times. September 28, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.64 “UN Releases Emergency Funds for Rohingya Refugee.” VOA News. October 3, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017. 65 “Thousands of Rohingya refugees stranded near Bangladesh-Myanmar Border.” UN News Centre. October 17, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017. 66 “Rohingya Emergency.” UNHCR. October 17, 2017. Accessed October 17, 2017.67 IBID68 IBID

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ongoing UN cholera vaccination campaign in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF.69

Questions to Consider:I. With the election of the National League for Democracy as a majority party

in parliament and Aung San Suu Kyi as the unofficial leader of Myanmar, would the state be considered a democratic state if it does not focus on addressing human rights violations against the Rohingya minority within its borders? How might Kyi’s government do this while also continuing to stabilize the state? Could the state’s attempts to retain the military from killing any more Rohingya threaten this fragile balance of power between Kyi’s government and the state military?

II. Should the international community put pressure on Myanmar to take care of the ethnic conflict? If so, what means (economic sanctions, aid, outside military intervention etc.) should be used to make the state comply with international human rights law? Or should the international community do nothing for fear of destabilizing the state all over again when democracy is just starting to gain some ground?

III. Is the intervention and aid of the UNHCR and its partners, as well as other international organizations, enough to solve the issue? Or are these just short-term solutions to the crisis? How might the issue be resolved in the long term?

IV. What are your countries policies towards this issue? What would your country do if Myanmar continues persecution of the Rohingya? What would happen if Bangladesh started abusing the refugees fleeing Myanmar?

V. A New York Times article by Saw Nang and Wai Moe states that “The roughly one million Rohingya in Rakhine are officially stateless, having been denied citizenship by the Myanmar authorities…” If the Myanmar government does not recognize this sizable ethnic group and they do not have a state of their own, could the Rohingya be considered a stateless nation like the Kurds in the Middle East or the Catalonians in Spain? Would giving the Rohingya people citizenship status be a first step in working towards a viable solution to the issue?

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VI. This emerging democracy already seems to be facing one of the downsides of becoming a democratic state. Civil society pressures the government and has a strong influence on the course of action that democratic state will take. Here, the majority of Myanmar people have a deeply rooted discrimination against the Rohingya. This unpopular opinion of the Rohingya is the very thing that makes it harder for the government to change its policies towards the minority group. If this is the case, will Myanmar ever become a true democracy? And if yes, how so? Would changing the attitudes of the state’s population be a first step and how might this be achieved?

Further Readings:I. This New York Times article provides more insight into the dynamics and

complexities of the conflict and the balance of power between Aung San Su Kyi and the military. It also really pushes the reader to consider and look for the certain parties that have control over the legitimate use of force in the state of Myanmar. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/opinion/myanmar-rohingya-aung-san-suu-kyi.html

II. The following reading provides more detail on Myanmar’s political history and its impacts and implications on the current affairs of the state. It also provides a more historical background leading to the events that are taking place in Myanmar today. http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/1962-coup--ne-win-regime.html

III. This Council on Foreign Relations article talks about the way in which the military in Myanmar still holds power and acts as an autonomous unit from the newly instituted government of Aung San Su Kyi. The Myanmar government is perceived to be the party held most accountable for the atrocities against the Rohingya, when the real culprit is the military, which should be blamed instead. The article explores how the military set up this ingenious game. https://www.cfr.org/interview/how-myanmars-military- wields-power-shadows

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Topic 3: Crisis Across Borders: Migrants of Colombia and Venezuela 

IntroductionThe five decades of conflict that have plagued Colombia have created one of the highest and most prolonged rates of internal displacement in the world – leading hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Despite the Colombian government’s commitment to ending displacement, the country still struggles with guerilla groups, cartels, paramilitary, and narcotráfico groups which bar international actors from aiding the situation.70 The rising rates of IDPs have placed more pressure on Colombia to find a sustainable solution for a peaceful future.

La Violencia La Violencia, the political conflict in Colombia (1946-1958), claimed over

200,000 lives. The murder of the Liberal Party leader Jorge Elicer Gaitan sparked the conflict’s initial street riot in Bogota known as El Bogotazo. 71 This event catalyzed the widespread political violence in Colombia.

Although the reason behind the violence is widely disputed, many blame the intense partisan rivalries between Colombia’s two majority political groups, the Liberal and Conservative Parties.72 With an increase in liberal senatorial seats after conservative domination, many predicted Gaitan, known as “the people’s candidate”, would win the upcoming 1950 elections. 73 Some investigations have assigned responsibility for the assassination to CIA Operation Pantomime.

70 Ferris, Elizabeth. “Changing Times: The International Response to International Displacement in Colombia.” December 2012. Accessed October 18, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Changing-Timesthe-Intl-Response-to-Internal-Displacement-in-Colombia-December-2014.pdf 71 World Peace Foundation. "Colombia: La Violencia." Mass Atrocity Endings. December 14, 2016. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/colombia-la-violencia-2/#_edn172 IBID73 Encyclopædia Britannica. "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán." Encyclopædia Britannica. July 20, 1998. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jorge-Eliecer-Gaitan

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Regardless of the cause, the death of Gaitan dramatically intensified the local partisan violence, inciting a deadly, ten-year conflict. 74

The high tensions between the liberal and conservative parties during the period led to “the dissolution of the liberal-controlled congress” and the uncontested win of Laureano Gómez in the 1949 election. 75 After falling ill, Gómez passed the presidency to Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez, (serving from 1950- 1953) under whose presidency the highest rates of violence were reported, that is, until Rojas Pinilla took power in the military coup of 1953. 76 Along with the state-supported violence under Pinilla’s tightened military regime, local forces used people’s personal vendettas and feelings of inequality to provoke violence on the local-level, overall, leading to an increased civilian death toll.77 With conditions continuing to worsen, the conservative party’s Laureano Gómez and the liberal party’s Alberto Lleras Camargo created the Pacto de Benidorm to oppose Pinilla and propose the implementation a 12 year power sharing plan called the National Front – which began in 1957. 78 In mitigating the partisan-fueled violence, the National Front effectively brought the initial issue of La Violencia to an end. However, the exclusion of smaller parties and the declining social conditions led to growing unrest. 79 This marked the turn from political violence to class-oriented violence.

This shift led to the creation of leftist geurilla groups including El Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) and Movimiento 19 de Abril (M19). 80 Per the instruction of the 1958 pact, the government began to dismantle the National Front in 1970. 81 The presidents following such an instrumental institutional

74 World Peace Foundation. "Colombia: La Violencia." Mass Atrocity Endings. December 14, 2016. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/colombia-la-violencia-2/#_edn175 IBID76 World Peace Foundation. "Colombia: La Violencia." Mass Atrocity Endings. December 14, 2016. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/colombia-la-violencia-2/#_edn177 IBID78 Encyclopædia Britannica. "Declaration of Sitges." Encyclopædia Britannica. September 10, 2009. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Declaration-of-Sitges#ref1068664 79 US Library of Congress. "History of Colombia: THE NATIONAL FRONT." History of Colombia. 2013. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://motherearthtravel.com/history/colombia/history-9.htm 80 IBID81 US Library of Congress. "History of Colombia: THE POST-NATIONAL FRONT." History of Colombia. 2013. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://motherearthtravel.com/history/colombia/history-10.htm

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change faced difficult obstacles. The post national-front period, characterized by high inflation and unemployment, further fueled social unrest. The guerrilla movement, drug trafficking, and marijuana cultivation contributed to the steady decline of growth rates from 1978-82. 82 Despite these challenges, the Colombian government took significant strides to strengthen Colombian democracy and restore peace.

Today the ELN and FARC remain prominent groups in Colombia. While they arguably differ ideologically, they have similar goals - “both oppose the privatization of natural resources and claim to represent the rural pool against Colombia’s wealthy.” 83 Additionally, FARC and ELN use violence and kidnapping as for funding and leverage. 84 A research conducted by Colombia’s National Center for Historical Memory estimates that “guerrilla groups have kidnapped around 25,000 people” between 1970 and 2010. 85 One example of this being the abduction of presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, and several other high-profile public officials from 2002-2008. 86 In late 2016, relations seemingly took a turn for the better when Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos negotiated a peace treaty with FARC to institute a ceasefire and disarmament. 87 Since the beginning of 2017, however, the violence and displacement has continued.

Colombian Displacement

82 IBID83 Felter, Claire, and Danielle Renwick. "Colombia's Civil Conflict." Council on Foreign Relations. January 11, 2017. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict 84 “”85 “Una Verdad Secuestrada” Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. 2013. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://www.pan.org.co/sites/default/files/pdf/CLDN.UNA%20VERDAD%20SECUESTRADA.pdf86 Felter, Claire, and Danielle Renwick. "Colombia's Civil Conflict." Council on Foreign Relations. January 11, 2017. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict87 Fjeldstad, Øivind. "Hope, Violence and Displacement." NRC. June 19, 2017. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/2017/hope-violence-an-displacement/

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Figure III: UNHCR88

The long-standing conflict in Colombia has taken countless lives and left many more displaced within their own country. A report released by the IDMC estimated that over 56,000 new displacements have occurred since the beginning of 2017. 89 According to Human Rights Watch, since 1985 the Colombian armed conflict has displaced approximately 6.8

million people – the largest population of IDPs after Syria. 90 Conflict-zones directly impacting rural areas has increased social and economic inequality – specifically amongst displaced ethnic groups, Indigenous people, and Afro-Colombians. 91 Unlike many other refugee crises, the Colombian government funds all IDP programs with the exception of small-scale assistance from the World Food Program and the International Committee of the Red Cross.92

During this long-standing conflict, the influx of refugees has strained Colombia’s relations with Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Hundreds of thousands of people have primarily fled to Ecuador and Venezuela. 93 Over the years, the governments of both Ecuador and Venezuela have worked to

88 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Colombia Situation update, February 2017, February 2017, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/58b6d1604.html [accessed 18 October 2017]89 IDMC. “Colombia Mid-Year Update.” 2017. Accessed October 16, 2017. http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/country-profiles/Mid-Year-update-2017/COL-conflict.pdf90 World Report 2016. "Colombia: Events of 2015." Human Rights Watch. January 27, 2016. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/colombia 91 Congressional Research Service. “Peace Talks in Colombia.” March 31, 2015. Accessed October 16, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42982.pdf92 Ferris, Elizabeth. “Changing Times: The International Response to International Displacement in Colombia.” December 2012. Accessed October 18, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Changing-Timesthe-Intl-Response-to-Internal-Displacement-in-Colombia-December-2014.pdf93 Fjeldstad, Øivind. "Hope, Violence and Displacement." NRC. June 19, 2017. Accessed October 15, 2017. https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/2017/hope-violence-an-displacement/

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improve the refugee conditions due to the limitations in healthcare, work, and education opportunities in the border regions.94 After the 2015 deportation of 20,000 refuge-seeking Colombians from Venezuela, the total amount of those internally displaced has reached today’s count of 7 million ICDs. 95 However, with the urgent situation in Venezuela, remaining Colombian refugees and the people of Venezuela now face more difficult realities. The political, economic, and humanitarian crisis has resulted in a wave of Venezuelan refugees which the Colombian government estimates has pushed around 300,000 Venezuelans to cross into Colombia seeking refuge. 96

The reversal of roles in the refugee crisis of the region has forced Colombia to adjust to the mass exodus of refugees across its border, while supporting its own heavy IDP population. Although on the road to recovery, the Colombian government is not of sound enough infrastructure to provide security for these refugees.

UNHCR ActionThe UNHCR remains present in Colombia, with four field offices in the

Pacific region. 97 The Office’s priorities in Colombia continue to be preventing and assisting displacement situations. This is accomplished through supporting community-based land protection projects, engagement with populations (emphasizing Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities), contributing to the strengthening of public policies, and ensuring protection-by-presence in remote areas affected by ongoing conflict. 98 The UNHCR has partnered with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to create ‘protection clusters’ – a sector-based coalition of all participating organizations used to coordinate efforts more

94 IBID95 Daniels, Joe Parkin. "Grateful Colombian refugee opens home to Venezuelans in need." UNHCR. August 31, 2017. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2017/8/59a672b24/grateful-colombian-refugee-opens-home-venezuelans-need.html 96 IBID97 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Forced displacement growing in Colombia despite peace agreement." UNHCR. March 10, 2017. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/briefing/2017/3/58c26e114/forced-displacement-growing-colombia-despite-peace-agreement.html 98 UNHCR. “UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-2015: Colombia.” Accessed October 16, 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/528a0a367.pdf

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efficiently. 99 Overall, the UNHCR is working alongside the Colombian government to ensure sustainable solutions for the refugees and IDPs.

Supplemental ReadingsI. More general background information and data about the Colombian

conflict: http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/

II. CRS report on the conflict, terrorist groups, and peace talks: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42982.pdf

III. Overview of the internally displaced refugee crisis: http://www.coha.org/colombias-invisible-crisis-internally-displaced-persons/#_ednref9

IV. Summary of Colombia-Venezuela relations, including emphasis on the refugee crisis: http://theglobalamericans.org/2017/04/impact-collapse-venezuela-colombia/

Food for Thought I. How can Colombia better meet the needs and provide for the masses of

people internally displaced? How can the involvement of NGOs and other international actors mediate the situation and fill in the gaps of government aid’s limitations?

II. Given the long, intertwined history of Colombia and Venezuela, how might their relationship be used to mitigate the refugee crisis? Is there a sustainable option to handle the situation locally, or would partnering with other countries prove more effective?

III. The threat of guerilla groups (i.e. ELN and FARC) and the weak infrastructure limits the extent to which the Colombian government can handle incoming refugees. Should Colombia treat the situation as a security threat or a humanitarian crisis?

99 "The Fate of the Colombian IDPs." UNRIC. Accessed October 15, 2017. http://www.unric.org/en/colombia/27002-a-refugee-in-their-own-country-the-fate-of-the-colombian-idps-

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