A Tale of Two Lettersby Thomas Kimmel, Jr. & Donald Reed

Introduction

Following the Pearl Harbor disaster, the investigative commission appointed by the Roosevelt administration pointed the finger of blame at U. S. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Naval commander in Hawaii, declaring him--along with the Army commander Major General Walter C. Short--derelict in his duty, & solely responsible for the success of the attack.1

With the horror of the attack, and the obloquy from the Roberts Commission’s declaration still fresh, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox nonetheless supported Admiral Kimmel’s search for a post-retirement job with the Harris Engineering Company.2 Knox’s loyalty to Admiral Kimmel caused anxiety within the Navy Department, which perceived Knox’s support as a potential embarrassment to the Roosevelt Administration. Despite Secretary Knox’s noble personal gesture, the story does the Navy no credit.

The Rugg Letter

The story of Admiral Kimmel’s employment with the Harris Company, & the Navy’s alleged part in ending it, has unfolded gradually over the course of 67 years, since 1942. The latest chapter only came to the authors’ attention in 2009.

So little is known because apparently, Kimmel kept the matter to himself so as not to burden either the Harris Company or his career naval officer sons. In fact, he deceased in 1968 having never shared this information with his two surviving sons.3 However,

1 Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941. On December 16th President Roosevelt appointed sitting Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen Roberts to investigate the matter. On December 17th Admiral Kimmel was replaced. On December 18th the Roberts Commission began its investigation. On January 24, 1942, the Commission’s report not only blamed Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the success of the Japanese attack, but declared beyond its charter that the Washington high command "fulfilled their obligations." Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Congress of the United States; Pearl Harbor Attack [hereafter PHA], U. S. Congress, Joint Congressional Committee [hereafter JCC] on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 40 parts, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, Part 39, pages 1-21 [Hereafter 39PHA1-21].________________________________________________________________________2 The Frederic R. Harris Engineering Company was operated by two former Chiefs of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Admirals Harris and Sanford. Vice Admiral S.M. Robinson, Chief of Procurement and Material, described them as “the best drydock designers and builders in the world.” From the Truman Library Oral History project interview of Lt. John H. Tolan Jr. (available on line on its website at: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/tolanj.htm#123; See Kimmel, Husband E., pages 118-121, 123-129.) [Hereafter Tolan Interview.]________________________________________________________________________3 Manning Kimmel and Thomas Kimmel Sr. were both Naval Academy graduates serving on submarines during World War II. Manning, Admiral Kimmel’s oldest son, was killed in action in 1944. A third naval officer son, Edward Kimmel served on the USS Ranger and USS Vixen. Thomas Sr. retired from the Navy in 1965 after serving a full career. Admiral Kimmel’s eldest grandson, Thomas Jr., also served in the Navy during Admiral Kimmel’s lifetime.

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Kimmel did confide in his attorney Charles Rugg, who in a 1946 letter revealed the part he knew to Admiral Harry Yarnell.4

The Rugg letter tells the incredible story that the Navy Department contacted the Harris Company with the intent of forcing Harris to either fire Admiral Kimmel or risk losing the Harris navy contracts:

You [Admiral Yarnell] doubtless know that he [Admiral Kimmel] has left the Harris Company. The story of that was astounding. Harris got for his firm the job of rebuilding Guam, constructing originally the new docking facilities. He had arranged for Kimmel not to go to Guam, but to head the San Francisco office that was going to be in charge of it, and Kimmel had made plans to move out there, and was apparently set for several years’ more intensive and interesting work. Just before Kimmel left [for San Francisco to work for the Harris Company], along in the middle of the summer [year unspecified] word came from the Navy Department, Kimmel suspects from the Secretary’s office, that if Kimmel [were to have] anything to do with the [Guam restoration] project the contracts with Harris would be cancelled, also intimating that they did not want Kimmel staying with the Harris firm any more. In view of that Kimmel voluntarily resigned, although, as I understand it, Harris was ready to blow the lid off about it. Since then Kimmel had not found any other job, but is looking around for one.5 & 6

______________________________________________________________________________________4 U. S. Admiral Harry Yarnell was a former Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, a former Commandant of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and in 1932 was the first to lead a successful aircraft carrier mock attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yarnell assisted Admiral Kimmel during the Naval Court of Inquiry with his wide knowledge of Naval and Public Affairs.

In 1966 Admiral Kimmel wrote: “Admiral Yarnell was on the retired list but had been ordered to active duty in the Navy Department. At the conclusion of the proceedings of the Naval Court or Inquiry, Admiral Yarnell was unceremoniously relieved or duty and practically thrown out of his office. When I expressed my regret that his assistance to me had caused his relief, his reply was, ‘If that is the reason, I am proud to be relieved.’" See Husband E. Kimmel, “Events Leading to the Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor Behind the Scenes,” November 1966, authors’ file # 1927.________________________________________________________________________5 Charles Rugg, Esq., letter to Admiral Harry Yarnell, dated December 9, 1946. Authors’ file #1934.________________________________________________________________________6 James V. Forrestal succeeded Knox as Secretary of the Navy on April 28, 1944. Secretary Forrestal used the existence of an intelligence report in the Navy Department, which told of British success in air-dropping torpedoes in shallow water, against Kimmel in his negative endorsement, i.e., veto, of the Naval Court of Inquiry’s favorable findings about Kimmel. When Kimmel read Secretary Forrestal’s endorsement, he requested the information, and its source. Admiral Kimmel never received the information, nor ever learned of the existence of the intelligence report.

See 39PHA362 for Forrestal’s endorsement. See Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, 2001, page 308, footnote 28 documenting his discovery of an intelligence report available in the Navy

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Despite Admiral Kimmel’s efforts to shield his sons, some twenty years after his death, they became aware of Rugg’s letter.7 The letter in turn became a topic of discussion in a 1988 meeting between Kimmel’s sons and Secretary of the Navy William Ball, during which they apparently had gained the Secretary’s support for posthumous advancement of Admiral Kimmel on the retired list to his pre-Pearl Harbor rank.8

Captain Thomas Kimmel Sr. memorialized the event in a letter to his four children as follows:

The last thing in the meeting I [Captain Kimmel] handed him [Secretary Ball] the letter from Rugg to Admiral Yarnell to read. He was visibly shaken when he read it. I told him that my father had never told me about this, and I had only known about it a few weeks. I added that I thought it was disgraceful, and that I never thought the Navy would do such a thing.9

The Harris Company matter surfaced again in 1995 when Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Edwin Dorn was preparing to conduct a Senate-mandated review of the Navy’s post-Pearl Harbor handling of Admiral Kimmel. Kimmel’s son, Edward, wrote to Dorn advising him of the Harris matter in an effort to have it included as an issue in Dorn’s review.

Unfortunately, the matter was not addressed in the Dorn Committee’s report--despite Secretary Dorn having referred Edward’s letter for consideration to the Senate committee’s counsel, Commander Roger Scott.10

Department, dated July 15, 1941, declassified in 1998, which told of the British Navy’s success in air-dropping torpedoes in shallow water. Admiral Charles Lockwood, the author of the report, and apparently Secretary James Forrestal chose not to reveal the existence of Lockwood’s report to any Pearl Harbor investigation.______________________________________________________________________________________7 It is unclear exactly how Kimmel’s sons learned about the letter. However, there are two relatively obvious answers. Admiral Kimmel donated his extensive papers to the University of Wyoming and his sons certainly had access to them. However, the more probable answer is that the attorney junior to Rugg, Edward Hanify, who continued to work on the Kimmel case for the remainder of his life on a pro bono basis, likely would have known about the Harris matter and shared it with Kimmel’s sons. In fact Hanify attended the 1988 meeting with Secretary Ball.______________________________________________________________________________________8 See Edward R. Kimmel letter to Secretary of the Navy William L. Ball III, dated April 26, 1989, authors’ file # 1123. Secretary Ball recommended that the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association’s initiated request for advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel on the retired list be forwarded to the President for consideration, but he was overruled by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Taft IV. This is also the exact 45th anniversary of the day that Rudolph Halley met with the “stunned” Lt. Tolan.______________________________________________________________________________________9 Captain Thomas K. Kimmel Sr., USN, (Retired) letter, dated May 2, 1988 to Thomas Jr., Virginia, Husband II, and William, authors’ file.______________________________________________________________________________________

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With this issue not having been acknowledged or addressed, the Dorn Report’s Finding Number 3 thus unequivocally stated, “The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel & General Short was substantially temperate and procedurally proper.”11

Apparently, Commander Scott must have received Edward Kimmel’s letter addressed to Dorn, since, subsequently, he specifically considered the matter of the Harris affair to be inconsequential. In a 1998 law review article, he concluded in a footnote that the government had taken no action against Kimmel that entitled the admiral to due process, & that whatever grievances Admiral Kimmel had had they were not recognized or remediable at law.

The Kimmels have . . . alleged that the Navy Department threatened “to take away construction contracts from Frederick R. Harris, Inc., a naval contractor, if they (sic) continued to employ Admiral Kimmel” after he had retired . . . . The Kimmels have not produced a copy of correspondence or any other evidence to support this allegation.12

So until 2009, Rugg’s letter, the Dorn’s report omission, & Scott’s dismissal of the relevance of the Harris matter was all that had been known of the matter.

In that year, the authors learned of the role Secretary Knox had played in helping Kimmel obtain employment, and the Navy’s dishonorable efforts to bury the fact of Knox’s assistance. This startling new information came to light during a review of a 1974 interview, conducted as part of an oral history project by the President Harry S. Truman Library.

The Knox Letter

Lieutenant John Tolan (not to be confused with Pearl Harbor attack author John Toland), a naval officer formerly assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, served as a liaison to the Senator Harry Truman Committee.13 In 1974, Tolan was interviewed by James R. Fuchs for an oral history project of the President Harry S. 10 The Dorn Report is titled, "ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND MAJOR GENERAL SHORT ON THE RETIRED LIST, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, December 1, 1995."______________________________________________________________________________________11 Ibid, p. 5.______________________________________________________________________________________12 See Commander Roger D. Scott, (JAGC, USN), “KIMMEL, SHORT, MCVAY: CASE STUDIES IN EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY, LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF MILITARY COMMANDERS,” MILITARY LAW REVIEW, VOL. 156, JUNE 1998, pp. 52-199, especially p. 143.______________________________________________________________________________________13 Select Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, 1943-45. Popularly known as the “Truman Committee,” its highly publicized proceedings thrust the senator from Missouri into the national limelight investigating waste and abuse in the National Defense Program.______________________________________________________________________________________

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Truman Library.14 Tolan said he was “stunned” by the story of the Knox letter supporting Kimmel’s efforts to obtain a post-retirement job:

TOLAN: No public figure ever uttered a word of doubt [that] Admiral Kimmel and [General] Short were to blame.15 Both were in total disgrace. Their resignations were almost compelled. They were put on retirement pay of $6,000 a year and told to "settle yourself in a quiet nook somewhere and let old Father Time help this entire situation," as Admiral Stark told Admiral Kimmel. Public hatred of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was so universal that I was stunned when I heard Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox put in a good word [in writing] for the Admiral.16

Tolan described Knox’s support of Kimmel as a “startling occurrence,” not because Secretary Knox expressed a kind word for Admiral Kimmel--he had previously done so in confidence to Tolan and Tolan’s boss Captain John A. Kennedy (no relation to the later President)--but because Knox might have done so in writing. Tolan’s first hint that Knox actually wrote such a letter was when an investigator for the Truman Committee inquired if the letter existed.17

TOLAN: I was called to Rudolph Halley's office (investigator for the Truman Committee). He said, "Lieutenant, Drew Pearson18 has a story that Secretary Knox has written a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel giving him permission to work for a Navy contractor. As a result of this letter the Admiral is working in New York for a salary of $25,000 a year for the Frederic R. Harris Engineering Company. Pearson says Mrs. Kimmel also is

14 Tolan Interview, p. 118. A member of the Truman Library staff confirmed to author Thomas Kimmel Jr. that the Tolan interview was accurately represented on their website.______________________________________________________________________________________15 Admiral Yarnell wrote that, “The most disgraceful feature of the whole affair was the evident determination on the part of Washington to fasten the blame on the Hawaiian commanders. One of the strongest impressions of the affair is the lack of moral courage of anyone in Washington from the President down to accept in the slightest degree any blame for the tragedy in the face of overwhelming evidence that their incompetence and stupidity was entirely responsible for what happened.” Admiral Yarnell letter to Charles Rugg, dated July 5, 1946, authors’ file # 1934.______________________________________________________________________________________16 Tolan Interview, p. 119.______________________________________________________________________________________17 Tolan Interview, p. 120.______________________________________________________________________________________18 Tolan Interview, p. 120. This is, of course, the famous investigative reporter Drew Pearson, author of the syndicated column "Washington Merry-Go-Round." Tolan also commented, page 120, that Pearson’s “Capitol Hill bird dog was an aggressive young fellow by the name of Jack Anderson.”______________________________________________________________________________________

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working for the Harris firm for another $25,000 annual salary.19

Tolan explained how alarmed he was that the Knox letter might actually exist, because should it become public knowledge, it would have been an enormous embarrassment to the Administration and the Navy, so he immediately considered what might have to be done to conceal the letter’s existence.

FUCHS: Did Halley seemed surprised?TOLAN: Yes, but when he came up with Secretary Knox's name, I was alarmed. It meant a direct approach to the Secretary. I hoped he hadn't written any such letter. If he had, we might be asked to conceal this fact from the Committee.FUCHS: How could you have accomplished that?TOLAN: Only by involving Chairman Truman and by asking his help to cut off Pearson. That seemed unlikely as Halley concluded, "Pearson wants to get a copy of Secretary Knox's letter. He wants the Truman Committee to get it for him. We are getting a wonderful press from Pearson but we may, or may not, want to get into this. However, we would like to know whether or not such a letter exists. You can tell Captain Kennedy [that] Pearson will probably break his story, with or without the letter, in about two weeks. He says he has clear proof about Admiral and Mrs. Kimmel working for Admiral Harris.[”] This meeting with Rudolph Halley occurred in early afternoon of Wednesday, April 26, 1944.20

Tolan and his boss, Captain Kennedy, immediately reported, what they viewed as an alarming situation, to Secretary Knox and discovered, to their dismay, that the story was true. Secretary Knox had indeed written a work-permission letter to Admiral Kimmel.

FUCHS: Had he written the letter?TOLAN: Yes, he had. But he made no offer to make a copy of it available. Instead, he spoke very solemnly to Captain Kennedy. "John," he said, "I wrote the letter. Admiral Harris and Admiral Sanford came in one day to tell me how very sad it was that Husband Kimmel was becoming physically and mentally deteriorated by his idleness. They spoke of his many talents. They had work

19 Tolan Interview, p. 120.______________________________________________________________________________________20 Tolan Interview, p. 121.

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for him in their engineering firm. They wanted me to write him a letter and give him my permission to take the job. I wrote the letter. I'll just have to take the consequences. You see, John," he added, "Husband Kimmel is a very old and warm personal friend. I feel very sorry for him."21

Tolan then described how Knox wanted Tolan & Kennedy to handle the Truman Committee. Knox wanted facts surrounding the letter given to Knox’s confidential assistant, Adlai Stevenson, who would draft a response to the Truman Committee. In an honorable manner, Knox was willing to accept the consequences of his support for Kimmel.

TOLAN: "Mr. Secretary," Captain Kennedy inquired, "I have a memorandum here. Do you want it? Or would you like me to respond to the [Truman] Committee in any way?" The Secretary thought for a moment. Then he said, "Give it to Adlai. (Adlai Stevenson was [Knox’s] confidential assistant and speech writer.) Lt. Tolan says Drew Pearson won't break the story for several days. Adlai will have time to draft a statement. I'll talk to him about it. Just give him the file." Still pensive, he continued, "We'll have to let the chips fall where they may. That's all there is to it. I only hope that the day Drew Pearson breaks the story will be the same day our forces hit the coast of France. It will be buried in the back pages." . . . .

Captain Kennedy and I returned to our office. He didn't call Adlai Stevenson until the next morning in order to give the Secretary time to speak first. At that time, Captain Kennedy gave me the file and asked me to deliver it to Stevenson. I had anticipated meeting him with great pleasure. When I walked into his third floor Navy Department office, I was surprised that there was no secretary. He was sitting far across the room writing before a bright window that faced

21 Tolan Interview, pp. 123-24. Co-author Reed’s reaction after having seen this story for the first time:

“Prior to this page, reading the first draft of “A Tale of Two Letters” certainly was interesting, since I had never met my great-uncle, Mr. Knox (he died in 1944, eight years prior to my birth).  But the level, steady tenor of any historical account, as it should, appeals to reason, to the mind; and thus, I was completely unprepared for what happened next.

“Tolan’s description -- ‘he spoke very solemnly’ & Knox’s solemn, determined statement, ‘I’ll just have to take the consequences’ -- went through me as if a live current had surged. 

“This is exactly the speech pattern & cadence of the paternal side of my family, as also personified by my father (Knox’s nephew, who also worked in Washington D.C. during WWII & who was close to his uncle; deceased in 1967).  And as a result, I have little doubt that the essential details of Tolan’s account of his being in Knox’s office on that afternoon – of what he witnessed, asked and heard in response -- are genuine.” ______________________________________________________________________________________

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south. Without turning, he said, "What is it?" I said, "I'm Lt. Tolan. I have this file on the Admiral Kimmel matter." Adlai Stevenson didn't even turn his head, but told me, "Just leave it on the desk out there."22

Tolan next described how Secretary Knox’s untimely death the next day ended the anxiety of the Truman Committee and the Navy Department, ended the media’s interest in the story, and allowed the matter to remain secret from the public.23

FUCHS: Did he ever write the statement of explanation by Secretary Knox?TOLAN: He didn't get the opportunity. The file was put in his hands on Thursday morning, April 27, 1944. On Friday, evening, April 28, 1944, our gallant Secretary, Frank Knox, died in that same chair, in that same office, of a heart seizure.24

FUCHS: Did the story of the letter remain a secret?TOLAN: It has never been made known. Two recent books verify the fact that Admiral Kimmel worked for Admiral Harris . . . . He went to work about June 1942. Although he kept an office at the Harris firm, he took leave in the fall of 1943 to prepare his defense against a Navy inquiry. It was conducted from February 22 to June 15, 1944 by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Retired. This preceded two additional Navy Boards of Inquiry, and, finally from November 15, 1945 to May 31, 1946, the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack continued to

22 Tolan Interview, pp. 124-25. Adlai Stevenson was Mr. Knox’s attorney, and, apparently, his principal attorney.______________________________________________________________________________________ 23 If Admiral Kimmel ever received Secretary Knox’s letter, the Kimmel family is not aware of it as it is not known to exist in the Admiral Kimmel papers currently on display at the University of Wyoming.______________________________________________________________________________________24 Contrary to Tolan’s statement that Knox died at his desk the New York Times reported that Knox died at his home. New York Times, April 29, 1944, by Sidney Shalett, from the NY Times archives file: “WASHINGTON, April 28 -- Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, died at his home here this afternoon at the age of 70. The Navy was in mourning for its vigorous leader, who in his four years of office directed the unprecedented development of the United States fleet from an inadequate, undermanned organization to the mightiest navy afloat.”______________________________________________________________________________________

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try Admiral Kimmel.25 He was never cleared of the blame.26 Drew Pearson, after Secretary Knox's death was left without a story. Naturally, I never talked with Mr. Halley again about the letter -- never told him there was a letter. The grim reaper took care of our anxieties.27

By memorandum, dated November 1966, 84-year-old Admiral Kimmel added some clarity to this matter by describing the loyalty of Admiral Harris, but still did not reveal the Navy Department’s role in his post-retirement employment story. He wrote:

Near the end of 1943 I submitted my resignation to Admiral Harris, the President of the Frederic R. Harris and Company engineering firm at that time engaged principally in the design of floating dry docks for the Navy. I had been employed by this firm in 1942 shortly after I was retired.

I informed Admiral Harris I wished to submit my resignation as I had decided to go to Washington and fight and I did not want to embarrass him or his firm. He strongly advised me not to take this course for if I did they would destroy me. He stated, "I have always advised you thus for your own interest."

25 Tolan incorrectly refers to three “Navy Boards of Inquiry.” Contrary to Tolan’s recollection in his interview with Fuchs, there was only one Naval Court of Inquiry (NCI), July 24-October 19, 1944, to investigate the Attack. Composed of three Admirals, Murfin, Kalbfus, and Andrews, the NCI was also the only Pearl Harbor Attack investigation of ten authorized that accorded Admiral Kimmel the opportunity to defend himself.

Admiral Thomas Hart’s one-man ex parte investigation was not a Naval Court of Inquiry, nor was Admiral Hewitt’s one-man ex parte investigation, accordingly, neither accorded Admiral Kimmel the opportunity to defend himself by calling and cross-examining witnesses and by other procedural safeguards as required by an NCI. Tolan also misstates the February 12th start date of the Hart investigation as February 22nd. He correctly states the beginning and ending dates of the Joint Congressional Committee investigation as November 15, 1945 and May 31, 1946. ______________________________________________________________________________________26 Tolan’s statement that “[Kimmel] was never cleared of blame” overlooks the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which effectively exonerated Kimmel. It found there was not a scintilla of evidence to support a charge of dereliction of duty against Admiral Kimmel. It found he committed no errors of judgment based on information he was given, and it approved of all of his force dispositions. Admiral Murfin, the President of the Court, opined that they thought Admiral Kimmel had done everything possible under the political circumstances. The Court criticized Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark for not keeping Kimmel properly informed of events as he had promised Kimmel he would do on multiple occasions.

The JCC found no dereliction of duty on the part of Admiral Kimmel or General Short. The only tribunal that declared a charge of “dereliction of duty” against Admiral Kimmel or General Short was the Roberts Commission. Admiral Kimmel’s predecessor wrote that, “The Report of the Roberts Commission was the most unfair, unjust, deceptively dishonest document ever published by the Government Printing Office.” J. O. Richardson, On The Treadmill to Pearl Harbor, 1973, p. 453.______________________________________________________________________________________27 Tolan Interview, pp. 126-27. Neither John Tolan, John A. Kennedy, Frank Knox, Adlai Stevenson, Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson, or Rudolph Halley testified at any of the ten official Pearl Harbor investigations.

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My reply was, "That is a chance I will have to take. But I have to live with myself and my mind is made up." Admiral Harris refused to accept my resignation and kept me on the payroll throughout the investigations and assisted me in every way he could.28

Conclusion

The Navy discredited itself by choosing not to reveal the Knox letter and allowing Knox’s death to eradicate interest in its existence. As noted in 2007, the former Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Admiral Tom Brooks wrote that,

Chief of Staff Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Stark, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, and Secretary of State Hull, among others—[tried] to cover up their mistakes with regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, and to fix the blame on the Hawaii commanders at the time of attack. . . [S]enior Army and Navy officials committed perjury, suborned perjury, destroyed evidence, and intimidated witnesses. Testimony during the nine investigations… presents a sordid picture of Washington officials covering themselves at the expense of the two Pearl Harbor commanders. Kimmel and Short[’s]… seniors in Washington shared culpability and acted in a disgraceful fashion in their attempt to deflect all the blame. For this reason alone, a compelling case can be made to restore Kimmel and Short to their pre-war ranks.29

Congress passed a law in 2000 recommending in perpetuity that the President posthumously advance Admiral Kimmel and General Short on the retired list to their highest held ranks in World War II.30 This initiative was begun in 1984, and adopted formally on December 6, 1990, at the specific request of The Pearl Harbor Survivors Association (PHSA), not the Kimmel family.

28 Husband E. Kimmel, “Events Leading to the Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor Behind the Scenes,” November 1966, authors’ file # 1927.______________________________________________________________________________________29 Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, review of George Victor’s The Pearl Harbor Myth, “Naval Institute of Proceedings,” May 2007. p. 170.______________________________________________________________________________________30 The United States Congress, in Public Law 106-398, Section 546 of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, recited that the Pearl Harbor Commanders had performed their duties competently and professionally and requested that the President of the United States advance Rear Admiral Kimmel to his highest temporary rank held during World War II, admiral, as provided by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, from which he alone, among flag officers, has been punitively excluded by the Navy.______________________________________________________________________________________

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Indeed, in 1991, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke had written to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney31 that,

It is my judgment that you should approve this posthumous promotion and recommend it to the President . . . . not because of the importance to . . . the Kimmel family but because of the importance to the Navy as an institution.32

To date, no President has honored the PHSA’s request, no doubt because of continued opposition from the Navy Department. It is now clear that the Navy Department owes it to Secretary Knox--let alone Admiral Kimmel and General Short--to revisit the issue and set the record straight.33

31 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney responded by letter, dated October 23, 1989, to his Wyoming constituent inquiry with counsel for the Kimmel family as follows: “The Kimmels should seek help from the voices of that time . . . . such as Admiral Burke . . . [and] the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association . . . . Until there is interest in this by those who were part of that time, and a sense that the Senate would favorably act on a nomination by the President, such advice to the President would not be prudent.”______________________________________________________________________________________32 Admiral Arleigh Burke letter to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, dated July 24, 1991. ______________________________________________________________________________________33 Assistant Secretary of the Navy Carolyn M. Becraft turned down the PHSA request for advancement in a letter to the Kimmel family, dated December 20, 1989, stating, “I am responding on behalf of the President . . . . Absent bias in the judgment or important evidence now available that was not available then it is not appropriate for the Department of the Navy to partake in resolving historical disputes.”

For more “bias in the judgment” and “important evidence now available that was not available then,” beyond the scope of this paper, see “Why Did the Attack on Pearl Harbor Occur?,” by Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr., and J. A. Williams, Esq., Association of Former Intelligence Officers, Winter/Spring Journal 2009, pp. 53-59, also available on the Kimmel website at: http://www.pearlharbor911attacks.com .

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