indrastra | 7 naval strategic insight by rear admiral dr. s. kulshrestha (retd.), indian navy

IndraStra Global Naval Strategic Insight

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By

Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.)

INDIAN NAVY


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CONTENTS

SR.NO

TOPICS

PAGE NO:

A.

Foreword

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B.

About The Author

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1.

Policy Level Intervention Imperative for Accelerating Indigenous Manufacturing of Weapon Systems for Indian Navy

6

2.

French Influence in the Indian Ocean Region - A Perspective

8

3.

Anti-Submarine Air Armament: Decoded

11

4.

Maritime Domain Awareness - Indian Context

14

5.

Developing a Concept of Oceanic Domain Awareness for India

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6.

Aircraft Carriers in Indian Ocean Region

20

7.

Rooting for a Sea Port in Thar Desert

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It is with great pleasure that we present to you the Naval Strategic Insight by Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY through the collection of 7 strategic articles pertaining to India’s role in maritime security apparatus of Indian Ocean and beyond. We hope the readers will find this report both informative and interesting, that it will give everyone a greater understanding of the work undertaken by the author and our organization.

This Naval Strategic Insight for the period July 2015 is ambitious and this is as it should be. As we prepare to meet ongoing commitments of our contributors, it is important that our structures fit the overall strategy by providing effective delivery of quality analysis as a primary goal. IndraStra Global has had a proud record of achievement in recent months and we know that it has the people, the resources and the will to build on these successes and to face the future with confidence.

IndraStra Editorial Team JULY 26, 2015

NEW YORK CITY


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Rear Admiral S Kulshrestha is an alumnus of Jodhpur University with Gold Medal in Solid State

Physics in his Post Graduation. He joined Indian Navy in the year 1975 and was awarded Silver Medal

at the Naval Academy, the Telescope and the Sword of Honour for being adjudged the best Naval

Officer during initial training. He did his specialisation in Quality Assurance of Naval Armament and

adorned various key appointments at Naval Command Headquarters, DRDO establishments, Ordnance

Factories and finally rose to become the Director General of Naval Armament Inspection (DGNAI) at

the Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy).

During his career spanning over three decades in the Armament Quality Organisation in the Indian

Navy, he has gained and attained thorough knowledge of Quality Assurance of sophisticated naval

armament, Quality Management Systems, Project Management, Negotiation on technical as well as

financial subjects and administration of defence as well as civilian workforce. As DGNAI, he was

directly responsible for timely availability of reliable and safe naval armament (which are sophisticated

complex systems, comprising of mechanical/ electrical/ electronic/ chemical components/ mechanisms/

circuitry) to the operational fleet of the Indian Navy.

As part of self development he has been engaged in the study of strategic aspects of acquisition of

Nanotechnology in India by both the public and private sector, with specific relevance to National

Security issues. He has two MPhil degrees pertaining to nanotechnology and associated issues from

Mumbai and Chennai universities and has a Doctorate from ‘School of International Studies’ at the

Jawaharlal National University (JNU). He is also an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence

College (NDC).He has superannuated from Indian Navy in 2011 and is currently unaffiliated. He has

been writing in defence journals on issues related to Armament technology and indigenisation. He is a

Senior Fellow of New Westminster College, Vancouver, Canada, as well as an integral member of

“Brains Trust” at Hindustan University Chennai, India.


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Weapon systems on a warship depend upon the

assigned role and mission of the warship in war.

Generally, warships carry weapons to cater for threats

emanating from the air, surface and underwater. For air

threats like sea skimming missiles and air attacks,

ships have surface to air missiles, guns in dual role,

and close in weapon systems/point defense systems

(multi barrel guns, short-range missiles). For surface

threats, ships have surface-to-surface missiles and

guns. For anti submarine warfare (ASW) ships have

torpedoes and ASW rockets. Warships carry decoys for

deception of enemy torpedoes and oncoming missiles,

these comprise of chaff dispensers, infrared (IR)

decoys, acoustic decoys etc. The warships also have

an extended weapon capability on the helicopters they

house on board; this could be a lightweight torpedo,

rockets, or small calibre guns. The advent of

weaponised unmanned vehicles is introducing another

facet of weaponisation.

Naval weapons are complex in design due to the

corrosive sea environment in which they have to

operate, severe space and weight restrictions, and

problems of stabilization as the ship rolls, pitches and

yaws. Further, as with all weapons, they cannot be

procured just by paying the currency required by the

manufacturers. The pricing of weapons is based upon

the need of the country, its relations with the producing

country, its position in the world at large and other

considerations like, foreign policy issues, type of

technology, availability of similar systems for sale in

other countries etc.

In case of India, it has been the experience that the

weapon systems it desires are not available for

purchase, alternates offered are exorbitantly priced,

and those affordable are invariably not required by

India.

The ideal solution is local availability of weapon systems,

which will ensure maintainability, timely upgrades, and

modularity for warship design. The indigenous effort has

still not matured to provide viable weapon system or even

subsystem solution within the time frame and the

budgeted costs. Economic viability, arms export policy

and non-availability of technological prowess, appear to

be the main reasons. India is left with no alternative but

to import and also prolong use of existing armament by

process of life extension, constrained with

improper/insufficient spares, inadequate documentation

and testing methods. Weapons thus continue to be

deployed well beyond their useful life without ascertaining

if or at all, or to what extent they meet the designed

parameters.

The Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP) has been

promulgated to enable the Armed forces to timely

procure the desired equipment with least drain on

national resources. The DPP is being regularly revised to

cater for changing Indian conditions. It has been

structured so that the Indian defense industrial base is

progressively strengthened by offsets, transfer of

technology, and joint venture regimes. ‘The Long Term

Integrated Perspective Plan’, LTIPP, of the armed forces,

is an indicative acquisition plan for the next 15 years but

without any commitment of funds or frozen requirements.

Policy Level Intervention Imperative for Accelerating Indigenous

Manufacturing of Weapon Systems for Indian Navy

The article was first published at IndraStra.com on May 16, 2015


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The weapon procurement procedure commences with

drawing the staff requirements, which the Defence

Research and Development Organisation and industry

claim are unrealistic, the armed forces justify it since

weapons are used over decades and therefore once

procured they should remain current and amenable to

technological upgrades as long as possible.

Perhaps the only way the Government of India can resolve

this issue is through policy level intervention. One of the

suggested ways is by categorizing external threats at two

levels depending upon their severity & extent and

thereafter specifying two types of procurement, one (say

P1) to the staff requirements of the Armed Forces and the

other to a level (say P2 through local sources only) which

meets at least 75% of the staff requirements. Kill-ability

studies may be carried out to assess the numbers (with

sufficient redundancies) of P1 and P2 types required to

meet the threats in their entirety. Further, it can incentivize

the P2 procurement by increasing the defense budget

proportionately and set up an accountability mechanism

for timely delivery, maintainability, and function-ability of

the same.

It suffices to state that weaponisation of warships is

undergoing a change today forced by factors like

economic slowdown, emergence of littoral threats,

reduction in blue water engagements, development of

powerful sensors and weapons as well as advent of

unmanned vehicles on the horizon. It is imperative that

policy level intervention be initiated in procurement of

weapons to ensure that the Defense Industrial Base in

India is strengthened to levels where it can sustain the

requirements of the Armed forces.

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Art

French Influence in the Indian Ocean Region - A Perspective

The Article was first published at IndraStra.com on May 20, 2015

The Foreign Legion detachment in Mayotte has

strength of 270 personal and can act as a rapid

reaction force. This contingent exercises mainly with

Madagascar armed forces, adds to security and

maritime surveillance of the Mozambique Channel

and can be used for humanitarian assistance tasks in

the area. Mayotte has an EEZ of 63,078 sq kms.

Reunion (La Reunion) is an island ~120 kms SW of

Mauritius and East of Madagascar. Reunion provides

a convenient access to sea lines of communications

(SLOCS) in eastern and southern coast of Africa.

France maintains a small naval presence at Reunion

islands through its naval base at Point des Galets,

which has a frigate, a support ship and some patrol

craft. Reunion has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ)

of 31, 5058 sq kms.

Reunion (La Reunion) is an island ~120 kms SW of

Mauritius and East of Madagascar. Reunion provides

a convenient access to sea lines of communications

(SLOCS) in eastern and southern coast of Africa.

France has continued to cultivate and nurture its

influence in the Indian Ocean Region through its

geographical presence, naval ties and inter-

dependencies developed through military equipment

sales. France has its out posts at Mayotte & La

Reunion and military bases in Djibouti and Abu Dhabi.

The Mayotte archipelago consists of two major islands

and a number of small islets between NE

Mozambique and NW Madagascar in the Mozambique

Channel. Though geographically it is a part of the

Comoro Islands, its people preferred accession to

France in 2009.

MAYOTTE ISLANDS

REUNION ISLAND


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AL

CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI

In 2011 France has signed an agreement with Kenya

for cooperation in the fields of international security,

economic partnership, and scientific collaboration

amongst others. France has also gifted a patrol boat

for helping Kenya in its fight against sea piracy. France

has nurtured its relationship with South Africa with

which it holds regular military exercises. Both countries

are looking for greater cooperation in ensuring

maritime security in association with other countries.

France, Mozambique and South Africa carried out

‘Operation Oxide’ an anti-piracy naval exercise in

2011.

France maintains a small naval presence at Reunion

islands through its naval base at Point des Galets, which

has a frigate, a support ship and some patrol craft.

Reunion has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 31,

5058 sq kms

Republic of Djibouti is strategically located in the horn of

Africa, with Gulf of Aden and Red Sea as its eastern

borders. It shares its borders with Somalia, Ethiopia and

Eritrea. Djibouti’s location offers a controlling position

over the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Its Camp

Lemonier military base (ex France) has been leased to

USA and is being upgraded by an investment of $1.4

billion to house over 1000 US Special Forces. France,

under a defence treaty, pays €30 million/year for keeping

up to 3000 troops under the Forces Françaises de

Djibouti. France has also stationed marine, air force and

army units at Djibouti with fighter aircrafts at Ambouli

airport. Djibouti provides a military access to SLOCS

between Red Sea and Indian Ocean, which carry the bulk

of French energy supplies. Interestingly, since 2012,

China too has got a foothold in Djibouti, as its China

Harbour Engineering Company is executing a $64 million

project of constructing an ore terminal for export of salt to

SE Asia.

In 2009, France signed an agreement with Emirates to

operate a military base at Abu Dhabi. The naval base is at

port Mina Zayed and can berth French naval ships except

aircraft carriers.

The air force base is at Al Dhafra which can house fighter

aircraft. The Army base (Urban Combat Training and

intelligence) is at Zayed and the famous 13th Démi-

Brigade de la Légion Étrangère has been relocated to this

base from Djibouti, without diluting the French military

presence at Djibouti. Abu Dhabi is located near the

junction of Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. This

base provides France access to the SLOCS in Persian

Gulf and ensures safety of its oil supplies.

AL DHAFRA AIR BASE, UAE


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In addition to the above, the French presence also

comprises of its Territory of the French Southern and

Antarctica Lands , which have Scattered Islands

(around Madagascar),Crozet Islands (South of

Madagascar), and the St. Paul, Amsterdam and the

Kerguelen Islands in southern Indian Ocean. Further,

south, it has its claims in the Antarctica. The Combined

EEZ of all the French territories in the Indian Ocean

amounts to nearly 1 million sq kms! The claimed EEZ in

the Antarctica region is about 1.7 million sq kms.

Thus it can be seen that France has a significant

strategic presence from Emirates in the Persian Gulf,

Djibouti in the Gulf of Aden, off Madagascar and down

to the Kerguelen islands in the Southern Indian Ocean

Region. Further, it has ensured that its national interests

in its energy supply lines and the extensive EEZ are

carefully monitored and guarded.

The French sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean

region has been shaped by a combination of its own

energy and EEZ security requirements as well as by

forging long-term relationships with countries through

supply of military equipment. Its major competitor

today is the United States, with which it has friendly

relations. However, with China ramping up its own

influence in the region by providing lucrative arms

deals, affordable infrastructure and a rapidly growing

PLA Navy, France would face a serious contender

since it is unlikely that it would be able to match the

attractive financial packages offered China in the

Indian Ocean Region-IOR.

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Anti-Submarine Air Armament: Decoded

The Article was first published at IndraStra.com on June 8, 2015

The evolution of a standoff anti submarine warfare

solution involving use of aircraft in detecting a

submarine at sea and attacking it with depth charges

and air launched torpedoes has its genesis in the

devastation caused by the German submarines during

WWI. The armament carried today by maritime aircraft

and helicopters includes, anti ship cruise missiles,

lightweight torpedoes, depth charges and bombs. The

aim of this article is to focus on anti submarine air

armament currently in use by major navies.

Air Dropped Depth Charges. Finland was the first to use

air dropped depth charges from its Tupolev SB aircraft

in 1942. Subsequently the methodology was adopted by

RAF Coastal Command. Later depth charges were

designed for aerial deployment and have recently once

again come into focus because of the ASW threat in

littorals. These can be very effectively utilized for

flushing out the lurking diesel submarines. Two depth

charges are worthy of mention, these are the MK 11

depth charge of UK and the BDC 204 depth charge of

Sweden.

The Mk 11 depth charge was developed by British

Aerospace (now BAE Systems) for air delivery from

maritime aircraft and helicopters.

The Mk 11 depth charge was designed for shallow water

operations against submarines on the surface or at

periscope depths. It is fully compatible for carriage and

release from a wide range of ASW helicopters and fixed-

wing maritime patrol aircraft. The Mod 3 version

incorporates a 4 mm mild steel outer case and nose

section, which is designed to withstand entry into the water

at high velocities without distortion. It has been cleared for

carriage on Lynx, Merlin, NH 90, Sea King, and Wasp

helicopters.

The BDC 204 depth charge was developed by Bofors

Underwater Systems (now Saab Dynamics) for air delivery

from maritime aircraft and helicopters of the Swedish Navy.

It was designed for use against submarines operating in

shallow waters or at periscope depth, and in order to cover

a wide range of applications was produced in four different

weight categories and with different sinking speeds ranging

between 5.2 and 6.8 m/s. The depth charge can be

deployed in patterns, with different depth charges set to

detonate at different depths to achieve profound shock and

damage to submarines. The BDC 204 family of depth

charges is fitted with standard NATO suspension lugs and

their design allows them to be carried as a high drag

general purpose bomb or torpedo. They have been cleared

for carriage on the Boeing Vertol 107 helicopter and CASA

C-212 Aviocar maritime patrol aircraft.


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Air Launched Torpedoes: Few of the prominent air launched torpedoes are described below.

Stingray is a LWT manufactured by BAE Systems. It has a diameter of 324 mm, weight of 267 kg, and length of 2.6 m. Its speed is 45 kts with a range of 8 km and its warhead is 45 kg of Torpex. It can dive up to 800 m. Stingray is fed with target data and other associated information prior to its launch, after entering water it searches for target autonomously in active mode and on acquiring the same, attacks it. It is carried by Nimrod aircraft. Stingray Mod 1 is reported to have a shaped charge warhead and improved shallow water performance. Mk 46 Mod 5 torpedo is the mainstay of US Navy’s air launched lightweight torpedoes. It is manufactured by Alliant Tech systems. It has a diameter of 324 mm, length of 2.59 m, with a weight of 231 kg. It runs on Otto fuel, has a range of 11km with a speed of 40 kts and can dive up to 365 m. It has a PBXN-103 warhead of 44 kg. It has an advanced digital computer control system with a built in logic and tactics for search and re-attack. It has effectively performed in both deep and shallow waters and can attack both the nuclear as well as the smaller diesel submarine. Over 25000 MK 46 torpedoes have been supplied to customers till date. Interestingly the Chinese YU-7 torpedo is said to have been developed from the MK 46 Mod 2.

The Mk 54 Lightweight Torpedo is a hybrid of technologies taken from MK 46, MK 48 and MK 50 torpedoes. It is supposed to have homing and warhead of the MK50 and propulsion package of the MK 46 torpedo. It has incorporated COTS processing technologies for an advanced guidance and control system. It is stated to have sophisticated shallow water capabilities for littoral threats. It is understood that the MK 54 torpedo has been requested for P8i aircraft by India. The A244/S developed by WAAS and currently manufactured by the Euro Torp consortium is a 324 mm diameter, 2.8 m long, and 244 kg weight torpedo. It has a cruise/surge speed of 30/39kts, with a range of 6 km and depth up to 600 m. Its Homing head can function in mixed, active or passive modes. It has special signal processing to distinguish target from decoys. A244/S Mod.3 is the latest upgrade of the A244/S. It has more powerful propulsion battery, with an increased number of cells, which ensures a 50% increase in the endurance of the weapon to13.5 km. It has an Advanced Digital Signal Processor module to counter sophisticated torpedo countermeasures .The homing head has preformed multiple transmission and reception beams and multi-frequency operating capability. It can classify and track several targets simultaneously, and discriminate between the target and countermeasures.

MU 90/Impact is in mass production for 6 major NATO and Allied Countries. The MU 90/IMPACT torpedo is 323.7 mm 'NATO Standard' caliber, 2.85 mm long with a weight of 304 kg.


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It is powered by an Aluminium-Silver Oxide sea water battery using dissolved sodium-dioxide powder as electrolyte with a closed-loop electrolyte re-circulation system, the torpedo is propelled by an electronically controlled high-RPM brush-less motor driving a skewed multi-blade pump jet propulsion allowing a continuously variable torpedo speed automatically selected by in built logic of the torpedo. The control and guidance electronics has embedded operational and tactical software including the signal processing, the data processing and the torpedo guidance algorithms, which enable the MU 90 to continuously self-adapt its configuration and tactics. The inertial system is based on 'strap-down' technology enabling all-attitudes capability including bottom following capability. The warhead consists of V 350 explosive, fully insensitive, shaped charge warhead, with an impact type exploding device, incorporating two mechanical and six electrical independent safety devices. Low Cost Anti Submarine Weapon (LCAW) A200/A is a miniature torpedo developed by WASS. LCAW has been developed as an intermediary between air launched torpedoes and conventional depth charges. It is a low cost option which provides propulsion and guidance to a depth charge without the costs of a torpedo. The air dropped version A200/A is deployed from aerial sonar buoy dispensers. The weapon is primarily designed to engage targets in shallow water, like midget submarines. The A200/A version has a length of 914.4 mm, weight of 12 kg, and a diameter of 123.8 mm. The warhead is a 2.5 kg PBX shaped charge and the LCAW has an operating depth from 15 m to 300 m. It has a speed of about 18 kts with a range of 2 km.

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Maritime Domain Awareness - Indian Context


The oceans are complex mediums whose nature provides ample opportunity for an enemy to avoid detection—weather, sea states, and coastal land masses all present considerable challenges to modern sensors. Peacetime economic use of the seas complicates this problem enormously. The oceans are the world’s foremost (and most unregulated) highway, home to a vast and wide variety of international neutral shipping that possess no apparent threat. Determining the enemy in such a crowded and complex environment is difficult during conventional war, during an asymmetric conflict such as the global war on terror (GWOT), it is a formidable task. It is the asymmetric nature of terrorism that forms the core of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). In conventional naval war the enemy is relatively well defined and almost universally a combatant. Pursuit of GWOT, where literally any vessel could be a potential enemy or weapon carrier, or when any maritime event can have an impact on the security of India, demands a much higher level of awareness than that normally required in a conventional naval conflict. This is recognized by the formal definition of MDA as articulated by the US government vide their document National Security Presidential Directive 41, 2004:- “Maritime Domain Awareness is "the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of U.S.

This is accomplished through the integration of intelligence, surveillance, observation, and navigation systems into one common operating picture (COP) that is accessible throughout the U.S. Government".

Unlike traditional naval operations, it is apparent that the goal of MDA is far more than simply looking for potential maritime enemies poised to attack India. The implications of “Anything associated” with the maritime environment that can impact the security, safety, economy or environment go far beyond a classic maritime threat. As per the US interpretation, these include smuggling of people or dangerous cargoes, piracy, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), identification and protection of critical maritime infrastructure, oil spills, weather, and environmental concerns among other events.

Maritime events that could potentially impact India are not the only wide-ranging element of MDA it is also essential that threats be identified as early and far from the coast as possible. The global nature of MDA activities occurring overseas and in foreign ports is very much a part of MDA For example, if a cargo is loaded in Aden and its ultimate destination is India (via several other international ports), the loading, transport, security, and all matters associated with that container would be part of MDA.


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MDA must therefore be exercised over all oceans worldwide, and potentially cover all maritime interests that ultimately impact India. Putting in place an effective MDA is a herculean task viewing the range of potential security challenges and enormous geographic area represented by the maritime domain. In India a plethora of agencies possessing a wide range of operational and intelligence capabilities would require information fusion under the over-arching MDA.

Although many factors are considered in MDA, its core process is ultimately the monitoring of vessels and the vessels’ cargo, crews, and passengers to rapidly generate geo-locating information on vessels of interest. This is an analytical process that includes tracking, data base searches for unknown linkages and anomaly detection. Fundamental to this is the detection, monitoring, tracking of vessels. This tracking process is comprised of five elements designed to focus on a narrow area of tactical dimension where threats can be identified and isolated namely; maritime surveillance, detection, tracking, classification & identification and targeting. Targeting involves interpreting detection and identification information fused with intelligence to sort vessel intentions and determine risk.

MDA’s core is applying the vessel tracking process to a layered defence model centred on the coastline of India,

the ultimate goal of which is to detect potential threats early and as far away from the Indian coastline as possible. As there is no single high value unit to protect MDA “layers” are expanded to include an entire coastline with the overall goal of coordinated surveillance. Not all areas in these “layers” are considered equally, but rather additional attention is given to areas that are potential targets for the terrorist/enemy.

The US has the 2000 nm limit of the Maritime Detection and Identification Zone-MDIZ it is based on the legislated 96 hour notification requirement for foreign vessels entering U.S. ports. A vessel travelling 20 kts will arrive at its destination in roughly 96 hours. MDIZ’s aim is to gather more timely information on the vessel as it approaches closer to the U.S. coast. When entering the MDIZ, positions every four hours are the norm while in territorial waters the goal is to obtain positional data every 3 minutes. There are many systems that could provide a high degree of surveillance and tracking data, but the actual fusion of this data remains a problem area. In order to derive a comprehensive MDA picture, information needs to be fused, correlated, and analysed and for it to be relevant to national security it must be designed to operate cohesively at tactical, regional and strategic levels.


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Structure of the Indian MDA The 26 Nov 2008 attack on Mumbai has been analysed and security gaps addressed to formulate the MDA. The fundamental principle for the MDA has been the application of data fusing to get actionable intelligence inputs to measure, compare and identify and engage and prevent sea-borne criminal activities. The number of different agencies at central and state level involved is 13, and therefore effective coordination is an issue. Some of the initiatives include:-

- Launch of GSAT7 satellite in geosynchronous orbit by lSRO, with Rukmani terminals (ex Israel) placed on Major warships for instantaneous data transfer to meet the requirements of the Navy. ISRO is also likely to put in place by 2013 the Indian Regional Navigation Seven Satellite System (IRNSS) which would provide data within 1000 miles of India. - Setting up of The National Command Control Communication and Intelligence network (NC3IN). - The setting up of a radar chain (X band AIS receiver VHF and Electro-Optics) of 46 sensor stations being linked with the AIS inputs (Covering the entire Indian coast), LRIT (Long Range Identification & Tracking) and VTMS (Vessel Traffic Management Systems). Coastal plots are maintained by the ICG Regional HQs to support the Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) set up next to naval maritime operations rooms (MORS) in all naval commands and at New Delhi. - Setting up of Multi Agency Centres (MAC) for intelligence inputs and reports.

- Registration of fishing vessels by states, and provision of battery operated Distress Action Terminals (DATs) for vessels below 300 tons. DG Shipping would provide smaller fishing boats with AIS transponders which has enforced ISPS code for Port security with port security plans. Also, providing Biometric Identity cards for fishermen which can be identified on a machine on board surveillance platforms. - Setting up of a Marine Police force with 73 Coastal police stations across 9 states and provided with 5 and 10 ton craft which can patrol inshore waters.

- A continuous synopsis of record of shipping with World Customs Organisation has been enforced and MARSEC (Maritime Security) levels are exercised and coastal villagers educated on need to be vigilant by the IN and ICG. - The Indian Navy has instituted Marine Commandos Rapid Reaction Forces and a Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB) of 100 seamen who are being equipped with 80 fast interceptor craft (FICs) for protection of naval bases, VAs and VPs. UAVs and Aerostats are also planned for induction.

- Coordinated coastal and offshore asset patrolling has been strengthened by the IN and the ICG. - All steps for MDA are networked with the Indian Navy’s fleet of ships, submarines and MR aircraft. The Government of India has put in place a formidable plan for MDA, and the individual systems are being setup prior to final integration and fusing of data. It is expected that the MDA would be fully functional by 2015.

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Developing a Concept of Oceanic Domain Awareness for India


India has put in place a formidable structure for major elements of maritime domain awareness (MDA) in area of its immediate interest however; in my opinion should be the aspiration of the Indian Navy to acquire formidable sea denial and sea control capabilities. It is opined that the terms Sea watch/denial/ control are likely to expand and transform in to ‘Oceanic space watch/ denial/control’. The term Oceanic space denial/control would embrace a cylindrical space in 3D+ dimensions; that is the sea surface, the atmospheric volume above, the outer space at least up to low earth orbiting satellite heights, the water volume up to the sea bed, the sea bed itself and also security of the deep sea mining assets in the EEZ.

The above premise implies that a broader oceanic horizon is inclusive of not only extensive and broader spatial operating arena, but also much wider and broader foray in to the verticals below the surface to the sea bed and above up to periphery of the atmosphere. Unless implications of this nature are anticipated and factored in, technological forecasts themselves would trail behind the rapid advancing pace of technology and the synergies being achieved due to harmonization and adaptation inter and intra scientific fields. Therefore, it is imperative that holistic perspectives into the ‘information consciousness’ arena include the oceanic domain awareness as well as it’s connect with India’s security and MDA.

Oceanic Domain Awareness (ODA)

Scientific study of the oceans originated in U.S. essentially as a function of national security. Investigations that focused on the tactical and operational impacts of the fluid, geophysical, chemical and biological marine environment upon U.S. Navy operations successfully addressed many challenging naval requirements; but oceanographic inquiry in support of naval needs also triggered unexpected results. In many instances, the knowledge of the oceans that was acquired through directed studies - and through complementary lines of inquiry that were enabled by tools developed for naval oceanographic research - further affected national security in ways that were not anticipated and which transcended tactical and operational significance and could be considered of more strategic consequence.

The primary impetus to the rapid development of oceanography during its 20th century days as a science is without a doubt the submarine and the fundamental changes that occurred when naval warfare became truly three-dimensional. Prosecuting submarines was feasible principally through the transmission of underwater sound, actively by sonar to echo-locate targets and passively by

listening hydrophones and triangulation.


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The scope of oceanographic efforts in the pursuit of the submarine opened all of the oceanographic disciplines (physical, chemical, biological, and geological oceanography) to increased investment, research effort and importantly to integration. Twentieth-century oceanography was fundamentally a security-based endeavour to reduce the opacity of the oceans to antisubmarine warfare in WWI, WWII and the Cold War, and harness that opacity for offensive submarine operations, along with a host of other security based naval concerns. Fundamental progress in basic knowledge of the ocean sciences has occurred due to advances in sensor technologies. Understanding of plate tectonics and sea floor spreading was discovered during large-scale mapping of the sea floor after the World War II. This led to the revamping of theories of evolution and structure of the earth. Subsequently, the investigation of mid-ocean ridges carried out by submersibles and towed deep sea vehicles led to detection of many unknown forms of life in the hydrothermal vents and microbes below the seabed at great depths. In the past Ocean geologists, physicists, biologists, and chemists, have used an array of tools, from deep-sea drilling to instrumented buoys, to improve their understanding of role the ocean plays in controlling longer-term climate change and weather.

Scientists have now commenced a long term exploration of the chronological variations in ocean systems both for very short and prolonged time periods. Advances in technologies that have spurred this study are primarily based upon:-

-Availability of new sensors which can be placed and report upon chemical, biological and physical characteristics. -Advances in computers and software that has enabled storing, retrieving and manipulating large volumes of sensor data. Real time data is available to large number of research communities for interpretation, modelling, simulation and prediction. -Advances in telecommunications through undersea cables and satellites allowing real time control of sea based sensors and transmission of bulky sensor data.

Technologies (e.g., robust sensors and infrastructure, autonomous vehicles) need to be developed to enhance data collection in all weather conditions to support high-spatial resolution and near-real-time forecasting throughout the Open Ocean and coastal zone. Providing accurate and comprehensive environmental information will require expanding observational networks to monitor, record, and present real-time, surface-monitoring data (e.g., high-frequency, coastal-based radars).

This expansion will require advancing sensor and technology development, particularly for autonomous and persistent observations, as well as for long-term observing systems; expanding real-time or near-real-time data collection on environmental variables by incorporating observational capabilities of crafts of opportunity (e.g., fishing, cargo, and passenger vessels); and enhancing automated and autonomous bottom-mapping capabilities for change detection to improve rapid, full-scale survey scheduling.

Data collected by the observing systems must be accessible through a comprehensive national data network, either through a single system or a distributed network. Developing this data network will require new methodologies that address gaps in data collection, sharing, and interoperability of technologies, and should permit integration of existing research into operational systems (e.g., systems providing real-time navigation data to vessels). This data network should be able to link with other databases, such as those focusing on ecosystem data, and developed in accordance with

international standards for data exchange.


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The national data network will also provide the data needed for models simulating multiple scenarios to better understand potential impacts, weather events or man-made disruptions on marine operations, and to support operations restoration plans.

The coast and Open Ocean are critical domains for the security of a nation with sea as boundaries, both at home and abroad. National-security operations in the ocean take place globally and often require continuous, near-real-time monitoring of environmental conditions using tools such as autonomous sensors, targeted observations, and adaptive modelling. These capabilities, combined with improved understanding of the ocean environment enabled by other ocean science research activities, will support accurate ocean-state assessments ‘and allow future forces to conduct joint and combined operations in near shore and deep-ocean operating environments, anywhere and at anytime’. The differentiating aspects between MDA and ODA need recapitulating. The MDA focuses upon the maritime security environment specific to naval operations; the ODA focuses upon the overarching oceanic environment. Both are technology intensive and require sophisticated sensors and computational capabilities. MDA has tactical, regional and strategic components whereas the ODA is strategic knowledge based architecture. Both require elaborate data and information fusing interface with myriad of interconnected agencies. The MDA primarily needing vast inputs from commercial, intelligence and security agencies and the ODA from advanced research, academic and scientific communities. In view of the above, it can be appreciated that the MDA needs to be integrated within oceanic domain awareness for completeness of maritime knowledge, the lack of which can lead to serious consequences. This has been reflected in a recent assessment of naval exercises and weapon firings in the US, where it was found that over 90% of them were affected adversely due to imperfectly assessed or little known environmental factors. In an actual conflict, these would have led to mission failures. This along with the sinking of HMS Bounty (a fifty year old replica of the 18th century square rigger HMS Bounty) due to the hurricane Sandy when it was 160 miles away

from the eye of the storm, off North Carolina, only under-pins the gaps in oceanic knowledge that need to be bridged and fact that Oceanic Domain Awareness is an enabler for the future and an ‘imperative’ for a nation like India.

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Aircraft Carriers in Indian Ocean Region

The Article was first published at IndraStra.com on May 30, 2015

Recently the Government of India cleared the funds for the construction of India’s second indigenous aircraft carrier the 65,000 tonne INS Vishal. In 2014 July, the Modi government had released funds to complete the construction of the first indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant being built at Cochin Shipyard. In 2013 December, it was revealed through Duowei News that the Chinese planned to commission two Liaoning class indigenous aircraft carriers Type 001A by 2020 and the contract for the same had been awarded to the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation.

So why does an aircraft carrier mean so much to navies with blue water aspirations? Firstly, a Carrier strike group (CSG) does not need permissions from any sovereign power for landing/overflying its aircraft, when it is operating in international waters. Secondly, a CSG is a sovereign territory of the country to which it belongs and can position itself in international waters in close vicinity of expected conflict zones.

This provides it with tremendous flexibility of operations and makes it a powerful diplomatic negotiating tool. It can declare presence, project power ashore or actively associate in stabilising a conflict environment. An aircraft carrier is akin to a mobile naval air station along with 70 to 80 fighters, bombers and support aircraft, which can sail to any place on the earth within a span of about two weeks travelling 650 to 700 nm per day. An aircraft carrier is however vulnerable to attacks from air, sea and underwater and therefore it normally travels with a protective consort comprising of two Guided missile destroyers capable of firing missiles like the Tomahawk, two destroyers, a frigate, two submarines and a supply ship. This group of ships along with the aircraft carrier is called a CSG. The composition of a CSG is mission centric and can vary depending upon the situation and foreseeable threats that may be encountered. Thus the CSG has at its disposal, about 9/10 ships, 70/80 aircraft and about 7500/8000 trained naval complement to accomplish its designated task. The air element of the carrier comprises of strike fighter jets (e.g. F/A-18 Hornet), fighter jets for gaining air superiority (eg.F-14 Tomcat), an electronic warfare aircraft (eg. EA- 6B Prowler), A tactical warning and control system aircraft (e.g. E -2C Hawkeye), A subsonic anti submarine jet aircraft (eg. S -3B Viking), and an ASW /SAR helicopter (e.g. SH-60 Sea Hawk). A CSG is a formidable, awe inspiring, force centre representing its country. It is one of the reasons, why China had shelved its plans to convert Varyag ex Ukraine in to a floating casino and refurbished it for naval use as Liaoning. A researcher at the Chinese Naval Research Institute, Senior Captain Li Jie has said “Aircraft carriers are incomparable and cannot be replaced by other weapons;" If a big power wants to become a strong power, it has to develop aircraft carriers." Needless to state that when Liaoning is fully operationalized and deployed in South China fleet it will considerably shift the balance of power in the territorially disputed region.


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Status of Aircraft Carriers in the Asia Pacific Region A look at the status of aircraft carriers in the region only underpins the fact that it may be in the best interests of the countries in the region to ensure that balance of power does not tilt in favour of China later. Of the countries in the Asia Pacific region, there are only two regional powers capable of operating aircraft carriers, namely India and Thailand. The Chinese Aircraft carrier Liaoning is understood to be currently operating under training mode. India: currently operates two carriers (INS Viraat & INS Vikramaditya) which are reasonably potent and can project sufficient power to cover India’s areas of interest. However, with a third carrier (indigenous) joining in a couple of years, India will become a potent regional force in the coming decade.

Thailand: currently operates HTMS Chakri Naruebet, however since the Sea Harriers were retired in 2006, it operates only helicopters.

China: It is anticipated that it may be a couple of years before PLAN is able to operationalized Liaoning for power projection role. There are reports of indigenous Chinese

Japan: Japanese Izumo-class helicopter destroyer 22DDH 183 is the first of the two new type of helicopter carrier ships being constructed for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The ship can carry up to 14 aircraft however, but only seven ASW helicopters and two search and rescue (SAR) helicopters have been initially planned. This has given rise to the speculation that in future it may be able to support STOVL (short take-off, vertical landing) aircraft. Japan already has the F-35 A (Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightening II) and it would be logical for it to go in for the STOVL version F-35 B if the need arose.

Aircraft carriers under design/ construction, which would take some time to be inducted.

USA: currently have three carriers in the region with one based in Japan. The Asia – Pacific shift would entail pivoting of 60% of its naval forces to the Asia – Pacific region, implying thereby that 5/6 aircraft carriers can be mobilised for power projection at very short notice. This amounts to about 45 squadrons of fighters (~ 350 a/c). The region will become a beehive of activity with US regional maritime exercises, port calls, disaster relief operations etc. "Elements of China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region." - Admiral R Willard, U.S. Navy. Russia: does not have an aircraft carrier positioned in the region. The economics of the region and Anti Access/ Area-denial perception brings to fore the need for the United States of America to keep projecting its power from the sea if wants to maintain its supremacy in the area. Needless to assert that the US will have no option but to keep its navy active in the Asia – Pacific region for a long time to come.


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Rooting for a Seaport in Thar Desert


The Government of India has granted ‘in principal’ approval to the Sagarmala project. This project envisages promotion of port led direct and indirect development as well as creation of an efficient cost effective goods transportation infrastructure. The aim is to develop new regions with enhanced connectivity to main economic centers and beyond through extensions of rail, inland water, coastal and road services.

In view of the foregoing the aim of this article is to project a preliminary case for creation of a sea port in the Thar region in the state of Rajasthan by constructing a navigational channel from Lakhpat (near Kori Creek) in Rann of Kachchh, Gujarat to Sanchore (Jalore District) in Thar desert region of Rajasthan, India. As per studies carried out by A S Gaur, et al, Harappans were considered to be great mariners and businessmen; since their society was mainly agrarian their interest in inhabiting the poor quality land of Kachchh could have been due to reasons of procuring minerals, lime stone, lead and agate. These have been found in the Harappan sites and could have come from Pachchham or Khadir islands in the Rann. Since the weight of lime stones found there is about 100 kg, these could have been transported using sea/riverine routes if the Rann was sufficiently inundated by sea during those times. The Harappans sites have been discovered around Little Rann and on the southern border of the Great Rann.


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Sedimentation rate studies in Little Rann indicate that it used to be submerged throughout the year until about 2000 years ago. In fact, the little Rann was navigable up to the 16th century. Similar results are applicable to Khadir Bet in Great Rann of Kachchh. The Rann of Kachchh was thus connected via Little Rann and Nal-Bhal to Gulf of Khambhat. Other evidences also support the theory that the Rann was navigable and an extended Gulf up to the early times in Christian era.

The Sanchore area in Jalore district is a low-lying area located at the northern tip of Rann of Kachchh. The navigational channel would traverse a distance of about 300 km from Lakhpat to Sanchore in an area which is sparsely populated, under developed, and comprises of large tracts of barren land. The navigational channel would run parallel to the border with Pakistan well within the Indian Territory, and provide an efficient patrolling medium for the paramilitary forces. The excavated earth can be utilized for raising the level and reclaiming land adjacent to the canal for utilization in various ways. The seaport at Sanchore would be a boon to the land locked states of Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Uttranchal, Madhya Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir. It would also reduce the load on the existing ports, roads, railways and provide a viable and cost beneficial transportation alternative for a variety of goods using the inland sea port. Development would get an impetus in the near barren landscape of Rann of Kutch as well as drought prone arid regions of Rajasthan. Along the route of the navigational channel, minor ports can also be developed at suitable locations along with desalination plants. Agriculture can be planned utilizing drip irrigation techniques for bio fuel species like Jatropha.

Chemical industries, salt pans, and salt water based Pisciculture can be set up in areas with population to provide stable livelihood. As far as power generation is concerned, it can be done on the lines of the famous ‘Canal Solar Power Generation Project’ on the Narmada Canal in Gujarat. Under this project, it is claimed that the one MW plant, set up over a 750 meter-long stretch of the canal, will generate 1.6 mn units of clean electricity and prevent evaporation of 9.0 mn litres of water from the canal annually. The Navigational Channel would thus provide an ideal base for locating the solar panels and generating electricity much in excess of the requirement of the port and could feed the national power grid if required.

Interestingly the above proposal ties in comfortably with the declared tenets of the Sagarmala initiatives that it “would also strive to ensure sustainable development of the population living in the Coastal Economic Zone (CEZ). This would be done by synergising and coordinating with State Governments and line Ministries of Central Government through their existing schemes and programs such as those related to community and rural development, tribal development and employment generation, fisheries, skill development, tourism promotion etc. In order to provide funding for such projects and activities that may be covered by departmental schemes a separate fund by the name ‘Community Development Fund’ would be created”.

It is understood that a bird’s eye view of viability of such a project has been undertaken by some agencies (including one headed by an Admiral of the Indian Navy) and keen interest has been evinced in the same by national and international conglomerates. The preliminary development costs for a 350 km navigational channel and an inland seaport at Sanchore with 12 berths and 8 moorings is likely to be in the region of $ 2 billion. The project warrants serious consideration and detailed studies by the government agencies so that the long overdue development of the barren Rann of Kachchh and the Thar Desert regions of Rajasthan can be earnestly undertaken with the construction of the inland sea port at Sanchore and its linking navigational channel from Kori creek.

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indrastra | 7 naval strategic insight by rear admiral dr. s. kulshrestha (retd.), indian navy

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