water scarcity and political instability
TRANSCRIPT
Water Scarcity and Political Instability
An In-Depth Case Study of Kenya’s Water Crisis
Till taught by pain, men know not water's worth - Byron (1826)
Sabine Kaptein - 6081185
Master Thesis Political Science - International Relations
31-08-2016
Supervisor: Dr. Farid Boussaid
Second Reader: Dr. M.P. Amineh
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Abstract
This study examines the impact of water scarcity on the political instability of a country. In this thesis,
Kenya is used as an in-depth case study. Effects of global warming causes severe droughts in Kenya,
while fast population growth and poor management of water supply enhances Kenya’s water crisis.
The analysis section of this thesis is presented in three chapters. In the first chapter, the impact of
water scarcity on the Kenyan population and environment is examined and an overview of drought
episodes is provided. The second chapter sets out that events of water-related-conflicts increases in
times of drought. This chapter also shows that historic tribal clashes contribute to the eruption of
water related conflicts. The third chapter provides an overview of the political context in Kenya of the
period 1990-2013. Also, indicators of political instability from the study of Jong-A-Pin (2009) are
used to examine Kenya’s political stability. Evidently, all of the indicators of political instability were
present during the period 1990-2013, indicating that Kenya was political unstable. Two of the nine
indicators were related to water scarcity. This means that water scarcity can contribute to the political
instability of a country, direct or indirect via the enhancement of the factors ‘ethnic tensions’ and/or
‘civil conflicts’.
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Table of Content
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 6
Chapter 2. Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 8
Chapter 3. Conceptual Framework ....................................................................................................... 10
3.1 Environmental Scarcity .............................................................................................................. 10
3.2 Social Effects of Environmental Scarcity and Conflict Theories ............................................... 12
3.3 The Pathway from Environmental Scarcity to Violent Conflict ................................................. 14
3.4 Political Stability ........................................................................................................................ 16
Chapter 4. Methodology and Sources ................................................................................................... 19
4.1 Kenya Water Crisis ..................................................................................................................... 19
4.2 Design: Case Study ..................................................................................................................... 19
4.3 Data Collection ........................................................................................................................... 20
Chapter 5. Concepts of Water Scarcity ................................................................................................. 21
5.1 Definitions of Drought ................................................................................................................ 21
5.2 Water Stress ................................................................................................................................ 21
5.3 Falkenmark Water Stress Indicator ............................................................................................ 22
Chapter 6. Analysis: Water Scarcity ..................................................................................................... 23
6.1 Geography .................................................................................................................................. 24
6.2 The Kenyan Climate and Water Resources ................................................................................ 24
6.3 Causes of the Water Crisis .......................................................................................................... 25
6.3.1 Drought ............................................................................................................................... 25
6.3.2 Population Growth .............................................................................................................. 27
6.3.3 Poor Management of Water Supply .................................................................................... 28
6.3.4 Contamination of Water ...................................................................................................... 28
6.4 Adapting to Water Scarcity ........................................................................................................ 29
6.5 Sub Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 30
Chapter 7. Analysis: Tribalism and Water Related Conflicts ............................................................... 31
7.1 Kenyan Tribalism ....................................................................................................................... 31
7.2 Drought and Pastoralism ............................................................................................................ 32
7.3 Water Related Conflicts .............................................................................................................. 33
7.4 Sub Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 36
Chapter 8. Analysis: Political Context and Political Instability ............................................................ 37
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8.1 Political Context Kenya, Before and After the Independence .................................................... 37
8.2 Political Context Kenya, period 1990-1997 ............................................................................... 38
8.2.1 Tribalism and Electoral Violence ........................................................................................ 38
8.2.2 Water Scarcity and Electoral Violence ............................................................................... 39
8.3 Elections 2002-2007 and Kenyan Crisis (2007-2008) ................................................................ 40
8.3.3 Adoption of a New Constitution (2010) .............................................................................. 41
8.4 Elections 2013 ............................................................................................................................ 42
8.5 Sub conclusion: Political Context and Political Stability ........................................................... 42
Chapter 9. Conclusion & Discussion .................................................................................................... 45
10. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 47
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Water is the essence of life. The availability of safe drinking water and sanitation are essential to
sustain life and health (OHCHR, 2010). Yet 663 million people on this planet do not have access to
clean drinking water, and 2.4 billion people lack access to sanitation facilities (World Health
Organization, 2015). The causes of the current water crisis can be traced back to poverty, inequality
and unequal power relationships, but is also worsened by social and environmental challenges. In
some arid areas of the world, water scarcity has become a threat to human health and the natural
ecosystems (Seckler, Barker & Amarasinghe, 1999). The World Economic Forum (2015), lists in its
most recent annual risk report water scarcity as the largest global risk in terms of potential impact.
Water crises derives from the rising global demand for water. This is mainly caused by the rapid
growth of world population, improving living standards, changing consumption patterns and
expansion of irrigated agriculture (Vörösmarty, Green, Salisbury & Lammers, 2000). At the global
level there is enough freshwater available to meet global demand, but spatial and temporal variations
of water demand and availability are large, which leads to water crises in certain parts of the world
during specific times of the year (Zhuo, Mekonnen & Hoekstra, 2016).
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine how water scarcity has an influence on the
political stability of a country. In this thesis, Kenya is used as an in-depth case study. About 47
million people live in Kenya, and 43 percent of the population do not have access to clean water.
Therefore, water scarcity has been an issue for decades (Linke, O’Loughlin, McCabe, Tir & Witmer,
2015). The climate in Kenya is predominantly arid year-round, and only a small portion of the
country’s land is optimal for agriculture. Global warming has caused severe droughts, and other issues
like the contamination of drinking water and a lack of water resources have enhanced Kenya’s water
crisis. At the same time, water demand in Kenya has risen as a result of fast population growth. The
arid climate and the lack of rainfall also affects the ability to acquire food, especially in the rural
areas. A lot of Kenyans who live in poor urban slums have only access to contaminated water sources,
which causes cholera epidemics and other infection diseases that affect the health and livelihoods of
inhabitants. There is also a discrepancy between the urban and the rural population in access to clean
water: less than half of the rural population has access to water, in contrast to 85 percent of the urban
population. In this thesis the effects of the Kenyan water crisis on political stability are examined. The
theory of Homer-Dixon (1991; 1994; 1995) is used to identify the pathway from environmental
scarcity to violent conflict. Furthermore the theory of Jong-A-Pin (2009) is used to examine the
concept of political instability. The concept of political instability is measured by nine indicators that
are distributed into three categories, ‘violence’, ‘protest’ and ‘political regime’. Those nine indicators
will be used in the analysis section of this thesis to measure the degree of political instability in
Kenya. The aim of this thesis is to examine how water scarcity affect political instability. To
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demarcate this thesis somehow, Kenya is chosen as an in-depth case study. This has the limitation that
the outcomes of this study will not be generalizable. In this thesis, an attempt is made to find an
answer to the following question: How does the water crisis in Kenya impact the country’s
political stability? It is important to find out how water scarcity has an impact on the political
stability, because due to increasing social and environmental challenges, like climate change and
accelerating urbanization processes, it is likely that the water crisis is exacerbating in the future. At
this point, water scarcity is a real problem in a large part of the world, including Asia, Africa,
Oceania, the Middle East and parts of South and Middle America. It is therefore relevant to research
the possible link between water scarcity and political stability.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
The question if resource scarcity will lead to conflict and war is in most debates grounded by the
Malthusian theory (Allouche, 2011). The Malthusian theory states that population grows
exponentially, while food production grows linear. This creates an imbalance between economic
availability of natural resources and population growth. “Neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural
resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these
limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result” (Allouche, 2011, p. S3). These neo-
Malthusian arguments are not supported by empirical studies. Because of rapid technological
developments, labor productivity in agriculture has increased dramatically and resources barriers that
seemed unchallengeable have been breached.
The term ‘water war’ is increasingly used in the media, by NGO’s and within international
organizations. In 2007, the United Nations Secretary Ban Ki-moon stated that ‘water scarcity
threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007).
However, the scientific evidence seems quite weak that water has been a principal factor in
international conflicts (Allouche, 2011). Also, no direct correlation between water scarcity and
international conflict has been found. Most scholars now tend to agree that water scarcity by itself is
not the issue, but rather the allocation of water sources between the various riparian states (Allouche,
2007). The perception of each state approximated water needs composes the core issue in
transboundary water relations. On the contrary, some specialists argue that scarcity actually drive the
riparian states to cooperation (Brochmann & Gleditsch, 2006).
The popularity of the term water wars arises again in the debates over the likely impacts of
climate change. The argument in this debate runs that climate change will contribute to the worsening
of ecological conditions, which will lead to resource scarcities, institutional failure, mass migrations
and social breakdown, and in turn will cause political instability and conflict (Purvis & Busby, 2004).
Although there is a growing public concern that climate change will lead to political instability and
conflict, the scientific evidence to support this claim is still thin (Barnett & Adger, 2007).
More complex is the link between scarcity and conflict at the intra-state and the local level
(Allouche, 2011). At the intra-state level, research shows that countries suffering from environmental
degradation were more likely to experience civil war, although the effect of environmental
degradation was secondary to economic and political factors (Urdal, 2005). A same kind of
correlation is found between food insecurity and conflict. A measurement of food insecurity and
living standard is infant mortality. According to the US State Failure Task Force, infant mortality is
one of the three variables that is highly correlated with civil war (Goldstone, 2003). Although some
specialists challenge the assumption that food insecurity is a direct cause of conflict, they prefer to
emphasize the role of political and ethnic rivalry (Paalberg, 1999). There is a clear consensus among
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scholars that structural conditions of hunger and inequality are among the underlying causes of
conflict (Allouche, 2011). But it is important to remember that in most cases resource scarcity is not
the result of inadequate availability or production, but is mostly linked to the politics of inequality.
At the local level, some studies demonstrate that a lack of freshwater can lead to intense
political instability and occasionally result in acute violence (Allouche, 2011). There has been
documented conflicts between farmers and pastoralists over water access and use. In some African
states, like Sudan and Nigeria, the state is unwilling or unable to intervene in these conflicts causing
the conflicts to turn violent (Hussein, Sumberg & Seddon, 1999). So the local level may support the
conflict-water scarcity nexus. Also, it seems that conflicts about water scarcity are more caused by the
way the water use is governed than by the scarcity itself (Allouche, 2011). Conflicts seems to reflect
societal problems. Metha (2005) found that the major factors affecting a potential water crises are
access and control over water, political power and social and gender relations. This concludes that
water crises on a local level are at the level of human security. In the ‘conceptual framework’ the
different types of security will be further explained.
This paragraph shows that there is no clear consensus in science about the causes and
consequences of water scarcity. Some scholars link resource scarcity to conflict, war and violence
(Allouche, 2011). Other studies demonstrate that only at the local level water scarcity can lead to
political instability (Hussein, Sumberg & Seddon, 1999). Also, climate change is a growing public
concern which will lead to an increase of resource scarcities (Purvis & Busby, 2004). Some say this
will induce institutional failure, mass migration and conflict, although the scientific evidence to
support this claim is still weak (Barnett & Adger, 2007).
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Chapter 3. Conceptual Framework
In this paragraph the main concepts of this thesis are further explained. Also the connection between
the different concepts are discussed. The conceptual framework of this thesis is built on two main
theories; the theory of Homer-Dixon (1991; 1994; 1995) about environmental scarcity and conflict,
and the theory of Jong-A-Pin (2009) about political instability. The first paragraph elucidates three
main sources that can lead to an increase of environmental scarcity. In the second paragraph the link
between environmental scarcity and conflict is made. In the last paragraph the concept of political
instability is explained and nine indicators to measure the degree of political instability in Kenya are
clarified.
3.1 Environmental Scarcity
As mentioned earlier in the literature review section, there is no clear consensus in science about the
causes and consequences of water scarcity. In my thesis, I make use of the theory of Homer-Dixon
(1994) who stated that environmental scarcity can cause political instability and therefore contribute
to the eruption of violent conflict. In this paragraph the causes of resource scarcity will be
exemplified.
According to Homer-Dixon (1994) there are three main sources that can lead to an increase of
environmental scarcity. The first source is environmental change, which refers to a human induces
decline in the quantity or quality of a renewable resource that occurs faster than it is renewed by
natural processes. The second source is population growth, which reduces the resource per capita
availability by dividing it among more and more people (Gleick, 1993). The third source is unequal
resource distribution, which concentrates a resource in the hands of a few people, and subject the rest
of the population to greater scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Often the three sources of resource
scarcity interact, and two patterns of interaction are mostly common: ‘resource capture’ and
‘ecological marginalization’. ‘Resource capture’ occur when resource depletion and population
growth cause unequal resource access, see figure 1 on page 11.
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Figure 1. Resource Capture: Resource depletion and population growth cause unequal resource
access.
(Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 7).
A fall in the quantity and quality of renewable resources can combine with population growth
to encourage powerful groups within a society to shift resource distribution in their favor. As a
consequence, this can produce dire resource scarcity for poorer and weaker groups whose claims to
resources are opposed by these powerful elites. In contradiction, ecological marginalization occur
when unequal resource access and population growth cause resource degradation and depletion, see
figure 2.
Figure 2. Ecological Marginalization: Unequal resource access and population growth cause
resource degradation and depletion.
(Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 8).
Unequal resource access can combine with population growth to cause migrations to regions
that are ecologically fragile, such as areas that are at risk of desertification. High population densities
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in these areas, combined with a lack of knowledge and capital to protect local resources, cause severe
poverty and environmental damage.
3.2 Social Effects of Environmental Scarcity and Conflict Theories
The relationship between environmental scarcity and conflict is a complex one. In the previous
paragraph is shown that depletion of renewable resources, singly or in combination with population
growth and unequal resource access, can lead to an increase of environmental scarcity. In this
paragraph deeper knowledge is gained about the consequences of environmental scarcity.
Furthermore, the nature and the causes of scarcity-related-conflict are examined.
To analyze how environmental scarcity can cause, or contribute to, the eruption of violent
conflict, it is important to study social effects that environmental scarcity can have in a developing
society. Homer-Dixon (1991) hypothesizes that four principal social effects may, either singly or in
combination, substantially increase the probability of acute conflict in developing countries. These
effects are: decreased agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement and
disruption of legitimized and authoritative institutions and social relations. Agriculture accounts for
70% of global freshwater withdrawals and is in most developing countries the most important
economic sector. The rapidly growing world population and shrinking water resources make it
difficult for food production to keep up with the rising demand. A decrease in agricultural production
lead to scarcity of food and further impoverishment (Gurr, 1985). Water scarcity can therefore
influence economic productivity directly or indirectly through other social effects such as decreased
agricultural production. The third social effect is population displacement. Some researchers have
suggested that environmental scarcity produce environmental refugees (Jacobson, 1989; Myers, 1993;
Keane, 2003). This implies that environmental disruption could be a clear cause of refugee flows.
However, environmental disruption is only one of the many interacting social and psychical variables,
including agricultural and economic decline, that ultimately force people from their homelands
(Homer-Dixon, 1991). The fourth social effect is disrupted institutions and social relations. In
developing countries this social effect is mostly achieved through the combination of the first three
social effects: A decrease in agricultural output can cause malnutrition and disease, and may weaken
rural communities, and by encouraging people to leave; economic decline may corrode confidence in
the national purpose, weaken the tax base and undermine legal, financial and political institutions.
Mass migration of people into a region may disrupt labor markets, shift class relations and upset the
traditional balance of economic and political authority between ethnic groups (Homer-Dixon, 1991, p.
98).
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Besides the four social effects that environmental scarcity can have in a developing society, it
is also important to address the nature and the causes of social conflict. Three types of theory on the
nature and etiology of social conflict are particularly important in the light of the four general social
effects identified (Homer-Dixon, 1991). At the individual level, frustration-aggression theories are
used to explain civil strife, including riots, strikes, coups and guerilla wars. This theory suggest that
aggression is the result of blocking or frustrating a person’s efforts to attain a goal (Abell & Jenkins,
1971). This theory also suggests that this aggression and frustration can be caused by relative
deprivation, when people perceive a discrepancy between the level of satisfaction they have achieved
and the level they believe they deserve, often defined in economic terms. At the group level, group-
identity theories are used in social psychology to explain conflicts involving ethnicity, nationalism
and religion (Homer-Dixon, 1991). These theories focus on how groups reinforce their identities and
how “we-they” cleavages arises. Individuals may have a need for “we-ness” that can be satisfied when
their group discriminates or attacks another group (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971).
Furthermore, a person’s sense of self-worthy may be strengthened when the group they belong to
achieve a higher status than the status of other groups. Leaders may try to exploit these needs in order
to increase their political power, for example by attacking other groups, but this behavior makes
divisions between groups deeper and more belligerent (Homer-Dixon, 1991).
At the systemic level of analysis, structural theories explain conflicts that arise from the
rational calculations of actors in the face of perceived external constraints. The assumptions of
structural theories are often grounded in the microeconomics and game theory. The structure of an
actor’s social situation is the ‘perceived set of possible interactions with other actors and the perceived
likely outcomes of these interactions’ (Homer-Dixon, 1991, p. 105). The structure is determined by
psychical, social and psychological factors (Wendt, 1987). Physical factors like resource limits, the
total number of actors and barriers to communication or movement. Social factors such as the set of
power relations between actors, beliefs and understandings and rules of social interaction, and
psychological factors such as the preferences and believes of other actors. Structural theories suggest
that external constraints can encourage or even oblige actors to engage in conflict (Waltz, 2010).
Domestic structural theories advocate that civil strife will be more likely to occur when there are well-
organized groups within a society whom can quickly channel, coordinate and articulate discontent.
According to this theory, insurgency is a function of the “opportunity structure” that confronts groups
challenging the authority of elites. Homer-Dixon (1991) assumes that environmental scarcity will
produce the three above described principal types of conflict.
In this thesis, the theory of Homer-Dixon (1991) will be used as a guidance. In the analysis
section of this thesis, the four principal social effects are used to interpret the impact of water scarcity
on the Kenyan society.
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3.3 The Pathway from Environmental Scarcity to Violent Conflict
In the previous paragraph the social effects of environmental scarcity are discussed. Furthermore three
principal types of conflict are reviewed that can be used to analyze conflicts on three different levels
of analysis; the individual-, group- and systemic level. In this paragraph the link between resource
scarcity and conflict will be illustrated by a model that shows the possible pathway from
environmental scarcity to conflict.
The link between water scarcity and conflict is complex. Homer-Dixon (1994) explains the
relationship between resource scarcity and conflict as follows. Resource scarcity is caused by three
main sources: Decreases in the quantity and quality of renewable resources, unequal resource access
and population growth. These sources act singly or in various combinations and lead to an increase
environmental scarcity for certain population groups. When environmental scarcities concern for
example water, it can reduce economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the
scarcity and for the larger national and regional economies. People affected by the scarcity may
migrate or expelled to new lands. Migrating groups often trigger ethnic conflicts when they move to
new areas, while decreases in wealth can cause deprivation conflicts such as rural rebellion and
insurgency. The productivity losses and migrations may in developing countries eventually weaken
the state, which in turn decreases central control over ethnic rivalries and increases opportunities for
insurgents and elites challenging state authority. This pathway is illustrated in figure 3.
Figure 3. Possible consequences of resource scarcity.
(Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 28).
Scarcities can interact with numerous political, economic and social factors, such as the legitimacy of
the political regime, migrations from resource scare zones and weakened institutions (Homer-Dixon,
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1991). Under certain conditions these social effects can then, cause ethnic conflicts, coups d’etat and
insurgencies (Hagmann, 2005). When the balance of power in the society shifts away from the state
towards challenger groups, the likelihood of violent conflict will increase. This means that the
capacity of the state to respond to challenger groups is thus the key to the containment, or the
explosion, of violence. To avoid this potential violence, societies can try to adapt to the renewable
resource scarcities. Strategies for adaption fall into two categories, and both depend on adequate
social and technical ‘ingenuity’. Ingenuity is a term introduced by Homer-Dixon (1994) that can be
understood as ideas applied to solve practical social and technical problems. First, societies can use
their indigenous resources more sensibly and provide alternative employment to people who have
limited resource access. For example, literacy and family planning campaigns can ease population-
growth induced scarcity and economic incentives like taxes on scare resources can reduce depletion
and degradation by encouraging conservation and technical innovation. Second, a society can
“decouple” itself from independence on the scare resource, by producing goods and services that do
not rely on this specific resource. It can than trade the produced goods and services on the
international markets for the resources it no longer has home. But for these adaption strategies to
succeed, social and technical ingenuity is needed (Homer-Dixon, 1991). Technical ingenuity is
needed to develop technical innovations, like new agricultural technologies that compensate for
environmental loss. Social ingenuity is needed to create organizations and institutions that provide the
right incentives for technological entrepreneurs and buffer people from the effects of scarcity. Social
ingenuity is often a precursor to technical ingenuity (Homer-Dixon, 1994).
The development and implementations of technical innovations depend on a stable system of
markets, legal regimes and educational and research institutions. However, some developing countries
may not be able to supply this essential ingenuity. They are underendowed with the social institutions,
including efficient markets, productive research centers and capable states, that are necessary for the
supply of both technical and social solutions to scarcity. Also, their ability to create and maintain
these institutions may be reduced by the environmental stress they endure. States can therefore be
weakened by a lack of adaption in the face of environmental scarcity. Governments in this position
may experience increased political and financial demands from their citizens, and their legitimacy
may decline as a result of their inability to meet these demands (Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998). Also,
scarcities may simultaneously increase the incentives for powerful groups to gain the scare resources,
and make a huge profit from it.
Homer-Dixon (1994) suggest that three hypotheses could possibly declare the link between
environmental scarcity and conflict. The first hypothesis assert that environmental scarcity causes
conflicts between states. The second hypothesis assert that environmental scarcity causes large
population movement, which in turn lead to group-identity conflicts. The third hypothesis claims that
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environmental scarcity disrupts social institutions and increases economic deprivation, which in turn
causes insurgency and civil strife. In the analysis section of this thesis, the theory of Homer-Dixon
(1994) is used to examine which of the three hypotheses fits the Kenya case study best. Also the
possible pathway from environmental scarcity to conflict illustrated in figure 3 is used to explain the
link between water scarcity and conflicts in Kenya.
3.4 Political Stability
In the previous paragraph, the theory of Homer-Dixon (1991; 1994; 1995) is used to examine the link
between environmental scarcity and conflict. However, in this thesis I research the link between water
scarcity and political instability. Therefore, in this paragraph the theory of Jong-A-Pin (2009) is used
to explain the concept of political instability and it seems that ‘conflict’ is only one aspect of political
instability. The term political stability is synonymous with endurance equilibrium, durability and
viability (Sharma, 1989). In political terms it refers to a situation of endurance of a political system.
Conversely, the term political instability is defined as the process whereby the political life or
atmosphere of a state or region abruptly changes or fails (Alesina, Özler, Roubini & Swagel, 1996).
When the political situation of a state or region is not certain because it has a high change of getting
disturbed or changed, the political situation in that region or state is called unstable.
Due to the processes of modernization, the nature and patterns of political instability has
changed significantly in the last century (Sharma, 1989). Both old and new states experienced violent
changes and even breakdown of their political systems. Political instability has been a recurrent
feature in the landscape of newly emerged states. But also some advanced societies have experienced
massive disorder and violence. Events of violent political riots, abrupt changes in political systems
and irregular transfers of leaderships have given rise to scholarly interest in examining the various
aspects of political instability (Morrison & Stevenson, 1971). Yet, there is no agreed theory that
explain the causes, consequences and cures of political instability (Sharma, 1989). The problem with
measuring political instability is that it cannot be observed directly. Political instability is a latent
construct, so indicators have to be used that are observable. Several studies have used different
techniques and indicators to measure the concept of political instability. In my thesis, I use the most
important indicators of the study to political instability of Jong-A-Pin (2009). In this study twenty-five
political instability indicators, which all have been suggested in earlier research, are used in an
exploratory factor analysis. In my thesis, I make use of the nine most significant indicators,
distributed into three categories, namely: ‘violence’, ‘protest’ and ‘political regime’. In table 1, an
overview is provided of the indicators and categories used in this thesis to measure the concept of
political instability.
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Table 1. Indicators of ‘Political Instability’
Violence Protest Political Regime
Ethnic Tensions Riots Changes of Chief Executive
Internal Conflicts Demonstrations Cabinet Changes
Civil Conflicts Major Constitutional Changes
Major Government Crisis
Jong-A-Pin (2009)
In the category ‘violence’ is ethnic tensions the first indicator of political instability. Ethnic tensions is
the degree of tensions within a country which is attributable to racial, nationality or language
divisions (ICGR, 2005). To measure this indicator, an overview of ethnic tensions is given in the
analysis part of this thesis. Another indicator of ‘violence’ is internal conflicts, which is an assessment
of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance (Jong-A-Pin,
2009). The third indicator in the category ‘violence’ is the intensity and quantity of civil conflicts per
year.
The next indicators belong to the category ‘protest’. Riots are any violent demonstration or clash of
more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force (Databanks International, 2005). The
indicator demonstrations is measured by the following definition: Any peaceful public gathering of at
least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government
policies or authority.
The last category is ‘political regime’ which covers four indicators. The indicator changes of chief
executive measure ‘the number of times that effective control of the executive changes hands’ (Jong-
A-Pin, 2009, p. 27). And cabinet changes is measured by the number of times a new premier is
named, or when 50% of the cabinets posts are occupied by new ministers. The third indicator is major
constitutional changes, which means ‘the number of basic alterations in a state’s constitutional
structure, the extreme case being the adoption of a new constitution that significantly alters the
prerogatives of the various branches of government’ (Jong-A-Pin, 2009, p. 27). The last indicator is
major government crisis, that is indicated as any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring
the downfall of the present regime (Databanks International, 2005).
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Those indicators will be used in the analysis section of this thesis to measure the degree of
political instability in Kenya. The aim of this thesis is to examine how water scarcity has an influence
on political instability. To do this, all of the indicators will be examined in the analysis section. Also
the water crisis in Kenya will be explained and a possible connection between the two concepts (water
scarcity and political instability) will be made.
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Chapter 4. Methodology and Sources
This chapter outlines the methods used in the thesis to find an answer to the research question. As a
structure, a case study design is used to examine the effect of water scarcity on the political stability in
Kenya. The chapter will exemplify why the method of case study is chosen and how the data is
collected.
4.1 Kenya Water Crisis
I choose Kenya as a topic for my research because Kenya is the regional leader and growing
economic center in East Africa (USIP, 2015). Kenya is also a country of many contrasts, from its
landscape to demographics, and more so its social and economic inequalities. Kenya’s political
context has been heavily shaped by historical domestic tensions and contestation associated with
centralization and abuse of power, corruption and post-election violence. Political stability is key for
Kenya to maintain its influential position in the region. Therefore it is interesting to examine the effect
of the current water crisis on the country’s political stability.
4.2 Design: Case Study
For my thesis I make use of the qualitative research approach. A case study design is used to examine
the in-depth case of water scarcity in Kenya. According to Yin (1989) a case study approach provides
a mode of inquiry for an in-depth examination of a phenomenon. He states that the “distinctive need”
for case study research “arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena” (p. 14). In
my thesis I make use of a single case design. Yin (1989, p. 48) argues that a single case design is
warranted on the basis that the case is revelatory. A case is revelatory when there is an assumption or
belief, that the problems discovered in the particular case are common to other cases as well. Despite
the fact that the case study method is commonly used in social sciences, the case study method has
often been contested. Flyvbjerg (2006) explores common misunderstandings about case study
research. Some scholars argue that theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge
and that case studies are not generalizable and not suitable for theorizing, due to their specific
contextual features. The argument that case studies are not generalizable is refuted by Flyvbjerg
(2006):
“One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to
scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. But
formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas “the force
of example” is underestimated” ( p. 228).
20
Referring to the theorization argument, Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that social science is different
from natural science because it rejects the existents of a universal truth. Therefore, the attempts to
construct predictive theories in social sciences is not useful, it only “draws attention away from those
areas where social sciences could make an impact” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 41). The strength of social
science is not in predictive or explanatory theory, but in reflexive understanding, which is the
weakness of natural sciences (Delanty, 2005). Contextualization is important, because the relation
between science and society is not causal and linear but reflexive and interactive. Therefore case
studies can contribute to an extraction of rich and in-depth knowledge. In this thesis, it is vital to
achieve historical and context-dependent knowledge about Kenya, in order to understand the
relationship between water scarcity and political stability. To examine this relationship, the case study
method is the best way to look into the processes and patterns of this case study in-depth.
4.3 Data Collection
This thesis will not be conducted in Kenya itself, therefore secondary literature sources will be the
main sources of this thesis. To gain knowledge about the topic and to build the case study, the most
important sources of this thesis will be peer-reviewed articles and reports from organizations like the
United Nations. The use of this type of sources will increase the credibility and validity of the thesis.
The timeframe that is used in this thesis is the period 1990-2013. This period is chosen because since
the 1990s studies of how climate change might affect the environment and human life expanded
quickly (Henderson-Sellers & Howe, 1996). Also at that time, international organizations like the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was established to do further research on the impact of
climate change.
Two main data sources in this study are used to build the case study. First an overview of
drought episodes is used to exemplify the impact of drought events in Kenya (Huho & Kosonei,
2014). Also, an overview of water related conflicts in the period 1990-2013 is used to indicate the
frequency, intensity and geographical location of clashes over water in Kenya (Pacific Institute,
2013).
21
Chapter 5. Concepts of Water Scarcity
In this chapter the indicators and concepts used in this thesis are further explained. It is necessary to
clarify these concepts before the research is executed because it will elucidate the severity and kind of
water scarcity and drought. This section relates to the concepts of security written above as water
scarcity and drought are factors that contribute to an environment of human insecurity, that can
potentially lead to conflict (Serkeci, 2009).
5.1 Definitions of Drought
Drought occurs in high as well as in low rainfall areas. Drought is a ‘creeping phenomenon’ making
an accurate prediction of either its onset or end a difficult task. The severity of drought is also difficult
to determine. It is dependent not only on the duration, intensity and geographical extent of a specific
drought episode but also on the demands of human activity and by the vegetation on a region’s water
supplies (Wilhite & Glantz, 1985, p. 3).
There are four types of droughts; meteorological drought, agricultural drought, hydrological
drought and socioeconomic drought (Wilhite & Glantz, 1985). Meteorological drought is defined as
the degree of dryness in comparison to some ‘normal’ or average amount and the duration of the dry
period. Definitions of meteorological drought must be considered as region specific since the
atmospheric conditions that result in deficiencies of precipitation are highly variable from region to
region. The definition of agricultural drought links various characteristics of meteorological drought
to agricultural impacts, for example, when the water supply is insufficient to cover livestock or crop
water requirements (Gommes & Petrassi, 1996). Hydrological drought is concerned with the effects of
periods of precipitation shortfalls on surface or subsurface water supply. The frequency and severity
of hydrological drought is often defined on the basis of its influence on river basins (Wilhite &
Glantz, 1985). Socioeconomic drought is based on the impact of drought conditions (meteorological,
agricultural, or hydrological drought) on supply and demand of some economic goods.
Socioeconomic drought occurs when the demand for an economic good exceeds supply as a result of
a weather-related deficit in water supply. Socioeconomic drought is worsened by growing populations
and excessive demands of goods and the results are often manifested in crop failure leading to famine
and economic devastation.
5.2 Water Stress
According to Tatlock (2006), “Water stress refers to economic, social, or environmental problems
caused by unmet water needs. Lack of supply is often caused by contamination, drought, or a
disruption in distribution”. While water stress occurs throughout the world, no region has been more
22
afflicted than sub-Saharan Africa. The major reason why sub-Saharan Africa is more vulnerable to
water stress than other regions is because of the insufficient infrastructure. There is a significant
disparity within the sub-continent: In sub-Saharan Africa, there are 980 large dams. Around 589 are in
South Africa, whereas Tanzania, a country with nearly the same population and land mass, has only
two large dams. Also, most water sources in Africa are at least in some sense ‘transboundary’. This
means that the available water sources often lead to conflict between the adjoining countries.
5.3 Falkenmark Water Stress Indicator
Several tools and models are developed to determine water scarcity. A widely used measure to
indicate the level of water stress is the Falkenmark indicator. It is defined as the average per capita
water available per year (Perveen & James, 2011). To develop this measurement, multiple countries
were surveyed and the water usage per person in each economy was calculated (Brown & Matlock,
2011). A threshold of 1700 m3 of renewable water resources per capita per year was set, based on
estimates of water requirements in the household, industrial and energy sectors, agricultural, and the
needs of the environment (Rijsberman, 2006). Countries whose water sources cannot sustain this
figure are said to experience water stress. When supply falls below 1000 m3 a country experiences
water scarcity, and below the 500 m3 it is called absolute scarcity. To determine the water scarcity in
Kenya in this thesis, the Falkenmark indicator is used.
23
Chapter 6. Analysis: Water Scarcity
The aim of this analysis is to examine the link between water scarcity and political stability. The
analysis section of this thesis consist of three chapters. In the first chapter a brief presentation is given
about the impact of water scarcity and drought in Kenya. Then the effects of population growth on
available water resources is discussed. Furthermore, the usage of water resources and adaptation to
water scarcity is examined. This chapter is built on concepts and theories explained in the theoretical
framework, especially the theory of Homer-Dixon (1994) about the causes of environmental scarcity.
In the next chapter, the link between tribalism and water related conflicts is explored. In the third
chapter the political context of Kenya is explained and nine indicators from the study of Jong-A-Pin
(2009) are used to measure the degree of political instability in Kenya. Followed by the conclusion
that will recapitulate how water scarcity can be a contributing factor in the evolution of political
instability.
Figure 3: Map of Kenya (FOA, 2015)
24
6.1 Geography
Kenya is situated on the East African coast and is bordered by South Sudan and Ethiopia in the north,
Somalia and the Indian Ocean to the east, the United Republic of Tanzania to the south and Uganda
and Lake Victoria to the west (FAO, 2015). Kenya covers 580 370 km2, including 11 230 km2 of
inland water bodies in particular Lake Victoria and Lake Turkana. Much of the country, especially in
the north and east is arid to semi-arid. From the Indian Ocean the land rises gradually through dry
bush to the arable land of the Central Highlands (Soja, 1968). The Great Rift Valley divides the
Central Highlands, which is one of the main features of the country (FAO, 2015). Also characteristic
is the large diversity of landscapes, from glaciated mountains to deserts, like the Chalbi desert,
hosting a rich biodiversity.
Around 27,4 million hectare of the Kenyan ground is cultivable, of which 6,1 million hectare
is cultivated and 21,3 million hectare are permanent pastures (FAO, 2015). To protect the rich
biodiversity in Kenya, 47 000 km2 of land are preserved in sanctuaries and national parks.
Nonetheless, in 2008 only 3 456 km2 of ground was forested, including 54 m2 of mangroves
(Businge et al., 2011).
Kenya is commonly divided into seven major geographic regions, as pictured in figure 3. The
Coastal Region is characterized by a variety of geographical features, the southern shoreline consist
largely of stretches of coral rock and sand interrupted by bays, inlets and branched creeks (African
Studies Center, 2015). Traveling inland from the coast, one encounters a narrow plain which finally
debouches in a line of discontinues ridges. The Southern Coastal Hinterland is a relatively featureless
erosional plain broken in a few places by groups of hills. The Region consist of a belt of plains
extending north- and southward to eastern Kenya Highlands (FAO, 2015). The Northern Plain-lands
Region is made up of a series of rapid plains formed by erosion or by great outpourings of lava. The
region includes the Chalbi Desert and Lake Rudolf. The Kenya Highlands Region is characterized by
significantly higher altitude, cooler temperatures and more precipitation. The Rift Valley Region
encompasses the Eastern Africa’s Rift Valley which was formed by an extended series of faulting
rock movements (African Studies Center, 2015). The region stretches southward through the Kenya
Highlands into Tanzania. At last, The Western Plateau Region consists mainly of faulted plateaus
marked by escarpments, and it forms a part of the extensive basin around Lake Victoria.
6.2 The Kenyan Climate and Water Resources
Given that Kenya straddles the equator, the Kenyan climate varies from tropical on the Indian Ocean
coast to arid further inside the country (African Studies Center, 2015). The climate is predominantly
influenced by the inter-tropical convergence zone, by the Great Rift Valley and high mountains, and
25
by large water bodies. In this part of Africa, seasons are distinguished by duration of rainfall rather
than by changes in temperature (FAO, 2015). In the Highlands and the Western Plateau, rain falls in a
single long season. The Western Plateau receives over 178 cm precipitation annually. However, more
than 80% of the country is arid or semi-arid, receiving less than 51 cm per year. In the dry areas
rainfall is sporadic. The arid and semi-arid lands are mostly covered by rangelands and nature
reserves, hosting around 80% of the country’s livestock. In the remaining area of land lives around
80% of the population, and this area can be classified as medium to high potential agricultural land. In
the high rainfall zone, the intensive agricultural sector predominates (MALF, 2015). In the medium
rainfall zone, farming includes cattle and drought-tolerant crops.
Most of Kenya’s water originates from the five main drainage areas in the country: Lake
Victoria, the Rift Valley and inland lakes, the Athi River and coast, the Tana River and Ewaso Ng’iro
(African Studies Center, 2015). There are six hydro-geological formations which influence the
distribution and availability of the groundwater resources. The internal renewable surface water
resources are estimated at 20.2 km³/year and renewable groundwater resources at around 3.5
km³/year, but 3.0 km³/year is considered to be overlap between surface and groundwater, which gives
a value of total internal renewable water resources of 20.7 km³/year (FAO, 2015). Water resources
available per capita is about 650 m3 (World Bank, 2015). According to the Falkenmark indicator, a
country experiences water scarcity when supply falls below 1000 m3 per capita (Rijsberman, 2006).
6.3 Causes of the Water Crisis
6.3.1 Drought
Kenya is a highly drought prone country because of its eco-climatic conditions (Mbogo, Inganga &
Maina, 2013). Only about 20% of the territory receives high and regular rainfall, the rest of the
territory is arid and semi-arid lands were periodical droughts are part of the climate system. Droughts
causes huge damages to the Kenyan population, the environment and the economy. It affect the water
supply in both urban and rural areas, it causes loss of livelihood and crop failures which contributes to
food scarcity. Long periods of drought also causes the deterioration of human health due to
malnutrition and poor quality water, that eventually can lead to the deaths of humans, livestock and
wildlife.
The main cause for Kenya’s vulnerability to drought is its dependence on rainfall (Mbogo,
Inganga & Maina, 2013). The mainstay of the economy, agriculture, is almost entirely rain-fed. Kenya
is a water scare country, whose per capita water availability is one of the lowest in Africa, making the
access to clean water difficult in most areas of the country. In table 2 an overview is provided of the
experienced periods of drought in Kenya since 1990.
26
Table 2. Events of Drought and Impact in Kenya
Year Area of occurrence Impact
1991-1992 Arid and Semi-Arid Districs of North Eastern,
Rift Valley, Eastern and Coast Provinces
1.5 million people affected
1996-1997 Countrywide 2 million people affected. Declared a
national disaster
1999-2000 Countrywide 2.4 million people affected
2004 Countrywide About 3 million people affected and in need
of relief aid for 8 months to March 2005
2005 Countrywide 2.5 million people close to starvation.
Declared a national disaster
2006 Countrywide 3.5 million in need for food by September.
40 human lives lost and about 40% cattle,
27% sheep and 17% goats lost
2007-2008 Countrywide 4.4 million people affected, 2.6 million
people at risk of starvation, up to 70% loss
of livestock in some pastoral communities.
2009- 2010 Countrywide 8.3 million people affected.. Acute food and
water shortages in pastoral and agro-
pastoral areas. About 3.8 million people
urgently required food aid and about 6.2
million were at risk of starvation. 70-90%
loss of livestock by Maasai pastoralists.
Loss of wildlife animals: 40 elephants died.
2011 Garissa, Isiolo, Wajir, Mandera, Mombasa,
Marsabit, Nairobi, Turkana, Samburu and
Turkana Counties
6 million people affected. 4.3 million
people were in dire need of food
2012 Countrywide 4.8 million people affected. 3.75 million
people in dire need of food by july 2012
2014 Countrywide 2.2 million people were affected and 1.5
million in dire need of food, the IFCR
launched an appeal to assist almost 650,000
affected people
27
2015-2016
(Ongoing)
Countrywide 4 million people affected. 1.1 million
people food insecure, in need of food
assistance for 6 months (September 2015 –
February 2016).
(Huho & Kosonei, 2014, p. 16)
Table 2 shows that drought episodes in Kenya are recurring events and that frequency of droughts are
increasing. It also shows that the intensity and impact of drought episodes are expanding, as more and
more people are affected by droughts. In the next paragraph, the rapid population growth of Kenya is
examined. Population growth can besides the increasing frequency of droughts, be another reason for
the increasing group of people that is affected by droughts.
6.3.2 Population Growth
There are about 47 million people living in Kenya, of which about 20 million (43 percent) do not have
access to clean water (Cook, Kimuyu & Whittington, 2016). The population of Kenya is quickly
expanding, from almost 2.9 million people to 40 million people within one century. Kenya has a very
young population, almost three-quarters of the population is under the age of 30. Expectations are that
the Kenyan population hit 95.5 million by 2050 (United Nations, 2015). stated by
The proportion of urban population in Kenya is also expanding, nowadays around 26.4% of
the population lives in urban areas (United Nations, 2015). This rapid urbanization lead to an
increased pressure on water supply. Most of the urban poor Kenyans have only access to polluted
water, which causes cholera epidemics and multiple other diseases that affect health and livelihoods
(Linke et al., 2015). Despite the shortage of clean water in urban slums, there also is a large rural to
urban discrepancy in access to clean water. According to the World Bank (2015) 57 percent of the
rural population has access to clean water, as opposed to 82 percent of the urban population. The
theory of Homer-Dixon (1994) point out that ‘rapid population growth’ and ‘unequal resource
distribution’ lead to an increase of environmental scarcity. Both sources are present in Kenya, and
both are contributing to Kenya’s water crisis.
According to the Falkenmark indicator, a country experiences water scarcity when supply
falls below 1000 m3, and experience absolute scarcity below 500 m3 (Rijsberman, 2006). The per
capita available water in Kenya is about 650 m3 (World Bank, 2015). Future projections show that by
2025, per capita water availability will drop to 235 m3/year as a result of population growth.
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6.3.3 Poor Management of Water Supply
Due to the increasing population and increasing use of water for agriculture, there has been an
increased need for funding, managing and developing water resources in Kenya. However, the actions
taken have not been effective because organizations that are in charge of managing water resources
have mostly failed. Kenya’s water resources have been mismanaged through unsustainable water and
land use policies, laws and institutions, growing pollution, weak water allocation practices and
increasing degradation of rivers, lakes, wetlands, aquifers and their catchments (Linke et al., 2015). In
1974 the Kenyan government devised a plan that all households would have access to safe water by
the year 2000. To manage water effectively, the National Water Conservation and the Pipeline
Corporation were established. But in the 1980s the government experienced budget problems and
knew it would not meet its goals by the year 2000. Therefore, the government handed the rural and
urban water systems over to the communities and departments within local authorities, so they would
take responsibility for preserving and managing the water systems. Another problem to the
mismanagement of the government is a problem of private investors not willing to provide water
services in Kenya. The main reason for this is that access to clean water has become a human right
(Meshel, 2015). As a consequence investors fear that the government may interfere in business
decisions, like determine the price investors can charge.
In accordance with the theory of Homer-Dixon (1991), it seems that Kenya is not able to
supply the social and technical ingenuity that is needed to tackle the water scarcity. Kenya is
underendowed with social institutions, like productive research centers and efficient markets that are
necessary for the supply of both technical and social solutions to the water scarcity. Also, Kenya is
not able to maintain the created institutions, like the Pipeline Corporation and the National Water
Conservation plan.
6.3.4 Contamination of Water
Another problem that contributes to the worsening of Kenya’s water crisis is the disability to maintain
clean water (Linke et al., 2015). As described in the theoretical framework, Homer-Dixon (1994)
advocates three main sources that cause environmental scarcity. One source is environmental change,
which refers to a human induces decline in the quantity or quality of a renewable resource that occurs
faster than it is renewed by natural processes. In Kenya, water pollution is a result of human activities
and industrialization processes. Water resources are under pressure from agricultural chemicals and
urban and industrial wastes, as well as from use for hydroelectric power (Kithiia, 2012). The rapid
population growth in Kenya have led to uncontrolled settlements in urban slums with poor drainage
and sanitary facilities. These uncontrolled settlements are mostly located near or on top of the rivers
courses draining the city and contribute significant pollutants amounts and water quality degradation.
29
In addition, water resources in Kenya are increasingly being polluted by organic, inorganic and
microbial matter (Kithiia, 2012). The impact of pollution on water resources is manifested by water of
poor quality which gives rise to water toxicity to humans, animals and aquatic life. It also contributes
to high cost of water supply as polluted water is expensive to treat. Contaminated water can cause
cholera epidemics and other infection diseases, which affect the health and livelihoods of urban slums
inhabitants.
6.4 Adapting to Water Scarcity
Water is the most limiting factor in crop and livestock production in arid and semi-arid lands
(ASALs) in Kenya. The agricultural sector withdrawals around 60 percent of the available freshwater
sources (Aquastat, 2015). Around 55.25 percent of the Kenyan population is economically active. The
majority of this percentage is employed in the agricultural sector, and most of these are smallholders
(UNDP, 2013). Agriculture in Kenya is predominantly rain-fed making it highly vulnerable to climate
change. In ASALs is the main livestock production strategy through pastoralism, in which people
raise herd animals as a means to earn a livelihood (Orindi, Nyong & Herrero, 2007). Pastoralism
relies on the availability of water, pastures and labour to thrive, with water as the determining factor.
The pastoral livelihoods are under severe threats from recurrent droughts. The pastoralist communities
have developed mechanisms to cope with these droughts. However, these strategies are no longer
adequate as the droughts have increased in magnitude and frequency. Coping strategies exerted are for
example, keeping mixed herd of grazers and browsers because different groups of animals are
unlikely to be affected in the same way during a period of drought (Mc Cabe, 1990). Also they often
stock more productive females in their herds to ensure that animals lost are easily replaced when the
climatic situation improves. But under extreme drought conditions, some pastoralist groups like the
Maasai and Turkana have adopted non-pastoral activities like charcoal burning of engaged in other
forms of employment for income (Oba, 2001). However, the pastoralists livelihoods are threatened by
the dwindling sources like water and forage, and some of these communities see no other option than
to migrate to better areas, like the high potential areas of the Kajiado District where they can practice
crop farming (Orindi, Nyong & Herrero, 2007).
Adaption to climate change at the farm level includes also many different strategies, such as
changing crop practices, like choice of fields and crop varieties, and land use and management, like
tree planting for protection, irrigation systems and soil and water conservation measures (Bryan,
Ringler, Okoba, Roncoli, Silverstri & Herrero, 2013). Just like the pastoralists also the farmers adopt
a combination of agricultural and non-farm activities, and sometimes they also need to migrate
temporary or permanent to better areas for sustaining the livelihood.
30
To help ASALs communities cope with the effects of climate change, the government of
Kenya, international aid agencies and non-governmental organizations have channeled significant
resources (Mude, Ouma, van de Steeg, Kariuki, Opiyo & Tipilda, 2009). The most recent project is
funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, and is called
Kenya Adaption to Climate Change in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (KACCAL). The aim of this project
is to develop and pilot a range of coping mechanisms for reducing the vulnerability of small-holder
farmers and pastoralists in rural Kenya to long-term climate change, including variability (Omuko,
2015). This should be achieved through enhanced access to and management of water for irrigation,
promotion of indigenous crops and promoting livestock varieties that are more suited to the climate
and the promotion and development of alternative livelihood opportunities. The project is also
strengthening climate risk management planning and capacity of District level planners to mainstream
climate change into District-level sectoral development plans. The KALLAC project started in June
2010 and ends in November 2016. The Implementation Status and Result Report from May 2015
indicates that the project is far from its end goal (World Bank, 2015).
6.5 Sub Conclusion
According to the theory of Homer-Dixon (1994), three main sources can lead to an increase of
environmental scarcity. These sources are environmental change, population growth and unequal
resource distribution, which all play a role in the Kenyan water crisis. In Kenya water has always been
a scare resource, but future predictions indicate that by the year 2025 the per capita water availability
will drop to 235 m3/year, which is marked, according to the Falkenmark indicator, as extreme scarcity
(Rijsberman, 2006). Water scarcity in Kenya is caused by a mixture of climate change, population
growth and a poor management of water supply, especially in the agricultural sector. The agricultural
sector is the main source of income for many Kenyans. The sector is predominantly rain-fed, making
it highly vulnerable to climate change. Also, the periods of droughts in Kenya are worsening in
frequency and intensity, which has a devastating effect on the agricultural communities and food
supplies.
In the next chapter, the periods of drought explored in this section are linked to water related
conflicts. Also, the role of Kenyan tribalism in water related conflicts is examined.
31
Chapter 7. Analysis: Tribalism and Water Related Conflicts
In the previous chapter, the impact of drought episodes on the Kenyan population is examined.
Furthermore, the causes of water scarcity were explained as well as adaptation strategies to cope with
the increasing episodes of drought. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to link the episodes of
drought explained in the previous chapter, with events of water related conflicts. Also, the role of
Kenyan tribalism in water related conflicts is examined.
7.1 Kenyan Tribalism
Tribalism in Kenya is not a historical inevitability (Masakhalia, 2008). It cannot be traced to ancient
warfare or hatreds from cultures clashing over the ages. The roots of Kenya’s ‘tribes’ today are to be
found in the colonial history of Kenya (Robertson, 2008). Kenya was under British colonial rule in the
period 1895 until 1964 (Gertzel, Goldschmidt & Rothchild, 1970). The major opposing groups in
Kenya today, the westerners from western Kenya (Luhya, Kalenjin, Kissi & Luo) and the GEMA
from the Mount Kenya (Kikuyu, Meru & Embu people) had little to no contact with one another
before the colonialist came. This means that Kenya’s tribalism is a relatively new phenomenon
(Masakhalia, 2011). It is a product of modern times, arising from colonialism, urbanization and the
political culture that sprung up in independent Kenya.
Before British colonialization, the Kenyan tribes lived in their own districts where they lived
up to their own cultures (Masakhalia, 2011). The communities lived free from each other and no
conflicts about water or pasture for livestock occurred. Some tribes, like the Kikuyu and the Masaai,
lived peacefully in the same areas and intermarried regularly. But then the British colonizers arrived
and brought with them the principle of ‘divide and rule’ which polarized the various ethnic groups in
Kenya. They magnified differences among the tribes and divided them from each other using
population control policies (Robertson, 2008). The British viewed tribal designations as fixed, for
example; The Maasai people were tall, thin and dark-skinned and were great warriors, while the
Kikuyu people were short, lighter-skinned and more suited for farming. The colonial government also
made it illegal for different tribes to go onto each other’s reserves, which contributed to the creation
of ethnic differences. This served as the breeding ground for negative tribal stereotypes which then
became embedded in popular belief (Masakhalia, 2011). So ‘tribalism’ was an effective way to keep
power, but it did not necessarily reflect Kenyan society (Robertson, 2008).
Multiple studies have showed that environmental scarcities can lead to escalation of an
existing socio-economic conflict, like tribal rivalries (Gleditsch, 1998; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998;
Kahl, 2006; Homer-Dixon, 2010). In Kenya, most conflicts over water are subjected to the pastoralist
groups (Haro, Doyo & McPeak, 2005; Orindi, Nyong & Herrero, 2007). The general consensus is that
32
climate change have led to pastoralism coming under threat which results in an increase in inter-tribal
conflicts over natural resources. In the next paragraph, the theory of Homer-Dixon (1994) is used to
explain the link between water scarcity and the eruption of violent conflict in Kenya.
7.2 Drought and Pastoralism
Homer-Dixon (1994) explains the relationship between water scarcity and conflict as follows.
Water scarcity is caused by three main sources: Population growth, decreases in the quantity and
quality of renewable resources and unequal resource access. These sources act singly or in various
combinations and lead to an increase of water scarcity for certain population groups. Water scarcity
can therefore reduce economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the scarcity and
for the larger national and regional economies. People affected by water scarcity may migrate or
expelled to new lands. Migrating groups often trigger ethnic conflicts when they move to new areas,
while decreases in wealth can cause deprivation conflicts such as rural rebellion and insurgency. The
productivity losses and migrations may in developing countries eventually weaken the state, which in
turn decreases central control over ethnic rivalries and increases opportunities for insurgents and elites
challenging state authority.
In earlier chapters of this thesis it is shown that all three sources as stated by Homer-Dixon
(1994) play a role in the Kenyan water crisis. It is also shown that water scarcity in Kenya reduce
economic productivity, especially in the agricultural sector. In the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs)
in Kenya, pastoralism is the major agricultural production strategy. ASALs cover about 80% of
Kenya’s landmass and support about a third of the country’s population (Schilling, Opiyo &
Scheffran, 2012). Pastoralism is practiced by the majority of Turkana and Pokot ethnic groups and is
mainly nomadic transhumance. In pre-colonial days, there was no restriction on movement and
pastoralists could freely move beyond national borders in search for water in times of drought
(Berger, 2003). But when the international borders were fixed, this free movement was restricted to
national borders, and while in normal years pasture and water resources were sufficient between those
national borders, it was not in low rainfall or droughts years. This made that the pastoralist
communities across the region depend on the same communal pool of scare resources (Eriksen &
Lind, 2009). As a consequence, conflicts between pastoralists arose and the increasing frequency and
severity of the periods of drought forced people to migrate. Some people dropped completely out of
the pastoralist lifestyle, and moved to urban centers to seek casual work (Kaimba, Njehia & Guliye,
2011). At the same time, the competition between pastoralist communities for scare natural resources
continued. The absence of the government in some rural parts of Kenya makes people take the law
into their own hands. Remote areas in the North of Kenya rely on community-organized security
groups, such as home guards and police reservists to maintain law and order (Schilling, Opiyo &
33
Scheffran, 2012). This has in part led to the proliferation of weapons in the North, and many
pastoralists have joined armed opposition groups.
According to the theory of Homer-Dixon (1994) conflicts are triggered by a decrease in
wealth and forced migration, two factors that are both currently present in Kenya. Those factors may
eventually weaken the state, which in turn decreases central control over ethnic rivalries and increases
opportunities for insurgents challenging state authority. In Kenya this is now partly happening, in
remote resource scare areas law and order is not maintained by the government but by community-
organized security groups. Also ethnically-based opposition groups are on the rise in rural areas in
Kenya. This exemplifies that the theory of Homer-Dixon (1994) is useful in explaining the link
between water scarcity and conflict in rural Kenya. In the next paragraph, other causes of conflicts in
Kenya will be explained. Also, an overview is provided of water-related-conflicts in the period 1990-
2013, documented by the Pacific Institute.
7.3 Water Related Conflicts
In northwestern Kenya, pastoral communities have a long history of conflicts (Schilling, Opiyo &
Scheffran, 2012). As pastoralism revolves around livestock, the conflicts are predominantly about
livestock and its related productive assets, such as water, land and pasture. The violent theft of
livestock, referred to as cattle raiding, is a major problem in rural Kenya. Cattle raiding is both a
contributing factor and an articulation of conflict. On the one hand, raiding leads to distrust between
communities which is a prerequisite of conflict (Mureithi & Opiyo, 2010). On the other hand,
communities use raiding to articulate their hostility toward enemy communities (Eaton, 2008). Cattle-
raiding caused severe loss of lives and increased destitution.
Another cause of the increased inter-tribal cattle raiding in Kenya, besides the increased
environmental degradation, can be the lack of meaningful activity for young men (Berger, 2003).
Also, the availability of smuggled arms instigate some of the young men into organized cattle rustling
and banditry. According to a report from Unicef (2015) the Kenyan population will double by 2050
and trends show that Kenya is facing a youth bulge. At this moment, 64 percent of the youth
population is unemployed, and while the economy is growing, growth does not match job creation to
meet employment demands of the growing youth population. Climate change will put additional
pressure on job creation as it is already affecting the viability of agricultural and pastoralists
livelihoods.
Besides the youth bulge, Kenya is also experiencing rapid urbanization due to high rural to
urban migration (Unicef, 2015). This urbanization process presents besides economic progress also
developmental and security challenges. 55 percent of the urban population, of which the majority is
34
youth, lives in informal settlements such as slums and shantytowns. The residents of those informal
settlements are particularly vulnerable to climate change, as they have limited access to clean water,
housing, sanitation, food and energy. The high number of urban youth and the precarious living and
livelihood situation most of them experience, can contribute to the eruption of violence in periods of
drought (Gleditsch, 2011). In table 3, an overview of water related conflicts in the period 1990-2013
is provided.
Table 3. Overview Water Related Conflicts in the Period 1990-2013, documented by Pacific
Institute
Year Conflict
1993 Violence erupts in the Narok district of Kenya’s Rift Valley province. Maasai warriors attack
immigrant Kikuyu settlers and massacre at least 17 of them, after Kikuyi settlers allegedly mutilated
Maasai cattle. 16 more Kikuyus are killed in other parts of Narok and the rest of the Kikuyu
population is forced out of the area and into refugee camps. Environmental concerns played a central
role: a few months previously, the Narok County Council had declared Enoosopukia, the site of the
conflict, to be a water catchment area and decreed that all inhabitants, mostly transplanted Kikuyus,
had to leave.
1996 The Orma and Degodia clans wage war over grazing land and water due to a severe drought, with 10
fatalities.
2000 A clash between villagers and thirsty monkeys left eight apes dead and ten villagers wounded. The
duel started after water tankers brought water to a drought-stricken area and monkeys desperate for
water attacked the villagers.
2000 The Ethiopian government says that regional drought worsens traditional conflicts at watering points
and over access to pasture. The tensions are heightened by the presence of the Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF), an Ethiopian armed opposition group said to be operating from Kenyan territory near the
common border.
2005 Police were sent to the northwestern part of Kenya to control a major violent dispute between Kikuyu
and Maasai groups over water. More than 20 people were killed in fighting in January. By July, the
death toll exceeded 90, principally in the rural center of Turbi. The tensions arose over grazing and
water. Maasai herdsmen accused a local Kikuyu politician of diverting a river to irrigate his farm,
depriving downstream livestock. Fighting displaced more than 2000 villagers and reflects tensions
between nomadic and settled communities.
2006 At least 40 people died in Kenya and Ethiopia continuing clashes over water, livestock and grazing
land. Fighting occurred in the southern Ethiopia in the region of Oromo and the northern Kenya
Marsabit district.
2009 Fighting over boreholes in arid northern Kenya kills at least four people as competition for resources
grows in the drought-hit region between the Murulle and Garre clans in Elwak, Mandera District.
35
2012 Violence, including several deaths, occurs during disputes over access to water in the poorest slums
around Nairobi, Kenya.
2012 Somali Al Shabaab insurgents poison a well and damage water infrastructure near the port city of
Kismayo, Somalia. Insurgents are fighting against Kenyan peacekeeping troops participating in the
African Union mission in Somalia.
2012 Tensions lead to violence between Uganda and Kenya after Kenyan Pokot herdsmen cross the border
seeking water and pasture. In October, the Ugandan government sends 5,000 soldiers to control
violence among pastoralists from the two countries.
2012-
2013
Extensive violence over water is reported in Kenya, with more than 100 deaths in clashes between
farmers and cattle herders. The conflict is part of a long-running dispute between Pokomo farmers and
Orma, semi-nomadic cattle herders, over land and water. The current conflict is being exacerbated
by Kenyan and foreign investment in vast tracts of land for food and biofuel cultivation, putting
pressure on local resources. (See also entry in 2001.)
2013 Fighting between Borana herders and the crop-growing Burji community kills at least 56 people in
2013. The violence is rooted in historic clan rivalries as well as competition for water and pasture in
the arid region. Clashes between the two communities date back to the 1960s and are related to
disputes over the use of political power to take control of water and fertile land.
http://worldwater.org/water-conflict/
It is noteworthy that most of the water related conflicts erupted between pastoralist tribes.
Most of these conflicts took place in the northern part of Kenya, and some of the violence is rooted in
historic tribal rivalries. It is also noticeable that some conflicts over water transcends state borders. In
2006 at least 40 people died in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya in clashes over livestock,
grazing land and water. In 2008 Somali pastoralist tribes fight over boreholes in northern Kenya, and
in 2012 tension arises between Uganda and Kenya when Kenyan herdsmen cross the border in search
for water and pasture. These events shows that water scarcity is a phenomenon that goes beyond state
borders and that periods of drought in one place can have an impact on the environment, political
situation, available resources and livelihoods of another place.
In figure 4, the data from table 2 about the events of drought and table 3, about the events of
water related conflicts are merged. This figure shows that conflicts over water especially arise in
periods of extreme droughts.
36
Figure 4. Periods of Drought and Events of Water Related Conflicts.
7.4 Sub Conclusion
Multiple studies have showed that environmental degradation can lead to escalation of an existing
socio-economic conflict, like tribal rivalries (Gleditsch, 1998; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Kahl, 2006;
Homer-Dixon, 2010). In this chapter, the roots of Kenyan tribalism are explored and it seems that
tribal clashes indeed contribute to the eruption of water related conflicts. This happens mainly
between pastoralist tribes. This chapter has also shown that water scarcity is a phenomenon that
transcends state borders, and that the frequency of clashes over water with neighboring countries is
increasing.
In the next chapter the political context of Kenya before and after the independence will be
described. Moreover, the indicators of political instability from the study of Jong-A-Pin (2009) will be
used to measure the political instability of Kenya in the period 1990 until 2013.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
People Affected by Droughts(in millions)
Water Related Conflicts (Yes:5 No: 0)
37
Chapter 8. Analysis: Political Context and Political Instability
In this section the political context of Kenya is discussed on the basis of nine indicators displayed in
table 1, page 15. These indicators are classified in three different categories, namely; political regime,
violence and protest. To make the examination of the link between water scarcity and political
instability easier, the indicators used in the category ‘violence’ will be acuminated on water related
events described in the previous chapter.
First, an overview of the political context in Kenya of the period before 1990 is described.
Then the political context of the period 1990 until 2013 is examined on the basis of the political
instability indicators. In the previous chapter, the role of Kenyan tribalism in water related events is
explained. In this chapter, the road to Kenyans independence is examined and the consequences of
political tribalism after the independence is discussed.
8.1 Political Context Kenya, Before and After the Independence
Kenya was under British colonial rule in the period 1895 until 1964 (Gertzel, Goldschmidt &
Rothchild, 1970). Kenya gained its independence in 1963, but the situation of tribalism and mutual
suspicion persisted. The road to independence began in the 1950s with the Mau Mau Rebellion
(Branch, 2009). The Mau Mau movement was a militant African nationalist group that opposed
British colonial rule and its exploitation of the native population. The Mau Mau movement was
primarily made up by Kikuyu members, the largest ethnic group in Kenya, who were among the most
exploited of the poor under colonial rule (Lonsdale, 1990). The movement carried out violent attacks
against colonial leaders and white settlers. Britain declared a state of emergency in 1952 and arrested
many Kenyan independence leaders. Between 1952 and 1956, the British defeated the Mau Mau
through brutal military action and widespread detention of the Kikuyu. But in the same time, the Mau
Mau movement persuaded the British that political, agrarian and social reforms were necessary. In
1957 the British approved for the first direct elections of native leaders to the Legislative Council, and
by 1960 the majority in the council were Africans (Curtis, 2003). In the following years, the British
worked with African and white settlers to plan the independence of Kenya. In 1963 a constitution was
produced, that provided for the creation of a bicameral legislature. Since the independence, Kenya has
been shaped primarily by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) a party that was largely
dominated by two tribes, the Kikuyu and the Luo. (Nyström, 2000). However, this unity between the
Kikuyu’s and the Luo’s was short lived, because the president after the independence, Mzee Jomo
Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) started favouring the Kikuyu people. This favouritism manifested itself in greater
government expenditures for social infrastructure in Kikuyu areas, corruption benefits to fellow
tribesmen and privileged access to government and jobs (Masakhalia, 2011).
38
During the 1960s and by the early 1970s, the one-party system was a trend that could be seen
all over the African continent (Tordoff, 1997). All African countries, except for a few, were one-party
states, and Kenya was no exception. Another trend across the continent was one of personalizing
power in the hands of the party leader, who also became the state president. In Kenya, this power was
contributed to Kenyatta, who became president after the independence until 1978. Later Daniel arap
Moi became president, in the period 1978 - 2002. The government of Kenya moved away from a
federal system to a unitary one, as the government removed the federal elements from the constitution
in 1964. These trends point to centralization of power, personalized by the president (Nyström, 2000).
The main argument that Kenya held for the one-party system was that it benefitted the political
stability.
In this paragraph, a small overview of the political context of Kenya before and after the
independence is provided. In the next paragraph the political context of Kenya in the period 1990 to
2013 will be discussed. This section will be more in-depth and concentrated on the indicators of
political instability explained in the conceptual framework.
8.2 Political Context Kenya, period 1990-1997
8.2.1 Tribalism and Electoral Violence
Since 1990, a wave of democratization processes swept across the African continent (Nyström, 2000).
The Kenyan government had faced criticism since 1986 and in July 1990 a series of riots throughout
the country took place, demanding more democracy. In May 1991 the Forum for the Restoration of
Democracy (FORD) was formed by six opposition leaders. Soon after the formation, the FORD group
was declared illegal by the Moi government. In November 1991 a pro-democracy demonstration took
place, and several members of FORD were arrested. This caused the international community to react
strongly with outrage and the World Bank decided to withdraw the financial funds and demanded
government reform (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 182). Due to the combination of international
and domestic pressures, president Moi agreed to reform the party system. This reform would make an
end to the political power monopoly that his party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) held.
In December 1991, the vice-president Mwai Kibaki resigned and founded the Democratic Party (DP).
During the first half of 1992, over 2000 people were killed in tribal disputes in Western
Kenya (Nyström, 2000). As a result, the Kenyan government put a ban on political rallies. This ban
was later lifted after protests organized by the FORD group. In December 1992 the first multi-party
elections were held, but opposition parties lacked to form an alliance against KANU, so president Moi
and KANU were able to remain in control (Tordoff, 1997, p. 16). However, the results of these
elections are contested and it is the question to what extent the elections were held fair (Patel, 2001).
39
When Jomo Kenyatta was president (1964-1978) the Kikuyu, the largest ethnic group in
Kenya, dominated Kenyan politics. At that time, Kikuyu domination alienated other ethnic groups,
like the Kamba, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo and other smaller groups within the country. President Moi
belongs to the Kalenjin group (Tordoff, 1997, p. 166). After the 1992 elections tensions between
ethnic groups increased and tribal clashes continued (Nyström, 2000). In the Rift Valley province,
around 5000 people were killed and another 75000 displaced, with the town of Molo being an
epicenter of the violence. The conflict was primarily between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin
communities, and land ownership was mentioned as one of the main reasons for the conflict. Bratton
& van de Walle (1997, p. 239) concluded that in Kenya, “democratization has resulted in
reaffirmation of ethnic identities, with political parties emerging along ethno-regional criteria rather
than ideological ones”. These ethnic clashes left the Kenyan society so divided that it was thought at
this time that a civil war was quite possible to erupt (Patel, 2001).
The next five years (1992 – 1997) were characterized by further opposition splintering (Patel,
2001). The election in 1992 did not change who was in power, nor did it changed the level of
corruption within the government (Nyström, 2000). However, this time the IMF pressured the Kenyan
government to take action against the official corruption. The IMF suspended payments in August
1997, and Kenya promptly inaugurated an anti-corruption body. At the same time, a serious strife
erupted in and around Mombasa, essentially along ethnic lines (Jeni, Bilin & Frances, 1999, p. 30).
Arson attacks were directed at people who were not originally from Mombasa, but who worked and
lived there for a long time. Approximately 40 people were killed and several others displaced.
In the 1997 elections, as was the case in the 1992 elections, functionalism among opposition
prevented them from presenting a unified front against Moi and the KANU party (Nyström, 2000).
And again, there were allegations of fraud surrounding the election. Daniel arap Moi was reelected in
December 1997 for his fifth term as president. In Kenya tribalism has infiltrated politics and with the
advent of multiparty politics, a lot of tribal parties arose. ‘Leaders’ of parties appeal to people of their
own tribes for their support, and voting was done purely along tribal lines, as each tribe believes that
it is ‘their time to enjoy’ political power and resources (Lonsdale, 2014). After a month of the
elections of 1997, politically motivated ethnic clashes erupted in the Rift Valley Province. Hundreds
of people were killed, and thousands of others displaced from home and livelihoods (Klopp, 2002).
This outburst of violence followed a similar pattern of previous eruptions of violence, prior and after
the first multi-party elections in 1992.
8.2.2 Water Scarcity and Electoral Violence
Prior to the elections of 1992 and 1997, the leading presidential candidates were mobilizing voters
along ethnic lines. This has resulted in a polarized electorate and outbreaks of violence between the
40
members of rival ethnic groups. As described in chapter 7, Kenyan tribalism is a result from
colonialism and the political culture that sprung up in independent Kenya (Masakhalia, 2011).
Environmental scarcity contributed to the eruption of violent conflicts between tribes about scare
resources and livestock. In some areas of Kenya the government is absence, and community-
organized security groups arise whereby people take the law into their own hands (Schilling, Opiyo &
Scheffran, 2012). This contributed to the proliferation of weapons in the north of Kenya and increased
armed opposition groups.
In Kenya politicians use the grievances of settlers and squatters over land and resources as
political tools, driving election violence within the state (Kimenyi & Romero, 2008). As water
become more scare because of the rapid population growth and pastoralist migrations, the stakes in
the battle over water become increasingly high. This means that water scarcity has led to a deepening
of already existing ethnic divisions and tensions (Boone, 2011). Kenya’s political party system that is
deeply riven along ethnic lines and in particular the politicians who use the grievances of settlers
fueled these ethnic rivalries that contributed to the eruption of electoral violence.
8.3 Elections 2002-2007 and Kenyan Crisis (2007-2008)
The next elections took place in December 2002 place. Whereas Kenya’s previous elections had been
marked by widespread political intimidation and violence, the periods before and after the 2002
election proceeded relatively calm (Center, 2003). In preparation of the 2002 elections, opposition
parties came together and formed a new party called the National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition
(NARC). In the elections, NARC presidential candidate Mwai Kibaki (a Kikuyu) won with 62 percent
of the votes, against 31 percent of the KANU candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, president Moi’s preferred
choice of successor (Steeves, 2006). The election in 2002 was an important benchmark in Kenya’s
political history. It was the first time that a united opposition mounted a successful campaign in
support of a single presidential candidate. The manner in which the elections were conducted and the
results of the election demonstrated that Kenyans wanted a different leadership in place (Andreassen
& Barasa, 2011).
In 2005 the NARC coalition fell apart. A referendum about constitutional reform divided the
NARC into camps for and against the proposal. President Kibaki became leader of a new party, the
Party of National Unity (PNU). In the 2007 elections, two main coalitions dominated the scene, the
PNU of president Kibaki, and the party of his former ally Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM). The alliances were largely formed on ethnic lines, the PNU was supported by
Kikuyu people, based in the Central and Eastern Provinces and strongly represented in Nairobi, the
Coast Province and Rift Valley. The ODM was backed by Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin people,
represented in the Nyanza and Western Provinces and Rift Valley. The opposition party accused the
41
government of privileging the dominant Kikuyu population over other ethnic groups (Andreassen &
Barasa, 2011). Kibaki was declared the winner in the presidential election, but the opposition party
won a majority of seats in the National Assembly. Odinga and the ODM rejected the results, stating
the elections had been rigged. The announcement of the results triggered widespread and systematic
violence, resulting in more than 1000 deaths and the displacement of over 500.000 civilians (KNCHR,
2008). Clashes were characterized by ethnically-targeted killings of those aligned with the PNU by
the ODM. Also counterattacks took place by the PNU with the intent on killing people in ODM-
aligned communities. Due to the ethnic nature of the crisis, violence was principally present in the
Kikuyu dominated region of the Rift Valley (Kanyinga, 2009). In Mombasa, Kenyan Coastals took
the streets to protest the electoral manipulations and support their preferred candidate Odinga. The
tension erupted when landless Coastal communities tried to grab the land of Kikuyu people (Dercon
& Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012). Ethnically motivated violence took also place in the slums of Nairobi.
For several months, the violence continued. In February 2008 UN secretary general Kofi Annan
brought successfully Kibaki and Odinga to the negotiating table and a power-sharing agreement was
signed, called the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 (Kanyinga & Long, 2012). This
accord established the office of the Prime Minister and created a coalition government. Kibaki
remained the president of Kenya, but Odinga was made Prime Minister of the power-sharing Cabinet.
Also two Deputy Prime Ministers were named, Kenyatta for the PNU and Musalia Mudavadi for the
ODM (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). The cabinet included 20 ministers from each party, though the
PNU held most of the senior portfolios, including foreign affairs, defense, finance and energy.
8.3.3 Adoption of a New Constitution (2010)
Following the end of the Kenyan crisis (2007-2008) the government began taking steps towards
ensuring that widespread violence would not reoccur in the next presidential election. In August 2010
a referendum for a new constitution took place, and over 67 percent of the Kenyan public approved
the new constitution (Akech, 2010). The new constitution was enacted replacing the older one that
had been in place since Kenya’s independence in 1963. The new constitution devolves power to local
governments, providing the Kenyan people with more rights and paves the way for land reform
(Sihanya, 2012). It also vests the executive authority with the president, rather than splitting power
between the president and prime minister. The presidency is also stripped of certain powers and
patronage that previously allowed for centralized control (Kanyinga & Long, 2012). This makes the
presidency less salient, and its capture would no longer be as vital as it has been throughout the
Kenyan history since independence.
The constitution of 2010 changed the electoral procedures, the Independent Electoral and
Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was formed to monitor the elections, and to ensure credible, free and
42
fair elections (Shah, 2015). Another electoral reform included the reorganization of the geographical
regions in Kenya into forty-seven distinct countries, each with a senator, governor, district Assembly
and a mandatory seat allocated for the representation for women (Kramon & Posner, 2011). To
mitigate the geographically- and ethnically centered politics of the past, another requirement was
introduced. Each presidential candidate must secure at least half of the popular vote in the general
election and at least 25 percent of the vote in 24 of the 47 districts. This must create a wider base of
support that cuts across geographic, ethnic and political cleavages.
8.4 Elections 2013
Despite the adoption of the new constitution in 2010, previous to the elections of 2013 fear prevailed
that riots and violence would erupt again (Carrier & Kochore, 2014). In March 2013 the general
elections were held, and voters could elect the president, members of the National Assembly and New
Senate, as well as Country Governors and Representatives. This was also the first election that was
managed under the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). Uhuru Kenyatta
(leader of The National Alliance (TNA)) won the elections with slightly more than the required 50
percent of the votes. Kenyatta’s opponent, former prime minister Raila Odinga (Orange Democratic
Movement) accused the IEBC of conspiring with Kenyatta and stealing votes (Cheeseman, Lynch &
Willis, 2014). Odinga unsuccessfully filed a petition against the election at the Supreme Court. Fear
existed that the presidential race would culminate another episode of violence, but besides some
minor protests about the election results, the country mainly remained peaceful.
8.5 Sub conclusion: Political Context and Political Stability
In chapter 7, the role of Kenyan tribalism in water related conflicts is explored. It is shown that in
times of drought, historic tribal clashes contribute to the eruption of conflicts over water. It is also
shown, that the frequency of water related conflicts increases in times of drought. In this paragraph,
an attempt is made to identify whether political instability was present in Kenya during the period
1990-2013. This will be done by the use of the ‘political instability indicators’ from the study of Jong-
A-Pin (2009).
In table 1 page 15, an overview is provided of the nine indicators that measures the concept of
political instability (Jong-A-Pin, 2009). The category ‘violence’ covers three indicators, ‘ethnic
tensions’, ‘internal conflicts’ and ‘civil conflicts’. The indicators ‘ethnic tensions’ and ‘civil conflicts’
are present in the examined water related conflicts of the previous chapter. One of the key drivers of
conflict in Kenya is the dimension of community identities (Osamba, 2001). In colonial times, the
British were concerned about dividing and conquering, and engaged in both creating ‘tribes’ and
dividing them from each other using population control policies (Robertson, 2008). Differences
43
among the various communities/tribes were magnified, which instigated clashes whereby each
community distrusted and fought the other. Tribalism, was at that time an effective way to keep
power. When independence was realized in 1963, the situation of hostility persisted. The increasing
water scarcity has led to a deepening of existing ethnic divisions and tensions. Kenya politicians use
the grievances of the communities and squatters over land and resources as political tools, driving
election violence within the state. Since the introduction of a multi-party system in 1991, only the
general elections of 2002 has been peaceful. All other elections, (1992, 1997, 2007 and 2013) have
had controversies and/or experienced outbursts of violence.
The indicators ‘internal conflicts’, ‘demonstrations’ and ‘riots’ are also present in the political
context of Kenya. The most significant conflict witnessed since Kenya’s independence, was the 2007-
2008 crisis, a series of inter-ethnic clashes ignited by the 2007 disputed presidential elections
(Kanyinga, 2009). Kibaki won the 2007 elections, but opponent Odinga stated that the elections had
been rigged (Andreassen & Barasa, 2011). The result of the elections triggered first non-violence
protests, but then became violent when supporters of Odinga started rioting. Odinga encouraged
supporters to engage in mass protests which he announced on radio stations and local television
(KNCHR, 2008). Hundreds of violent demonstrators were shot by the police, causing more violence
(Roberts, 2009). The targeted ethnic violence escalated and was mainly directed against Kikuyu
people (the community of which Kibaki is a member). For several months, the violence continued,
resulting in more than 1000 deaths and the displacement of over 500 000 civilians (KNCHR, 2008).
This conflict, and the other examined conflicts in the analysis section, shows that the indicators
‘internal conflicts’, ‘ethnic tensions’, ‘civil conflicts’, ‘demonstrations’ and ‘riots’ are also present in
the political context of Kenya. It also illustrates that the Kenyan society is highly fragmented, both
ethnically and regionally.
The category ‘political regime’ covers four indicators, namely: ‘changes of chief executive’,
‘cabinet changes’, ‘major constitutional changes’ and ‘major government crisis’. The analysis of the
political context of Kenya shows that all of these indicators are present within the examined period. In
1991 the party system was reformed due to a combination of international and domestic pressures
(Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). This reform made an end to the political power monopoly and
created a situation of political pluralism in the Kenyan party system. In the elections of 2002, Kibaki
won with 62 percent of the votes and defeated KANU which had governed the country since the
independence in 1963 (Center, 2003). The victory of Kibaki is an example of the ‘changes of chief
executive’ indicator and the Kenyan crisis (2007-2008) is an example of the indicator ‘major
government crisis’. The Kenyan crisis ended in February 2008, when Kibaki and Odinga both signed
a power-sharing agreement (Kanyinga & Long, 2012). In this agreement, the office of the Prime
Minister was established and a coalition government was created. A new cabinet was formed with 20
44
ministers from Kibaki’s party and 20 ministers from Odinga’s party. This means that the indicator
‘cabinet changes’ is present. The last indicator to measure political instability is ‘major constitutional
changes’. This indicator is also present, because after the Kenyan crisis, the government took steps to
prevent that widespread violence would reoccur in the next presidential election. A new constitution
was drafted, and enacted on 27th August 2010, replacing the old one that had been in place since
Kenya’s independence in 1963.
In this paragraph, the nine indicators of political instability from Jong-A-Pin (2009) have
been used to examine whether Kenya was political unstable in the period 1990-2013. It has been
determined that all of the nine indicators were present during this period, what indicates that Kenya
was political unstable. Two of the nine indicators that were present are related to water scarcity,
namely: ‘ethnic tensions’ and ‘civil conflicts’. This indicates that water scarcity in Kenya enhances
existing ethnic tensions and/or civil conflicts and therefore, it is possible that water scarcity has an
impact on the political stability of a country.
45
Chapter 9. Conclusion & Discussion
This thesis set out to study Kenya’s water crisis and the impact it has on the country’s political
stability. Kenya is used as an in-depth case study. The study draws from diverse sources of secondary
data including an overview of water-related-conflicts in the period 1990-2013.
The conceptual framework of this thesis is built on two main theories. The theory of Homer-
Dixon (1991; 1994; 1995) is used to identify the pathway from environmental scarcity to violent
conflict. Water scarcity in Kenya is caused by a mixture of climate change, population growth,
unequal resource access and poor management of water supply, especially in the agricultural sector
(Linke et al., 2015). The agricultural sector is the main source of income for many Kenyans and the
water crisis have had a devastating effect on agricultural communities and the national food supply.
Water scarcity reduces economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the scarcity and
for the larger national and regional economies (Homer-Dixon, 1991). In Kenya this has led to an
increased flow of rural to urban migration and a decrease in wealth, two factors that according to the
theory of Homer-Dixon (1994) trigger conflict. In Kenya, conflicts over scare natural resources occur
mainly between rival ethnic communities. Kenya’s ‘tribalism’ is a product of modern times, arising
from colonialism, urbanization and the political culture that sprung up in independent Kenya
(Masakhalia, 2011).
According to Homer-Dixon (1994) a decrease in wealth and increasing migration flows may
eventually weaken the state. This decreases governmental control over ethnic rivalries and increases
opportunities for insurgents challenging state authority. When the balance of power in the society
shifts away from the state towards challenger groups, the likelihood of violent conflict will increase.
In Kenya this is now partly happening, in remote resource scare areas law and order is not maintained
by the government but by community-organized security groups (Schilling, Opiyo & Scheffran,
2012). Also ethnically-based opposition groups are on the rise in rural areas and violent conflicts over
scare resources are increasing . This exemplifies that the theory of Homer-Dixon (1991; 1994; 1995)
proofs itself useful in examining the relationship between water scarcity and conflict in Kenya.
The second theory that is used in this thesis explores the concept of political instability. It
seems that ‘conflict’, as used by Homer-Dixon, is only one aspect of political instability. In this thesis,
nine indicators from the study of Jong-A-Pin (2009) are used to measure the degree of political
instability in Kenya in the period 1990-2013. Evidently, all of the nine indicators of political
instability were present during this period which indicates that Kenya was political unstable.
46
The examination of the Kenyan political context shows that the Kenya’s society, as well as
Kenya’s political party system is divided into ethnic tribes. This means that prior to an election,
presidential candidates mobilizes voters along ethnic lines. This has resulted in a polarized electorate
and outbreaks of violence between members of rival ethnic groups. Furthermore, Kenyan politicians
use the grievances of settlers and squatters over land and resources as political tools, driving election
violence within the state (Kimenyi & Romero, 2008). Since the introduction of the multi-party system
in 1991, only the general elections of 2002 has been peaceful. All other elections, (1992, 1997, 2007
and 2013) have had controversies and/or experienced outbursts of violence.
As water become more scare, the stakes in the battle over water become increasingly high. So
the increasing water crisis lead to a deepening of ethnic divisions and tensions (Boone, 2011).
Kenya’s political party system that is deeply riven along ethnic lines and in particular the politicians
who use the grievances of settlers fueled these ethnic rivalries and contributed to the eruption of
electoral violence. This indicates that Kenya’s water crisis contribute to the political instability
indicators ‘ethnic tensions’ and ‘civil conflicts’. Therefore, water scarcity can have an impact on the
political stability of a country.
To improve this study, it is interesting to explore what impact Kenya’s political instability has
on the political instability of the region. The overview of water-related-conflicts in chapter 7 shows
that some conflicts transcends state borders. These conflicts demonstrate that water scarcity is a
phenomenon that goes beyond state borders, and that periods of drought in one place can have an
impact on the environment, political situation and available resources of another place. It is therefore
interesting to analyze how domestic violence over water can spill over to violence on a regional level,
and whether this spillover can have an impact on the political stability of the region.
47
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