WATER CONFLICT, SECURITY WATER CONFLICT, SECURITY AND COOPERATIONAND COOPERATION

Dr. Marwa Daoudy

IUHEI (Geneva), CERI (Paris)

« Water is not necessary for life, it isis life »

Antoine de St-Exupéry, Terre des Hommes, 1939

WATER, AN INTERNATIONAL WATER, AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUEISSUE

PARTIAL PERSPECTIVE: « Crisis » or « war» because of freshwater

scarcity – « geopolitics of water »

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:

Sanitary, environmental, political, institutional and financial issues

MAPMAP

Water, an International IssueThe Debate: Water and IRBenefit-Sharing

ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS

INDICATORS:

Global dataResource use per person per yearRate of utilizationDependency rate on external sources

THE WATER CYCLETHE WATER CYCLE

WATER-RELATED DATA WATER-RELATED DATA 263 internationally shared basins (A. Wolf, Oregon State,

Water Database) 70 in Africa, 55 in Europe, 40 in Asia, 33 in South America,

6 in the Middle East 1400 million cubic kilometers (millions of billions of m3),

70% of the earth, only 2.5% of freshwater Renewable resources: 40 000 km3/year, i.e. 0,007% of the

total water volume Not an issue of global availability but geographic

distribution: 9 countries – 60% of world water resources.

CRISIS - INDICATORS (I)CRISIS - INDICATORS (I)

Availability per person per year:

> 1700 m3/h/an: relative water sufficiencyBetween 1700 and 1000 m3/p/year: water

stressBetween 1000 and 500 m3/p/y: scarcity

line< 500 m3/p/y: absolute scarcity

CRISIS - INDICATORS (II)CRISIS - INDICATORS (II)

Rate of dependence on external sources:

Upstream/downstream (main areas of tension)

E.g: Turkmenistan (98%), Egypt (97%), Syria (80%)

INDICATORS (III)INDICATORS (III)

Water utilizations:

70% to agriculture (ME: 80-90%)Global food: need to find a balance

between agriculture/industry/domestic use

ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (I)ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (I)

Health-related dilemmas:

Water quality (80% of diseases are water-borne in poor countries - WHO)

Pollution (pesticides and salinity of water and soils)

ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (II)ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (II)

Demographic growth:World population: x 3 in 100 yearsPressures on water: x 6 in 100 yearsMainly in developing countriesIncreased urbanization: + pressure on water

(90% of demographic growth is absorbed by cities)

Green Revolution: food security, intensive irrigation practices (vs. Blue Revolution )

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCESORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES

Increased water demand (demographic growth)

Decreased water supply and water quality

Main areas of conflict

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCEINTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Decision-making process?Execution of mandates?Accountability, responsibility?

THE DEBATETHE DEBATE

Institutional, economic, ethical, strategic and political issues at stake

No common vision or unified strategy

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTOF THE ENVIRONMENT

Efficiency of international agreements

Legitimacy of procedures

Equitable share of responsibilities

International Water GovernanceInternational Water Governance

Environmental, economic and social issuesSustainable development:

Promoting Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)

Global good vs. Economic good

Water ethics: International Water Law

MULTILATERALISMMULTILATERALISM

Promoting International Water Governance:

– Stockholm, Rio, Johannesburg 1972, 1992, 2002

INTEGRATED WATER INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT (IWRM)MANAGEMENT (IWRM)

* Sustainable water management and sustainable development

* Integrating sometimes opposed interests (ecosystems/human needs, surface water/underground resources, upstream/downstream interests, different uses…).

* Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 (Rio): water is an economic good

WATER AND ECONOMICS WATER AND ECONOMICS

Symbolic dimension: water = gift from God= public good

Water costs?

WATER ECONOMICS: THE WATER ECONOMICS: THE DEBATEDEBATE

Regional scarcity: need to calculate total distribution costs

Global economic costs: distribution + opportunity + external

Conclusion: need to enhance economic efficiency and environmental, ecological sustainability. Avoid « tragedy of common goods ».

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONSALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Private investments in water sectorInvestments to increase water supplies

(supply management): desalination « Virtual water »: food imports = water

imports (1500 m3/ton of cereals)Water markets

ISSUES AT STAKE ISSUES AT STAKE Privatization of water sector: risks

Water access as human right

Water as global public good

Third way: between total privatization and total State control

WATER ETHICSWATER ETHICS

Need to enhance cooperation among States

International legal standards Slow but steady construction of IL on

utilization of international watercourses for non-navigational purposes (United Nations Convention, 1997).

CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS

Multidimensional issueWater: human survival, economic

growth and political stability « Hydro-politics »: link between

hydraulic issues strategic, economic and political levels (cooperation, conflict, security).

WATER AND IRWATER AND IR

The Theoretical DebateThe Theoretical Debate

I. Water Conflict & Cooperation: some IR theories

II. Debating water issues in the 1990s: environmental security vs. virtual water

III. Debating water issues today: benefit sharing vs. water rights.

Water Specificity – Water Specificity – Some Theoretical implicationsSome Theoretical implications

Global Common Good = need for collective action

Avoid « tragedy of the commons » (Hardin, 1968) or unilateral abuse by developing common and organized management of resources.

Water, Conflict and Security

Conflict over WaterConflict over WaterClassification criteria (Zeitoun & Warner,

2006):Development disputesControl of water resourcesWater as political toolWater as military targetWater as military tool

Inter-State

Intra-State

Water Conflict and Cooperation Water Conflict and Cooperation

Regime Theory: regional institutions to manage cooperative regimes for natural resources.

International Governance: agent-based resolution of collective problems at local, national and international level.

Water Conflict & Cooperation Water Conflict & Cooperation

Power Matrix:Power Matrix: additional factors (other than asymmetry) to explain link between water and conflict (interests, riparian position, projected power).

Inherent asymmetry as specific nature of conflicts over water (Haftendorn, 2000). – Conflict resolution should address

asymmetric structure of conflict

Water Conflict vs. Water Cooperation Water Conflict vs. Water Cooperation

Environmental security vs. virtual water (Pessimists vs. Optimists)

Debate in 1990s: very high risks of violent conflict because of increasing water scarcity (e.g., Middle East)

Vs. no conflict despite water scarcity and tensions: additional supply through water embedded in food imports

GEOPOLITICAL STUDIESGEOPOLITICAL STUDIES

Conventional Geopolitics:– Natural resource endowments and

geography are defining features of a State’s status

Geographical and environmental determinism

WATER - GEOPOLITICSWATER - GEOPOLITICS

Neo-Malthusianism: « WATER WARS»Demographic growth, resource scarcity

and violent conflict

Cornucopian perspectives: cooperation vs. conflict

Available but mismanaged resourcesNeed to evaluate resources economically

(price)

WATER WARS?

The DebateThe Debate

The inevitability of water conflicts is supported by quantitative and qualitative analysis. The link between water and violent conflict is thus confirmed.

As a strategic security concern, water can become a source of conflict but interdependent riparian states are more likely to cooperate over water.

Water & SecurityWater & Security

A new debate on national security: critical security studies (CSS)

Enlargement of threats: from traditional (military, economic) to non-traditional (environment, resources, health)

Link between environmental problems and emergence of conflicts

« Environmental security »

Research QuestionsResearch Questions

What linkages are established between the environment and security? How can they explain the successful securitization of the environment as a referent object since the 1990s.

Some would argue that resource scarcities have been over-securitized in the last decades. How? Why? What about current trends towards the securitization of the environment in relation to development?

Environmental Security (1)Environmental Security (1)

Transnational environmental problems

Resource-based conflicts

EnvironmentalEnvironmental Security (2) Security (2)

Toronto School (Homer-Dixon, 1993, 1994)

Oslo School (Gledditsch, 1998, 2000)Woodrow Wilson Center for

International Scholars (ECSP), Washington.

THE SECURITIZATION OF WATER THE SECURITIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENTRESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Link between environmental problems (water) and national security issues

Threat perception

Securitization of environmental problems: maintain local biosphere as an essential support on which will depend all other human activities (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 74)

UNDERLYING CONCEPTSUNDERLYING CONCEPTS

Negotiation

Power (asymmetry)

Conflict (resolution)

Water, Conflict and Negotiation

NEGOTIATION ELEMENTSNEGOTIATION ELEMENTS

ActorsStructureProcessStrategiesResults

ACTORSACTORS

• Defining the Hegemon: State that temporarily gains a preponderance of power in the international and/or regional system

• It can unilaterally dominate the rules

and procedures that guide political and economic relations – and water dynamics

STRUCTURESTRUCTURE

Asymmetry of power (upstream/downstream, military, economic resources)

History of relations (politics, culture, etc..)

Structural power (1st dimension of power)

PROCESSPROCESS

Cooperative, integrative – (win-win)

Conflict-oriented, distributive – (win-lose)

Mixed (but predominantly…)

STRATEGIESSTRATEGIES

Bargaining Power (« 2nd face of power »)

Time– Costs of no agreement

AGREEMENTSAGREEMENTS

Bilateral vs. basin-wide, temporary vs. lasting, stable, unstable

Structure of agreements =

power structure (Schelling, 1960)BATNA: Best Alternative to No

Agreement

How to reach agreements in situations How to reach agreements in situations of Hydro-Hegemony?of Hydro-Hegemony?

Security dilemmaUnilateral upstream development =

dependence and insecurity for downstream riparians

Bargaining power: reverse of asymmetrical dynamics

Some Counter-Hegemony Some Counter-Hegemony StrategiesStrategies

Issue-Linkage: linkage, securitization process

Change the other riparian’s utilities & alternatives Impact on strategic, economic, security interests

– Immediate interests: food and water security – General interests: regional, border security

International Law: source of bargaining and structural power for dependent and/or downstream riparians

Power Asymmetry: The DebatePower Asymmetry: The Debate

Power asymmetry between strong and weaker riparians constitutes a major source of water conflict. The will of the stronger states prevails and determines the course of action.

Power asymmetry between strong and weaker riparians constitutes a major source of water cooperation A difference in power symmetries presents an opportunity for weaker riparians to find solutions and strategies to impact the process and final outcome, thus enhancing the “power of the weak”.

Water Conflict ResolutionWater Conflict Resolution

Asymmetry of power: specific to water conflicts vs. political or some other environmental conflicts

Resolve the conflict by addressing the structure of conflict, not causes

“Desecuritization” process: focus on interests, power and rights

POWER ASYMMETRY AND POWER ASYMMETRY AND HYDRO-HEGEMONYHYDRO-HEGEMONY

Research findings: more efficient outcomes if asymmetry of power (power strategies)

– limits to Hydro-Hegemony

Only bilateral agreements – limits to issue linkage and downstream power

Water Cooperation & Economics

«Cornucopian » perspectives«Cornucopian » perspectives

Political EconomyCooperative solutions through water

markets and pricing of water:Virtual waterDemand managementBenefit-sharing

The DebateThe Debate

Cooperation through joint water management, information-sharing, monitoring, etc. can provide the incentive for broader cooperation between co-riparians that is needed for effective de-securitization, thus allowing for conflict prevention/transformation, mutual benefit-sharing and development of all the concerned riparian states.

Policy & Research FindingsPolicy & Research Findings

“Transboundary Water Cooperation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit-Sharing”, Expert Group on Development Issues of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Co-authored with Phillips, Mc Caffrey, Öjendal, & Turton, 2006.

The framework for the approachThe framework for the approach

Specific research and policy-oriented questions:– What role does the sharing of benefits play in the

conflict/cooperation debate?– Can cooperation on the sharing of international

watercourses be utilized as a broader conflict prevention tool?

– What are the key areas for development partners in integrating trans-boundary water management more closely into their overall development agendas?

From ‘Water Wars’ From ‘Water Wars’ to the Sharing of Benefitsto the Sharing of Benefits

Options for cooperation and the amicable sharing of benefits resulting from professionally managed watersheds.

The ‘desecuritization of water resource management’

Benefit-SharingBenefit-Sharing

Sadoff and Grey (2002)

Simplest and most useful general framework to date

Benefits from cooperation over a shared river basin may be divided into four different categories: ‘environmental’, ‘economic’, ‘political’, and ‘catalytic’.

The Inter-SEDE ModelThe Inter-SEDE Model

Phillips et al., 2006: assumption that a well-managed watershed will provide enhanced benefits in terms of Security, Economic Development, and the Environment

Comparative analysis for the Jordan, the Kagera and the Mekong basins

Establishment of relevant categories of indicators for 21 riparians of the three basins

Categories of BenefitsCategories of Benefits

Security: promotion of peaceful relations, reduction of military expenditure, prevention of human and societal insecurity.

Economic development: enhancement of trade,

food production, local household consumption, livelihoods.

Both of the above elements are nested in the environment: contribution to biodiversity, promotion of sustainable management of trans-boundary resources, access to sufficient w. resources.

Identify Key DriversIdentify Key Drivers

Use indicators to identify key drivers

All riparians have been ranked for all the indicators and resulting ranks placed in five bands: 1-5

Conclusions: relative importance of different categories of drivers

CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS Clear need for further development of the

concept as a whole: “one size does not fit all”Over-riding importance of security-related

dynamics: securitization/de-securitization dynamics

Any successful benefit-sharing scheme will require the generation of a ‘broad basket’ of possible benefits to act as an inducement to each co-riparian to be involved.

Benefit-sharing will need to be established based on concrete inducements which can be quantified

Equitable allocation vs. benefits: two sides of same coin

From Theory to Reality? From Theory to Reality?

Testing the frameworks in the Jordan and Mekong Basins.