war & secession

BOOK REVIEWSON

WAR AND SECESSION:PAKISTAN, INDIA AND

THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH

ABU BELAL MUHAMMAD SHAFIUL HUQ

MD MAHBUBUR RASHID

KAZI ANISUZZAMAN

Book Reviews: War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh

Introduction

1. ‘War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh’ written by Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose is a unique historical legacy portrayed the time when a new country named ‘Bangladesh’ was born. Basically, this book was published in 1990 at Berkeley by University of California Press.

2. Professor Sisson has interests in comparative politics with special emphasis on representative institutions, systems of political authority, and culture and democratization, particularly in India and Asia. His publications include War and Secession: India, Pakistan, and the Creation of Bangladesh; Congress and Indian Nationalism: The Pre-independence Phase; The Congress Party of Rajasthan: Institution Building in an Indian State etc. He was extended the Distinguished Alumni Award by the Department of Political Science, and is currently an Institute Associate of the university’s Institute of Collaborative Research and Public Humanities. Before returning to Ohio State, he was a Professor of Political Science at UCLA where he also served as the Senior Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs. An amateur musician, he was a founding member of the Board of Trustees of the Los Angeles Opera, a member of the Board of Opera Columbus, and currently serves as a member of the Board of Santa Fe Pro Musica. Dr. Sisson served as Interim President of The Ohio State University, and until his retirement held the Board of Trustees Chair in Comparative Politics.

3. Leo Eugene Rose's many articles and books on South Asian politics and foreign policy enlightened several generations of Americans. Leo's services to the University of California, moreover, went beyond research. He served with Bob Scalapino as co-editor of this journal for more than three decades, helping to establish its reputation for balanced, accurate analysis of current events. In addition, he was mentor to a number of students, undergraduate and graduate, in the course of over fifty years at Berkeley. Linked throughout his life to the University of California, Leo received his B.A. (1949), M.A. (1954), and PhD (1960) from that institution. From the early 1960 until his death he combined teaching, research and co-editorship of Asian Survey with his longtime colleague Robert Scalapino, who remembers him with the following words:

"In personality, Leo was out-going, friendly, and always prepared to answer a call for assistance. I never ceased to marvel at the variety of his close friends throughout South Asia. Several episodes remain vivid in my mind. One was our visit to the Dalai Lama in Dharmala shortly after his exile began. ..“

Leo Eugene Rose passed away after a long illness on September 11, 2005 in Oakland California, bringing an end to the career of one of our most illustrious specialists on South Asia.

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Brief Description/ Orientation with the Book

4. This book is devoted to explaining why things turned out that way during the contemporary period of 1971. It analyzes the process by which perceptions became increasingly rigid and information more restricted and frequently distorted, so that options for the successful prosecution of the political game were reduced to those based upon collective withdrawal and ultimately the use of force. The book basically falls into two parts, each encompassing one of the subcontinent's two wars of 1971.

5. In part 1 the authors analyze the efforts on the part of the military regime and political parties to reach a negotiated agreement between what ultimately became two sovereignties the military regime in West Pakistan, and the Awami League in East Pakistan, or Bangladesh together with their abortion in the military crackdown of 25 March and the beginning of civil war. The process is as complex as it is fascinating, and it is necessarily understood in terms of the political context from which the major figures in the drama derived much of their understanding of the situation in 1971, as well as of the intentions of their allies and adversaries. Chapter 2 examines the context provided by political conflict and development in Pakistan, including the crucial elections of December 1970, and Chapter 3 reviews the images and legacies in Indo-Pakistani relations that were critical in shaping the perceptions that each held of the other in the 1971 crisis. Chapter 4 analyzes the first phase of negotiations and the definitions of interest and perceptions of distrust that attended them. Chapter 5 concerns the negotiations between two domestic sovereignties the military regime centered in Rawalpindi and the Awami League centered in Dhaka. After the collapse of central authority in East Pakistan that attended the postponement of the convening of the National Assembly and the ineffective employment of military force to quell dissent and reassert central authority in the eastern province. Chapter 6 constitutes an analysis of the negotiations toward constitutional agreement by the civil side of the state, the preparation and imposition of a "military solution" to political conflict by the military side of the state, and the commencement of civil war.

6. In part 2 the authors analyze the war of liberation and the relationships between context, perception, and decision that led to the outbreak of the Bangladesh war. Chapter 7 analyzes the Indian response to the military crackdown by the Pakistani government, and Chapter 8 reviews the strategies and timing of the military regime in attempting to recreate the state in East Pakistan and in pursuing a different political settlement in the context of the developing international crisis with India. Chapter 9 discusses the development of Indian policy toward the crisis in East Pakistan, and Chapters 10-12 analyze the process of decision making that led to war between India and Pakistan, as well as the role of external powers in ameliorating the crisis and as witnesses to its close. The book concludes in Chapter 13 with a discussion of findings and their implications for issues of war and peace in the region. The second part (the last seven chapters) of the book basically discusses the causes and the results of the war between Pakistan and India, the dismemberment of Pakistan, and the creation of Bangladesh as a sovereign state.

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Strength of the Book

7. Systematic Analytical Approach. War and Secession is probably the most complete treatment to date of the turmoil that shook South Asia in the early 1970s. The most remarkable feature of this book is the depth of its scholarship. Because its analysis is based on such thorough research. The book under review is a political study of the causes and consequences of this crisis and the war, based on a reconstruction of the real facts, historical events, political processes and developments. It candidly recapitulates the respective roles of the political elites, their leaders and governments, and assesses their perceptions of the real situation. It is an absorbing narrative of almost thirteen months, from 7 December 1970, when elections were held in Pakistan, to 17 December 1971 when the war ended after the Pakistani Army's surrender. The authors, who are trained political scientists, give fresh interpretations of these historical events and processes and relate them to the broader regional and global issues, thus assessing the crisis in a broader perspective. Their focus on the problems under discussion is sharp, cogent, enlightening, and circumspect, whether or not the reader agrees with their conclusions. The grasp of the source material is masterly; their narration of fast-moving political events is superbly anchored in their scientific methodology and political philosophy. This method of approaching political problems of regional crises adds richness to the entire analysis. War and Secession analyzes the decisions that led to and accompanied the wars in South Asia which created the nation of Bangladesh in 1971. Its authors begin with the widely accepted premise that none of the parties involved in the crises of the early 1970s wanted war. Their book attempts to explain why, nonetheless, Pakistan broke up amid civil war and became embroiled in a war against India. John Sisson and Leo Rose rely on a wealth of hitherto unavailable sources that they collected from 1978 through 1987. Their evidence includes papers released under the Freedom of Information Act and interviews with participants who were central to the decision-making processes that led to war. Their systematic use of oral history adds strength and authority to their interpretation of documents and gives their analysis a unique perspective that later studies will be unlikely to attain.

8. Leadership Philosophy. Reprising a theme that the authors first address in chapter 3, argue that the fundamental misperceptions with which Indian and Pakistani leaders had regarded each other since independence contributed to their misunderstanding and lack of communication in 1971. Each country "viewed the intentions and declarations of the other as fundamentally hostile" based on its perception of "history". Sisson and Rose note with irony that in 1971 democratic India exhibited "strong and consistent control" while authoritarian Pakistan did not. Indian leaders relied on an institutional policy-making infrastructure and drew on personal experiences of their country's previous war against Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan's military regime was diplomatically uninformed and suspicious of civilian experts. This contrast in approach to decision-making placed Pakistani leaders at a disadvantage. According to the authors, their behavior was "reflexive and designed more to deny India satisfaction than to reach domestic accommodation". Pakistani leaders also incorrectly assumed that the

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international community would restrain India from pursuing a military campaign. The result was a victory for India and the secession of Bangladesh.

9. The Process of Polarization. The main thesis here is that the political crisis of the early 1970s where there was no inherent political mechanism to solve the problem of transfer and sharing of political power among the contenders. The struggle for political power in Pakistan after a long period of military rule, thus, became a crucial problem, and the ruling elites, both of East and West Pakistan, failed to reach any settlement. Sisson and Rose carefully reconstruct the subsequent maneuvering for power by military and political elites. They conclude that the outcome was a "theater of the absurd" (p. 176) where virtually all these elites misperceived the situation. There was acute polarization on several planes: social, political, and regional. This polarization led to the civil war. According to the authors, three factors further sharpened this polarization:

a. First, the participants mistrusted the intentions of their adversaries, which led to misperceptions and misunderstanding of their ideas, intentions, programmes, and policies.

b. Second, the participants' positions were ambiguous and unclear to each other: for example, Mujib's Six Points created confusion, misunderstanding, and mistrust. c. Third, "each participant was fearful that its core interests could not be protected under any arrangement in the transfer of power of which it was not a part", (pp. 266-267).

10. The Role of India. By far the most useful chapters concern India's calculations about the situation in East Pakistan and the attempts to prepare international opinion for invasion. The authors are certainly right to insist upon the smallness and cohesion of India's foreign policy process as opposed to Pakistan's indecision and misperceptions. Rose and Sisson emphasize not so much the 'refugee' problem as propelling India towards intervention but rather the concern in New Delhi towards the political situation in West Bengal and the north-eastern states generally. They are certainly right to underline India's concerns about a radical left-wing Bengali government in what was then East Pakistan, and the belief that India must involve herself in the setting up of an Awami League government if only to ensure that it was pro-Indian and purged of extremists like Tajuddin. "The process of polarization", conclude the authors, "was encouraged as well by the inability of the military regime to preserve its neutrality in the negotiations; ultimately it became a contestant with a standing no different from that of the others". (p. 267).

11. The Role of Superpowers. The role of the superpowers in this crisis presents a candid and clear analysis of how they perceive and handle regional conflicts from the standpoint of their own interests. The Soviet Union sided with India. The United States played an ambivalent role but, according to the authors, covertly supported India: "… if there was a 'tilt' in the US aid policy upto December 1971, it was toward India rather

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than Pakistan", (p. 258). As a last resort, the authors claim, if political settlement of the civil war became impossible, "then the United States wanted to help arrange a peaceful separation of the country into two sovereign states", (p. 258). China paid only lip- service. This clearly shows that, in the global context, small countries like Pakistan cannot depend on the super powers for their security. They can survive only on account of their internal vigour, self-reliance, and a viable socio-political and socio-economic order. Political independence without economic independence is an illusion.

12. The Nature of Political Crises. The book makes an important contribution towards understanding the nature of political crises and local wars, which often erupt in developing areas like South Asia, and which have the potential to develop into regional and global conflicts. How the ruling elites in the developing countries sometimes prove inefficient and incapable of resolving the political and constitutional crises over the heads of the masses, is lucidly explained by the authors in this case study of Pakistan. Democracy does not mean governance and rule of rich elites over the poor masses. Real democracy is popular sharing in the decision-making process at the grass-roots level which must ensure basic needs to all. Economic and political advantages, privileges, powers, and gains are the rights of all. This study shows how real problems of the masses are deliberately shelved by the ruling elites in their lust for power and privilege. Even after the 'liberation' of Bangladesh, prosperity did not come to the Bengali masses.

13. Well Balanced Historical Accounts. Thus the authors provide a well-balanced and unbiased historical accounts leading to the war of 1971. The book is very well researched with numerous notes on various sources of information. The book describes the genesis of the problems in East Pakistan, beginning with the partition of India and the formation of Pakistan's two wings. Carefully collected economic data demonstrates the lop-sided distribution of wealth in Pakistan with more government spending and foreign aid going to the West than to the East, despite the latter having a greater population and suffering from severe natural disasters.

Weakness of the Book

14. Access to Critical Primary Sources. Beside the professional outlook of the book under discussion it has also few grey areas which stuck our reviewing team. Sisson and Rose relied for the most part on selective interviews with key participants. A list of those interviewed is provided in the appendix, but specific identities are concealed in the footnotes. The psychological significance of 1971 demanded a more effective way of apportioning responsibility for events which, according to the authors' own thesis, were by no means inevitable. Lack of access to critical primary sources, both private and official, in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India is no fault of the authors. The use of official American papers obtained under the freedom of information act certainly strengthens the second part of the study dealing with the Indo-Pakistan war and the response of the international community, but it adds nothing to the first and more important part, focusing on the political imbroglio preceding the military crackdown in East Pakistan. The freshness of the

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interpretations partly derives from the fact that the study is based on new evidence collected from a rich data of primary sources which have become available for the first time. The authors have also utilized interviews with people who were directly connected with the events and had first-hand knowledge of the formation and implementation of the relevant policies. But the veracity and authenticity of such interviews cannot be scientifically ascertained; since in matters of wars and other serious contentions, human emotions, feelings, and biases tend to influence the statements. The authors have, however, tried hard to keep the discussion objective and impartial. Some interviewees remained anonymous. Their statements must have been taken only with a pinch of salt. Anonymity cannot be a source of evidence in matters of serious research like civil wars. Sisson and Rose depend almost wholly on participant information for the pre-civil war period. Yet both Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League in East Pakistan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People's Party in West Pakistan had been killed before the authors began the study in 1978. Indeed, most of the key Awami League leaders had been assassinated after the 1975 military coup in Bangladesh. Consequently, the study gives few insights into the thinking within the Awami League's inner counsels; much less the rank and file, as the negotiations stalled and the political atmosphere grew more acerbic.

15. The True Nature of Neediness of Bangladesh. The authors assume (pp. 146-149) that India planned to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan and invade East Pakistan when about three and a half million Bengali refugees, fled to West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura, the three politically volatile states of India. But the refugee problem was exploited by India as an excuse. The authors have themselves quoted the remarks of Indian scholar K. Subramaniam about the civil war in Pakistan to the effect that East Pakistan's crisis had presented India with "an opportunity the like of which will never come again", (p. 149). As the authors also explain, the fact is that India and Pakistan lived ever since their independence, in a state of disquiet and mutual mistrust. Fearful of the Indian might, Pakistan was forced to join the western military pacts to safeguard its territorial integrity. The problems and difficulties of one were always exploited by the other for its own advantage. Here the true nature of neediness of the birth of a new nation a new entity and in particular the birth of a new country Bangladesh was less emphasized.

16. The Desires of the People of Bangladesh. The big picture of the book seems to be an adequate account of the events of the 1971 war leading to the creation of Bangladesh. We do not proclaim to be an expert in this field, but the authors did a fair job constructing the events and major actors leading up to the crisis that became the 1971 war. The unfortunately drawback may also be the book's strength - the perspective was drawn mostly from the views of India, Pakistan, and Mujibur Rahman, the elected leader of the Awami Party in East Pakistan, which eventually became Bangladesh. Sisson and Rose present a thorough analysis of the policy decisions of the involved governments that led to the creation of Bangladesh as an independent country. The authors describe the issues and events that faced the leaders of the respective governments and their actions. Of note,

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the book does not describe the events that occurred to the people of Bangladesh during the war. Somewhere the needs and desires of the people of Bangladesh become submerged. Nonetheless, the authors do responsibly convey some of the important events of the war itself (their chosen topic), but not the history, politics, and culture of Bangladesh. People desiring more of the latter will wish to read more elsewhere.

17. Inadequate Narration of True Consequences. While reading ‘War and Secession’ we kept trying to account for the authors' strangely sterile analysis of one of the most outrageous and unravelling of the democratic processes in recent history. It may be assumed that neither of the authors spent much time in Pakistan or Bangladesh previous to their research trips for interview purposes. Their sometimes painfully detailed account is limited to the bureaucratic and military chambers of power and is curiously drained of the flesh and blood of the real historic situation. Academic "objectivity" actually becomes less objective by not adequately indicating the real consequences of the dry political struggles. This becomes especially evident halfway through the book when, surprisingly, after spending a long chapter detailing final negotiations, the infamous military crackdown of March 25, 1971 actually entailed, in terms of the brutal extermination of tens of thousands of Bengali civilians which was otherwise ignored or not given the due importance.

18. Leadership Charisma of Shekh Mujibur Rahman. The authors' subtle anti-Indian bias and curious defensiveness of Nixon-Kissinger becomes more apparent in the last third of the book. The final "Interpretations" was a disappointment. It offered no new insights or thought-provoking analysis, or, most pointedly, suggestions for how to avoid, or more constructively intervene in, such conflicts in the future. The leadership charisma of the then East Pakistan heroes’ like Shekh Mujibur Rahman was mostly missing. His contribution to the end of conflict, popularity among the general mass, majestic motivational leadership, dedication to people and many more shining characteristics were missing/ignored in this book.

19. The Politics of Genocide. “Kill three million of them and the rest will eat out of our hands” – General Yahya Khan. The events in what became the nation of Bangladesh received intense media coverage in 1971; there has been little scholarly interest in the question of genocide since that time. The course of genocide started from Operation searchlight in March, Search and Destroy in mid-May to early October and the Scorched Earth from October to December, 16. Among the scholars, the main arguments against describing the events of 1971 as genocide came from Richard Sisson and Leo E Rose in 1990. In early April 1971, a group of American Diplomats in Dhaka, led by Counsel General Archer Blood, sent a telegram to the state Department protesting the administration’s refusal to condemn the mass killing of the Bengalis. The telegram stated in part: “…Our Government has failed to denounce the suppression of Democracy. Our government has failed to denounce the atrocities… we have not chosen to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately, the

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overworked term genocide applicable, is purely an internal matter of a sovereign state…We as professional public servants, express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interest here can be defined and our polices redirected…..”

20. Restricted the Scope of Vision. The book will be welcomed by the scholars and specialists in the area of international crisis behavior in general by those specializing in the political problems of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in particular. As the general problems (such as regional disparities, class exploitations, dominance of elite in politics and economics, mistrust and misperceptions among political groups and parties and the use of religion for political purposes, etc) discussed by the authors still plague the Pakistani polity, the book will be immensely useful to only Pakistani politicians, political analysts, theorists and the students of political students of political science and political behavior.

21. Minor Factual Errors. However, there are also a few minor factual errors that don't change the book's value for its detailed account or the overall import of the history it describes. For example, they switch from referring to the capital of Pakistan as "Rawalpindi" to "Islamabad" without explanation, and similarly offer the first use of the term "Bangladesh" without quotes or context. Again, they describe the "major" cyclone of "October" 1970, which in fact took place on November 12-13; and then proceed to give no indication of the singular, historic nature of this cyclone, which killed at least 250,000 people in the Ganges Delta overnight.

Conclusion

22. The book will be welcomed by the scholars and specialists in the area of international crisis behaviour in general, and by those specializing in the political problems of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in particular. As the general problems such as regional disparities, class exploitation, dominance of Elites in politics and economics, mistrust and misperceptions among political groups and parties, and the use of religion for political purposes, etc discussed by the authors, the book will be immensely useful to politicians, political analysts, theorists, and students of political science and political behaviour. In the developing societies, the failure to resolve in a peaceful manner, the internal political and constitutional problems by the aspirants to power, the study shows clearly, often leads to regional crises which overlap and extend to the contiguous areas of neighbouring countries. This destabilizes the whole region and creates the possibility of intervention by a super power. This also means that any problem in any individual country soon acquires international dimensions. No country is an island. East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Afghanistan and now Kuwait and Iraq are recent examples. In the final analysis, it is not religion that

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holds a multicultural nation together but respect and shared dreams.

23. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose put all of their many interviews to good use in War and Secession (Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh). They present all sides of the various complex relationships of this region, as well as presenting the fascinating international views of the situation, predominantly China, USSR, and the US. They are careful to remain unbiased and present the misperceptions that all sides were using to base their decisions upon. This book will also be a joy for the general reader as they make all the issues understandable and unravel all the tangles between the various personalities. The authors provide a definitive account of the creation of Bangladesh that will both entertain and inform.

24. The book gives a comprehensive select bibliography of source material, as well as a detailed list of the participants interviewed by the authors, which include politicians, administrators, government and military officials, political journalists, jurists, and scholars of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the United States, all of whom claimed to have a first-hand knowledge of the crisis in Pakistan's eastern wing. Overall, this book provides some valuable "primary source" information for specialists, with insights into why the war happened, but little acknowledgement of its probable inevitability, given the arbitrary divisions of post-British Partition. For such advanced analytical reading our team would like to recommend few books like ‘Anatomy of Violence - Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971’ by Sarmila Bose. Besides few recommended references are:

Blood, Archer (2002): The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh: Memoirs of an American Diplomat, The University Press, Dhaka.

Government of Pakistan (1971): White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, August 5.

Guhathakurta, Basanti (2000): Ekattorer Smriti, University Press, Dhaka. Haider, Rashid (ed) (1988-2000): Smriti: 1971, Bangla Academy, Dhaka, vol 1-13.

(ed) (1996): 1971: Bhayabaha Abhignata, Sahitya Prakash, Dhaka. Imam, Jahanara (1986): Ekattorer Deenguli, Sandhani Prakashani, Dhaka. Islam, Nazrul (1996): ‘Shorirbhedi Bullet’ in Haider (ed). Mascarenhas, Anthony (1971): The Rape of Bangladesh, Vikas Publications, Delhi. Matinuddin, Lt Gen Kamal (1993): Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis 1968-71,

Services Book Club, Lahore. Mitha, Maj Gen A O (2003): Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldier’s Life, Oxford University

Press, Karachi. Niazi, Lt Gen A A K (1998): The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Oxford University Press,

Karachi. Qureishi, Maj Gen Hakeem Arshad (2002): The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier’s

Narrative, Oxford University. Press, Karachi. Rahman, Muhammad Anisur (2001): My Story of 1971, Liberation War Museum,

Dhaka. Safiullah, Maj Gen K M (1996): ‘Aloukik jibanlabh’ in Haider (ed).

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Shil, Kaliranjan (1996): ‘Jagannath Hall-ei chhilam’ in Rashid Haider (ed). Ula, Nurul (1996): ‘Gonohatyar chhobi’ in Haider (ed). United States Department of State (2005): South Asia Crisis, 1971, Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1969-76, Volume XI.

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