HEARTBREAKINGNEWSOn July 28, 1944,General Pattonwas given control of the troops of the

ThirdArmythenontheContinentofEurope.The First Army had begun its St. Ld push on July 26. Gaining in

momentum in the succeeding days, it came to a climaxwhenGeneral PattonexplodedhisThirdArmyontotheBrittanyPeninsulaonAugust1.

In twoweeks, troops of the ThirdArmy had driven the fleeingGermansinto theportsofLorient andBrest andhadcleared theLoireRiver toAngers.The drive of the ThirdArmy to the east had bypassed Paris and had reachedReims,Verdun,andCommercy.

BytheendofAugust,theGermanswereontherun.Atthispoint,GeneralPatton presented his case for a rapid advance to the east for the purpose ofcutting the Siegfried Line before it could be manned. Bradley was verysympathetic, but SHAEF, SupremeHeadquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force,didnotconcur.

Allsupplies—bothgasolineandammunition—weretobethrownintotheFirst Army’s move north so Patton’s Third Army had no gas with which tomove;hewasheartbroken.

“Itwasmyopinionthenthatthiswasthemomentouserrorofthewar.”—GeneralGeorgeS.Patton

WARASI

KNEWIT

GEORGES.PATTON,JR.

AnnotatedbyColonelPaulD.Harkins

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TableofContents

INTRODUCTION

PARTONE

OPENLETTERSFROMAFRICAANDSICILY

OPERATION“TORCH”NorthAfricaVisitoftheCommandingGeneralandStafftoGeneralNoguesandtheSultanofMoroccoTheSultan’sAnniversaryRequiemMass,HonoringAmericanandFrenchDeadLunchwithGeneralNogues,Rabat,Morocco‘‘FeteDesMoutons”(SheepFestival)HeldatRabatTheSultan’sVisittoCasablancaVisittoMarrakechandBoarHuntVictoryParadeHeldatTunis,May20,19431NotesontheArabCeremonyHeldatHeadquartersIArmoredCorpsOPERATION“HUSKY”TheInvasionofSicilyTheCaptureofPalermoSidelightsontheSicilianCampaign‘‘TheFlightintoEgypt”TheHolyLandMalta

PARTTWO

OPERATION“OVERLORD”

1THECAMPAIGNOFFRANCE,AVRANCHE3,BRESTTOTHEMOSELLETouringFrancewithanArmy2FORCINGTHELINEOFTHEMOSELLE

TheFlood3THECAPTUREOFMETZANDTHESAARCAMPAIGNStuckintheMud14THEBASTOGNE-ST.VITHCAMPAIGN—“THEBULGE”TheBulge5THEEIFELTOTHERHINEANDTHECAPTUREOFTRIERManyRiversandPassiveDefense6THECAPTUREOFCOBLENTZANDTHEPALATINECAMPAIGNTheBeginningoftheEnd7FORCINGTHERHINE,FRANKFURT-AM-MAINANDACROSSTHEMULDE“TheRhine,theRhine,theGermanRhine”8CROSSINGTHEDANUBEANDENTERINGCZECHOSLOVAKIAANDAUSTRIATheLastRound-up

PARTTHREE

RETROSPECT

REFLECTIONSANDSUGGESTIONSCONCERNINGTHESOLDIERSMALLUNITTACTICSBattleTricksMiscellaneousNotesCommandGeneral

EARNINGMYPAY

AppendixAOPERATION“TORCH”COMPOSITIONOFIICORPSAppendixCOPERATION“HUSKY”LETTERSOFINSTRUCTIONCOMPOSITIONOFANARMYROSTEROFPRINCIPALSTAFFOFFICERSCORPSTHATSERVEDWITHTHIRDARMYDIVISIONSTHATSERVEDWITHTHIRDARMY

COMMANDERASST.DIV.COMMANDERBackCover

“Mysword1givetohimthatshallsucceedmeinmypilgrimage,andmycourageandskilltohimthatcangetit.Myworksandscarslcarrywithme,tobeawitnessformethatlhavefoughtHisbattleswhonowwillbemyrewarder”

Sohepassedoverandallthetrumpetssoundedforhimontheotherside.PILGRIM’SPROGRESS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe work of an editor is not easy, especiallywhenthateditorisalsoawife,anditiswithagratefulheartthatIacknowledgethehelpofmanyfriendsinpreparingthisbookforpublication.Iamespeciallyindebted to Colonel Paul D. Harkins, my husband’s deputy Chief of Staffthroughout the war, for his first-hand knowledge and for the careful researchembodied in his footnotes and prefaces; and to Douglas Southall Freeman,whommyhusbandheldinhonorasthegreatestmilitarybiographerofourtime,forhisintroductiontoWarAsIKnewIt.

BEATRICEAYERPATTON

MAPS

NorthAfricanCampaign—FrenchNorthwestAfrica8-9SicilianCampaign—Operation“Husky”50DispositionandMovementofThirdU.S.ArmyTroopsfrom1Augustto14

August1944102-103BattleLineandDispositionofThirdU.S.ArmyTroopson31August1944

118-119DispositionandMovementofThirdU.S.Armyto15September1944and

TacticalSituation25September1944138ResumptionofOffensive—MovementofThirdU.S.ArmyandBattleLine

on8November,IDecember,and19December1944160-161MovementofThirdU.S.ArmyTroops—The Capture of Koblenz and the Palatinate Campaign Battle Line on 13

Marchand22March1945244-245ForcingtheRhine,Frankfurt-on-Main,andAcrosstheMulde22March,31

March,IIApril,21April1945282-283MovementofThirdU.S.ArmyDivisions1-9May1945andEnemySituation9May1945CrossingtheDanubeand

EnteringCzechoslovakiaandAustria300-301

INTRODUCTION

GeneralGeorgeS.Patton,Jr.,keptafulldiaryfromJuly,1942,untilDec.5, 1945, four daysbeforehis fatal accident.His entries sometimesweremadewhile the froth and emotion of battle were still upon him. They are alwayscandid, frequently critical, and occasionally caustic, though they never aresavageinthesensethattheydamneverybodywhodidnotagreewithhim.Thespiritof thediary is thatofacommanderwhobelieved thatacontinuousboldoffensivewouldendthewarbeforethesnowfellontheArdennesinthewinterof 1944-45. Every obstacle to such an offensive had to be overcome; everyleader who opposed it must be challenged to show why the drive would notsucceed; silence or dissent appeared in Patton’s eyes as overcaution orconcessiontoAllies.

This dominant tone of General Patton’s diary is so unmistakable and soclearly patriotic that it will not be misunderstood by historians; but becauseGeneralPattonusedwordsasheemployedfire—togetdecisiveresultsquickly—he saidmany things in his diary thatwould hurt the feelings of individualswhose devotion and ability he would be quick to acknowledge. The diaryincludes more than one reference to leaders whom Patton himself criticizedsharplyand,ashethought,justly;butwhenthosesameindividualsweretreatedunfairlyorwereblamedbyotherswherePattonconsideredthemcorrectintheiraction,heinstantlybecametheirdefender.Allthiswillbeplainwhentimegivesperspective. For the present, those military writers whom Mrs. Patton hasconsulted about the publication of the diary of 1942-45 agreewith her that itshouldbewithheldfrompublication.

This decision might be disservice to the study of the West-Europeancampaign of 1944-45 if General Patton had not written War I Knew Heundertookthissmallbookafterthecloseofhostilitiesandhedrewheavilyfromthediaryfordetail.Somepagesofthenarrativearealmostverbatimthetextofthe diary, with personal references toned down or eliminated. Because theGeneral himself had made extracts from the diary, the possibility ofincorporatingotherpartsofitinthisvolumehadtobeconsidered.ThisappliedparticularlytotheaccountoftheBattleoftheBulge,whichistreatedmuchmorefully in the diary than in this text. Experiment showed that the inclusion ofexpurgateddiary-entriesmightmisleadthereader,andthatprintingthoseitemsin fullwould be doingwhatGeneral Patton apparently had decided not to dowhen,withthediaryonhisdesk,hewroteWarAsIKnewIt.

The text as here printed is, then, precisely as it came from theGeneral’sswift pen with the single elimination of a criticism of one officer who, if heerred, most splendidly atoned. That incident was of no large importance inrelationtotheoperationsoftheThirdArmy,andofnonewhateverinitseffectonthecampaign.Fortherest,assurancemaybegiventhat,sofarassomewhatcareful comparison of the two documents has disclosed, the diary containsnothing of significance,with respect to the planning and the execution of thecampaign, that is not summarized by the General in this volume. The readerlosesonlythestrongflavorofthediary;thestudentmaybeconfidentthatwhentheday-by-dayisprinted, itwillnotrefuteanysoundconclusionbasedonthisnarrative. Something in addition may be learned from the diary by futuresoldiersconcerningthemoraleoftheThirdArmy.Thevitalsubjectofintegratedcommandmaybeillustratedbyotherentries.Meantime,nationaldefenselosesno lesson that Patton thought America might learn from his experience. It isgratifying to be able to state this and thereby to justifywithholding the diaryitself at a time when Patton’s forthright criticism of individuals might offendtheirsensibilitieswithoutcontributingtomilitarysecurity.

GeneralPattonhadunfailinghumor,soldierly-sharppowersofobservationand interest that ranged fromhorses andyachts to archaeologyandethnology.Hewrotewithjudgmentandenthusiasmofmuchthathesawandhewasmostdelightfullyhimselfinhisletters.Thesepapersfallintotwogroups—thosethatweremeant for theeyesofMrs.Pattononly,and thoseshequiteproperlyhadcalled“openletters,”whichshewasfreetoshowtheGeneral’sfriends.Bygoodchance,someofthemostcharmingofthe“openletters”relatetotheperiodofoperationswhichGeneralPattoncoveredlightly,ornotatallinWarAsIKnewIt.TointroducethemanwhoappearsinNormandy,ithasseemedappropriatetopublishthelettersthatrelatetothecampaigninAfricaandinSicily.Thesearenot, strictly speaking, military papers, but they have interest in themselvesbesidesshowingwhatmannerofmanGeorgePattonwas.

Includingtheseletters,WarAsIKnewItrepresentsatypeofearlynarrative—onemightsayofprovisionalnarrative—thathadaplaceinthehistoriographyof theSecondWorldWar.TTiepresentbookcorresponds, forexample, to thememoirs that Jubal A. Early, John B. Hodd, Richard Taylor, and Joseph E.JohnstonissuedafewyearsafterthecollapseoftheSouthernConfederacy,withthehappydifferencethatPattonhadnodefeat toexcuse,nogrievancetovent.Those early Confederate books were undocumented and in some particularsinaccuratebut theyhavegreathistoricalvaluebecausetheywerewrittenwhilesomeoftheimpressionsofwarwerefresh.

About 1960Americansmay expectmore deliberateworks of a character

similar to thememoirs ofGrant, of Sherman, and ofSheridan. Someof thosefuture volumes will be more accurate historically than the militaryautobiographies issued immediately after thewar.Gain in this respectmaybeoffsetbythefailuresofmemoryandbythetreacherousandineradicableimpulseof a certain type of mind to read into the planning of military operations apurposethatcouldnothavebeenforeseen.After1965or1970glamorwillbegintoenvelopmemoirs.Fewwillbevaluable;mostofthemwilldeceivemorethantheywillenlighten.

Bythattime,itshouldbepossibletowritemeasurableaccuratebiographiesoftheleadingfiguresofthewar.Theofficialsourcematerialforthose“lives”issovast that ifonly themore importantarmyreportsof theSecondWorldWarwere printed, theywould fill, it is estimated, 1000 volumes of the size of theOfficial Records of theUnion andConfederate Armies. As no comprehensivepublicationofthereportsof1941-45iscontemplated,somedocumentsofvaluemay be lost and not be recovered again within the next twenty-five or thirtyyears. Inspiteof this, thepictureof the leaderswillbeclearenoughin twoorthree decades for the biographer to undertake his task. It is to be hoped thatGeneralPattonwillbeamongthefirsttoattractacompetentbiographerandthatotherswillleavehimalone.Hewasamantowin,tointrigue,andsometimestoenragehis fellow-commanders.Alwayshe fulfilled theNapoleonicmandateofsupplying by picturesque conduct the causerie de bivouac thatmakes soldiersswear at their commander and then swear by him. In the larger qualities ofleadership, Patton’s daring reminds one of “Stonewall” Jackson. HisdeterminationtopushstraighttotheRhineofcourserecallsSherman’smarchtothe sea. Pattonwas cast in themold of great American soldiers; his personalpapersareamong the fullest leftbyanAmericanGeneral.Hewillbean idealsubjectforagreatbiography.

DOUGLASSOUTHALLFREEMANWestbourne,Richmond,Virginia,July26,1947

PARTONE

OPENLETTERSFROMAFRICAANDSICILY

OPERATION“TORCH”

AlthoughthematerialthatfollowsontheAfricanCampaignhaslittletodowiththeactualfighting,becauseoftherestrictionimposedbycensorshipatthetimeitwaswritten,abriefsummaryofthemilitarycampaignwillperhapsproveusefultoorientthereader.

OnNovember8,1942,threetaskforces,ofwhichWesternTaskForcewasone,landedonthenorthcoastofAfrica.1ItsgroundforceswerecommandedbyMajor General Patton and its headquarters were based on an Army table oforganization, to be designated Fifth Army Headquarters after landing. AWestern Task Force was composed of three task units: the northern, underMajorGeneralLucienK.Truscott, landingatPortLyautey; thecentral,underMajorGeneralJonathanW.Anderson,

^hefollowingstorywastoldmebythePublicRelationsOfficeroftheWarDepartment,MajorGeneralA.D.Surles.OntheeveningofNovember7,1942,his office was invaded by the press. They begged for news; some eventhreatened theofficer incharge.Finally,onesaid.“Comeon,boys, let’sgo totheWhiteHouse; they’re always good to us there,” and the newsmen left theofficeinabody.

Mr.StephenEarly, thePresident’s secretary,met themat the door of theWhiteHouseofficewithhisusualcordiality,invitedthemin,andurgedthemtobe seated.When he had done the honors, he excused himself, saying, “I’ll beback in aminute.” Fifteenminuteswent by; then half an hour, and the pressbegantowonder.Someonetriedthedoor,Theywerelockedin.

At last, Mr. Early came in, waving a dispatch. “It’s all over boys!” heshouted.“Ourtroopshavelanded.Turnontheradio.”B.A.P.

Subsequentorderschangedthis.

landing at Fedhala;1 and the southern, under Major General Ernest A.Harmon,landingatSafi.TheArmyairelementswerecommandedbyBrigadierGeneralJohnK.Cannon.Thetaskforceconsistedofaboutthirty-twothousandmen.Thearmadawasunder thecommandofAdmiralH.K.Hewittuntil suchtime as the ground and air forces should be firmly established ashore. TheAdmiralzigzaggedhisconvoyofapproximatelyonehundredvesselsacrosstheAtlantic for fourteen days without incident, and assisted in the landings with

boldsupportandtirelesseffortonthepartofhisentirepersonnel.Thelandingswereacompletesurprise to theFrench,andthe fighting,as

evincedbythecasualties,wassevere.TheFrenchNavy,bothatseaandonland,foughtviciouslyandheroicallytotheend.

OnNovember11,asgroundtroopswerealertedandtheplaneswereoverthetarget,theFrenchsignaled“Enough,”thusmissingbyminutesSheprobabledestruction of Casablanca, which was only stopped by a miracle ofcommunication.

The peace was signed at Fedhala that afternoon, and General PattontoastedtheheroicdeadofbothnationswiththewishthattheyfightsidebysidetothedestructionoftheNazis.

Rehabilitationoftheharbor,roads,andrailroadswasstartedatonce,andwithintwoweeksAmericanunitsweretrainingtheFrenchinmodernweaponsofwar.

EarlyinMarch,1943,GeneralPattonwasorderedtoTunisiatocommandtheIICorps,whichhadsufferedaserioussetbackatKasserinePass.ThiscorpswasapartoftheEighteenthArmyGroup,underGeneralSirHaroldAlexander.The purpose of the operation was to assist the advance of the British EighthArmy,underGeneralMontgomery,bythreateningGeneralRommel'srearinthevicinityofGafsa.LateinApril,MajorGeneralOmarN.BradleytookovertheIICorps and General Patton returned to his interrupted work of planning theinvasionofSicily.

P.D.H.GeneralPattonlandedatFedhala.

NorthAfrica

October29,1942

I am sending this back by Captain Gordon Hutchins of this ship, theAugusta.By the time it reacheshome,everything thathashappenedwillbe inthepapers.WeleftNorfolkat8:10A.M.ofthetwenty-fourthandthesortiewasremarkable for its orderly, and apparently faultless, efficiency. We moved incolumnthroughtheminefieldsandoutthesweptandbuoyedchannel,wherewejoinedalineoffivecolumnswiththeAugustaleading.

November2

Thismess is thebest Ihaveeverseen. I fear I shallget fat. I take lotsofexercise each morning, including chinning myself and running in place fourhundred and eighty steps (one quarter mile) in my cabin. In the morning, atbattlestations,weputonrubberbeltsandtinhats,butasmybattlestationismycabin,Idon’thavetohurry.ThenIgoupontheflagbridgetillitgetslightandthen have breakfast. Just finished reading the Koran—a good book andinteresting.

Havebeengivingeveryonea simplifieddirectiveofwar.Use steamrollerstrategy;thatis,makeupyourmindoncourseanddirectionofaction,andsticktoit.Butintactics,donotsteamroller.Attackweakness.Holdthembythenoseandkicktheminthepants.

November6

InfortyhoursIshallbeinbattle,withlittleinformation,andonthespurofthe moment will have to makemost momentous decisions, but I believe thatone’sspiritenlargeswithresponsibilityandthat,withGod’shelp,Ishallmakethemandmakethemright.Itseemsthatmywholelifehasbeenpointedtothismoment.Whenthisjobisdone,IpresumeIwillbepointedtothenextstepintheladderofdestiny.IfIdomyfullduty,therestwilltakecareofitself.

November8

LastnightIwenttobed,dressed,andsleptfrom10:30.Thiswashardtodo.Iwent on deck at 2 and saw the Fedhala andCasablanca lights burning, alsoshorelights.Seadeadcalm—noswell.Godiswithus.1

Wehavehadagreatdaysofarandhavebeeninanavalbattlesinceeight.At 7:15, six enemy destroyers came out ofCasablanca; twowere on fire.Allshipsinrangeopenedonthemandtheywentback.TheMassachusettshadbeenshellingtheJeanBartforaboutthirtyminutes.Iwasgoingashoreateightandmyboatwasonthedavitswithallourthings,includingmywhitepistols.Isentanorderlytogetthem,andatthatmomentalightcruiserandtwobigdestroyerscameoutofCasablanca, tearingup thecoastclose toshore, to tryandgetourtransports.TheAugusta speededup to twentyknots andopened fire.The firstblastfromtheturretblewourlandingboattohell,andwelosteverythingexceptmy pistols. At about 8:20, enemy bombers attacked the transports and theAugustawenttoprotectthem.ThenwewentbackintothefightwiththeFrenchships,andfiredhardforaboutthreehours.Iwasonthemaindeckwhenashell

hitsocloseitsplashedwateralloverme,andlater,onthebridge,onehitevencloser, but Iwas too high to getwet. Itwas hazy and the enemyused smokewell. Icould just see themandmakeoutoursplasheswithourshipsall firinglikehellandgoinginbigzigzagsandcurvestokeeptheenemyfromoursubs.

AdmiralHall,ChiefofStafftoAdmiralHewitt,myChiefofStaff,ColonelGay,ColonelsJohnsonandEly,ontheStaffoftheAmphibiousLandingForce,Atlantic Fleet, my Aides, Jenson and Stiller, and SergeantMeeks and I wentashoreat12:42,andasourboatlefttheship,thesailorsleanedovertherailandcheered.Wehitthebeachat13:20,gettingverywetinthesurf.Therewasstillquiteafightgoingon,butIhadnobullets.

HarmontookSafibeforedawn,thoughwedidnotgetthenewsuntilnoon.

AndersonhadbothriversandthehighgroundbynoonandcapturedeightoftheGermanArmisticeCommission.Theyonlyheardofthelandingatsix,soitwasacompletesurprise.

Whilewewerestill inWashington,ColonelW.H.Wilburvolunteered togotoCasablancatodemandthesurrender.Helandedinthefirstwaveanddroveto Casablanca in the darkwith a white flag. Hewas shot at several times enroute,butatCasablancatheFrenchhonoredhisflag,althoughtheydeclinedtosurrender.

‘WhenOperation“Torch”wasbeingplanned,itwasascertainedfromlocalknowledgethatthereareonlytwelvedaysoftheentireyearwhenalandingisevenpossible.

November11

IdecidedtoattackCasablancathisdaywiththe3rdDivisionandonetankbattalion.Ittooksomenerve,asbothTruscottandHarmonseemedinabadway,but I feltweshouldmaintain the initiative.ThenAdmiralHallcameashore toarrange for naval gunfire and air support and brought fine news. Truscott hastakentheairfieldatPortLyauteyandthereareforty-twoP-40’sonit.HarmonismarchingonCasablanca.

Anderson wanted to attack at dawn, but I made it 7:30, as I wanted nomistakesinthedark.At4:30thismorning,aFrenchofficercametosaythattheforcesatRabathadceasedfiring,andalltheStaffwantedtocallofftheattack.However,Isaiditmustgoon.Iremembered1918,whenwestoppedtoosoon.IsenttheFrenchofficertoCasablancatotellAdmiralMichelier,incommandatCasablanca,thatifhedidnotwanttobedestroyed,hehadbetterquitatonce,as

Iwasgoingtoattack—Ididnotsaywhen.IthensentwordtoAdmiralHewittthatifatthelastminutetheFrenchquit,Iwouldradio“ceasefiring.”Thatwasat5:30.At6:40theenemyquit.Itwasanearthing,forthebomberswereovertheir targetsand thebattleshipswere inposition to fire. IorderedAnderson tomoveintothetown,andifanyonestoppedhim,toattack.Noonestoppedhim,butthehoursfrom7:30to11werethelongestinmylifesofar.

At 2 o’clock, AdmiralMichelier and General Nogu&s came to treat forterms. I opened the conferencebycongratulating theFrenchon theirgallantryandcloseditwithchampagneandtoasts.Ialsogavethemaguardofhonor—nousekickingamanwhenhe’sdown.

NoguesandIarecallingontheSultaninadayortwo.

VisitoftheCommandingGeneralandStafftoGeneralNoguesandtheSultanofMorocco

HEADQUARTERSWESTERNTASKFORCENovember16,1942

We left Casablanca, a citywhich combinesHollywood and the Bible, at9:45, and proceeded towards Rabat. The country after passing Fedhala is thefinesttankcountryIhaveeverseen,beingrollingandopenwithhereandtherestone farms which would make infantry strongpoints, but would be uselessagainstthe105mm.gun.

105mm.Howitzer

The country in general is reminiscent of the Kona coast of Hawaii. Thetreesareidentical,andtheseaisthesamestartlingblue.Wepassedlargeflocksofsheepandherdsofcattle,allofthemofnondescriptbreeds.AlltheroadandrailwaybridgeswereguardedbyatypeofMoroccanirregularcalled“Goons”1—at least that ishow it sounds.Theyaredressed in ablack-and-white striped

bathrobe, with a turban which was, some years ago, probably white, and areequippedwithveryancientriflesandbayonets.

After passing Fedhala, the power of the Navy-Air arm was frequentlyevinced by destroyed trucks and armored cars which littered the road. OnreachingRabat,GeneralHarmon2 hadprovidedan escort formeconsistingofscout cars and tanks. However, I felt that to arrive at General Nogues’3Residencywithsucha forcewouldappearboastfulonmypart, so Idismissedthem.

Upon reaching the Residency, we were met by a battalion of Moroccancavalry, only the officers mounted. Also, the bodyguard of the GovernorGeneral, who are Moroccans, dressed in white uniform with red leatherequipment. The pistol and cartridge pouch was fastened in the middle of thestomachwithcross-belts.

Both guards were very impressive, and each had its own field music,consistingofFrenchtrumpets,drums,andabrassumbrellawithbellsaroundtheedgewhichcontinuallyrotatedduringtheplayingoftherufflesandflourishes.

We inspected both guards and complimented the French officers,commending them on their appearance,whichwas truly soldierly in the 1914meaningoftheword.Itwasratherpathetictothinkthatoneofthelighttanksinthe escort which I had turned down could have easily destroyed all of thesplendidcreaturesstandingatsalute.

The Residency is a beautiful marble structure, built on the lines of theAlhambra,byMarshalLyautey,1andIcouldwellseewhyGeneralNoguesdidnot want to leave it. He received us very cordially, and we talked for abouttwentyminutes,whenitwastimetoproceedtothepalaceoftheSultan.

Thepalacegrounds,whichcompriseseveralhundredacres,aresurroundedby a wall some twenty feet high, alleged to have been built in 1300. This Iseriouslydoubt,althoughitiscertainlyveryold.

Afterpassing throughthewall,wewentforabouthalfamile throughthenative huts, which apparently housed the retainers and their very numerousprogeny.Thepalaceitselfisatremendousthree-storywhitebuildingofMoorisharchitecture, which you enter through a gate just wide enough to permit thepassingofanauto.

Inside, the palace guards, composed of black troops dressed in red coats,red bloomers, and white gaiters, and armed with rifles, were drawn upcompletely around the square. I should think at least four hundredmen werepresent.

We dismounted, and another fieldmusic, equippedwith drums, cymbals,

horns,andthemetalumbrella,playedwithgreatabandon.OntheleftsideofthegateasyouenteredwasthegreenflagoftheFaithful.

It ismadeofvelvet,hasagoldborder,andcertainArabicwordsinthecenter.Having passed through this second gate, we came into the Old Testament, alarge court whichwas completely encircled bymen dressed inwhite Biblicalcostumes.HeretheGrandVizier,orsoItookhimtobe,metus.Hewasdressedinawhiterobewithahoodandworeunderneathitasilkheaddressembroideredin gold.He had themost enormous set of gold inlaid teeth I ever saw, and ascragglybeard.HetoldusthattheSultanhadgraciouslyconsentedtoreceiveus,which,inviewofthepreparations,wasalreadyevident.

We mounted three flights of stairs, and on reaching the top, our guideremovedhis shoes.We thenentereda long roomwith the twelveapostlesandsomereservesalongtheleftside,andontherightsidewerealargenumberofgoldchairs,LouisXTVmodel.

1MarshalLyautey,1854-1934.

ThefloorwascoveredwiththethickestandmostbeautifulrugsIhaveeverseen.AttheendoftheroomonaraisedplatformsattheSultan,whoisaveryhandsomeyoungman,extremelyfragile,andwithahighlysensitiveface.

Whenyoufirstenter,youhaltandbowfromthehips.Youadvancehalfwayup the room and repeat the operation. You then advance to the edge of theplatformandbowathirdtime.TheSultangotupandshookhandswithmeandwithGeneralNogues,andweallsatdown.

The Sultan, talking in Arabic, although he has a perfect command ofFrench,toldtheGrandViziertotellmeinFrenchhowgladhewastoseeme.Ithentalkedtohimthroughtwointerpreters,expressingmycontentmentthathispeopleandtheFrenchandourselveswereagainreunited,andassuredhimthatouronedesirewastounitewithhispeopleandtheFrenchinmakingcommonheadagainsttheenemy.ItwasveryamusingtoseethathecouldunderstandtheFrenchconversationperfectly,buthad towait tohave it translated intoArabicbecausehisdignitydidnotpermithimtoadmitthatheknewaforeignlanguage.

When the initial conversation had terminated, he informedme that, sincewewereinMohammedancountry,hehopedtheAmericansoldierwouldshowproperrespect forMohammedaninstitutions. I toldhimthatsuchanorderhadbeen issued in forceful languageprior toourdeparture from theUnitedStatesandwould be enforced. I further stated that since in all armies, including theAmericanArmy, theremight be some foolish persons, I hoped that hewouldreport to me any incidents of sacrilege which some individual soldier mightcommit.Herepliedthatnosuchincidentswouldhappen,butthatiftheydid,he

wouldbringthemtomyattentionthroughGeneralNogues.Ifinishedbycomplimentinghimonthebeautyofhiscountry,thediscipline

of his citizens, and the splendid-looking cities. We then rose, he got off histhrone and shook hands and invited me to come on Wednesday to a tea,celebratinghisascensiontothethrone.Ithadbeenoriginallyintendedformetovisit him on that day, but I had informed General Nogues that, since IrepresentedthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesandtheCommandingGeneraloftheAlliedForces,itwouldbeinappropriateformetocometoanaudience.Hisinvitingmetotheaudienceindicatedclearlythatheappreciatedmyposition.

Whenthisconversationwasfinished,wemetthetwelvewisemenandtheirreserves,aboutsixteeninall.TheywerethePashasofthevariousprovincesandcitiesofMorocco.ApparentlyaPashaisalifetimejob,theseniormemberbeingninety-twoyearsold;thejunior,Ishouldthink,wasaboutseventy.Theywerealldressed in white and in their stocking feet, and were a most distinguished-lookinggroupofmen,evidentlyhabituatedtocommand.

We then left the palace and were again saluted by the Red Guards.Weproceeded to General Nogues’ Residency, where we were entertained byMadameNogues and her niece, and treated to amost sumptuous lunch in thebesttaste.GeneralNoguesimpressedonmethatatnotimeduringtheGermanoccupancyhadanyGermanoccupiedhishouseorsatathistable.

After a short conversation at the end of the meal, we left, reachingCasablancaatthreeo’clock.

TheSultan’sAnniversary

HEADQUARTERSWESTERNTASKFORCENovember22,1942

ThesecondvisittotheSultanwassimilartothefirst,exceptthatwehadanescortofasquadronofcavalryfromtheResidencytothepalace.Themenweremountedonwhitestallions,withwhitecapesandbluehoodsthrownback,whiteturbans,redcoatswithbrassbuttonsandbrassfrogs.Threeofficersrodewithus,oneoneachsideandonebehindthecar.Themountedtrumpetersplayedduringthewholecourseoftheride.

On reaching the palace, awhole regiment of cavalrywas drawn up.Onesquadronwasequippedwithlances.Thisregimentandtheescorthadthefinestmounts Ieversaw. Inside theoutercourtyard,wehad theBlackGuard,whichconsistsofhugeSenegalese,withredcoatsandredfezes,redleatherequipment,and white spats. We also had a band similarly accoutered, which played theMoroccannationalairandtheMarseillaise.

Weweremet by theGrandVizier, orMufti, who took us into the innercourt,wheretwoveryoldgentlemenwithstaves,asinBiblicalplays,precededus.Eachofthesemenhadsomesortofcartridgeboxtiedaroundhisstemandwasalsoarmedwithaverylongcurvedscimitarinaredleatherscabbard.

The throne-roomand thevestibule outsidewere crowdedwith chiefs: thefarther away from the throne, the lesser the chief. The high chiefs,whowerearrangedontheleftasoneapproachesthethrone,wereveryfine-lookingmen,andallofthemquiteoldandquitelarge.

TheSultanwasaccompaniedbythePrinceImperial,oneofhissons,aboutfourteen years old. The Prince Imperial sat in the first chair, Nogufes in thesecond,andIinthethird.Onthepreviousvisit,IhadsatinthefirstandNoguesinthesecond,butthisarrangementwasquiteproper.GeneralNogufesthenreadalongpreparedorationinFrench,whichwastranslatedintoArabicbytheGrandVizier,whoalreadyhadacopyof it inhispossession.He thenvery solemnlypresented the Sultan with his—the Sultan’s reply—neatly written in Arabiclonghand, which the Sultan read and which the Grand Vizier translated intoFrenchfromapaperhealreadyheldinhishand.

Whilethiswasgoingon,Ibecamemoreandmoreimpressedwiththefactthat theUnited Stateswas playing too small a role, sowhenNogu£s stoppedspeakingandsteppedfromthefrontofthethrone,Isteppedoutwithoutaskinganyone’spermissionandspoke,asnearlyasIcanremember,asfollows:

YourMajesty, as a representative of the great President of theUnited States, and as the commander of a huge military force in

Morocco, Iwish to present the compliments of theUnitedStates onthisoccasion,thefifteenthanniversaryofyourascensiontothethroneof your ancestors, and I wish to assure you that so long as YourMajesty’s country, in co-operation with the French Government ofMorocco,co-operateswithusand facilitatesourefforts,wearesure,with thehelpofGod, toachievecertainvictoryagainstourcommonenemy,theNazis.

IamconvincedthatYourMajestyandtheFrenchGovernmentofMoroccosharethisopinion.Solongasweareinaccordonthispoint,wehaveonlythebrightestfuturetolookforwardto.Iamimpelledtothe belief in this mutual accord when I remember that one of YourMajesty’s great predecessors presented to our famous President,George Washington, the buildings now occupied by the AmericanMissionatTangiers,andwhenIalsorememberthatsincethedaysofthegreatWashington, the accord and friendshipwith theFrenchhasbeenequallyprofound.

Iwish to take thisoccasion tocomplimentYourMajestyon theintelligent co-operation which his subjects have accorded to theAmericansandalsotoexpressagainmyprofoundappreciationoftheexcellentbearingandsplendiddisciplineofYourMajesty’ssoldiers.

OnepointofinterestabouttheSultanisthatheissupposedtowearabeardbutpreferstogocleanshaven,withtheresultthathegetsbybyusingeitherhandclippersorarazor,andhasabeardnotoverathirty-secondofaninchlong.Hismustache is equally abbreviated. He is also not supposed to wear Europeanclothes,buthasbeenseenbysomeofourofficersandnumerousFrenchofficersridingabout the countryonhorseback,unattended, inEnglish ridingclothes. IamcertainhespeaksFrenchandalmostcertainhespeaksEnglish.Infact,IhaveheardarumorthathewasgraduatedfromOxfordunderanassumedname.

The tea on the afternoon of the ascension celebration was attended bynearly everybody of any importance. As I was unable to go, I askedGeneralHarmontoattendforme.Duringtheteasomescreamswereheardfollowedbytwo shots. The Sultan excused himself andwalked outwith great dignity andafterawhilereturned.GeneralNoguesaskedhimwhathappened.Hesaidthatoneofthepanthersinthemuseumhadmadeaverybeautifulleapoftwentyfeetandhadgonethroughaholeandstartedtoeatuponeoftheladiesoftheharem,butsomeof theguardshadshot it.Theladywasonlycutonthe throat,anditmade littledifference,as shewasnotawife,butaconcubine.With this slightinterruptiontheteawenton.

The old kashas or forts are very interesting and really quite formidableobstacles. There are a good many of them in the country, particularly in themountains. They have the Moorish type of crenelation, and have out-juttingtowersaboutevery twohundredyardsof front.Someof thewallsare ten feetthick.

Some of these forts are alleged to be ofRoman origin, but as yet I havenever seen one that looked that old. The fort at Port Lyautey,which held outagainstusforthreedaysandwasfinallytakenthroughtheuseofaself-propelled105mm.gun,blastingbreachesthroughwhichthe2dBattalion,60thInfantry,2assaultedwithgrenadesandbayonets,isaverytoughproposition.Ithadresistedsix-inchnavalfire,trench-mortarfire,anddive-bombers,andonlyyieldedtotheever-victoriousdoughboywiththerifleandgrenade.Ididnotgotoocloselyintothequestionofwhosurvivedinthegarrison,butdoubtwhetheranyofthemdid.Insuchaclosefightasoldierhasnotimetochangehismind.

Owingtothefact that thereisverylittleyoucanbuyinMorocco,moneyhasceasedtohavevalue,anditisverydifficulttoemployhelp.Wearemakingarrangements to sell the commoditieswhich theArabsmostly desire, namely:sugar, tea,rice,coffee,andclothata lowpricetoArabswhoworkforus.WewillpaytheArabsinfrancs,andinthiswayrehabilitatethevalueofmoney.

ThismorningGeneralKeyes2andIwenttotheCatholicChurch,whichwasverycrowdedandunquestionablycontaineda largenumberofwidowsofmenwehadkilled.Mostofthesepeoplewerequiteyounganddressedinblackandwereweeping,butseemedtohavenoanimosityagainstus.

M7MadameHardion, thewifeof theMinister forCivilianAffairs, explained

the situation by the fact that, after 1940, the French were so ashamed ofthemselvesthattheyhadnopride,andthewomenweremoreashamedthanthemen;therefore,whenwecametheyweredelightedtofightwithusinwhatshetermedwasafriendlymanner.Seeing that theycertainly lostbetween twoandthreethousandkilledonshore,andatleastfivehundredkilledatsea,whilewelostbetterthansevenhundredashoreinkilledandwounded,Idonotthinkthatitwasaveryfriendlysortofwar.Sheinsistedthat itwas,andthat ithaddoneagreatdealtoraisethemoraleoftheFrenchpeople.ParticularlywasthistrueoftheFrenchwomen,whoformerlyhadbeensodisgustedwiththementhattheywouldnotlivewiththem.Inviewofthenumberofchildrenonthestreets,Icanhardlycreditthislaststatement.

So far Ihaveonly seenonedrunkenAmerican soldier, andhewasbeingtakencareofbytwoofhisfriendsinaverycreditableway.Ourmenhavehadahardtime,becauseonlyonthetwenty-firstdidwegetkitchensashore,andwehavenotentageexceptpuptents.However,theyareinverygoodspirits,andthehealthofthecommandremainsexcellentexceptforalittlediarrheawhichlastsaboutadayandis,Ibelieve,attributabletothewater.

It is very interesting to note the change coming over the soldiers.Whenthey firstgothere, theywereextremelysloppy,probablybecauseofexcessive

fatigue, but within the last two days our efforts at smartening them up havebornefruit,andshortly,Ibelieve,theywillbeacredittoanycountry.

In the fields the plowing is donewith themost peculiar combinations ofanimals.Thepeasantseitheruseahorseandacamel,aburroandacamel,abulland a camel, or a bull and a horse. I am informed that they cannot use twocamels because they fight each other. Any animal hooked up with a camelbecomesdisgustedandlosesinterestinlife.

The French Army, particularly General Martin at Marrakech, has beenextremelyfriendly.GeneralMartinhasgiventwopartiestoofficersofthe47thInfantry1 fromSafi, andhas invitedmeandanyofmy staff to comeand staywithhimforanindefiniteperiod.Iamplanningtovisithimshortly.

During 1940, General Martin commanded the 67th Moroccan Division,whichwasbeaten.WhenGeneralAnderson2calledonhim,hebroughtout theflagofthedivision,whichhenolongercommands,andaskedGeneralAndersontoremovethecrepewithwhichitwasdecorated.ThiswastobedoneasasignthattheshameofthedivisionhadbeenremovedbythefightingwhichGeneralMartinhaddoneagainstus.HethencutthecrepeintwoandgavehalfofittoGeneralAnderson.Itwasaverytouchingand,Ibelieve,significantgesture.

It isof interest tonotethat,onthetwentieth,weunloadedthirtythousandmen in thirteenhours, and since that timehavebeenunloading suppliesat therateofforty-seventonsanhourinspiteoftheverybadconditionoftheharbor.TheAmericanNavyand theFrenchNavyhavedoneandaredoingasplendidjob.ThisnaturallyalsoappliestoourownSupplySection.

1ColonelE.H.Randle.2MajorGeneralJ.W.Anderson,3dInfantryDivision.

RequiemMass,HonoringAmericanandFrenchDead

HeldatCasablanca

HEADQUARTERSWESTERNTASKFORCE

November231942General Keyes, Admiral Hall,1 and I met General Nogu&s, Admiral

Michelier,2 and some of his Staff at the Casablanca Residency at 8:45 A.M.From there we proceededwith a police escort to the Cathedral of the SacredHeart. The streetswere linedwith French andAmerican soldiers andmilitarypolice.TheCathedralwascrowdedtothedoors.

The Bishop of Morocco, in full red robes, covered with a richlyembroidered surplice andwearing a foursided red cap,met us at the door andconducted us to the front of the Cathedral. Here there were two biers: theAmericanontheright,coveredwithanAmericanflag,andwithaguardofsixAmericansoldiers,andtheFrenchontheleft,withaFrenchflagandasimilarguard.

AttheterminationoftheMass,wefollowedtheclergyoutandenteredourcars.Aratherincongruousfeaturetomewasthefactthatinfrontofthepeople,whenweenteredandleft,wasaguardofMohammedancavalryonfoot,armedwithsabres.

AfterwaitinganhourintheResidencyinordertogivethepeopletimetowalktothecemetery,weproceededtothecemetery,wheretherewasabattalionof American infantry and a battalion of French African infantry drawn upoutside of the gate, preceded by a group of people of the French Legion, acounterpartof theAmericanLegion.Wewalkedabouthalfamile through thecemeteryandhaltedbetween two flagpoles,Americanon the rightandFrenchontheleft,eachwiththecolorsatthetruck.

1'RearAdmiralJohnHall,ChiefofStafftoAdmiralKentHewitt,laterincommandoftheports.2AdmiralMichelier,incommandoftheFrenchNavyatCasablanca.

General Nogues and I then placed a huge wreath on a tabletcommemorating the heroic dead, and a red wreath was placed by the FrenchLegion. When this ceremony was completed, the French band played ourequivalentofTapsduringwhichtheflagwashalf-masted.Followingthis, theyplayed theMarseillaise and the flag was run up to the truck. Our band thenplayedTapsand theflagwashalf-masted.Following this,ourbandplayed theStar-SpangledBannerandtheflagwasrunuptothetruck.

Wetheninspectedthegraves,AmericanandFrench,stoppinginthemiddleofeachgroupofgravestosalute.Wewerefollowedbyalargecrowdofpeople—severalthousand,Ishouldthink.

Eachgravewasproperlymarkedwithacross,andinthecaseofourdead,adogtag was on the cross. The names will be subsequently painted. We thenreturnedtothegate,enteredtheautomobiles,andproceededbacktotheoffice.The whole affair was very solemn, and when I made the remark to GeneralNogues that I thought the intermingling of French and American blood hadproducedaverysacredsacrament,heseemedpleasedandmoved.

LunchwithGeneralNogues,Rabat,Morocco

HEADQUARTERSWESTERNTASKFORCEDecember8,1942

GeneralNoguesaskedme,GeneralKeyes,andeightotherofficerstolunchat his house to meet His Excellency, M. Boisson, the Governor of Dakar.GeneralFitzgerald,AirCorps,flewusupinhisplane,ashewasalsoinvitedtotheluncheon.

We were received with the usual honors. In addition to ourselves, M.BoissonandtheFrenchgenerals,theGrandVizieroftheSultanandtheChiefofProtocolwerebothpresent.TheChiefofProtocol is theman Ihadpreviouslythoughtwas theGrandVizier.TheGrandVizier is themanwhostandson theSultan’s right at the head of the twelve apostles. He is a very smart oldgentlemanofninety-two,andhespeaksaboutthesameamountofFrenchthatIdo.

Whenwefirstarrived,noonewaspayinganyattention tohim,soIwentoverandtalkedtohim.DuringlunchhesatonMadameNogu&s’left,andIsaton her right. Again nobody talked to him. In leaving and entering the diningroom, I was supposed to precede him, but took particular pains not to do so,whichseemedtohaveanexcellenteffectontheoldman.

After lunch he sent the Chief of Protocol to ask if I would talk to him,whichIdid.OneofGeneralNoguesadherentswaspresentandalsoanAmericannavalofficerwhospokeFrench,butItalkedpracticallydirectlytotheoldman.HesaidthatHisMajestywasveryanxiousformetoknowthatthewholelifeofMoroccodependeduponmaintainingpeace.IassuredhimthatIwasaprofoundstudent of history; that since my earliest infancy my whole idea had been tomaintainpeaceinFrenchMorocco,andthatIintendedtodosobyconsultingthewishesofHisMajestythroughGeneralNogues.HesaidthatwhenHisMajestyheardtheseremarksfrommehewouldbeovercomewithjoyousemotion.Itoldhim that I felt that whenever I could make HisMajesty happy I myself wasdoubly glad. He then talked about the race antipathies—Jews—existing inMorocco.ItoldhimthatIfullyunderstoodthosethingsbecauseasachildIhadbeen raised on a large ranch, which had the governance of twenty thousandsheep—whichwasnotquitetrue,buthadagoodeffectontheArabs—andasaresult of my acquaintance with sheep, I understood perfectly about raceantipathies,and therefore Iwoulddonothingabout itbecause I felt that, sincetheSultan’s ancestors havehandled suchquestions for thirteenhundredyears,theywerebetterfittedthanIwastocontinuetheirmanagement.Hesaidthiswascompletelytohiswayofthinkingandthatnoracialortribaltroubleswouldeversticktheirheadsabovethesurface.

Ithentoldhimthatitwasveryimportantformetoknowwhatwasgoingon in Spanish Morocco, and that I knew that he and the Sultan had betterinformationonwhatwenton there thananyoneelse.TheGrandVizier repliedthattherewerecertainnativeslivinginSpanishMorocco,miscalledArabs,whowerealwaysthecauseoftrouble,andthattheSultanwouldmakeithisspecialtask to keepme informed ofwhat thesemiscreants and their Spanishmasterswere planning, and that such information would be given me as if I were amemberofthefamily.

I then told him that, in spite of my most diligent efforts, there wouldunquestionablybesomeraping,andthatIshouldliketohavethedetailsasearlyaspossiblesothattheoffenderscouldbeproperlyhanged.Hesaidthatthiswasasplendid idea,and that thehangingofsuchmiscreantswouldunquestionablybringgreatjoytoallMoroccans.

Thisconversationtookaboutfifteenminutes,attheendofwhichtimetheGrand Vizier assured me that my complaisance had given him the happiestfifteenminutesofhislife,towhichIrepliedthatifIhadaffordedhappinessforfifteenminutes,IfeltthatIhadnotlivedinvain.

ThisallsoundsveryfunnywhenyouwriteitdownandmusthavesoundedagooddealfunnierwhenexpressedinmyFrench,butitisexactlythewaytheArabsliketotalk.

TheGrandVizierendedupbysayingthatitwasnecessarytoconversewithagreatmanfullytorealizehisgreatness,andthattherewasanArabicsayingtotheeffectthatthosewhosaidallmenwereequalwereeitherfoolsorliars,andthatheandtheSultanwereneither.

‘‘FeteDesMoutons”(SheepFestival)HeldatRabat

HEADQUARTERSWESTERNTASKFORCEDecember19,1942

The Sultan invited me, the division commanders, and forty officers toattendtheceremonyatthepalace.ItwasfeltthatitwouldbemoreappropriateiftheescortofhonorshouldbefurnishedbytheAmericans.TothisendIinformedGeneralNoguesthatIwouldarriveattheairportat2:15andinspecttheescortofhonor,

whichwasacompanyofthe82dReconnaissanceBattalion,1thenproceedtotheResidencyandpickuphimandhisofficers.

GeneralNoguesandIrodeinareconnaissancecarwithtopdown,andwestoodup.Theescortofhonorhadaprofoundeffectonthepopulace,itbeingthefirsttimeIeverheardtheArabscheer.

Attheentrancetothepalaceenclosure,therewasanescortconsistingofacompanyoftanks,abatteryof105mm.self-propelledguns,andabatteryof75mm.assaultguns,withthebandfromthe3dDivision.

We halted at the front of this force, which presented arms. The bandrenderedtheusualhonorsandplayedthenationalanthemsofMorocco,France,andtheUnitedStatesinsuccession.

Wethenproceededtothepalace,leavingtheescortoutside.AtthepalacetheusualceremonywiththeRedGuardtookplace.WethenpaidourrespectstotheSultan,whoinsistedontalkingtomeatconsiderablelength,expressinghissatisfactionthatI,asarepresentativeofthePresidentandGeneralEisenhower,hadbeenabletobepresentatthechiefpoliticalandchiefreligiousfeastofhisempire. I expressed the satisfaction which I felt the President and GeneralEisenhowerexperiencedasaresultofbeingrepresented,andthatIfeltthatthesefortunateinstanceswereanotherillustrationofthehelpwhichGodhadgivenourcause.IfoundthatthementionofGodwiththeSultanisaone-hundred-percenthit.

Two newCaidswere commissioned, andwhen thiswas over,wemovedoutside thepalace toagrassplotaboutas longasapolo field,butonlyabouthalfaswide.ThiswascompletelysurroundedbyacrowdofMoslemswithsomeFrench.Atentwasprovidedforthevisitingofficers,andI,asrepresentativeoftheUnitedStates,wasgiventheprincipalseat.

ThePrinceImperialsatnexttome,andhetoldmeinexcellentFrenchthatIwas about to witness the most exciting spectacle in the world. The excitingspectaclewassomewhatofaflop,buttheceremonyprecedingitwasextremelyinterestingandornate.

1LieutenantColonelP.A.Disney.

Toour left,aswefaced thearena,were thechiefofficialsofall the largecitiesandtribesoftheEmpireofMorocco,arrangedinacolumnofplatoons,soto speak. The band of the Black Guard played continuously, and besides thepalaceguardstherewasaregimentofcavalry,halfofwhomwerelancers.

Presently, a large number of Arabs, wearing red caps, rushed out of thepalacegateandranshoutingtowardus.Theywerefollowedbytwomenonfoot,withabout twenty-foot lances,heldvertically; thencame theSultandressed inArab costume and mounted on a beautiful white stallion. The saddle andtrappings were of pink silk, and a man walked behind him carrying a hugeumbrella.

Asheapproached,theArabsallshoutedandyelled,andtheforeignofficerssaluted. When he reached the head of the column of platoons of the citydelegates, he halted and a man on each side of his horse waved a whitehandkerchief.ThisapparentlywasthesignalfortheleadingplatoonofcitizenstobowfromthehipsthreetimesandchantsomethinginArabic.Assoonastheyhaddonethis threetimes, themeninredcapsrushedbehindthemandhustledthemtotheside,andtheprocesswasrepeatedwiththenextgroup,andsoonforabouttwentygroups.

The retinueof theSultanwas interesting.TheSultan is supposed tohavesevenhorses,thereforeherodeoneandhadfourremounts,eachcaparisonedinsilksofdifferentcolors,yellow,red,green,andpurple.Inadditiontothishehadagoldcoachofthevintageofabout1400,Ishouldthink,withhugelampsonallfourcomers,andaplacebehindfortwofootmen.Thiswaspulledbytwohorses,whichwereledbygrooms.ThisaccountedforthesevenhorsesnecessaryfortheSultan’sstate.

Behind the coach came a cart covered with white boxes, then a camelloadedwithwhiteboxes,andthenamulesimilarlyloaded.AsfarasIcouldsee,theboxeswereempty,butapparentlytheyrepresentedtheprovisionswhichHisMajestyhadnormallycarriedwithhim.ThesignificanceoftheceremonyisthatintheolddaystheSultanmadeayearlyprogressionofhisrealmandmovedbythemeansindicatedinthisceremonialshowandwasmetatthegateofeachcityby the City Fathers, who are now moved to the palace for this ceremonialrepetitionofthevisit.

Upon thecompletionof» thispartof the show, theSultan returned to thepalaceandthenthegreatoccasionaroseofwhichthePrinceImperialhadbeentellingme. It consisted of groups of from three to twentyArabs,mounted onhorses, with old-fashioned muskets.,, At a given signal, one of these groupswouldchargeviolentlyup thearena,doingasortofmanualofarmsmounted,one movement of which was to hold the gun over the head in a horizontalposition,muzzletothefront.Thiswasapparentlythestart.

Afterthistheywouldwhirltheguninvariouswaysandfinallyattempttodischargeit.Sincethesegunsareflintlocks,notoverthirtypercentwentoff.Onthreeorfouroccasionswhichtheydid, theArabshootingitalsowentoff,and

when an Arab, usually a venerable Arab, falls—“Oh, what a fall is here, mycountrymen”—his hat comes off, his shoes come off, and several bags andsacks,whichhecarriesconcealedunderhisrobe,arescattered.Theshowisthenhaltedwhileretainerspushhimontohishorseandcollecthisparaphernalia.Inall,aboutthreehundredArabspassedinthisway.

CASABLANCA

January1,1943

Earlythismorningwehadourfirstairattack.Thefirstexplosionofthreebombsoccurredabout3:15andwokemefromaperfectlysoundsleep. I lit inthe middle of the floor, pulled the curtain across the window, got on someclothes,andwasontheroofinaboutfiveminutes.

Therewas a low ceiling of some twenty-five hundred feet,with rain andwind,andalloursearchlights—almostasmanyasGeorge1hasyearsofage—wereworking,probingholesintheclouds.

1GeneralPatton'sson

Presently the lightantiaircraftbegangoingoffatagreat rate,with tracerslookinglikefireflies.Thiscontinuedforaboutfiveminutesandsuddenlytherewasatremendousflashfromwhichcamelongoctopus-liketentaclesoffirewithbulbsalong them.The fire from this incendiaryblazedverybrightly for abouttwentyminutesduringwhichtimenothinghappened.

Thenwedistinctlyheardairplanes,andtheheavyantiaircraftbeganfiringbytheuseofadevicewhichmakesitunnecessarytoseetheplane.

Thenoise continued, andpretty soon, fromover thehouse toourback, alarge four-motor enemy bomber appeared and was immediately caught in therangeoftwosearchlights.Assoonasthisoccurred,apparentlyeveryantiaircraftgun in thevicinityopenedfire,and theplanewas literallyoutlinedwith tracerbulletsandsurroundedbythewhiteburstsofhighexplosive,whichimmediatelychanged into a small black cloud. Although this bomber was not over twothousandfeetup,andprobablybecauseof it, shepassedclear throughwithoutbeinghit,oratleastIdonotthinkshewashit,althoughsomeothersthinkshewas.

Wecouldhearotherplanesabovethecloudsandoccasionallytheexplosionof bombs. Once a fragment whined by on its way down, but apparently ourhousewasnotinthelineofthereturningfragments.

Whilethiswasgoingon,Isentofficerstovariouspointstogetinformation,and they kept telephoning in. So far as our defense was concerned, it wasworkingcorrectlysotherewasnothingformetodobutworry.

Aboutaquartertofive,weheardanotherbomberfrombehindus,anotherfour-motor job. She came over still lower than the first one, and again wassurroundedbytracerandhighexplosive.IamsurethatthisplanewashitatleasttwiceanddisappearedinthedirectionofEurope.

Justaftershepassed,weheard thewhineofbombs,whichstrucknearanantiaircraft battery, about half amile to our right.MyAide, LieutenantA. L.Stiller, went over to ascertain the exact location and damage, but no one hadbeenhurt.

Things then quieted down and I decided to go to bed, as the raid wasapparentlyover.Atabout5:30,firingrecommenced,andIreturnedtotheroof,as I had not undressed. There were quite a few explosions and a tremendousantiaircraftfirefromourgunsandalsofromships.ItwasbetterthanthegreatestFourth-of-Julydemonstrationpossibletoimagine.

Presentlyabomberwaspickedupby thesearchlightscrossingdirectly infrontofusataboutfourthousandfeet,astheceilinghadlifted.Theantiaircraftshellswere bursting all around her, but suddenly she fell about two thousandfeet, upon which there were loud cheers from all directions. However, shestraightenedoutandcontinuedhercourse,andinaboutthreemilesagaintookatumble, almost to the level of the sea. Smoke trailing fromone or two of hermotors could be seen distinctly, and I believe she was a dead duck, but shedisappearedintothemistbeforehittingthewater.

As soon as it was light, I went out to inspect the holes and talk to thesoldiers. They were very calm, and one gun crew I talked to, who had beenwithin fiftyyardsofacrater, said that ithadnotknocked themdown,buthadbruisedthemwithmudandrocks.

Theholeswereaboutthesizeofanaveragebedroom,andtherewereinthecraters quite a lot of bomb fragments, whichwe collected in order to get thenumbers. In thiswewere fortunate, and thereby learned the typeofbombandtypeoffuse.

Although therewere quite a number of bombs dropped, no soldierswerekilledandonlyaveryfewwounded.TheArabswerelessfortunate.OnebombinonetownclosebykilledmoreArabsthanIamyearsoldandwoundedothers.Iwrote a letter of condolence to thePasha,whichmayhelphim, butwill notrestoretheArabs.

Aboutteno’clockIhadameetingofallaviatorsandantiaircraftofficerstodiscusstheschemeofdefenseandtomakethenecessarycorrections.Wewereof the opinion that everything had gone satisfactorily, but that a few changeswere desirable. These have now been made. Material damage was zero. Thebombersdeliberatelyseemedtopickoutopenfieldsorthemiddleofthestreets.Nothinghittheharbor.

Whenthelastbomberflewover thehouse,GeorgeMeeks1said,“Sir, if Ihadmysaddle,Icouldthrowitonhimandridehim.”

TheSultan’sVisittoCasablanca

January12,13,1943

About twoweeksago, theSultan’suncle,who lives inCasablanca,askedme if Iwould like to inspect theSultan’spalacehere,andsaid that theSultanwas very anxious to be herewhen I visited it, but that he could not come toCasablanca without a reason; so we decided to give a demonstration of allweaponsandmotorvehiclesinthiscommandinhishonor,andalsotoinvitetheFrench.

Thepurposeof this demonstrationwas twofold.Primarily, to impress theFrenchandArabswithourpowerandalso,byshowingourpower,totakeawaythe stigma of defeat from the French, for obviously with their weapons theycould not fight suchweapons aswe displayed.Wedid not stress the fact thatnoneofourheavyequipmentwasashorewhenthefightingtookplace.

OntheafternoonofJanuary10,IwenttotheSultan’spalaceandwasmetby the Grand Protocol. Presently, the other officers, including some French,arrivedandwehadanaudiencewith theSultan,withmedoingall the talking,whichwasindicatedbytheGrandProtocol,whokeptlookingatmetostarttheconversation.WestillwentthroughtherigmaroleofmytalkingtotheProtocolinFrench and theProtocol talking to theSultan inArabic, andback the sameway.Wehadaguardofhonorconsistingofacompanyoflighttanks,anumberofFrenchmotorcycleinfantry,andsomemotorcyclemilitarypolice.TheSultan,hisson,andtheGrandProtocolgotinthefirstcar;GeneralKeyesandIinthesecondcar;thenthetwelveapostles,whowereallViziersasIhavediscovered.ThentherestoftheAmericanandFrenchofficers.Inall,aboutthirtycars.

ThefieldwasveryhandsomelyarrangedbyColonelWilliams.3Thecrewsstoodatattentionwiththeirside-armsateachvehicle,andtheammunitionforallweaponsstackedinfrontofthevehicle.

Whenwearrivedatthegrounds,IhadmycommandcarfortheSultan,andafter the band had rendered the honors and played the three national airs, Ihelped the Sultan get into it. He indicated that I should join him. GeneralNogues,whichhadinformedmethatnoforeignereverrodewithHisMajesty,protested to the Sultan. The Sultan said that that was his business, and that Ishouldridewithhim,whichIdid,onhisright.HethenaskedNoguestocomeinonhisleft,andthePrinceImperialsatinfrontholdingontothehandrail.Thisis

alleged tobe the first time inhistory that a foreignerhas ever riddenwith theSultan.

Wepassedvery slowly in front of eachvehicle, and I explained it to thebestofmyability,bytalkingindirectFrenchtotheSultan—whospeaksitbetterthanIdo.Whenwegottothelaundrytruck,IcouldnotrememberthenouninFrenchandsoIsaid,“Icannotrememberthatname.”HesaidinperfectEnglish,“Youmean laundry truck,” thereby spilling the beans that he could not speakEnglish.

From this exposition,we drove to the airfieldwhereColonel Beam1 hadarrangedaveryfinedemonstrationof thevarioustypesofairplanes.ThesetheSultaninspectedwithgreatinterest,andthePrinceImperialclimbedintoallofthemandworkedthecontrols.

Fromthereweproceededtotheportandmadeatourofthewharves.ThenAdmiralHalltooktheSultanandtheseniormembersoftheparty,includingtheViziers,tothedestroyerWainwright,wheretheyhadabattlestationdrill.

MostoftheViziersarearoundninety,socouldnotclimbuptheladder,andIremainedwiththemandwegotveryintimateandtoldjokes.ThetheorythattheArabhasnosenseofhumorisabsurd.

WereturnedtheSultantohispalaceandre-enteredtheaudiencechamber,andassoonaswegotthere,IhadtospeakFrenchtotheGrandProtocolandtheProtocolinArabictotheSultanandsoon.TheSultanthen,withahappysmile,suggestedthatitwouldbeagreathonorifIwouldhavebreakfastwithhimthenextday, thethirteenth.IsaidIshouldbedelightedandaskedifImightbringGeneralClark.1Wethenwenthome.

Shortly after supper, the Protocol called up and said that General Clarkshouldnotcome.Iwasverymuchupsetandofferednottogomyself,butClarktoldmetogoahead.Thiswasveryfortunate,asIfoundouttodaythatthereasontheyhadnotwantedClarkwasthattheyfelthewasoftoohighranktobeaskedsocasually.Iwasverymuchgratifiedtolearnthis.

We arrived at the palace at 1:30 andweremet outside by a battalion ofFrench native infantry, with two bands and a company of the Black Guardinside.

I was conducted to the audience room alone, and I started the usualrigmarole,buttheSultanimmediatelycutouttheinterpreterandtalkedtomeinFrench.Afterwehadconversedforwhatseemedtomeaterriblylongtime,theotherswereallowedtocomein.

About this time breakfast was announced with the opening of twoenormouscurvedwoodendoors. Ibelieveof rosewood.Thebreakfast room is

the most beautiful room I have ever been in. It is black-and-white modeledmarbletoaheightofaboutfifteenfeet;abovethatisveryfinewhitestucco,andabove that is a curvedwooden roof, gilded.The floor is blackmarble and thefoursideboardsaremarble.Therearewhite-flutedDorichalf-columnsallaroundtheroom.ItoldtheSultanitwasthemostbeautifulroomIhadeverseen—andheadmittedit.

IsatdownbetweentheSultanandthePrinceImperial,andtherestofthepeoplewereseparatedinArab,French,andAmericangroups.WehadaregularFrench breakfast of about ten courses, ending up with the Kus-Kus and icecream. During this meal, which lasted three hours, I talked continuously inFrenchtotheSultanandthePrinceImperial,whobothunderstoodme.

Afterlunchwewalkedthroughatrulybeautifulgardentoapavilionmadecompletelyofmosaic,bothwallsandfloor, insideandout,anddecoratedwithcarvedrosewood.All thebanisterswereofcurvedbronze.Havingdrunksomecoffeehereandtalkedsomemore,weproceededthroughadoublerankofBlackGuards toasecondmarblebuilding,called thePavilionofJoy.This isenteredfromasunkengardeninwhichafountainplays.

1MajorGeneralMarkW.Clark,CommandingGeneraloftheFifthArmy(justactivated).

Inside,thePavilionofJoyisofwhitemarblewithstuccoandisdividedinthemiddlebyaraisedplatformwithDoriccolumnsofwhitemarble.Wesatinthe right-hand half and some of the lesser people in the left-hand half wheretherewasalsoanativeorchestra.

In front of the Sultan and myself, there were nine different types ofsweetmeats, at least a couple of hundredof each.Thesewere in curved silverdishesortrays.Thetraysareraisedonfourlegsaboutafootfromtheground.Afterwehadtalkedsomemore,theservantsplacedthesetrayswithinourreach.Noone that Isaw, includingtheSultan, tookmore thanonesweetmeat.Whilethiswasgoingon,theyserveduswithhotminttea.

When we had drunk the second glass of mint tea, the sweetmeats wereremoved and the official photographer came in and took pictures. I was justabouttoleavewhentheSultangotuponthestepsandaskedmetostandinfrontof him.He then decoratedmewith theOrder of theGrandCross ofOuissamAlaouite,onapumpkin-coloredribbonwithawhiteedgethatgoesovertherightshoulder with the medal hanging over the left hip. The ribbon is about fourinches wide. There is also a huge silver star which you wear normally, onlyusingtheribbonforfulldress.TheSultanstatedthathewasdecoratingmewiththis on account ofwhat I had done forMorocco, and I told him in reply thatnothingIhaddoneforMoroccocouldcompensate for thehonorMoroccohad

donemeinpresentingmewiththeribbon,whichseemedtobetherightthingtosay.TheCitationread,“Leslionsdansleurstanirestremblenthsonapproche.”1

General Keyes, General Wilbur,2 and General Wilson and Admiral Hallreceived the same order in the next lower grade, the Grand Officer Order.Colonel Gay4 5 and Colonel Conrad6 received the next one, which is a neckribbon,andisknownastheCommanderOrder.

1“Thelionsintheirdenstrembleathisapproach.”2•BrigadierGeneralW.H.Wilbur,onGeneralPatton’sStaff.

Wethenwent to theswimmingpoolwhichisbeyondthereceptionroom.Thiswas thefinestpool Ihadeverseen,withred-and-greensubmerged lights,andadivingboardinpolishedduraluminum.Theheightofthedivingplatformcan be regulated by an electric switch, operated by the foot. There are alsorowing machines and punching bags. One of the Viziers, who seems to beespeciallyfondofme,saidtheyhadthemalloverMorocco,asthewomencouldnotgooutandhadtohaveexercise,andtheseweretheonlyplaceswheretheycouldgetit.

WethenreturnedthroughthedoublerankoftheBlackGuard,enteredtheaudiencechamber,where theSultan immediately lapsedintoArabic,and,afterstayingtwominutes,Istartedtoleave.AsIgotup,theSultansaidhehopedthiswasthebeginningofalongandpermanentfriendshipbetweenhimandmeandour countries. I replied that Iwould domy uttermost tomake the end of thisfriendshipasfortunateandhappyasthebeginning.

VisittoMarrakechandBoarHunt

CASABLANCA

February1,1943

ThePashaofMarrakechhadbeeninsistingforalongtimethatIpayhimapersonal visit, so on the afternoon of February 1, I, GeneralWilbur, ColonelGay, Colonel Williams, Colonel Davidson,7 and Captain Jenson8 flew toMarrakech. We were met at the airfield by a battalion of infantry, a FrenchGeneral, and thePasha.We first calledonGeneralMartin, theFrenchDistrictCommander,andthenwenttothepalace.

Thepalaceof thePashaoccupiesabout twocityblocksandiscompletelywalledin.Toapproachit,youwalkthroughastreetwheretwovehiclescanjustpass,andinthroughaverynarrowgate.Fromthisyouenterabeautifulgarden,withamarblefountainandtwoverybeautifulwhitemarblelions.

ThePashahasthreeguesthouses,eachoneofwhich, inmyopinion,costprobablyamilliondollars.TheoneassignedtoGeneralWilburandmyselfhasonthefirstflooramuseumandthePasha’sprivateoffice.Thismuseumcontainseverything fromRoman coins to the latest type of firearms. The collection ofswords is remarkable, and I am sure that one of the weapons I saw is aCrusader’ssword.Itwasimpossibletoadmireanyofthese,because,hadIdoneso, they would have immediately been presented to me. However, they wereveryinteresting.Isawasuitofchainmailinthemostperfectconditionofanysuit I had ever seen, probably due to the dry climate, which had prevented itfrom rusting. There were also a backplate and a breastplate of around 1400,whichwasremarkablygoodandveryheavy,completelychasedingold.Amongother things in themuseumwas a set of china presented to the Pasha by thePresidentofFrance.

Onthesecondfloorofthishousewasalargeroomaboutthirtyfeetsquare,witha lotofboothsaroundthesides,suchaswesee insodafountains,exceptthat thepartitionsweremadeof carvedandpaintedwood.Asyouentered theroom, there was a movable bar with every kind of liquor, but which nobodyseemedtodrink.

Myroomwasonthenextfloorandconsistedofabedchamber,adressingroom,andaverycompletemodernbathroom.Thewallswerewhiteuptoabouttenfeet,andabovethatwerestucco.Ihadasittingroomfortyfeetsquarewithasofacompletelyaroundit,withthemostbeautifulceilingandwallsIhaveeverbeheld.TheentirewallabovesixfeetwasmadeofArabianstuccowork,asfineas lace. The Pasha toldme it took a year tomake, and I believe he was notexaggerating.

Thelowerpartofthewallwasamosaicofwhite,red,andyellowtiles.

Attheendof thehall leading to theapartmentandbedroomwasanArabwhomthePashareferredtoasaslave.Hewasveryamiableandarmedwithadagger,andspenthistimetryingtofindouthowhecoulddosomethingforme.

Thehouseoccupiedbytheotherofficerswassimilartomine,buthadmorebedrooms,four,Ibelieve.Thebedswerecoveredwithvelvet,overwhichwerelaidreallacecounterpanes.Eachbedroomhadamodembathroom.

Afterwehadwashed forhalfanhour,whichapparentlywas the rule,wewentintothethirdhouse,builtonsimilarlines,wherewedranktea.Whenthiswasfinished,theCadi,whoisthePasha’sson,tookusonatourofthecityandsurroundingcountry,allofwhichbelongstothePasha.

They have several very large concrete tanks, I should think about twohundredyardsonasideandabouttenfeetdeep.AtoneofthesetankstheguideinformedmeaSultanhadbeendrowned,althoughhepersonallythoughthehadbeenmurdered;andheshowedmetheboatinwhichtheaccidenthadoccurred.Itwasalargesteamlaunchwithasteamengine,datedabout1880.Theboatwasabout thirty feet long, in a fairly dilapidated state, but once had been paintedyellowandgreen,withagolddesignlaidon.

The“diffa,”atwhichonlyabouttwelvepeoplewerepresent,wasalongtheusual fines except that everything was more elegant. In fact, GeneralMartin,who has served in Morocco for forty years, said he had never seen such abanquet.Afterdinnerwewenttoaroomandhadtwosetsofdancersentertainusfor about an hour. These women would seem to be about thirty, and are, Iunderstand,veryhighlytrained.Eachonewearsapastel-coloreddressandoveritasortofsurpliceof lace.Therearesixwomenineachgroupwithonemalefiddlerplaying the single stringed instrumentwhichalwaysaccompanies thesedances.Fourofthewomenbeattimeandsqueal,whiletwogooutanddoasortofduet.Theywaltzaroundforalittlewhile,thenkickthefrontoftheirdressesabout three times, stamping their feet in time to the music, and then do oneminuteofaviolenthula.Theythenreturntotheirplaceinthelineandtwoothergirls do the same thing. This continueswithout alteration until the end of theshow.

Wewerecalledatsixonthemorningofthethirdforalightbreakfast.Thelightbreakfast,whichWilburandIate,tookfivementoserve,andconsistedofcoffee,toast,threekindsofpreserves,tea,fourkindsofcandy,andsomecakesthatlookedlikescones,onlynotsowellcooked.AfterwardIfoundthefivemeneatingwhatwasleft,whichwasampleforaboutfifteen.

We left the palace in the pitch dark about seven o’clock. I rodewith thePashaandhispersonalbodyguardinaRolls-Royce.Theothersfollowedintwoother cars accompanied by the son of the Pasha. We drove for about two

hundredmiles throughdesertgraduallychanging into thefoothillsof theAtlasMountains.ThiswasthecountryinwhichasayoungmanthePashahadfought,anditwasveryinterestingtohearhimdescribethefightswhichhadtakenplace.HeisaBerber,andforthreehundredyearshisfamilyhasruledthispartofthecountry as absolute chiefs. I have never met a man in whom the hereditaryqualitiesof leadershipare soapparent.The ideaofhis superiority is so inbredthathedoesnothavetoshowit.Whereverhepasses,theArabsbowandgiveamodifiedHitlersalute.Sofarasheisconcernedtheydonotexist,andyetatthetablehewillhelpclearoffacourseandpickupthecrumbs.InprofilehelooksverymuchlikeanEgyptianmummywithacafe-au-laitcomplexiononthedarkside.Hishandsarebeautiful.

Hesaid thatArabswouldnever fightagainstBerbersexcept inbuildings;and in his early days they had very fewweapons exceptmuskets, so the onlywayhecouldkillArabs—ofwhomhehaddestroyedmanyhundreds—wasbysneakingup to adefendedhouse at night andputting abombunder it. In thisoperation theywouldmakeafuseoutofhairs fromtheirwhiskersand threadsfrom their coats, impregnating themwithpowder; andwhen the sun cameup,theywouldtelltheArabstheywouldblowupthehouseiftheydidnotcomeout.If they came out, they shot them,which the Pasha describedwith appropriategestures.Iftheyrefusedtocomeout,theyblewaholeinthewallandstormeditandkilled themwithswords.Hedescribedone fight inwhichhehadattackedwithtwoplatoonsforabouttwelvehoursagainstathousandArabs.

The road we drove along was the one where he had had this fight.ApparentlythistimetheArabswerenotinthehouses.Hehadoneplatoonattackbyfire,andheledtheotheroneinamountedchargefromtheflank.Hesaiditwasverygay,andthatnearlyallhismenwerekilledaswellas theArabs.Healso showedmeanolivegrovewherehe said therewere somanydeadArabsthatthejackalsgotsickeatingthem.

Thecountryisfullofalmondtrees,whicharereallybeautiful.Viewedfromtheair,theylooklikeghostbouquetsorlikebitsofcobwebcoveredwithdew.Whenyougetclose,theylookverymuchlikecherrytrees,onlymorebeautiful,andmore numerous than any cherry trees I have ever seen. There is anArabcustomthatwhenaman ismarriedorhasabirthday,allhis friendscomeandeach brings five almond seeds which they plant. This account for the largenumberoftrees.

After driving one hundred and twenty miles we came to a tent where asecondbreakfastofcake,wine,andcoffeewasservedandwhereweweremetby six French officers. There were a number of Goums present, armed withcarbines, and riding one horse and leading another. I drew a very nice Arab

stallion.Hewasaboutfifteen-twoandprobablyweighedathousandpounds.ThesaddlewasanexactcopyofthemilitarysaddleIboughtofJanninatSaumurin1912. The Pasha rode a mule, large and black, with a red saddle shapedsomething like a bathtub. When we were all mounted, we proceeded up themountainsforaboutanhour.Inadditiontothemountedgrooms,therewereanequalnumberoffootmen,whocarriedshotgunsforthemountedmen,orsimplywent along for the fun.Weweremoving at a good hound trot and thesemenkeptupwithperfectease,barefooted,oversharprocksandafewcactus.

Whenwe reached theplace for thedrive, thePashapersonallyplaced theimportantguests.Iwasontheleftinunquestionablythebestplace.Wilburwasnext beyond me, and on the Pasha’s right were Colonels Gay andWilliams.Eachpostwasinablindmadeofcutbrushaboutthreefeethigh.Icouldseetothefrontaboutfortyfeet.

Wheneveryonewas inposition, thebeaters,ofwhom therewereabout athousand, started to work. First, jackals and foxes came running very fastthroughthetrees,andImissedthreeshots,butsodideveryoneelse.ThenaverylargeboarchargedimmediatelyinfrontofthePasha,whomissedhim,andthenturnedwith hisMannlicher rifle and opened fire at the boar and the retainers,whowereallgettingoutofhisway.Fortunately,noone,includingtheboar,washit.

AboutthistimethelargestandblackestboarIhaveeverseencamestraightat.meover rocks, anddownhill. I hit him in the left eyewith a slug at aboutfifteenfeet,andhismomentumcarriedhimsothathefellcloseenoughtosplashbloodonme.Itwasreallyquiteexciting,because,hadI failed tostophim,hewouldprobablyhavehitme,andhehadveryfineteeth.

Another boar camewhom the Pasha shot through the body, but failed tostopuntilhehadpursuedanumberofArabs.Everybodyexceptmeturnedandshotatthisone,andagainnoonewashitexcepttheboar.

At the completion of this beat, we moved downhill, about five hundredyards,andhadwhattheycalleda“contrebattu,”whichmeansthattheydrivethegamebackoverthegroundtheyhavejustpassed.ThistimeIshotajackal,butdidnothaveashotataboar.ThePashakilledtwomoreboars,stillwithhisrifle.Inall,wekilledfourteenboars,fivejackals,threefoxes,andtworabbits.

We drove back to the tent where the cars were waiting, had somemorefood,andwereinformedthatthelocalchiefwasholdingadiffaforus.Wegottohisplace,whichwasaone-buildingvillagelikeOuarzazate,onlysmaller,withabout three hundred inhabitants, all ofwhom lined the courtyard, dancing andsingingduringtheentiremeal.

OwingtothefactthatIhadtogetaplanebackbeforefiveo’clock,thiswas

ashortaffairlastingonlyanhourandahalf,butnotduringonemomentofthistimedidtheinhabitantsstopsinginganddancing.

Flyingbackintheevening,IwasstruckbythefactthatthewholecountryispockmarkedwitholdArabtentemplacements.Theygiveonetheimpressionofleechbitesonhorses.Thenumberoftheseindicatesthatthiscountryhasbeentremendouslyinhabitedforaverylongtime.

Ithasalwaysbeenmyambitiontomeetarobberchiefinhisowncountry,andalsotohaveanexcitinghuntwithlittledanger.ThePashaandmywildboar,whichwasthelargestkilled,satisfiedmytwoambitions.

VictoryParadeHeldatTunis,May20,19431

HEADQUARTERSIARMOUREDCORPS

May20,1943

On the night of the eighteenth, General Eisenhower phoned and askedGeneralBradley910andmyselftobepresentattheparade,probablyfeelingthatwehadsomethingtodowithitsexistence.

B-25Mitchell

We secured a B-25 from General Cannon and flying at better than twohundredandfortymilesanhour,withatailwind,reachedTunisat9:45A.M.Theflightupwasparticularlyinterestingtous,aswepassedovermostofBradley’sbattlefields.WealsopassedovertheruinsofCarthage,whichareonlyvisibleonthemap—-onthegroundthereisnothingtosee.However,themountainsbackofit,ofwhichIreadadescriptioninsomeoldbook,wereperfectlyfamiliar.

Our bombing of Tunis had been extremely accurate, because, while thewaterfrontwaslargelyobliterated,the•otherportionsofthecitywerehardlyhit

at all. All the airfieldswere coveredwith destroyedGerman planes, probablyseveralhundred.

Whenwereachedthefield,GeneralEisenhowerhadjustarrived,drivenbyKay.11We both shook handswith him and congratulated him, but hewas sobusymeetinghighrankingofficersoftheFrenchandBritishArmiesthatwehadnotimetotalktohim.

Shortlyafterwearrived,GeneralGiraud2cameandwaswarmlygreetedbyeveryone.Afterawhilethe“sacredfamilies”gotintoautomobiles,escortedbyBritisharmoredcars,andwefollowedbehindtheescortwithGeneralCatroux3asourcompanion.HespeakstheclearestandmostbeautifulFrenchIhaveeverheard,andwehadquiteaniceconversation.

Bradley and I were put on the right of the reviewing stand, which waslargelyoccupiedbyFrenchciviliansandminormilitaryofficers.

Immediately in front of uswas the line ofFrenchColonial Infantry, of averydarkcolor,althoughIdonotbelievetheywereSenegalese.Justacrossfromus was a battalion from one of the British Guard Regiments, who put up anexceedinglyfineappearance.

Onmy immediate leftwas a very largeFrench ecclesiasticwith a purplesash around hismiddle, which acted as a background for a tremendous crosswithanamethystinit.Idonotknowwhothismanwas,buthewasapparentlymuch beloved, asmany French officers and enlistedmen came up and shookhands with him and called him General. I think he spoke English, as heapparentlyunderstoodwhatIsaidtoBradley.

Presently, there was a great fanfare of trumpets and much saluting,followedbywhattheFrenchcall“Afireofjoy.”Itwasveryamusingtonoticethechangeinpeople’sexpressions—practicallyallofwhomhadbeenbombed—whentheyfoundoutthatitwasn’tanairattack.

All this noise heralded the arrival of General Giraud and GeneralEisenhower, accompanied by Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham,1 General SirHarold Alexander,12 13 General Anderson,14 Chief AirMarshal Tedder,15 AirMarshalConyngham,16Mr.Macmillan,17 theBritish political officer, andMr.Murphy,18 theAmerican.Mr.Murphy andGeneral Eisenhowerwere the onlytwoAmericansonthestand.

Thenexteventwasamarch-pastbyabandofHighlandpipers,Ithinkfromthe42dRegiment.Theycameby in the traditionalhalf-step,counter-marched,andre-passed.Itwasaverysplendidsight.

Whentheyhadclearedthefront,thebandoftheForeignLegion,withthetraditional white caps and red epaulets, numbering at least one hundred

instruments,marchedbyleadingtheFrenchcontingent.Then, for nearly an hour, the French troops, who had participated in the

battle,marchedby.Asusual,theymarchedmagnificently.Theyhaveaninnatecapacityforceremonialmarching,and,asfarasthatgoes,foranyotherkindofmarching. They consisted of Frenchwhite troops, French Senegalese,Goums,and the Foreign Legion. The Foreign Legion was very resplendent, withenormouswhiskers,manyofwhichwere redorblond. In fact, it seems tomethat the French Foreign Legion is largely composed ofGermans and Swedes.Theyareveryfine-lookingtroops.

One impressive thing was that these troops, who had participated in avictoriouscampaign,werearmedwithModel1914equipment,inspiteofwhichfacttheyhaddonewell.Ofcourse,now,theywillbeimmediatelyre-equippedwith American Lend-Lease materiel. However, during the fighting, the onlyAmerican equipment they had were some Thompson sub-machine guns andsomeBazookas.

EachFrenchregimentandseparatebattalioncarried theTricolor,with thebattalionhonorswrittenonit.Thiscausedalmostcontinualsalutingonthepartofthespectators.

AftertheFrenchhadpassed,abattalionofthe34thInfantryDivisioncameby. Our men were magnificent physical specimens, very well turned out, butthere were no flags, not even company guidons; and regimental commandersmarchedontherightofthefileclosersoftheleadingcompany.

In spite of their magnificent appearance, our men do not put up a goodshow in reviews. I think that we still lack pride in being soldiers, and mustdevelopit.

FollowingtheAmericanscametheBritishcontingentswitharepresentationfrom every division in the First Army, each led by its division or corpscommander.TheGuardunitswerebigmen;theotherswereverysmall.Allofthemwere dressed in shorts, except theGurkhas,who are very small, and, inadditiontotheirbayonets,carryahugeknifesomethinglikethePhilippinebolo.

TheBritishalsounderstand theartofceremonialmarchingand reallyputonasplendidshow.Therewasonesergeantmajorwhoshouldbeimmortalizedinapainting.HetypifiedallthatisgreatintheBritishnoncommissionedofficer,andhecertainlyknewit.Ihaveneverseenamanstrutmore.

FollowingtheBritishinfantrycametheAmericantanksmannedbyBritish,andtheBritishChurchilltanks,alsoanumberoffieldguns.

Thewholemarch-past lasted about two and one-half hours.When itwasover,aboutthirtyofuswereaskedtoalunchattheFrenchResidency,givenbyGeneralGiraud.Itwasaveryformalaffair,buttherewerenotoasts.Afterward,mostofushadtoleaveatonceinordertogetbacktoourstationsbeforedark.

IhopethisisonlythefirstofmanysuchtriumphalprocessionsinwhichIshallparticipate.

Theflightbackwasveryfastbecausethewindhadchanged,andagainwehad about a thirty-mile tail wind, with the result that we got in half an hourbeforewewereexpectedandhadtowait.

AtthelunchImetmyfriendGeneralBriggs,whocommandstheBritish1stArmoredDivision,andhadachancetointroducehimtoGeneralHarmon,whois commandingour1stArmoredDivision.Theyareverymuchalikeandbothverysuccessful.

GeneralGiraudrememberedmeatonceandwasextremelycomplimentaryinhisremarks.HeisaveryimpressivemanandlooksexactlylikeamodernizedVercingetorix.

Bazooka

NotesontheArab

CASABLANCA

June9,1943

It tookmea long time to realizehowmuchastudentofmedievalhistorycangainfromobservingtheArabs.

Allmembersofouroil-daubedcivilization thinkofroadsas longslabsofconcrete or black-top, or at least as dragged and graded thoroughfares full ofwheelruts.Asamatteroffact,roads,orperhapsit isbettertocall themtrails,existedthousandsofyearsbeforetheearth-shakinginventionof thewheelwaseven dreamed of, and it was along such roads that our sandaled or barefootprogenitorsmovedfromplacetoplacejustastheArabsdotoday.

Viewed from the air, the Arab road is a gently meandering tracery ofindividual footpaths. Where the going is good, this collection of paths mayspreadtoawidthoftwentytofortyyards,while,whererockyoutcroppingsmustbecircumventedordefilespassthroughthewanderingtendrils,theycomeintofocusandformasinglepath,onlyagaintospreadoutwhenthegoingimproves.Nowhere is a wheel track or a heelmark, because the Arabs wear heellessslippersorgobarefooted;theiranimalsareunshod—therearenovehicles.

In the waterless districts, the roads are generally straight, but not in thebrutalmathematicalmeaningoftheterm.Theyarestraightonlyasamanwouldwalk from one point to another, or as the dried slime path where a snail hascrossedthesidewalk.

In the coastal lands where there is rain, we have alternative roads. Theprincipal track follows the ridges for the same reason that, in our West, theIndian trails and buffalo paths, and even the highwaysmade by the pioneers,stick to the high ground. In the dry season, themeanderings of the crestlinedroadareshort-circuitedattimesbytrailsleadingacrosslowgroundwhichwouldbeuselessintherainyseason.

In the forest, the roads are evenmore sinuous.Themenwhomade themcould not see very far, so the trail wanders largely and keeps only a generaldirection.

IttakeslittleimaginationtotranslatetheArabonhiswhitestallionandthemen andwomenon donkeys into theCanterbury pilgrims,while the footman,equippedwithalargestaffandponiard,caneasilybemistakenforFriarTuck,LittleJohn,orRobinHood.Thissimilaritynotonlyappliestotheirdress,savethe turban, but also to theirwhiskers, filth, and probably to theirmorals; andtheyarealltalking,alwaystalking.Theyhavenootherrecourse.Fewcanread,therearenobooks,nonewspapers,noradios,todistractthem.Onlythespokenword,andtrulytheyare“wingedwords”withadailyrateoffromfortytosixty

miles,aswelearnedduringthebattlesinTunisiabycheckingtheknownoriginofarumoragainstthetimeweheardit.

Ofcourserumorswerenotfactual,butwereingenerallittlelessgarbledintransmission than some of those received by radio. In the rumors, tanks oftenwere reported as trucks and trucks as tanks, and always the number attainedastronomicalproportions;butthat isnatural.OnceIaskedafarmerinVirginiahowmany

soldiershadpassedhim,andhereplied,“Ahdon’tknowforsure,butAhreckonaboutamillion”—andhecouldreadandwriteandhadaradio.

For a long time I was greatly intrigued by constantly seeing groups ofArabs squatting in the dust or mud—how they avoid piles is a mystery—gossiping.ThenIgottheanswerfromachanceremarkbyasoldierwhoreferredtosuchagroupas“themorningeditionofthedailynews.”

Theagriculturalhabitsof theArabare a strangemixtureofold andnew.Mowingmachines and combines work side by sidewith Ruth andNaomi—manyRuthsandNaomis—cuttingwheatwithasickleandcarefullytyingeachbundle with a wisp of straw. But even when using modern machinery, theinfluenceofthetrailroadisapparentbecausetheArabhasneverlearnedtohitchanimalsabreast;therefore,weseeamowingmachineoraheaderbeingpulled,not by a span or two of horses, but by four horses in tandem, each horsepersonally conducted by an Arab, while one, or, more often, two, handle themachine.TheyactuallyalsohavegleanersasinBiblicaltimes.

Thethreshingisdoneonadirtfloorbyhorseswalkingortrottinginacircleandspreadingmanureastheygo.Sometimestheanimalssimplymoveatliberty.Atother times theypullasmall roller.Aftersomedaysof thisoperation,menarmedwiththree-prongedwoodenforksthrowthechaffintotheairandthewindblows it away. Finally, women, using large tray-like baskets, throw theremaininggrainandmanureintotheairinthefinalstageofwinnowingandgetridofatleasthalfofthedroppingsandsomeofthedirt.

The burial customs too are strange. In many places, usually on hilltops,therearesmall,square,whitebuildingswithadome-shapedroofwhichcontainstheremainsofaholyman.ThesegravesofMaraboutsarenotchurchesnorevenshrines,simplytombs,but it is thecustomtoplant thedeadnearthemwithoutanymarkersorevenmounds.Infact,ourmenhaveunwittinglywalkedonthesegraveswithresultingunpleasantness.

Fromtheair, thegravescanbeeasilyseenclusteredaroundtheMarabouttomb or simply grouped on some low hill.Apparently theArabs are asmuchafraidofwaterindeathastheyareinlife.

OnedayIsawafuneralwhich,foritsruggedsimplicity,wasoutstanding.

Intheleadingcartwereseveralelderlymensittingonthefloor,whilebetweentheirfeetwasthebody,wrappedinwhitecloth,withhalfofitslengthstickingoutofthetailofthecartanddanglinginthewind.Behindthiscameothercartsandonefour-wheeledwagon,somebicyclists,andthenmenandwomenonfoot,perhapsthirtyinall.

The Arab influence on Spain and Latin America is again emphasized assummerweatherapproaches.Thereisaregularepidemicofsombrerosmadeofparticoloredstraw,exactlylikethoseweknowathome,exceptthat,sincetheyarewornsuperimposedontheturbans,theyaremuchlarger.

Ihaveneverhadasatisfactoryexplanationfortheturban—theoneusuallygiventhatitisatropicalheaddressdoesnothold,inviewofthefactthatmanyArabs, particularly in the army, wear turbans which consist simply of a ragwrappedaroundthehead,leavingthewholeshavencrownbare.

Another similarity between the Arab and the Mexican is the uttercallousnesswithwhichbothtreatanimals.NeitheranArabnoraMexicanwouldthinkofunpackingananimalduringaprolongedhalt.Ifthebeastischafedraw,the Arab does not even bother to treat the wound with lard, which is theinvariable panaceawith theMexican.He just lets it bleed and trusts toAllah.Becauseahorseisdeadlameisnoreasonfornotworkinghim.

Alltheanimalsarehead-shyandmanyareblindasaresultofthecheerfulcustomofbeatingthemontheheadwithastick.

Themethodofcastratingsheepandcattleisunspeakablycruel.Ithinkthatthereasonthatthehorseanddonkeyarenotalteredisduetotheirarchitecture,whichforbidstheemploymentoftheArabmethod.

Onecannotbutponderthequestion:WhatiftheArabshadbeenChristians?TomeitseemscertainthatthefatalisticteachingsofMohammedandtheutterdegradationofwomenistheoutstandingcauseforthe

arresteddevelopmentoftheArab.Heisexactlyashewasaroundtheyear700,whilewehavekeptondeveloping.Here,Ithink,isatextforsomeeloquentsermononthevirtuesofChristianity.

CeremonyHeldatHeadquartersIArmoredCorps

June19,1943

ColonelChauvin informedme that hewould like to confer uponme and

twoother officers designatedbyme,whohad servedwithme in theTunisianCampaign, an honorary membership in the 2&me Regiment de Marche deTirailleursAlgeriens, togetherwith the regiment’sFourragereof theLegionofHonor.

InamedGeneralBradleyandGeneralGaffey,1andthenaskedif itwouldbepossibletoconferthesamehonorposthumouslyuponMajorR.N.Jenson,2whichrequestwasgranted.

Theceremonywasasfollows.The1stCompanyofthe1stBattalionofthe2eme Regiment de Marche de Tirailleurs Algeriens, preceded by the FrenchcolorsandtheFrenchband,arrivedatthecourtyardofourHeadquartersat4:35in theafternoon. Inside thecourtwasoneofourplatoonsand thebandof the36thEngineers.

When theFrenchwere inposition,ourplatooncame topresent armsandthebandplayed,“TotheColors,”inhonoroftheFrenchflag.

ColonelChauvinthenaccompaniedGeneralBradley,GeneralGaffey,andmyself toinspect theFrenchcompany.Whenwearrivedinfrontof thecolors,whichwerepostedontheleft, theFrenchbandplayedtheMarseillaise.At thetermination of this, Colonel Chauvin, accompanied by his Chief of Staff,CommandantGerrier, took a position in front of us and in a loud voice said,“LieutenantGeneralG.S.Patton,Jr.,isherebymadeanhonorarymemberoftheDeuxiemeR6giment deMarchedeTirailleursAlgeriens and is presentedwiththeFourragereoftheLegionofHonor.”HerepeatedthisannouncementinfrontofBradleyandGaffey.

1BrigadierGeneral,laterMajorGeneralHughJ.Gaffey,atthattimecommandedthe2dArmoredDivision._

2GeneralPatton’sAidedeCamp,killedinactioninTunisia.

He then stated, “MajorR.N. Jenson,deadon the fieldofhonor,April1,1943, is hereby made an honorary member of the Deuxieme Regiment deMarche de Tiralleurs Algeriens and is presented with the Fourragere of theLegionofHonor.”

Colonel Chauvin then took a position on my right, and the regularAmericanRetreatwasplayed, the flag lowered,and thenourbandplayedfirstthe Marseillaise and then the Star-Spangled Banner. This terminated theceremony.

The French Color Guard consisted of Lieutenant Biard, who carried theflag,andfourtirailleurs.EachofthesefourmenwasdecoratedwiththeMilitaryMedal, which is the highest award a French soldier can receive, it being

restrictedtoenlistedmenandarmycommanders.TheLieutenanthadtheGrandCrossoftheLegionofHonor,andtheCroixdeGuerrewithanumberofpalms.

TheofficersintheFrenchcompanywereallFrenchmen.ThemenwereallBerbersandwereextremelyfine-looking.

ItisalwaysamazingtonotethedifferencebetweenaBerberdressedinhisnormalcostumeofabathrobeandaBerberdressedinuniform.Theirappearancechangesforthebetter.

—————1Goumiers.Commandingthe2dArmoredDivision,partofwhichlandedinMorocco.8Generald’ArméeAugusteNogues,FrenchResidentGeneralofMorocco.2ColonelF.J.deRohan.*Major General Geoffrey Keyes, Deputy Commanding General,Western

TaskForce.3ColonelJ.J.B.Williams,ChiefofArtillery,WesternTaskForce.4brigadierGeneralArthurWilson,ChiefoftheServiceofSupplysupporting

WesternTaskForce.5Colonel H. R. Gay, Chief of Staff, Western Task Force, with General

Pattonthroughoutthewar.6ColonelA.B.Conard,on-GeneralWilson’sstaff.7Colonel, later Brigadier General G. H. Davidson, Assistant Engineer of

WesternTaskForce.8BCaptainR.N.Jenson,AidetoGeneralPatton.9Thishasalreadybeencoveredinthenewspapersandnewsreels;whatIam

sayingissimplymyimpression.Author'snote.10AtthattimeMajorGeneralO.N.BradleycommandedtheIICorps.11CaptainKaySummerby,W.A.C.,ArmyoftheU.S.

GeneralHenriHonoreGiraud.sGeneralGeorgesCatroux,DeputyforGeneraldeGaulleinAfrica.12CommanderoftheMediterraneanBritishnavalforces.13CommanderoftheBritish18thArmyGroup,composedofFirstandEighth

BritishArmies.14^ajor General A. N. Anderson, Commander of the British First Army in

Tunisia.15Air Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder, Air Commander under General

Eisenhower.16WiceAirMarshalSirArthurConyngham.17RepresentativeoftheBritishForeignOfficeinAlgiers.18^PoliticalandcivilaffairsadvisertoGeneralEisenhower.

OPERATION“HUSKY”

The I Armored Corps, which planned the Sicilian Campaign, was whatremainedofWesternTaskForceHeadquartersafterfurnishingmenandofficersfor the newly createdFifth Army.CorpsHeadquarterswas reinforced for theinvasion,anduponlandinginSicily,wasrenamedUnitedStatesSeventhArmyHeadquarters.

The Allied Ground Forces were commanded by General Sir HaroldAlexanderandcomprisedtheBritishEighthArmy,underGeneralMontgomery,andtheUnitedStatesSeventhArmy,underGeneralPatton.TheAmericanandBritishnavalforceswerecommandedbyAdmiralSirAndrewCunningham,andtheairforcesbyAirChiefMarshalSirArthurTedder.

The armieswere landed on July 10, 1943,1with theBritishEighthArmytakingthesoutheastsideoftheislandandtheAmericanSeventh,thesouthwest.

Troopsof the7th InfantryRegiment,3dDivision,ColonelH.B.Shermancommanding,enteredMessinaonthenightofAugust16.Onthemorningoftheseventeenth,GeneralPattonenteredthecity,andSicilyfell.Thecampaignhadlastedthirty-eightdays.

P.D.H.

1GeneralPattonwaslyinginhisbunkthenightbeforetheSicilianlandingwhenheheardtwo

doughboystalkingoutsidehiswindow.“Well,”saidone,“whenwegoashoreinthemorning,Ireckonwe’llhearthatthemarineshavelanded.”

TheInvasionofSicily

July11,1943

GeneralGay,CaptainStiller,andI,andsomesoldierslefttheMonroviaintheAdmiral’sbargeat0900andreachedthebeachatGelaat0930.

Dukw

Standing on the beach, I noticed two Dukws,1 destroyed by personnelmines,andaboutsevensmalllandingcraftbeached.WhileIwasmakingtheseobservations,theenemyopenedfirewithwhatwasprobablyan88mm.ora105mm.gun.Theshellshit thewaterabout thirtyyardsfromthebeach,butcouldnotgetintothebeachonaccountofthedefiladeaffordedbythetown.

After our scout car was de-waterproofed, I intended to go to theHeadquarters of the 1stDivision, about threemiles to the southeast along thecoastroad.AswegotintoGela,wenoticedaflagontheleftanddecidedtocallon ColonelW.O. Darby, commanding the Rangers. This was very fortunate,because, had we proceeded down the road, we should have run into sevenGermantanks,whichatthatmomentwereadvancingalongittowardthetown.

1Amphibioustwo-and-a-half-tontrucks.

AswearrivedattheRangersCommandPost,ColonelDarbyandthetownofGelawerebeingattackedfromthenortheastbyquiteanumberofGermansandItalians.DarbyhadabatteryofcapturedGerman77’s,“K”Companyofthe3d Battalion of the 26th Infantry, two Ranger battalions, a company of 4.2chemicalmortars,andabattalionofthe39thEngineers.

Hewascutofffromthe1stDivisiononhisrightbytheseventanks,whichnowclosedintoonethousandyardsoftherightsideofthetown.

WewentuptoanObservationPost,aboutahundredyardsbehindthefrontline, where we could plainly see the enemymoving across the field, perhapseighthundredyardsaway.

Darby had the roads patrolled by groups of three halftracks. Thesehalftracks,intended,notforcombat,buttocarryengineers’equipment,workedverywell,greatlyannoyingtheItalians,whoapparentlyhadnomobileartillerywiththem.

The Italian advance seemed to stick at about 1150, andwewent back toDarby’sHeadquarterstofindoutwhatwastakingplaceontheright,whichwecouldseefromthetownofGela.

Aboutthetimewegotthere,twoHurricaneBombersdroppedbombsinthetown.ThenGermanartillery,apparently88mm.all-purposeguns,openedfire.Theyhitthebuildingwewereintwice,andalsomadeaholeintheroofofthebuilding across the street, but no one was hurt except softie civilians. I haveneverheardsomuchscreaming.

About that time an officer from the 3dDivision came inwith ten tanks,having made the trip by the shore road from Licata1 to Gela. Two tanks of

CombatCommand“B”alsoarrived.12ItoldGaffeytoclosethegapbetweenGelaandthe1stDivisionandtosend

a company of tanks to helpDarby. Thiswas done.Darby counter-attacked atonce to his left and took five hundred prisoners.We also destroyed the seventankseastofGela.

AfterIgotthesituationofthe3dDivisionfromtheofficerwhohadmadethetrip,GeneralRoosevelt3arrivedandItalkedtohimaboutthefailureofthe1stDivisiontocarryitsobjectivelastnight.Thechiefreason,asfarasIcansee,isthatthedivisionattackedwithoutanti-tankgunsandwithoutmovinguptheirartillery.Whentheywerecounter-attackedbytheGermantanks, theydidverywellandaccountedforquiteafewofthem.

Thebagofenemytanksforthedayis,Ithink,aboutfourteen.Ihaveseeneleven.

IthendecidedtogodownandseeGeneralAllen4andGeneralGaffey.Whileweweredrivingdowntheroad,wemetAllen

coming in and halted on a hill. This was about 1530. While we were there,fourteenGermanbomberscameoverandwereattackedbytheanti-aircraft.Wegotofftheroad,butasitwasparalleltothelineofflightoftheenemyairplanes,quiteanumberoffragmentsfromtheanti-aircrafthitalongtheroad.Onepiecestruck within, I should think, five to ten yards of General Gay and myself.Duringthisattack,wesawtwobombersandoneotherplaneshotdown.

After this,wemounted our cars and drove to theHeadquarters of the 2dArmoredDivision.Whilewewerethere,aGermanbatterykeptshellingus,butnotveryaccurately,orelsethehillbehindwastoohightoclear,asnearlyallofthe shots were overs.We arranged for Allen and Gaffey to take Ponte OlivoAirfieldinthemorning.

WethendrovebacktoGelawithoutincidentexceptthatIthinkitisquiteunusualforanArmyCommanderandhisChiefofStafftotravelsomesixmilesonaroadparalleltothefrontsoftwoarmiesandaboutequallydistantfromthetwo.

On the way back to Gela, I happened to be looking out to sea. From aLiberty freightship,which theGermanshadbombedaboutahalf-hourearlier,smokewas issuing. Before our eyes a tremendous explosion threwwhite andblackcloudsseveral thousandfeet into theair.Theshipwas literallyblownintwo,butatthepresentwriting,somesixhourslater,therearhalfisstillafloat.Most, if not all, of the army personnel on board, who numbered only onehundredandfifteen,weresaved.

WhilewewereonthebeachatGela,waitingforaboattotakeusouttothe

Monrovia,IsawthemoststupidthingIhaveeverseensoldiersdo.Therewereaboutthreehundred500-poundbombsandseventonsof20mm.high-explosiveshell piled on the sand, and, in between the bombs andboxes of ammunition,thesesoldierswerediggingfoxholes.ItoldthemthatiftheywantedtosavetheGraves Registration burials that was a fine thing to do, but otherwise they’dbetterdigsomewhereelse.

About the time we got through explaining this to them, two HurricaneBomberscameoverandstrafedthebeach,andallthesoldiersjumpedrightbackintothesame

holes they had dug. I continued to walk up and down and soon shamedthemintogettingup.

WegotbacktotheMonroviaat1900,completelywet.ThisisthefirstdayinthiscampaignthatIthinkIearnedmypay.

July18,1943

Since the initial successful assault on the beaches before daylight on thetenth, we have continued to push along several days ahead of our assumedschedule.Thishasbeenduetothefactthathavingoncegottheenemystarted,wehavenotlethimstop,buthave,sotospeak,keptonhisheels.

It is also due to the fact that the Italians andGermans spent tremendouseffortintime,labor,andmoney,buildingdefensivepositions.Iamsurethat,justasinthecaseoftheWallsofTroyandtheRomanwallsacrossEurope,thefactthat they trusted to defensive positions reduced their power to fight.Had theyspentone-thirdasmucheffortinfightingastheydidinbuilding,wenevercouldhavetakenthepositions.

On the other hand, the Italian troops, most of whom are from NorthernItaly,havefoughtverydesperately.TheGermantroopshavenotfoughtaswellas thosewedestroyed inTunisia.This isparticularly trueof their tanks.Theyhaveshowngallantry,butbadjudgment.

Thetallyofprisoners,guns,etc.,speakmoreforcefullythanwordsastothesuccess of the operation. While comparisons are odious, I believe that up toyesterdaytheEighthArmyhadnottakenoverfivethousandprisoners.

The enemy has been booby-trapping his dead, firing on us from the rearafterwehavepassedthroughhim,andusingdum-dumbullets.Thishascausedussomecasualties,buthascausedhimagreatdealmore.

On the field southofBiscariAirport,wherewehadquitea fight, I couldsmelldeadenemywhiledrivingforatleastsixmilesalongtheroad.

TheGermanshave,onseveraloccasions,putminesinbehindtheItalians,sothatwhentheItaliansattempttorun,theygetblownup.ThisnaturallydoesnotmaketheItalianslovetheGermans.

Therehavebeenseveralverygallant instances.Onthe tenth,someItaliantanksenteredthetownofGela,

which was defended by Colonel Darby and two battalions of Rangers.Darbypersonally engagedoneof the tanks at fiftyyardswith a lightmachinegun from his peep.When he found that these bulletswould not penetrate, hehurrieddowntothebeach,underfireofthreetanks,gotholdofa37mm.gunjustunloaded,splittheboxofammunitionwithanaxe,hurriedbackupthehill,andwentintopositionwithhisgunlessthanahundredyardsinfrontofatankcomingdownonhim.Thefirstroundfailedtostopthetank,buttheseconddidstop it. However, the enemy crew did not get out until Darby put a thermitegrenadeontopofthetankandroastedthemout.

The other day this same officerwas offered the command of a regimentwithanincreaseofonegradeinrank,butherefusedtotakeitbecausehewishedto stay with themen he had trained. On the same day, GeneralWedemeyer1requested to be reduced to a Colonel so that he could take command of aregiment.Iconsiderthesetwoactsoutstanding.

Duringthelanding,anartillerylieutenantflewhisPiperCuboffalandingboatwitharunofaboutfiftyfeetofchickenwire.Duringtherestoftheday,hecircled the townundercontinuous fire.Hisplanewashit several times,buthekepttheCommandingGeneralofthe3dDivisioninformedofthesituation.

AnavalofficerbringinginanLCT175-footlandingcraft,foundthewatertoo shallow togethisbow in, sohebroached it to thebeachandengaged theenemymachinegunswithhis two20mm. cannonand silenced them, therebypermittingthetroopstogetashore.

The naval gunfire support—that is, naval fire put on the beaches fromvessels at sea—has been outstanding.We have even called for this support atnightandgotitonthetargetonthethirdsalvo.

ThepeopleofthiscountryarethemostdestituteandGod-forgottenpeopleIhaveeverseen.Oneday,whenIwasinthetownandtheenemynearlytookit,someshellsandbombskilledafewcivilians,andeveryoneinthetownscreamedlikecoyotesforabouttwentyminutes.

Theanimalsaremuchbettercaredforandfatter,andalsolarger, thantheanimalsinAfrica;otherwise,everythinghereismuchworsethaninAfrica.

1BrigadierGeneralAlbertC.Wedemeyer.

Thecartsareverypeculiar.Theyare in theformofaboxabout fourfeetsquarewiththingsthatlooklikebedpostsatthecomersandalongthesides.Thepanelsbetweenthesebedpostsarepaintedwithpictures.Underthecartthereisascrollwork built up between the axle and the bottom of the box, just like theporchesofhousesbuiltaround1880.

Thecollarofthecartanimalhasaspikeprojectingupwardsabouttwofeet,andmanyofthehorseswearplumesonthecrownpieceofthebridle.

Duringthefirst twoor threedays,whenwewerehavingfightingclosetothetowns,theinhabitantswere,tosaytheleast,notfriendly;butsincewehavedemonstrated that we can destroy either the Germans or Italians, they havebecomequiteAmericanizedandspendtheirtimeaskingforcigarettes.

TheCaptureofPalermo

July23,1943

On the afternoon of the twenty-first, we secured a position northeast ofCastelvetranofromwhichtolaunchthe2dArmoredDivision,1whichheretoforehadbeenheldbacknearthemiddleoftheislandsothattheenemycouldnottellwhichwayitwasgoing.

The troopsmoved into position, beginning at 4 P.M., andwere all set bydark.Inthemorningtheystartedtheirrelentlessadvance.

Thefirstactwastobreakthroughtheenemyonhisimmediatefront.Thiswasdonebythe41stInfantry,2supportedbyabattalionofmediumtanksfromthe66th,3Thisstartedtheenemyrollingback.Fromthenon,itwasaquestionofattacking him with converging tanks whenever he tried to stop us, which heattemptedonthreeoccasions.

1Commanding,MajorGeneralHughJ.Gaffey.2CommandingOfficer,Colonel,laterBrigadierGeneral

S.R.Hinds.3CommandingOfficer,Colonel,laterBrigadierGeneral

J.H.Collier.

Inonecasea75mm.assaulthowitzerinahalftrackengagedaGerman105atfivehundredyardsanddestroyedhim.Thisactwasasluckyasitwasheroic.

ThelaststandwasmadeinthemountainssouthwestofPalermo,whichwasamostdifficultnuttocrack,butwasfinallydonewithartilleryfireandtanks.

We met some of the most ingenious tank traps I have ever seen. TheGermanswoulddig ahole about eighteen feet longand ten feetdeephalfwayacrosstherightsideoftheroadandcoveritwithchickenwireanddusttomakeitlookliketheroad.Then,aboutthirtyfeetbeyond,onthelefthandsideoftheroad theywouldmakeasimilarpit. In frontofeachpit theywouldputawireentanglementwith thehope that our tankswoulddisregard thewire and crashintotheholes.Fortunatelywedidnotdoso.Inotherplacestheydugtrapsabouttwenty feet wide and fifteen feet deep for distances of several miles, but bystickingtotheroadsandblastingourwaythrough,wehadnotroublewiththem.

Idroveupthroughthecolumnandreceivedaverywarmreceptionfromthe2dArmored,allofwhomseemedtoknowme,andallofwhomfirstsalutedandthenwaved.

Aswenearedthecity,itwasdark,soIpickedupColonelR.F.Perry,ChiefofStaff of the division, to act as a guide.He statedhe believed the townhadfallen,andwethereforedecidedtogoinandsee.

Aswe approached, the hills on each side were burning.We then starteddown a long road cut out of the side of a cliffwhichwent through an almostcontinuous village. The street was full of people shouting, “Down withMussolini!”and“LongLiveAmerica!”

Whenwe got into the town, the same thingwent on. Thosewho arrivedbefore dark, among themGeneral Keyes,1 had flowers thrown on the road infrontof them, and lemons andwatermelonsgiven them in suchprofusion thattheyalmostbecamelethalweapons.

TheGovernor had left, butwe captured the twoGenerals, both ofwhomsaid that theywere glad to be captured because the Sicilianswere not humanbeings,butanimals.Thebaginprisonersforthedaymusthavebeenclosetotenthousand.Onthemorningofthetwenty-third,whenIwasinspectingtheharbor,Ipassedagroupofprisoners,allofwhomstoodup,saluted,andthencheered.

1MajorGeneralGeoffreyKeyeswasDeputyCommandingGeneralofSeventhArmy

andalsoCommandingGeneralofaProvisionalCorpsinSicily.

Theharborisnottoobadlydamaged,butthedestructionaroundthelipisreallyappalling.Forabouttwoblocksindepthpracticallyeveryhouseisapileofrocks.Someships,smallfishingsteamers,wereapparentlyblowncompletelyoutof thewaterand landedon thedock;at least I canaccount for theirbeing

there innootherway.Agoodmanyof the small craft in theharborare sunk,severalofthembeingcutcompletelyintwo.

We took over the so-called Royal Palace for a Headquarters and had itcleanedbyprisonersforthefirsttimesincetheGreekOccupation.Wearealsohaving theprisoners remove the rubbish from thestreetsandplug theholes inthedock.

TheItaliansherearemuchbetter-lookingthantheoneswetookintherestofSicily,beingbiggerandolder.

The Cardinal’s Vicar came to call on me, and I assured him that I wasamazedat thestupidityandgallantryof the ItalianArmy:stupid,because theywere fighting for a lost cause, andgallant, because theywere Italians. I askedhim to tell them that and to spread the rumor. I further said that we haddemonstratedourabilitytodestroythem,andthatiftheyfailedtotakethehintandsurrender,wewouldcertainlydoso.Asamatteroffact,Icalledofftheairandnavalbombardmentwehadarranged,becauseIfeltenoughpeoplehadbeenkilled,andfeltthatwiththedriveofthe2dArmoredDivisionwecouldtaketheplacewithoutinflictingunproductivelossesontheenemy.

I believe that this operation will go down in history, certainly atLeavenworth,5asaclassicexampleoftheproperuseofarmor,andIalsobelievethat historical research will reveal that General Keyes’ Corps moved fasteragainst heavier resistance and over worse roads than did the Germans duringtheirfamousBlitz.

Wedid notwaste any time, however, and started thismorning, capturingthenorthroadandalsomovingartillerytosupportthefinaleffortoftheIICorpswhichwillbegininafewdays.

HeadquartersSeventhArmy

APO758U.S.ARMY

August1,1943GENERALORDER

NUMBER10

TOBEREADTOTROOPS

SoldiersoftheSeventhArmyandXIIAirSupportCommand:Landedandsupportedbythenavyandairforce,youhave,during

twenty-one days of ceaseless battle and unremitting toil, killed andcaptured more than 87,000 enemy soldiers, you have captured ordestroyed361cannon,172,tanks,

928 trucks, and 190 airplanes—you are magnificent soldiers!General Eisenhower, the Commander-in-Chief, and GeneralAlexander, theArmyGroupCommander, have both expressed prideandsatisfactioninyourefforts.

NowinconjunctionwiththeBritishEighthArmyyouareclosinginforthekill.Yourrelentlessoffensivewillcontinuetobeirresistible.Theendiscertainandisverynear.Messinaisournextstop!

G.S.PATTON,JR.,Lieut.General,U.S.Army,

DISTRIBUTION:“D”Commanding

HEADQUARTERSSEVENTHARMY

APO758U.S.ARMY

August22,1943GENERALORDER

NUMBER18

SoldiersoftheSeventhArmy:Bornatsea,baptized inblood,andcrownedwithvictory, in the

courseofthirty-eightdaysofincessant battle andunceasing labor, youhave added a glorious

chaptertothehistoryofwar.Pittedagainst thebest theGermansandItalianscouldoffer,you

have been unfailingly successful. The rapidity of your dash, whichculminated in the capture of Palermo, was equalled by the doggedtenacitywithwhichyoustormedTroinaandcapturedMessina.

EverymanintheArmydeservesequalcredit.Theenduringvalorof theInfantryandthe impetuousferocityof the tankswerematchedbythetirelessclamorofourdestroyingguns.

The Engineers performed prodigies in the construction andmaintenance of impossible roads over impassable country. TheServicesofMaintenanceandSupplyperformedamiracle.TheSignalCorps laid over 10,000 miles of wire, and the Medical Departmentevacuatedandcaredforoursickandwounded.

On all occasions the Navy has given generous and gallantsupport.Throughouttheoperation,ourAirhaskepttheskyclearandtirelesslysupportedtheoperationofthegroundtroops.

As a result of this combined effort, youhavekilledor captured113,350 enemy troops. You have destroyed 265 of his tanks, 2324vehicles,and1162largeguns,and,inaddition,havecollectedamassofmilitarybootyrunningintohundredsoftons.

Butyourvictoryhasasignificanceaboveandbeyonditsphysicalaspect—youhavedestroyedtheprestigeoftheenemy.

The President of the United States, the Secretary of War, theChief of Staff, General Eisenhower, General Alexander, GeneralMontgomery,haveallcongratulatedyou.

Yourfameshallneverdie.G.S.PATTON,JR.,

Lieut.General,U.S.Army,Commanding.

SidelightsontheSicilianCampaign

October,1943

Nowthatsufficienttimehaselapsed,itispermissibleformetogiveyouageneral idea of the lighter side of the Sicilian Campaign and subsequentincidents.

Thefirst intimationIhadthatwewereinthetransportareawaswhenthedavitforalandingboatgavewayandtheboatcrashedintomyporthole.Foramomentwethoughtthatabombhadhit.Asweweresleepinginfullpack,wewentondeck.Thewholecoastlineasfaraswecouldseewasamassofflames.Insomeplacestheylookedlikeburningmountains;inotherplaces,simplylikea

lineoffire.Atintervalsalongtheflamingshore,searchlightswouldsuddenlyflareand

sweepthewater.Thiswasveryinteresting,because,whilethelightsmadeitsobrightondeckthatwecouldreadapaper,theenemywasapparentlyunabletosee us from the land. I think this had something to dowith refraction and thehazecausedbythefires.

Wheneveroneofthesesearchlightsflickeredon,innumerabletracerbulletsfromourdestroyers andpatrol boats hurried toward it likebees returning to ahive.Thatsearchlightimmediatelywentout.

The fires along the shore, we discovered, were caused by our highexplosivesignitingthewheatfields.FortunatelyfortheSicilians, thewheathadbeenharvested,butthestubblewasstillthereandthatiswhatburned.

ThesouthernSicilianis,ifpossible,thedirtiestofallSicilians.Therewereactuallycasesinwhichtheylivedwithcorpsesintheirhousesforseveraldaysbecausetheyweretoolazytoremovethem.Yet,whenweusedpostholediggersto bury them, they were very angry and said the dead should be buriedhorizontally and not vertically. We gave them the opportunity of horizontalburialby“permitting”thecivilianstodigthegraves.

In the courtyard back of the house I occupied, I once counted eightchildren,elevengoats, threedogs,aflockofchickens,andahorse,allpickingupfilthyscraps

fromthepavement.Noneofthemseemedtodie.Isupposepeoplethathavebeenraisedontomatosaucemadeafter theSicilianmannerareimmune.Theirmethod of preparing this sauce is to collect tomatoes,many of themoverripe,and squeeze them outwith their hands onto old sheets, or pieces of paper, ordoors,oranythingelse theycanfind.They leave thisbloody-lookingmess forseveral days, and then put it on trays, usually lying on the sidewalks, to dry.Since the streets are never cleaned, there is plenty of germ-laden dust tomixwiththesauce.Thisisthethingwithwhichtheyeattheirmacaroni.

The Italians, under German tutelage, were extremely clever in theconstructionofpillboxes. In fact, inmanycases theywere tooclever,becausetheycamouflagedthemwithhayorbushesandourfirstphosphorousshellssetthemonfire.

Inothercasestheywenttothetroubleofbuildingstuccohousesoutsideofthepillboxes.Inorder toput the latter intoaction, theysimplygavethewallakick and there was the pillbox. In spite of the tremendous number of thesethings,wehadpracticallynotroubleindestroyingthem.Onebattalionalonegotthirty-nineinoneday.

Owing to the lack of water and other causes, we decided to drink

champagne while at Gela and secured a case, which would seem ample, butowingtothelargenumberofvisitingfiremen,itdisappearedinabouttwodays.Itwasthennecessarytosecuremorechampagne.Inordertodothis,thedealer,whowasabootlegger,hadtobegotoutofjailthroughtheinterpositionoftheBishop.Afterhewasremovedfromjaillongenoughtosellusmorechampagne,heobliginglyreturnedtohiscell.

AgrigentowasoneoftheearliestGreekcities,aslateritwastobeoneoftheearliestCarthaginiancities.AtAgrigentotherearethreeverybeautifulGreektemples—one toJuno,one toConcordia,andone toHercules.There isalsoasacred way connecting these temples, bordered on each side by rock-hewntombs,nowallpilfered.

TheMayorofthetown,whowasbywayofbeinganarcheologist,tookmetolookat these temples.Whenwecameto thetempleofHercules,whichwasthebiggestbutintheworststateofrepair,Iaskedhimhaditbeendestroyedbyanearthquake.Hesaid,“No,General,itwasanunfortunateincidentoftheotherwar.” When I asked which was the other war, he said that this temple wasdestroyedintheSecondPunicWar.1

TheemergenceoftheCarthaginiansatAgrigento,in470B.C.isofinterestasshowingthatglobalwarisnotnew.AtthattimeCarthageowedasortoflip-service alliance, or in fact vassalage, toXerxes, King ofKings. Thiswas thetimewhenXerxeswas planning to cross theHellespont and attackGreece. InordertopreventtheGreeksfromSyracuseandthecitiesintheheelofItalyfromsendingreinforcementstothemothercountry,XerxesorderedtheCarthaginianstolandinSicilyandintheheelofItalyforthepurposeofkeepingthecolonialGreeksathome.

Whenonethinksofthestaffworkandprevisionnecessarytoarrangesuchan operation, when it probably took the courier a year to get from Sardis toCarthage, we can give ourselves, with our instantaneous means ofcommunication, less credit for good planning. On the other hand, theCarthaginian Army, which landed at Agrigento and points west, and whichnumberedsomethreehundredthousandmen,tookfiveyearstogettoSyracuse,andhavinggottheresufferedcompletedefeatandtotalannihilation.

Ata small road junctioncalledSegesta,HughGaffeyand I saw themostbeautiful Greek temple and theatre that I have yet encountered. With theexceptionofthefactthattheroofofthistemplenolongerexists,itisinaperfectstate of preservation and has been very little repaired. Since theGreeksweredriven from this part of Sicily in 470 B.C.—that is, some twenty-five hundredyearsago—thetemplemusthavebeenbuiltatanearlierdate.

There isone ratherpeculiar thingabout this temple.Thecolumnsarenot

monolithic,orcomposedof twoor threeblocks,as isusually thecase,butarebuilt up of a i number of small stones. It is further noteworthy that, after thelapse of two and one-half millenniums, you cannot get a sharp knife edgebetweenthejointsandthestones.

WhenIwasabouteightyearsold,aministernamedMr.BlisstoldmethatwhenhevisitedtheParthenonhehadputhissilkhatononeendofthesteps,andhavinggonetotheotherendhadsightedacrossandcouldnotseethetopofhissilkhat, indicating that, inorder to secureagreeable lines, the straight linesofthe Greek temples were actually curves. Gaffey and I tried the same thing atSegestawithtwosteelhelmets,oneontopoftheother,andwereunabletoseethemoverthecurveofthesteps.

1218-201B.C.

Thetheatre,capableofseatingperhapstwothousandpeople,isontopofaveryhighhill,sothatinadditiontotheviewoftheactors,thespectatorsalsohadeverbeforethemamagnificentseascape.Apparently,theGreekswhobuiltthistheatrehadlivedinavillagebackofit,butowingtotheinevitablecannibalismof all ancient things by succeedinggenerations, the townno longer exists andcanbetracedonlybythefactthatnearlyallthestoneslyingoverthehillshowtracesofhavingbeenworked.Speakingofcannibalism,IreadthatagreatdealofPisaisconstructedwithstonetakenfromCarthage.

ThecityandharborofSyracusearetomeofparticularinterestbecausethisplaceprobablyhasbeenthesceneofmoreamphibiousoperationsthananyotherharbor in theworld.Whenlookingover itswaterIcouldalmostseetheGreektriremes,theRomangalleys,theVandals,theArabs,theCrusaders,theFrench,theEnglish,andtheAmericans,who,tomentiononlyafew,havesuccessivelystormed,orattemptedtostorm,thatharbor.

WhenwefirstcametoSicily—andthesamething is trueofSardiniaandCorsica—we were surprised at the large number of small towers dotting thecoastline.Thesetowerswereapparentlybuiltbetween1500and1600undertheinfluence ofGenoa. The system consisted of aman picking out for himself agoodspotforatowerandbuildingit.Hewouldthengotothegovernmentandoffertogarrisonthetower,usuallywithhimselfandfamily,ifhewerepaid.Thepay was not excessive—in our money, about fifty dollars a year. Apparentlythat,andnottheArabpirates,istheoriginofthetowers.

Another very striking characteristic, particularly of Sicily, is the fact that

nearlyall the townscling like limpets to the topsof theprecipitouspeaks.OncloserexaminationyouwillfindthatthehighestbuildingonthesepeaksistheruinofaNormancastle.

TheNormans captured Sicily between 900 and 970, and then apparentlyeachNormangentlemanbuilthimselfatower—forthatiswhatmostofthemare—on the highest peak he could find. In the course of time, as his richesincreased,hesometimesaddedaninnerandthenanouterbailey,butthisisnotthegeneral rule.The town thengrew from thedescendantsofhis soldiersandfromthelocalpeoplewhocameclosetothecastleinordertosecureprotection.

The PalaisRoyal at Palmero (“The Paleopolis” of Polybius) had such anorigin.Itssitewasavolcanicoutcropping,surroundedbytwostreamsonwhichtheArabs erected a castle called a “ksar.”This outcropping,muchmanicured,stillexistsandtheoriginalksar,builtbytheArabsaroundA.D.700,stillformspart of the central keep of the palace.Unfortunately the palace also has beenovermanicured, and only in the basements and inner walls can one see theoriginalbuilding.

InthebasementoftheoldkeepwefoundtheNormantreasury.Itconsistedoftwostoneroomsbasedonbedrock,oneroomcompletelywithintheother.Inorder toget into the inner room, itwasnecessary toopen twodoors andpassthroughashortvestibule.Thesedoorswereconstructedsothatwhentheouterdoorwas opened giving entrance to the hallway, the inner automatically shut.Whentheinnerdoorwasopened,theouterdoorwasshut.Inside,thereisapitabouttenfeetdeepandtwentyfeetsquarewithamonolithicblockinthebottom.Onthisblockwaspiledthelargesttreasure,suchasvases,dishes,andthelike.

In the four corners of the room are hugewine jars,which are suspendedfrom the ceiling so that a sentinel going down through a door could see thatnobodyhadcutintothebottomofthem.Itwasinthesewinejarsthatthemoneywaskept.

Whenwewerestorming these townsordrivingpast them, Icouldalmostpictureinmymind’seyethesmallgroupsofknightsandmen-at-armswho,byvirtueofoccupyingthesestrongpoints,ruledtheworldastheyknewit,andhowpitifullyweak in numbers and armor theywere in comparisonwith our guns,tanks,andinfantry,whichrolledbytheminendlessstreams.

However, therewere some thingswhich the ancient knights and their ill-smelling companionswouldhaveunderstood andhave laughed at— thatwasourImprovisedmulecavalry.Inordertomoveovertheterrificcountrythroughwhich we had to fight, we had to improvise mounted units. These men rodewhatever they could find — mules, burros, and occasionally bullocks. Thesaddleswereeitheroflocalconstruction,capturedItalianequipment,orsimply

mattresses.Once Imet a young soldier with a captured Italian saddlewhich he had

casuallyplacedonthehorse’sneckinfrontofthewithers.WhenIstoppedhimtoquestionhisideasinsoplacingthesaddle,thehorseloweredhisneckandthesoldier rolledoff.Hesaid thathe thought thatwas theplace toputa saddle. Isupposethattheonlytimehehadeverbeenonaquadrupedwasatacircuswhenherodeonanelephant’shead.

Nevertheless, this improvised horse cavalrywas a tremendous advantage.Infact,wecouldnothavewonthewarwithoutit.Weallregrettedthatwedidnot have a complete American cavalry division with pack artillery. Had wepossessedsuchaunit,notaGermanwouldhaveescaped.

Thehome lifeof thenatives isverypeculiar.Apparently theyhaveneverdecided tocook inanyspecialplace, so thatallcooking isdone in thestreets.Thecookingequipmenthasimprovedconsiderablysincewecame,astheynowuseourdiscardedfive-gallonoilcans.Notonlydotheycookinthestreet,butsitinthestreet,and,whatismoredistressing,singinthestreetsatallhoursofthedayandnight.Owingtothefactthattheyliveprimarilyongarlic,whichissoldbyoldmencarryinggarlandsofgarlicovertheirshoulders,thesingingnotonlyimpressestheear,butalsothenose.

TheSiciliantakesmuchbettercareofhisanimalsthandoestheArab,andhe practically never uses a bit, all the horses andmules being controlled by ahackamore.Also the Sicilian animals, being house-raised, are themost docilecreatures I haveever seen.This also applies to themules.Toencourage theseanimalstopullormoveforward,theSicilianemitsanoisebetweenabelchandagroan.Hehasnoverbalmeansofcheckingthehorsebecause,wheneverhestopsgroaningatit,thehorseautomaticallyhalts.

OneveryfunnythinghappenedinconnectionwiththeMoroccantroops.ASiciliancametomeandsaidhehadacomplaint tomakeabouttheconductoftheMoroccans,orGoums,astheyarecalled.HesaidthathewellknewthatallGoumswerethieves,alsothattheyweremurderers,andsometimesindulgedinrape—thesethingshecouldunderstandandmakeallowancesfor,butwhen

they came to his house, killed his rabbits, and then skinned them in theparlor,itwasgoingtoofar

Since the greater portion of the Sicilian life is spent in sitting, it wouldnaturally seem that after thousandsofyearshewouldhave thoughtofmakingcomfortableseats,butno,hesitsonrocks,mud,boxes,oranythingbutchairs.However, they are a very cheerful people and seemingly contentedwith theirfilth, and it would be a mistake in my opinion to try to raise them to ourstandards,whichtheywouldneitherappreciatenorenjoy.

Corsica looks exactly as if you had taken the worst part of the RockyMountainsandsubmergeditintheocean.Itisnothingbutasuccessionofhigh,absolutelybarrenhilltops,composedofpolishedgraniteinthemajorityofcases.However, ithas twostrikingcharacteristics; it iswhollyFrench,and ithasnot

sufferedfromtheair.Itisadistinctshocktoarriveinacitywhichhasnotbeenblownup.Ajaccioisjustasitwas.

Naples, on the other hand, has been very badly raided, but, owing to theabsolutelymarvelousperformanceofourpeople, thedocksare infairworkingorder.

Pompeiicomesuptothehighestidealsofwhataruinshouldbe.Italsogivesyouthehighestideaofthetypeofmenwhobuiltit.Itisveryunfortunatethatduringourattacksitbecamenecessarytobombtheruins.Luckily,noverygreatdamagewasdone.

‘‘TheFlightintoEgypt”

SinceithasbeenannouncedovertheradioandalsointhepressthatIhavebeentoCairo,Icannowwriteaboutit.

Colonel Codman,6 myself, and eight other members of the Staff of theSeventhArmy took off from Palermo at 0715December 12 and flew first toBenghazi,wherewestoppedtore-gasandtolunch.

Theairfieldisaboutfifteenmilesfromthetownandiscoveredwithsmallbombandshellfragments,butotherwiseisinfinecondition.Thecountry,whiledevoidof

landmarksofanysortandpracticallywithoutvegetationsothatitrequiresnavigationalmethods, isneverthelessquite rolling, and Ibelieve thereare fewplaceswhereatadistanceoffifteenhundredyardstroopswouldnotbeinvisible.Itoccurredtomethathaditbeenpossibletousethem,observationballoons,oreven the old battery commanders’ ladders, would have been very useful. Thesurface isa sortofhard-bakedmudofabrownishcolorand ismucheasier totraverse than is the sand around Indio.1 However, after several vehicles havegoneonanyonetrack,thesurfacebreaksup.Thisaccountsforthefactthatwewere informed that in desert movement vehicles should not follow in trace.However, in Indio, we found that it wasmuch better to have them follow intrace. Certainly the country seems to me very much easier to operate in,particularlywitharmor,thanisourowndesert.

From Benghazi we flew straight across the desert to Tobruk, which is averysmallandbadlybanged-uptownwithanartificialharborfullofwrecks.

FromTobrukwe flewalong the railway toElAlamein,and,althoughwe

cameclosetotheground,wecouldseeveryfewwreckedvehiclesorguns,andpracticallynowire.

FromElAlameinwe flew along the coast toAlexandria and then up theNileDelta toCairo.There isaverystrikingdemarcationbetween thegreenoftheNileValleyandthebrownofthedesert.Iwasinformedthat,exceptfortheDelta,whichisaboutonehundredandfiftymileswide;therestofEgyptislessthanthirtymileswideandsometwenty-fivehundredmileslong.

Itwasquiteathrill,asweapproachedCairo,toseethepyramids.Weweremet at the airfield by General Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson’s Aide de Camp,MajorH.ChapmanWalker.TheAidetookCodmanandmyselftotheGeneral’shouse,wherewestayedduringourentirevisit.TheGeneralhimselfwasabsentwhenwearrived,buthis formerchiefof staffandseveralofficers livedat thehouse,which,whileveryunpretentious,isquitecomfortable.Itissituatedabouta twenty minutes’ drive south of the city in a section called Madi. MajorChapman Walker had arranged a very complete program, which, afterinspection,weapproved.

1Indio, California, United States Desert TrainingCenter.

December13,1943

Codman, myself, and Major Chapman Walker, accompanied by LadyRanforly,secretarytoGeneralWilson,wentonashoppingtripinthemorning.

Cairo is really a disgusting place. It looks, and the people act, exactly astheydidinNewYorkin1928.Bothsidesofthestreetaresolidwithautomobilesandthereareotherautomobilesparkedinthemiddleofthestreets.Allthestoresare running full blast and seem to have plenty of goods to sell, but at terrificprices.Forexample,Ipricedapairofsilkstockingswhichcostfourpounds.

TheEgyptian peasant,who abounds in large numbers, is distinctly lowerthantheSicilian,whomIhadpreviouslyconsideredatthebottomofthehumancurve.When theAssuanDamwasconstructed, itgaveacertain typeof fresh-watersnailachancetodevelopinlargenumbers.Thissnailisthehostforasortofhookworm,which,sincetheconstructionofthedam,hasbecomeamenace.Asaresultofthishookworm,theEgyptianpeasantconstantlysuffersfromthebellyache and has his sexual vigor reduced. In order to relieve his pain andrestorehisvigor,hehas taken tosmokinghashish.Thishas thedesiredresults

for a few months and then becomes impotent, and the peasant even moresusceptibletotheattackofthehookworm,sothatheisinaviciouscircle.Priortothewar,thetrafficinhashishwaswellundercontrol,withtheresultthatthenativeswerequitediscontented;butsincethewartheyhavebeenabletogetallthehashish theywant and arenowveryhappy.Theyareunspeakablydirty intheirhabitsandintheirdress.Onthefresh-watercanalIsawamandefecatinginthewater,while below him, at a distance of notmore than ten yards,womenwere washing clothes; and a short distance farther downstream a village wasdrawingdrinkingwater.

OfthewholepopulationofEgypt,sometwelvehundredownpracticallyallthelandexceptforafewmillionpeasantswhoownapproximatelyfour-fifthsofanacreapiece,whiletherestownnothing.Theaveragepayofapeasantisfiftydollarsayearfromwhichhehastorenthisdrinkingwater.

Thesailboatson theNilehave the same lines theyhad in thedaysof theancientEgyptians,butsinceA.D.762theyhaveadoptedtheArablateensail inplace of the square sail which they formerly used. In spite of their awkwardappearance, these boats sail very well, and it is said that, when an Englishcompany brought out some specially constructed sailing barges which theythoughtwouldbeatthenativecraft,thenativessailedcirclesaroundthem.AsfarasIcoulddetermine,thenativeboatshavenokeel,butahugerudderwhich,inasense,actsasacenterboardaswellasarudder.

Afterwegotthroughshopping,wehadcocktailsatthefamousShepheard’sHotel.Thecocktailsweregood,butcostaboutadollarandahalfapiece.

IntheafternoonwevisitedtheBritishTankSchool,whichisinterestingbutnotanywhereaswellarrangedasourschoolsatKnoxorBenning.

TheHolyLand

December14,1943

WetookoffbyplaneforJerusalemat0700andcrossedthecanaljustsouthofLakeTenes,whichisnearwherethechildrenofIsraelcrossed.

Itneveroccurredtomeuntilthisflightthat,atthetimetheJewscrossed,itwasunnecessaryfor themtofordanything,because there isastretchofdesert

fromBitterLaketotheMediterraneanwhichhadnowateronit.However,theydidget across andNapoleoncrossed at about the sameplace andalso lost hisbaggagewhenthewindshifted.

FromthecanalweflewalongthelineofAllenby’sadvanceandcrossedatWadiElArishatthespotwherethebattleoccurred.ItisamuchlessformidableobstaclethanIhadgatheredfromthebooks.

Beersheba and the surrounding country do not look too difficult, butcertainly away from the wells the country is an absolute sand sea, and it isdifficulttounderstandhowAllenbyevermovedacavalrycorpsacrossit.

From Beersheba we flew over Hebron and Bethelehem and turnedwestwardjustsouthofJerusalem,finallylandingatAqir,nearthecoast,whereweweremetwithsomecarsanddriventhirtymilestoJerusalem.

The only reason for calling Palestine a “land of milk and honey” is bycomparisonwiththedesertimmediatelysurroundingit.Itconsistsofnothingbutbarrenstonyhillsonwhichafewolivetreesekeoutaprecariousexistence.Wedid not see a single beehive, although there were quite a number of mimosatrees.

OnreachingJerusalem,weweremetbyMajorGeneralD.F.McConnell,who commands thedistrict.Hegaveus aBritishpriest,whohad lived a longtimeinJerusalem,asaguidetoseethesights.

WeenteredthecitythroughthegatewhichTancredstormedwhenthecitywas first taken (A.D.1099).TheChurchof theHolySepulchrecoversboth theTomb of Christ and also the place where the Cross stood. It is run by acomposite group consisting ofCatholics,Greeks, andCopts, and by a strangefreakofchance,orBritishpoliticalinsight,thedoorkeeperisaMohammedan.

Itstruckmeasananomalythat,duringmyentirevisittoJerusalem,Iwasguardedby four secret servicemen, and theoddestpartof itwas that,when Ientered theTomb, the secret servicemen came inwithme.Peoplemust haveverylittleconfidencetofearassassinationinsuchaplace.

FromtheTombwewenttotheCrusaders’ChapelwherethosewhobecameKnights of Jerusalem were knighted. In this chapel is the sword which issupposedtohavebeenusedontheseoccasions.Inmyopinionitisafake,sincethepummelisnotofthecorrectshape,norhasitsufficientweight.ThepummelsofCrusaders’ swordswereusuallycarved in the formofa stoneor apieceoflead,whichinanearlierdatehadactuallybeentiedthere.Thispummelwasinthe shape of a blunt acorn. The crossguard and the shape of the blade werecorrect.

From herewewent to the placewhere theCross had stood.Most of themountainwascutawayduring theRomanoccupation,when they filledup the

Tomb and erected a Temple of Venus over both the Mount and the Tomb.However,thereisanaltarwhichissupposedtobeontheexactspotwheretheCrosswaserected.

WhileIwasin thischapel,IsecuredarosaryforMaryScally1andhaditblessedonthealtar.

Afterweleftthechurch,wefollowedtheWayoftheCross,whichisadirtystreet, to the point where the Roman Forum had stood. I should think thedistanceislessthanhalfamile.InadditiontotheStationsoftheCrossusedbytheCatholics,theGreekshaveanumberofextraones,sothatitispracticallyaday’stripforaGreekpriesttowalkdownthestreet,astheyhavetostopinfrontofeachstation.

From the Forum we got into the cars and drove to the Garden ofGethsemane,wheretherearestillolivetreeswhichjustpossiblymayhavebeeninexistenceatthetimeoftheCrucifixion.

AfterlunchingwiththeCommandingGeneral,wedrovebacktotheairfieldand flewback toCairoalong thecoast,passingoverGaza.Although I lookedverycarefully,Icouldseenoindicationofthefighting,butIdidrecognizethecactushedgewhere the tanksgotstuck.WereachedCairo justatdark,havingcompleted inoneday the tripwhich took theChildrenof Israel fortyyears toaccomplish.

Onthefifteenth,ithadbeenarrangedforaneminentscholartoshowusthesights,whichwepresumedwerethepyramids.WewenttoShepheard’sHoteltopickupthisgenius,butwhenItoldhimIwantedtogotothepyramids,hewasshocked,andsaidthat,thoughhehadlivedinCairoforfortyyears,hehadbeenthere only once, and that the only things worth seeing in Cairo were themosques.I toldhimIhadseenall themosquesIwantedtoandwouldhavetodispensewithhisservices.

Wedrove to thepyramidsandpickedupa fairly fluentbutvery ignorantnativeguide.Tomethepyramidswerequitedisappointing.TheyarenotasbignorasimpressiveasthosearoundMexicoCity.TheSphinxisinapoorstateofpreservationandrathersmallerthanIhadexpected.However,therocktempleatthefootoftheSphinxisaremarkableconstruction.Apparentlytheypileduptherocksandthencutthechapelsortombsoutofthem.

Oneofthetombshasaslabroofabouttwentyfeetlongbysixfeetwidebytwofeetthickwhichhasbeenslippedintonotchesanduprightwallsandisveryhighlypolished.Thispolishingandchippingwasalldonewithbronzechisels,the Egyptians having somemethod of tempering bronzewhich has now beenlost.

At5:30ImadeatalkonlandingoperationstoalltheofficersoftheMiddle

EastCommand,somefivehundred inall. Ibelieve that the talkwentoffquitewellas,contrarytotheBritishcustom,theyapplaudedandseveralofthemwrotemeletters,oneofthemsayingthatinallhispreviousmilitarycareerhehadnotlearnedasmuchasinmythirty-minutelecture.

December16,1943

MajorGeneralBeaumontNesbitt,inchargeofvisitingfiremen,tookmetoShepheard’sHotel,wherewepickeduptherestof theStaffanddrovefor twoand one-half hours along the fresh-water canal to the Combined OperationsTrainingCenterwhichisontheshoresofthesmallBitterLake.ApparentlytheBritish were so interested in the talk I had given yesterday evening that theyasked me to repeat it to some two hundred student officers and LieutenantGeneralR.M.Scobie,whocommandstheBritishtrainingthere.

TheTrainingCenter,whilenotnearlyaslargeorasgoodastheonewehadat Mostaganum, had one or two improvements over our methods. They hadmock-ups of the sides of ships built out into the water so that actual landingboatscouldcomealongside,andthemencouldhavethepracticeofgoingdownthenettingsintomovingboats.

Onthewaybackwehadaregularduststorm,anditwasquitehardtosee.GeneralSirHenryMaitland-Wilsonhadreturnedandwasatdinner.Heisa

verylargemanandquitejovial.Iwasmoreimpressedwithhimthanwithalmostany otherBritish officer I havemet.All of them, including theGeneral,wereverymuch interested inmy reaction to GeneralMontgomery, but I was verycarefulinwhatIsaidandrefusedtobedrawnout.

Ontheseventeenth,GeneralNesbitttookmetomeetGeneralAnders,whocommandsthePolishIICorps.AccompaniedbyGeneralAndersandtherestofourStaff,wedrovetothePolishcampnearFaqus,whichisontheeasternsideoftheDelta.Wehadaguardofhonorofaveryfine-lookinggroupofsoldiers.We then had lunch.At lunch,GeneralAnders pinned onme the insignia of aPolishLieutenantGeneralandtheshoulderpatchoftheIIPolishCorps.Nottobeoutdone,IgavehimoneofmyUnitedStatesinsigniaandtheshoulderpatchoftheSeventhArmy.

Hestruckmeasverymuchofaman.HewasChiefofStaffofaRussiandivision in World War I. He has been hit seven times and won the Polishdecoration for valor twice. His troops are the best-looking troops, includingBritish andAmerican, that I have ever seen.He toldme, laughing, that if hiscorpsgotinbetweenaGermanandRussianarmy,theywouldhavedifficultyin

decidingwhichtheywantedtofightthemost.After we had inspected the II Polish Corps, Colonel Cummings1 and I

drovetoAlexandriawherewehadbeeninvitedbytheCommandingofficeroftheLevant,ViceAdmiralSirArthurWillis.WecrossedthewholeoftheDeltatogettoAlexandria,butunfortunatelymostofthetripwasinthedarksothatwedidnotseeagreatdeal.

December18,1943

Atteno’clock,ColonelMosely,whohasriddenintheGrandNationalfourtimes, called for us and tookus to theYachtClub,whereweweremetby anAdmiralandtakeninabargetoinspecttheharbor.

WethenvisitedtheBritishTankRepairWorks,whichisveryimposinginsizeanduninspiring inorganizationandmaintenance.Amongother things,wefoundgasketsweremadebyhand.

WedrovebacktoCairoacrossthedesert,adistanceofaboutonehundredandfiftymiles.

1ColonelR.E.Cummings,AdjutantGeneral forGeneralPattonduringentire service

overseas.

December19,1943

WeleftCairoat0700andflewuptheNiletoKarnak.GeneralWilsonhadprovided uswith aMajorEmory,who is a very distinguishedEgyptologist incivil life and was number two in the Carter Expedition which dug up Tut’sgrave.

Kamakisontheeastbank.HerewetooksomedilapidatedFordsfromtheairfieldtotheriverandthencrossedinanativeboat.WethentookthreeotherFordsanddrove first to theValleyof theKings.Thiswasmost interesting,asMajorEmoryhadmademanyoftheexcavationstherehimself.

We first entered King Tut’s tomb, which, according toMajor Emory, isverysmall.Therewereoriginallythreesarcophagibesideastonecasket.Atthepresent time only the number two sarcophagus is in place, and in it are theremainsofKingTut.Thenumberonesarcophagus,whichwasofsolidgold,thebullionvalueofwhichisseventhousandpounds,isintheMuseumatCairo.The

one inwhich theKing reposes isofwood,butcoveredwithgoldplating.ThethirdoutsidewoodenoneisalsointheMuseumatCairo.

Major Emory stated that the tomb of theKing is builtmore or less as areplica of his house, and that in each room of the tomb there were theimplementsappropriatetothatroominthehouse.Hepointedoutthat,whereasanenormousamountofvaluableobjectsweretakenfromKingTut’stomb,theremusthavebeenavastlygreaternumberinsometombsthroughwhichheledus,because,incomparisontothetombofsomeoftheRameses,KingTut’swasjustacubbyhole.

FromtheValleyoftheKingswedrovetoThebesandinspectedthetombofa PrimeMinisterwho lived in the next reign followingKingTut. Thiswas amostinterestingtombfortworeasons:first,ithadbeendiscoveredandopenedbyMajor Emory; and second, it is one of the few places in Egyptwhere thestereotypedformofbas-reliefdoesnotexist.Ononesideoftheentrancetothetombthebas-relief isof theold type.Ontheotherside it isquitemodernized.ThereasonforthiswasthatduringthetourofofficeofthePrimeMinisterthereformreligioncame in,so that,whilehalfofhis tombwascutbeforehewasreformed,theotherhalfwascutafterwards.

Another point which is very interesting was to see how the Egyptiansworked.Onthewallofthistomb,whichhadneverbeencompleted,youcouldseethelinedrawingsoftheartistswhodrewthesculptures,nextyoucouldseewheretheyhadbeenroughlychiseledout,andfinallyastheywerecompleted.

We thendrove to the templeanddwellingofRameses II.There isaveryinteresting thing there.Duringhis fighting inSyria,Rameseshadcomeacrosscrenelatedbattlementsandhadcrenelationsonthebattlementsofhispalace.

Wecrossedtheriver,hadlunch,andthenvisitedtheTempleofLuxorandthatofKamak.Thesetwotemplesareabouthalfamileapart.Certainly,anyonewhoisinterestedinruinsshouldseeallthenon-EgyptianonesfirstbecausetheEgyptianruinsmakeotherslooklikenothing.

In the courtyard ofKarnak there is aRomanForum,which if viewed byitselfwouldbequiteimpressive,butto*whichyouhavetohaveyourattentioncalled inorder tosee it,onaccountof itsbeingsomuchovershadowedbytheEgyptianmonuments.

ThereisstillinonepartofKamaktheinclinedplanewhichtheEgyptiansusedtomovestonesfortheerectionoftheirbuildings.

Thereareseveralobelisksinthetemple.MajorEmorycalledourattentionto thefact that in theobelisks inNewYork,London,Paris,andMadrid,whenour skilled engineers tried to erect them, they always chipped the base by nothavingthemlandperfectlyperpendicularlyonthepediment,but theseobelisks

atKamak,whichweighatleastseventy-fivetonsapiece,areinperfectpositionandalignmentonthebaseswithnochipping.

We returned toCairo, landingafterdark.Thenextday, the twentieth,weflewtoPalermo.

MALTA

FieldMarshalLordGortinvitedmetovisithimatMalta,soafteratriptoAlgiers, Colonel Codman, Captain Stiller, and I took off on the morning ofJanuary4,1944.AswewerenottoreachMaltauntilthreeo’clock,wehadtimetoflyoverthebattlefieldswheretheIICorpsfoughtlastspring.

When we were about sixty miles northwest of Constantine, the pilot,CaptainHetzer,toldmethathehadonceseenaRomanruininthatvicinity,sowehuntedforitandpresentlyfoundit.Itisquitealargecitywithabigtempleinagoodstateofpreservationandafinetheatre,andyetitsnameisnotshownonanymapwhichIhavebeenabletofind.

AsweapproachedTebessa,weflewovertheplaceswhereIhadfirsttakencommandoftheIICorps.Inmymind’seyeIcouldstillseethefieldscoveredwith tanks, guns, and tents, but even in so short a time every trace of thosetroopshadbeenobliterated.

Thegreat dumps atTebessa,whichwere theobject of theGerman thrustthroughtheKasserinePass,havenowbeencompletelyclearedupandthereisnoindication that they ever existed. The same is true at Ferianawherewe had aCommandPost,andalsoatGafsa.

LookingoverthecountrywherewefoughtduringthebattleofElGuettargivesoneadefiniteideaofthegreatnessoftheAmericansoldier.Themountainsareimpossiblydifficult.IamgladthatwhenIfoughtthisbattleIdidnotknowhowhardthecountrywas,sincewecouldnotgetanairplanefromwhichtolookatitandwehadtomakeourdecisionsfromthemap.HadIknownhowdifficultitwas,Imighthavebeenlessbold—butitisalwayswelltorememberthatthecountryisjustashardontheenemyasitisonyou.

On the other hand, the gum-tree roadwhich penetrated our position, andoverwhichIspentmanyanxioushours,isnotanywhereasdangerousanavenueas it showson themap,andhadIbeenable to lookat it fromtheair, Imighthavesleptbetter.

After leaving El Guettar, we flew over Maknassy, where, too, all thewreckageandtankswelosttherehavebeencompletelyremoved.

Malta,whichwereachedatthreeo’clock,isquitedifferentfromthewayIhad pictured it. It is almost completely covered with villages and the areasbetweenthemarecrowdedwithtinyfields.Theonlyplacewherethiscrowdingdoesnotexistisontheairfields.

The island is made out of a soft porous stone which works as easily aswoodwheninaquarry,butwhichhardenswhenexposedtoair.

Inorder toprotect themselvesagainst theGermanbombardments, agreatmanyofthevitalinstallationsatMaltahave,astheworldknows,beenburiedincaves,but Idonotbelieve theworldknowshowbig thesecavesare,norhowrelatively easy it is to construct them. Certainly, the clean-up job which theBritishhavedonesincetheBlitzisworthyofthegreatestpraise.

AlltheAirCorpsinstallations,includingthecaves,wereshownusbymyfriend. AirMarshal Park, who had commanded the RAF inMalta during thefightingthereandhaddoneaverywonderfuljob.TheRAFinMaltaisthebest-dressed and best-disciplined Air Force that I have ever seen, whether it beAmericanorEnglish.

On the next day, Captain Holland, Lord Gort’s Aide, took us on asightseeing trip around the island during which we visited forts, the harbors,severalchurches,andotherpointsofinterest.

ThefortsareofadifferenttypefromanyIhaveeverexamined,beingpre-Vauban, but nevertheless artillery-proof. This means that the walls are fromeight to sixteen feet thick and the crenelations are for artillery rather than forsmallarms.

DuringtheSiegeof1528,thethreeforts,oneontheislandandtheothersonthetwopeninsulas,wereheldbyaboutfourhundredknightsandsomeeighthundredmercenariesagainstsomefortythousandTurks.

In the construction of these forts, the nature of the island is again ofadvantageandhasbeenexploited,asitissimplynecessarytocutawaytherockto produce awall,while the rock thus cut away is utilized to project thewallfartherup.

ThemostinterestingthingIsawisthelibraryoftheKnightsofMalta.Wewere taken through this by the librarian. He speaks and reads in script ninelanguages, so he is perfectly capable of translating the valuable collection ofmanuscriptsinthelibrary.

Onecodex,datingfrom1420anddepictingthelifeofSaintAnthony,whospenthistimebeingpursuedbydevilsintheformof

beautiful women, was particularly interesting to me because in one of the

pictures it showed an armorer’s shop inwhich suits of armor, varying in datefromearly1100to1400,werehungupforsalejustasonehangsupclothesnowinapawnship.Thepointofinterestisthatmosthistoriansarepronetoclassifyarmorbydates,whereasherewehavevisualproofthataslateas1400alltypesofarmor,bothmailandplate,werestillbeingused.

Another codexwhichwas interestingwasoneof theoriginalprintingsofthe Bible, using wood type. In this case all the capitals were omitted andsubsequentlyilluminatedbyhand.

InordertobeaKnightofMalta,itwasnecessarytohavesixteencrossesofnobility, so that when anyone came up to be a knight, he had to present hisgenealogy, which was then studied by a college of heralds, and, if provencorrect,permittedhimtojoin.Sinceallthesegenealogies,coveringtheknightsfromsometimein1100todate,arepreservedinthelibrary,itgivesthegreatesthistoricalfamilytreeintheworld.

Inadditiontotherequirementofsixteencrossesofnobility,aknighthadtospend eighteenmonths at sea on the galleys as a fighter, and thenwork in ahospital.

The knight also had to take four vows—Poverty,Chastity,Humility, andObedience.ThevowofPovertyrequiredhimtogivefour-fifthsofhisthenestatetotheOrder.However,ifhewasasuccessfulknight,hereceivedfromtheOrdermorethanahundredfoldoverwhathegave,sothatmostofthemdiedveryrich.This was particularly true before 1800 when the knights had a sort ofstranglehold on the privateering business in theMediterranean and used theirhatred for the Turks as a means of veiling their personally conducted piracyagainstTurksandagainstanyoneelsewhomtheycouldcatch.

ThevowofChastitywasnotenforcedexceptbyoneGrandMaster,who,inordertodiscouragetheamorousactivitiesofhisdependents,requiredthatallthegirls liveacross theharborfromtheforts,so thatwhenaknightwantedtoseehis lady-love, he had to row across and thereby bring discredit upon himself.Apparentlythediscreditconsistedoftheotherknightscheeringhim.

ThevowofHumilitywasgotaroundbythesimpleexpedientofwashingapoorman’sfeetthreetimes.ThevowofObediencewasrigidlyenforced.

It is interesting to remember that the average Maltese has never seen amountain, a river, a lake, a forest, or a railway train, and, according to myfriends,hehasnodesiretomeetanyofthem.

PARTTWO

OPERATION“OVERLORD”

ThisbriefaccountoftheactionsoftheThirdArmyandtheXIXTacticalAirCommand, commanded by Brigadier General, later Major General, O. P.Weyland, in theconflict just terminated, isahastilywrittenpersonalnarrativeforthebenefitofmyfamilyandafewoldandintimatefriends.

Iapologizeforthefrequentappearanceofthefirstpersonalpronoun,andsince I have criticized numerous individualswithout knowing their side of thequestion,Imustaddthatthestoryisasfactualasitispossibleformetomakeitfrommypersonalnotesandatthetimeitiswritten.

G.S.P.,Jr.July-August,1945

1THECAMPAIGNOFFRANCE,AVRANCHE3,BRESTTOTHEMOSELLE

1Augustto24September,1944

On July 28, 1944,GeneralPattonwas given control of the troops of theThirdArmythenontheContinentofEurope.

TheFirstArmyhadbegunitsSt.LopushonJuly26.Gaininginmomentumin thesucceedingdays, itcame toaclimaxwhenGeneralPattonexplodedhisThirdArmyontotheBrittanyPeninsulaonAugust1.

Intwoweeks,troopsoftheThirdArmyhaddriventhefleeingGermansonthepeninsulaintotheportsofLorientandBrest;hadclearedtheLoireRivertoAngers; and hadmoved beyond LeMans and Alengon in its drive east. {SeeMap,pages102-103.)BytheendofAugust,theGermanswerestillcontainedinthe Brittany ports, and the drive of the Third Army to the east, gaining inmomentum, had by-passed Paris and had reached Reims, Verdun, andCommercy.{SeeMap,pages118-119.)

Asearlyas thefifthofSeptember,ThirdArmyelementswereinMetzandPont-à-Mousson,andbySeptember15(seeMap,page138),elementsoftheXUandXXCorpswere along theMoselle, and, in some places, across the river.PlansfromaboveanchoredtheThirdArmyprogresstotheeastandlackofgasandotheressentialsuppliesbroughttheall-outadvancetoastandstill.

As thecampaignendedonSeptember25, theThirdArmyhadcleared theenemy from the west bank of the Moselle, north of Metz, and had gainedsubstantial bridgeheads east of the Moselle, south of Metz. Luneville andRambervillerswerewellwithintheThirdArmy’sfrontlines.

During the period covered in this chapter, the American Seventh ArmylandedsuccessfullyinSouthernFranceandmovednorthwithspeedanddaring,contactingelementsoftheThirdArmyonSeptember11,northofDijon.

The First AmericanArmy and SecondBritish Armymade parallel drivesacrossNorthernFrance, reaching theBelgianborder,and in earlySeptembercapturedAntwerpandNamur.TheRussiansandRumanianscrossedBulgaria,and theRussiansopenedanewoffensivesouthofEastPrussia.TheAmericanNinthArmywasformedontheContinentandtookoverfromtheThirdArmythereductionoftheportsontheBrittanyPeninsula.

TheAmericanandBritishAirForcescontinuedtheirsupportofthegroundforcesandtheirbombingoftheinnerReich.

Astheperiodended,theBritishhadmadetheirill-fatedparatroopdropatArnhem; the First Army was breaching the Siegfried Line in and aroundAachen;theNinthArmycompletedoperationsontheBrittanyPeninsula,exceptfor Lorient and St. Nazaire; the Seventh Army, after clearing Epinal, wasapproachingtheBelfortGap.

P.D.H.

TouringFrancewithanArmy

When I was at Peover Hall, the initial Headquarters of the ThirdUnitedStatesArmyinEngland,inMarch,April,andMay,1944,itbecameevidentthattheThirdArmywouldlandeitherontheCherbourgPeninsulaorinthevicinityofCalais.Personally,Ifavoredthelatterplace,because,whilethelandingwouldhave been expensive, the subsequent pricewould probably have been less. Inamphibiousoperationsweshould landasnear theobjectiveaspossible.Calaiswasnearerthisobjective7thanwasCherbourg.

Thinking over the probable course of events, I picked out certain pointswhich I felt surewould be the scenes of battles or else be very critical in theoperation.Infact,ItoldMr.J.J.McCloy,theAssistantSecretaryofWar,whenhevisitedPeover,thatthefirstbigbattleoftheThirdArmywouldbeatRennes.Actuallyitwasthesecondbigbattle.

I also picked Laval, Chateaubriant, Nantes, Angers, Tours, Orleans, andBourgesandNevers,becauseatthattimeIfeltweshouldgosouthofthebendoftheLoire.Iamstillnotsurethatweshouldnothavedoneso.

Manyotherpoints,atmostofwhichwesubsequentlyfought,wereselected;butsinceIhavenotmymaphere,Icannotnamethemall.IdorememberthatChartresandTroyesand,strangetosay,WormsandMainz,weremarked.Itisof interest to note that this study was made on a road map of France, scale1:1,000,000,andif“Thegreateststudyofmankindisman,”surelythegreateststudyofwaristheroadnet.

It is my opinion that, in the High Command, small-scale maps are bestbecausefromthatlevelonehastodecideongeneralpoliciesanddeterminetheplaces, usually road centers or river lines, the capture of which will hurt the

enemy most. How these places are to be captured is a matter for the lowerechelonstodeterminefromthestudyoflarge-scalemapsor,betterstill,fromtheground.

IalsoreadTheNormanConquestbyFreeman,payingparticularattentionto the roadsWilliam the Conqueror used in his operations in Normandy andBrittany.Theroadsused in thosedayshad tobeongroundwhichwasalwayspracticable.Therefore,usingtheseroads,eveninmoderntimes,permitseasyby-passingwhentheenemyresorts,ashealwaysdoes,todemolition.

We2lefttheUnitedKingdomonJuly6,takingoffbyplaneatexactly1025.ThatwasayeartotheminutefromthedateonwhichweleftAlgiersontheroadtoSicily.AsweflewdowntheeastcoastoftheCherbourgPeninsula,therewasatremendousmassofshippinglyingoffshore.Afterwelandedanddrovealongthebeach,thesightofthedestructionofvesselswasappalling.Someofthishadbeendonebyenemyaction,but agreatdealof itwasdue to the stormwhichraged for several days just after the initial landing. The beach defenses,particularly the pillboxes, were impressive. The fact that the Allies made asuccessfullandingdemonstratesthatgoodtroopscanlandanywhere.

LeavingOmahaBeach,wedrovetoGeneralBradley’sHeadquarterssouthofIsigny,whereIspentthefirstnightinthemidstofthemostinfernalartillerypreparation Ihaveeverheard.Bradley’sHeadquarterswaswell in frontof thecorpsartilleryandrightamongstthebatteriesofthedivisionalunits.

NextdaywedrovetoourfirstCommandPostontheContinentatNehou,southeastofBricquebec.Thischateau,Bricquebec,issupposedtohavebelongedto one ofCaesar’s lieutenants, and is interesting in that the principal tower iseleven-sidedandshowsthe transitionfromtheearlysquare tower to theroundtower.IndrivingtotheCommandPost,wehadtocrossthebridgeatCarentan,whichwassupposed tobeunder fireandhad tobecrossedathighspeedwithbig distances between vehicles.When Iwent over, I saw four of our soldierssittingonit,fishing.However,everyvisitingfiremanwhomIsubsequentlymettoldmeofthedangershehadencounteredcrossingthebridge.

OurCommandPosthadbeenverywelllaidoutbyGeneralGay1inanoldappleorchard.

While there I took occasion to examine the German defenses aroundCherbourgbothfromthegroundandfromtheair.IalsohadtheArmyEngineer,Colonel Conklin,make drawings of them, as I felt that theGermans, being amethodicalpeople,wouldprobablyusethesameformofdefenseswhereverweshouldmeet them. Inmyopinion, thesedefenseswerenot too formidable andtheresultsprovedmecorrect.

1BrigadierGeneral, laterMajorGeneral, Hobart R.GaywasGeneral Patton’s

ChiefofStaff throughout thewarwiththeexceptionofabriefperiodinEnglandandtheinitialmonthsontheContinent.SeeAppendixF.

The whole northern tip of the Cherbourg Peninsula was covered withlaunching sites for V-l bombs. These were very interesting. Usually a smallconcrete road, camouflaged to look like dirt, led off from a main road andeventuallycametoaconcreteslababoutthesizeoftwotenniscourts.

On the edges of this slabwere semicircular pointswhere trucks couldbeleft.Downthecenterof theslabwereanumberofholes.Atsomeof thesiteswere caves or dugouts inwhich rockets could be stored. In others thesewereabsent.Themethodofprocedurewasthat,duringthenight,aconvoycontainingacertainnumberofrocketsandaknocked-downrampmovedup.Therampwaserected by placing the uprights in the holes previously mentioned. It had anangle of about thirty degrees to the horizontal. The rocketwas placed on thisramp,whichhadbeencarefullypointedtoreachacertainareaofEngland,andwasthendischarged.Whenthesupplyofrocketswasexhausted,thewholeoutfitpickedupandleft,whileadetailremainedtorestorethecamouflage.VeryfewofthesitesIvisitedhadbeensuccessfullybombed.

Therewasanotherenormousconstruction,thereasonforwhichhas,sofar

asIknow,neverbeenexplained.Itconsistedofaconcreteblockapproximatelya mile long and about sixty to eighty feet square. In the hills at either side,wedge-shaped excavations, approximately one hundred feet deep and twohundredfeetwideat the top,hadbeenmadeandfilledwithconcrete. It ismyopinion that there was more material in this construction than in the GreatPyramid. Some three thousand slave laborers had worked on it for over twoyears,anditwasnotmorethanhalf-completed.

On July12GeneralTeddyRoosevelt1 died, andwhilewewere attendinghis funeral services at the cemetery near St. Sauveur our anti-aircraft gunssoundedafittingrequiemforabravesoldier.

Secretary of War Stimson, accompanied by Mr. Bundy2 and GeneralSurles,3visitedusontheseventeenth.

On the twenty-fourth, Colonel Flint4 was killed, and he and GeneralMcNair1wereburiedonthetwenty-sixth.Paddywouldhavebeenpleasedwithhisfuneral.Wehadaspecialcoffinmadeforhimandhewascarriedtohisgraveinamechanizedcavalryhalf-track.HehadanArmyCommander, threeCorpsCommanders,anArmyChiefofStaff,andaDeputyChiefofStaff,andallthecavalrymenaroundHeadquartersforhispallbearers.

GeneralMcNair’s funeral, on the other hand,was, for security reasons, asmall affair. Only Bradley, Hodges, myself, Quesada,2 and his personal aidewerepresent.

1BrigadierGeneralTheodoreRoosevelt,AssistantDivisionCommanderofthe1stU.S.

InfantryDivisionatthetimeofhisdeath.2Mr.HarveyH.Bundy,SpecialAssistanttotheSecretaryofWar.3Major General Alexander D. Surles, Chief of War Department Public Relations

Branch.4ColonelHarryA.(Paddy)Flint,CommandingOfficerof the39thInfantryRegiment

ofthe9thDivisionatthetimeofhisdeath.

On the twenty-fourth,GeneralHenry3 spent thenight andwehad a verypleasant time examining the launching sites and spoke to the 6th ArmoredDivision.

The first Sunday I spent inNormandywas quite impressive. I went to aCatholicField.Masswhereallofuswerearmed.Aswekneltinthemudintheslightdrizzle,wecoulddistinctlyhear the roarof theguns,and thewholeskywas filledwithairplaneson theirmissionsofdestruction . . .quiteatvariance

withtheteachingsofthereligionwewerepracticing.I shall always remember very unpleasantly the time spent in the apple

orchard,becauseIwasobsessedwiththebeliefthatthewarwouldendbeforeIgotintoit.Iwasalsocertainthat,bypushingharder,wecouldadvancefaster.Istated at the time, and still believe, that two armoreddivisions, precededby aheavy artillery concentration using air bursts, and followed by two infantrydivisions,couldhavecutstraightdownthewestcoasttoAvrancheswithoutthenecessityofwaitingforanairblitz.

My belief in the practicability of this operationwas greatly strengthenedwhen the3dArmoredDivision invented thehedge-spade for tanks,whichwassubsequentlyimprovedbyColonelNixon.4AlltheCherbourgPeninsula

1LieutenantGeneralLesleyJ.McNair,ChiefoftheArmyGroundForces.2Lieutenant General, later General, Omar Bradley, Commanding General of the

Twelfth U.S. Army Group in Europe. Lieutenant General C. H. Hodges, CommandingGeneral,FirstU.S.Army.MajorGeneralE.R.(Pete)Quesada,CommandingGeneral,NinthTacticalAirCommand.

3MajorGeneralGuyV.Henry,WarDepartmentStaff.4ColonelThomasF.Nixon,ChiefOrdnanceOfficerforGeneralPattonthroughoutthe

war.

“Bocage”country—thatis,itiscomposedofinnumerableandagreatdealofeasternBrittanyiswhatiscalledsmallfieldsseparatedbybanksofearthfromfourtosixfeethighsurmountedbyhedges.Theseformidealdelayingpositionsfor infantry. The tank spade, however, cut through them like a spoon throughwarmbutter.

Anarrestingsightwerethecrucifixesatroadintersections;thesewereusedbySignalpersonnelassupplementarytelephoneposts.Whilethecrosseswereinno way injured, I could not help thinking of the incongruity of the lethalmessagespassingoverthewires.

WhiletheThirdArmydidnotbecomeoperationaluntil1200onthefirstofAugust,GeneralBradleyappointedmetocommanditbywordofmouthonthetwenty-eighthofJulyandexplainedtheplansfortheinitialuseoftwocorps,theVIII(Middleton)ontherightandtheXV(Haislip)ontheleft.1

In conformity with this plan, I visited the troops near Coutances on thetwenty-ninth and found an armored division sitting on a road, while its

Headquarters,secretedbehindanoldchurch,wasdeeplyengrossedinthestudyofmaps.IaskedwhytheyhadnotcrossedtheSienne.Theytoldmetheyweremakingastudyofitatthemoment,butcouldnotfindaplacewhereitcouldbeforded.Iaskedwhatefforttheyhadmadetofindsuchaplaceandwasinformedthat theywerestudying themapto thatend. I then told themIhad justwadedacross it, that itwasnotover two feetdeep, and that theonlydefense I knewaboutwasonemachinegunwhichhadfiredveryinaccuratelyatme.IrepeatedtheJapaneseproverb:“Onelookisworthonehundredreports,”andaskedthemwhy in hell they had not gone down to the river personally.They learned thelessonandfromthenonwereaverygreatdivision..

ThemorningofJuly31,wemovedourCommand

VIIICorps(Middleton)4thArmoredDivision6thArmoredDivision8thInfantryDivision79th

InfantryDivision

XVCorps(Haislip)5thInfantryDivision83dInfantryDivision90thInfantryDivision

The remainder of the Third Army, consisting of the XII Corps (80thDivision)andXXCorps(2dFrenchArmoredDivision),wasnotreadyforactionatthistime.

Post to a point north of theGranville—St. Sever—Lendelin road. It washerethatWilliecontractedaviolentloveaffairwithaFrenchladydogandalsoexhumed a recently buriedGerman, to the shame and disgrace of themilitaryservice.

Gaffey,Gay, and I stayed in theoldCommandPostuntil 1545,butwerenotidle,becauseduringthattimewesucceededintalkingtheCommunicationsZoneoutofthreecavalrygroupswhichwebadlyneeded.Aftersupper,Gaffeyand Idrove to theCommandPostof theVIIICorpsatBrehal.Middletonwasverygladtoseeus,ashehadreachedhisobjective,whichwastheSeluneRiver,anddidnotknowwhattodonext.Itoldhimthat,throughouthistory,warshadbeenlostbynotcrossingrivers,andthatheshouldgetoveratonce.WhileweweretalkingabouthowtobridgeitinthevicinityofPontaubault,thetelephonerangandweweretoldthatthebridge,thoughdamaged,wasstillusable.Atthe

timeIconsideredthisanomenofthefuturesuccessoftheThirdArmy.Wealsoheard that the 4th Armored Division had just captured the dams east of thebridge, which also served as crossings and that they had taken four thousandprisoners. As a result of this news, I told Middleton to head for Brest andRennes,withthe6thArmoredDivisionandthe79thInfantryDivisiononBrest,andthe8thInfantryDivisionand4thArmoredDivisiononRennesandalsotocreateataskforceunderGeneralH.L.Earnest1togoalongthenorthcoastofthePeninsula.

Returning toHeadquarters,wepassedoneof thedeadestGermans Ihaveeverseen.Hewashalf-lying,half-sitting,underahedgeinfulluniformwithhishelmet on his chin strap in place, andwas perfectly black. I hadnever beforeseenthishappentoacorpse.

On the morning of August 1, everyone was busy at our camp exceptHarkins89andmyself,soathighnoonheandIdecidedtocelebratethebirthdayof theThirdArmywithadrink.Theonly thingwecould findwasabottleofallegedbrandygivenHarkinsbyCampanole.1Wetriedtodrinkthis,butgagged.

Thepassageof the twoArmyCorps (VIIIandXV) throughAvranches isoneofthosethingswhichcannotbedone,butwas.Itwasonlymadepossiblebyextremelyeffectiveuseofveteranstaffofficersandbytheactiveparttakeninitbycorpsanddivisioncommanderswho,onoccasion,personallydirectedtraffic.Itwas very evident that if a jam occurred, our losses, particularlywith truck-borne infantry, would be terrific, and I had to say to myself, “Do not takecounselofyourfears.”

The immediatemission of the ThirdArmywas to secure andmaintain abridgehead over the Selune River between Avranches and St. Hilaire-de-Harcouet. Iconceived thishadbestbedoneby the immediatecaptureofBrestandLorientandproceededonthatassumption.

By evening of August 1, the 6thArmoredDivision had taken PontorsonwhereBeatrice2andIspentanightin1913,whenwevisitedMontSt.Michel.Inthisoperationthe6thlostabatteryofself-propelledguns,duetostupidity.Theguns were too far to the front, too close together, and had no securitydetachment. The officer responsible for this was killed in the action. On thesamedaythe4thArmoredDivisionwasnearRennes.Hereaveryamusingthinghappened.AboutanhourbeforesundownwereceivedareportthatanarmoredcolumnwasfifteenkilometerssouthwestofRennes,movinginrapidly.IaskedGeneralWeyland,commanding theXIXTacticalAirCommand, to sendsomefighterbomberstostopit.Thebomberswereunabletofindthecolumn,becauseit actually was the 4th Armored Division moving in from the northeast.

However, the planes did do some very effective work knocking out enemyresistanceaheadofthe4thArmoredDivisionandthiswastheprecursorofmanyother such jobs. It was love at first sight between the XIX Tactical AirCommandandtheThirdArmy.

On the second of August, Stiller and I joined the column of the 90thDivision marching east from Avranches, and walked in ranks with them forsomehours.Atthattimetheefficiencyofthisdivisionwasextremelydubious,but had just secured the services of General McLain1 and GeneralWeaver.1WhenwegottoapointwheretheroadturnedsouthtoSt.Hilaire,ImetMcLainandHaislip, andwas informed that the fightingdown the roadwas causedbyWeaverpersonallyleadinganassaultoverabridge.

1ColonelN.W.Campanole,ChiefCivilAffairsOfficer,ThirdArmy.SeeAppendixF.2Mrs.Patton.

Thiswasthebeginningofthemakingofoneofthegreatestdivisionsthatever fought, andwasdue largely to these twomen.Thedivision subsequentlyhadaseriesofgreatcommanders.1

Driving back to Army Headquarters with Haislip, I saw a young officerleapwildlyoutofapeepand intoaditch. Iwentup to findoutwhatwas thematterandtheysaidanenemyplanewasoverhead.Thatwastrue,butitwassohighitwaspracticallyinnocuous; justanother instanceof thenervousnessofafirstfight.Theygotbackintothecarevenfasterthantheygotout.

Coming back fromAvranches, sometime around the second ofAugust, IsawoneoftheworstaccidentsIhaveeverwitnessed.Oneofourengineershadfallenoff abulldozerandbeen runover lengthwise, so thathewaspracticallysplit in two.Hewas still alive, and I stayedwithhimandgavehimmorphineuntilanambulancecame.

During this periodwehad agreat deal of enemyair overus, although incomparisonwithwhatwegave them itwasprobablyquitepaltry. I rememberonenightdistinctlyhearingahundreddifferentexplosionsinaboutanhour.Ofcourse,thefactthatIcouldhearthemshowedthattheywerescattered.

Another night the enemy deliberately bombed and strafed their ownprisoners in one of our cages. The ProvostMarshal in command there turnedthem loose, and out of several thousand, all but fifty came back. Those whoreturnedwereextremelymadwiththeGermansandtalkedveryfreely.

On the fourth, Codman, Stiller, and I decided to find the 6th ArmoredDivision. Stiller rode in the armored car to lead the way and Codman and I

followed in the peep, moving via Avranches, Pontorson, Combourg, andMerdrignac.Wemetaveryexcitedliaisonofficerwhotoldusthattheroadwasunderfire.Afterwardwefoundoutthatthepoorboywasslightlytouchedinthehead.However,proceedingdowna road forover fifteenkilometers incountryknown to be occupied by the enemy, and not seeing one of our soldiers,wasratherexciting.FinallywecaughtupwiththeCommandPostofthedivision.

1SeeThirdArmyOrganizationAppendixH.

Nextday,atthebriefing,IlearnedwithconsiderableperturbationthatIhaddriven right through aGerman division. I did notwish to chagrin ourG-2 bytellinghimIhadnotbeenabletofindit.

As we advanced into the Breton Peninsula, the attitude of the peoplebecamemuchmorefriendly.Ithinkthisisbecausetherehadbeenlessfightingthereandlessbombing.TheNormansintheCherbourgPeninsulawerecertainlynotparticularlysympathetic.However,sincebothweandtheGermanshadhadtobombtheirtowns,perhapstheyshouldnotbecriticized.

On account of the great distances I had to cover,most ofmy travelwasdoneinanL-5LiaisonplaneandIsawhundredsofcrashedplanes.Aroundeachone of these wrecks there was a path beaten by curious ghouls. The sightremindedme of dead birds partly eaten by beetles. The gliderswith their bigheadsandwingsfarforwardwerereminiscentofdragonflies.

One day, on visiting Twelfth Army Group, General Bradley’sHeadquarters, I passed through St. Lo, where Beatrice and I spent a night in1913 and bought some furniture. Up to that time it was the most completelyruinedcityIhadeverseen.Sincethenmyeducationhasbeenimproved.

The seventh ofAugustwas the heaviest air bombardmentwe received. Ithink they were light bombs, probably about two hundred pounds, and somepersonnelbombs.Duringthisoperationtheygotoneofourammunitiondumpstothetuneofaboutonethousandtons.Itwasstillgoingoffthreedayslater.

As of the seventh—that is, the beginning of the second week—the 83dDivisionof theVIIICorpswas in theoutskirts ofSt.Malo.The6thArmoredDivisionwascloseto,butnotin,Brest.Dinanhadbeencapturedbyaninfantrycombatteamofthe8thDivision,whichthenmovedonupthePeninsulawestofSt.Malo to attackDinard.The4thArmoredDivisionwas inVannes andwasapproaching Lorient. The 79thDivisionwas across the river at Laval and the90thacrossatMayenne,while the5thArmoredwasnearChateauGontierandreconnaissance elements of another part of the 8th Division were in

Chateaubriant.At 0830 an American Air Corps officer, who had been shot down near

AngersandrescuedbyamemberoftheFrenchForcesoftheInterior,cameinandtoldusthathehaddrivenfromAngerstoChateaubriantonthebackroadsandfoundnolargeformedbodiesofGermans—onlyafewSignalCorpsmentakingupwireandmovingeast.HestatedthatthebridgeatAngerswasintact.IsentGeneralGaffey,theFrenchman,andColonelCarter1oftheStafftoVitrytopick up a combat team of the 5th Infantry Division with some tanks and areconnaissancetroop,andattackAngers.Itwasaslightlyriskyoperation,butsoiswar.Inthiscaseitwassuccessful,exceptthatthebridgewasblownupintheirfacesjustastheyreachedit.

Late on this day we got a rumor that the Germans had several PanzerDivisionsandwouldattackwestfromthelineMortain-BarentononAvranches.Personally I thought this a German bluff to cover a withdrawal. However, Istopped the 80th and 35th Infantry Divisions and the 2d French ArmoredDivisioninthevicinityofSt.Hilaireincasesomethingshouldhappen.

Ontheeighth,Hughes2andIdrovetoDol,whichissupposedtocontainthelargestphallicsymbolintheworld,althoughIcouldnotfindit;thentoseetheVIIICorps.Nexton tonearSt.Malo,which the83dDivisionwasattacking. IfoundMacon, who commanded the division, well up in front. When he sawGeneralHughesinthecarwithme,heturnedwhite,andIrealizedhethoughtIwasabouttorelievehim,soIcalledout,“Finework.”Asamatteroffact, thedivisionwasdoingwell,butnot toowell.Theyhadalready losteighthundredmenandhadtakenthirteenhundredprisoners.3

1LieutenantColonelB.S.Carter,AssistantG-2,ThirdU.S.Army.2MajorGeneralE.S.HughesofGeneralEisenhower’sStaff.3AtthetimeGeneralPattonvisitedGeneralMaconandthe83rdDivisioninSt.Malo,

the fighting had degenerated to a sniping contest. Though therewasn’tmuch noise, itwasdangerous to stick one’s neck out. Because of the quietude, General Patton suggested thatGeneral Macon take General Hughes and himself closer to the front. General Macon isreported to have replied, “General, if you just move up there forty yards, you’ll be in theenemyfrontline.”Nothingelsewassaid

ThiswasthedayweorderedtheXVCorpstoattackonthelineAlengon-Sees.On the eighth,St.Malo fell to the83dand the last resistance to the5thDivisioninAngersceased.

GeneralSpaatz,1Tedder,andBradleycametoHeadquarters.ThiswasthefirsttimewehadallbeentogethersinceGAFSA,2thedaytheGermansbombedthemain street inbroaddaylight just afterSpaatzhad toldme that theBritishhadcompletemasteryoftheair.Tedderlaughinglysaid,“I’llbetPattonlaidthatonasawheeze.”ItoldhimIhadnot,butifIcouldfindtheGermanwhodidthebombing, Iwouldcertainlydecoratehim.Asa resultof thisbombing,wealsohadtheuniqueexperienceofseeingArabsandcamelsrun.

IbecameworriedbecausetherewasabigholeintheAmericanflankfromSt.HilairetoMayenne;alsoasecondgapsouthwestofAlengon.TheonlythingIcoulddotosafeguardthesegapswastoassemblethe8thArmoredatFougeres.

On the eleventh, Codman and I visited Headquarters of the XV Corpsnortheast of LeMans, then the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 5thArmoredDivision.IcouldnotfindGeneralLeClercofthe2dFrenchArmored,as he was running around up in front, although I followed him farther thancautiondictated.The2dFrenchArmoredandthe5thArmoredhadhadquiteafightthedaybeforeinwhichtheylostbetweenthemsomefortytanks.

Anamusingincidentoccurredonthistrip.Ihavealwaysinsistedthatanti-tankgunsbeplacedwheretheycanseewithoutbeingseen.Icametoacrucifixinthemiddleofathree-wayroadjunction,andsittingexactlyunderthecrucifixwas an anti-tank gun completely unconcealed. I gave the non-commissionedofficerinchargethedevilfornothavingcarriedoutmyinstructions.WhenIgotthroughhesaid,“Yes,sir,butyesterdaywegottwotanksfromthisposition.”SoIhadtoapologize.Perhapsthesanctityofthelocationsavedthegun?.

1LieutenantGeneralCarl Spaatz,CommandingGeneral,AmericanAir Forces, under

GeneralEisenhower.2GAFSA—GeneralPatton’sHeadquartersinTunisia.

Wemadeplansforthe7thArmoredDivisiontocrosstheMayenneRiveratMayenne andmove onAlencon,while the 80thDivisionmoved north to jointhemontheLaval-LeMansroad.Wheneverthe35thDivisionwasrelievedbythe First Army, it was to close up on these divisions to form the XXCorps,whichthenwouldgoinontheleftoftheXVCorps.The5thInfantryDivision,lessacombatteamwhichwasstillatAngers,assembledatLeMansandwastobe joined by the 4thArmored as soon as itwas relieved.These twodivisionsweretoformtheXIIICorps,preparedtomovenortheast—thatis,onthesouthoftheXVCorpsandontherightflankofthearmy.

The islands off St.Malowere still giving trouble, firing at our troops onshorewiththeirlong-rangeguns,butsofarIhadhadnosuccessinpersuadingtheBritishNavytodoanythingabout it.Wealsodecidedtoaskfor theaironDinard, becausewewere having toomany casualties trying to avoid bombingtowns.

In driving to our new Command Post, six miles northwest of Le Mans,CodmanandIstoppedattheChateauFougeres.Thisisthebestchateaufromamilitary point of view, I have ever seen, because the dwelling part of it wasdestroyedbyRichelieuandnopeoplehavelivedinitandimproveditsincethisday.Ithasbeentakenonlytwice,onceabouta.d.1100andoncewhenwetookit.

Onthethirteenth,itbecameevidentthattheXXCorpswashittingnothing,sowemoveditnortheastofLeMans,usingthe7thArmoredDivisionandthe5th InfantryDivision and sending a combat team of the 80th toAngers. Thispermittedus tomake theXIICorpsoutof the4thArmoredand35th Infantry,which was now assembled. The XV Corps, consisting as before of the 5thArmored,2dFrenchArmored,90thand79thDivisions,hadtakentheAlen$on—Sees—Argentan line. It could easily have entered Falaise and completelyclosedthegap,butwewereorderednottodothis,allegedlybecausetheBritishhad sown the areawith a large number of time bombs. This haltwas a greatmistake,asIwascertainthatwecouldhaveenteredFalaiseandIwasnotcertainthat theBritishwould.Asamatterof fact,wehadreconnaissancepartiesnearthetownwhenwewereorderedtopullback.

Owing to the resulting necessity of halting theXVCorps, theXXCorpsnowmovedonDreuxand theXIICorpsonChartres.From this formation thearmy, consisting of four corps (VII,XII,XV, andXXCorps), could attack inany direction without crossing columns and, in fact, did on the twelfth andthirteenthandalsolater.

ThankstotheforesightofColonelCummings,10theAdjutantGeneral,thesystem of administration in the Third Army passed direct from divisions toarmy, leaving the corps in its proper sphere as a tactical unit.Because of thisarrangement we had perfect facility in shifting divisions without losing amoment’stime.Weneverhadtoregroup,whichseemedtobethechiefformofamusementintheBritisharmies.

—————

1The3dDivisionandCombatCommand“A,”2dArmoredDivision,landed

atLicata.2CombatCommand“B,”2dArmoredDivision,landedatGelaonD+1.38BrigadierGeneralTheodoreRoosevelt,AssistantDivisionCommander.4MajorGeneralTerrydelaM.Allen,commandingthe1stDivision.5TheCommandandGeneralStaffCollege.6ColonelCharlesR.Codman,AidedeCamptoGeneralPattonandwithhim

throughoutthewar.7TheheartofGermanyandthedestructionoftheReich.

2«we”—GeneralPattonwasaccompaniedbyMajorGeneralH.J.Gaffey,thenChiefofStaffofThirdArmy,hisAides,LieutenantColonelC.R.Codmanand Major Alexander Stiller, Sergeant Meeks, his orderly, and “Willie,” theGeneral’sdog.

8SeeAppendixH.9Colonel Paul D. Harkins, Deputy Chief of Staff for General Patton

throughoutthewar.SeeAppendixF.10Colonel Robert E. Cummings, Adjutant General of the Third Army

throughoutthewar.

AsofAugust14theThirdArmyhadadvancedfartherandfasterthananyarmyinhistory.Thenightofthefourteenthwasthefirstnightwehadnotbeenbombed since starting, but in themorning we were attacked by an Americanplanewhichhadgotlost.

CodmanandIflewtoLeMans,andIneverrecallgettingintoaplanewithmorereluctance,becauseIhadbeenassuredbyalltheStaffthat,iftheGermansfailedtoshootmefromabove,theAmericanswouldgetmefrombelow,astheyweretriggerhappy,duetoconsiderablebombing.Itwasoneofthefewdays,infact,thatIhavehadapremonitionofimpendingdeath.Itfailedtomaterialize.

We landed beside a road and immediately secured amedical peepwhichhappened to be passing.Before getting into it, I had them take down theRedCrossflag,asIdidnotwishtotravelunderfalsecolors.AfterseeingMcLainofthe90th,wewenttotheXVCorpstoorientHaisliponwhatwasgoingon.Heagreedwithmethat,withtwodivisions,hecouldmoveonDreuxandholdtheFalaiseGapwiththeothertwo.Later,IsawBradley,

whoapprovedtheplan,sowestartedtheXVCorpsonDreux,theXXonChartres,andtheXIIonOrleans.Healsoletmekeepthe80thDivisionfortheeasternmarch,replacingitintheVIIICorpswithadivisionfromtheFirstArmywhich had been pinched out. To sum up, at the close of this day thearrangementswerethatthreecorpswouldattackeastat2030andtheVIIICorpswouldcontinuemoppingupinBrittany.

Just east of LeManswas one of the best examples of armor and air co-operation I have ever seen. For about two miles the road was full of enemymotortransportandarmor,manyofwhichboretheunmistakablecallingcardofaP-47 fighter-bomber—namely, a group of fifty-caliber holes in the concrete.Wheneverarmorandaircanworktogetherinthisway,theresultsaresuretobeexcellent. Armor can move fast enough to prevent the enemy having time todeployofftheroads,andsolongashestaysontheroadsthefighter-bomberisone of his most deadly opponents. To accomplish this happy teamwork twothings are necessary: first, intimate confidence and friendship between air andground; second, incessant and apparently ruthless driving on the part of thegroundcommander.Apintofsweatsavesagallonofblood.

The spirit of themen in theEvacuationHospitalswas improving and theincidence of “battle fatigue” and of self-inflicted wounds had droppedmaterially.Soldiersliketoplayonawinningteam.

General LeClerc came to see me, quite upset because he and the 90thDivision were standing fast, while the 5th Armored and the 79th InfantryDivisionsweremovingonDreux.Iexplainedtohimthatthatwasthequickestway to shuffle the troops, and that I was not interested in the political

repercussions ofwho got to the Seine first. In spite of a little rough talk, wepartedfriends.

TherewasanotherscareaboutfivePanzerDivisionsatArgentan,soIwasorderedtohaltonthelineDreux-Chateaudun.However,Italkedmywayoutofthisandstartedagaininthemorning.

Onthefifteenth,PrinceFelixofLuxembourgjoinedus.Onthesixteenth,Stiller,Codman,andIdrovetoChartres,whichhadjust

been taken byWalkerwhomwemet at the bridge, still under some fire. ThebridgehadbeenpartlydestroyedbyaGermanhidinginafoxholewhopulledthe detonator andblew the bridge, killing j someAmericans, after the leadingelementshadpassed.:Hethenputuphishandsandsurrendered.TheAmericanstookhimprisoner,whichIconsideredtheheightoffolly.

Fromthere,wevisitedtheHeadquartersoftheXVCorpsatChateauneuf-en-Thymerais.GeneralHaislip had a very bad eye, due to an accidentwith aFrenchtruck,butheandthetroopswereingoodspirits.

At1830on the sixteenthofAugust,Bradleycalledand toldme to attackandcaptureTrun,intheFalaiseGap,withthe2dFrenchArmoredandthe90thand80thDivisions.HealsosaidthatGeneralGerow,whoseVCorpsintheFirstArmy had been pinched out, and whose divisions had been sent to my VIIICorpsintheattackonBrest,wouldtakeoverthesetroops(2dFrenchArmoredand 90th and 80th Divisions) as a corps, Bradley also intimated that GerowwouldtakeoverthenewattackonTrun.

Inthemeantime,IsentGaffeytoAlen$ontocarryoutBradley’sorderandstartthewar;andasBradleyhadsentforme,IarrangedwithGaythatifGaffeywastobereplacedbyGerow,IwouldtelephoneGaythewords“changehorses”andaddthetimeofattack.

Nextmorning I learned thatGerowandStaffhadarrivedat*ThirdArmyHeadquarters.IcalledGay,andgavewhatIbelievewastheshortestattackordereverissuedtoanarmycorps:“ChangeHorses0600.”1

In place of the three divisionswe lost,we got two pinched out from theFirstArmyandalsotwoRangerBattalions.

In themeantime I toldHaislip to attack and takeMantes-Gassicourtwiththe5thArmoredand79thInfantryDivisions.InthiswaywewouldcontroltheGermanbargetrafficontheSeine.

On the seventeenth ofAugust a very sad thing happened.MajorGeneralGilbert Cook, who commanded the XII Corps and had been Deputy ArmyCommanderduring themovementof thearmyfromEngland to theContinent,becamesoillfromcirculatorydisordersthathecouldnolongerretaincommand.Thiswasagreatblowto

both of us, and I acceded to medical opinion only after a very soul-searchingtime.Cookwas,andis,afinesoldierandanaudaciousleader.Hehadhungontocommandlongerthanaproperregardforhishealthjustified.Onthenineteenth,IsecuredMajorGeneralMantonC.Eddytoreplacehim.Eddyhadcommanded the 9th Division in Tunisia and Sicily and in the cross-Channellanding.

ColonelOdom1waswoundedbyasniperwhilepassingthroughthesamewoodsIdrovethroughonthesixteenth.Hewasstandingupinhispeep,havingjustremounted,whenhefeltablowoverhisheartandheardashot.Heputhishandupanditcameawaycoveredwithblood.Whenthedriversawithesaid,“Wewill get the hell out of here,” and turned so fast that Odomwas almostthrownout.Thebulletfollowedaribanddidnotgointothelungcavity.Haditdoneso, itwouldhavekilledhim.Disregardinghisownmedicaleducation,hereturnedtodutythreedaysafterbeinghit.

TheSicilianCampaignhadendedayearbefore,ontheseventeenth.On thenineteenth, incompanywithGeneralWycheof the79thDivision,

wewenttoMantesandsawtheSeineRiver.Iwasstronglytemptedtoorderthe79thacross,butdidnotdosountilIhadseenGeneralBradley.WhenIdidseehim that evening, after a long flight in which we twice had to turn back onaccount of bad weather, he not only approved the crossing of the 79th, butordered the 5thArmoredDivision of the same corps to attacknorth along thewesternbankoftheSeine,whiletheXIXCorps(MajorGeneralC.H.Corlett)oftheFirstArmycameuponitsleftrear.Furthermore,hesanctionedmyplantocross theXXCorpsatMelunandFontainebleauand theXIICorpsatSens. Itwas evident that when these crossings were effected, the Seine and Yonnebecameuseless to theGermansasmilitarybarriers.TheMeluncrossing is thesameasthatusedbyLabienuswithhisTenthLegionabout55b.c.

ColonelCodmanwenttoVannesandbroughtbackmyoldfriend,GeneralKoechlin-Schwartz of the French Army. In World War I he was one of theleadinginstructorsattheArmyGeneralStaffSchoolatLangres.Wehadaverypleasanteveningtalkingoveroldtimesandhesaid,amongotherthings,thathadhethought,muchlesstaught,atLangreswhatIhadbeendoing,hewouldhavebeenputinthemadhouse.HealsostatedthatwhenheheardanarmoreddivisionwasheadingforBrest,heknewIwasincommand.IaskedhimwhytheFrenchArmyhaddonesobadlyin1940.Herepliedatoncethatfortenyearspriortothat time the FrenchArmy had thought, taught, and practiced defense—neverattack.

Onthetwentieth,onecombatteamofthe79thDivision,XVCorps,forcedacrossingatMantes.At thesametimethe5thArmoredDivision,samecorps,

startednorthonLouviers.JustasitwasclearingEvreux,itwasstruckintheleftrearbysomeGermanarmor.The7thArmored,whichwasatEvreuxatthetime,joinedinthefightandtheGermanslosttentanksandwithdrew.However,thisfightdelayedthemoveofthe5thArmored.

InconsonancewiththeplansIhadalreadymadeonthetwentieth,Ifixedthe time of attack for theXX andXIICorps onMelun,Montereau, and Sensrespectively asof daylightMonday, the twenty-first ofAugust, so that noonewould be up in time to haltme.However, to play safe, I gave them the codeword“Proset”which,ifitcameovertheradio,wouldmean“Haltinplace.”

Ialwayshadaveryfunnyfeelingatsuchtimes.Theplans,whentheycameintomymind, seemedsimple,butafter Ihad issued theordersandeverythingwasmovingandIknewthatIhadnoreserve,Ihadafeelingofworryand,asusual,hadtosaytomyself,“Donottakecounselofyourfears.”ThesensationisverymuchlikethatIusedtohavesteeplechasing.Iwasalwaysveryanxioustoride the race, but when the saddling bell rang I felt scared. When the flagdroppedandtheracewason,myfearleftme.

When thismove started, Eddy of theXII Corps askedme howmuch heshouldworryabouthisrightflank.Isaidthatthatdependedonhownervoushewas by nature. Of course, there was nothing to cover his right flank, but byadvancing in depth—that is, one division following the other—this lack ofdefensewasimmaterial.IfIhadworriedaboutflanks,Icouldneverhavefoughtthewar.Also,IwasconvincedthatourAirServicecouldlocate

anygroupsofenemylargeenoughtobeaseriousthreat,andthenIcouldalwayspullsomethingoutofthehattodrivethembackwhiletheAirForceinthemeantimedelayedtheirfurtheradvance.

Havingcompleted these instructions,wemovedtheArmyCommandPosttoBrou,fifteenmilesnorthwestofChateaudun.ItwasinthesewoodsthatWilliewasattackedbya largenumberof ferocioushornets. It took theCommandingGeneral,theChiefofStaff,theDeputyChiefofStaff,severalsoldiers,andaboutfive gallons of gasoline to bum out the hornets. Willie was very sorry forhimself,andweputsodaandwateronhiswounds.

About this time Colonel Nixon secured three complete fuses for the V-lbombsfrommaterielwecapturedattheairdromenorthwestofOrleans.

AsofAugust21, theendof thefirst threeweeks,casualtiesfor theThirdArmywere:

Our replacements during the same period had amounted only to 10,622.Thiswasthebeginningofourconstantdwindlinginstrength,causedbylackofreplacements,whichdidnotterminateuntilabouthalfwaythroughtheBastognefight.

Duringthissamethreeweeks’periodweestimatedthattheenemyhadlost:

FromourexperienceinTunisiaandSicilyourestimateswereveryaccurate.Materiellosseswereasfollows:

TigerTank

Whilewewereatthiscamp,JudgeRobertP.Patterson,Under-SecretaryofWar, and General Brehon E. Somervell, Chief of the Army Service Forces,visitedus.

The crossings over the Seine and Yonne Rivers were successful atMontereauandSens.TheXXCorpshadnotyetgotacrossatMelun,owingtothefactthattherehadbeenaveryseverefightbetweenour2dInfantry(ColonelA.W.Roffe)ofthe5thDivisionandseveralthousandGermansatBauillet.Ifeltat this time that thegreatchanceofwinning thewarwouldbe to let theThirdArmymovewiththreecorps,twoupandoneback,tothelineMetz—Nancy—Epinal. It was my belief then, and still is, that by doing this we could havecrossedtheGermanborderintendays.Theroadsandrailwayswereadequatetosustainus.

Elements of the 5th InfantryDivision ran into someGestapo inOrleans,who,unfortunately,attemptedtoescape.TheyalsocapturedaveryfineCadillaccar,whichtheypresentedtoThirdArmyHeadquarters.

I flew toBradley’sHeadquarters to sell theaboveplan tohim,but foundthat he had already gone to see Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery on asimilarplan, theonlydifferencebeing thatheproposed touse twoarmies, theFirstandThird,whereasIproposedtousesimplytheThird.

ThecitadelatSt.Malofelltothe83dDivisiononthetwenty-first,allegedly

because anAmerican-bornGerman,who had been captured,was put on cookpolice in the citadel and had persuaded the twoGerman cooks on duty there,whowerealsofromBrooklyn,thatthebestwaytoendthewarwastopunchaholeinthewatertank.Thiswasdone,andthegarrisonwasforcedtosurrenderbecauseoflackofwater.Whethertrueornot,thisisagoodstory.

Onthemorningof the twenty-third,wehadgreatexcitementwhenitwasreported that a group of Frenchmen were in camp with a proposition. Iimmediatelythoughttheywereaskingforsurrenderandsohadtheconversationtakendown.However, it turnedout theysimplywanted togetasuspensionofhostilitiesinordertosaveParis,andprobablysavetheGermans.IsentthemtoGeneralBradley,whoarrestedthem.

Justaftertheydeparted,myfriend,GeneralJuin,3cametoseeme.HewasextremelycomplimentaryandsaidthatmydaringwasNapoleonic.Healsosaid,andthiswasmore to thepoint, that theeasiestwaythroughtheSiegfriedLinewastheNancyGap.Ihadcometothissameconclusionfromastudyofthemap,because,ifyoufindalargenumberofbigroadsleadingthroughaplace,thisistheplace togo regardlessof enemy resistance. It isuseless tocaptureaneasyplacethatyoucan’tmovefrom.InordertomakemyplanforthemovementontheNancyGapmoreworkable, itwas desirable to secure two extra divisions.Neitherthe90thnorthe80thwouldgetupintime,soItriedtopersuade

GeneralBradley to letmehave twodivisions from theVIICorps (MajorGeneralJ.L.Collins)oftheFirstArmy,whichIthoughthadclosedonChartres.When I talked to Bradley, I found out that thiswas not the case, so I had toproceedeastwithoutthem.

ColonelMuller1andIthenflewtoLavaltoseeBradleyonthequestionofsupply.Hewas at the airportwaiting forme, as he had to go to seeGeneralsEisenhower andMontgomery.Bradleywas verymuchworried, as he felt thatMontgomerywasover-influencingGeneralEisenhowerandwouldcauseallorpartof theAmericanarmiestoturnnorth.AirMarshalSirLeigh-Mallory2hadbeentalkingtoBradleyalldaytryingtoselltheidea.AfterBradleyleftandintheshortperiodoftime,abouttenminutes,whichwasnecessarytoridefromtheairporttotheHeadquarters,IhadwhatIbelievewasmygreatesttacticalidea—namely, for the Third Army to turn north, the XX Corps from Melun andMontereau, theXIICorps fromSens.This could be done faster than anythingelse.Wewould head initially onBeauvais, and could have picked up the 4thInfantryDivision,FirstArmy,whichwasclosinginonParis,the79thDivision,also First Army, fromMantes, and possibly the 5th Armored Division. AfterreachingBeauvais,wecouldhaveparalleledtheSeineRiverandopenedittothe

BritishandCanadians,andthereafterhavetakenoursuppliesacrossatMantes,savingat leastfiftypercentof thehaulnecessarytotakethemviaMontereau.General Leven C. Allen, Bradley’s Chief of Staff, was enthusiastic, so wedecidedthatwhenBradleyreturned,ifhetelegraphedme“PlanA,”Iwouldturnnorthandif“PlanB,”Iwouldcontinueeast.

If thedoingsof theThirdArmyand itsGeneral are subject to inquirybyfuturehistorians,thetwopointsjustmentionedshouldbeawarning.InthespaceoftwodaysIhadevolvedtwoplans,whollydistinct,bothofwhichwereequallyfeasible.ThepointIamtryingtobringoutisthatonedoesnotplanandthentryto make circumstances fit those plan. One tries to make plans fit thecircumstances. I think the difference between success and failure in highcommanddependsupontheability,orlackofit,todojustthat.

1Colonel, laterBrigadierGeneral,WalterJ.Muller,G-4,ChiefofSupplyforGeneral

Pattonthroughoutthewar.2Air Marshal Sir Leigh-Mallory, Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air

Forces.

TheFrench2dArmoredandthe4thInfantryDivisionenteredParisonthetwenty-third. On the twenty-fourth, the British Broadcasting CompanyannouncedthatPatton’sThirdArmyhadtakenParis.Thisseemedtomepoeticjustice, as I couldhave taken it had I not been toldnot to.Later, I found thatwhentheFrench2dArmoredenteredParis,theytoldeveryonetheybelongedtotheThirdArmyandnottotheFirst.

Onthetwenty-fifthofAugust,wemovedtheThirdArmyCommandPostto a point between Orleans and Pithiviers. Just before starting for this point,BradleywiredmetocometoChartres.TheCathedral,fromwhichalltheglasshad been removed, was not hurt in any way, and, to my mind, was morebeautiful than ever, because there was enough light inside to appreciate itsarchitecture.

Monty hadwon again, and theweight of the operationwas to be turnednorthratherthaneast.TheFirstArmywithninedivisionswastocrosstheSeineatMelunandMantes,bothofwhichplaceshadbeencapturedandbridgedbytheThirdArmy.Uponcrossing,theFirstArmywouldmoveonLille.TheThirdArmy,with sevendivisions—namely,XIICorps,4thArmored,35thand80th;

XXCorps,7thArmoredand5th Infantry; andXVCorps,2dFrenchArmoredand 90th Infantry—was to advance alone in the direction of the line Metz-Strasbourg.Sofarthingswerenottoobad,aswestillhadsevengooddivisionsgoinginthedirectioninwhichBradleyandIalwayswantedtogo.

Returning from this conference, I reached the newCommand Post ratherlateanddecidedtoflytotheXXCorps,whichIhadnotseenforafewdays.Myregular pilot (Major W. W. Bennett, Commanding Officer, 14th Air LiaisonSquadron,ThirdArmy)wasnot there,soasergeantpilotflewme.Presently itbecame very clear that wewere lost, but we kept wandering around until weflewrightoveraGermanfieldhospitalinawoods.ThisconvincedmethatwewereatleastfifteenmilesintherearoftheGermanlines,soweclimbedandgotoutasfastaswecould.

On the twenty-sixth, theSignalCorps sentpeoplearound to take“ADaywith General Patton.” We first drove to the XX Corps, which was atFontainebleau, then via Nemours to beyond Montereau and found the 5thInfantryDivision.IcomplimentedGeneralIrwinonthesplendidworkwhichhisdivision had done andhad the good luck to be able to decorate several of hismenwithDistinguishedServiceCrosses.

When, early in the campaign, I had issued orders that at least oneregimental combat team of infantry should ride on the tanks of an armoreddivision, the 5th Infantry Division complained most bitterly, stating, amongother things, that therewasnothingfor themen toholdon to. I told themthatwasthemen’shardluck,butIwassuresoldierswouldratherrideonanythingfortwenty-fivemilesthanwalkfifteenmiles.IrememberthatonthisdayIrwinwas loud in his praise of tank-borne infantry. The professional soldier iscertainlyconservative.

We retraced our steps and crossed the Seine at Melun in company withelementsofthe3dArmoredDivision,FirstArmy.Whentheyrecognizedme,allthesemenstoodupintheirtanksandcheered.

Afterleavingthem,IfoundtheHeadquartersofthe7thArmoredDivisionand told the Commanding General in very incisive language that I was notsatisfied with him nor his division as to appearance or progress. This isimportant,becauseitwaslaternecessarytorelievethisofficer.

I then returned to Fontainebleau and flew to the XII Corps, which wassituatedontheSens—Troyesroad.Whilethere,GeneralWoodcameintostatethat the 4th Armored had just captured Troyes. This capture was a verymagnificentfeatofarms.Colonel,laterGeneral,BruceClarkbroughthiscombatcommandupnorthofthetown,whereagullyordepressiongavehimcover,atabout three thousand yards from the town. The edge of the townwas full of

GermangunsandGermans.Clarklineduponemediumtankcompany,backeditwith two armored infantry companies, allmounted, and chargedwith all gunsblazing. He took the town without losing a man or a vehicle. Later, it wasnecessarytore-attacktogethimout,becausetheGermansclosedinbehindhissmallforce.

InreadingovertheaccountintheprecedingpagesoftheplacesIwentinoneday, Iamimpressedwithmyownagility.PerhapssomedayIshall figureout thenumberofmilesIdroveandflewtryingtodirect thecampaignsof theThirdArmy.I’llbetitwasaboutamillion.

Onthetwenty-seventh,theXXCorpstookNogentandcontinuedtomoveon Reims, while the XII Corps moved out on Chalons via Vitry. Higherauthoritycompelledmetoleavethe35thDivisioneastofOrleanscoveringmyright flank, although personally I did not believe you could have persuaded aGermantocrosstheLoireinanortherlydirection.IflewtoOrleans,whichwasbeing shelled from across the river in a very moderate manner. The airportnorthwest of the town was doing a roaring business. The day before it haddispatchedsixhundredairplanesandwasdoingaboutthesamethisday.Theseairplanescarriedgasolineandammunitionforourtroops.

Onthe twenty-eighth,wetookChateau-ThierryandclosedinonVitry-le-Francois, Chalons, and Reims. General Bradley came about 1030. I hadconsiderable difficulty in persuading him to let me continue the attack to theMeuse.Hefinallyassented.

Thetwenty-ninthofAugustwas,inmyopinion,oneofthecriticaldaysinthis war, and hereafter many pages will be written on it—or, rather, on theeventswhichproducedit.Itwasevidentatthistimethattherewasnorealthreatagainst us as long as we did not allow ourselves to be stopped by imaginaryenemies. I therefore told Eddy of the XII Corps to move on Commercy anddirectedWalkeroftheXXtodothesameonVerdun.Everythingseemedrosy,whensuddenlyitwasreportedtomethatthe140,000gallonsofgasweweretoget that day had not arrived. At first, I thought it was a backhanded way ofslowinguptheThirdArmy.Ilaterfoundthatthiswasnotthecase,butthatthedelaywasduetoachangeofplanbytheHighCommand,implemented,inmyopinion,byGeneralMontgomery.

IsawBradley,GeneralH.R.Bull(GeneralEisenhower’sG-3),andAllen,Bradley’sChiefofStaff,atChartreson the thirtieth. Ipresentedmycaseforarapid

advance to theeast for thepurposeofcutting theSiegfriedLinebefore itcouldbemanned.Bradleywasverysympathetic,butBulland,Igather,therestofSHAEF’s1Staff,didnotconcur.

Itwasmyopinionthenthatthiswasthemomentouserrorofthewar.SofarastheThirdArmywasconcerned,wenotonlyfailedtogetthebackgasdueus,butgotpracticallynomore,because, inconsonancewith thedecision tomovenorth,inwhichtwocorpsoftheFirstArmyalsoparticipated,allsupplies—bothgasolineandammunition—hadtobethrowninthatdirection.

In addition to this, the air lift, onwhichwehadpreviously counted for agoodproportionofoursupplies,wasbeingdivertedtofeedtheParisians;whileothertransportplaneswerebeingassembled,unknowntomeatthetime,foranairdropinfrontoftheTwenty-FirstArmyGroup.Finally,asalaststraw,ComZ2usedseveraltruckcompaniestomovetheirHeadquartersfromCherbourgtoParisatthisverydate.

Afterreceivingtheaboveheartbreakingnews,IwenttoournewCommandPostatLaChaume,nearSens.ThereIfoundthatEddyhadobtainedpermissionfromGaffey tohalt atSt.Dizier,becausehe said that tocontinuebeyond thatpointwould findhis tankswithoutanygasoline. I immediatelycalledhimandtoldhimtocontinueuntilthetanksstopped,andthengetoutandwalk,becauseit was mandatory to get crossings over theMeuse. In the last war, I drainedthree-quartersofmytanksinordertoadvancetheotherquarter,andIfeltEddycoulddothesame.IwassureitwasaterriblemistaketohaltevenattheMeuse,becausewecouldcontinuetotheRhineinthevicinityofWorms.ItwasagoodtimetoquoteKipling’spoem.“If.”“Ifyoucanfilltheunforgivingminutewithsixtyseconds’worthofdistancerun...”

Toaddtoourtroubles,GeneralDeGaulleattemptedtodetachthe2dFrenchArmored,whichwasbadlyneeded to relieve the35thDivision, thenguardingourrightflank.

SupremeHeadquarters,AlliedExpeditionaryForce.CommunicationsZone,commandedbyLieutenantGeneralJ.C.H.Lee.

Onthethirty-firstofAugust,IflewwithGeneralBradleytoMorlaixonthenorthwestern end of the Brittany Peninsula. From there we drove to theHeadquartersof theVHICorpsandthenontoPlougastel—DaoulasPeninsula,whichisjustsoutheastofBrest,andmetMiddleton.HewasnotsanguineaboutthecaptureofBrest,andwasfullofcomplaintsaboutthelackofdaringonthepart of the infantry. Also the Com Z had failed to bring up the amount ofammunition they had promised. I told him the explanation concerning theinfantrywas that theywere tiredout fromhaving fought so long.On thewayback,ItoldBradleyIcouldnotfightonfourfrontsindefinitelyandwouldliketheVIIICorpsturnedovertosomeoneelse,Bradley,asusual,hadbeenthinkingthesamething.Itwasquiteremarkableduringthiswarhowoftenthesameideas

struckbothofus.Spent thenightwithBradleyandSimpson.1SimpsonwastotakeovercommandofthetroopsinthePeninsula,withtheideaofusingthe94thDivision,whenitarrived,torelievethe6thArmoredDivision.

On the second of September, at Chartres, General Eisenhower gaveBradley, Hodges, and myself his plan, which was to support Montgomery inclearing thePasdeCalais area.We toldhim that theThirdArmyalreadyhadpatrols on the Moselle in the vicinity of Nancy, and that patrols of the 3dCavalryhadenteredMetz.

We finally persuadedGeneralEisenhower to let theVCorps of theFirstArmyand theThirdArmygoon and attack theSiegfriedLine as soon as theCalaisareawasstabilized.Untilthattimewewouldbeabletogetverylittlegasorammunition.HewasimpressedwiththethoughtofagreatbattleofGermany.PersonallyIdidnotbelieve,andsostated, that therewouldbeagreatbattle ifwepushedrighton.ItfinallyendedupwithpermissiontosecurecrossingsovertheMoselle andprepare to attack theSiegfriedLinewhenever I couldget thefueltomove.

OnthethirdofSeptember,IvisitedtheXIICorpsatLigny-en-Barroisandexplainedournewplan toEddy. Iwasdelighted to learnhehadcapturedonehundred thousandgallons of aviationgasoline and so couldmoveon; also sixhundredthousandpoundsofmeat.

1LieutenantGeneralW.H.Simpson,CommandingGeneral,NinthArmy.

WethendroveviaCommercyto theHeadquartersof the80thDivisionatGironville.Manyofthetownswepassedwereprettywellsmashedup.GeneralMcBride seemed to be in good form and theColonel of his leading regiment,Davidson,4hadthesituationverywellinhand.FromthisRegimentalCommandPost, Montsec stood well out to our left front, while Apremont, Pannes, andEsseywere all round andvery reminiscent of the time—twenty-sixyears, lessnine days before—when we attacked in this region. Montsec has a hugemonument to our dead. I could not help but think that our delay in pushingforwardwouldprobablyresult,afterduecourseoftime,intheerectionofmanyothersuchmonumentsformenwho,hadwegonefaster,wouldnothavedied.Some weeks afterward, I went over this same ground withMr. Byrnes, laterSecretaryofState.

Onthewayback,westoppedofftoseeColonelClark,CombatCommander

ofthe4thArmoredDivision,andlearnedthatatVitryhehadperformedanotherremarkable feat of arms.As they approached the town, a French civilian toldhimthatthebridgewasattheendofacertainstreetandwascoveredonthefarsideby fourGerman88’s, placedhub tohubon a causeway leading from thebridge.Clarkchargedintothetownwithacompanyoflighttanks,firinginalldirectionsandthrowinghandgrenades,rushedacrossthebridge,smotheringthegunners with fire, and actually knocked the 88’s off the causeway withoutreceivinganyvehicularcasualties.

SinceourprogressfromnowonhadtobealongthelinesofwhatGeneralAllencalls the“rocksoup”method, Iwilldescribe it.A tramponcewent toahouse and asked for some boiling water to make rock soup. The lady wasinterestedandgavehimthewater,inwhichheplacedtwopolishedwhitestones.Hethenaskedifhemighthavesomepotatoesandcarrotstoputinthesouptoflavoritalittle,andfinallyendedupwithsomemeat.Inotherwords,inordertoattack,wehadfirsttopretendtoreconnoiter,thenreinforcethereconnaissance,and finally put on an attack—all dependingonwhat gasoline and ammunitionwecouldsecure.

M5A1

Therewasarumor,which,officially,Ihopedwasnottrue,thatsomeofour

Ordnance people passed themselves off as members of the First Army andsecuredquiteabitofgasolinefromoneofthedumpsofthatunit.ToreversethestatementmadeabouttheLightBrigade,thisisnotwarbutismagnificent.

Asoftheendofthefourthweek,casualtiesfortheThirdArmywere:

OurestimateoftheGermanlosseswas:

WhenwemovedourCommandPost to a point southeast ofChalons,wewere visited by Mrs. Anna Rosenberg of the War Mobilization andReconversionOffice.ApparentlyWilliewasmuchoutragedatherappearanceinaverytightpairofslacks,sogentlybutfirmlyinsertedhisteethintoherleg.Shetookitingoodpart.

OnthefourthofSeptember,welearnedfromBradleythat,thesituationinthe north having been stabilized, wewould now get our half of the available

supplies,andcouldcrosstheMoselleandforcetheSiegfriedLine.Alsothatwewere to get the 2d French Armored and 79th Infantry at once, and the 6thArmored and 83d Infantry as soon as they were relieved by elements of theNinthArmy.Thereturnofthe2dFrenchand79thgavebacktotheThirdArmythe XV Corps which we had lost with great regret after crossing the Seine.GeneralHaislip,theCorpsCommander,cameandwasasdelightedtobebackasweweretohavehim.

Pending the arrival of the XV Corps east of Troyes, I had to hold theshoulder fromNeufchateau toNancywith theXIICorpsandat the same timesecureacrossingovertheMoselleatToulandPont-à-Mousson.AssoonastheXVCorpswasoperational,theXIICorpswastoadvancealongthelineNancy—ChateauSalins, theXVCorpsattacking inechelon to its right rear,crossingtheMosellesouthofNancy,probablyinthevicinityofCharmes.TheXXCorpswouldattackandforcecrossingsinthevicinityofMetz.

I drove to the front, passing throughVerdun andEtain,wherewe turnednorth and came toHeadquarters of the 90thDivision. However, we got therebefore the division arrived.We then returned to Etain and drove toConflans,whichisfamousasthebirthplaceoftheimaginaryBrigadierGerard’sHussars.Conflanswasonthefrontlineandwasbeingheldbyelementsofthe2dInfantryofthe5thDivision.Ontheeasternedgeofthetown,Ifoundacombatcommandof the7thArmored,whichhadbeenheldupforoveranhourbymachine-gunandmortar fire. Of course it was absurd for an armored unit tomake such astatement. I ordered it to advance, and then went back to the DivisionHeadquarters to expressmy opinion to the Commander. This was the secondoccasion it had beenmy personal duty to demandmore combat activity fromhim. General Walker had first noted his lack of pugnacity when we were atChartres and at that time recommended that I relieve him. In spite of myreputationasahead-cutter,Ireallyamverylong-suffering.

OnreachingHeadquarters,IfoundthatwewerehavingsometroublewiththeFirstArmyovergasoline.WealsoheardthattheXIICorpshadgotabloodynoseatPont-à-Moussonwhereoneofthebattalionsofthe5thDivisionhadbeenthrownbackforaloss.

Ontheeighth,IdrovetoLigney-en-BarroistoseeEddy,andthenontothelinesouthofToul,whereitappearedpossiblethatquiteabattlewasbuildingup.EddyandIwentuptoWood’sHeadquarters,whichwastooclosetothefront,aswecouldactuallyseethefighting,andshellsweredroppingacrosstheroadfromwherewesat.Itwasveryrefreshingtofindamanwhogotupthatclose.

On the ninth, General Bradley agreed to let the 83d Infantry and 6thArmored Division go up, after which we had quite a conversation about the

Brestoperation.Weboth felt that the takingofBrest at that timewasuseless,becauseitwastoofarawayandtheharborwastoobadlydestroyed.Ontheotherhand,we agreed that,when theAmericanArmy had once put its hand to theplow,itshouldnotletgo.Therefore,itwasnecessarytotakeBrest.

On this same day I sawMadame deVaux and her son in Paris,my firstvisit. I hadknown them inBourg1 twenty-sevenyearsbefore.After lunch shetookme to seeGeneral Serigny, Petain’s old Chief of Staff, who had brokenwithPetainasaresultofthelatter’sactions,Serigny,whomIhadknownintheoldwar,wasverygushingandsaidthat,whileheadmiredGeneralPershing,mytacticswereathousandtimesbetter.Ofcourse,thiswasmoreFrenchthanfact.AlsothemobilityofthepresentarmiesisgreaterthananythingGeneralPershinghad.Hadhe possessed ourmobility, I am sure hewould have gone as fast orfaster.

On the night of the ninth of September, the Command Post of the 90thDivisionwas attacked by theGermans andGeneralMcLain awoke to find anenemytankfiringatadistanceofabout twenty feet.Fortunately, the tankwasnotfiringathim;itapparentlybelongedtoagroupthatwaslost.Theywentbackandrejoinedtherestofthedivisionandattackedatdawn.However,McLain,agreat fighter, had notwasted his time and as a result of the second attack theGermanslostfortytanksandninehundredmenkilled.OneofthefewtankstoescapewasaPanther.Isawthetrackswhereithadgonestraightintoourline,obliviousofwhatwecoulddotostopit,andthenturnedsharplytotheleftonaroadleadingtoGermany.Itdisappearedinacloudofdustandsparkswhereourtracerswerehittingit.

We learned that the XV Corps would attack along the line Chaumont—Neufchateau—Luneville at 0800 on the eleventh.While the XII Corps had ahard fight east of the river and south of Nancy, it continued to progress. Astrange thing about this river crossing was that one regiment received heavyresistanceandconsequentcasualtiesandthenextregimentonitsrightreceivednoresistanceandnocasualties.Inthebooks,wewouldhavestoppedtheattackwhere the resistancewasandpushed theattackwhere thegoingwaseasy,butthebooksdon’tconsider thedifficultyofcommunicationand thedifficulty,ordanger,ofstoppinganightattackonceithasbeenlaunched.

The XX Corps got some infantry across south of Metz, and the 90thDivisionwaspushinguptowardtheriverfromMetztoThionville.Elementsofthe2dFrenchheadquarters,1stU.S.TankBrigade,1918.

Armored Division, XV Corps, made contacts with elements of the 1stFrench InfantryDivision, SeventhArmy, in the vicinity of Sombernon on thetenth.

While flying over France, I was continually struck with the amount ofhumaneffortthathadbeenspentintheconstructionoftrenchesandotherlethalagentsduringboththisandWorldWarI.Apacifistcouldgetasplendidtextforasermononhumanfrailtyfromsuchmonumentstotheevilofwar.Buthecouldget evenbetter arguments against himself by looking at the cemeteries,whereeachlittlewhitecrossatteststothehumanfollywhichhasinvariablyresultedinmorewars.

ThetwentythousandGermanswhosurrenderedtotheNinthArmyontheeleventhstatedthattheywisheditspecificallyunderstoodthattheysurrenderedtotheThirdArmyandXIXTacticalAirCommandandnottotheNinthArmy.

Onthetwelfth,wehadameetingatTwelfthArmyGroupHeadquartersonthequestionofsupply.AsColonelR.W.Wilson,G-4ofFirstArmy,wasthere,I watched my step very carefully. He had been my G-4 in the II Corps.WelearnedthatMontgomeryhadtoldEisenhower that thedelayin theadvanceoftheAmericanVIICorpshadbeenduetolackofgasoline.Thiswasnotthecase;itwassimplyanotherinstanceofMontytryingtoforceeverythingtothenorthtoattack the LowCountries and the Ruhr. If the High Command yielded to hisblandishment,therewouldbenothingleftfortheThirdArmytodobutholdthewest bank of the Moselle defensively, and even move the XX Corps intoLuxembourg. However, I felt that couldwe force a crossing, this unfortunatesituation could be prevented, and Bradley gave me until the night of thefourteenthtodoit.HadInotsecuredagoodbridgeheadbythat time,Iwastostoparguingandassumethemournfulroleofadefender.

GeneralHughesbroughtmeanewpearl-handled.38pistolandanewissuewinter coat,whichwasvery thoughtfulofhim.Heand I tried tovisit theXVCorps,but,owing toamistake,onlygot to its rearechelon.Bennett,with twoplanes,pickedusup thereona slopinghill coveredwithcows.Eventuallywegotoff.ThenextdayHughesandIwenttotheXIICorps,onlytofindthatEddyhad gone at daylight to the 80thDivision,whichwas heavily counterattackedsouthofPont-à-Mousson.Infact,theGermansactuallygottothebridge,buttheubiquitousColonelBruceClarkof the4thArmoredwascomingthatwaywithhiscombatcommandanddrove theGermansback.The2d Infantryof the5thDivisionandonecombatcommandof the7thArmoredwerealsodrivenoffahillnorthwestofMetzbyaGermancounterattack.However, the35thDivisionand Dager’s (Brigadier General H. E. Dager) combat command of the 4thArmoredwerewell over the river south ofMetz and advancing onLuneville.The5thInfantry,lessthe2dInfantry,gotacrosssouthofMetz.

Whilemakingthistour,HughesandIsawaverynicetankfightatarangefrom one thousand to fifteen hundred yards.We were in a plum orchard, so

couldcombinebusinesswithpleasure.IntheforegroundweretwoGermantanksburningbrightly,whilebeyondthemthreeofourtanksweregoingupagainstaline of woods. We could see the gun flashes and could tell the differencebetweentheAmericanandGermanmachineguns.Therateoffireofthelatterismuch higher than ours.We then drove to theHeadquarters of theXVCorps,whichwehadfailedtofindonourlastattempt.Theyhaddoneanexcellentjobtaking Neufchateau and by-passing Chaumont. Also, they secured a crossingovertheMoselleatCharmes.ArchbishopSpellmanvisitedusthatevening.

BytheeveningofthefourteenthIhadmadegoodmypromisetoBradleyand had secured, in both his opinion andmine, a good bridgehead across theMoselleandfeltthatIcouldstill,withluck,keepedgingtowardtheeast.

Wemoved toanewCommandPost fivemiles southofEtain,whichhadbeen theGermanrailhead for theVerdunoperation inWorldWar I; therefore,thetownandthesurroundingcountryhadbeenveryheavilyshelled.Infact,thetownhadbeen completely rebuilt in 1921withAmericanmoney.On thewaythere I stopped for lunch at Verdun with General Bradley and General Bull.Bradley was quite depressed, because apparently Montgomery had againsucceededinpersuadingtheHighCommandtomoveallthesuppliestotheFirstArmy,leavingtheThirdArmytohold;butBradleythoughtthattheThirdArmycouldpushon.Evenmoredepressingwasthenewsthat

onecorpsoftwodivisionsfromtheTwelfthArmyGroupwastogototheSeventhArmywhich at themoment had but one corps. Then Simpson of theNinthArmywastogetsevendivisionsandtheFirstandThirdArmiesweretobe raised to nine infantry and three armored divisions. At that time, beingoptimistic,Ifeltthatthewarwouldbeoverbeforewegotthetroops.Actually,during the Bulge I commanded seventeen divisions and, in April-May, 1945,eighteen.

While all this discussion was going on, we received a very welcomemessage thatNancy had fallen and that theXVCorps had destroyed the 16thGerman InfantryDivision (General Lieutenant ErnstHaeckel), including sixtytankswhile these tankswere in the act of attacking the right flank of theXIICorps.TheXVCorpshadgoneovertheMoselleatCharmesforthepurposeofstoppingthisattack,andhadarrivedintime.

WhiletheCommandPostwasatEtain,IvisitedtheVerdunbattlefieldsofWorldWarI,particularlyFortDouaumont.Thisisamagnificent,thoughfutile,monumenttoheroism.Youcanseeallovertheruinousfragmentswherebravemen died tomaintain something they could have savedmuchmore easily byattacking.TomeDouaumontepitomizesthefollyofdefensivewarfare.

At this time it appeared that there was a possibility of the XII Corps

breaking through,and Iplanned that, in suchanevent, Iwouldgive it the7thArmoredDivisionand let theXXCorps,with the83d,90th,and5th,containMetzwhiletheXIICorps,with7th,6th,and4thArmoredandthe35thand80thInfantryDivisions,woulddrivethroughtotheRhine.

NextdaywehadavisitationofRussians,whomIavoidedbygoingtothefront,butI retaliatedfor their treatmentofourobserversbyfixing themaG-2mapwhichshowedexactlynothing.OnvisitingtheXIICorps,IfoundGeneralEddyquite nervous. I told him to go to bed early and take a large drink, as IwishedhimtobeinpositiontorushtheSiegfriedLine.

I was certainly very full of hopes that day and saw myself crossing theRhine. I even advisedEddy that, in the advance, he should form a columnofdivisionsand,aftersecuringthegapintheSiegfriedLine,heshouldsend

somearmor,backedbyamountedcombatteam,straightonwiththehopeofsecuringabridgeatWorms,while,-withtheremainderofhiscommand,hepushedbacktheshouldersoftheholeandmoppeduptheareabetweentheSaarandtheMoselle.“Thebest-laidplansofmiceandmengangaftagley.”

Indriving to theXIICorps viaToul,Pannes, andEssey, Iwent over thesameplaces Ihad lived inandattacked twenty-sixyearsandfourdaysbefore.Someofthelandmarkswereveryclear,butawallbehindwhichIhadlainwhiledirecting an attack wasmade of cement, whereas inmymemory it had beenstone. Possibly they had built a newone. In any event, Imust havewalked aterriblylongwayonthattwelfthofSeptember,1918.

At this same time theFrenchwere again trying to gain control of the 2dFrench Armored Division, which was kicking vigorously through its CorpsCommander,Haislip.

Casualtiesfortheseventeenth:

BradleycalledtosaythatMontywantedalltheAmericantroopstostopsothathe,Monty,couldmakea“daggerthrustwiththeTwenty-FirstArmyGroupat the heart of Germany.” Bradley said he thought it would be more like a“butter-knife thrust.” Inorder to avoid suchaneventuality, itwasevident thattheThirdArmyshouldgetdeeply involvedatonce, so I askedBradleynot tocallmeuntilafterdarkonthenineteenth.

On the eighteenth, I decorated General LeClerc with the Silver Star andalsogavehimsixSilverStarsandtwenty-fivebronzeStarstospreadamongthesoldiersofhisdivisions.AtthistimeColonelVennardWilson’s106thCavalryGroup reported two columns ofGerman infantry attackingLuneville from thedirectionofBaccarat.ItoldHaisliptoattackatonce.Heissuedtheordersmostexpeditiously,andsinceWychehappenedtobethere,everythingstartedatonce.

I then went to see Eddy at Nancy and found him unworried. He wassendingCombatCommand“B”ofthe6thArmored,whichhadclosedatToul,onLuneville to stop the counterattack. Iwasdetermined that the attackof theXII Corps on the Siegfried Line should go on in spite of what happened atLuneville.IwasalsogladtofindthattheXIIandXXCorpshadmadephysicalcontactnorthofPont-à-Mousson.

WhengoingoveranEngineerandG-2studyoftheSiegfriedLine,Ifoundthatthetwoplacesalreadypickedforaprobablybreak-throughbyastudyoftheroadmapexactlyaccordedwithwhatameticulousstudyofcontouredmapshaddeveloped.

Thenineteenth,insteadofbeingthedayIhopeditwouldbe,wasbad.The35thDivisionhadbeenpushedoffahillnortheastofNancy,sotheenemyhadobservation and could fire into the town.The 4thArmoredwas being heavilyattackedandtheXVCorpshadnotyetreachedLuneville.TocheerEddyup,Itoldhimtwostories: first, thatGrantoncesaid,“Ineverybattle therecomesatime when both sides consider themselves beaten; then he who continues theattackwins”;second,whatLeeissupposedtohavesaidatChancellorsville,“Iwastooweaktodefend,soIattacked.”Asaresult,Eddyretookthehillatonce.

He and I then drove out to seeWood.Wemet him right upwith BruceClark’s Combat Command, which had just destroyed twenty tanks. Sincecrossing theMoselle, Clark had killed seven hundred, taken fourteen hundredprisoners, and destroyed seventy tanks and twenty-seven guns. It was veryapparent thatWood’s division was spread pretty thin, but I still believed weshould continue the attack. This I felt was particularly true against Germans,because as long as you attack them they cannot find the time to plan how toattackyou.

On the twentieth, at Bradley’s Headquarters, I saw a map study whichcompletelyconfirmedthelineofadvancewhichBradleyandIhadfavoredsincethebeginning,namely,todrivethroughwithtwocorpsabreastandthethirdoneecheloned to the right rear on the general axis, Nancy—Chateau Salins—Saarguemines—Mainz or Worms, then northeast through Frankfurt. It wasevident that the Third Army should have an increase of at least two infantrydivisions and retain four armored divisions. I was convinced then, and havesincediscoveredIwasright,therewerenoGermansaheadofusexceptthosewewereactuallyfighting.Inotherwords,theyhadnodepth.ItwasonthisdaythatIdefinitelydecidednot towaste capturingMetz,but to contain itwith as fewtroopsaspossibleanddrivefortheRhine.

Onthetwenty-first,thingspickedupsofarasfightingwasconcerned,butone ofmy staff,who had beenwithGeneralDevers’ SixthArmyGroup, hadheardDev-ers remark thathewasgoing to takea lotof troops from theThirdArmy, so I flew to Paris to argue against itwithGeneral Eisenhower. Eventsprovedmytripuseless,butatthetimeIthoughtIhaddonesomething.

ThenextdayCodman,Stiller,andIvisitedthe90thDivisionandthe358thInfantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Christian Clark, who had beenGeneral Drum’s Aide in 1936. We then picked up Colonel Polk of the 3dCavalryGroupandwenttothefarleftofourline,whereweweretheonlythingbetween the flankand theGermans.During thisdrivewepassedsomeallegedFrench soldiers whowere undisciplined and unarmed and solely interested ineatingAmericanrations.Idecidedtogetridofthem.

The twenty-thirdwas one of the bad days ofmymilitary career.BradleycalledmetosaythathigherauthorityhaddecidedthatIwouldhavetogiveupthe6thArmoredandalsoassumeadefensiveattitude,owingtolackofsupplies.GeneralDevershadtoldGeneralEisenhowerthathecouldsupplytheXVCorpsviaDijonbyOctober1,andthereforedemandedit.ButBradleyandIfeltthathewouldeventuallygetit,whichhedid.WhenItoldmysorrowstoGeneralGay,he said, “What price glory?” meaning that after the Moroccan victory, theTunisianvictory,theSicilianvictory,andfinallynowinFrance,wehadalwaysbeenwhittleddown.However,Ihadtheoptimismtorememberthatallthroughmylife,everytimeIhadbeenbitterlydisappointed,itworkedforthebest.Itdidinthiscase,althoughatthetimeIdidn’tknowit.

On the twenty-fourth, Gaffey, Maddox,5 and I met the three CorpsCommanders,Eddy,Haislip,andWalker,atNancy(Headquarters,ThirdArmy),andarrangedadefinitedefensivefronteastoftheMoselle.Wealsoalsoselectedsuccessivepointsalongthisfrontatwhichwewouldattackonthe“rocksoup”plan,ostensiblyforthepurposeofsecuringajump-offline—actuallyhopingfor

a break-through.GeneralHaislipwas depressed at the prospect of leaving theThirdArmyandweweredepressedatthethoughtoflosinghim.

A very fine feat of air co-operation occurred on the twenty-fourth. Fivetanks of the 4th Armored were being attacked by some twenty-five Germantanks,andtheonlythingwecouldsendtotheirhelpwasair.Theweatherwasunflyable according to all standards, but General Weyland ordered twosquadronstoattack.Thistheydid,beingvectoredinbyradarataheightofnotoverfifteenfeetfromtheground.Havinglocatedtheenemy,theyskip-bombedand also strafedhim.While this fightingwasgoingon, thepilots hadno ideathat they could ever land andyet carried out their jobmagnificently.Actuallythey did land successfully far back in France,where they found a hole in theclouds. One of the officers who led this attack was named Cole, and IsubsequentlyheardthathehadreceivedtheMedalofHonor.Hedeservedit.

ThecasualtyreportasofSeptember24was:

—————

1Lieutenant Colonel Charles Odom, on Medical Staff of Third Army

Headquarters.

2Theseandothersetsoffiguresinfollowingchaptersaretakenfromfigures

posteddailyonthe“situationmap”keptatThirdArmyHeadquarters.Theywereasaccurateasthereportsatthetimecouldindicate.

3Lieutenant General A. Juin, Chief of Staff of the -National Defense of

France.4Colonel O. L. Davidson, Commanding Officer of the 319th Infantry

Regiment,80thInfantryDivision.5ColonelH.G.Maddox,G-3,ThirdArmy,withGeneralPattonthroughout

thewar.

2FORCINGTHELINEOFTHEMOSELLE

25Septemberto7November,1944The period of Third Army activities covered within the dates of this

campaign was the most unproductive and uncompensatory in its history.Weather and restrain-ing directives seemed to join hands in impeding theprogressofitstroops.Aftertwomonthsofrapidadvancesandoffensivewarfare,unitswerecalledupontotakelimitedobjectivesandtofighttheelements.

Inspiteoftheabove,andwiththefutureinmind,thefrontimprovedfromthe insecure bridgeheads of September 25 to secure bridgeheads, wellestablished,withsufficientareataken,andfromwhichsuccessfulattackscouldbelaunched.(SeeMap,138.)

Duringthisperiod,GermanresistanceincreasedonotherEuropeanfronts.General Montgomery's Twenty-First Army Group spent the period clearingenemy troops from the port of Antwerp and theWalcheren Islands. The FirstArmy, after clearing Aachen, continued to buck increasing resistance in theSiegfried Line. In the VosgesMountains, the going was rugged and slow forGeneral Devers* Sixth Army Group (American Seventh and French FirstArmies).TheRussians enteredCzechoslovakiaand clearedBudapest. In Italy,the advance to the Po Valley proceeded slowly. The air forces continued topoundGermanairfieldsandindustrialcenters.

P.D.H.

TheFlood

TheperiodfromSeptember25toNovember7,wasadifficultonefortheThirdArmy.Forthefirsttimeinourexperiencewewerenotadvancingrapidly,if at all.We were fighting, with inadequate means, against equal or superiorforces in excellent defensive positions, and the weather was against us. OnSeptember 25, I received from General Bradley a Top Secret documentreiterating the fact thatwewere toassume thedefensive. Itwasnothingbut awrittenrestatementoftheinformationIhadreceivedsomedaysbefore.Inordertomakeitamatterofrecord,.1drewupandgavetoGeneralBradleymyplanfor occupying a defensive position and enlarging the bridgehead over theMoselle River. The whole plan was based, as stated in the last chapter, onmaintaining the offensive spirit of the troops by attacking at various pointswhenevermymeanspermittedit.

Onthetwenty-sixth,ColonelCodman,ColonelCampanole,andIdrovetoGondrecourt for the purpose of locating a Madame Jouatte, who had beenGeneralMarshall’slandladyin1917.GondrecourthadnotchangedatallsinceIhad last seen it, but the family we were in search of had gone to SouthernFrance.However, themayor,whohad two charmingdaughters, gaveus somewine,andoneofthegirlsplayedthepiano.

FromGondrecourtwedrove,viaNeufchateau,toChaumontandhadlunchat the Hotel de France, where General Pershing, General Harbord, deChambrun,1andIlunchedinthefallof1917whenwevisitedChaumontforthefirst time and selected it asHeadquarters for theAEF.The same peoplewererunning the hotel—only one generation younger.They offered us someof thesame kind of meat we had had in 1917. After lunch we visited GeneralPershing’s house in town and also the barracks which had housed ourHeadquartersfortwoyears.

Some fifteen days before, the XV Corps, Third Army, recapturedChaumont, ourAir Force had attacked and ruined the barracks.However,mylittleofficebythegatewasintact.Iratherlikeit,asitwastheseatofmyfirstconsiderable command as Commandant of General Pershing’s Headquarters,AmericanExpeditionaryForce.

While at the barracks,ColonelCampanole received a horrible shock.AllthewaydownhehadbeentellingusofabeautifulFrenchgirlhehadknown,in1917and1918,andwhomhehadhighhopesofagainmeeting.This ladywasconnected with the police in some manner, so at the barracks I asked a

policeman if he knew her, explaining that she was a great friend of ColonelCampanole’s. The policeman, with more candor than politeness, turned toCampyandsaid,“Oh,yes,Iknowherwell,butsheistoooldevenforyou.”

After receiving this shock, we drove to Val des Ecoliers, where GeneralPershing lived during the latter part of the war and where I was Aide to thePrinceofWales,dancedwithhimandtaughthimtoshootcraps.Unfortunately,theplacehadbeenverymuchlooted.

WethendrovethroughLangres,wherewehadnotimetostop,andontoBourg,myTankBrigadeHeadquartersin1918.ThefirstmanIsawinthestreetwas standing on the samemanure pile whereon I am sure he had perched in1918.Iaskedifhehadbeenthereduringthelastwar,towhichhereplied,“Oh,yes,GeneralPatton, andyouwere here then as aColonel.”He then formed atriumphalprocessionofallthevillagearmedwithpitchforks,scythes,andrakes,and we proceeded to rediscover my old haunts, including my office, and mybilletinthechateauofMadamedeVaux.

Thegraveofthatnationalhero,“AbandonedRear,”wasstillmaintainedbythenatives. It originated in thismanner. In 1917, themayor,who lived in the“newhouse”atBourg,bearingthedate1760,cametome,weepingcopiously,tosay that we had failed to tell him of the death of one of my soldiers. Beingunawareofthissadfactandnotlikingtoadmitittoastranger,IstalleduntilIfoundoutthatnoonewasdead.However,heinsistedthatwevisitthe“grave,”sowewenttogetherandfoundanewlyclosedlatrinepitwiththeearthproperlybanked and a stick at one end to which was affixed crosswise a sign saying,“AbandonedRear.”ThistheFrenchhadtakenforacross.Inevertoldthemthetruth.

OnthewaybacktoEtain,wepassedtheairfieldfromwhichCodmanhaddoneagreatdealofhisflyinginWorldWarI,andfromwhichtheyoperatedtobombConflans.

Thetwenty-seventhwasabigdayforvisitingfiremen.Wehadtengeneralsaltogether,ofwhomGeneralsHughesandSpaatzwereverypleasant.WealsogotdefinitenewsthatwewouldlosetheXVCorps,consistingofthe2dFrenchArmored and the 79th Division. However, we were promised the infantryelementsofthe26thDivision,MajorGeneralWillardS.Paul,andasmuchmoreof it aswe couldmove. I could alwaysmove any troops givenme, but I haddifficultyinmovingthosetakenaway.

This shortage of troops lasted for some time and was scandalous. Weapparentlyhadtoprovideeleveninfantrybattalionstoactasstevedores,andwealso had to use the motor transport of all newly arrived divisions to haulsupplies.

Iplanned to relieveelementsof the80thandallof the4thArmoredwiththe26thwhenitcameup.Thetwoformerdivisionshadhadveryhardfighting,andthe80thhadbeenoccupyingparticularlydifficultterrain.The4thArmoredDivisionrepelledthreeattacks,butaregimentofthe35thInfantryDivisionwaskickedoffahillnorthofChateauSalins.Iusedtogetdisgustedwith,andstilldeprecate,thewayourtroopshadofbeingkickedoffplaces.

Stiller and I drove to Pont-à-Mousson via St. Benoit and Thiaucourt, atwhich latter place is a huge United States Cemetery—a monument to thepacifistswhoproduced the lastwar.Wevisiteda forwardObservationPostofthe80thDivision in companywithGeneralMcBride.They certainlywerenotholdingasecurebridgehead,astherewerethreehillslookingstraightdownthevalley to thebridge. Itwasdown thisvalley, asmentioned in the last chapter,that the 80th received a violent counter-attack. In order to take the hills, wewould have to let one combat team of the 80th rest. I planned to do this byrelievingitwithacombatteamofthe26thwhenitarrived.

On the way back, I decorated several soldiers at a RegimentalHeadquarters, and also had the chance ofmaking three battlefield promotionsfromSergeanttoLieutenant.

IthenpickedupGeneralIrwinofthe5thDivisionandwedrovetovisitaforwardbattalionofthe2dInfantry.Toreachthis,therewasachoiceofgoingoverahighmountain in themudon foot,ordrivingdowna road .whichwasunderdirectenemyobservationandfireforaboutamile.Iselectedtheroad.Onthe way down, they missed us quite widely, but shelled the BattalionHeadquarterswhileIwasthere.Theymusthavepracticedontheroad,becausedriving back they dropped a salvo of four 150mm. shells; the first waswellbeyondus,thesecondnearenoughtobeuncomfortable,thethirdthrewmudandrocksalloverus, and the fourth lit about two feet from the left-hand running-boardofmyjeep—itwasadud.

Onthe twenty-ninthofSeptember,eastofNancy, Iwaspresentwhen the35thDivisionwasattackedbyportionsofoneortwoGermandivisionsandlostmoreground.The4thArmoredDivisionwasalsobeingattacked.ItoldEddytouse therestof the6thArmoredtohelpout the35th.Hedemurred,sayingif itfailed,hewouldhavenothingleft.Itoldhimthatwasaverygoodreasonwhyitshould not fail, and reminded him that Cortez burned his ships.We sent forCombatCommand“B”(Colonel,laterBrigadierGeneralG.W.Read)ofthe6thArmored,whichwaswiththeXXCorps.Itmovedinfifteenminutes.

GeneralEisenhowerandGeneralBradleycametolunchandwehadanewdrinkwe called the170. Itwashalf brandy andhalf champagne.Most peoplethoughtitwasallchampagne,sotheresultswereexceptionallygood.

GeneralEisenhowerexplainedthesituationinaverylucidandconvincingmanner. He stated that the Sixth Army Group (Lieutenant General Jacob L.Devers’Headquarters)wasnottoexceedsixteendivisionsandthattheTwenty-FirstArmyGroup (FieldMarshalMontgomery’sHeadquarters)was limited toseventeendivisions,owingtoshortageofmanpower.Itactuallydwindledmuchbelow this before the end of the war. Therefore, all the remaining divisionsarrivinginFrancewouldcometotheFirst,Third,andNinthArmies

At that time itwashisplan tohave theNinthArmycomeinbetween theFirstandThirdArmies,andtakeoverMetzwhenweresumedourdriveto theeast.

Afterhehadfinished,Imadethesuggestionthatsomebody,eitherhimselfor a very high ranking officer, be designated to arbitrate between theTwelfth

ArmyGroup(GeneralBradley’sHeadquarters), theComZ,and theAirCorpson thequestionof supplies.At that time theComZprovided thesuppliesandalso said where they were to go. Furthermore, I stated that they were tooinflexibleintheirmethods.Iffightingtroopshadbeenequallyinflexible,thewarwouldhavebeenalreadylost.

IalsopersuadedGeneralEisenhowertoreleasethenamesofofficerstothepress to include regimental commanders. The names of junior officers hadalreadybeenreleased.

AsIvisualizeditat thattime,theGermanswantedbothMetzandNancy,but,sincetheypossessedMetzandwewerenotbotheringthem,theywouldbequietthereandexpendalltheireffortsontherecaptureofNancy,becauseitwasvery apparent that Nancy, and more particularly Chateau Safins, was thedoorwaytotheinvasionofGermany.IexplainedthisinmyLetterofInstructionNumber4.1

On the thirtieth of September, I decided to take a rest, but sent GeneralGaffey to theXIICorps.At1500hecalledmeon theradio-telephone tosayIhadbestcometoNancyatonce.WhenIgotthere,Ifoundthatthe35thDivisionhadbeenpermittedtowithdrawfromthewoodswestofChateauSafins,andthatthe6thArmoredhadnotbeenputintothefightasIhaddirected.Apparentlythe15th and 539th German Divisions were attacking the 35th. As a result of asomewhat heated conference, the 6thArmoredwent in and, attacking at dawnthe next day, recaptured the hill and killed a large number of Germans. Thiscouldhavebeendonethedaybeforehadmyinstructionsbeencarriedout.ItwasveryfortunatethatGeneralGaffeyarrivedinNancywhenhedid.

1SeeAppendixD.

Thesituation,however,didnotlookwell,andIhadonecombatcommandofthe90thDivision,XXCorps,assemblewithtrucksreadytomoveonhalfanhour’snotice.Ithinkoneexplanationforthefailureofthetroopstostayonthehillwas that threeof thegeneralsconcernedhadescapeddeathbynothingflatthat same day. They were standing in a gateway when a shell came throughkillingtwoMP’sandfatallywoundingthreeothersnottwofeetfromthem.

Once,inSicily,Itoldageneral,whowassomewhatreluctanttoattack,thatIhadperfectconfidenceinhim,andthat,toshowit,Iwasgoinghome.Itriedthesamethingthatday,anditworkedagain.

Flying back toHeadquarters, we justmade it, andwe actually landed in

blackness.Thiswas not too remarkable, becauseMajorBennettwas a skillfulflier.

I called the Chief of Staff of the XII Corps (Brigadier General Ralph J.Canine)atmidnightandonbeinginformedthathewasasleep,Itoowenttobed,asIknewthesituationmustbeallright.

CasualtiesforOctober1:

On the second of October I decorated the Commanding Officers of tworegimentswhichhadretakenthehill,andthenhada lookover thecountry the4th Armored, Major General J. S. Wood, was defending. As usual with thatdivisionthedispositionswereexcellent.I thenvisitedBaade,whocommandedthe35thDivisionandhadbeenwoundedin thefight thedaybefore.He is thequietestmanunderfireIhaveeverseen.

For about ten days, we had been contemplating trying out the defensivequalities of the German forts covering Metz west of the Moselle. The 5thDivisionbelievedthatDriant,oneoftheseforts,couldbetakenwithabattalion.OnthethirdofOctober,theyputtheirplanintoexecutionandhadconsiderableinitialsuccess.However,afteraboutsevendaysofitwedecidedtoquit,astheoperationwastoocostly.

The 83d Division closed in on the city of Luxembourg on the fourth ofOctober. I drove up to inspect it, and was amazed that the whole duchy wasuntouchedbywar, save for the railroadyards in the city itself.Theremustbesomethingpeculiaraboutthestatusofthecountry,becausenobodybombedit.

This was the anniversary of the day I first started my efforts with theOrdnancetosecuretwoco-axialmachinegunsinthemantlesofalltanks.UptothepresentIhavehadnosuccess.

Onthefifth,itwasnecessarytoaddasecondbattaliontotheDriantattack.Eddycametoseemeaboutoneofhisdivisioncommanders,whohadthe

pernicious habit of commanding battalions instead of combat teams. Wediscussedrelievinghim,butfinallydecidedwedidn’tknowanyoneanybetter,so itwould be necessary to educate him.Subsequently, he becameone of thefinestDivisionCommandersintheThirdArmy.

Thishabitofcommandingtoofardown,Ibelieve,isinculcatedatschoolsandatmaneuvers.Actually,aGeneralshouldcommandoneechelondown,andknow the position of units two echelons down. For example, an ArmyCommandershouldcommandcorps,andshowonhisbattlemapthelocationsofcorps and divisions, but he should not command the division. A CorpsCommander should command divisions and show on his map the location ofcombat teams. A Division Commander should command combat teams andshowonhismapthelocationofbattalions.TheRegimentalCommandershouldcommandbattalionsandshowonhismapthelocationofcompanies;similarly,withtheBattalionandCompanyCommanders.

Ithasbeenmyobservation that anygeneralofficerwhoviolates this ruleand at, let us say, the Army level, shows the location of battalions, startscommanding them and loses his efficiency. In Tunisia, the British G-3 toGeneral Alexander, began telling me where to put battalions and it wasnecessary forme to refuse flatly to receive suchorders.Alexanderbackedmeup.

The 26th Division closed in, taking over the sector held by the 4thArmored,andonecombat teamrelieved thenortherncombat teamof the80thDivision.

TheGermansbombardedtheHeadquartersoftheXXCorpsnearConflanswitha280mm.gun.Fromthethicknessofthewalloftheshellandthesizeofthefragments,thiswasapparentlyanavalgun,probablyfiredfromarailroadcarconcealedinatunnel.

TheplansfortheXIICorpsattackontheeighthofOctoberwerecompletedandapprovedat this time.Theoperationwasas follows:The80thDivision toattackstraighteast,withitsrestedcombatteamtakingthethreehillsinitsfront;onebattalionofthe35th,withatankcompanyattached,wastoattacknorthwesttoclearthewoodsonthedivisionsector,whiletwocombatcommandsofthe6thArmoredDivisionattackednorthbetween the leftof the35thDivisionand therightofthe80thDivision.Theoperationwasplannedasaninexpensivemethod

ofstraighteningthelineandmaintainingtheoffensivespiritofthetroops.On the seventh ofOctober,GeneralMarshall andGeneralBradley came,

andafter lunch thewholeStaffwasassembledandwewentover theplansfortakingFortDriant,andalsofortheXIICorpsattack.Asusual,GeneralMarshallaskedveryincisivequestions,butIbelievewewereabletoanswerhim.Hewasverydisappointedthat,owingtoapromisetoseeMontgomery,hewouldnotbeabletobepresentontheeighthofOctobertowatchourattack.

On the eighth, I decided to fly toNancy,whichwas amistake, because,owingtotheweather,Icouldnottakeoffuntiltoolatetoseetheopeningphaseofthebattle.WhenIdidgettotheObservationPostoftheXIICorps,fourtownsinourimmediateforegroundwereblazingbrightlyandfromoneofthemtherewas a columnof smoke at least four thousand feet high.The tanks of the 6thArmoredweremovingforwardagainstthesouthernflankoftwovillages,fromwhichtheywerereceivingconsiderablefire,whileinthebackgroundtheP-47’sof the XIX Tactical Air Command were doing a wonderful job of bombing.Immediately in front of us, several hundred prisonerswere grouped in a fieldawaitingfurtherdisposition.ItwasunfortunatethatGeneralMarshallcouldnothaveseenthefight.

GermanRailwayGun

After watching this for some hours. I visited General Paul, whocommanded the 26th Division. He had been Adjutant of the 27th Infantry atSchofieldBarracksin1925and1926,whereIhadformedaveryhighopinionofhim,whichwassubsequentlyamplyjustified.FromhisHeadquarterswedrovetotheObservationPostofthe80thDivision.Thesouthernmostofthetwohillsinitsfronthadbeentaken,butthenorthernhill,whichwasheavilywooded,wasapparentlystilloccupiedbytheGermans.WhenIarrived,theyseemedcontenttolettheGermansstaythereuntilmorning.Iconceivedthistobedangerousanddirectedthehilltobetakenthatnight;thiswasdone.

Onthetenth,thethreeArmyCommanders(Hodges,Patton,andSimpson),with their G-4’s (Chiefs of Supply), assembled at ArmyGroupHeadquarters.Whenwearrived,GeneralBradleyexplainedthatMontgomeryclaimedthatthe

capture of the Ruhr was a two-army job under one commander, and that he,Montgomery, should be that commander, using his own Army and the FirstUnitedStatesArmy.GeneralEisenhoweragreedthatitwasatwo-armyjob,butfelt that itshouldbetwoAmericanarmies.Therefore, theNinthArmy,insteadofremainingbetweentheFirstandThirdArmiesandusingasitsinitialcorpstheVIIICorpswhichwasthenclosinginfromBrest,wouldmovenorthoftheFirstArmyand takeover itsXIXCorps,while theVIIICorpswould join theFirstArmywithaCommandPostinthevicinityofBitburg.TheThirdArmywouldlose the83dDivision to theVIIICorps,butwouldeventuallyreceive the95thDivisionand10thArmoredDivision.TheFirstandNinthArmiesweretostarttheattackontheRuhrassoonasammunitionwasavailable,whichatthattimewassupposedtobeOctober23.

This business being settled, asCaesar says,we thendiscussed the supplysituation,pendingthearrivalofMajorGeneralWalterB.Smith,ChiefofStafftoGeneral Eisenhower. When Smith arrived, he stated that my suggestion ofhavingaseniorofficerumpirethedecisionsoftheCommunicationsZone,astosupplies, had been put into effect, and that General R. C. Crawford, G-4 ofSHAEF,would be the officer.At thismeeting, I emphasized the fact that toomuchattentionwaspaidtotonnageandnotenoughtorequisitions.Forinstance,it is perfectly useless to get a thousand tons of gasoline when you need fivehundred tonsofgasoline, twohundred tonsof ammunition, and threehundredtonsofbridgingmaterial.YettheCommunicationsZonetoldyoutheyhad

movedsomuchtonnage.Wealsosucceededinputtingoverthepointthatammunition should be issued in kind, and thatwe should not be toldwhat toshoot,butwhatwewouldget,andallowedtouseourownjudgmentonhowtomake the savings. It was further determined that, from this date forward,ammunitionwouldbe listed inroundspergunperdayandnot inunitsoffire,becausenobodyknewwhataunitoffirewas.Webelievedatthistimethatsixtyroundspergunperdayfor105’sandfortyroundsforthelargercaliberweretheminimum. Thismeant that if the supply people could average that number ofrounds,anarmycouldmakeasaving,sothatondaysofbattlewecouldfireuptothreehundredandfiftyorfourhundredroundsof105’s.

CasualtiesforOctober8:

On themorning of the tenth, I drove toNancy in time to have breakfastwithGeneralMarshall,whohadspentthenightwithEddy.Eddyhadarrangedanexcellentitinerarywhichwefollowed,andsawallthedivisionsinhiscorps.During thedrive, Ihadanopportunityof arguing for stars forColonelsBruceClark (later Brigadier General, Combat Command Commander, 4th ArmoredDivision) and George W. Read (later Brigadier General, Combat CommandCommander,6thArmoredDivision).Onthewaybackfromthe35thDivision,twosalvosofenemyshellhitonthemountainaboveus,aboutthree

hundredyardsaway.ThiswasthethirdtimeIhadbeenshelledonthatroadanditseemsprobablethattheenemyhadgoodobservation,orelsearadio.

After leaving theXIICorps,we inspected thedivisionsof theXXCorps,accompaniedbyGeneralWalker.Whenwevisitedthe90thDivision,IwasveryemphaticinpraisingGeneralMcLain.Afterweleft,GeneralMarshallstatedhehadhopesofbeingabletogiveMcLainacorps.DuringthecourseofthedayIhadseveralopportunitiestotalkatlengthtoGeneralHandy,1whichwasalwaysapleasuretome.

On the eleventh, we decided to abandon the attack on Driant. Theammunitionsupplyatthistimewasextremelyprecarious,averagingaboutsevenroundsperdayforthe*155’sandnotmuchmorethantwicethatforthe105’s.

On the twelfth, atGeneralBradley’s invitation, Iwent toVerdun tomeetMr. J.F.Byrnes,SecretaryofState, and, asBradleyhad togo to seeGeneralEisenhower,IspenttherestofthedaytakingMr.ByrnesoverthebattlefieldsoftheSt.MihielandMeuse—Argonne.Ifoundhimoneofthemostinterestingand

well-informedmenIhaveevermet,andenjoyedhiscompanyandcomments.Onthethirteenth,wemovedtheCommandPosttoNancy,wherewewere

very well established in a German barracks. This was one of six barracksoriginallybuiltbytheFrench,whichhadbeenbombedatourrequestwhenweweretakingNancy.Fortunatelyforus,thebombinghadnotbeenveryeffective;whenSpaatzsawithesaidhehopedIwouldnever tellanyone theAmericanshaddoneit.

On the fourteenth, General Eisenhower invited all Corps and ArmyCommanderstocometotheHeadquartersoftheFirstArmy,eastofLiege,andlunchwithKingGeorgeofEngland.AfterthedepartureofHisMajesty,GeneralEisenhowergaveusapeptalkonkeepingupthespiritoftheoffensiveandalsoonnotcriticizing theCommunicationsZone.Under thecircumstances,bothofthesethingswereeasiersaidthandone.

Onthefifteenth,accompaniedbyGeneralEddyandGeneralWood,Igavethe officers, and asmany non-commissioned officers and privates of the 26thDivision aswe could collect, my usual pep talk. I particularly emphasizedmarching fire. This division was one of the first to adopt the doctrines Iadvocate,andthroughoutitsfightingsecuredgoodresultswithsmallcasualties.

1LieutenantGeneralT.T.Handy,DeputyChiefofStaff,UnitedStatesArmy.

CasualtiesforOctober15:

Shortlyafterthis,McLainwasrelievedtogettheXIXCorpswhoseformer

commander, Major General C. H. Corlett, had gone home sick, and MajorGeneral J.A.VanFleet took over the 90thDivision.GeneralVanFleet,whomade a wonderful Division and Corps Commander, had landed in Normandycommanding a regiment of the 4th Division, and had been among the firstofficers to be recommended for temporary promotion. He terminated the warcommandingtheIIICorps.

Ialsovisitedthe95thDivisionwhichhadjustcomeinunderMajorGeneralH.L.Twaddle, andgavemyusual talk to the fieldandcompanyofficers.Wedroveabouteighthours in therain thatday, inanopencar,andgotextremelywet.

On the seventeenth, Generals Gaffey and Gay and Colonels Harkins,Maddox,1Muller,1Koch,1andIwentovertheplansforthenextoperation.TheplanwastoinitiatetheassaultwiththethreeinfantrydivisionsoftheXIICorpsforthepurposeofgettingabridgeheadovertheSeilleRiver.Whenthishadbeenaccomplished, the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were to move through theinfantry.

1ColonelH,G.Maddox,G-3,ThirdArmy,ColonelWalterJ.Muller,G-4,ThirdArmy,

andColonelOscarW.Koch,G-2,ThirdArmy,werewithGeneralPattonthroughoutthewar.

The 6th Armored Division was to secure the high ground east of Metzwhile the 4th Armored Division was to go on directly to the Saar River andsecure a crossing south of Saargemund. One day later, the XXCorps was toattack,the5thDivisionsouthofMetzfollowingthe80th.The95thDivisionwastocontain—keepthedefendersoccupied—Metzandmakeafeintcrossingnorthof the city, while the 90th Division was to cross north of Thionville and befollowedimmediatelybythe10thArmored.AssoonasthehighgroundeastofMetzhadbeensecured,the10thArmoredwastoturnnorthandattackSaarburg,which,priortothearrivalofthe90thDivision,wastobeattackedbyataskforceunder Colonel J. K. Polk, 3d CavalryGroup. It was hoped that the operationwould eventuate in the capture of Metz and in the release of two armoreddivisions, the 4th and 6th, for a rupture of the Siegfried Line and subsequentassaultontheRhineRiver.

ItwillbenotedthatboththeplansfortheoperationforthecaptureofMetzandtheSaarcampaignwereworkedoutwithmuchgreaterdetailthanwereouroperations while going across France. The reason for this is evident. TouringFrance was a catch-as-catch-can performance where we had to keep going to

maintainourinitialadvantage.Inthisoperationwehadtostartmovingfromaninitialdisadvantage.

On the nineteenth, Harkins took the plans to Bradley for approval.Brigadier General R. E. Jenkins (G-3, Sixth Army Group) and Colonel J. S.Guthrie(G-3,SeventhArmy)calledtoarrangeaboundarybetweentheSeventhandThirdArmies.TheyalsowantedtoprocuretherailroadfromToultoNancy.Therewasnotroubleabouttheboundary,sincetheytooktheoneweproposed,andtherewasnotroubleabouttherailroad,sinceIrefusedtoshareit—notfromanyungenerousattitude,butsimplybecauseitwasbeingusedtotheutmosttosupplytheThirdArmy.

ThissameeveninganallegedsixtyenemyplanesflewoverNancyandouranti-aircraftgotthreecertainsandthreeprobables.Ihaveneverfoundoutwhattheseplanesweredoing,astheydidnotdropanybombs.

On the twentieth, General Patch1 of the Seventh Army asked me for atreadway bridge company for an operation he proposed for November 1. Iarrangedtogiveittohim.

On the twentieth,General Spaatz and I visitedGeneralWood and saw averyinterestingdemonstrationoftankswithandwithoutducks’feet.23

GeneralSpaatzstayedonwithWood,andIwent tovisit theregimentsofthe 26th Division, as theywere each shortly going to put on an initial show.Everythingwasinexcellentshape,exceptforthelackofingenuityintakingcareof men. I showed them how to make drying rooms, and cautioned themparticularlyaboutkeepingthemen’sfeetdry.Thisisofinterestbecause,shortlyafterward,thisdivisionhadoverthreethousandcasesoftrenchfoot.

Onthetwenty-first,MajorGeneralJohnMillikin,CommandingGeneral,IIICorps,nowpartoftheThirdArmy,reported.IwasopposedtohavingMillikinbecause Ibelieved itwrong toput anofficer in commandof a corpswhohadnevercommandedadivisioninbattle,whilealltheDivisionCommanderswereveterans.Asidefromthis,IconsideredMillikinanexcellentgeneral.

ItoldMillikintosendupalltheseniorofficersofhisCorpsStafftododutywith their opposite numbers on the Army Staff, so that, when he becameoperational,hewouldknowwhattoexpect.

Eddybroughtinhisplanfortheoffensive,whichwasapproved.ThatsamenighttheonlyV-lbombtoentertheterritoryoftheThirdArmy

hitahilleastofthecity,doingnoharm.The first attack of the 26th Division was successful, and the casualties

whomIvisited in thehospitalwere ingoodspiritsandmuchelatedover theirtriumph.

CasualtiesasofOctober22were:

Onthetwenty-second,BradleyandAllen,hisChiefofStaff,cameandwewentovertheplansfortheimpendingattack.GeneralBradley’scontentionwasthat if all the armies—that is, the two British, threeAmerican in the TwelfthArmy Group, and Seventh Army in the Sixth Army Group—attackedsimultaneously,itmightwellendthewar.Icontended,asIhadsetforthtohimin the letter ofOctober 19, thatwewere fighting three enemies.Onewas theGerman, the secondwas theweather, and the thirdwas time.Of these three Iconceived theweather to be themost important, because, at thatmoment, oursickrateforthefirsttimeequaledourbattlecasualtyrate,andtheweatherwasnot improving.As to time,everyday’sdelaymeantmoredefenses toattack. Ifurther stated there was not enough ammunition to supply all the armies, butthere was enough to supply one army, and that the Third Army could attacktwenty-four hours after getting the signal from then on. After considerableargument,IwasgivenaminimumdateofNovember5,theattacktotakeplaceanytimeonorafterthatdatethatairbombardmentwouldbeavailable.

Onthetwenty-third,WalkerandEddyhadameetingundermysupervisionto arrange the details for their attack. General Millikin, commanding the IIICorps,whichwas not then operational,was also present.After themeeting, Imadeaninspectionofthesupplyinstallations

in the vicinity of Toul, using for the first time a special railway car,captured from theGermans, thatMuller hadprovided forArmyHeadquarters.

ThecarwasreputedtobeHindenburg’s,andlaterGoering’s,specialcar.On the earlymorning ofOctober 24, theGermans opened fire onNancy

with a 280 mm. gun or howitzer, continuing to fire until 0445. Three of theshellshitintheimmediatevicinityofourquarters;none,Ishouldsay,morethanthirty-fiveyardsfrommyhouse.Onestruckthehouseexactlyacrossthestreetfromus,andtheangleoffallwassuchthatitcouldnothavemissedtheroofofGeneralGalley’s roombymore than a few inches.Nearly all the glass in ourhousewasbroken.

Iheardquitealotofscreamingintheruinsand,takingmyflashlight,wentacrossthestreet,whereIencounteredaFrenchmanpullingvigorouslyatthelegofamanwhoseemedtobestuckintheruin.Takingtheotherleg,Ijoinedinthegooddeed,withtheresultthatthemanbegantoscreamandeventuallytochokeandfinallyceasedallnoise.Oninvestigation,wefoundthathisheadwasstuckundera tableandwehadalmostpulled itoff.Aside fromasoreneck,hewasuninjured.

Whilethiswasgoingon,anoldlady,caughtintheruinsfartherback,keptscreaming,andmyFrenchfriendkeptreassuringherinthisfashion:‘1imploreyou,Madame,donotderangeyourself;becalm,betranquil.TrytorealizethatthegreatGeneralPatton ishimselfoccupyinghimselfwith the removalof thebrickssothatyou,too,maybesaved.Hehasfurtherhadthehumanitytosendforadoctorandanambulance.Iagainurgeyoutobetranquil.”Whileweweregetting theuntranquil lady, the thirdnear-missarrivedand threwquitea lotofrocks on us. I really believe that Iwasmore frightened that night than at anytimeinmycareer.

The supply situation,particularlyas to rations,gasoline, andammunition,wasexceptionallybad;somuchsothat,asofOctober25,GeneralLeeandhisadherentspaidusapersonalvisitand,Ibelieve,madeeveryefforttoamelioratethesituation.

Onthetwenty-fifth,ColonelD.T.Colley’s104thInfantryRegiment,ofthe26thDivision,madeanattack.Theywereabout three-quarterssuccessful,asaportion of the hill remained still in enemypossession.However,General Paulthought that they had had sufficient practice and directed another regiment totakeovertheassault,asof1800.Colleygotwindofthisatabout1300,wentupto his leading battalion and told them that the honor of the regiment did notpermitthemtoturnoveranincompletejob.Hestatedhewouldleadtheassaulthimself,whichhedidwithgreatgallantry.Thepositionwas taken,butColleywas shot in the right shoulder, the bullet progressing diagonally through bothlungs andemerging from the lowerpart ofhis left lung,miraculouslymissingheart and blood vessels on the way. I gave him an Oak-Leaf Cluster to the

Distinguished Service Cross which he had won inWorldWar I. He made acomplete recovery and returned, at his own urgent request, to command aregiment.

I visited the three combat teams of the 95th Division and made them aspeechoncombat.

Aboutthistimewethoughtwehadfiguredouttheobservationpostsfromwhich thepersondirecting the280mm.gunoperated, andaverycomplicatedplanwasmadefor theircapture,as theyweresupposed tobewithinour lines.Actuallytheywerenot.TheP-47dive-bombersprobablyaccountedforthegun,becausewehadverylittlemoretroublefromit.

Theammunitionsupplywasstillbad,andthegasolinewasnotsufficienttoreplacethedailyexpenditure.

The761stTankBattalion (colored, commandedbyLieutenantColonelP.T.Bates) reported to theArmyon the twenty-eighthofOctober.Thiswas thefirstofsuchbattalionstoreport.

On the twenty-eighth, I directed General Walker to stop fooling aroundwith Maizieres-le-Metz, which the 357th Regiment of the 90th Division hadbeenattackingforsomedays,andgoinandtakeit.Thiswasdonesuccessfullyon the twenty-ninth, but in the action Colonel G. B. Barth, the RegimentalCommander,receivedawoundwhichatthetimewasconsideredfatal.However,herecovered.

On the twenty-ninth,Weyland and I visited theTwelfthArmyGroup forthe purpose of securing the assistance of the 83d Infantry Division in ourimpendingattack.Theideawastohavethe83dcrossthebridgesecuredbythe90thandadvancerapidly,coveredbyPolk’scavalrygroup,totakeSaarburgandpossiblyTrier,thenreverttoFirstArmy.Afterconsiderablediscussion,Bradleyconsentedtogivemeoperationalcontrolofthe83dDivision,providedIwouldnotusemorethantworegimentalcombatteams.

Anotherpointofdiscussionwaswhetherornotwewouldhave to reduceourunitstoT/O1strengthpriortotheanticipatedassault,as,duringthelull,wehadsecuredsufficientreplacementstobeoverstrengthforthefirsttime.GeneralBradleywasvery cute about this.He said, “Youwill notice that theorder forreductionofoverstrengthtakeseffectafterthefifteenthofNovember,bywhichtimetheactionoftheenemywillprobablyhavedoneit.”GeneralWeyland,withmyassistance,arguedfor theretentionofoneof thefightergroupsof theXIXTacticalAirCommand,whichwasbeingsent to theNinthArmy,butwewereunsuccessful.

Onthethirty-first,Iinspectedandmadeatalktothe761stTankBattalion.Agoodmanyofthelieutenantsandsomeofthecaptainshadbeenmysergeants

in the 9th and 10th Cavalry. Individually they were good soldiers, but Iexpressedmybeliefatthattime,andhaveneverfoundthenecessityofchangingit,thatacoloredsoldiercannotthinkfastenoughtofightinarmor.

BeforeweleftEngland,BradleyandIevolvedtheideaofhavingoneextracolonelineachdivision,sothatintheeventofacasualtywewouldhaveamanimmediately available. This was necessary, because the difference in agebetween the regimental and battalion commanderswas such that the latter didnothavethenecessaryexperiencetotakeoveraregiment.OneofthecolonelsIsecuredforthisjobwasmyclassmate,BobSears,whoisthreeyearsolderthanmyself.Hetookcommandofaregimentofthe35thDivisionaboutthethirdofAugustandcommandeditthroughallitsfightinguntilthethirty-firstofOctober,when,inspiteofhisgreatheartandmeticulouspersonalcare,itbecameevidentthat he would have to be relieved, or die at his post. He had made a greatreputation for himself and had actually killed seven Germans with his ownhands.Ibelievethisisarecordforaregimentalcommanderinanywar.

1TablesofOrganization,thecontrollingdocumentsforthestrengthofArmyunits.

WhenGeneralSpaatzvisitedGeneralWood,asalreadyrecounted,hewasdistressedatthefactthatWoodlivedinaverywetandmuddytent,sohesenthimhisowntrailer.WehadapresentationofthistrailertoGeneralWood.Itwasa huge affair andmost luxurious. I have never seen amanmore pleased thanWood,andyetmoredeterminednottousethetrailer.

On November 2 at 1400, we had a conference of Corps Commanders,GeneralWeyland,myself, and theArmyGeneral Staff, and representatives ofthe8thand9thAirForcestomakeadefinitearrangementastowhenandwheretheAirwouldstrike in the impendingattack.Astheresultof thismeeting, theprioritieson targets,notably theMetz fortsand thewoods in frontof the80thDivision,wereestablished,anditwasdecidedthatthedateoftheFirstArmy’sattack would be called D-Day; that the XII Corps would launch its infantryattackonDplus1 and its armoronDplus2,unless the situationpermittedamore rapid engagement of armor; that the XX Corps would launch ademonstrationby the95thDivision to thenorthandwestofMetzonDplus1and the90thDivisionwould launch itsattacknorthofThionvilleonDplus2.Aftermuchdiscussion, theboundarybetween theXXandXIICorpswasalsoestablished.

OnNovember2,GeneralBradleyandGeneralA.FranklinKibler(hisG-3),cametoNancyandstateditwasevidentthattheBritishwouldnotbereadytojumpoffpriortoNovember10,andprobablynotbeforethefirstofDecember.HefurtherstatedthattheFirstArmycouldnotjumpoffuntilatleasttwooftheAmericandivisions, thenattached to theBritish,were releasedand returned totheFirstorNinthArmies.HewantedtoknowwhenIcouldjumpoff.Itoldhimthat,asalreadystated,Icouldjumpoffthedayafterasuccessfulairattack,ornot later than the eighth in the event that weather prevented an air attack.GeneralBradleysaidhewasverygladtofindsomebodywhowantedtoattack.

OnNovember3,Iaddressedtheassembledofficersandnon-commissionedofficers and a few selected privates of the three infantry divisions of the XIICorps;namely,the26th,35th,and80th.Iimpresseduponthemthehonorwhichhad been given the Third Army of being permitted to attack alone. I alsoreiterated my insistence on the use of marching fire and of all supportingweapons.

FinalarrangementsweremadethroughWeylandthat, in theevent theAircouldnotbombpriortodarknessonNovember7,theXIICorpswouldjumpoffonNovember8withoutairsupport.IhadatelephoneconversationwithBradley,at this time, on the use of 83d Division. I requested that some of the corpsartillerywith it be authorized to cross theMoselle River and support the twocombat teams in their attack. We did not get to a definite decision on thissubject.

DuetobadweatherthetentativeairbombardmentofMetzsetforthefifthwasimpossible,andthebomberswentdeepintoGermanytoreleasetheirloads.

Devers visited me that day and promised that the Seventh Army wouldsupportmyrightflank.

On the fifth, I addressed the officers of the 10thArmored 90th Infantry,95th Infantry Divisions and Headquarters of the XX Corps. Each of theseaddressestookplaceintherain.Theyweremyusualpre-battlepeptalks.

GeneralHughescametovisitmeonthefifth.Onthesixth,heandImadetalkstothe4thand6thArmoredDivisionsattheirrequest.Ihadnotoriginallyincluded them in my schedule, because I felt they were such veteran andexperienced divisions that it was painting the lily to talk to them; but theyseemedtofeelquitehurt,soItalkedtothem.Intalkingtothe4th,Isaid,makingajokeof thefact that theFirstArmywasnotcominginasoriginallyplanned,“theFirstshallbelastandthe4thshallbefirst.”

Onthesixth,ItoldthepressthattheattackwouldcomeoffonorbeforethemorningoftheeighthofNovember.Igavethemfulldetailsandaskedthemtokeepthethingasecret.Ifurtheraskedaradiorepresentativetoannounceonthe

airthattheattackwasalimitedobjectiveattackforthepurposeofstraighteningthelineforwinteroccupationandtoldhimIwouldinformhimwhenhecouldchangethisstatement.Hedidexactlyasasked,andIbelievethebroadcasthadsomeeffectindeceivingtheGermans.

ItwasstrangetothinkthattwoyearsagoontheseventhofNovemberwewereapproachingAfricaaboard theAugusta. Itblewhardallafternoon,butat1600thewindstoppedandwemadeaperfectlandingontheMoroccancoast.At1430ontheafternoonofthesevenththisyear,itwasraininghardasithadbeenforsometime.At1900,GeneralsEddyandGrowcametothehouseandarguedwithmetoholdoff theattackonaccountofbadweatherandswollenrivers. Iasked themwhom theywished to name as their successors because the attackwastogooffasscheduled.Theyimmediatelyassentedand,asusual,didgreatwork.

ThecasualtyreportasofNovember7was:

ItisinterestingtonotethatthenecessityofhaltingontheMoselleresultedin the above losses, which, had we been able to continue our advance onSeptember24mightnothaveoccurredandcertainlynotinsuchnumbers.

MateriellossesasofNovember7were:

—————

1Colonel Jacques de Chambrun, a French officer who acted as General

Pershing’spersonalliaisonofficerinWorldWarI.2lieutenantGeneralA.M.Patch,CommandGeneral,SeventhArmy.3Ducks’feetwasanamegiventoextensionsputontheouteredgeoftracks

oftankstogivemoreflotationinmud.TheyweremanufacturedinFranceandLuxembourgspecificallyforThirdArmytanks.

3THECAPTUREOFMETZANDTHESAARCAMPAIGN

8Novemberto8December,1944

Itwasnotdifficult toget the troopsof theThirdArmyoutof the lethargyproducedby the inactivityofOctober.Theywereneverdefensive-minded,andwerereadyatthedropofahattotakeoffinanydirection.

Thehatdroppedwith thebeginningof theNovember8offensive.Thoughtheelementswereagainstthem,throughOctober,ThirdArmyunitshadnudgedfarther forward into the German lines in order to gain the use of betterspringboards.

FromSeptember25toNovember7,theyhadpushedforwardanaverageoffour thousandkilometers to theeast, southofMetz,andnorthof thatcity theywerestrongenoughtocrosstheMoselleatanyplace.

Thenewoffensive to theeastbeganearlyonthemorningofNovember8.One thousand thundering guns opened the attack, which jumped off despitefloods, rain, and fog. Slow, tedious, and costly though the advance, by mid-Decemberoperationshadprogressedsufficientlytocallforanewsetofplans—anewco-ordinatedeffort—abreak-throughtotheRhine.MetzfelltotheThirdArmyonDecember13,thefirsttimeithadbeentakenbyassaultA.D.641.{SeeMappages160-161.)

This newoffensivewas planned,with the help ofGeneral Spaatz andhisEighthAirForce, for the nineteenth ofDecember. The air-blitzwas to be thegreatestofitskindyetattempted.OnethousandheavybombersoftheEighthAirForceweretopoundenemypositionsfor

three consecutive days. Orders were issued, commanders informed,replacements promised, troop movements begun, prayers offered: everythingwas inreadiness.One thingonlywasamiss—theGermanHighCommandhadnotbeenconsulted.Theresult—“TheBulge."(SeeMap,page190.)

OnotherfrontstheTwenty-FirstArmyGroupmovedslowlyagainststrongresistance. The First Army consolidated its gains. The Russians advanced toBudapest.InItaly,Ravennawastaken.TheSixthArmyGroupsweptthroughtheVosgesMountains and reached the Rhine at Strasbourg Colmar, and beyondHagenau. The Air Force continued its heavy offensive strikes. In the Pacific,Tokyo began to feel the fullweight of theAmerican offensive,while theNavy

supportedthegroundtroopsintakingLeyte.P.D.H.

StuckintheMud1

ing. I hadnot let himknow for fear Imightget a stoporder.He seemeddelighted that we were going ahead. Then General Eisenhower came on thephoneandsaid,“Iexpectyoutocarrytheballalltheway.”Codman,Stiller,andIimmediatelydrovetotheObservationPostoftheXIICorps,buttherewassomuchartificialfogandsmokefromthepotscoveringthebridgesthatwecouldsee little. At about 1000, fighter-bombers appeared in force and attacked theknownenemycommandposts.Thedaywas thebrightestandbestwehadhadfortwomonths.

I visited theHeadquarters of the 80th, 35th, and 26thDivisions and alsosawGeneralWood.Bydarkthatnighteveryunitwasonitsassignedobjectivefortheday;unfortunatelyitstartedtorain.

Visitingthefrontontheninthwasverydisheartening.Manyofthebridgeswereout;trucks,airplanes,andonehospitalplatoonweremaroonedbythefloodwaters,andthingslookedbad.However,whenIgottothe5thDivision,GeneralIrwin,DivisionCommander, andColonelA.W.Roffe,Commander of the 2dInfantry, andmyselfwentuponahill and saw1476planesof theEighthAirForcecomeoverandbombthetargetsatMetz.Itwasagreatsight.Atfirstwesaw smoke corkscrews in the air, and some of us thought theywere Germananti-aircraftrockets.Actuallytheyweremarkersfromourleadplanes.Wewereclose enough so that the roar of themotorswas very distinct, and the groundwherewewereshookconstantly.

Onthewayback,wefoundthateverybridgeontheMoselleRiver,exceptoneatPont-à-Mousson,wasout,andthattheSeilleRiverhadincreasedinwidthfrom two hundred to five hundred feet.On the other hand, I ran intoCombatCommand“B”of the10thArmoredDivision,BrigadierGeneralE.W.Piburn,nearMarslaTour,thesceneofthegreatcavalrybattlein1870,andtheywerelooking fine and moving right into action with beautiful discipline. Fivebattalionsofthe90thDivisionwereovertheMoselleRiverthatnight

Generals Spaatz, Doolittle,1 and Curtis,1 and Professor Bruce Hopper,historianfortheAirForce,spentthenight.Iwasverygratefultothem,becauseIamquitesure that thewonderfulairsupportwehadreceivedthatdaywasduelargelytothefriendshipofthesemen.

On the tenth, the river had gone down a little and the bridge at Pont-à-Mousson,whichwentoutonthenightoftheninth,wasagainusable.Thiswasvery satisfactory, as, prior to that time, I had seven divisions across anunfordableriver,andnobridges.The4thArmoredDivisionwentwelland the6thArmoredDivision,movingnortheast,caughtacolumnofGermansbetweenitandthe5thInfantryDivisionandhadabigkilling.Haislipof theXVCorpscameintoassuremethattheXVCorpswouldcovertherightflankoftheThirdArmy.TheXVCorpswasatthistimeassignedtotheSeventhArmy.

Ihadhopedtowinthisbattlebytheeleventh,asitwasmybirthdayandmyluckydayinWestAfrica.However,Ididnotwinit.

Bradleycalledupat1710and,inmyopinion,crawfishedquiteflagrantlyinforbiddingmetousethe83dDivision.Ibelievehehadbeenovertalked,eitherbyMiddletonorHodges,orboth.Iwasverysoreatthetime,andstillregarditas a great mistake. Had two combat teams of the 83d been used to attackSaarburg,thattownwouldhavefallenonthetwelfthorthirteenth,andwewouldprobably have captured Trier. With Trier in our hands, Von Rundstedt’sbreakthrough could not have occurred. This probably is another case of “On

accountofanailashoewaslost,”etc.Trenchfoot was becoming very acute at this time. In one division alone

there were three thousand cases. This could not have been wholly prevented,because themen had to ford riversmore thanwaist-deep, so that even rubberbootswouldnothavehelped.However,agooddealofthefaultwasduetotheofficersandnon-comsnot takingcorrectivemeasures. Iwroteapersonal letterontrenchfootandthesituationimproved.Iorderedthatallshoesbedubbedpriorto issue, anddirected thatprisonersofwarbeused for thispurpose.Also thatonedrypairofsockspermanbesentforwardeachdaywiththerations.Owingto the efforts of Colonel Muller, we were now practically equipped withovershoesfortheinfantry,butinsomeoftheregimentstheunfortunatemistakewasmadeof thinking that theovershoes tired themen toomuch,and theydidnotwearthemwhentheyshouldhave.Becauseofthedifficultywithtrenchfoot,it becamemore andmore evident that it was desirable to get both corps intocolumnofdivisionsso thatsomedivisionscould restanddryoutwhileotherswenton.

TheheadsoftheStaffsectionsgavemeabirthdaypartyinColonelKoch’squarters,wherewehadArmoredDiesels1todrink,fieldexpedienttype—“fieldexpedient”meaning that the adequate liquors formaking the old 2dArmoredDieselwerenotavailable.

On the twelfth, the90thDivision receivedaviolentcounter-attackby theequivalent of aGerman infantry division. This they repelled in a very gallantmanner,althoughtheyhadnotanksandnotank-destroyergunsontheeastsideof theMoselleRiver,andthebridgebehindthemwasout.However, thecorpsartillery,totheextentofsomethirtybattalions,cameineffectively.

The ammunition situation had improved, except in the case of 240 mm.howitzersandeight-inchguns.

General Eisenhower called to tell me he had removed General Silvester,Commanderofthe7thArmoredDivision,fromhiscommand,andthatSilvesterhadstatedIhadapersonalanimusagainsthim.Thiswasnottrue,becauseIhadkeptcorpscommandersfromreducinghimasearlyasAugust.

On the thirteenth, the SeventhArmy jumped off.Bradley andBonesteel2visitedmeandwedrovetotheHeadquartersoftheXIICorpsatChateauSalins.We also visited the 4thArmoredDivision, andBradley had an opportunity ofseeing how really bad the mud conditions were. Tanks actually bellied downwhenofftheroads.

Wewerepromisedtheinfantryofthe75thDivision3onDecember10andthewhole of the division byDecember 15. Also, that wewould get the 11th

ArmoredDivision,whichwasthenembarkingintheUnitedKingdom.

1Ingredientsoftheoriginal:Juiceofonelemon,sugartotaste,oneandone-halfounces

ofryeorbourbon,oneteacupofshavedice;whirlinamixer.2MajorGeneralCharlesH.Bonesteel,ofGeneralEisenhower’sstaff.3CommandedbyMajorGeneralFayB.Prickett.Thisdivisiondidnotbecomeassigned

totheThirdArmyatthistime.

At that time Bradley had the idea that, when the FifteenthUnited StatesArmywasorganized,hewoulduseittotakeovertheareabackoftheThirdandFirstArmiessoastogiveusasmallerarmyareatolookafter.

Later in the evening, we visited the wounded in the hospital, and foundtheminexcellentspirits.Theattitudeofthewoundedthroughoutthisoperationwasmagnificent.

On the fourteenth, I had to dissuade General Eddy from by-passingFalkenberg.

I visitedWalker and we inspected the 95th Division. The losses of thisdivisionsinceNovember8hadbeen80killedand482wounded.Thiswastoomanycasualtiesforthelittlegroundgained,andIsotoldTwaddle.

At Thionville we saw the longest Bailey bridge in theworld. It had justbeencompletedbytheEngineers,andwasbuiltunderfire.Somefirewasthenfallinginthevicinity,butthebridgewasnothitwhilewewereonit.Wethendrove to Cattenom and crossed a treadway bridge under a smoke screen, andvisited the 90thDivision. The crossing of the 90thDivision over theMosellewas an epic river crossing done under terrific difficulties. After they got twobattalionsover, thebridgewentoutandeverythingelsehad tocomeacross inassaultboats.

GeneralVanFleet tookus tosee thebattlefieldof the twelfth,andIhaveneverseensomanydeadGermans2inoneplaceinmylife.Theyextendedforadistanceofaboutamile,practicallyshouldertoshoulder.

The10thArmoredDivisionstartedcrossingatthisdate,sowewerereallymakingprogress.

On the fifteenth,GeneralEisenhowercame,andwevisited theXIICorpsandthe26thand35thDivisions.Hewasverywellpleasedwithwhatwasgoingon and was photographed walking in the mud, of which there was an amplesupply.

Thatnightwehadaveryamusingincident.Iwantedtohaveagoodfirefor

General Eisenhower in his room, and we had such a good one that the hotelcaughtfireandwehadconsiderabledifficultyinputtingitout.Infact,ColonelJimmyGault,hisBritishAide,andmyselfgotinquiteasweat.

AsofNovember15,theoperationwasquitesatisfactory,exceptthatthe4thAmored had been set back a little bit and the SeventhArmy had not done asmuch as we hoped. The XII Corps started to shift divisions with the idea ofgetting the 6th Armored Division ready to exploit, should they get abreakthrough.

CasualtiesasofNovember15were:

On the sixteenth, General Eisenhower left, after visiting the Ordnance andQuartermasterinstallations,andalsoahospital.

I heard from Marlene Dietrich,3 who was in Germany during the FirstWorldWar,thattheGermansusedtetanusantitoxin,orserum,asatreatmentfortrenchfoot,sowestartedtryingitonafewvolunteersinthehospital;ithadnoresults.

At Falkenberg, on the seventeenth, we learned from prisoners that therewereanumberofdelayedbombswithasmuchastwenty-onedays’delayfusesburiedthroughoutthetown.Subsequently,aboutfifteenofthesewentoff.

Eddycalledmetostatethathisallowanceofshellsfortheeighteenthwas

ninethousand,butItoldhimtogoaheadandshoottwentythousand,becauseIcouldseenoreasonforhoardingammunition.Youeitheruseitoryoudon’t.IwouldlosemoremenbyshootingninethousandroundsadayforthreedaysthanIwouldbyshootingtwentythousandinoneday—andprobablynotgetasfar.Ibelieveinfightinguntillackofsuppliesforcesyoutostop—thendiggingin.

TheeighteenthwasagreatdayfortheAir.TheXIXTacticalAirCommandstarted flying at dawn and flew until well after dark; then they sent out theirnightfighterswhichattackedsomefifteenconvoysinthedarkness.

The XX Corps made good progress. The 90th and 95th Divisions bothadvancedlongdistancesandwerepracticallywithincontactofthe5thDivisioneastofMetz.The10thArmoredDivisionwasonitsobjective.Thingslookedsogood that I could almost picturemyself going through the Siegfried Line anyday.Iwasslightlyoveroptimistic.

IvisitedtheHeadquartersofthe5thDivisionatFortLeisneinthevicinityof Vemy. The 10th Infantry (commanded by Colonel Robert P. Bell) in thatdivisionmadeanightattackandadvancedsixkilometerstocutthelastenemyescaperoutefromMetz.WhileIwasatthefort,thisunitmadephysicalcontactwithelementsofthe90thDivision,andelementsofboththe5thand90thstartedfightinginthestreetsofMetzby1100thatday.Thenightattackwasinteresting,becausetheyhadtoadvancethroughaminefield.Theychosetodoitinthedarkand, as a result, lost about thirty-fivemen.Had theyadvanced in thedaytime,they would probably have lost the same thirty-five men to mines; and, inaddition,severalhundredmentomachinegunandriflefire.

AtVemywesawaverygoodexampleofheavybombing.Whenadirecthitwithabigbombwasmadeononeoftheforts,thebombscrippledit,butnottotheextentonewouldimagine.However,theshockeffectduetothedetonationisprobablyverygreat.

The lastGermancolumn toattempt togetoutofMetzwascaughton theroad by a company of medium tanks from the 6th Armored Division, whoopenedfireonthematarangeofaboutonehundredandfiftyyards.

Ivisitedtheroadandhaveseldomviewedasceneofgreaterdevastation.Anothernicepieceofworkwascapturingthebridgeleadingfromthewest

banktoanislandintheMoselleoppositeMetz.Thiswasfoundintactandwascoveredwithairburstsuntilsometanksranoutonitanddrovetheenemyawayfromdetonatingthecharges.

I advised Bradley that whileMetz had not officially surrendered, it wasoursandthecreditforitscapturebelongedtotheXXCorps.

Onthetwentieth,weatherpreventedanyairsupport.However,theFrenchbroke through at Belfort and the Seventh Armywas going ahead excellently.

Thiswasgoodnews.OnthissamedatewemadearrangementstohavetheIIICorpsabsorbthe

5thDivisionandtakeoverMetz.ThiswouldnotonlyrelievetheXXCorpsfromlookingoveritsshoulder,butwouldalsogettheIIICorpsoperational;sothatinthe event the enemy attacked the VII Corps to our north, we would havesomething to use against him. The XX Corps, then consisting of the 10thArmored, the90thandthe95thDivisions,couldcontinuetheattackalreadyinprogress against Saarburg and initiate a second attack between Merzig andSaarlautem.Atfirstglanceanattackatthispointseemedfoolhardy,asitwasthestrongestpositionoftheSiegfriedLine.However,apparentstrengthsometimesproducesweakness,becausepeopleare inclinednot tooccupystrongpositionswithasmanymenastheyshould.

Both theXXandXIICorpswereworriedabout their insideflanks, in thevicinity of St.Avoid, each demanding that the other occupy a vacancywhichexistedthere.However,Ifeltthatitwasbettertonarrowthefrontsofthecorpsandtrust totheLordthattheGermanswouldnotcomethroughbetweenthem.AsfarasIknow,theGermansnevertriedtomakethisattack.

Unquestionably the impetus of the attack was deteriorating, due toexhaustionand lackof replacements.Theonly solution seemed tome toget anarrow front for each corps. As of the twenty-second, the final plans for thecontinuationoftheoffensivewere:XXCorps—the10thArmoredDivisionandonecombat teamof the90th—toattackSaarburgandMerzig; therestof the90thDivisionandthe95thDivisiontoattackinthevicinityofSaarlautem.The5thDivision, lessone combat teamwhichwas to remain inMetz,wouldbe areservetofollowwhicheverofthetwoattacksprovedsuccessful.

At this time the resistance inMetz had completely broken down andwewere actually shelling the remaining forts with German materiel andammunition.IntheXIICorpsthe80thand6thArmoredDivisionsweretoattackin thevicinityofSaarguemines;onecombat teamof the35thDivisionwas toaccompanythe6thArmored;the26thDivisionandtherestofthe35thweretostand fast, refit, and dry out. The 4th Armored was to attack south ofSaarbriicken.Oneoftheunfortunatethingsaboutthiscampaignwasthatithadbeen plannedwhen theweatherwas good and the country dry.Therefore, theoperationswere envisaged as of a blitz nature.When it actually cameoff,wewereinthemiddleofthegreatestfloodineightyyears.

On the twenty-third, we had a guard of honor for Generals Eddy andWalker to celebrate their respective captures of Nancy andMetz.While theywerestillMajorGenerals,wehadthebandplaythe“RufflesandFlourishes”forLieutenant Generals, and I hoped these would be prophetic. In the case of

Walkertheywere,andIbelievethatEddywilleventuallygethisthreestars.GeneralGiraud,oftheFrenchArmy,spentpartofthedaywithmeandwas

verycomforting.Hehadbeen incommandatMetz foranumberofyearsandhad studied all routes of attack from that vicinity toward Germany. He waswholly in accord with those we had picked out. He also pointed out certainpiecesofterrainwherehesaidattackswereimpossible.Atthat timeItookhisadvice,butwhentheXXCorpsattackedonMarch13,1945,weactuallywentovertheimpassablecountry.

Elements of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division (General Lieutenant FritzBayerlein)were identified between theXII andXVCorps andwere struck inflankwithconsiderablesuccessbythe4thArmored.

WehadastudypreparedfortheutilizationoftheXVCorps,asapartoftheThirdArmy,intheprojectedattackfromtheSaartotheRhine.Onthetwenty-fourth,GeneralsEisenhowerandBradleypassedthroughNancy

ontheirwaytotheSixthArmyGroupandItriedtosell theideaofusingtheXVCorps,basingmydemandforitonthefactthatbetweenLunevilleandThionville there was room for only one army, and there was just one naturalcorridor.Whilethiswasasoundargument,itdidnotsucceed.

TheshortdaysandtremendousdistancesmadeitverydesirabletomovetheCommandPostforward,but,withtheexceptionofSt.Avoid,therewasnoroadnetfromwhichonecouldcommand,andatthattimeSt.AvoidwasoccupiedbytheXIICorps. In picking aCommandPost, youmust always have a roadnetfromwhichyoucanmoveforwardtoanyportionofyourline.ACommandPostsituatedataspotwhereitisnecessarytomovetotherearisdisadvantageous.Inthisconnectionitisalwaysbest,wherepracticable,todrivetothefront,sothatthe soldiers can see yougoing in that direction, and to save time, fly backbyCubsothatyouareneverseengoingtotherear.

Speaking of flying remindsme that, whenwe first beganmoving acrossFrance,Iusedtonoticefromtheairinnumerablefoxholesoneachsideofthemain roads.On inquiry it turned out that, in order tomake theGerman truckdriverssticktotheirjobs,suchprotectionhadtobeprovided,sothatwhenourbomberscamedownonthemtheycouldjumpintoahole.Thelocalinhabitantswere required to dig andmaintain these places and they very promptly filledthemuponcewehadpassed.

PiperCub

Anotherthingwhichimpressedmewasthenumberofshellcratersinopenfields,wheretheyhadapparentlyIdonenoharmatall.Unquestionablythiswasoftenthecase,butwhenonethinkshowseldombulletsfromeithergunsorriflesfindtheirbillets,oneshouldnotbetoocriticaloftheairbombing.Ontheotherhand,practicallyalltheGermanairfieldslookedasiftheyhadhadarecentcaseoferysipelas,theyweresofullofcraters.

Onthetwenty-fifth,Ivisitedthe95thDivision.Themoraleofthemenwasgood,buttheirmethodofattackseemedtomewantinginpush.Several88’sor105’sstrucknearuson thisdrive.We thenpassed throughMetz,and itwasavery pleasant feeling to enter a citywhich had not been captured for thirteenhundredyears.

Wereceivedanumberofreplacementcaptains.Iinitiallyassignedthemtocompaniesunder lieutenantsuntil theyhad learned the ropes.While this isnotauthorizedinRegulations,IdiditinboththisandtheFirst,WorldWar,anditworks.

TheSeventhArmysentaproposedboundarybetweenthemselvesand theThird Army which would have pinched us completely out, but we finallypersuadedthemtoaccepttheboundarywhichwewouldhaveusedbetweentheXII and XV Corps had we secured the XV Corps; namely, north boundary:Lorentzen—Rahlingen —Boutin—Waltholben—Kaiserslautern—Bobenheim. IcalledGeneralHaisliptocongratulatehimonhisbreakthrough,whichhadreallybeenafinepieceofwork.

AverellHarriman,AmbassadortoRussia,visitedus,andItookhimtothe4thArmoredDivision toshowhimthat theRussianswerenot theonlypeoplewhohad tocontendagainstmud.On thisdrivewe traversed fouroldand twonewtankditches,varyingfromtwelvetofifteenfeetdeepandfromtwenty-fivetothirty-fivefeetinwidth.Alsoinnumerablelinesoftrenches,allofwhichhadbeen passed by our men, because, almost invariably, they had not beenadequately defended. The amount of man-hours used in digging these futiledefensesisappalling.Whenwewerewiththe4thArmored,wecrossedtheSaarRiverandspatonthefarbank.

Idecoratedalieutenant,who,incommandofoneofourM-4ShermanshadputoutfiveGermanPanthertanks.Ithensearchedoutthelocationofthisgreatexploitandfoundallthedestroyedvehiclesstillsmoking.Thetracksinthemudshowedwhathadhappened.Ourtankhadbeencomingdowntheroad,hugginga high bank, and suddenly saw slightly ahead, in a hollow to its right, twoPanthertanksatarangeofabouttwohundredandfiftyyards.Theseitengagedandputoutofaction;then,apparently,chargedtofinishthem,and,bysodoing,uncoveredthreemoretanks,whichitengagedatarangeofnotmorethanfortyyards.AlltheGermantankswereputoutandsowasours.

Harriman toldme thatStalin, in thepresenceof theChief ofStaff of theRussianArmy,hadpaidtheThirdArmyaveryhighcomplimentwhenhestated,“TheRedArmycouldnothaveconceivedandcertainlycouldnothaveexecutedtheadvancemadebytheThirdArmyacrossFrance.”

On the twenty-eighth,GeneralsBrereton1 andRidgway4 5 called atThirdArmyHeadquarterslookingforajobfortheAirborneArmy.IshowedthemanareabetweenWormsandMainzwhich,fromagroundstandpoint,wasthemostdesirablecrossingplace.Theystatedthatitlookedallrighttothemandthattheywouldmakeastudy.

The trouble with the Airborne Army is that it is too ponderous in itsmethods.At thepresentstage inairbornedevelopment, it ismybelief thatoneairborne regimentper army, availableon twelvehours’notice,wouldbemoreuseful than several airborne divisionswhich usually take severalweeks to getmoving.Three times in our crossing overFrance, plansweremade to use theairbornedivisions,butwealwaysgottotheplacetheyweretodropbeforetheycouldgetreadytodrop.

GeneralWalker stated that he could attackSaarlautern any time after themorning of the twenty-ninth of November, and that, while he would like airsupport,hedidnothavetohaveit.BradleycalledtosaythattheFirstandNinthArmies seemed stalled, and that, if we got a breakthrough, wewould get thesupportwhichwouldotherwisehavebeensenttothem.

Onthetwenty-ninthofNovember,IwentoverwiththeXIICorpsplanstosecureacrossingovertheSaarRiverbyusingthe26thDivisionnorthwestofthe4th Armored, with the idea of working down the east bank of the river tofacilitatethecrossingofthe35thDivisionatSaar-Unionwhich,inturn,wouldprobablypermitthe6thArmoredtocrossatthesamepoint.

IndrivingfromChateauSalinstoSt.Avoid,wecrossedtheMaginotLineandwereimpressedbyitslackofimpressiveness.Infact,elementsofthe80thDivisionfoughttheirwaythroughthispartofthelinewithoutknowingit.

The shortageof replacementshadnow reachednine thousand, and I tookfive per cent of theCorps andArmyHeadquarters troops to train as infantry.Thisproducedloudwailsfromall theSectionChiefs,whodeclaredtheycouldnotruntheirofficesifanycutwereeffected.Asmatteroffact,eventhetenpercentcutwhichwesubsequentlymadehadnoadverseeffect.

Amongtheothershortagesexperiencedatthistimewasthatofliquor.Thegoodolddayswhenwecapturedtwenty-sixthousandcasesofchampagneatonetownand fourteen thousandcasesofcognacatanother (all thepropertyof theGermanArmyandsomarked)hadgoneforever.

General Weyland and I, with our Staffs, went over the use of mediumbombersonSaarlautemanddecidedthat,iftheycouldnotbombvisuallybeforethefirstorsecondofDecember,theywouldhavetobombonOBO;1andthatiftheycouldnotbombpriortothesecondofDecember,the90thand95thwouldattackanyway.Latethatevening,Weylandcalleduptosayhefearedthat,ifwedidnotattackonthefirstofDecember,thebombersmightnotgetoffatall,soIdirectedWalkertofollowtheminonthatdate.Thiswasprobablyamistakeonmypart,asthe95thDivisionwouldhavebeenbettersetwithanadditionalday’sdelay.

1AirCorpsexpressionforbombingbyinstrumentswhenvisibilityispoor.

WhenthemediumbombersattackedSaarlautemonthefirstofDecember,onlyfourof theeightgroupssucceeded indropping theirbombson the target,and the95thDivisionfoundagreatdealmore troublegetting to the river thantheyhadanticipated.Onthesecond,tengroupsofmediumbombersdidgetin.their attack on Saarlautemwith fine effects, one of themost significant beingthattheyputoutthecityelectricplant.TheGermanswereusingelectricityfromthisplantasthepowertodetonatethebridgesacrosstheriver.Astheresultofthisbombing,thebridgesweretakenintact.

I then visited the 90th Division and the Command Post of the 359thInfantry under Colonel Raymond E. Bell. I asked him to take me to anObservationPostnorthofSaarlautem.Wedrovepartwayand,descendingfromthe cars in awood, started down a long road.Across the river, enfilading theroad,IsawaGermanpillboxwithagunofsomedescriptionstickingoutofit.IaskedBellifthepillboxwasmanned,andhesaidhethoughtitwas.Therangewaslessthantwohundredyards.Fortunately, theydidnotshoot,butwhenwegottotheObservationPost,whichwasinahouse, theydroppedquiteaheavyconcentration around us without getting a hit. I have always hated OP’s inhousesbecauseIfeelsoconspicuousintheupperfloors—especiallywhenbeingshelled.

Onthesecond,itbecameevidentthatGeneralWoodhadtobesenthomefor a rest.Thiswas arranged throughGeneralEisenhower, and I sentGeneralGaffey,thenArmyChiefofStaff,totakeoverthedivision.Itwasquiteafavortoaskofaman,buttherewasnooneelseavailable,andthenecessitiesofwardemanded that the 4th Armored have a good commander. The subsequentexploitsofthisdivisionshowedthatmychoicewascorrect.

Thesituationastoreplacementswasnowextremelybad.Inanarmyofsixinfantryandthreearmoreddivisionswewereeleventhousandmenshort,which,beingtranslatedintotermsofriflemen—andtheyarethepeoplewhogethurt—meantthattheriflecompanieswereatonlyfifty-fivepercentoftheirstrength.We issuedorders to takea second fiveper centof corps andarmy troopsandalso for thedivisions tocannibalize1 theirnonessentialunits, suchasanti-tankcompanies,toprovideriflemen.

OnthefifthofDecember,thedayafterGaffeyassumedcommand,the4thArmored Division advanced seven miles, with General Earnest leading theattack. The 90th Division crossed the Saar above Saarlautem and the 95thDivisionsucceededingettingasecondregimentacrosssouthofthetown.Whileenemyartilleryfirewasheavy,ourlosseswerenotexcessive.

On the sixth, Members of Congress Luce and Merrick, while beingconductedaroundthefrontoftheThirdArmy,pulledthelanyardsontwogunsfiringatFortDriant.Iwasverymuchputoutoverthis,because,inWorldWarI,oneofourCongressmendidasimilarthingandarousedgreatpublicindignation.

That night Generals Spaatz, Doolittle, and Vandenberg2 came, and wearranged for a heavy bombing attack on the Siegfried Line in the vicinity ofKaiserslautern.Thiswasprobablythemostambitiousairblitzeverconceived.Itwastoconsistofthreesuccessivedaysofattack,eachoneinconsiderabledepth,andeachdaytoconsistofonethousandheavybombers.Inordertoreducethe

possibility of our men being hit, we planned to pull the infantry back fourthousandyardsfromtheirmostforwardposition,sothatthebomblinecouldbeputonourformerfrontline.Inordertopreventtheenemyreoccupyingthefour-thousand-yardstripthusevacuated,weplannedtoscattertanksthroughtheareaimmediatelybehindthebombline.Thechanceofadirecthitontankswassmallandfragmentationhaspracticallynoeffectagainstthem.

IntheSaarlautemfight,the90thDivisionwasunabletomaintainitsbridge,owing to direct enemy fire, but maintained its position with great gallantrythroughtheuseofferriesatnight.

ThecaptureofMetz and theSaar campaignof theThirdArmybeganonNovember 8, 1944. On December 8—that is, after onemonth’s fighting—wehadliberated873townsand1600squaremilesofground.

1Cannibalize: to reduce the number of men in the gun crews to provide needed

riflemen.2MajorGeneralH.S.Vandenberg,Commanderof9thUnitedStatesAirForce.

Wehad taken 30,000 prisoners and had killed orwounded about 88,000.Wehadalsoaccountedfor137tanksand400guns.Ourbattlelossesduringthesame month aggregated 23,000 killed, wounded, and missing, our non-battle18.000,foratotalofsomethingover41,000.Ourreplacementswereonly30,000making us 11,000 short. To delve further into figures, during the 130 days offighting fromAugust1 todate, theaverage lossesof theThirdArmyfromallcauseshadbeen812aday;theaveragedailylossesoftheGermansinfrontofushadbeen2,700.

In order to make our date with the Air Force for the Third ArmybreakthroughtotheRhine,whichwasinitiallysetatDecember19,wehadtogetto theSiegfriedLine prior to that date, so from then on the operations on thefrontoftheXIICorpsbecameahorse-raceagainsttime.Towinthisrace,itwasnecessary tobring in the leadingcombat team(346th Infantry,commandedbyColonelN.A.Costello)ofthe87thDivision(BrigadierGeneralFrankL.Culin,Jr.)assoonasthecombatteamarrived,andalsotobepreparedtore-employthe4thArmoredandthe80thDivisionswhichhadbeenrestingforafewdays.

TheweatherwassobadthatIdirectedallArmychaplainstoprayfordryweather.IalsopublishedaprayerwithaChristmasgreetingonthebackandsentittoallmembersoftheCommand.Theprayerwasfordryweatherforbattle.6

1On or about the fourteenth of December, 1944, General Patton called

Chaplain O’Neill, Third Army Chaplain, and myself into his office in ThirdHeadquartersatNancy.Theconversationwentsomethinglikethis:

General Patton: “Chaplain, I want you to publish a prayer for goodweather. I’m tired of these soldiers having to fightmud and floods aswell asGermans.Seeifwecan’tgetGodtoworkonourside.”

ChaplainO'Neill:“Sir,it’sgoingtotakeaprettythickrugforthatkindofpraying.”

GeneralPatton:“Idon’tcareifittakestheflyingcarpet.Iwanttheprayingdone.”

Chaplain O'Neil: “Yes, sir. May I say, General, that it usually isn’t acustomary thingamongmenofmyprofession topray forclearweather tokillfellowmen.”

GeneralPatton: “Chaplain, are you teachingme theology or are you theChaplainoftheThirdArmy?Iwantaprayer.”

ChaplainO'Neill:“Yes,sir.”

Outside,thechaplainsaid,“Whew,that’satoughone!Whatdoyouthinkhewants?”

Itwasperfectlycleartome.TheGeneralwantedaprayer—hewantedonerightnow—andhewanteditpublishedtotheCommand.

The Army Engineer was called in, and we finally decided that our fieldtopographical company could print the prayer on a smallsized card, makingenoughcopiesfordistributiontothearmy.

ItbeingnearChristmas,wealsodecidedtoaskGeneralPattontoincludeaChristmasgreetingtothetroopsonthesamecardwiththeprayer.TheGeneralagreed, wrote a short greeting, and the card was made up, published, anddistributedtothetroopsonthetwenty-secondofDecember.

Actually, the prayer was offered in order to bring clear weather for theplannedThirdArmybreakthrough to theRhine in theSaargueminesarea, thenscheduledforDecember21.

TheBulgeputacrimpintheseplans.Asithappened,theThirdArmyhadmovednorthtoattackthesouthflankoftheBulgewhentheprayerwasactuallyissued.

PRAYER

AlmightyandmostmercifulFather,wehumblybeseechThee,ofThygreatgoodness,torestraintheseimmoderaterainswithwhichwehavehadtocontend.Grantus fairweather forBattle.Graciouslyhearken tousas soldierswhocalluponTheethat,armedwithThypower,wemayadvancefromvictorytovictory,and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thyjusticeamongmenandnations.Amen.

REVERSESIDE

ToeachofficerandsoldierintheThirdUnitedStatesArmy,IwishaMerryChristmas.Ihavefullconfidenceinyourcourage,devotiontoduty,andskillinbattle.We march in our might to complete victory. May God’s blessing restuponeachofyouonthisChristmasDay.

G.S.PATTON,JR.LieutenantGeneral

Commanding,ThirdUnitedStatesArmy

Whether itwas thehelpof theDivineguidanceaskedfor in theprayeror just thenormalcourseofhumanevents,weneverknew;atanyrate,onthetwenty-third, thedayafter theprayerwasissued, theweather cleared and remained perfect for about six days. Enough toallowtheAlliestobreakthebackboneoftheVonRundstedtoffensiveandturnatemporarysetbackintoacrushingdefeatfortheenemy.

WehadmovedouradvancedHeadquarterstoLuxembourgatthistime to be closer to the battle area. The bulk of the Army Staff,includingtheChaplain,wasstillinNancy.GeneralPattonagaincalledmetohisoffice.Heworeasmilefromeartoear.Hesaid,“Goddamn!look at theweather.ThatO’Neill sure did somepotent praying.Gethimuphere.Iwanttopinamedalonhim.”

TheChaplaincameupnextday.TheweatherwasstillclearwhenwewalkedintoGeneralPatton’soffice.TheGeneralrose,camefrombehindhisdeskwithhandoutstretchedandsaid,“Chaplain,you’rethemostpopularman in thisHeadquarters.Yousurestand ingoodwiththeLordandsoldiers.”TheGeneralthenpinnedaBronzeStarMedalonChaplainO’Neill.

EveryoneofferedcongratulationsandthanksandwegotbacktothebusinessofkillingGermans—withclearweatherforbattle.

P.D.H.

Onthetwelfth,StillerandIvisitedtheCommandPostsofthe4thArmored,the26thandthe87th.The87thwastakingoverfromthe26thandonecombatcommandwasinfighting,andapparentlydoingwell.Laterit turnedoutthatithad not, in fact, done as well as was first thought; however, it was a gooddivision.

We next visited the 35th Division, which was fighting along stubbornly,although very tired and very short ofmen. Itsmissionwas to secure the highgroundontheleftoftheXIICorpsatSaarguemines.Idecideddefinitelytoplacethe 6th Armored and the 26th Division in the III Corps near Saarbriicken,because, if the enemy attacked the VIII Corps of the First Army, as wasprobable,1IcouldusetheIIICorpstohelpbyattackingstraightnorth,westoftheMoselle River. If, on the other hand, theXXCorps got jumped from thenorth,where the enemywas certainly concentrating in the vicinity ofTrier, itcouldfacetotheleftandholdofftheattacks,whiletheIIICorpscouldadvanceto theeastatSaarbriicken, inconformitywith theadvanceof theXUCorps. Italked this thing overwithGeneral Eddy and he agreed that the solutionwascorrect.

OnDecember 13, we definitely set the nineteenth as the date for the airblitz. Itwas planned to get theXIICorps through the enemypositions by thenightofthetwenty-second.If,atthattime,theVICorps(commandedbyMajorGeneralE.H.Brooks)oftheSeventhArmyonourrighthadnotbrokenthrough,wewould stillhave time tomove theairblitzdown for a secondoperation infrontofthiscorps.

1ItshouldbenotedthatGeneralPattonsawpossibilitiesofanenemybreakthroughin

theFirstArmyzoneon thisdate,December12.HehadhisStaffmakea studyofwhat theThirdArmywoulddoifcalledupontocounter-attacksuchabreakthrough.

ThefightingatSaarlautemwasverytedious,aswewerefightingfromonehouse to the next, but, on the other hand, the casualties had been remarkablylow.

The80thand5thDivisionswerenowatfullstrength,owingtothefirstfivepercentcut in theoverheadof thearmyandcorps,andwehad four thousand

additionalmengleanedfromcorpsandarmytroopstrainingatMetz.Thiswouldfill the 26th Division and leave some over for the 90th and 95th. If theCommunications Zone had done the same thing, we would have had enoughsoldierstoendthewar.AllthatwouldhavebeennecessarytoattainthisresultwasforGeneralEisenhowertoissueanorderthatthetroopsofComZbecuttenpercentfortheproductionofriflemen.

Onthefourteenth,atSaarlautem,CodmanandIcrossedthebridgeovertheriverunderallegedfire.Itwaspurelyamotiononmyparttoshowthesoldiersthatgeneralscouldgetshotat.Iwasnotshotatverymuch.NearlyallthehousesI inspected in Saarlautem on either side of the river were actually forts. Thegroundfloorofeachhousewasmadeofreinforcedconcreteabouttwelveinchesthick,and thereweremachine-gunopeningsfitted justabovesidewalk level inpracticallyeverycellar.TheGermansarecertainlyathoroughgoingrace.

The90thDivisionhadbeendoingamagnificentjobmovingoneastoftheriver,inspiteofthelackofabridge.Alsotheirriflestrengthwasextremelylow,buttheywerecheerfulandwerekillinganenormousnumberofGermans.

We then drove through Thionville to Luxembourg to see Bradley.ApparentlyMontgomery,withtheassistanceofthePrimeMinister,hadsecuredthe services of the Ninth Army. Montgomery was bitterly opposed to theoperationsofbothPatchandmyself.Hestillwantedallavailableforcesmassedonthenorthandwantedtocommandthemhimself,maintainingthattheRhinecouldbecrossedonlyinthevicinityofCologneandthatitmustbedoneunderhim.All thiswas very distressing tome, because,whilemy attackwas goingforwardbyshortleaps,itwasnotverybrilliant,andIfeltthat,ifIfailedtobreakthroughaftertheairblitz,Iwouldhavetogoonthedefensiveandloseseveraldivisions.

On the sixteenth, Eddy was very depressed and nervous, particularlybecausethe87thDivisionhadnotdonewellandonecolonelhadbeenreplacedforfailuretopreventtrenchfoot.Thiscolonelafterwardprovedtobeasplendidfighter.

At that timeIbelieved thesituationwasmuchmorefavorable than ithadbeen,andcontemplatedplacingtheIIICorpsbehindthe35thDivisiontoexploitanysuccesswemightgetduringthebreakthrough,because,whileMillikinwasuntriedinbattle,hewasatleastnotfatigued.

I seriously contemplatedmaking Eddy take a short rest, andwould havedonesohadInotfearedthat theeffectofa leaveonhimmightbeworsethanthatofstayingatthefront.

General Allen, Chief of Staff of the Twelfth ArmyGroup, called on thenightofDecember16 tohave the10thArmoredDivisionattached to theVIII

CorpsoftheFirstArmyinordertorepulsearatherstrongGermanattack.Thiswasthefirstofficialnoticewehadofthe,tous,anticipatedGermanassault,latercalledtheBulge.AsthelossofthisdivisionwouldseriouslyaffectthechancesofmybreakingthroughatSaarlautem,Iprotestedverystrongly,sayingthatwehadpaidahighpriceforthatsectorsofar,andthattomovethe10thArmoredtothe north would be playing into the hands of the Germans. General Bradleyadmitted my logic, but said that the situation was such that it could not bediscussedoverthetelephone.

On the seventeenth, information about the German attack became moredefinite.Quiteanumberofsingleenemyunitswerelocatedonawidefront,butnolargebodyof troopscouldyetbefound.Thenightof theseventeenth therewasconsiderablemovementamongtheGermansinfrontoftheXXCorps.ThismighthavebeenafeinttocovertheattackontheVIIICorpsoftheFirstArmy,or theattackon theVIIICorpsmightbea feint tocoveranattackonourXXCorps.IratherbelievedthattheattackontheVIIICorpswastherealthing.

The situation on the ThirdArmy frontwas not bad in case theGermansattacked.The5thDivisionwasrelievingthe95th,andthe80thwasmovingintothe XII Corps line in order to be sure we reached the Siegfried Line by thenineteenth.TheonlyplacetheGermanscouldreallyhavehurt theThirdArmywas in the Saar-Moselle Triangle where Colonel Polk with his reinforced 3dCavalry,aboutfourthousandmen,washoldingaboutathirty-milefront.

IhadGeneralMillikininandtalkedoverwithhimthepossibleuseoftheIIICorpsinanattacktothenorthincasetheGermanscontinuedtheattackontheVIIICorpsof theFirstArmy. IalsodirectedEddy toget the4thArmoredengaged,becauseIfeltthat,ifwedidnot,ittoomightbemovedtothenorthbyhigher authority. The fact that I did this shows how little I appreciated theseriousnessoftheenemyattackonthatdate.

At 1030 on the eighteenth, Bradley calledme and askedme to come toLuxembourgwithmyG-2,G-3,andG-4foraconference.HestatedthathewasgoingtosuggestsomethingwhichIwouldnotlike.Whenwearrived,heshowedme that the German penetration was much greater than we had thought andaskedwhatIcoulddo.ItoldhimIcouldhalttheattackofthe4thArmoredandconcentrate it near Longwy, starting that midnight. I also said that the 80thDivision could be removed from the line and start for Luxembourg in themorning, and that the 26th Division, though it had four thousand greenreplacementsfromHeadquarters’units,couldbealertedtomoveintwenty-fourhours. That night about 2300, Bradley called and askedme to meet him andEisenhoweratVerdunat1100onthemorningofthenineteenth,whichwasthenextday.IimmediatelycalledaStaffmeetingfor0800onthenineteenth,with

all members of the General Staff, and General Weyland and his Staff, to bepresent.

Istartedthemeetingbysayingthatplanshadbeenchanged,and,whilewewereallaccustomed to rapidmovement,wewouldnowhave toprove thatwecouldoperateevenfaster.WethenmadearoughplanofoperationbasedontheassumptionthatIcouldusetheVHICorps,FirstArmy(Middleton),andtheIIICorps,ThirdArmy(Millikin),onanytwoofthreepossibleaxes.Fromtheleft,theaxesofattackwereinorderofpriorityasfollows:FromthegeneralvicinityofDiekirch,duenorth;fromthegeneralvicinityofArlon,onBastogne,whichwas still held by our troops; and, finally, from the general vicinity ofNeufchateau,againsttheleftnoseoftheenemysalient.

WhenitisconsideredthatHarkins,Codman,andIleftforVerdunat0915andthatbetween0800andthathourwehadhadaStaffmeeting,plannedthreepossible lines of attack, and made a simple code in which I could telephoneGeneralGaywhichtwoofthethreelinesweweretouse,itisevidentthatwarisnotsodifficultaspeoplethink.

We reached Verdun at 1045. Eisenhower, Bradley, Devers, Air MarshalTedder, and a large number of Staff officers were present. General Strong,SHAEF G-2, gave a picture of the situation which was far from happy.EisenhowerstatedthathewishedmetogettoLuxembourgandtakecommandofthebattle,andaskedwhenIcoulddoit.Isaidthatafternoon,December19.He also stated that hewould likeme tomake a strong attackwith at least sixdivisions.

I toldhimIwouldmakea strongattackwith threedivisions,namely, the4thArmored, and the26th and80th InfantryDivisions, by the twenty-second,butthatIcouldnotattackwithmorethanthatuntilsomedayslater,andthat,ifIwaited,Iwouldlosesurprise.

When I said I could attack on the twenty-second, it created a ripple ofexcitement. Some people thought I was boasting and others seemed to bepleased.

AtthattimeIfiguredthatIwastohavetheVUICorps(FirstArmy)withthe 101st Airborne (commanded by Major General M. D. Taylor), the 28thInfantryDivisionandpartof the9thArmoredDivision; theHICorpswith the26thand80thInfantryDivisionsand4thArmoredDivision;theXIICorpswiththe 5th and 4th Infantry Divisions and 10th Armored Division; and the XXCorpswiththe90thand95thInfantryDivisionsand6thArmoredDivision.The87thInfantryDivisionandtheinfantryregimentsofthe42dDivision,whichwealsohadatthattime,wouldgototheSeventhArmy.

After itwas determined that the ThirdArmy should attack, a conference

was held betweenEisenhower,Devers, andBradley as to the shift of front. Itwas finally decided that the SeventhArmywould take over part of the ThirdArmyfrontandassumeastaticrolefromsomewheresouthofSaarlautemtothefarendoftheirpresentline,theRhineRiver.Pendingthearrivalofadivisiontorelieveit,wewerenottobeallowedtomoveour6thArmored.

AirMarshalTedderurgedmetogetridoftheXXCorpssoIwouldhaveonlyoneoffensivefront.IstucktotheXXCorps,becauseIwantedtohaveitfora rest area.As it turnedout somemonths later, the retentionof theXXCorpswasprobablytheluckiestthingIeverdid,becausethroughitIhadachancetotake Trier and, having taken Trier, the final attack through the Palatinatewasmadepossible.

Assoonasthesevariousdecisionsweremade,ItelephonedGaytostartthe26thDivisionandthe4thArmoredonArlonviaLongwy,andthe80thDivisionon Luxembourg via Thionville. The 4th Armored had actually pulled out thepreviousnight,December18.The80thstartednextmorning,thenineteenth,andthe26thstartedonreceivingorders.

If we take the casualty report as of December 21, which marked theterminationofthefightingintheSaarbattle,andsubtractfromthatthecasualtyreportasofNovember8,wewillseethatthefightingintheSaarwasbloodyanddifficult.Wewill also get a datum plane fromwhich to judge the cost of theBattleoftheBulge,whichwasnowabouttostart.

ThecasualtyreportasofDecember21was:

—————

1Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle, Commanding General, Eighth

UnitedStatesAirForce,andBrigadierGeneralE.F.Curtis,ChiefofStaff forGeneralSpaatz.

2The dead Germans were the result of a concentration of twenty-seven

battalionsbroughtdownontheirheadsbytheXXCorps.TheAmericanGravesRegistrationService,inpolicingthebattlefield,hadcarriedmanytotheroadsideforfurtherdisposal.

3OntheU.S.O.ShowCircuit.4^ajorGeneralL.H.Brereton,CommandingGeneral,FirstAlliedAirborne

Army.5MajorGeneralM.B.Ridgway,CommandingGeneralXVIIICorps, First

Army.6On or about the fourteenth of December, 1944, General Patton called

Chaplain O’Neill, Third Army Chaplain, and myself into his office in ThirdHeadquartersatNancy.Theconversationwentsomethinglikethis:

General Patton: “Chaplain, I want you to publish a prayer for goodweather. I’m tired of these soldiers having to fightmud and floods aswell asGermans.Seeifwecan’tgetGodtoworkonourside.”

ChaplainO'Neill:“Sir,it’sgoingtotakeaprettythickrugforthatkindofpraying.”

General Patton: “I don’t care if it takes the flying carpet. I want theprayingdone.”

ChaplainO'Neil:“Yes,sir.MayIsay,General,thatitusually

4THEBASTOGNE-ST.VITHCAMPAIGN—“THEBULGE”

19Decemberto28January1945

OnDecember19,1944,GeneralEisenhowercalledaconferenceatVerduntodealwiththeVonRundstedtbreak-through,knownas“TheBulge.**AsearlyasthetwelfthofDecember,GeneralPattonhadspeculatedonthepossibilityofaGermanoffensiveonhisnorthflankintheFirstArmyarea,andplanstomeetsuchaneffortwerestudied.Whathappenedduringthesedaysandthoseensuingisbestrecordedinhisnotesonthecampaign.

The Bulge was an exhausting operation, filled with grim fighting,unimaginablesituations,precisetimingandmovementandasuperhumaneffortonthepartoftheAmericansoldier.ByJanuary28,thebattleoftheBulgeendedandAmerican troopswereoncemorewell establishedon theGermanborder,readytostrikeattheheartoftheReichwithoutrespite.Anewall-outoffensivebegan on January 29. (See Map, page 190.) During the period, GeneralMontgomery took over command of the American First Army north of theGermanbreak-through.Hecountered theGermanoffensivewithaFirstArmypushtothesouth,joiningtheThirdArmyinthevicinityofHouffalize.BoththeTwenty-FirstandTwelfthArmyGroupsthenjoinedinpushingtheenemybacktotheeastand to theSiegfriedLine.TheSixthArmyGroup,havingassumed thedefensive in order to free theThirdArmy troops for an offensive, took over aportion of the Third Army lines and set up defensive positions in the VosgesMountains.TherewasnothingnewinItaly.

InthePhilippines,GeneralMacArthurlandedonLuzonand,attheendoftheperiod,wasintheoutskirtsofManila.

TheRussians,sweepingwestward, tookWarsaw,Cracow,Lodz,andwerewithinninetymilesofBerlin.

TheAirForcecontinuedtoblastGermany,whiletheNavycommandedalltheseas.

P.D.H.

TheBulge

I spent the night of the nineteenthwith theXXCorps in Thionville, andtelephonedfromtheretohavethe5thDivisionpulledoutofactionandstartedon Luxembourg. The next morning, I arrived at Bradley’s Headquarters inLuxembourg and found that he had, without notifying me, detached CombatCommand “B” (Brigadier General H. E. Dager) of the 4th ArmoredDivisionfromArlontoapositionsouthwestofBastogneandhadhaltedthe80thDivisioninLuxembourg.Sincethecombatcommandhadnotbeenengaged,IwithdrewittoArlonandhadthe80thDivisionresumeitsmarchtothevicinityofMersch.

WhileBradleyandIweretalkingovertheplansforacombinedoperationwith the First and ThirdArmies, Eisenhower called up and informedBradleythat Montgomery was to have operational command of the First and NinthUnitedStatesArmies,owingtothefactthattelephoniccommunicationsbetweenBradleyandthesearmiesweredifficult.Asamatteroffact,thiswasnotentirelytrue,anditappearedtomeatthetimethatBradleywasbeingsidetracked,eitherbecause of lack of confidence in him, or as the only way Eisenhower couldpreventMontgomeryfrom“regrouping.”

Speaking of Montgomery’s lack of speed reminds me of somethingSergeantMeekssaidtomewhenwefirststarted,andMontgomerywasholdingvalorouslyatCaenwhilewewerecarrying theball.SergeantMeeks remarkedthat,“’ForeGod,General,ifGeneralMontgomerydon’tgetamoveonhimself,thoseBritishsoldiersaregoingtohavegrassandlimpetsgrowingontheir leftfootfromstandinginthewater.”

In any case, General Bradley took what was practically a demotion in amostsoldierlymanner,nordidheatany timeduring thesubsequentcampaigninjecthimselfintotheoperationsoftheThirdArmy,ashemightwellhavedone,since thatwas the only unit he had to command.On the other hand, I alwaysinformedhimofwhatIwasgoingtodo,andprofitedbyconsultationswithhimandhisStaff.

FromLuxembourgIdrove toArlonandsawMiddleton,Millikin,Gaffey,andPaul,andgotfromMiddletonafirst-handpictureofwhatwasgoingon.TheVIIICorpswasfightingverywell,buthadnothingbutremnantswithwhichtofight, except in the case of the 101st Airborne Division1 in Bastogne. InBastognealsowasacombatcommandofthe9thArmored,123456oneofthe10thArmored,7 the705thTankDestroyerBattalion,andsomecoloredartilleryandcoloredQuartermasterunits.Incontrasttosomeofthecoloredartillery,the

colored Quartermaster men provided themselves with rifles and fought verywell.

After leaving thismeeting, I visited theHeadquartersof the9th and10thArmored Divisions and the 4th and 80th Infantry Divisions (all northeast ofLuxembourg)anddirectedGeneralMorris,8whocommandedthe10thArmoredDivision, to take temporary command of the two combat commands of hisdivisionpresent,andtheonecombatcommandofthe9thArmoredDivisioninhisvicinity,andalsoofthe4thInfantryDivision,pendingthearrivalofGeneralEddy’sXIICorpsfromthesouth.ItoldGeneralLeonard,commandingthe9thArmoredDivision,tomovehisHeadquarterstojointheVIHCorpsandassumecommand of the two combat commands of the 9thArmoredDivision and theoneof the10thArmoredDivision inBastogne. Inmyopinion,splittingup the10thand9thArmoredDivisionsintheVIIICorpshadbeenamistake;however,the situation at the time may have rendered it necessary. I also did a lot oftelephoning to get up self-propelled tank destroyer battalions, divisional tankbattalions,hospitals,ammunition,bridgingmaterials,etc.,andIdirectedthetwoarmored divisions and the 4th Infantry Division to cannibalize their anti-tankgun units and turn them into riflemen, because all three divisions wereexcessivelyshort.

Attheendofthisratherhecticday,mydriver,SergeantMims,saidtome,“General, the Government is wasting a lot of money hiring a whole GeneralStaff.Youandmehas run theThirdArmyall day anddone abetter job thantheydo.”ActuallytheremarkablemovementoftheThirdArmyfromtheSaartotheBulgewaswholly due to the superior efficiency of theThirdArmyStaff,particularlyGeneralGay,GeneralMuller,ColonelNixon,andColonelE.Busch,Quartermaster of the ThirdArmy. Thosewho desire to inform themselves onhow an army should be moved should study this operation as set forth inmeticulous detail in the “AfterActionOperationsReport” of theThirdArmy.The setup at nightfall of the twentiethofDecemberwas as follows:TheVIII,Corps(Middleton),nowThirdArmy,ontheleftconsistedofthe101stAirbornewith attachments, the28th InfantryDivision less about two regiments, the 9thArmored,andcertaincorpsartilleryunits;theIIICorps(Millikin)hadthe26thand80th Infantryand4thArmoredDivision; theXIICorps (Eddy)hadat thatparticular moment in Luxembourg the 4th Infantry Division, the 5th InfantryDivision, the10thArmoredDivision,currentlycommandedbyMorrispendingEddy’s arrival; theXXCorps (Walker) had the 90th, 95th, and 6thArmored.However,the6thArmoredwasnotfreetoleaveitslocationnearSaargueminesuntil ithadbeenrelievedbyelementsoftheSeventhArmy.The35thDivisionwasmovingonMetz,whereitwastopickupreplacementsandbeattachedto

either theXIIorVIIICorpsascircumstances indicated.The timeofattackfortheIIICorpswasdefinitelysetat0400,December22.

On the twenty-first, I received quite a few telephone calls from varioushigherechelons,expressingsolicitudeastomyabilitytoattacksuccessfullywithonlythreedivi-Isions.Imaintainedmycontentionthatitisbettertoattackwithasmall forceatonce,andattain surprise, than it is towaitand lose it.At thattime,Iwassurethatbythetwenty-thirdortwenty-fourth,IcouldgetupGeneralEddy’s Corps and have him attack with the 5th Infantry and 10th ArmoredDivisions, andpossibly the 4th InfantryDivision, although the latterwasveryshortofmenandbattle-weary. I felt sure,andstatedat the time, that theFirstArmy could attack the northern flank of the Bulge on the twenty-third if itwantedto.Ifearedthattheenemymightstartaspoilingattack1southfromthevicinityofEchtemachagainstthe4thDivisionand,hadheknownthesituation,he would undoubtedly have done this, but, as always, the Germancommunicationssystemwasverybad,andIdoubtthatatthistimeheknewtheThirdArmywasmoving.

TheCorpsStaffsoftheHI,XII,andXXmetmeatLuxembourg.TheVIIICorpswastoofarawayandcouldnotattendthemeeting.Asusualonthevergeof action, everyone felt full of doubt except myself. It has always been myunfortunateroletobetherayofsunshineandthebackslapperbeforeaction,bothforthoseundermeandalsothoseoverme.Icansaywithperfectcandorthat,atthattime,Ihadnodoubtastothesuccessoftheoperation,evenwhen,at1700,December 21, the 4th Infantry Division reported a violent attack, which laterturnedouttobenothing.MychieffeelingatthattimewasthatIwisheditwasoneday later, because,whenwe are attacking, the enemyhas to parry,while,whenwearedefendingorpreparingtoattack,hecanattackus.DuringthenightMillikinaskedtodelaythehourofattacktill0600December22.

The IIICorps jumpedoff at that hour, 0600, and in spite of considerableresistanceandagreatdealof trouble fromblown roadsandbridges,advancedforanaverageofsevenmiles.ThiswaslessthanIhadhoped,butIrealizedthatit is always difficult to get an attack rolling, and I further felt that the enemywould probably not react for an additional thirty-six hours, by which time Ihopedwewouldbemoving.

1Spoilingattack:Anoldnamegiventoanattacktocauseadiversionorapprehension.

The 10th Infantry Regiment (Colonel Robert P. Bell) of the 5th InfantryDivision did a remarkable thing by attacking in the direction ofEchtemach atnoon on the day of its arrival, after moving about seventy-five miles fromSaarlautern.ItfortunatelyranintotwoGermanbattalionsjustpreparingtomakeanattackonthe4thInfantryDivision,anddestroyedthem.AtArlonImeteightenlistedmenandoneofficerwhohadbeenatWiltzwhentheGermansattacked,and had walked out on the nineteenth of December. They had come straightacross the southern portion of the German-occupied territory and seen onlysevenGermans.ThisledmetobelievethatthedensityoftheGermanattackwaslessthanreported.

Owing toweatherconditions inEngland,wehadbeenunable to resupplyBastognebyairon the twenty-second,butmadearrangements todo soon thenight of December 22-23. At this time it became evident that the XII CorpscouldnotattacknorthoftheSauerRiveruntilwehaddriventheenemyeastofthatriverandhadreplacedthe4thInfantryDivision,whichwasexhaustedandsixteenhundredmenshort,withanewinfantrydivision—probablythe90th.The6thArmoredDivisionfromtheXXCorpswastojointheXIICorps,whilethe4thInfantryand10thArmoredDivisionswouldjointheXXCorps.Therewasapossibilityatthistimethatthe11thArmored,whichwasallegedtobeclosinginthevicinityofReimsinSHAEFReserve,mightbeturnedloose.Theamountofcorps and army artillery supporting the attack of the Third Army was quiteimpressive,consistingasitdidof88battalionsor1056gunsof105mm.caliberorbigger.

On the twenty-second, Bastogne received a violent attack from thenortheastwhichthe101stAirbornerepulsed.Itwaspossiblythefirstreactiontoourattack.

Fromcapturedorderswe learned that theGermanshad intended tomovewestbeyondArlonandthenturnsouthandattackthecityofLuxembourgfromthewest.

Since thispossibilitystillexisted, itbecamenecessary toconsider the leftflankofthearmy.TheXIICorps,usingallofthe5thandpartofthe4thInfantryDivisions,madealimited-objectiveattacktodrivetheenemyeastoftheSauerRiver,whiletheXXCorpsmadeanotherlimited-objectiveattackinthedirectionof Saarburg as a diversion. The weather had turned fine and we had seven

groupsoffighter-bombersdoingasplendid job,alsosomeplanesfromthe9thAirForcewhichbombedanddestroyedbridgesinthevicinityofSaarburg.Onthe other hand, it was necessary to move Combat Command “R” of the 4thArmoredDivision(ColonelWendellBlanchard)fromtherightflanktotheleftflank of the III Corps in order to attempt a break-through to Bastogne. Thismovement left a huge gap between the 26th Infantry and the 4th ArmoredDivision,whichwe filledupwith the6thCavalryGroupunderColonelE.M.Fickett.Theadvancesforthedaywerenotimpressive,varyingfromtwotofivemiles.

Thedayofthetwenty-fourthwasratherdiscouraging.Allalongthelinewereceivedviolentcounterattacks,oneofwhichforcedCombatCommand“B”ofthe4thArmoredDivisionbackseveralmiles,withthelossofanumberoftanks.Thiswasprobablymy fault, because I had insistedon a day andnight attack.Such an attack is all right for the first night of battle and possibly the secondnight, but after that themenbecome tired. Furthermore, unless youhave verybrightmoonlightandcleargoing,armoredbattleatnightisofdubiousvalue.Iremember being surprised at the time at how long it tookme to learn war. Ishouldhaveknownthisbefore.

The 101stAirborne had got some supplies by air drop and had not beenattackedduringdaylight,probablybecausetheenemywasafraidofourfighter-bombers.

TheXIICorps,attackingonthefrontDiekirchtoEchtemachtosecuretheSauerRiverline,hadprogressed*practicallytotheriver,exceptinthevicinityof Echternach. Prisoners taken that day stated that they had not received anyregularrationsforsomethreetofivedays.IWealsointerceptedaradiomessagefromtheGerman5thParaDivision(GeneralMajorLudwigHeilman),fightingagainst the 26th Infantry Division, that they could not hold out much longerwithout help and needed bazookas and ammunition. On the front of the XXCorpsnothinghappened.

CasualtiesasofDecember22:

Itwasmybeliefatthattime,whichsubsequenteventsprovedincorrect,thatthisattackhadbeenplannedandwasbeingrunbytheGermanGeneralStaffforthepurpose of regaining the initiative. However, it was evident that they werealreadybehindschedule,soIbelievedthenthatwemightpossiblysurroundanddestroy them.Therewas theworrisomethought, though, that in1940theyhadattacked as at present and then swung southwest through Saarbrucken andThionvilletoMetz,andofcoursetheymightrepeat this.WehadnoideawhattheGermanresourceswereandunquestionablyoverestimated them,althoughIwasprobablylessguiltyinthisrespectthanmostothers.

Christmas dawned clear and cold; lovely weather for killing Germans,althoughthethoughtseemedsomewhatatvariancewiththespiritof theday.Ileftearlyinthemorningwiththepurposeofvisitingallthedivisionsincombat,and succeeded in seeing twocombat commandsof the4thArmored, the26th,the80th,the5th,andelementsofthe4thInfantryand10thArmoredDivisions.

It is to thegreat credit of theQuartermasterCorps thaton thisChristmasDayeverysoldierhadturkey;thoseinthefronthadturkeysandwichesandtherest, hot turkey. I know of no army in the world except the Americanwhichcouldhavedonesuchathing.Themenweresurprisinglycheerful.

While we were with Combat Command “A” (Brigadier General H. L.Earnest)ofthe4thArmored,twoGermanairplanesstrafedandbombedus,butwithout success.Thiswas the only time in the fighting inGermanyorFrancethatIwasactuallypickedoutontheroadandattackedbyGermanAir.

Asawhole,thedaywasnottoosuccessful.Wecontinuedtoadvance,butwehadnot relievedBastogne.Owing toweatherconditions,Bastognehadnotbeen resupplied from the air. The only bright spot was that the 5th InfantryDivisionhaddriven the enemyback to theSauerRiver in its front, andkilledquiteafewwhentheytriedtoescapeacrosstheriver.

Arrangements had been made for the 6th Armored to relieve the 10thArmored north of Luxembourg, and for the 35thDivision,which had been inMetzsincethenightofthetwenty-third,tomoveupandjointheIIICorpsonthemorning of the twenty-sixth, taking its place between the 26th and the 80thDivisions.The80thDivisionwouldthenjointheXIICorps.

LatethatnightwehadaquietChristmasdinneratGeneralBradley’smess.Afterward Bradley and I had a long talk, during which he told me thatMontgomery stated that theFirstArmycouldnot attack for threemonths, andthattheonlyattacksthatcouldbemadewouldbemadebyme,butthatIwastooweak.Hence,weshouldhave to fallback to the lineof theSaar—Vosges,oreven to the Moselle, to gain enough divisions to permit me to continue theattack.We both considered this a disgusting idea,whichwould,we felt, havetremendouspoliticalimplicationsandprobablydoomtodeathorslaveryalltheFrenchinhabitantsofAlsaceandLorraine,whomsuchamovewouldabandontotheGermans.9101

1Onthismatter,GeneralPattoncalledforanopinionfromhisStaff.Theiranswerisembodiedinthefollowingletter:

26December,1944

Memorandum:

For:TheArmyCommander

1. It is our belief that the Third Army should continue theoffensive and carry the fight to the enemy, and destroy himwithoutdelay.Thefollowingfactorsarebasesforthisrecommendation:

a.ThatalltheknownGermanstrikingpowerinthewestisnowconcentratedinawell-definedarea.

b.Otherenemyoffensives,asfarascanbeestimatedatthistime,wouldbeoflimitedobjective,and,unlessarmorhasbeenmovedfromotherfronts,itwouldlackthethrustandspeedofarmor.

c.AtpresenttheThirdArmycomposesseven(7)stronginfantrydivisionsandthree(3)armoreddivisions.Theseforcesaresupportedby108battalionsofartillery.Inaddition,fourpotentialdivisionsexist(94th, 87th, 17th AB, and 11th Armored). This would later beaugmentedby the28th Infantryand the9thArmored,plus the101stAirborne when refitted. The Third Army service installations areexceptionallywellsituatedatthepresenttimetosupportcontinuationof the attack. Our stores in these installations are being improveddaily.Ourrailnetinthisareaisexcellent.ThepresentsupplysituationwithintheArmyisgood.IthasbeengearedtosupporttheattackandiftheCommunicationsZonecancontinuetoputsupplieswithinreachofArmy, we can continue. Presently we have a strong SignalCommunicationNetwork,wellplacedandinoperation.

d.AlliedtroopsappeartobeavailabletoextendthenorthflanktotheMeuse;thus,byusingthisriverasanobstacleandwiththetroopsenumerated above, Third Army can seal off the south flank of theGermansalient. It issuggestedhere that thepresentholdingforceontheMeuseRiverintheThirdArmyzoneofresponsibilitymovetotheSemoisRiverandthereestablishacontainingline.

e. Third Army’s continued attack is a constant threat tocommunicationswithin the salient.Ageneralwithdrawalpermits theenemy to effect reconstruction of forces, later permitting him theinitiative.Timeishisstrategicobjectivenow.

f.Ouraireffortwillhaveawell-definedareaofoperationsforamajoreffortinarestrictedareasuchastheareaindicatedabove.TheAirisnowbasedonfieldscapableofsupportingthepresentoffensive.Theyarewealthy inpilotsandplanesandhavemore than theyhavehadatanyothertimeduringtheoperation.

g. The American (soldier and public) psychology must beconsidered. Although it cannot be evaluated, it would probably beseriously affected by a voluntary withdrawal. The American soldierhastriedwithallofhisskillandhearttogainthegroundnowinourhands. To give it upmight be catastrophic both from a psychologicandamilitarypointofview.ThirdArmytroopsknowandunderstandthe attack. They do not know or understand the retreat or generalwithdrawal.

2. It is the consensus of opinion that the present Saar positionscanbeheld.AwithdrawalontheextremeflankfromalongtheRhine

River to theSaar-VosgesMountain linewouldperhapsatmostyieldtwoAmericandivisions.Initiallythesetwodivisionscouldsupportanattack toclearout thepresent trianglenowheldby theenemy in theXXCorpszonebetween theSaarandMoselleRivers.This, in itself,would cause the enemy some concern. Giving up the Vosges areawouldyieldlittletotheenemyfromasupply,air,orstrategicpointofview.Withdrawal to theMoselle is not considered advantageous inanyway.

CONCLUSIONS:a.ThatthemaindefensivelineontheMeuseRiverbetweenthe

flanksoftheFirstandThirdUnitedStatesArmiesextendtothatriver.b. Continue the offensive operation now undertaken by Third

UnitedStatesArmy.

PAULD.HARKINSH.G.MADDOXOSCARW.KOCH

Colonel,G.S.C.Brig.Gen.,G.S.C.Colonel,G.S.C.DeputyChiefofStaffG-3G-2

Until 1400 on the twenty-sixth, the situation looked bad. We had beenunabletobreakthroughtoBastogneandhadreceivedcontinuouscounterattacks.The5th InfantryDivisionhad,however, closedupon theSauerRiverand thenightofDecember25-26wehadused thenewproximity fuseonanumberofGermansnearEchtemachandactuallykilledsevenhundredofthem.

The Combat Command (Colonel T. L. Harrold) of the 9th ArmoredDivision,workingwiththeXIICorps,wassenttojointhe4thArmoredintheIIICorps, to extend still further the leftof thatunit.Also, a fragmentof the28thInfantryDivision,whichhadcomeinto the linesof theXIICorps,wassent totheVIIICorps.The35thDivisionstartedtomoveintothelinepreparedtoattackonthetwenty-seventh,whiletwo-thirdsofthe6thArmoredDivisionhadclosednorth ofLuxembourg. I believed then that thismovement of the 6thArmoredDivisionwaspremature.Ishouldhavewaitedlongerandwouldthenhavefoundthatitwasbettertoengageitontheleftflank,becausethecorridornorthfromDiekirch,whichwasmyfavoritelineofattack,wassupposedtobetoonarrowforarmor.FromlaterobservationIthinkthiswasamistakeandthatarmorcouldhavegoneupthecorridor.Oneneverknows.

At1400onDecember26,GeneralGaffeycalledmeandaskedifIwouldauthorize his taking a big risk with Combat Command “R” under Colonel

Blanchardforabreak-throughtoBastogne.Itoldhimtogoahead.At1845theyhadmade contact andBastognewas liberated, but the corridorwasonly threehundredyardswide.DuringaGermanairraidonthenightofthetwenty-sixth,one hundred German prisoners rushed our guards. Many were shot; noneescaped.

AtthistimeIwasdoingmyutmostthroughGeneralBradleytosecureoneorallof the11thArmored,17thAirborne, and87th InfantryDivisions,whichwere sitting aroundReims in SHAEFReserve. I felt that,with our entry intoBastogne, the German was licked, and that it was not necessary to hold areserve,buttoattackwitheverythingwehad.

Onthemorningofthetwenty-seventh,BradleywenttoseeEisenhowerandMontgomery.BradleyandIwereveryhopeful thatEisenhowerwouldputhimback incommandof theFirstandNinthArmies,becausewefeltMontgomerywouldneverattack.Ialsoaskedhimtosuggestthatthe11thArmoredand17thAirborne bemoved fromReims to a switch position along the Semois River,fromwhich location theycouldcover the left flankof theThirdArmyandbejustaswellplacedtoprotecttherestoftheAmericanforcesastheywereonthelineoftheMeuse.

AfterameetingwithMiddletonandMillikinatAtIon, itwasdecidedthatthe III Corps should keep operational control of the VIII Corps troops inBastogne until the situation clarified. We also planned an attack with onearmored division reinforced by an infantry combat team onHouffalize on thethirtieth,andanattackwithonearmoreddivisionandtwoinfantrydivisionsonSt. Vith on the thirty-first. For the operation the VIII Corps was to resumecommandofthe101stAirborneandattachedtroops,andcovertheleftflank.IfeltatthattimeifIcouldgetthreemoredivisionsthesituationwouldendverypromptly.

OnBradley’sreturn,heandIdiscussed,andactuallyplanned,withGeneralAnderson1ofthe8thAirForce,anattackacrosstheSauerRiveratEchternachupthecorridortoBonn.WeproposedanairblitztobeprecededbyanattackonSaarburg by the XX Corps in order to pull the enemy to the south. Thepossibilities of such an attack were very alluring, but in order to make it asuccess, at least three more divisions were necessary; that is, three more inadditiontothe11thArmoredand87thInfantrywhichBradleyhadsucceededingettingreleasedtome.Troopswerenotavailable,sotheshowfellthrough.

1Brigadier General, later Major General, O. A. Anderson, Deputy Commander for

OperationsHeadquarters,8thAirForce.

IsentGeneralGrowandColonelHarkinstoBastognetoarrangetomovethe6thArmoredDivisiontothatvicinity,undercoverofdarkness,foruseinourprojectedattackonSt.Vith,sotheywouldcomeinasacompletesurprise.The11thArmoredand87thInfantryweretoclosesouthwestofBastogneat2400onthe twenty-ninth and to attack in the direction of Houffalize in the morning,passing through the left elements of the 101st Airborne. The situation on thefrontoftheXIIandXXCorpsremainedstatic.

Onthe thirtieth, the11thArmoredand87thInfantry jumpedoff, the87thontheleft.TheyimmediatelyranintotheflankofalargeGermancounterattack,consistingofthe130thPanzerLehrDivisionand26thVolksgrenadierDivision.Thismeetingengagementupsetbothattacks,butwasveryfortuitous,sofaraswewereconcerned,becausehadwenothittheflankoftheGermans,theymighthaveagainclosedthecorridorintoBastogne.Allthegeneralsconcernedinthisparticularattackwereinfavorofmypostponingittwenty-fourhours;hadIdoneso,itwouldhavepermittedtheGermanstodrivehometheirattack.

ThissamedaytheGermansalsoputinatwo-divisionattack,consistingofthe 1st SS (Brigadier E. Wisch, SS Oberst Mohmke) and 167th Regulars(GeneralLieutenantHocker)fromthenortheastagainstthe35thand26th,andathirdattackagainstthenorthernfaceofBastogne.Thiswasprobablythebiggestco-ordinated counterattack that troops under my command have everexperienced.Weweresuccessfulatallpoints.

On this day four Germans in one of our jeeps, dressed in Americanuniforms, were killed, and another group of seventeen, also in Americanuniforms,werereportedbythe35thDivisionasfollows:

“One sentinel, reinforced, saw seventeenGermans inAmericanuniforms.Fifteenwerekilledandtwodiedsuddenly.”

I drove to Bastogne through the corridor, passing quite close to theGermans.Luckilytheywerenotfiring.Onreachingthetown,IdecoratedwiththeDistinguishedServiceCrossBrigadierGeneralMcAuliffe,whocommandedthe 101st during the fight, and Lieutenant Colonel S. A. Chappuis, whocommanded the502dAirborne Infantry.We thendrovearoundso thesoldierscould seeus, and theywerequite delighted.On the twenty-fifth, theGermanshadsentawhiteflagdemandingthatMcAuliffesurrender, towhichherepliedwith'thefamousword,“Nuts.”

Onthethirty-first, theGermansmadeseventeencounterattacksagainstus,allofwhichwererepulsed.Wefailed togainmuchgroundexcept that the6thArmoredDivision, attacking by surprise along the road to St. Vith, advanced

fourkilometers.TherehadbeenrumorsforanumberofdaysthatGermans,flyingcaptured

P-47’s,werestrafingourtroops.Ofcourse,suchrumorswereverybad.GeneralsSpaatz,Doolittle,andVandenbergcamein,andwediscussedwaysandmeansofstoppingtherumors,andfinallydecidedthatforthefirstoftheyearnoP-47wouldflyintheareaofeitherXIIorXXCorps,sothatifanyattackscametheywouldbedefinitelyrecognizedasGermanplanes.Wesucceededalsoingettingthe 17th Airborne turned over to the Third Army in exchange for the 28thInfantryDivision.

P-47

The following Order expresses briefly and to the best of my ability theoccurrencesof1944:

GeneralOrders

1January,1945

Number1

TOTHEOFFICERSANDMENOFTHETHIRDARMYAND

TOOURCOMRADESOFTHEXIXTACTICALAIRCOMMAND

From the bloody corridor at Avranches, to Brest, thence acrossFrance to the Saar, over the Saar into Germany, and now on toBastogne,yourrecordhasbeenoneofcontinuousvictory.

Not only have you invariably defeated a cunning and ruthlessenemy, but also you have overcome by your indomitable fortitudeeveryaspectof terrainandweather.Neitherheatnordustnor floodsnorsnowhavestayedyourprogress.

Thespeedandbrilliancyofyourachievementsareunsurpassedinmilitaryhistory.

RecentlyIhadthehonorofreceivingatthehandsoftheTwelfthArmy Group Commander, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, asecondOakLeafCluster to theDSM. This awardwas bestowed onme,notforwhatIhavedone,butbecauseofwhatyouhaveachieved.FromthebottomofmyheartIthankyou.

MyNewYearwishandsureconvictionforyouisthat,undertheprotection of Almighty God and the inspired leadership of ourPresident and theHighCommand, youwill continueyour victoriouscourse to theend that tyrannyandviceshallbeeliminated,ourdeadcomradesavenged,andpeacerestoredtoawar-wearyworld.

Inclosing,Icanfindnofitterexpressionformyfeelingsthantoapplytoyoutheimmortal

words spoken by General Scott at Chapultepec when he said:“Braverifles,veterans,youhavebeenbaptized infireandbloodandhavecomeoutsteel.”

G.S.PATTON,JR.,Lieut.General,U.S.Army,Commanding

Aroundthefirstoftheyear, theGermansbeganbombardingLuxembourgcitywithapeculiarweapon.1At firstwe thought itwasa rocket, thena long-distanceshell,andseveral rumorswerestartedas towhat itconsistedof,untilrecentlywhenthegunwhichfireditwascaptured.Theprojectilewasaboutsixfeet longand four inches indiameter,but ithada forwardcollar six inches indiameter, and on the rear, an inverted conewith long trailing fins. The initialpowderchargeexpandedthecone,producingagaslock,andthemissilestartedforward through an unrifled tube one hundred and ninety-five feet long, withabout twenty-five joints bolted together with flanges. At every fourth sectionthere were two short tubes coming in at an angle of forty-five degrees, each

containing a booster charge.When the projectile left themuzzle, the forwardcollar fell off, and it was stabilized through the fins. Its probable range wasthirty-fivemiles.Theburstingchargewasverysmall,butoneunfortunateshotstruckahoteljustastheCommandingOfficerofHeadquartersCompany,ThirdArmy,CaptainJohnDementi,steppedout,andkilledhim.

OurprogressonNewYear’sDaywasnotoutstanding,exceptinthecaseofthe6thArmoredDivision,whichdidfairlywell;wehadnothingtoworryabout.AllthetroopsintheThirdArmywereexactlywheretheyweresupposedtobe,sothatiftheylost,theywouldloseduetobetterfightingqualitiesonthepartofthe enemy, and not through anymistakeswhich I hadmade in deploying thesoldiers.

1The German H.D.P. (Hochdruckpumpe, or high pressure pump). General Patton’s

figureof195feetforthelengthofthetubemayhavebeenconservative,asinstallationshavesincebeenfoundhavingtubelengthsfrom189to394feet.Thisisexplainedbythefactthatthere are provided flanged sections of fifteen-centimeter tubing, threemeters in length, forassemblyoftheweapons.Theboostersaredesignedtobefittedtothetubeatanyofthejoints.

The 11thArmoredDivision fought fairlywell in its opening gambit, butlostanunnecessarilylargenumberoftanks.Ididnotbelievethatthecommand

of thatdivisionwaswhat itshouldhavebeen.Later,underanewcommander,thisbecameaveryfinedivision.

AtmidnightonthenightofDecember31,allgunsintheThirdArmyfiredrapidfirefor twentyminutesontheGermansasaNewYear’sgreeting.Whenthe firing ceased, our forward observers stated they could hear the Germansscreaminginthewoods.

On the second, I learnedmore about the action of the 11thArmored andfound that itwasquitebad, and thatGeneralMiddletonpersonallyhadhad tointervenetogetitstraightenedout.Weplannedtoputthe17thAirbornethroughthe11thArmored,exceptthatonebattalionoftankswouldhavetosupportthe17th Airborne, because that division had no organic tanks. One of the chiefdefectsofanairbornedivisionisthefactthatitneverhasanythingitneedsafteritlands—notanks,noadequateartillery,notransportation.

The6thArmoredDivisionstillcontinuedtodowell.TheXVCorpsoftheSeventhArmyonourrightgotaheavyattack,butsincealltheunitsidentifiedagainstitwerethosewehadchasedacrossthemudflatsfromtheMoselletotheSaar, I didnot at that timeconsider these attacks serious.Finally, after a longwait, the VII Corps of the First Army started in to attack in the direction ofHouffalize with the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions1 and the 83d and 84thDivisions.2 TheGermans, I thought,would not react to this attack for severaldays, but could see no reason for changing the then current disposition of theThirdArmy.IhadhadoneofmyfewhunchesonthenightofJanuary2-3thatthe Germans would attack. I was wrong. The 6th Armored made two milesduringthethird,whilethe87thDivisionontheleftgainedalittle.

The11thArmoredheldanenemycounterattackonitsleftcenter.OwingtothebadconditionoftheroadsandthefailureonthepartofComZtomovethe17thAirborneDivisionasrapidlyastheyhadpromised,itwasnotabletoattackonthethird,butwaspreparedtoattackinconjunctionwiththe101stAirborneonthemorningofthefourth.

1The2dand3dArmoredDivisions,commandedat thistimebyMajorGeneralE.N.HarmonandMajorGeneralMauriceRose,respectively.

2CommandedbyMajorGeneralRobertC.MaconandBrigadierGeneralA.R.Bolling

respectively.

WeweredelightedtoseeaSHAEFdirectivethattheTwelfthArmyGroupwouldresumecontrolof theFirstArmyassoonas theFirstandThirdArmies

madecontactatHouffalize.ThedesiretogettoHouffalizewasthusoneoftheimportantmotives forournext fewdaysof fighting.At this timeMontgomeryhad the nerve to get someone inAmerica to suggest thatGeneral EisenhowerwasoverworkedandneededaDeputyGroundForceCommanderforalltroopsinEuropeandthathe,Montgomery,wasGod’sgifttowarinthisrespect.

The 17thAirborne, in its attack on themorning of the fourth, got a verybloodynose,andreportedalossoffortypercentinonebattalion.Wheneveronegets such a report, it indicates that people do not know anything of war. Acasualtyreportofmorethantenpercentisseldomtrue,unlesspeoplehaverunawayorsurrendered.

IfoundMiley,Commanderofthe17thAirborne,inBastogne.Whiletherewehadconsiderableshelling, includingairbursts.Theflashesofourowngunsand thoseof theenemy in thegatheringdarknessagainst thewhite snowfieldswereverybeautiful,butnottooreassuring.InmydiaryImadethisstatementoftheafternoonofJanuary4,anditissignificant,asitistheonlytimeIevermadesuchastatement:“Wecanstilllosethiswar.”

IhavestatedearlierintheselettersthatBradleydidnotinanywayinterferewiththecombatoftheThirdArmy.Inonecase,whilehedidnotorder,hedidstrongly suggest, that, instead of attacking north of Diekirch and cutting theenemyoffatthewaist,weshouldputinanewdivisionsoutheastofBastognesoastoinsuretheintegrityofthecorridor.Iletmyselfbeover-persuadedbyhiminthis connection and assume full responsibility for the error of subsequentlyengagingthe90thDivisiontoofarwest.HadIputthe90thDivisioninnorthofDiekirch,IamsurewewouldhavebaggedmoreGermansandjustascheaply.

Inordertousethe90thDivisionoftheXXCorpstoattackthroughthe26thDivisionandcleantheGermansoutofthepocketsoutheastofBastogne,itwasnecessarytoprocuretheservicesofthe94thDivision.Iproposedthatwhenthe94tharrived,itwouldgototheXXCorpsandthe90thwouldthengototheIII.As soonas the26th InfantryDivisionhadbeenpassed throughby the90th, itwouldthenmovetotheXXCorpstorelievethe94th,whichwouldthengotothe XII Corps, so that we could have the new divisions to attack north fromDiekirch.Thiswas sort of a grand right and left, butwas the shortestway ofgetting a division in. It is significant to notice the easewithwhich the ThirdArmyStaffwasabletomovetroops.Tothemitmadenodifferencewhetherthedivision made one or three moves, provided they had a little notice. Theoperationwasdelayeda fewdaysbecauseSHAEFwouldnot release the finalRegimentalCombatTeam(one-thirdofthefightingstrengthofadivision)ofthe94thuntilthe28thDivisionhadclosedatReims.

On the sixth, I had General Millikin, III Corps, and Van Fleet, who

commandedthe90thDivision,inwithmyStafftoworkoutdetailsfortheattackofthe90ththroughthe26thandalongtheridgeroadtothenorthwest,southofWiltz.Onecombatteamofthe26thwastoattackoneachsideofthe90th,whilethe 3d Combat Team was to relieve the right Combat Team of the 35th andattacknorth.Thecombat teamof the35thsoreleasedwould thenhelp the6thArmored Division in an attack southeast to make a juncture with the 90thDivisiononthehighground.

We planned to support this attackwith the fire ofmore than a thousandgunsof105mm.caliberorlarger.Thisfirewasintwodirections,abouthalfthegunsfiringalong theaxisofmovementof the90thand theotherhalf firingatrightanglestoit,sothatwewouldgettheadvantageofdispersioninrangebothways. Iwasveryproudof this ideabecause itwasmyown.Furthermore, thegunsfiringat rightangleswouldput theirovers into the ridgenortheastof theWiltzRiver.

InordertodeceivetheGermansastothemovementofthe90thDivision,weused aSignalCorpsDeceptionGroup at the formerCommandPost of the90th,whichkeptuptheradiotraffic.Subsequentlycaptureddocumentsshowedthatthisdeceptionworked.The90thDivisiondidaverycleverpieceofworkinregistering in their guns.As they came in they registered, and a similar set ofgunsfromthe26thDivisionceasedfiring.Inthiswaywebelievethattheenemywaskeptwhollyinthedarkaboutthearrivalofanewunit.Ofcourse,the26thDivisioncoveredthefrontsothatnoprisonersfromthe90thcouldbecaptured.Thefactthatwereceivedonlythreecounterattacks,andtheylightones,ledustobelievethattheenemywaswithdrawing.

Theleftregimentofthe80thDivision,attackingthroughthe26th,capturedthehighgroundinthevicinityofDahl.Thistookthepressureofftherightofthe26th and facilitated later movements of the 80th Division in a northerlydirection. The attack by the 80th was very successful and cheap, for wesucceededingettingfiveenemytanksandsomeself-propelledgunsatthecostoftwoofourdivisionaltanks.

GeneralEddybecameworriedabout anattack south fromDiekirch. I didnot agreewithhim,but took theonly reserve I had,whichwas a companyoftowedtankdestroyers,previouslyusedforprisonerofwarescortduty,andsentthem to the XII Corps. I also had the G-3’s of the 4th Armored (LieutenantColonel J. B. Sullivan) and 10th Armored (Lieutenant Colonel J. A.McChristian)makereconnaissanceinthevicinityoftheXIICorpssothattheycoulddeploytheirunitsrapidly.

ColonelConklin,theArmyEngineer,inspectedtheroadblocksandminesinfrontoftheXIICorps.ThiswastheonlytimeinmyservicethatIusedroad

blocksandmines.TherewasconsiderableeffortonthepartofHigherHeadquarterstohaveus

attackHouffalizeon themorningof theeighth.However, aswewerenot toldaboutituntilabout0900,1postponedtheattackuntilthenextday.

IndrivingtoArlon,theHeadquartersoftheIIICorps,toarrangethisattack,Ipassedthroughthelastcombatteamofthe90thDivisionmovingupforbattle.Thesemenhadbeenintrucksforagreatmanyhourswiththetemperatureatsixdegrees below zero, andwere thoroughly chilled.On the opposite side of theroadwasanendlessfileofambulancesbringingmenback—woundedmen;yet,whenthesoldiersofthe90thDivisionsawme,theystoodupandcheered.Itwasthe most moving experience of my life, and the knowledge of what theambulancescontainedmadeitstillmorepoignant.Onthewayup,ImetGaffeyandsignaledhimtofollowme.

TheplanfortheattackontheninthofJanuarywasasfollows:Fromlefttoright in the VIII Corps, the 87th, the 17th Airborne, 101st Airborne, 4thArmored;IIICorps,6thArmored,35thInfantry,90thand26thInfantry;andintheXIICorpsthe80thDivision; inall,ninedivisions.Armored,35thInfantry,90th and 26th Infantry; and in the XII Corps the 80th Division; in all, ninedivisions. Late that evening,Middleton calledme to say he felt the 87th and17th,whichhadhadaprettybadtimethedaybefore,shouldnotattackuntilthetenth,and thesamewas true for the4thArmored. I toldhimtheattackon theninthwouldgoforwardasplanned.

We got continued rumors all this day, and in increasing emphasis, of aGermancounterattackatSaarbriicken.Thechiefreasonfortheserumorswasthefact that it was what the Germans should have done, as the road fromSaarbriickenleadsthroughSt.AvoiddirectlytoThionville,Metz,andNancy.St.Avoidwas thereforevery importantand, in theareaof theXXCorps,had thesame relativevalue thatBastognehad in theareaof theBulge. Inviewof thepersistenceof these rumors, I calledWalkerof theXXCorps and toldhim topreparedelayingpositions,andalsoobtainedthefinalcombatteamofthe94thDivisiontocloseonThionville.

The opening attack of the 90th almost ended tragically for General VanFleet.Ashewaswatching the leadingbattaliongo in,Germanmortar fire fellaroundhimandthemenoneithersideofhimwerekilled.

All the arrangements for this attackweremadebywordofmouth and invery shortorder, although theywere complicatedbecause thegunsofGeneralGalley’sdivision,the4thArmored,whichwasnowattachedtotheVIIICorps,hadbeenbackingthe35thDivisionoftheIIICorps,andwehadtoarrangetoletthembackthisdivisionduringtheinitialphasesofthisfight,andthenfollowthe

4thArmoredintoitsnewassemblyposition.Inspiteofourhighhopes, theattackdidnotmakemore thanabout three

kilometers, except that Combat Command “B” of the 4th, attacking inconjunction with part of the 101st Airborne, got as far as the woods west ofNoville.

ItwillberememberedthatonJanuary8,Iwasurgedbyhighauthoritytoattack.At1030,onthetenth,twodayslater,Ireceivedadirectordertopulloutanarmoreddivisionandputit inreservesouthofthecityofLuxembourgasapossible counter-measure to the supposedly impending break-through. Thesetwo instances, for which Bradley was not personally responsible, indicate theinadvisabilityofcommandingfromtoofarback.

Onreceiptoftheorder,ItookGeneralBradleywithmetoArlon,wherewediscussedwiththeCorpsCommanderswhichdivisioncouldbepulledout.Theonlypossibleonewasthe4thArmored,whichatthattimehadbutonecombatcommandengaged.ThetwoCorpsCommanders,myself,andtheCommandingOfficers of the 4th Armored, 6th Armored, and 101st Airborne, met at theHeadquarters of the latter division atBastogne, and, to the accompaniment ofquite a heavy enemy concentration, perfected the arrangement for thewithdrawalof the4thArmored and the reunitingof the6thArmoredwith the101stDivision.Thisisanothercaseillustratingtheextremefacilitywithwhichcommand can be exercised, provided commanders are willing to get closeenoughtothefronttoknowandseewhatisgoingon.Theordertostartthe4thArmored was received at 1030. Two combat commands of the 4th Armoredstarted via Arlon on Luxembourg before dark. The counterattack they weredestinedtorepeldidnotcomeoff.

On the way back to Headquarters, I visited the 35th, 90th, and 26thDivisions toexplain to themthat,while theattackon the leftmustcease, theywere to continue. This was quite satisfactory, as they had made fairly goodprogressthisdate.OnreachingHeadquarters,Ifoundanewrumor,dreamedupbyHigherHeadquarters,thattheenemywasabouttoattackusacrosstheriverjust north of Trier. It seemed to me then, §nd subsequent investigation hasproved me correct, that it was impossible for the enemy to make any suchcounterattack.Hehadnotroopsavailable—infact,hisattacksatthattimewereonashoestring.

Welostseveralcarloadsofammunition,reportedasthreehundredtons,butprobably one hundred tons, as a result of a freight train running into anammunitiontrainsouthofArlon.

On the eleventh of January, it became quite evident that the end of theBastogneoperationwasinsight.Anticipatingthis,Ihadhadastudymadeofthe

river lines and road nets in theXXCorps area and drove toThionville to seeGeneral Walker and talk over this study with him. It seemed to me that theenemy could cross the Saar River in three places; first, in the vicinity ofSaarburgwhere he had some bridging and ferrying sites intact. However, theroadnetwascrampedand Ididnot thinkhewould take thechance.ThenextpossiblepointofcrossingwasatSaarlautemthroughourbridgeheads.ThisIdidnotbelieveprobable,first,becausehewouldhavetotakethewesternhalfofthetown,whichweoccupied,and,second,becausethebridgewasminedbyus,andifhestartedtoattack,wewouldblowit.Finally,Saarbrücken:andthiswastheplacewhere Iwouldhaveattackedhad Ibeen theGermans. In the town thereweresevengoodbridges,andtheyhad,onthewestbank,abridgeheadoffromseven to ten miles. The road net to Thionville, and thence to Nancy, wasexcellent.However, St.Avoidwas the critical point, andGeneralWalkerwasperfectlyawareofthisfactandhadmadearrangementstodefendit.HehadalsoarrangedtoblowthecrossingovertheNiedRiversoastocanalizeanyGermanattack.

His andmypersonal solution at the timewas to attackSaarbriickenwithwhatwe had. In the light of present knowledge, itwould have been the idealthing todo, andwouldprobablyhavebroken theGerman line completely andmuchearlierthanitactuallywasbroken.

Due to SHAEF’s worry about the impending German counterattack, theposition of the vicinity of theXXCorpswas strengthened. In addition to the94thand95thDivisionsandthe10thArmoredDivision,whichwereatthattimeintheXXCorps,the4thArmoredDivisionintheThirdArmyReservecouldbeused,andthe8thand9thArmoredDivisionswerebothclosing, theonein thevicinity of Pont-à-Mousson and the other near Metz. The last two, however,wereinSHAEFReserve.

ThefinalattackfortheVIIIandIIICorpstotakeHouffalizewasplannedforthethirteenth.

On the twelfth, General Gay visited the corps to co-ordinate their attackplanandalsotogetabattalionof155mm.howitzers,whichtheXIICorpshadloanedtotheVIII,returnedtotheXII.

General Bradley told me the plans for the use of the Army Group. Hewanted the First Army to attack east on Cologne, while the Third Armymaintained pressure and really held a defensive flank from somewhere in thevicinity of St.Vith to the junctionwith the SeventhArmy. This plan had theadvantageofutilizingtheexistingbreachintheSiegfriedLinewestofCologne,which had beenmade by the First Army inNovember, and also of using the

shortestroute.PersonallyIwasopposedtoit,asitpreventedmefromattacking,andIbelievedthattheXXCorpssupportedbytheIIIorXIIcouldattackstraighteast throughSaarlautemwithbetterchanceofrupturingtheGermanArmyandcapturingtheSaarValley.Istilladheredtomytheory,thatinordertokeeptheGermansfromattacking,wehadtoattack.

TheattackonHouffalizestartedonthethirteenth,buttheprogresswasnotasrapidaswehadhoped.However,thementalattitudeofthemenwasexcellentHeretofore theyhadbeensomewhatdubious;nowtheywerechasingasinkingfoxandbabblingforthekill.

Onthefourteenth,GeneralsSomervell,Campbell,1Lee,andPlank2visitedme, and we had considerable discussion on equipment. I definitelyrecommended the cessation of the construction of tank destroyers and thereplacing of the tank destroyer battalion in an infantry division by a tankbattalion. I also reiterated my request for two co-axial machine guns in eachtank.

On the fifteenth, orders were issued for the XII Corps to start its attacknorth through Diekirch on the morning of the eighteenth. For this attack Iassignedthe4thArmoredDivision,the87thInfantryDivision,togetherwiththe80th, 4th, and 5th Infantry Divisions to the XII Corps. The weather stillremainedhideouslycold.

I drove to visit the troops attacking Houffalize. At one point we cameacrossaGermanmachine-gunnerwhohadbeenkilledandapparently instantlyfrozen, as hewas in a half-sitting positionwith his arms extended, holding aloadedbeltofammunition.

1MajorGeneralL.H.Campbell,Jr.,ChiefofOrdnance,U.S.Army.2Brigadier General E. G. Plank, Commanding General, Advanced Section

CommunicationZone.

AtanotherpointIsawalotofblackobjectssticking-putofthesnow,andon investigating, found theywere the toes of deadmen.Another phenomenonresulting from thequick-freezingof themenkilled inbattle is that they turnasortofclaretcolor—anastysight.

At 0905 on the sixteenth, the 41st Cavalry Squadron (Captain HerbertFoye)ofthe11thArmoredDivision,coveringourleftflank,madecontactwiththe 41st Armored Infantry Regiment (Colonel, later Brigadier General, S. R.Hinds)inthe2dArmoredDivisionatHouf-Falize.ThisrestoredBradleytothe

commandoftheTwelfthArmyGroup.Intheeveningwereceivedadirectivetosendthe10thArmoredDivisionto

theSixthArmyGrouptoaidintheliquidationoftheso-calledColmarPocket.On the seventeenth, IpersonallycongratulatedMillikinandMiddletonon

the successful termination of the Bulge. Although we had not driven theGermansbacktothelinefromwhichtheystarted,wehadonthatdatebegunthisfinaloperation.

GeneralHugheswaswithmeandwevisitedthe6thArmored,the90thand26thInfantryDivisions,andtoldthemthat,thoughweknewtheyweretired,itwasnecessaryforthemtocontinuetofight.IdecoratedGeneralVanFleetandtwoofhisofficerswiththeDistinguishedServiceCross.Ialsosawthe120mm.German mortar which the 90th Division used in lieu of the cannon in theircannoncompany.Itwasaveryexcellentandlightweapon.

TheVIIandIIICorpsweregivenorderstoresumetheiroffensivealongtheaxisBastogne—St.Vithonthetwenty-first.

The XII Corps attack across the Sure River jumped off at 0330 on themorning of the eighteenth without an artillery preparation, and secured acompletetacticalsurprise.

General Eddy and I visited the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions. The 4thDivisionwas somewhat apathetic andGeneralEddyhad to direct the divisioncommander to get across the river himself and also see that his battalioncommandersdid.The5thDivisionwasinfinespirits.WevisitedanObservationPost fromwhichwe could look down on theGermans about six hundred feetbelow us in the river valley. Ourmen had on snow suits, some captured andsomewhichGeneralEddyhadhadmadeinLuxembourg.

We had to dispatch the 101st Airborne, an AA unit, and some tankdestroyer units to the Sixth Army Group, for an attack which had started bysomeone saying they could reduce the Colmar Pocket with one division, andendedupbyrequiringaboutfiveadditionalunits.

Walkercalleduptoknowifhecouldmakeaseriousattackin theSaar—MoselleTrianglewiththe94thDivisionandacombatteamofthe8thArmored.Hegotthegreenlight.

ThedelayintheattackoftheVIIIandIIICorpsuntilthetwenty-firstmightpossiblybringa fewextra troops formerly facing those twocorps intocombatwith the XII Corps. However, the XII Corps was fresher and had a shorterdistancetogo.

Onthenineteenth, theconditionof theroads,due tosleetandice,wassobadwecouldnotmoveeitherthe101storthe76thDivision.

The94thDivisionran intoelementsof the11thPanzerDivision(General

LieutenantWeitershein)onthisdate.Inspiteofterribleweatheronthetwentieth,theXIICorpsadvancedseveral

kilometers,whilethe95thDivisionatSaarlautemmetthecounterattackoffourhundred Germans and repulsed it—partly due to the German’s own efforts.Becausetheircounterattackjumpedofftoosoon,theywerecaughtintheirownbarrageand then inours.Only fortyprisonerswere taken.GeneralSchmidtofthe 76th Division reported one of his combat teams would close in the VIIICorpsthatday.

On the twenty-first, theXII Corpswas practically on its initial objectiveandcaughtalargeGermanconcentrationatthebridgenearVianden,wheretheyhadgoodartilleryobservation,andkeptitundercontinuousartilleryfire,usingproximityfuse.

While visiting the VIII Corps on this date, I ran across two instructiveincidents.Inoneplace,elementsofthe17thAirborneDivisionwerestuckonaslippery hill, and yet the officers did not have enough sense to have themendismount and push the trucks. When this was done, the sticking completelyended.TheotherwasthattheiceandsleethadmadetheGermans’andalsotheAmericans’mines inoperative, as they filledwith ice rightunder the spider sothat no pressure was sufficient to detonate the mine. It was evident that wewouldhavemanycasualtieswhenthethawcame,astroopswouldusetheroads,which were apparently de-mined; and suddenly find a mine that had becomeoperative.Weuseddetectorstothemaximum.

GeneralVanFleetwasCommanderofaCorpsthenforminginEnglandandlater commanded the III Corps when GeneralMillikin got into trouble at theRemagenBridgeinMarch.AftercanvassingtheavailablebrigadiersintheThirdArmy, we picked General Earnest to take Van Fleet’s place with the 90thDivision.However, that sameeveningGeneralEisenhowerorderedme to takeMajorGeneralL.W.Rooks as temporary commanderof thedivision inorderthat he might familiarize himself with conditions at the front, prior to beingplacedonStaffdutyunderGeneralEisenhower.

Theattackof theVIII and IIICorpscontinued satisfactorilywithnothingbutweatherandsmall-armsfirestoppingthem.TheVIIICorpswaspracticallypinched out1 by the twenty-second. The 80th Division, XII Corps, wasprogressingverysatisfactorilynorthoftheWiltzRiver,soItoldGeneralEddynot to halt on his final objective, but to continue north, and, if necessary, useelementsofthe4thArmoredDivisiontocoverhisrightflank.

IcalledGeneralBradleyonthisdate,January22,andurgedthatallarmiesattackwhethertheywerefatiguedandhadlossesornot,asIwassure,inviewof

theRussianoffensive,1112thatthatwasthetimetostrike.Itwas.At 1530, GeneralWeyland called up and said there was a great deal of

GermanarmormovinginseveraldirectionsnorthofDiekirch; that, infact,hispilotsreporteditthebiggestconcentrationtheyhadseensincetheFalaiseGap,andthatallhisgroupswereattacking.13

Onthetwenty-third,everythingwasgoingwellexceptthatonebattalionofthe94thDivisionlostfortymenkilledandwoundedandfourhundredmissinginaction.IdirectedGeneralWalkertoinvestigate.

In spite of strong remonstrances byGeneralBradley andmyself, SHAEForderedthe35thDivision, lessonecombat team,whichwasinactionwith the6thArmored,tojointheSixthArmyGroup.The35thhadbeeninactualcombatwiththeenemyeverydayexceptfivesincethesixthofJuly,andIhadonlyjustsucceededingettingitoutoftheline.

TheVICorpsoftheSeventhArmywasdrivenbackafewmiles.TheplanforthecontinuationoftheTwelfthArmyGroupattackenvisioned

twocorpsoftheFirstArmyattackingtheSiegfriedLinenorthoftheVIIICorps(ThirdArmywiththiscorps),attackingparallelwiththem.TheIII,XII,andXXCorps were to hold defensively. If this plan failed to get results, it wouldpossiblybenecessaryforBradleytogiveMontgomerytwelvedivisions,sowewereallveryanxioustosucceed.

When the question of attackingwith a corps alongmy northern flank inconjunctionwiththeattackoftheFirstArmywasbroached,IthoughtofputtingGeneralWalkerthere,ashewaslessfatiguedthantheotherCorpsCommandersand also because I considered him a very aggressive soldier. However, afterconsidering the fact that Middleton had already fought over this ground and,further, was in command of the northernVIII Corps, I determined to let himcontinueinthatcommandandcarryouttheattack,foralthoughhewastired,Iknewhimtobeaveryaccomplishedleader.

Theplanforbuildinghiscorpsuptostrengthwascomplicatedandworkedout as follows: The 76th Division, a new division, in the VIII Corps was torelievethe87thDivisionintheXIICorps;the87ththengoingtoMiddleton.The17thAirborneDivisionoftheIIICorpswastorelievethe26thDivisionintheIIICorps,andthe26thDivision, in turn,would join theXXCorpsandrelievethe95thDivision,whichwouldgo toMiddleton.The90thDivisionof the IIICorps and the 4th Division of the XII Corps would also go to Middleton.Therefore,hewouldhavethe11thArmoredandfour infantrydivisions,whichmadeaverypowerfulattack.TheseplanswerearrangedatmyhouseatdinnerwiththeCorpsCommandersonthenightofthetwenty-third.

On the twenty-fourth, General Hodges came to lunch with Bradley andmyself.AfterlunchthestaffsoftheFirstandThirdArmieshadadiscussionofboundariesbetweenthearmies.Wearrangedaverysatisfactoryboundary.Justas everyonewas happy,GeneralWhitely,1G-3 at SHAEF, called up and toldGeneral Bradley that he wished to withdraw a Corps Headquarters from theTwelfthArmyGrouptohelptheSixthArmyGroup.Thiswastheonlytime,tomyknowledge,thatBradleylosthistemper.HetoldWhitelythatifhewantedtodestroy thewholeoperationhecoulddo soandbedamned, and takenotonlyoneCorpsHeadquartersbutallthecorpsanddivisions.GeneralBull,Whitely’sassistant,thencameonthewireandBradleyrepeatedhisstatement,addingthatmuch more than a tactical operation was involved in that the prestige of theAmericanArmywasat stake.Wewereall extremelypleasedwithhis attitudeandtoldhimso.GeneralHodgessaidhewouldbeabletojumpoffonSunday,thetwenty-eighth,soIimmediatelydecidedtojumpoffonSaturday,thetwenty-seventh.

Bradley,Hodges,andIwereunanimousthatwastingtroopsontheColmarPocketwasavery foolish thing, and, furthermore, itwas the third time inourknowledge that suchadiversionofefforthadbeenmade.Wewerepersonallydeterminedtocarryoutourattack,nomatterhowmuchwewerereduced.1415

Atthat timeIwasconvincedthattheGermanswerepullingout,probablyasfarastheRhine.Itisinterestingtonotethat,inthereportsofGermanofficerswhichIhavesinceread,thatiswhattheGermanHighCommandwantedtodo,butHitlerwouldnotletthem.

Onthetwenty-fifthofJanuary,Codman,Stiller,andIvisitedthe4th,5th,and80th InfantryDivisions.Wealso tooka lookatDiekirch,Eittelbrück, andWiltz.Allof themhadbeenverywell “liberated.” In freezingweather, andatthis time theweatherwas always below freezing, the destruction of the doorsandwindows from bombardment resulted in the freezing and breaking of thewatersystemssothatnoneofthelargehouseswerehabitable,sinceneitherthesewernorheatingarrangementswouldwork.

OnthisdatealsoalltheunitsoftheVIII,III,andXIIArmyCorps,excepttheleftregimentofthe80thDivision,wereontheirfinalobjective,namely,thehill mass east of the Diekirch—St. Vith road. The 76th and 87th InfantryDivisionswereeffectingtheirchangeofplace.

TheattackoftheXIICorpsintheoperationwasexceptionallygood,beingwellplanned,rapidlyexecuted,andcheap.

On the twenty-fourth, the 5th Infantry Division found elements of fiveGermandivisionsinonegroupofonehundredprisoners,whileonthesamedate

the6thArmoredDivision,inagroupofonehundredandfiftyprisoners,foundelementsoftenGermandivisions.Thisindicatedabadstateofdisorganizationamong theGermans.Unfortunately,we did not realize howbad itwas at thattime.AllduringthisperiodHigherHeadquarterswereverypessimisticandkeptwarningusnottohaveareverse.Thiswasabadattitude.

By dark on the twenty-sixth, it was evident that all the shifts in troopswould be accomplished on time and that the attack could start on the twenty-eighth.Had anyone proposed such a troopmovement at Leavenworth, peoplewould have gone crazy, but here it was being done. However, the differencebetweenthisoperationandaproblematLeavenworthwasthatherewehadanoldandexperiencedstaffofextremelycapablemen,whileatLeavenworthonecouldhavenothingbutstudentsmoreorlessbemusedwithformulas.

Onthetwenty-eighth,IvisitedMiddletonatBastogneandfoundhimveryoffensive-minded.Hisplanfortheattackwastobeginwiththe87thontheleft,the90thontheright,followedrespectivelybythe95thand4thInfantry.Afteracertainadvance,the90thInfantrywastoformadefensiveflanktotherightandthe4thwastopassthroughitanddothesamefarthertotheeast.The95thwasto pass through the 87thwhen the latter became tired andwould continue theattackalongtheaxisofthecorps.ItwasnotnecessarytoformadefensiveflankontheleftbecausetheFirstArmywasguardingusthere.The11thArmoredwastocloseinbehindthe90thandbepreparedforexploitation.

I stopped atMartelange,Headquarters of the III Corps, and told them toprepare towiden the base of the salient south of the 90thDivision; that is, tocross through theholemadeby the90thand thenattack southeast.Todo thiseffectively,IhadtogetanotherdivisionfortheIIICorps,whichatthattimehadonly the 17th Airborne, one combat team of the 35th Infantry, and the 6thArmoredDivision.

When I got toHeadquarters,Eddywas therewith a proposition to attacknorthandjoinupwiththe4thInfantryDivision.Iwasverymuchpleasedwiththeideaandtoldhimtogoaheadwithit.WealsosecuredfromtheFirstArmyaroadrunningwest fromHouffalize.Theroadnet in theareaof theVIIICorpswasextremelybadandwastogetmuchworse.

Onthetwenty-eighth,wedecidednottoattackuntilthetwenty-ninth,so,asusualbeforeabattle, the twenty-eighthwasanerve-rackingday.However, thereplacement system was working better than it had ever done before and wewerepracticallyuptostrength.Allthetransferofdivisionshadbeencompletedinspiteofsnow,ice,andsleet.

Thesituationastotruckmaintenancewasprettybadbecauseoftheheavytolltakenoftrucksbytheglassyroads,andalsobecausebetweenthenineteenth

ofDecemberandthesixteenthofJanuarywehadmovedseventeendivisionsanaverage distance of one hundred miles. Added to this, we were nowmovingeightdivisionsaboutthesamedistance.Theice,whichstucktotherunninggearof the trucks and froze the drivers, resulted in considerable laxity as to firstechelonmaintenance.Also,wewereveryshortofOrdnancepersonneltodothistypeofmaintenance.

SoendedthecampaignoftheBulgewhichhadcostus50,630men.DuringthisoperationtheThirdArmymovedfartherandfasterandengaged

more divisions in less time than any other army in the history of the UnitedStates—possibly in the history of the world. The results attained were madepossible only by the superlative quality of American officers, Americanmen,andAmericanequipment.Nocountrycanstandagainstsuchanarmy.

CasualtiesforJanuary29were:

5THEEIFELTOTHERHINEANDTHECAPTUREOFTRIER

29Januaryto12March,1945

On the twenty-ninth of January, 1945, the thirteen divisions of the fourcorpsoftheThirdArmywereabreasttheMoselle,Sauer,andOurRivers,readytocracktheSiegfriedLinefromSaarlautern,northtoSt.Vith.

TheVIIICorpsopened thenewoffensiveon thisdate, followedby theHICorpsimmediatelytoitssouth.TheXIICorpsjumpedforwardonthesixthandseventhofFebruary,theXXCorpsonthenineteenth.

Bytheendofthemonth,allcorpshadbreachedtheSiegfriedLine,famousumonument to thestupidityofman”and, for theGermans,Marchcame inasanythingbutalamb.Thefuryoftheattackneverceased;TrierfellonthesecondofMarchtotheXXCorps;onthefifththe4thArmoredDivisionbrokeloose,toreachtheRhineontheeighth.Onthethirteenth,theThirdArmycontrolledtheMosellefromtheSaarRivertoCoblentz,andtheRhinefromCoblentznorthtoAndernach.

The Eifel, impossible of fast going according to the prophets, had beendominated in twelve days. Trier, key city of the Saar Triangle, fell to the XXCorps. (See Map, page 221.)During this time nothing new happened on theTwenty-FirstArmyGroupfront.IntheSixthArmyGroup,AmericanandFrenchtroops cleared the Colmar Pocket and again advanced to the Rhine. TheRussiansreached theBalticbetweenStettinandDanzig,andwerewithin fortymiles of Berlin on theOder River.Therewas nothing new in Italy.The FirstAmericanArmybrokethroughtheSiegfriedLine,securedabridgeheadovertheRhineatRemagen,andpushedthreedivisionsacross.

InthePacific,IwoJimawasgivingtrouble,P.H.D.

Onthetwenty-first,GeneralBradleycametoThirdArmyHeadquarterstogive us the general plan for future operations, which was as follows: TheTwenty-First Army Group and Ninth United States Army were to attackbeginning on the twenty-third. When they reached the Rhine, they were toattempt to get a bridgehead.While this was going on, the First Armywas toprotecttherightoftheNinth,andtheThirdwastostayput—atleastintheory.WhentheTwenty-FirstArmyGrouphadreachedtheriver,theFirstArmywasto start on Cologne with its left corps. When Cologne was invested, but notnecessarilytaken,theIIIandVCorps—thatis,themiddleandrightcorpsoftheFirst Army—were to attack successively while the Third Army was to drivefromthedirectionofPrumonCoblentz.Thisphaseoftheoperationwastoendwhen the Allied Armies were bellied up against the Rhine from Cologne toCoblentz.

Inthenextphase,theFirstArmywastosittightalongtheriver,whiletheThird Army attacked up the old Frankfurt corridor, starting the attack fromSaarlauternandeitherSaargueminesorSaarburg,dependingoncircumstances.

IaskeddefinitelywhetherornotIcouldmakearushatCoblentzprior totheinvestmentofCologne,andwastoldthatiftheopportunitypresenteditself,Imightdoso.

On the twenty-second, I decorated a number of nurseswithBronze starsandalsoLieutenantJamesH.Fieldsofthe4thArmoredDivisionwiththeMedalofHonor. I toldGaffey I did notwantLieutenantFields sent to the front anymore,becauseithasbeenmyunfortunateobservationthatwheneveramangetstheMedalofHonororeventheDistinguishedServiceCross,heusuallyattemptstooutdohimselfandgetskilled,whereas,inordertoproduceavirilerace,suchmenshouldbekeptalive.

From this formation I drove to Remich and met Generals Walker andMorris.IfoundthatMorrishadlethisbridgetraingetlost,andthereforewasnotacrossatSaarburg,andthat,atalatehourintheafternoonwhenImethim,hewasbeingheldupbysmall-armsfirefromthefarsideoftheriver.Itoldhimhewouldhavetogetthebridgeinatonce,fireornofire.GeneralWalkerwenttoSaarburgtoputsomelifeintotheoperation.

TheVIIICorpswasadvancingwellandpromisedtobeonthePramRiveronthetwenty-third.

On that date, the situation in the triangle was very annoying, but due toSHAEF and not to the Germans. The idea of the SHAEF Reserve was veryunfortunate,forwheneverwesucceededingettinganymenfromit,wehadtoputanotherdivisionbackintoit.Thisdespitethefactthatthethreedivisionsof

armorwhichIhadwereallproperlyplacedfortheattack,andtwoofthemwereactuallyengaged.ThebestIcoulddowassecureafurtherrespiteofforty-eighthours before I would have to send something to replace the 10th ArmoredDivision.

Bradleycalledandsaidwewouldgettwonewinfantrydivisions,providedwecouldsendtwoolddivisionstorest.Boththe80thand90thneededarest,sothiswasnotdifficult—particularlyaswedidnothavetomovethemoutoftheThirdArmyarea.

The twenty-fourth of February was noteworthy for the fact that, on thisdate,nonbattlecasualtiesof13,976fortheoperationsinceJanuaryexceededthebattle casualties of 12,296. Thiswas the first time in the history of the ThirdArmythatthenonbattleexceededthebattlecasualties.Itwasnotduetoagreatincreaseinthenumberofnonbattle,buttoamarkeddecreaseinthenumberofbattle casualties. The proportion between the two types of casualty is a goodindexof theefficiencyof adivision,providedyou rememberwhat thenormalnonbattlerateusuallyis.

Onthetwenty-fifth,IhadinforlunchMiddleton,Walker,andGaffey(whowasActingCorpsCommander of theXIICorps, asEddywas on sick leave).General Bradley called and asked if he and Allen could come down also. Icoached the three Corps Commanders and General Weyland on persuadingBradleytoletuscontinuetheuseofthe10thArmoredDivisionforthepurposeof taking Trier.Weyland in particular was most eloquent. I am sure Bradleyagreedwithus,butfelthehadtocarryoutorders.However,wepersuadedhimtoletuscontinuetheattackuntildarkonthetwenty-seventh,providedGeneralEisenhowerwouldletmecallthe90thDivision,whichwasactuallynotfighting,areservedivisionfor thepurposeofabidingby therule.Hadwebeenrefusedpermissiontocontinuethisattack,thewholehistoryofthewarmighthavebeenchanged,becausethecaptureofTrierwasoneoftheturningpoints.

I again got Bradley’s assent to attempt a breakthrough east of the PramRiver, ifandwhenanopportunityoffered.BothBradleyandAllenweremuchpleased,Iamsure, infactAllensostated,tobeamongagroupofpeoplewhowereeagertofight.

The sequence of events leading up to the capture of Trier is of interest,becauseitviolatesthenormalconceptionofhowgeneralsplan.TheinitialattackontheSaar—MoselleTrianglehadbeenstartedbytheXXCorpsforthepurposeofbreakinginthe94thDivisiontobattle.Then,onthenineteenth,Walker,whohad a very good sense of timing, called to say that,with the assistance of anarmored division, he thought he could clear out the triangle. As will beremembered, I borrowed the 10th Armored Division, and things went

moderatelywelluntilwehadforcedthecrossingatSaarburg.ItthenoccurredtobothWalkerandmethatwehadneverintendedsimplytotakeSaarburg,buthadhadoureyesfixedonTrier,sowecontinued.

On the twenty-sixth, the XX Corps was not doingmuch, as it had beenviolentlyattackedeastoftheSaarandnorthofZerfbytheGerman2dMountainDivision(commandedbyGeneralMajorDegen),andatthattimeitlookedasifweshouldhavetoturneasttoremovethisdivision.Ontheotherhand,theXIICorpswasdoingverywell,with the4thArmored,whichwason its leftat theKyllRiverinthevicinityofBitburg,whilethe5thand76thDivisionswereatorapproaching the Kyll. Knowing this, I conceived the idea of moving the 4thArmored southbehind the5th and76th InfantryDivisions and attackingTrierfrom the north. General Gaffey, temporarily in command of the XII Corps,pointed out the difficulty, from a logistical standpoint, of moving the 4thArmored, and suggested using the 76th Division,, which was on the right,reinforcedbythetankbattalionofthe80thDivision,whichwasthenresting.

Thelessontobegainedfromthisisthatsuccessfulgeneralsmakeplanstofitcircumstances,butdonottrytocreatecircumstancestofitplans.

Themention ofBitburg remindsme of an incident I saw there,which isveryillustrativeoftheGermans.Ienteredthetownfromthesouthwhilefightingwas still going on along the northern edge, which was not too far distant, asBitburg is a small place. In spite of the fact that shells were falling withconsiderable regularity, I saw five Germans, three women and two men, re-roofingahouse.Theywerenot evenwaiting forLend-Lease, aswouldbe thecaseinseveralothercountriesIcouldmention.

On the twenty-seventh, the 10th Armored Division advanced eightkilometersnorthfromZerfandwas,therefore,halfwaytoTrier.Theenemyhadbroughtupthe2dMountainDivisionthedaypreviously,buthadmadeamistakein thedirectionofattackof the10thArmored.Heapparently thought the10thArmoredwastoattacksoutheastfromZerftogetbehindtheSiegfriedLine,sohe put in his counter-attack from that direction. Actually the 10th ArmoredturnednorthtowardPellingen,butdidexposeitsrightreartoattack.

IcalledBradleyatdark,asIhadpromised,totellhimthatIwasnotyetinTrier,butwaswithineightkilometersofit,andaskedifIcouldkeepon.Hesaidtokeeponuntilhewasorderedbyhigherauthoritytostopme,andaddedthathewouldkeepawayfromthetelephone.

On the twenty-eighth, the 10th Armored was still out of Trier, but wasdoing better, having reached country in which it could attack with multiplecolumns.Heretoforeithadbeennecessarytoattackinasinglecolumn,which,foranarmoreddivision,isalwaysdifficult.

Avisit toGeneralMorrisonthisdateprovedratherconvincingly thatourtelephone lines were tapped. Before starting, Codman telephoned and got thenameofthetownwhereweweretomeetGeneralMorris.Whenwereachedthecrossroadsnearthere,anMPmetusandstatedthattheGeneralwasinanothertown,towhichheledus.Whilewewerethere,thefirsttownreceivedaheavyartilleryconcentrationattheexacttimeweweresupposedtobeinit.

Saarburg,theHeadquartersofthe94thDivision,wasthehomeofJohntheBlind,KingofBohemiaandDukeofLuxembourg,whowaskilledattheBattleofCrecy in1346.Hiscrestof three feathers is thatnowusedby thePrinceofWales.HewasthefounderoftheOrderoftheRedLionofLuxembourgandoftheWhiteLionofBohemia—bothofwhichdecorationsIsubsequentlyreceived.

OnthewayhomeGeneralMalonytookmetoseewhathethoughtmightbeamedieval chateau. It turned out to be amodemwinerywith some very badwine.Whilewewerelookingitover,ashellcameaboutasclosetoourheadsasitcouldwithouthittingus.

I suppose the near-miss put ourminds on religion. In any event, drivingbackfromthisplace,oneoftheofficerswithmewasquiteemphaticabouthisreligiousancestry,andfinally,toprovehissanctity,said,“ByGod,General,mypeople have been Catholics for more than three thousand years.” I remarked,“What, B.C. Catholics?” and he said, “Yes, sir.” I have told this story manytimesandfewpeoplehavelaughed.

On the first ofMarch, I flew to Bastogne and talked over with GeneralMiddletontheproposedplansforhisnextoperation.Hisideawastousethe11thArmoredDivisiononthethirdinordertopunchaholetotheKyllRiverthroughtheGerman5thParatroopDivision.When they reached the river, the crossingwas tobe effectedby the4thDivision following immediatelybehind the11thArmored.Therestofhiscorpswasdoingwell.

IntheXIICorpsallunitswereonthelineoftheKyllRiverandthe76'thDivisionalonehadpickeduponethousandprisoners.

At1415,Walkercalleduptosaythe10thArmoredDivisionwasinTrierandhadcapturedabridgeovertheMoselleintact.Thecaptureofthisbridgewasdueto theheroicactofLieutenantColonelJ.J.Richardson,deceased.Hewasridingintheleadingvehicleofhisbattalionofarmoredinfantrywhenhesawthewiresleadingtothedemolitionchargesatthefarendofthebridge.Jumpingoutofthevehicle,heracedacrossthebridgeunderheavyfireandcutthewires.Theacidtestofbattlebringsoutthepuremetal.

I calledGenerals Smith andBradley and told themTrierwas ours. Bothseemedverypleased.

OnMarch2,WalkerandIwerediscussingplansforthereductionoftheso-

calledMettalachSalientsouthofSaarburgassoonasthe26thInfantryDivision,whichhadrested,hadrelievedthe94thDivision,whichwastired.Asweweretalking, it suddenly occurred tome that amore telling operationwould be tocrosstheMoselleatSchweichwiththe10thArmoredDivision,reinforceitbyaregimental combat team of the 76th Infantry Division and move onWittlich.Walkerstartedworkingontheplanatonce.

EddyandIcrossedtheSaaratEchtemachanddrovetoBitburg,visitingthe76th, 5th, and80th InfantryDivisions and the4thArmoredDivision.The tripwasveryinterestingfortworeasons.First,itshowedthetremendousdifficultiesovercomeby the76thDivision in forcing theSiegfriedLine at this point, andsecond,theutterfutilityoffixeddefenses.

Fromonepointontheroadalongwhichthe76thDivisionhadsuccessfullyadvanced, fifteenpillboxeswerevisible in addition todragons’ teeth andanti-tankditches.Yetthisrelativelygreendivisionwentthroughthem.Wevisitedthecommandpillboxforthesector.Itconsistedofathree-storysubmergedbarrackswith toilets, shower baths, a hospital, laundry, kitchen, storerooms, and everyconceivable convenience plus an enormous telephone installation. Electricityandheatwereproducedbyapairofidenticaldieselengineswithgenerators.Yetthewholeoffensivecapacityof this installationconsistedof twomachinegunsanda60mm.mortaroperatingfromsteelcupolaswhichworkedupanddownby means of hydraulic lifts. The 60 mm. mortar was peculiar in that it wasoperatedbyremotecontrol.Asinallcases,thisparticularpillboxwastakenbyadynamitechargeagainstthebackdoor.Wefoundmarksonthecupolas,whichwereteninchesthick,whereour90mm.shells,firedatarangeoftwohundredyards,hadsimplybounced.

Pacifists would do well to study the Siegfried and Maginot Lines,remembering that these defenseswere forced; that Troy fell; that thewalls ofHadrian succumbed; that theGreatWall ofChinawas futile; and that, by thesame token, the mighty seas which are alleged to defend us can also becircumvented by a resolute and ingenious opponent. In war, the only suredefenseisoffense,andtheefficiencyofoffensedependsonthewarlikesoulsofthoseconductingit.

OnMarch3,GaydeliveredtheorderinpersontotheCommandingGeneralofthe10thArmoredDivisiontocrosstheMoselle,and,attackinginconjunctionwithonecombatteamofthe76thDivision,togetacrossingovertheKyllRiverandcontinueeastparalleltotheMoselle.TherestoftheXXCorpsmoppeduprear areas. The XII Corps, 5th Division, forced a bridgehead across the KyllRiverforthepurposeofbreakingloosethe4thArmored.IntheVIIICorps,the11thArmoredDivisionattackedsixhourslate,throughthe4thInfantryDivision

andranintoconsiderableresistance.GeneralBradleywas of the opinion that theThirdArmywas getting too

much spread out, and would not be in a position to make what he called a“power drive” on Coblentz. He was assured that, owing to the road net, nopowerdrivebiggerthantwodivisionscouldbemade,andthatthosedriveswereunder way: in the VIII Corps the 11th and 90th; in the XII Corps the 4thArmoredand5thDivisions;intheXXCorpsthe10thArmoredandpartofthe76thDivision.The65thDivisionjoinedtheThirdArmyin theareaof theXXCorpsandthe26thDivisionrelievedthe94thDivision.

Onthisdate,March4,theNinthArmyandtheFirstArmywerealongthelineoftheRhineRiver.Duringtheprecedingthirtydaystheprisonerstakenbythe Third Army had averaged one thousand per day, and the total number ofprisonerstakensincethestartoftheoperationonJanuary29exceededthetotalnumberofbattlecasualtiesinflictedontheThirdArmyforthesameperiod.

IntheXIICorps, the5thInfantryDivisionhadforceditsbridgeheadovertheKyllandintheXXCorpsthe10thArmoredDivisionforcedacrossingovertheKyllRiverfarthersouthandmovedeast,northoftheMoselle.

OnMarch5,the4thArmoredDivisionoftheXIICorpsstarteditsbreakfortheRhinewithanadvanceofsixteenkilometers,andinspiteofrainandmud,reachedthevicinityofthetownofDaun.

At1000onthesixth,IcalledBradleyandtoldhimforthefirsttimethattheXIICorpswasonitswaytotheRhine,andurgedthattherightoftheFirstArmybeorderedtogetamoveonsoasnottodelaytheleftofthe87thDivisionontheleftoftheThirdArmy.

During the course of the day, the 4thArmored overran and captured theCommandingGeneraloftheGerman53dArmyCorps(commandedbyGeneralvonRothkirchandGeneralLieutenantBotsch).

IntheVIIICorps,onournorthflank,threebridges,oneforthe4thInfantry,oneforthe11thArmored,andoneforthe90thDivision,wereplacedovertheKyll.

PrinceFelixofLuxembourg,escortedbyGeneralGay,visitedthefrontandinspectedthe10thArmoredDivisionandalsothecityofTrier.Asaresultofthistrip,GeneralGay believed that the area north of theRhine in the zone of theThirdArmywasalmostcleanedup,andthatweshouldmakeplansforanattackto the southeast in thePalatinate.He recommended that the attackof the10thArmored be discontinued, as it would eventually be pinched out by thecontinued attack of the XII Corps, and he thought it could be used moreprofitablyelsewhere.

OnMarch7,at1700, the4thArmoredDivisionreached theRhineRiver.

The 11th Armored Division, which began to do better on this day, pushedforwardtothevicinityofKyllberg.Theattackofthe10thArmoredDivisionwasorderedstopped.

On this day we processed through the cages and photographed the twohundred thousandth German prisoner.Whenwe sent this to Public Relations,TwelfthArmyGroup, theywouldnotpublish thepicture,because,as themanhadasignonhimstatinghewas the twohundred thousandthprisonerofwar,theysaidhewasbeingdegraded,whichwascontrarytotheGenevaConvention.

Ontheeighth,onordersfromabove,welostthe6thArmoredDivisiontotheSixthArmyGroup.

We had a Staff conference at which all the Staff, including GeneralWeyland,waspresent,todeterminethefutureplanofactionoftheThirdArmyandXIXTacticalAirCommand.Theschemethendevised,andlaterexecuted,was as follows: To attack with two corps with the purpose of seizingbridgeheads over the Rhine River in the vicinity of Mainz, Oppenheim, andWorms.TheXXCorps,consistingofthe94th,26th,and80thInfantryDivisionsand the 10th Armored Division, later reinforced by the 65th Infantry and the12th Armored, was to attack from Trier—Saarburg in the direction ofKaiserslautern. The XII Corps, consisting of the 4th Armored, the 5th, 76th,90th,and89thInfantryDivisions,1wastoattacksouthacrosstheMoselleRiversoutheast ofMayen, heading initially onBingen andBadKreuznach,with thepurposeofcuttingofftherecrossingoftheRhinebytheenemyandsecuringacrossingforussomewherebetweenMainzandWorms.TheVIIICorps,withthe87thand4thInfantryand11thArmored,wastocontinuemoppingupnorthoftheMoselle andwest of the Rhine,with the distinct understanding that if wecouldsecureacrossingovertheRhine,itwastobeexploited.

General Bradley stated he would prefer us not to attack south, over theMoselle,unlesswesecuredabridgeintact.

TheFirstArmyseemedtobedoingverywellattheRemagenbridgehead.Wewerequitehappyoverit,butjustalittleenvious.

On theninth, I joinedGeneralsBradley,Hodges,Doolittle,Simpson, andsomeothers to receive theFrenchLegionofHonor,GrandOfficer grade, andCroix de Guerre with Palm. Before the ceremony, Bradley and I arranged tohave the boundary of the Third Army moved to the south, so as to give usSaarlautemasaplacetocrossovertheSaarRiver.IthenorderedGay,overthetelephone, tohave the80thDivision join theXXCorpsand the90thDivisionjoin theXIICorps.Weall felt itwasessential that theFirstandThirdArmiesshouldget themselves so involved thatMontgomery’s plan to usemost of thedivisionsonthewesternfront,BritishandAmerican,underhiscommand,foran

attackontheRuhrplains,couldnotcomeoff,andtheFirstandThirdArmiesbeleftoutonalimb.

Therewassometalkoftryingtoco-ordinatetheplansofattackoftheThirdandSeventhArmies,but since theSeventhArmycouldnot jumpoffuntil thefifteenth,IdeterminedtoattackassoonasIcould,asIfeltthattimewasmorevaluablethanco-ordination.Infact,itismyopinionthatco-ordinationisaverymuch-misusedwordanditsaccomplishmentisdifficult.

1CommandedbyMajorGeneralT.D.Finley.

Thetenthandeleventhwereveryslowdays,aseverybodywasgettingsetfor the next operation. However, it gave us time to assemble the CorpsCommanders.Fortunately,GeneralPatch,SeventhArmy,wasalsopresentatthemeeting,soeveryoneknewwhatwasgoing tohappen,andPatchagreed to letWalker(mysouthcorps)co-ordinatewithHaislip,commandinghisnorthcorps.Patchwasalwaysextremelyeasytoworkwith.

ThiswasthedaythatIreceivedmysetofThirdArmytablesilver,whichIhadorderedthroughGeneralLittlejohn,1andpaidforpersonally.

Walkerwasunabletogetoffonthetwelfth,butpromisedtojumpat0300onthethirteenth.TheXIICorpswasreadytojumpshortlyaftermidnightonthefourteenth.

LittlejohnandIspentalongtimediscussingandinspectinguniforms.Wefinally came to the conclusion that the best uniform for war is combat shoesproperlymade,withthefleshsideout,heavywoolentrouserscutnottoexceedeighteeninchesatthebottom,awoolenshirt,ahelmetorhelmetliner,and,forwinter, amodified trench-coat with a liner and gloves. The shirt and trousersmake the most useful, most uniform, and the best-looking outfit which oursoldiers possess, and by giving them two weights of shirt and possibly oneweightoftrousers(heavy),wewouldhaveasimpleandeffectiveuniformwhichnobodycouldeasilydeface.

Ageneralwhohadbeen relievedcame inathisown request and tried toexplain why he was no good. I offered him a lesser command in anotherdivision,buthetoldmeheneededforty-eighthourstoconsiderit.Ididnottellhimso,butIrealizedthatanymanwhocouldnotmakeuphismindinlessthanforty-eighthourswasnotfittocommandtroopsinbattle.

^ajor General Robert M. Littlejohn, Chief Quartermaster for GeneralEisenhower.

Hereended thecampaignwhichwillprobablybe referred to inhistoryasthatoftheEifel.Ithadbeenalong,hardfightwithmanyrivercrossings,muchbad weather, and a great deal of good luck. As of this date, March 12, thecasualtybalancestoodasfollows:

6THECAPTUREOFCOBLENTZANDTHEPALATINECAMPAIGN

13Marchto21March,1945

The Third Army’s Campaign was considered by many, including theGermans,tobeoneofthegreatestcampaignsoftheentirewar.

Intendays,twelveofitsdivisionscatapultedsouthacrosstheMoselle,eachtryingtooutdotheother,racingthroughtherearareasofGermantroopsstillfacing the American Seventh Army in the Siegfried Line farther south,surrounding or destroying two German armies, and capturing over sixtythousand prisoners and ten thousand square miles of territory with minimumlosses.

OnMarch22,eightdivisions,set for thekill,wereon theRhine,southofCoblentz. Four armored divisions, followed by supporting infantry units,thundered over the Honsbrouck Mountains, “impassable to armor .” TheGermans were confused, bewildered, and helpless. The enemy was a beatenmassofmen,women,andchildren, interspersedwithdie-hardNazis.ThewarhadbeenwonwestoftheRhine,asGeneralPattonhadpredictedalmostayearbefore.TheThirdArmywasinapositiontocrosstheRhineatMainz,Worms,and Oppenheim. (See Map, pages 244-245.) In the Sixth Army Group, theoffensive to the Rhine continued, and the enemywithdrew on the north flank,offeringstiffresistanceintheSiegfriedLine.

Onotherfronts,PanaycapitulatedtoMacArthur,MandalaystillheldoutinBurma,andthefightingprogressedslowlyinItaly.

The air forces continued pounding Germany, concentrating their heavyraidsonBerlin.

P.D.H.

TheBeginningoftheEnd

TheattackoftheXXCorpsjumpedoffontime,March13,butwasnotfast,owing to particularly bad terrain in front of both the 94th and 26th InfantryDivisions.TheXIICorpswasreadytojumpoffinthevicinityofTreisat0200on themorning of the fourteenth.When theXII Corps attacked,with the 5thInfantryDivisionontherightandthe90thontheleft,itbuiltfourbridgesacrosstheMosellebeforenoon,andbytheendofthedayhadfourteenbattalionsonthesouthern side of the river. Here a case of extremely good luck, or Divineintervention,occurred,because,on theafternoonof the twelfth,at leasthalfofthe 2d German Mountain Division was opposite the place of crossing, butapparentlytheywerefooledbytheattackoftheXXCorpsandmoveddowntomeet it, therebypermitting theXIICorps tocrossover,practicallyunopposed.Thisillustratesthedesirabilityofhavingadivergenceoftiminginanattack.

I drove to Trier viaWasservillig. The Roman legionsmarching on TrierfromLuxembourgusedthissameroad,andonecouldalmostsmellthecopperysweatandseethelowdustcloudswherethosestarkfightersmovedforwardintobattle.Asamemorialtotheirgreatdeeds,theleastdemolishedbuildingstandinginTrierwasthegatewaytotheRomanamphitheater.Therestofthemiddleofthecity,andallthebridges,excepttheonewecapturedintact,wereprettybadlyruined.Ivisitedthe10thArmored,the80th,94th,and26thInfantryDivisions.IwasanxiousatthistimeforfearthattheSeventhArmy,whichjumpedoffonthemorningof the fifteenth,wouldbeatme intoMainz. Itwouldhavehelpedmyself-confidenceifIcouldhavereadthefuture.

Onthefifteenth,IflewtoMayenandsawGeneralEddyoftheXIICorpsandGeneralMiddletonoftheVIIICorps.WhenItoldMiddletonIwouldhavetotakeeverythingawayfromhimexceptthe87thDivision,butwouldgivehimthe 76th as soon as possible, he made no kick at all, but came back with abrilliantsuggestionfortheimmediatecaptureofCoblentzwiththe87th.Hewasoneof theeasiestCorpsCommanders todobusinesswith Ihaveeverknown,andalsooneofthemostefficient.

Therestof theArmydidnotdoverywellexceptonthefrontof the80thand94thInfantryDivisions,wheregainsuptosixmilesweresecured.

FlyingbacktoHeadquarters,ImadedetourstogetpicturesofViandenandClairvaux,bothofwhichareexcellentchateauxofdifferenttypes—onetheriverfort,theothertherockfort.

At1100onthesixteenth,BradleycalleduptosaythatGeneralEisenhowerwasprobablyovermytowninanairplane,sincehehadbeenunabletolandatBradley’s.Ihurriedtothefieldandmethimshortlyafter twoo’clock.HewasaccompaniedbyGeneralSmith.Wewent atonce to theMapRoom,andbothwere quite enthusiastic and complimentary, Smith stating that I could borrowanydivisionIneededafterthesuccessIhadhadwiththe10thArmored.IntheafternoonwehadaguardofhonorforSmith,whichIbelievewasthefirstonehehadeverhad.

ThenGeneralEisenhowerandItooktwopeepsanddrovetoTrier,visitingthe Command Post of Combat Command “A” of the 10thArmoredDivision,wherewemetGeneralMorrisandtheAssistantDivisionCommander,GeneralPibern.Elementsof the10thArmoredandthe90thDivisionsbothreachedtheNahe River and secured bridges. The 11th Armored Division joined the XIICorpsandassembledin thevicinityofBoullay,preparatorytocrossingbehindthe89thDivision.The87thDivisioncrossedtheMosellenortheastof the90thand got into the outskirts of Coblentz, while the 28th Division, temporarilyloaned tomeby theFirstArmy, joined theVIIICorpsand tookover the riverfrontsouthoftheFirstArmytoCoblentzexclusive.

GeneralEisenhowertoldSmithtohavethe12thArmoredDivisionfromtheSeventh Army released to my Army and join the XX Corps, moving on themorningoftheseventeenth.

Ontheseventeenth,GeneralEisenhowerattendedthemorningbriefingandwasmostcomplimentary.Hestatedthatwe,asveterans,didnotrealizeourowngreatnessandwerenotcockyenough,and toldus tobe sure thatotherpeoplerealized how good the Americans were. As an example, he said that thenewspapers referred to the enemy fighting on the front of the 4th ArmoredDivisionasdonebyweaknumbersofGermans,butfailedtogivecredit tothe4thArmored for its rapidity ofmovement, which prevented large numbers ofGermansfromgettingaheadofit.

We flew toLuneville to seeGeneralsPatchandDevers.Therewas someidea that Patch and I should occupy the same Command Post, but after weexplained thatwehadperfect telephone communication and that ourpointsofinterestwerewidelyseparated,thethingwasnotpushed.

OnreturningtoLuxembourg,Ihadapressconferenceandbroughtoutthepointsmentioned byGeneral Eisenhower. I stated also that three divisions ofMarines in the Pacificwere getting great credit by reporting their tremendouslosses, while twelve or thirteen divisions in our Army were getting no creditbecausewedidnothavetremendouslosses.Iaskedthenewspaperstofixitup,thengavethemthescoresheet(theAmericancasualtylist,actual,comparedto

theestimatedGermancasualtylist)oftheThirdArmyandtoldthemtopublishit.

Thequestionof our tanksversusGerman tanks cameup, and I answeredthatbysayingthat,inthecourseofthefightingsofar,wehadgottwoGermantanksforeveryonewelost.Istatedalsothatallofourequipment,clothing,etc.,wassuperiortoanythingtheAlliesortheGermanshad.

Thinkingover thecriticismof the tanksasa resultof thediscussionwiththewarcorrespondents, Iwrotea letter toGeneralHandyrestatingwhat Ihadtold the correspondents. This letter was given wide publicity and hadconsiderableeffectinstoppingthefoolishcriticism,whichwasnotonlyuntrue,butwasalsohavingabadeffectonthemoraleofoursoldiers.1

Walkercalleduparound1800witharequesttorelieveoneofhisdivisioncommanders.Itoldhimifhecouldnameabetterone,hecouldrelievehim,buthecouldnot. I thencalledEddyandgavehimhellbecause the11thArmoredhadnotgotanywhere.Inordertomakeitaperfectday,IcalledMiddletonandtoldhimthatatleasthehadnotbeencussedout,andcongratulatedhimonhisgreatfeatincapturingCoblentz.

The eighteenthwasnot a particularlygoodor badday.The4thArmoredwas held up by a vicious counterattack by twoGrenadier regiments of the 2dPanzerDivision (commandedbyGeneralLieutenantvonLuttwitzandGeneralMajorvonLauchert).The remainingunitsof theVIII,XII,andXXCorpsdidwell,butnotbrilliantly.

1The story that spread throughoutAmerica about our tanksbeing inferior toGerman

tanks finally reached the soldiers on the front lines and caused some apprehension amongthem.

Taking two individual tanks and comparing them on a point by point basis—gun,muzzle velocity, armor protection, etc.— perhaps gives a shade to theGerman tank if youcomparedtheir“top”heaviestooursatthattime.Ifthetwotanksmetonavillagestreetandwere to fight it out, everything else being equal the American tank would probably havesuffered.However,thiswasnotGeneralPatton’sideaofhowtanksshouldbeusedinbattle.Hisideawasnevertousetanksinatank-to-tankfight,buttobreakthemthroughtheenemylinesandletthemrunamuckintherearareas.

GeneralPatton,knowinghowsuch rumorswereapt toaffectadversely themoraleofthe troops, tried toexplode therumorbefore itsunfortunateresults tookeffect.TheGeneralprobably knew tanks aswell as anyotherAmerican soldier.Hehad studied them intenselyfrom their inception in World War I. He pointed out the advantage of mobility, lack ofmechanicalfailures,powerturrets,gyrostabilizers,andtotalnumbers,inallofwhichweheldtheupperhandovertheenemy.Heshowedwherewewereandwithwhat,comparedtowheretheenemyhadretreatedtoandwhathehadleft.

The results were self-evident, and General Patton’s faith in the American soldier,coupledwiththesoldier’singenuity,guts,andfightingabilitywheninanAmericantank,dida

lottospikethenastyrumorthatwaslikelytoaffect,notonlyAmericanfightingmoraleatthefront, but also the morale of the workers at home, who were striving so hard to producenothingbutthebest.

On the nineteenth, the situation was much better. The VIII Corps hadcompleted thecleaning-upofCoblentz. In theXIICorps the4thArmoredwassix miles fromWorms and tenmiles fromMainz. The 90th and 5th InfantryDivisionswereacrosstheNaheRiver.Partofthe11thArmoredDivisionwasatNeisenheimandincontactwiththe12thArmoredoftheXXCorps,whichwasatLauterecken.The10thandpartofthe12thArmoredwerebothabouttwelvemilesfromKaiserslautern,withthe80thand94thrightontheirtails.

Itwasmyopinionthenthat,ifthewarceasedatthatmoment,troopsundermycommandwouldhavehadthebestandmostsuccessfulcampaigninhistory.Iamstillofthatopinion.

HodgesandBradleycameinintheafternoonandthingslookedgloomy,forifwe couldnot secure a crossingover theRhine,wewouldprobably lose tendivisions to the Ninth Army under Montgomery, and have to go on thedefensive. If,however,wecouldgetacrossbefore theBritishattack,wecouldcarrytheball.HodgesandIdeterminedthathewouldcrossatRemagenandIinthe vicinity ofMainz, andmake an initialmeeting at Geissen. From there hewouldtaketheautobahnroadandroadstothewest,whileIwouldgettheroadseastandadvancethroughKasselandHanau.

On the twentieth, the operationswere going particularlywell. In theXIICorps,ataskforceofthe90thDivisionwasapproachingtheRhineandclosingin south ofMainz, whichwould cut off all the available escape routes as farsouthasthattown.CombatCommand“A”ofthe4thArmored(commandedbyColonelH.A.Sears)wasninemilesnortheastofKaiserslautern,whileCombatCommand “B” (commanded by Colonel C.W.Abrams) of the same divisionwasby-passingthetown,theoccupationofwhichwaslefttothe80thDivision.

I made arrangements with Patch for a new boundary, hitting the RhinesouthofWormsandgivingtheSeventhArmyKaiserslautern,whenandiftheygotthere.ItoldPatchthatwhenIgottoKaiserslautern,Iintendedtoturnatleastonearmoreddivisionandoneinfantrydivisionsouthforthepurposeofmakingcontact with his VI Corps,1 thereby completely surrounding the remainingGermans, and that, as soonas thiswasaccomplished, Iwouldclearoutofhisarea.

On the nineteenth, our total losses, both battle and nonbattle, were eighthundred,whilewecapturedapproximatelytwelvethousandGermansinadditiontothosewehadkilled.

Itwasamusingatthetime,anditisevenmoreamusingtoremembernow,the difficulty I had in securing permission to take Trier, and in gettingpermission toget the4thArmoredDivisioncut loose for theRhine. In fact, itwasnecessarytousecertainchicaneryinordertosecurepermissiontocrosstheMoselleinasoutherlydirection.2

WhileIwaswithPatch,hejokinglysaid,“George,IforgottocongratulateyouforbeingthelastmantoreachtheRhine.”Ireplied,“Letmecongratulateyouonbeingthefirstmantoleaveit,”referringtothetimewhenhisVICorps(commanded by Major General E. H. Brooks) had been ordered back, afterhavinggainedtheRhine.

Onthetwenty-first,theoperationsinthePalatinatewerepracticallyended,because in the XII Corps the 90th Division had reached Mainz, and wasattackingthetownwithtworegiments.The4thArmoredwasatWormsandthe11thArmoredwas south ofWorms. In theXXCorps, the 12thArmoredwasclosinginonMannerheimandthe10thArmoredhadturnedsouthfromNeustadtonLandau.The80thDivisionhadcleared 'Kaiserslautern,while the94thand26thDivisionswere both closing in that direction in spite of some confusioncausedbythe6thArmored,fromtheSeventhArmy,crossingthelineofmarchofthe26thDivision.

1CommandedbyMajorGeneralE.H.Brooks.2TruetoGeneralBradley’sdesiresthatthePalatinateCampaigncouldnotstartunless

theThirdArmysecuredabridgeovertheMoselleintact,theXIICorpsrushedreconnaissanceelements to the river inaneffort togetone.The leadingelementsarrived in thevicinityofTreisandsawoneofthebridgesacrosstheriverstillstanding.It immediatelyradioedback,“BridgeatTreis intact.Continuingonmission.”ThismessagewasrelayedfromDivisiontoCorps to Army to Group. The campaign was on; the troops moved on the Moselle. Themessagewasthelastreceivedfromthevehiclethatsentit.Asitproceededtoandstartedtocrossthebridge,thebridgeblewup,takingvehicleandcrewalongwithit.Itwastoolatetostoptheattackwhenthenewscamethatthebridgewasnomore.Itdidnottakelongtobuildtemporary bridges of our own and thewarwas on again.Thiswas the fourth time that theThirdArmyhadcrossedtheMoselle.

I consulted with Eddy at Simmeren. It was evident that the GermansthoughtwewerecrossingatMainz,andhadplaced tworegiments in the townwithorderstoholdtillthelast.We,therefore,decidedtoputasmokescreenonthe river atMainz to give the impression that wewere to cross there, and tomake the crossing at Oppenheim. This was a particularly fortunate place tocross, because on our side there was a barge harbor which could be enteredthrough the townwithoutbeing seen fromeither sideof the river.Our assault

boatscouldbelaunchedinthisbargeharborwithouttheenemy’sknowledgeandslipintotheriverquietly.Eddyhadselectedthispointmanymonthsbefore.

However, I believe Iwas guilty of a greatmistake in notmaking a rivercrossingnorthoftheconfluenceoftheMainRiverwiththeRhine;thatis,northofMainz.My reason for not doing it was the fear of being held on the highgroundnorthofthejunctureofthetworivers.Ontheotherhand,hadIcrossedthere,thecrossingoftheMainRiveratFrankfurt,andatitsmouth,wouldhavebeen avoided.Thiswas one of the few timeswhen I tookwhat seemed to begoodprecautionsandwhichwere,ineffect,toogood.

Inanyevent,wedeterminedtocrosstheRhineonthenightofthetwenty-secondwiththe5thInfantryDivision.IgaveaplantoEddy,whichmighthavebeen quite picturesque, of using some two hundred L-4 planes to carry oneriflemanperplaneacross the river.By theuseof theseplaneswewouldhavetaken two hundred men across every thirty minutes. The idea was that ofBrigadierGeneralE.T.Williams,ChiefArtilleryOfficerof theArmy,andanextremelygoodone.1

After things had been arranged with Eddy, we flew to Mainz and sawGeneralMiddletonoftheVIIICorps,andmadearrangementsforhimtoforceacrossinginthegorgeoftheRhineinthevicinityofBoppard,orelsenearLorch,withtheideaofmovinginitiallyonMastatten,whichwasagoodcrossroad,andgave the optionofmoving either northeast onLimburgor of coming south tofacilitatetheMainzcrossingfromtheeastbank.

1TheassembledCubplaneswerenicknamedtheThirdArmyTroopCarrierCommand.

Inviewofthesituation,GeneralPatton’sideawastogetasmanymenaspossibleacrosstheRhineintheshortestpossibletime.Atthisparticulartimehebelievedthestrengthwasinthegreatestnumbers.

The matter of getting bridge materiel for these river crossings wasextremely difficult andwas onlymade possible by superhuman efforts on thepart of General Conklin, Army Engineer, and also by the Navy Detachment1whichco-operatedwithus.

Atthistimethequestionofrationsbecamequiteacute,andwetookstepstosaveeverywherewecould.

The twenty-first terminates the campaign of the Palatinate, but beforeleaving it I believe it well to point out that our attack across the Rhine atOppenheimwasmadewithouthalting—thatis,wesimplychangedthedirectionofthe5thand90thDivisionsfromsouthtoeast,whilecontinuingsouthwiththe

remainder of the two corps.This deluded theGermans into the belief thatwewerenotmakingaseriousattempttocross.IfeltthatthewaytogetacrosstheRhinewas by a coup demain. The execution of this coup wasmagnificentlyplannedbyGeneralEddyandgloriouslyexecutedbyGeneralIrwin.

CasualtiesasofMarch21were:

1NavyDetachment(NavalUnitN-2)consistingoftwelveLCVP’sandtheircrewswere

attached to the Third Army. They had practiced at Toul especially for the crossing of theRhine.Theyweremovedforwardintimetobelaunchedinthewaterandoperatingat0730onthetwenty-thirdofMarch.Thisunitgreatlyexpeditedthecrossing.

2The prisoner of war total as of 13 March was 220,000, so during the Palatinate

Campaign62,900Germanprisonerswerecaptured.

On March 23, I published General Order Number 70 covering theoperationsfortheperiodJanuary29toMarch22.SincethisorderexpressedmyideasofthePalatinateCampaign,itisinsertedhere:

GENERALORDER

NUMBER7023March,1945

ToTHEOFFICERSANDMENOFTHETHIRDARMY

AndToOURCOMRADESOFTHEXIXTACTICALAIRCOMMAND

In the period from January 29 to March 22, 1945, you havewrested 6484 square miles of territory from the enemy. You havetaken 3072 cities, towns, and villages, including among the former:Trier, Coblentz, Bingen, Worms, Mainz, Kaiserslautern, andLudwigshafen.

You have captured 140,112 enemy soldiers, and have killed orwounded an additional 99,000, thereby eliminating practically all ofthe German 7th and 1st Armies. History records no greaterachievementinsolimitedatime.

Thisgreatcampaignwasonlymadepossiblebyyourdisciplinedvalor, unswerving devotion to duty, doubled with the unparalleledaudacityandspeedofyouradvanceontheground;whilefromtheair,the peerless fighter-bombers kept up a relentless round-the-clockattackuponthedisorganizedenemy.

Theworldringswithyourpraises;betterstill,GeneralMarshall,GeneralEisenhower,and

GeneralBradleyhaveallpersonallycommendedyou.Thehighesthonor I have ever attained is that of havingmy name coupled withyoursinthesegreatevents.

Please accept my heartfelt admiration and thanks for what youhavedone,andrememberthatyourassaultcrossingovertheRhineat2200hourslastnightassuresyouofevengreaterglorytocome.

G.S.PATTON,JR,LieutenantGeneral,U.S.Army,

Commanding

7FORCINGTHERHINE,FRANKFURT-AM-MAINANDACROSSTHEMULDE

22Marchto21April,1945

Atthisperiodofthewar,speedwasoftheessence.Captureofterrainwasmoreimportantthanthemopping-upofabeatenenemy.Totaldisruptionoftheenemy's interior was in order. Only confused and bewildered enemyorganizationswereleft;fightingeverywherewasbyremnants.

Sensingthis,GeneralPattonorderedthefirstassaultcrossingoftheRhinetobemadebytheXIICorpsonthenightofMarch22-23.

BehindadvancedelementsoftheThirdArmy9alreadyalongtheRhinefromCoblentz toSpeyer,wasamassofconfusedGermans,andalsosomeconfusedAmericans. Everyone was heading east, Americans advancing, Germansretreating, and some of the advancing Third Army units reached the Rhineaheadof theGermans retreating before the SeventhArmy.As theseAmericandivisions hit theRhine, they came to a bottleneck.As theGermanshit it, theybecameprisoners.

At2200onthenightofMarch22,the5thInfantryDivisionoftheXIICorpsrowedacrosstheRhineonschedule.Therewasnoartillerypreparation,noairblitz, no dropping of paratroops. The crossing was made so quietly andefficientlythatitsurprisednotonlytheenemybutourowntroopsaswell.

Fortheensuingmonth,thoughsomecasualpocketsofresistancehadtobeforced,thewar,forthemostpart,becamearoadmarch.Infact,atonetimeonthe autobahn, north of Frankfurt, two armored and two infantry divisions, onbothsidesoftheroad,weremovingnorthabreast, towardKassel,whileinthecenter of the same road tens of thousands of German prisoners weremovingsouthwithoutguard.

Germanreserveswereoverrun,rearinstallationscrushedorignored,andthecivilianpopulationbewildered.Naziatrocitiescametolightandcriesofthephantom“redoubt"wentup.

By the end of a month, the advanced elements of the Third Army hadoverrun the district of Saxe, Coburg, and Gotha, were on the outskirts ofChemnitz, and beyond Nuremberg. TheMulde had been crossed when ordersfrom above indicated a new direction of attack —not to the east, but to thesoutheast,throughBavaria,alongtheCzechoslovakianborder.(SeeMap,pages282-283.)

Except in Italy, on all other fronts the situation was fluid. All the AlliedArmies on the Western Front were across the Rhine. The Twenty-First ArmyGroupwasontheElbeRiverinthenorth;theFirst,farthersouth,reachedtheoutskirts of Dresden. Nuremberg fell to the Seventh Army. The Russians tookVienna and Danzig. The air forces continued their strikes in support of thegroundtroopsonallfronts.

TheCommanderAn-Chief, PresidentFranklinDelanoRoosevelt, died onApril12.

P.D.H.

“TheRhine,theRhine,theGermanRhine”

OnMarch22,the10thand11thArmoredDivisions,onewiththeXIIandthe other with the XX Corps, had relieved the 4th Armored Division in thevicinityofWorms.Elements of the12thArmoredDivision, in theXXCorps,were moving on Ludwigshaven, while the 10th Armored Division had got acombat command at Landau. Finally, one combat command of the 12th wasmoving on the townofSpeyer.When it reachedSpeyer, all theGerman exitsovertheRhine,inmyarea,werecutoff.

Onthetwenty-second,wereachedourheight,uptothattime,inprisonerstakeninoneday—eleventhousand.

General Weyland, Colonel Codman, and I drove from Saarburg via St.Wendel toKaiserslautern,and from there through thewoods, forabout twentykilometers, in thedirectionofNeustadt.Herewewitnessedoneof thegreatestscenesofdestructionIhaveevercontemplated.AGermancolumnenteringtheroad from the northwest, and consistingmainly of animal transport and guns,was struck on the right flank by a company of medium tanks of the 10thArmoredDivision.TheGermansweremovinguparathersteepcanyonwithaprecipitous cliff on their left, while the tanks came in between them and themountain. Formore than twomiles horses and vehicleswere,pushed over thecliff.Youcouldseethemarksofthetanktreadsontheflanksandshouldersofthe horses, and see the powdermarks on themen and horseswhere they hadbeen shot atpoint-blank range. In spiteofmypride in the achievementof the10thArmored,Iwassorryforthepoorcreatures.

WhenwegotbacktoHeadquartersaboutdark,wefoundthatelementsofthe 10th Armored had made contact with elements of the VI Corps of theSeventh Army in the vicinity of a town called Schwanim, thus completelypocketing the German troops. I also got a telegram from Grow, nowcommandingtheFifteenthArmy,saying,“Congratulationsonsurroundingthreearmies,oneofthemAmerican.”

Onthenightofthetwenty-secondtheFifthInfantryDivision,jumpingoffat2230,crossedtheRhineandmadeitstwenty-thirdsuccessfulrivercrossingatOppenheim; it got six battalions across before daylight with a total loss oftwenty-eightmenkilledandwounded.

Inconnectionwiththiscrossing,asomewhatamusingincidentisallegedtohave happened, The Twenty—First Army Group was supposed to cross theRhineonMarch24, and, inorder tobe ready for this earthshakingevent,Mr.

ChurchillwroteaspeechcongratulatingFieldMarshalMontgomeryonthefirstassaultcrossingovertheRhineinmodemhistory.Thisspeechwasrecordedand,through some error on the part of the British Broadcasting Company, wasbroadcast, in spite of the fact that the Third Army had been across for somethirty-sixhours.

Owing to the fact that the 10th Armored Division was so deep in theSeventhArmyarea, I swapped it for the6thArmoredDivision,whichwasontheleftoftheSeventhArmy,bymutualagreementbetweenGeneralPatchandmyself.

OnMarch24,Codman,Stiller,GeneralEddy, and I crossed theRhine atOppenheim, stopping to spit in the river.Whenwe got to the far side, I alsodeliberately stubbedmy toe and fell, picking up a handful ofGerman soil, inemulationofScipioAfricanusandWilliam theConqueror,whobothstumbledandbothmadeajokeofit,saying,“IseeinmyhandsthesoilofAfrica”or“...thesoilofEngland.”IsawinmyhandsthesoilofGermany.

We then flew to the Headquarters of the VIII Corps to see about thecrossing atBoppard,which took place the night of the twenty-fourth, and thecrossingofthe76thDivisionatSt.Goaronthenextnight,thetwenty-fifth.

Itwasratherprophetic,Ithought,thatweshouldcrossatSt.Goar,nearthelegendarysiteoftheLorelei—oneofthesacredspotsofGermanmythology.

The Rhine crossing was going very well for the XII Corps. All the 5thInfantry, tworegimentsof the90th,andmostof the4thArmoredwereacross,and arrangements were made for the 6th Armored to start crossing on themorningofthetwenty-fifth.Inthemeantime,theXXCorpswasassemblinginthe vicinity of Mainz, where we had decided to construct a railway bridge,becausetherailwaynetwassuchthatthiswasofnecessityonourmainsupplyline.

Theplanfortheensuingoperationenvisagedsendingonecombatteamofthe76thDivisionsouthalongtheRhine,soastotakethehighgroundcoveringthecrossingoppositeMainz;tohavethe5thDivisioncrosstheMainRiverinthevicinity of Mainz, and the 80th : Division cross the Rhine north of theconfluenceof theRhineandMain,while the restof theXIICorpscrossed theMain east of Frankfurt,with an initial rendezvous point atGiessenwhere theVIIICorpswasalsoheaded.ItoldeachCorpsCommanderthatIexpectedhimtogettherefirst,soastoproduceaproperfeelingofrivalry.

AtthistimeIhadanideaofcreatingacompletelyarmoredcorpsofthreearmored divisions, supported by onemotorized combat team from an infantrydivision, putting them all under Walker and making a rush for Kassel orWeimar,dependingoncircumstances.

Onthetwenty-fifth,the87thDivisionsucceededinmakingitscrossingandhad two regiments over the river by daylight, in spite of the fact that all thehistorical studies we had ever read on the crossing asserted ! that, betweenBingen and Coblentz, the Rhine was im- • passable. Here again we tookadvantageofatheoryofourown,that theimpossibleplaceisusuallytheleastwelldefended.

WehadquiteaheavyGermanairattackonourbridgesites—at least twohundred sorties—but, thanks to our anti-aircraft guns and to theXIXTacticalAirCommand,thebridgewasnothit,althoughoneraft'wasstruckandsunk.

OnMarch26,IcrossedtheRhinewithCodmananddirectedEddytosendanexpeditionacrosstheMainRivertoHammelburg.Thereweretwopurposesin this expedition: first, to impress the Germans with the idea that we weremovingdueeast,whereasweintendedtomoveduenorth,andsecond,toreleasesomeninehundredAmericanprisonersofwarwhowereatHam-!melburg. Iintendedtosendonecombatcommandof the4thArmored,but,unfortunately,wastalkedoutofitbyEddyandHoge,commandingthe4thArmoredDivision,so I compromised by sending one armored company and one company ofarmoredinfantry.

IlearnedthatColonelJohnHines,sonofmyoldfriendMajorGeneralJohnL.Hines,hadbeenstruckinthefacewithasolid88andhadbotheyestakenoutwhileleadinghistanksintheattackontheairfieldsouthofFrankfurt.Afterhewaswounded,hetooktheradiotelephone,calledtheDivisionCommander,gaveanexactstatementofthesituationandendedupbysaying,“Andalso,General,you had better send someone to take my place, as I amwounded.”1 For thissuper—heroicacthewasgivenanOakLeafClustertotheDistinguishedServiceCrosswhichhehadwonduringtheSaarCampaign.Hewasaverygreatsoldierand should not die.GeneralGrowwas upset by the loss ofHines; in fact, soupset thathedidn’tdoanything for adayafterwardandhad tobeprodded totakeFrankfurt.

1FromaletterfromColonelJohnL.Hines,Jr.,toMrs.Patton:“Mycombatcommand,C.C.‘A’of the6thArmoredDivision,hadcrossedtheRhine

andpassedthroughthe5thInfantryDivisionontheleftofourC.C.‘B.’Ourmissionwastoclear theanglebetweentheMainandRhineriversandattackthebridges intoFrankfurtandFrankfurtitself.WehadpushedthroughsomeverydifficultwoodedandswampyterrainandafterabriskfighthadtakenthevillageofMorfelden.Myadvanceguardofmyrightcombatteam,the9thArmoredInfantryBattalion(reinforced)underLieutenantColonelBritton,waspushing on through scattered woods against heavy infantry andmachine-gun opposition toclear the airport.The airportweknewhad a large concentrationof88 and105 anti-aircraftartillery and we were receiving heavy fire from them. Also we were receiving some 150

millimeter artillery, probably fromFrankfurt. I had leftMorfelden inmy tank and gone onwith the advanced troops to push through the airport as rapidly as possible and get to thebridgesinhopesofcapturingoneormoreintact.WhenIreachedourroadjunctionneartheautobahn,veryheavyartillerycaughtouradvancedreconnaissance,settingseveralvehiclesonfire. This artillerywasmoving down the road near the road junctionwhere Iwas andwasabout two hundred yards away. I moved about two hundred yards off to the flank acrosscountrytoavoidthisconcentration.IrememberweflushedsomeGermaninfantryinfoxholeswhocamepastus to surrender. Iwas standing in the turretofmy tank talkingon the radiotelephone.The tankhadbeenswungaroundso that its tailendwas towardFrankfurt. Ihadbeentalkingfirsttomyothertaskforcetoascertainitsprogress,andthenIwaseithertalkingtoortryingtocontactColonelBrittonandlookingovertherearofmytanktowardFrankfurtwhenashellwhichIdidnothearcominghitthedeckofmytankandthesideoftheturret.Ihadmylefthandonthehatchandwasfacingtheshell.IrememberseeingtheexplosionandtryingtopulldownthehatchwithmylefthandonlytofindthatIhadlostthefingersofit.IrememberdroppingdownintothetankandfindingthatIwaschokingfromboneandshrapnelfragments in my throat and scooping them out with the fingers of my right hand. I thenremembertryingtocalltoreportoursituationandtohavesomeonetakemyplace,butIamconfusedastowhomIcalledorwhatIsaid.GeneralGrowtoldmelaterthatIhadcalledandsaidsubstantiallywhatGeneralPattonquoted.Iwas thentakento therear inmytankandIremember later talking to General Grow somewhere down the line. I have a confusedrecollectionofnotbeingabletosayanythinga|}doftryingto,buthesaysIactuallydidtalktohimandaskedhimtogetmebacktotheDivisionassoonaspossible....”

Later, ImetGeneralWalker at the rear echelonof theXIICorps andwecompleted arrangements for the 80th Division to cross the Main with onecolumnandtheRhinewithanother.

OnreachingHeadquarters,Idiscoveredthatataskforceofthe9thArmoredDivision,FirstArmy,hadbrokenloosetothesouth,andBradleyaskedmeifIwished it to come toWiesbaden, which I was about to attack. I immediatelyassented and then flew to Bad Kreuznach to see Colonel Hines.When I gotthere,hewasontheoperatingtableandunconscious.Itwasaverypainfulsight.

On the twenty-seventh, we moved the Command Post to Oberstein andoccupiedthebarracksof theformer107thGermanInfantryRegiment(ColonelGronawcommanding).Herewecaptureda tremendouscarvedeaglewhichwesenttotheUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademyasagiftfromtheThirdArmy.

On the twenty-eighth, considerable complication arose from the fact thatthe80thDivisionhadcompleteditscrossingsoftheRhineandtheMainwithoutmuchdifficultyandwasheadedonWiesbaden,aswas thecombat teamof the76thandalsothetaskforcefromthe9thArmoredDivision.Itlookedforawhileasifeachofthethreewouldshootintotheothertwo.Eventuallywegotthe9thArmoredandthe76thstoppedandreturnedtotheirproperplaces.

ColonelE.M.Fickett,commandingthe6thCavalryRegiment,withatask

forcefromtheVIIICorps,crossedtheautobahnandkeptoneast,doingaverysplendidjob,whilethe4thArmoredadvancedmorethantwo-thirdsofthewaytoGiessen.The6thArmoredhadalsoforceditswayacrosstheMainRiverintotheheartofFrankfurt,andwasmovingnorth.

Ontheotherhand,wewereverymuchdisturbedbecausewecouldgetnoinformationatallas towhathadhappened to the taskforcesenteast fromthe4thArmoredDivision.

WhiletalkingtoBradleyabouttheboundariesbetweentheThirdandFirstArmies, Imade the suggestion that, afterwe tookKassel, forwhichwewerethenheading,weshouldturneastintotheDresden—LeipzigTriangle.ThisideawaspartlytheresultofmyownstudyofthemapandpartlyfromconversationwithGeneralGiraudoftheFrenchArmy.Bradleywasquitesympathetic,andatthetimewemadeplansforthisoperation.

Giraudstatedthatmembersofhisfamily—hiswifeandtwodaughters-in-law,Ithink—wereprisonerssomewhereinthevicinityofWeimar.IsuggestedthathisAideaccompany the4thArmoredDivision,whichat the time seemedmostlikelytogettherefirst.TheGiraudswereeventuallyrescued,aswellasaBelgianprincess,whohad somevery interesting stories to tell aboutwhat shereferredtoasalagerforimportantwomennorthofBerlin.ShesaidthatinthislagerthereweresomefourthousandGermanwomenwhosehusbandsoccupiedimportantpositionsandthattheywere,ineffect,hostages.Apparentlytheywerefairlywellfed,buttheGermansexecutedalargenumberofyounggirlswhereshecouldseeitfromherwindow.Theseexecutionsapparentlytookplaceeverynight, so she lost considerable sleep. We considered her story quite anexaggeration.

On the twenty-ninth, the 70th Infantry Division (Major General A. J.Barnett) and the13thArmored (MajorGeneral J.B.Wogan)wereattached totheThirdArmy,buthadtobeheldinSHAEFReservewestoftheRhine.Thiseasedthesituationintherearagooddeal,andweputthe70thalongtheRhinefromCoblentz toOppenheim.We also got the use of all four cavalry groupsassignedtotheThirdArmy,asheretoforewehadbeenrequiredtoholdoneinreserve.BradleyaskedthatIleaveoneinfantrydivisioninanassemblyareaforArmy Reserve somewhere in the vicinity of Frankfurt or Wiesbaden. Weselectedthe5thInfantryDivisionforthisrole.

For the rest things were going very well. The 4th and 6th ArmoredDivisionshadmadesubstantialadvances,althoughthe11thArmoredDivision,whichhadturnedeast,washeldupbeyondHanau.ThenortherndivisionoftheVIII corps was also slowed down, owing to the fact that the First Army hadmadeaboundaryofitsownwithoutreferencetotheboundaryprescribedbythe

TwelfthArmyGroup,withtheresult that therightboundaryoftheFirstArmycut across the line of advance of the 87th Division. This was eventuallystraightenedout.

On the thirtieth, theGerman radio announced that theAmerican armoreddivisionattackingHammelburghadbeencapturedanddestroyed.1

Wereceived instructions tomoveas rapidlyaspossible to the lineof theWerra—Wesser Rivers, and after that tomove east on the ElbeRiver. It wassuggestedbyHigherHeadquartersthatwemakethismoveslowly.However,wepointedoutthattheonlywaytoavoidcasualtieswastomovefast.

The 6th Armored Division, supported by elements of the 80th and 65thInfantryDivisions,reachedapointtwelvemilessouthwestofKassel.

OnMarch31,IflewtoHeadquartersoftheXIICorpseastofFrankfurtandexplained that, after passing the Werra—Wesser Rivers, this corps wouldconfineitselftoadvancingapproximatelyfifteenmilesaday.IhadintendedtoflytotheXXCorpstoexplainthesamethingtothem,butWalkerarrivedatXIICorpsHeadquartersandwecompletedthearrangementsthere.

IthendrovetotheairfieldforthepurposeoftakingofffortheVIIICorps,whenGeneralSibert,G-2oftheTwelfthArmyGroup,landedandsignaledmetostop.HehadaplanforthecaptureoftheGermancommunicationcenterinthevicinityofGotha,Erfurt,Weimar,andOhrdruf,which,whenheexplainedittome,seemedfullofpromise.ItelephonedfromtheairfieldtoholdWalkeratXIICorpsHeadquartersuntilSibertandIgotthere.Unfortunately,Walkerhadleft,but theycaughthim,andhearrivedbackatHeadquartersabout thesame timeSibertandIdid.WethenexplainedtheideaoftherapidadvanceontheWeimarQuadrilateral—Eddy on the right,Walker on the left. I told them theywouldhave the greatest chance in history tomake names for themselves, and to getmoving. IgaveWalkerpermission toby-passKassel inorder toaccelerate theoperation.

ThenIflewtotheCommandPostoftheVIICorps,justwestofLimburg.TheLimburgairfieldwastakingongasolinefromtheTroopCarrierCommandat the rate of sixty planes an hour. Had it not been for the Air TransportCommand, wewould have run out of gasoline again. Each plane carried 115five-galloncans.

Before leaving Headquarters, Gay had agreed with me to telephone theboundarybetweentheVIIICorpsandtheXXandXIICorps,asweproposedtoputtheVIIICorpsinthemiddle.Middletonhadjustreceivedtheboundariesandwas satisfied with them. However, in view of the impending attack on theWeimarQuadrilateral, and the possibility of aGerman counterattack from thevicinityofHanau,Itoldhimnottostarthisoperation,because,inthepositionhe

thenoccupiednearLimburg,hewasideallysituatedtostopanyattemptonthepartoftheGermansthroughHanau.

Flying home, Codman and I followed the gorge of the Rhine and tookphotographs from the air of the twocrossings,made in thegorge, by theVIIICorps.

At 1830, Bradley called to state that General Eisenhower was somewhatperturbed about the riskwewere taking in our proposed rushonWeimar, butafterwediscussedit,Igotpermissiontocontinuetheattack.

Imadearrangementstoreconstitutethetwocompaniesofthe4thArmoredDivision, which we now definitely knew had been captured. After forcing acrossingovertheMaineastofFrankfurt,inwhichtheCaptainincommandwasslightly wounded, they continued the attack and reached the outskirts ofHammelburg.TheretheyranintoelementsofthreeGermandivisionswhich,aswehoped,hadbeendrawnbytheirattack.Whilesomeofthetanksandsomeofthe armored infantry engaged these divisions, other tanks went to the prisoncamp, some six miles to the north, and released the prisoners. These tanks,accompaniedbysometwelvehundredprisoners,rejoinedtherestoftheforceinthevicinityofHammelburgandstartedbackovertheroadtheyhadtaken.ThefollowingreportwasmadebymyAide,MajorStiller,whowaswith themhutnot incommand.He suggested that, insteadof returningover the roadalreadyused,thecolumnstrikenorth.Theofficerinchargedeclinedthatadviceandthecolumnstoppedtorefuel.Whileengagedinthisrefueling,theywereattackedbythreeregimentsofGermaninfantryfromthreedifferentdirections,andscattered.Whentheconfusionhadcleared,MajorStiller, theCaptain incommandof theforce, and fiveenlistedmencontinued to fightuntil theyhadusedupall theirammunitionandhadtheirvehiclesdestroyed,whentheysurrendered.

OnthefirstofApril, twoyearsfromthedayJenson1waskilled,wewerenotgoingsofast,dueprimarilytoroadblocksordemolitions.However,the4thArmoredDivisionwassixkilometerswestofEisenach,whilethenorthcolumnof the 11th Armored Division, also in the XII Corps, was in Oberfeld. Wereceived a message from the Twelfth Army Group that, if we could not getWeimarbythenightofthefirst,wehadbetterstopandwaituntiltheFirstandNinth Armies came abreast of us. However, we persuaded them to let uscontinueuntil1700hoursonthesecond.

On the second of April, the VIII Corps began to move in, as planned,betweentheXXonthenorthandtheXIIonthesouth,andtotakeoverthe4thArmoredDivision.The 80thDivision of theXXCorps resumed the attack onKassel and had a rather rough time of it, but whenever we turned the 80thDivisiononanything,wealwaysknewthattheobjectivewouldbeattained.

Itwasreported,onthisdate,thatacertainnumberofGermantroops,laterdiscovered tobemembersof the2dMountainDivision,hadescaped from thehills northeast of Frankfurt, and, cutting across the rear of theXIICorps, hadcaptured a hospital column, killed one officer and two enlistedmen, and alsocapturedanammunitiondump.Thefirstreports,whichcameinatnight,gaveamosthorribleaccountofatrocities, includingthemurderofallmembersof thehospital, therapingofallnurses,and thedestructionof theammunitiondump.This is simplyanother illustrationofmyopinion that the reportofno incidentwhich happens after dark should be treated too seriously. They are alwaysoverstated.

1MajorRichardN.Jenson,GeneralPatton’sAide,killedbyanairbombinTunisia.

In this particular case an officer and two enlistedmenwere killed in thefirst fighting. Thereafter, theGermans,while helping themselves to the trucksand ambulances, which they used for their own transportation, in no waymolestedthedoctors,nurses,orenlistedpersonnelofthehospital.Furthermore,whentheyreachedtheammunitiondump,whichwasdefendedbysomeduskysoldierswhoranaway,theydidnottakethetroubletoigniteit,buthurriedoninan attempt to get clear.We rounded them up next daywith the 71st InfantryDivision, the 10th Infantry Regiment (Colonel R. P. Bell) of the 5th InfantryDivision,andtheReconnaissanceBattalion(LieutenantColonelM.W.Frame)ofthe13thArmored,whichhadbeenreleasedtousthatday.Inallsomeeighthundredprisonerswere takenandprobably fivehundredkilled,as thesoldierswerestillundertheimpressionthatatrocitieshadbeencommitted.

The totalcasualties for thewholearmyon thisdayamounted to190menkilled, wounded, and missing, which is the most eloquent statement of theweaknessoftheopposition.

TheWerraRiverprovedmoreofanobstaclethanwehadanticipated,asitpracticallystoppedboth the6thand4thArmoredDivisionsandslowedup the11thArmored.Alsothe6thArmoredDivision,onthisday,receivedveryheavyGermanairattackswhileattemptingtobridgetheriver.

On the-third,wemoved theCommandPost to aGermanbarracks on thenorthern exit from Frankfurt. Codman and I drove there fromOberstein. Thevalley leading toMainz isvery reminiscentof theKawValley inKansas.Theroadswereinextremelygoodcondition,andalltheGermancivilianswereout,working violently to clean up their towns. The city ofMainz itself was very

badlybashedin.Iwouldestimatethatatthattimeatleasttwo-thirdsofitwasinruins. All the bridges over the Rhine were blown up by the Germans, butfortunately the railway bridge, which collapsed north of Oppenheim, made acomplete barrier, so that the Germans could not float either barges or minesdowntodestroyourbridgesnorthoftherailwaybridge.

OnthewaywestoppedatBadKreuznachtoseeColonelHines,buthehadbeenevacuatedabouttwohoursbeforeourarrival.1

We did see a number of recaptured prisoners ofwar,whowere in fairlygoodshapeconsideringwheretheyhadbeen.Inthisparticulargrouptherewereat least six enlisted SIW’s (self-inflictedwounded), including one officer, theonlyoneIhadeverseen.Igavethemmyusualspeech,whichransomethinglikethis:

“Didyougetthemanwhoshotyou?”“No,sir.Idoneitmyself.”“Oh,youdid!Whattimedidithappen,inthedaytime?”“No,sir,itwasatnight.”“Didyousuffermuch?”“No,sir,mybuddyfixedmeuprightaway.”“Doyouknowwhatyouare?”“No,sir,Idon’t.”Iwould then say, “Now, all of you other soldiers listen,” andwould use

aboutthreelinesofchoiceprofanityandstatethat,bywoundinghimself,henotonlyshowedhewasacoward,butalsoaddedtothelaborandriskofthebravemenwho did not use thismeans of getting out of battle. I gave the officer aspecialtreatment.

Onarrivingat thenewHeadquarters,wediscovered that the4thArmoredDivisionwas in thevicinityofGotha, andCombatCommand“B”of the11th(commanded by Colonel W. W. Yale) was twelve kilometers southwest ofOhrdruf. We also had a definite order from Higher Headquarters that, onreaching the lineMeiningen—Ohrdruf—Gotha—Mühlhausen,wewere to stopandawaitthearrivaloftheFirstandNinthArmies.

1ColonelHinesrecovered,butlostthesightofbotheyes.

OnApril4,weweregivennewboundariesbetweenourselvesandtheFirstandSeventhArmies,alsothenewhaltlinerunningthroughMeiningen—Gotha—Suhl—Langersalz-Mühlhausen.Afterreachingthisline,wewereorderednot

toadvancemorethanafewmilesadayuntiltheFirstandNinthArmiescouldcloseup.Thiswouldrequirealongperiodoftime,becausetwoofthefourcorpsoftheFirstArmyandonecorpsoftheNinthwerestillengagedincleaningupthe Germans trapped in the Ruhr Pocket. We had loaned the 5th InfantryDivisionand13thArmoredtoHodgestohelp.

Fortunately,GeneralPatchoftheSeventhArmywaspresentwhenwegottheboundariesandthehaltline.

IthenvisitedtheHeadquartersofthethreecorps.IntheXXCorpsthe6thArmoredDivisionhad takenMlihlhausen, and the 80thDivisionhad removedthefinalresistance inKasselandalsomostof the town.There theycapturedaGermangeneralandfourhundredmen.ThisgeneralstatedthathebelievedthatGermany would still win. His ideas seemed at variance with his action insurrendering.Furthermore,hewas the firstGermangeneralwhohad statedhethoughtGermanywouldwin.AlltheotherssaidGermanywasdefeated,butthattheycontinuedthebattlebecausetheywereorderedto.

IntheVIIICorpsIsawtwenty-nineWorldWarIGermanstandardswhichthat unit had captured. These were later sent to the Adjutant General inWashington.

That evening two lieutenants, who had been liberated fromHammelburgandmadetheirwayacrosscountrytoourlines,paidmeavisit.2

Late that evening, Patch called up to say that three other officers fromHammelburg had reached his Headquarters and told him ColonelWaters hadbeenbadlywounded.Patchsaidhewoulddoeverythinginhispowertocapturethecamponthefifth.

Onthefifth,the4thArmoredDivisionhaddefinitecontrolofthecitiesofGotha, Ohrdruf, andMühlberg. I was very happy, because General Gay wasfinally promoted to Major General, and General Williams, Army ArtilleryOfficer,andGeneralConklin,ArmyEngineer,alsoreceivedtheirfirststars.

Wehad theCorpsCommanders in for lunch for thepurposeofarrangingboundaries. Whenever boundaries are arranged, there is always a bitter fightbetweenall concernedover thequestionof roads, so Idecided to let the threesettlethisthemselves,whichtheyeventuallysucceededindoingafteralongandacrimoniousdebate.Ifelt,andtheCorpsCommanders,Ithink,agreedwithme,that therewasnothing in frontof theThirdArmywhich it,oranyof its threecorps,couldnoteasilyovercome.Wewere,therefore,opposedtostopping,but,in order to occupy the new boundaries as prescribed by higher authority, wepracticallyhad tostop,orat leastslowdown, inorder toperform, for the firsttimeinthehistoryoftheThirdArmy,theactofregrouping.Evenwhiledoingthis, however, we pushed along several miles each day, so as to prevent the

enemyfromdiggingin.On the sixth, I decorated Private Harold A. Garman, of the 5th Infantry

Division,with theMedalofHonor.Garmanwasanattachedmedico inoneofthebattalionsthatforcedthecrossingovertheSauerRiver.Duringtheaction,aboat with three walking and one prone wounded, paddled by two engineers,startedbackandwascaughtbyGermanmachine-gun fire in themiddleof theriver.The engineers, andone of thewalkingwounded, jumpedoverboard andswamforshore.Theothertwowoundedjumpedoverboard,butweretooweaktoswimandclungtotheboatwhilethelittercaselayprone.Theboat,stillunderahailofbullets,driftedtowardtheGermanshore.PrivateGarmanswamoutandpushedtheboattoourside.Iaskedhimwhyhedidit,andhelookedsurprisedandsaid,“Well,someonehadto.”

AftertheceremonyIwent,viaLimburg,toEhrenbreitsteintobepresentatthe ceremony of re-hoisting the American colors, which we had taken downtwenty-six years before, when the 4th Infantry Division started home at thetermination of our occupation of the Rhineland. Mr. McCloy, the AssistantSecretaryofWar,waspresent.

The 13thArmoredDivision started to close asArmyReserve in the reararea of the XX Corps. Late in the evening, Patch telephoned that the 14thArmoredDivision(commandedbyMajorGeneralA.C.Smith)hadrecapturedHammelburgandthatonlyaboutseventyAmericanprisonersremained,amongwhomwasColonelWaters,criticallywounded.

Elmer Davis of the OWI and General McClure1 came to dinner. AlsoColonel Darby of the Rangers, whom I had twice decorated with theDistinguishedServiceCross, once inTunisia and once inSicily.Hewas laterkilled.

Thegoodnewsofthedayarrivedwhen,at1705,GeneralEddycalleduptosaythatthe90thDivisionofhiscorpshadcapturedtheGermangoldreserveatMerkers, justifying General Sibert’s guess as to the location of a GermanHeadquarters. I had been burned on so many rumors that I told Eddy not tomentionthecaptureofthegolduntilwehaddefinitelyidentifiedit.

On the seventh, Bradley asked me if I could lend the 13th ArmoredDivisiontotheFirstArmyforthepurposeofcleaningoutthepocketbetweenitand the Ninth Army. It was during this operation that General Wogan, theDivision Commander, was seriously wounded. In order to replace the 13thArmoredDivision,Itransferredthe4thArmoredfromtheVIIICorpstotheXX,leavingtheVIIICorpstemporarilywithoutanarmoreddivision,butthiswasnottoo disadvantageous, as the country in its zone of actionwas not suitable forarmor.

AQuartermasterdetachmentoftheThirdArmyhadthesignal,and,asfarasIknow,solitarydistinctionofcapturingaGermanlieutenantgeneral,GeneralHahm,commandingthe82ndGermanCorps,togetherwithacolonel,amajor,alieutenant, and seven privates. Theywere apparently fed upwith fighting andsimply waited until American troops passed. The colored soldiers capturingthemwerethemostelatedsoldiersIhaveeverseen.

At1500,Eddycalledtosaythathehadenteredthegoldreservevaultandfound theequivalentofabilliondollars inpapermarks,but that thegold, if itexisted,wasbehindasteeldoor.ThisIorderedhimtoblowup.HestatedalsothathehadtwomembersoftheReichsbankincustody.

1BrigadierGeneralR.A.McClure,ChiefPsychologicalWarfareDivision,SHAEF.

On this day the four hundred thousandth prisoner captured by the ThirdArmywasprocessedthroughthecagesandphotographed.

Lateintheevening,quiteafightdevelopedintheVIIICorps,whensometwothousandGermanswerecaughtbetweenthe89thand87thDivisions.Atthesame time theXXCorpswas attacked on its northern flank, and repulsed theattackbyusingthe76thDivisionandonecombatcommandofthe6thArmored.

GeneralGiraud’sAidecameinatsuppertimewiththeGiraudfamily,whichhehadfoundatthetownofFriedrichroda.IkeptthemallnightandflewthemtoMetzinthemorning,asitwasquickerandsaferthansendingthembycar.

On the eighth, Mr. McCloy, accompanied by General Craig1 of the AirForce,arrivedandattendedourmorningbriefing.TheSecretarywasextremelycomplimentary.Hewasanxious toget to thefront toseesomeof thefighting,but owing to the distances involved and the fact that the roads were quiteinfestedwithsmallGermangroups,whoshotupourisolatedconvoys,Iatlastdissuadedhim.Ontheseventh,ColonelR.S.Allen,AssistantG-2,ThirdArmy,hadbeenseriouslywounded,onemankilled,andthreeotherscapturedoutofatotalofsevenwhiledrivinginthevicinityofGotha.Mr.McCloyandIdiscussedwhat, tome,was theseeminglybarbaricbombardmentof thecentersofcities.TheSecretarystatedthathehadtalkedtoDeversandPatchandtheybothagreedwithmethatitwasauselessandsadisticformofwar.

TheChiefofStaffofthe90thDivisionletoutthenewsofthecaptureofthegold, which, as previously stated, I was trying to conceal. In addition to thepapermoneypreviously reported,Eddyhad found,onblowing thedoor, some4500 gold bricks weighing thirty-five pounds apiece and alleged to be worth

$57,600,000. I immediately telephoned General Bradley that, owing to theamountoftheseizureandthefactthatithadbeenmadepublic,Ibelieveditwasnow a political rather than a military question and requested that G-4 fromSHAEFbeaskedtosendsomebodytotakeitover.

1MajorGeneralH.A.Craig,AssistantChiefAir Staff forOperations,Headquarters,AAF,

Washington,D.C.

Mr.McCloy,athisownrequest,visitedColonelWatersinthehospital,andwe also examined a number of wards and the operating rooms. He wasextremely complimentary in his remarks concerning the efficiencywithwhichthingswererun.AftertheSecretaryleft,IreturnedtothehospitalandpinnedtheSilverStarandOakLeafClusteronWaters.Hedidnotknowthathehadbeenawardedeitherdecoration,havingnotlived,inanhistoricalsense,formorethantwoyears,sincehiscaptureinTunisia.1

All threecorpswhich Ivisited in theafternoonwere ready to resume thelimited offensive to attainGridLine 20.2 In the case of theXXCorps, I toldthemthatif,onreachingthegridline,theycouldgetErfurt,alittletotheeast,togoahead,takingitbyenvelopmentfromthesouthinordertodishupanyhighranking Germans who attempted to pull out to the so-called “Redoubt”—theexistenceofwhichIthenpersonallydiscounted.TheVIIICorps,withthe89thDivisiononthenorthand87thonthesouth,movedonthesamegridlinewithorderstotakeAmstadt.TheXIICorpswasalreadyinadvanceofthegridline,but I believed itwould probably be held up except on its right,where it wasdirectedtotakeEisfeldandCoburg.

On the tenth, the objective set the day before had been attained, andwemoved the Army Headquarters from Frankfurt to Hersfeld, driving over theautobahn.Whenwefirstencounteredtheautobahns,welookedforwardtothemas of great military value, but after some experience it was evident that, asimmediate routesof attack, the secondary roadswerebetter, owing to the factthat the autobahns overpass the secondary roads and these points are easilydestroyedbydemolition.Infact,wecapturedaGermancolonelwhowasquiteproud of himself because he said that through the use of five hundred-kiloaviationbombshehadcertainlydelayed theThirdArmy twodays;whichwasprobably true.After an autobahnhadbeen in our possession for three days, itwas extremely valuable, because by that time the Engineers had repaired the

damage.Theybecameverycleveratthis,astheydidatallothermilitarytasks.To show the extent towhich theGermanswent in demolition,Codman and Ioncepassedfourteendemolitionsintwentykilometers.

1ColonelWaterswascapturedinFebruary,1943.2Alimitinglineonthemapuponwhichadjacentunitsweretoco-

ordinatepriortoadvancing.

On the way to the new Command Post at Hersfeld, we stopped atWiesbadenandhad lunchwithGeneralBradley.ThenewCommandPosthadapparentlybeenanarmoredtrainingcenter,oraQuartermastertrainingcenter.Itwasverywellsituatedandhadanexcellentmesshallandkitchenfortheenlistedmen’smess;alsoanumberofsheds,onecompletelyfullofsparepartsforhorse-drawnescortwagons.

DuringthelongdrivetoHersfeld,Inoticedevidenceofgreatcarelessnessin leaving gasoline cans along the road, so issued an order that the AssistantQuartermaster General of the Third Army was personally to drive along theroad,followedbytwotrucks,andpickupallthecanshefound.

I also found that practically every enlistedmember of theMedicalCorpshadcapturedacivilianautomobileormotorcycle,with the result thatwewerewasting gasoline at a magnificent rate and also cluttering up the road withtransportationwhichwould laterbeneededby theGermancivilians to rebuildthecountry.Wethereforeissuedordersforthesequestrationofthesevehicles.

Another thing I noticedwas the fact that theArmywas going to hell onuniform.During theextremelycoldweather it hadbeenpermissible, andevennecessary, topermit certainvariations, butwith the approachof summer I gotoutanotheruniformorder.

When we reached the new Command Post at Hersfeld, there wasconsiderable excitement over a rumor that the Germanswere going to land asmall glider-borne expedition for the purpose of killingme. I never putmuchfaithinthisrumor,butdidtakemycarbinetomytruck1everynightwhenIwenttobed.

GeneralEisenhowerandGeneralBradleyarrivedatourCublandingfieldat0900onApril 12, andweatonce setout to seeGeneralEddyandColonelBernardD.Bernstein2at thesaltmine inMerkers.TheywereaccompaniedbyseveralGermanofficials,whomwetookwithusintheelevatoranddescendedtwenty-onehundred feet.Themine,usuallydescribedas a saltmine,doesnot

produce table salt, but some sort of chemical which looks very much likeasbestos.Itisatremendousaffair,havingfivehundredandeightykilometersoftunnels.Thesearefromthirtytofiftyfeethighandaboutthesamewidth.

1WhileinthefieldandwhenathomeinArmyHeadquarters,GeneralPattonlivedand

workedintwotrucktrailers.Hisparlor,bedroom,andbathwasaconvertedOrdnanceTrailer,enteredfromtherear

afterclimbingasteepsetofsteps.ThestepswerecorrugatedironandwereagreathazardtoWillie, theGeneral’sdog.AfterWilliehad lostseveralofhis toenails in thecorrugations, itbecamenecessarytocoverthestepswithboards.

Inside, there was a desk with side drawers, electric light, two telephones, and othernecessaryofficefixtures.TheGeneralhadasmallmap-board,whichhereferredtoseldom,ifever.Hedidnotkeep thesituationposted inhis living trailer,as itwasposted inhisofficetrailer.Therewasasmallclosetforclothes,asmallwashstandandcabinetfortoiletarticles,andabuilt-inbedatthefarendofthetrailer.Aradiowasinstalledinanupperpanelinsidethetruck,which theGeneral used frequently in listening to broadcasts.He never used radio intalking to his commanders. Even during themost rapid advances, the SignalCorps usuallykeptupwithwirecommunications.Onceinawhileitwasnecessarytouseradiotelephone,butthiswashandledovertheregulartelephonesysteminstalledinthetruck.Oneofthetwotelephones—incidentally it had agreen receiver—wasadirect line toGeneralBradley andGeneralEisenhower.Thisparticulartelephonehadadevicesupposedtoscramblethewordsastheypassedover thewire and comeout as spokenon theother end.Most of theGeneral’soathswereusedatthisdevice.Itseemedhecouldnevergetitinphaseandcomplainedthatitscrambledhisownwordsbeforeheutteredthem.

All theelectricaldeviceswererunbyamobilegenerator thatfurnishedelectricityfortheHeadquartersgroup.

Theofficetrailerwasalong,moving-vantypeoftruck,fittedinsidewith.adesk,map-boards,andtelephone.ItwaslocatedincampclosetotheGeneral’slivingtrailerandwasusedfrequentlyforconferences.

TheGeneralpreferredtousethetwotrailersfor livingandwork,anditwasnotuntilthewinter set in that hemoved inside.When spring came in 1945, whilemoving throughGermany,hefavoredhistruck-houseforsleepingandusediteventhoughhisofficewasinabuildingandhismealsservedindoors.

2FromFinanceSection,SHAEF.

Inaddition to thepapermoneyandgoldbricks, therewasagreatdealofFrench,American,andBritishgoldcurrency;alsoanumberof suitcases filledwithjewelry,suchassilverandgoldcigarettecases,wrist-watchcases,spoons,forks, vases, gold-filled teeth, false teeth,etc.These suitcaseswere in nowaylabeled, and apparently simply contained valuable metal gleaned by banditmethods.GeneralEisenhowersaidjokinglythathewasverymuchchagrinednotto findabox full ofdiamonds.We foundnoprecious stones in thisparticularhideout.Weexamineda fewof theallegedart treasures.Theones I sawwereworth,inmyopinion,about$2.50,andwereofthetypenormallyseeninbarsin

America.FromtheminewedrovetoEisfeld,HeadquartersoftheXIICorps,where

wewere joined byGeneralWeyland.After lunchwe flew, accompanied by amythical air support which did not materialize because it got lost, to theHeadquarters of the XX Corps at Gotha, where we met both Middleton andWalker.AtWalker’ssuggestion,wedrovetoOhrdrufandvisitedthefirsthorrorcampanyofushadeverseen.Itwasthemostappallingsightimaginable.Amanwhosaidhewasoneoftheformerinmatesactedasimpresarioandshowedusfirst the gallows,wheremenwere hanged for attempting to escape. The dropboardwas about two feet from the ground, and the cord usedwas pianowirewhich had an adjustment so that when the man dropped, his toes would justreach the ground and itwould take about fifteenminutes for him to choke todeath,sincethefallwasnotsufficienttobreakhisneck.Thenexttwomentodiehadtokicktheboardoutfromunderhim.ItwasstatedbysomeoftheGermanspresentthatthegeneralswhowereexecutedaftertheHitlerbombincidentwerehangedinthismanner.

Ourguidethentookustothewhippingtable,whichwasabouttheheightoftheaverageman’scrotch.Thefeetwereplacedinstocksonthegroundandthemanwas pulled over the table,whichwas slightly hollowed, andheld by twoguards,whilehewasbeatenacrossthebackandloins.Thestickwhichtheysaidhadbeenused,andwhichhadsomebloodonit,wasbiggerthanthehandleofapick.Ourguideclaimedthathehimselfhadreceivedtwenty-fiveblowswiththistool. It later developed that he was not a prisoner at all, but one of theexecutioners.GeneralEisenhowermusthavesuspectedit,becauseheaskedthemanverypointedlyhowhecouldbesofat.Hewasfounddeadnextmorning,killedbysomeoftheinmates.

Justbeyondthewhippingtabletherewasapileoffortybodies,moreorlessnaked.Allofthesehadbeenshotinthebackoftheheadatshortrange,andthebloodwasstillcoolingontheground.

In a shednear-bywas a pile of forty completelynakedbodies in the laststages of emaciation. These bodies were lightly sprinkled with lime—not,apparently, for the purpose of destroying them, but to reduce the smell. As areducer of smell, lime is a very inefficientmedium. The total capacity of theshedlookedtometobeabouttwohundredbodies.Itwasstatedthatbodieswereleftuntiltheshedwasfullandthentheyweretakenoutandburied.TheinmatessaidsomethreethousandpeoplehadbeenburiedfromthisshedsinceJanuary1,1945.

Whenourtroopsbegantodrawnear, theGermansthoughtitexpedienttoremovetheevidenceoftheircrimes.Theythereforeusedtheinmatestoexhume

the recently buried bodies and to build a sort ofmammoth griddle of 60 cm.railwaytrackslaidonabrickfoundation.Thebodieswerepiledonthisandtheyattemptedtobumthem.Theattemptwasabadfailure.Actually,onecouldnothelpbutthinkofsomegiganticcannibalisticbarbecue.Inthepititselfwerearmsand legsandportionsofbodiesstickingoutof thegreenwaterwhichpartiallyfilledit.

General Walker and General Middleton had wisely decided to have asmanysoldiers aspossiblevisit the scene.Thisgaveme the ideaofhaving theinhabitantsthemselvesvisitthecamp.IsuggestedthistoWalker,andfoundthathehadalreadyhadthemayorandhiswifetakealookatit.Ongoinghomethosetwocommittedsuicide.WelaterusedthesamesysteminhavingtheinhabitantsofWeimar go through the even larger slave camp (Buchenwald) north of thattown.

From here we drove to the 80th Division, where General McBridedescribed the new technique he had devised. It consisted in firing a couple ofprojectiles containing proclamations to the effect that, unless the town inquestionsurrenderedbyacertainhour,itwouldbegivenatreatment,andthatifitintendedtosurrender,theburgomasterwastocomeoutwithawhiteflagandberesponsiblethatnoGermantroopswereinthetown.Whiletheproclamationwassinkingin,afewflightsoftheXIXTacticalAirCommandfighter-bombersflewoverheadand,towardtheendoftheperiod,gotlowerandlower.Whenthetime had elapsed, if no action had been taken by the Germans, the fighter-bombers were informed by the air-support party and dropped their eggs.Synchronizedwiththis,anartilleryconcentrationhitthetown.Asaresultofthismethod,agreatmanytownssurrenderedwithoutdifficulty.

We developed later a system known as the “Third ArmyWarMemorialProject”bywhichwealwaysfiredafewsalvosintoeverytownweapproached,before even asking for surrender. The object of thiswas to let the inhabitantshavesomethingtoshowtofuturegenerationsofGermansbywayofproofthattheThirdArmyhadpassedthatway.

Iwent tobed rather late andnoticed that I had failed towindmywatch,whichwasrundown,soturnedontheradiotogetatimesignal.JustasIturnedit on, the announcer reported the death of President Roosevelt. I immediatelyinformed General Eisenhower and General Bradley, and we had quite adiscussionastowhatmighthappen.Itseemedveryunfortunatetousthatatsocritical a period in our history we should have to change horses. Actually,subsequenteventsdemonstratedthatitmadenodifferenceatall.

Onthethirteenth,Bradleyaskedmetoleavethe65thInfantryDivisioninits present position until the following Sunday in order to facilitate certain

operationsbeingundertakenbytheFirstArmy.IvisitedColonelAlleninthehospital,ashehadbeenrecapturedwhenwe

tookWeimar.Hisrightarmhadbeenshotoffjustbelowtheelbow.Hegavemesomevery interesting information.Thesurgeonwhooperatedonhimused thelastetherinhispossessiontoputAllenunder,butitwasinsufficientandtowardtheendhegavehimbrandyandsomesortofchloraldrug.Allensaidhesawatleast eightyGermansoperatedonwithout any anaesthetic at all except chloraland cognac; there were no sanitary arrangements, no soap nor water, and thedoctors and nurses were literally wading in blood. Many of the men weredragged into the operating room by the hand, as there was a shortage ofstretchers.ThesurgeonwhooperatedonhimwasanAustrian,and,during thefewdaysAllenwas in thehospital, repeatedlygavefalse informationas tohisstateofhealth,because theGermans,havingdiscovered thathewasacolonel,were very anxious to get him to Army Headquarters for interrogation. ThesurgeonfinallytoldAllenthatiftheworsecametoworsthewouldhelphimtoescape and keep him hidden in the hills until we came up. Allen was a verysporting character and the only request he hadwas that he be left on duty atArmyHeadquarters,whichrequestwasgranted.Hedidanextremelygoodjobuntiltheendofthewar.

OnApril14,theXXandXIICorps,duetothearmorwhichassistedthem,wereonthestoplinerunningalongtheMuldeRiverfromournorthernboundarynearHochlitz to thevicinityofZwickau, thence throughPlauenandHof, thengenerallyparalleltoandeastoftheautobahntoBayreuth.

Lieutenant Graves1 and I flew to Mainz to be present by invitation ofGeneralPlank,ofComZ,at theopeningof therailwaybridgeover theRhine,whichhadbeenbuiltbymyfriendandformerclassmate,ColonelFrankHulen.Hulen, it seemed,wasmuchdepressedbecausehehadbuilt thebridge inninedays, twenty hours, and fifteen minutes, which, according to him, was sometwelvehourslongerthanCaesarhadtakentobuildasimilarbridge.Wepointedout to him that Caesar did not build a railway bridge. After appropriateceremoniesIwasaskedtocut theredtape, inlieuofaredribbon, toopenthebridge, and was handed a pair of scissors. However, my romantic instinctpromptedmetoaskforabayonetwithwhichIcut the tape.Wethengotonaflatcaranddroveacrossthebridgeinthefirsttraintopassoverit.PersonallyIwasmuchmoreworriedforfearthebridgewouldfalldownthanIusuallyaminafight.Onreturning,Hulenshowedussomeoftheequipmenthehadmadeforthepurposeofbuildingthebridge.Oneitemwasahugecranecapableofliftingawholebayatonce,which,Ibelieve,hecalleda“MobyDick.”

1LaterCaptainF.P.Graves,Jr.,AidetoGeneralPatton.

On returning toHeadquarters, I found thatGeneralGay,ColonelsPfann1and Codman had visited another slave camp north of Weimar, Buchenwald,whichwasapparentlymuchworsethantheoneatOhrdruf.IimmediatelycalledGeneral Eisenhower and suggested he send senior representatives of the pressand photographers to get the horrid details. General Eisenhower not only didthis, but also got Congressmen to come over. This was the camp where weparaded some fifteen hundred citizens of Weimar to give them a firsthandknowledge of the infamy of their own government. In honesty, I believe thatmostofthemwereignorantofmuchthathadgoneonthere.

IwasunabletogetanyinformationastowhatwastohappenafterIgotonthe stop line, except that Iwas told that, in the opinion of the TwelfthArmyGroup,Ididnothavesufficientsuppliestogofarther,inspiteofthefactthatIknewperfectlywellIhad.

I was informed by higher headquarters that a correspondent namedDriscoll,3 4 with the ThirdArmy, hadwritten an article stating that the ThirdArmywasheldupbytheFirstArmy.Apparentlypeoplearegettingtouchy.InbriefingcorrespondentsonceaweekIalwaysrefusedtoanswerquestionsaboutotherarmiesortodiscusstheminanyway,asIfelttheThirdArmycouldstandonitsownfeetandneededtomakenoexcusestoanyone.IhadMajorQuirk5inandissuedinstructionsthatnoarticlemakingacomparisonoftherelativemeritsofthevariousarmiesshallevergoout.

OnApril15, the threecorps (XII,XX,VIII)werepracticallyon the stoplineandIflewtoWeimarandvisitedwhatI thenthoughtwasgoingtobemynextCommandPost. Itwas the home of the former localGauleiter,who hadbeenresponsiblefortheslavelaborandallthegeneralnastinessinthatvicinity.HereGeneralWalkerpresentedmewithatoyboatforagrandson,andItookitwithouthesitation,forithadunquestionablybeenstolenfromsomeoneelsebythisGermanbandit.

I thenvisited, in companywithGeneralWalker, theWeimar slave camp,Buchenwald.Thiscampwas in thevicinityofafactory largelyengagedin theconstruction of parts for the V-l bomb and of artillery caissons, and is amonument to the accurate bombing of our air force, because they completelyeliminated the factorywithout putting a single bomb in the camp,whichwascontiguous.

In addition to the workers in the factory, a large number of political

prisonerswereassembledatthiscampandfedeighthundredcaloriesaday,withthe result that theydied at the rateof aboutonehundredeachnight. Iwalkedthroughtwobuildings,eachwithfourtiersofbunksonaside.Thebunkswereatrightanglestothegangwayandwerebuiltsothattheyslopedslightlytowardthefront,andsothatthefecalmatterandotherrefuseleftbytheprisonerstrickleddownunder their chinsonto the floor,whichwasat least three inchesdeep infilthwhenIwentthrough.Strangetosay,thesmellwasnotparticularlybad;itwasrathermoremustythanputrid.

Theinmateslookedlikefeeblyanimatedmummiesandseemedtobeofthesamelevelofintelligence.Ifasufficientnumberdidnotdieofstarvationorif,forotherreasons,itwasdesirabletoremovethemwithoutwaitingfornaturetotakeitscourse,theyweredroppeddownachuteintoaroomwhichhadanumberofhookslikethoseonwhichonehangsmeatinabutchershop,abouteightfeetfrom the floor.Eachof thesehookshadacordof clothesline thicknesswithagrommetateachend.Onegrommetwaspassedthroughtheotherandtheloopputovertheslave’shead,whiletheothergrommetwasfastenedoverthehookandthemanwasallowedtohangthereuntilhechokedtodeath,exceptthatifhetooktoolongtheyhadaclub,verylikealargepotatomasher,withwhichtheybeatouthisbrains.Thisclubmusthavebeenconsiderablyusedbecauseitwassplinteredononeside.

One of the most horrible points about this place was that all theseexecutionswerecarriedonbyslaves.Therewasafurtherdevilisharrangementofmakingthevariousgroupsselectthosewhohadtodie.Eachracialgrouphadacertainnumberofmenwhorepresentedit.Thesemenhadtoselectthosefromtheirgroupwhowouldbekilled locally,or sent tocamps likeOhrdruf,whichweretermed“eliminationcamps.”

In this camp there was a number of allegedly eminent physicians whoseprofessional rectitude had been so completely destroyed that they had beenpersuaded to perform some very abominable experiments on their fellowinmates. One case was reported in which eight hundred slaves had beeninoculatedwithanti-typhusvaccineandtheninoculatedwiththetyphusbug.Oftheeighthundred,somesevenhundreddied,andtheexperimentwasconsideredunsatisfactory.ColonelOdomaskedsomeofthesedoctorsiftherewasanythinghe could do for them. One said yes, that he was making a very interestingexperimentonahumanbrainandneededsomecarbonblack.Thehumanbrain,apparently,wasstillalive.

FromtheexecutionroomintheBuchenwaldset-uptherewasanelevator,hand operated, which carried the corpses to an incinerator plant on the floor

above.Here therewere six furnaces.The corpsewasplacedon a loading traysimilar to thoseused in the155mm.gunsand,at thecommand“Ramhome!”theendofthetrayhitagainstthestopperonthedoorandthebodyshotforwardintotheoven,whereitwasshortlyburnedup.Theslaveinchargeofthis tookgreat pride and kept rubbing his hand on the floor and then showingme howcleanitwas.

WhenIgothome,IfoundthatBradleyhadbeentryingtotalktomeonthescrambler telephone,whichwasoutoforder,soGayhad toldhimin theclearthatIwouldseehiminthemorning.

OneoftheinterestingthingstobeseeninflyingoverGermanyisthelargenumberofswimmingpools.Practicallyeverylittletownhasone.Ithinkitmusthavebeeninlinewiththeirhealthmovement.

Itwasalsonoteworthythat,whereasinFranceallthemainelectricpowerlines were completely destroyed, after we crossed into Germany proper, and

particularly after we got east of the Rhine, the main power lines were notdestroyedor,ifso,weredemolishedatonlyoneortwopoints.

OnApril16,incompanywithColonelHarkins,IflewtoWiesbaden,whereImetGeneralBradley,andlaterHodgesandhisG-3,andwegotthenewplan,which was, in effect, a change of direction to the south for the purpose ofattackingtheso-called“Redoubt.”Inordertoeffectthischange,theVIIICorpsremainedinplaceandrevertedtotheFirstArmy,atthesametimebroadeningitsfrontboth to thenorthandto thesouth.WeselectedtheVIIICorpsbecause itwasquickerforittoexpandbothwaysthanitwouldhavebeentoputinanothercorps,whichwouldhavetoexpandtwiceasfarononeside.TheexpansiontothesouthwasasfarasHof;andonthenorthtotheformerboundaryoftheXXCorps.Todothisweturnedoverthe76thDivisionoftheXXCorpstotheVIIICorps,andalsothe4thand6thArmoredDivisions.

The XX Corps Headquarters and artillery, and the 80th Division, werepulledoutandcametothesouth,withtheirleftboundaryontherightboundaryof the XII Corps in the area which had been heretofore occupied by the XVCorps of the Seventh Army. They picked up the 71st Division from the XIICorps,whichalso sideslipped to the right, andanadditionaldivision from therearwastocomeupeventually.

In addition to this, we got the HI Corps under General Van Fleet, withelementsofthatcorpsandothertroopsfromtheRuhrPocket.TheIIICorpswastotakeoverthegeneralfrontageheretoforeoccupiedbytheXXICorps(MajorGeneralF.W.Milburn)oftheSeventhArmy.

We also picked up the three armored divisions in addition to the 11th;namely,the13th(MajorGeneralJohnMillikin),whichhadseenaction,andthe16th(BrigadierGeneralJ.L.Pierce)and20th(MajorGeneralOrlandoWard)—bothvirgindivisions.Iwasgladtogetthem,asIfeltweshouldgetthesegreentroopsintobattle,afterallthetrainingtheyhadhad,beforethewarended.

TheThirdArmywas to attack in a southeasterly direction parallel to theCzechoslovakianborder,with theDanubeRiversplitting thezonebetween theXIICorpsonthenorthandtheXXCorpsinthemiddle.TheSeventhArmywastoattackstraight south,and theFirst andNinthArmieswere to remainon thedefensive.

Onthewayback,weflewovervonRundstedfsHeadquartersatthetownofZiegenburg,sixteenkilometerswestofBadNauheim,whichhadbeenbombedbyourfighter-bombersjustbeforewecrossedtheRhine.Theeffectproducedbythesebombingswasremarkablygood.Iamcontinuallyamazedattheefficiencyof the fighter-bombers, particularly their ability to pick out isolated motortransportandhitit.

WehadthefourCorpsCommandersinandexplainedthenewset-up.Theywereallperfectlyconfidentoftheirabilitytosideslip,changedirection,anddowhateverwasnecessary.GeneralWeyland,whowasalwayspresentwhenanydecisionwasmade in theThirdArmy,was equally confident of his ability tosupportanyactivitiesinwhichwemightbecomeengaged.Middleton,asusual,wastheperfectsoldierandsuggestedthatheconsultwithGeneralHodgesandfindoutwhatfrontlinethelatterdesiredhimtotake,andalsothetimeatwhichthetransferbetweenarmiesshouldbeeffected.Atlunch,afterthemeeting,Isatnext toGeneral Eddy andwas somewhat alarmed at his apparent lack of life,becauseusuallyhewasextremelytalkativeandcheerful.

Lateintheafternoon,GeneralWilliams,myself,ColonelCodman,ColonelOdom, and Lieutenant Graves flew to Paris, where I had a long talk in thehospitalwithColonelWaters,whomI foundmuch improved. I sawhimagainonthemorningoftheeighteenthbeforeflyingback.

Atbreakfastthatmorning,GeneralHughesandIwereeachreadingacopyofTheStarsandStripes.Iwaslookingattheright-handcolumndescribingtheactivities of the Third Army when Hughes reached across and pointed to thecenter column inwhich it stated I had just beenmade a fullGeneral.While Iwas,ofcourse,gladtogettherank,thefactthatIwasnotintheinitialgroupandwasthereforean“alsoran”removedsomeofthepleasure.Whentheinitiallistofnamescameout,SergeantMeeks,whoheard itover the radio, came tomyroom and said, “Good God, General, they are making all the troop clerks.”Codman secured forme the last setof four stars inParis and Idispatchedmythree-starsettoGeneralKeyes,whowaspromotedtoLieutenantGeneralinthesamelist.

Onthenineteenth,wehadsomeradiocommentatorsandsomeexpertsfromtheSecretaryofWar’sOffice.Thelatterwerequiteinteresting.

General Canine, Chief of Staff of the XII Corps, called up with thedepressing information thatGeneralEddywas in such a physical state that hewouldhave tobe relieved fromcommandandsenthome.HehadbeenaveryfineCorpsCommanderand Ihated to seehimgo.Also,hehadbeenwithmealmost since the initial landing inAfrica and had probably commanded largerunitsofcombattroopslongerthananyothergeneral.IwaspreventedfromgoingtoseehimthatdaybecauseGeneralBradleysentformetogotoWiesbadenforaconferencewithGeneralEisenhower,soI toldCaninetocarryoninGeneralEddy’s name and Iwould get a newCorpsCommanderwhen I sawGeneralsEisenhower and Bradley. The names I suggested were Gaffey, Harmon, andIrwin.1 Itwas decided that neitherGaffey norHarmon could be spared at themoment, so the choice was between Irwin, my candidate, andWyche, whom

GeneralEisenhowersuggested.IbelievehesuggestedWyche,notonlybecauseWyche was senior, but also because Irwin was a classmate of his, andEisenhower leaned over backward from promoting a classmate. I eventuallysecured the selection of Irwin on the ground that he had had more combatexperience,

sincehehadnot only fought continuouslyon theContinent, but had alsobeenthroughtheTunisianCampaign.

1MajorGeneralS.LeRoyIrwin,CommandingGeneral,5thInfantryDivision.

General Eisenhower stated that he was anxious for us to start in thedirectionofLinzassoonaspossible,butthat,owingtothefailureoftheBritishtomake sufficient progress, itmight be necessary for him to send a corps upthere.Hesaidhedidnotwishtogetoverextendeduntilthesituationinthenorthcleared up, and therefore I was to get ready to go, but was not to go until Ireceivedpermission.

C-47

Onthetwentieth,wesenttheArmyC-47toGeneralEddy’sHeadquartersforthepurposeofflyinghimtoParis,andIflewthereinaCubtotellhimgood-bye.Histroublewassuchhighbloodpressurethatitwasconsideredpractically

fatal..1After seeingEddyoffwithgreat regret, I flew to theHeadquartersof the

XX Corps at SchlossWeissenstein. This was the most magnificent and mosthideousbuildingIhadeverseen.Itwasbuiltaround1700andisfullofmuralsandgiganticplasterstatuesofoverfedfemales.

*HewasoperatedonintheUnitedStatesandentirelyrecovered.Thereisalsoacollectionofreallygreatpaintings.Inoneroom,theinlayin

the parquet floor is silver. Another room is all solid gold enamel. GeneralWalker had an uncanny capacity for choosing excellent Command Posts forhimself.Thestableatthischateauwasbuiltinasemicircledirectlyacrossfromthe main door. The saddle room, where apparently people congregated whilegetting ready to take off, had some excellentmurals, andwasmore luxuriousandbetter furnished thanmanydrawing roomsathome.Thestableswerealsoremarkablymodemand in agood stateof repair.Therewereover twentyboxstalls.ApparentlytheWeissensteinshadbeenahuntingfamily.

Fromherewe flew to theHeadquarters of the IIICorps atReidfeld. Justbeforewegotthere,Inoticedsometracerscomingbytherightsideofourplanewhich, at the same instant, dove for the ground, very nearly colliding with aplanewhichlookedlikeaSpitfire.Thisplanemadeasecondpass,againfiringandmissing.Bythis timeIwassurewewerebeingattackedanddecidedthat,sincetherewasnothingelsetodo,Iwouldtrytogetapictureoftheassailant,butwassonervousIforgot to takethecoveroff the lens,so thepicturewasablank.Onthethirdpass,ourattackercameinsofastandweweresoclosetotheground that he was unable to pull out of his dive and crashed, to our greatsatisfaction.WhileCodmanand Iwereengaged inhedgehopping toavoid thisbelligerent gentleman, four other planes were circling over us, but did notengageintheattack.

TheXVCorpsoftheSeventhArmy,whichhadsideslippedfromitsareatothat of the XXI Corps, Seventh Army, was having considerable difficulty inclearing the frontofour IIICorps,whichhadcome inbehind it. I told the IIICorpstoinfiltrateforwardthroughtheXVsothatitcouldbeonthestartinglineandreadytotakeoffonSunday,thetwenty-third.

GeneralMillikin,whohadformerlycommandedtheIIICorpsandhadnowbeen given the 13th Armored Division, spent the night. His attitude wasexcellent,andIpromisedtotalktohisdivisionattheearliestopportunity.

The country between Nuremberg and Hersfeld was some of the mostbeautiful I had ever flown over. We passed several farms which wereundoubtedlyhorsefarms,astheyhadexercisetracksbehindthestables.

WhileattheXXCorpsHeadquartersIpresentedGeneralWalkerwithmy

three-starpins,ashehadalsobeenpromotedonthelistwithme.On the twenty-first, the Third Army lost its Surgeon, Brigadier General

ThomasD.Hurley,andnearly lost itsOrdinanceOfficer,ColonelNixon,withstomachcomplaints.Hurleyhad togohomeandNixonhad tobeoperatedon,and would probably have died had not Colonel Odom visited him andascertainedhisprecariousstateofhealth.

SoendedtheRhineCampaignwhichhadcostus17,961casualties.

CasualtiesreportedasofApril21were:

——————

1Theactualcompositionofthetaskforcewasonecompanyoftanksandone

companyofarmoredinfantry,11officersand282men.2ThesetwolieutenantsreportedthatGeneralPatton’sson-in-law,ColonelJ.

K.Waters,wasaprisonerinthecampatHammelburgandhadbeenshotduringthemeleeatthecampwhentheAmericantroopsarrived.

3LieutenantColonelG.R.Pfann,Secretary,GeneralStaff,ThirdArmy.4Joseph Driscoll, New York Herald Tribune, President of American War

Correspondents’Association.5sLater Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Quirk, Public Relations Officer, Third

Army.

8CROSSINGTHEDANUBEANDENTERINGCZECHOSLOVAKIAANDAUSTRIA

April22marked thebeginningof theend.GeneralPattonhadlandedthefirstAmericantroopsinAfricaonNovember8,1942,andhisThirdArmyendedthemainfightinginEuropeonMay9,1945.(SeeMap,pages300-301.)

HeconductedAmericantroopsthroughthreeyearsofsuccessfuloperationsagainst the enemy. He never issued a defensive order. His theory—attack,attack, attack, and, when in doubt, attack again—shortened the war by nevergiving the enemy a chance to organize or reorganize enough to make aconcertedattackagainsthim.

Theterminationofhostilitiesandthestoplineimposedbyhigherauthorityhalted the Third Army on May 9. They had gone farther, captured moreprisoners, crossedmore rivers, liberatedmore friendly territory and capturedmoreenemyterritory,thananyarmyeverbeforeinAmericanhistory.

At the end of the campaign, the Third Army switched its attack to thesoutheast, cleared Bavaria, cleaned out the uGhost of the Redoubt,” enteredCzechoslovakia, crossed the Alps, and joined the Russians in Austria, east ofLinz.

Farthernorth,theBritishandAmericansjoinedhandswiththeRussiansontheElbeRiver and inBerlin. The SeventhAmerican andFrenchFirstArmiescleared

theAlpsintheirzoneandjoinedwiththeAmericanFifthArmyinItaly.InthePacific,RangoonfelltotheBritish,andalleffortwenttoestablishing

basesforaninvasionofJapanproper.TheairforcesandtheNavypoundedtheenemyonallfronts.

P.D.H.

TheLastRound-up

ByApril22,itwasobvioustomethattheendofthewarwasveryclose,buttherewerestillthosewhoinsistedthatagreatGermanconcentrationexistedtothesouthintheso-called“Redoubt.”

WeshiftedourCommandPost fromHersfeld toErlangen.Codmanand Idrovethereintherainandsleetand,whilepassingoverthetopofthemountainsat an altitude of four thousand feet, ran into a little snow. From Bamberg toErlangenthetrafficsituationwasextremelybad,owingto thefact thatwehadonlyone-waybridges,and thatnoofficersexceptGeneralMaddoxandmyselfhadenoughinitiativetogetoutandstraightenoutthemesses.

Erlangen is a university town built at the time of the Huguenotpersecutions. I was surprised to discover that mansard roofs dated from thatperiod,asforsomereasonIthoughttheyoriginatedin1870.

The11thArmoredDivision,the71standthe65thDivisionsdidverywell.Imade arrangements with General Bradley to keep the 70th Division in thevicinity of Frankfurt on occupation duty, and to increase its strength withreplacements,whowerenotbeingusedowing toour lowcasualties.Actually,thisdivision,foratime,wasalmostadivisionandahalf.

Onthetwenty-third,IdrovetoHeadquartersoftheXIIandXXCorps.TheautobahnfromErlangentoBayreuth,HeadquartersoftheXIICorps,wasaverybeautiful drive, as was the cross-country drive from Bayreuth to Bamberg,although,fromamilitarystandpoint,thelatterroadwascrookedanddifficult.

WhenIreturnedtoHeadquarters,GeneralPatchcalledupandaskedmetoswap the 14th Armored for the 20th Armored. The 14th Armored was stillfightinginthevicinityofMunichandinthezoneoftheIIICorps,whilethe20thArmoredwasinthevicinityofWurzburgandcouldbemorereadilyputintothezoneoftheSeventhArmy.Iagreedatonce.

Onthe twenty-fourth, Iaddressed theofficersandmenofMilliken’s13thArmoredDivisionasrequested.

The3dCavalryRegimentreachedtheDanubeinthevicinityofRegensburgat 0400 on the morning of the twenty-third. The III Corps, under the greatleadershipofVanFleet,startedmovingoutrapidly,anditwasamusingtofindthat the 14thArmoredDivision, which, prior to the arrival of Van Fleet, hadbeenconductingaprotracted,thoughunsuccessful,warwiththe17thSSPanzerGrenadierDivision (SSOberführerBochmann), suddenly drove them from itsfront.

April 25was quite an interesting day.We learned that the five thousandenemy soldiers, who had got in touch with the 26th Division the previousafternoon and stated their desire to surrender, wereWhite Russians who hadbeenfightingfortheGermansagainsttheRussians.Thequestionthenaroseastowhether theywereprisonersofwaror allies.We finallygot adecision thattheywereprisonersofwar,andtheywereandstillare.Inmyopinion,theyareinaverybadfix,becauseiftheRussiansevergetthemtheywillunquestionablybeeliminated.

The XIX Tactical Air Command reported large numbers of troops, raceunknown,movingupstreamonbothsidesoftheDanube,andthattheycontainedsomearmorwith a great deal of horse transport andguns.Whether theywereRussians,orGermansfleeingbeforetheRussians,wewereunabletodecide,butfiguredthat,byavigorousadvance,wewouldeventuallysolvetheproblem.

At noon Bradley called up suggesting that the First Army extend to thesouthandtakeoverthelineof theCzechoslovakianfrontier toapointclosetothejunctureofthatfrontierwiththeAustrianborder,movingtherebysuccessivecorpsasthesituationtothenorthclearedup.Thiswasverysatisfactorytous,aswehadaverylongopenflankalongthefrontier.

The 14thArmored reached theAltmuhlRiver about the center of theHICorps sector, while the leading regiment of the 86th Division, same corps,reached the river on the right of the corps boundary at Eichstatt. Van Fleetassuredmehewouldget across that river andbeon theDanubebynight.Hewasaverywillingworkerandagreatsoldier.

We had been having continuous rumors from air reconnaissance of amovementuptheDanubeValleyonbothsidesoftheriver,andfeltthatthe11thArmored Division, which had crossed the Naade River and progressed eightkilometers southeast of it,wouldpossiblybe the first to run into these troops.CombatCommand“A”(commandedbyBrigadierGeneralW.A.Holbrook,Jr.)andCombatCommand“B”(commandedbyColonelW.W.Yale)werethensixmilessouthofRegensburg,wheretheyhadhadquiteafight,but,afterbreakingthecrustthere,therestoftheadvancewassimplyaroadmarch.

ThebattlecasualtiesoftheThirdArmyforthetwoprecedingdayshadnotexceeded a hundred on either day, and the non-battle casualties were equallylow.

Considering that at this time the Third Army had fourteen divisions inactionandanequivalentnumberofcorpsandarmytroops,onegetsanideaofhowcheapthefightingwas.Asaroughmeasure,ifyoumultiplythenumberofdivisionsbythirtythousand,youcomeveryclosetothetotalnumberoftroopspresent;thisincludesdivision,corps,andarmytroops.

On the twenty-sixth, at Schwabach, I decorated Van Fleet with theDistinguished ServiceMedal and then visited the 99th Division and the 14thArmored.NeitherVanFleetnorIwasparticularlyimpressedwiththeactivitiesattheHeadquartersofthesetwounits.

The86thDivisionoftheIIICorpshadreachedIngoldstadtandwasfightingjustoutsidethetown.

ReturningtoHeadquarters,Ifoundthatboththe65thand71stDivisionsoftheXXCorpshad crossed theDanube, one east andonewest ofRegensburg.They encountered moderate resistance without artillery fire, and wereproceedingrapidlyontheirmission.

In the XII Corps, the 11th Armored Division was six miles from theAustrianborder.Onebattalionofthe90thDivisionwasclosinginonChamtocoverthepassthroughthattownintherearofthe11thArmoredDivision,aswehadaconstantrumorthatthe11thGermanPanzerDivisionwasabouttoattackthroughthispass.

AGermanofficercameintothe26thDivisionandinformedGeneralPaulthat therewere fivebargesanchoredon theDanube in the immediatevicinity,which, ifbombedorshelledbyus,wouldcause thedeathofallhumanbeingswithin a radiusof thirtykilometers.Paul toldhim toputguardson thebargesandwaituntilwearrived,whichwasdone.Healsotookprecautionstowarnourairforcenottodoanypromiscuousbombingofbargesontheriver.Actually,thebargescontainedpoisongas.

This remindedmeof a story Ihad justheard fromacapturedGerman. Itseems that two hundred SS troops, all ofwhom had beenHitlerYouth, weregivenaspecialcourseofinstructioninbombingandnavigation.Theyweretoldtheyweretouseanewtypeoflead-dustbomb,whichweinterpretedtomeananatomic bomb, for the purpose of destroying all human life in Germany. Onhearing this happy plan, eighty of the boys refused to participate and wereeliminated—orsotheothersweretold.Theremainingboysweretakentoahighpoint to see an experiment.An airplane flew low over an area and dropped abomb,which produced somethingwhich looked to them like great airwaves.Latertheboyswereblindfoldedanddrivenforanhourintrucks,andthentheireyeswereunbandagedand theywere told to examine theground.The area towhichtheyweretakenhadbeencoveredwithsnow,butwhateverhadgoneoffhad melted the snow, pulverized the small rocks, cracked the big ones, andremoved all trees. However, they stated that the waves were apparently of avisualnature,asanythingbehindabighillwasunhurt.Thesameprisonerstatedthat,inthevicinityofSalzburg,therewasanundergroundhangarcontainingonehundred and eighty airplanes, each of which was provided with one of these

bombs.Twopoints in the story seemeddubious.GeneralDoolittlepointedout to

me,forexample,thattheairplanedroppingsuchathingwouldnotflylow;also,theprisoner seemed too intelligent.Later,whenwegot toSalzburg,we couldfind no indication of the underground hangar or the one hundred and eightyairplanes.

Thiswas the first day I had visited the center ofNuremberg,whichwasreallyanappallingsight.Theoldwalledcity,whichhadbeensobeautiful,wascompletely destroyed—I think themost completely of anythingwe had so farseen.All of this couldnot be attributed to theAirCorps, because it hadbeennecessary for the XV Corps, Seventh Army, to put on quite an artillerybombardmentinordertopersuadetheGermanstoleave.

Onthetwenty-seventh,CodmanandIflewtotheHeadquartersoftheXXCorps at Pittersberg and had the ceremony of pinning three stars on GeneralWalker.HehadbeenreluctanttoputthestarsonuntilheheardthattheSenatehad confirmed him. I teased him, saying hemust have had a bad conscience.PersonallyIhavealwayswornmynewrankassoonasIhaveheardithasbeenforwardedtothePresident.

AccompaniedbyWalker,wedrovetoapointeastofRegensburgandthenacross theDanubeRiverona treadwaybridge.TheDanube isnotparticularlyimpressive. Near the bridge, however, were several barges loaded with theknocked-downpartsofasubmarine.

Later,weflewtotheHeadquartersoftheXIICorpsandtalkedtoGeneralIrwin.The11thArmoredDivisionhadcrossedtheAustrianborderandthe90thand26thDivisionswereclosingup.Irwinwasstillsomewhatworriedabouthislongopenflank,whichhadnotbeencompletelycoveredwhentheVCorps1oftheFirstArmycameinunderBradley’splan.IauthorizedIrwintoletthe11thArmoredlayupacoupleofdaysformaintenance,as ithadbeenoutofactiononlyfourdaysinthelastthirty.

1TheVCorpswascommandedbyMajorGeneralClarenceR.Huebner.

In the III Corps, the 86th and 99th Divisions were successfully over theDanubeandthe14thArmoredwascrossingtheriver.

TherewasveryevidentlyaraceonbetweentheIIIandXXCorps,bothofwhichwerecommandedbyefficientandpushfulofficers.

The XII Corps could not be in the race, owing to the fact that the road

conditions in its area were so bad that it could advance only in column ofdivisions,andthenwithdifficulty.

The5thInfantryDivisionwasagainreleasedtousunderthecommandofGeneral“Burfey”Brown.1Wepromisedthatwemighteventuallytradethe97th,agreendivision,foritwhenthe5thhadpassedtothefront.

Generals Spaatz, Doolittle, and Vandenberg came to lunch and I had aguardofhonorforSpaatzandVandenberg,asneitherofthemhadbeensalutedsincetheywerepromoted.

The British Broadcasting Company came out with the statement thatHimmler had sent a proposition to theUnited States andGreat Britain for anunconditional surrender,buthadbeen told that therewasnothingdoingunlessRussiawasalsoconsidered.

On the twenty-ninth, Lieutenant Graves and I flew to Viechtach, fifteenmilessoutheastofCham,butwereunable to land,sohad toflyback toChamandthendrive to theaforementioned town,whichwas theHeadquartersof theXIICorps.ThiscorpswaspushingonLinz,andIsuggestedtheyturnofftotherightsufficientlytocapture,orthreatentocapture,Passau,withaviewtogettingcontrol of, or causing the Germans to blow up, the bridges over the Inn andDanube Rivers, which meet at this point. Either solution would have beensatisfactory, as the chief purpose of securing the bridges was to prevent theGermans frommoving troopsup thesouthbankof theDanubewithaview toputtingtheminthe“Redoubt”area.

We then flew to the XXCorps at Regensburg, where we foundGeneralWalkerensconcedinthepalaceofthePrincesofThumandTaxis.Thisisamostornatebuildingoccupyingfoursidesofacitysquareandcontainingatheater,alibrary,anarmory,andthreechurches,tosaynothingofaparkandpicnicarea.Isubsequentlylivedinthepalace,soshouldnotcriticizeWalkerforoccupyingit.Infact,heshowedgoodjudgment.ThePrincesofThurnandTaxisacquiredtheBavarianmailmonopolysomethreehundredyearsagoandinventedthepostagestamp.Asaresultoftheirforethoughtthefamilyisstillveryrich.

1MajorGeneralA.E.Brown.

The bag of prisoners for the twenty-ninth amounted to twenty-eightthousand.

ThemonthendedwiththesituationoftheThirdArmynotgreatlychanged,except that the26thDivisionwasalmost inPassauand the11thArmoredwasclosingonLinz.WesecuredfromGeneralBradleythe4thArmoredDivisionin

aswapforthe16th,whichhadnotyetbeeninaction.Theideawastousethe4thArmoredandthe5thInfantryDivisionstoattacksouthwestupthevalleyoftheTraunRiveronSalzburg,inconjunctionwiththeattackfromthenorthwestbytheXXandIIICorps.Inthispartofthewar,terrainwasmoreimportantthantheenemy,andtheroutefromLinztoSalzburguptheriverwasbetterthantheroadsbeingusedbytheothertwocorps.HadwesecuredPassauintime,the4thArmoredand5thInfantrycouldhavemovedupfromthere,because,inadditionto theroutefromLinz toSalzburg, therewasalsoanotheroneupthesouthernbankof the InnRiver fromPassauwhichcouldbeutilized,providedweweresuccessfulincapturingthebridgesatthattown;sotheplangaveme,ineffect,twostringstomybow.

Welearnedthat,onthetwenty-ninth, theXIXTacticalAirCommandhadhad some very good shooting on an armored concentration north of Cham,whichlaterturnedouttobearmoredelementsofthe11thPanzerDivision.

Asanindicationthateverybodythoughtthewarwasover,Iwasdirectedto

makeatwo-minuterecordingofaspeechtobegivenonVE-Day.On May 1, General Lee and his Aide, Major H. D. Rothrock, Colonel

Codman, and I flew from the airfield at Nuremberg in some Cubs toHeadquarters of the III Corps atMainburg.We then drove to the Isar River,where the 86th Division was effecting a crossing at Freising, and thendownstream toward Moosberg. On the way we came to the 14th ArmoredDivisionwhichwascrossing,andInoticedthatallthetankswerecoveredwithsandbags.Thiswasverystupid.Inthefirstplace,itmadethesoldiersthinkthetankscouldbehurt;inthesecondplace,itoverloadedthemachinery;andinthethirdplace,itprovidednoadditionalprotection.Iorderedtheirremovalatonce.

While we were at this bridge, an International Red Cross man and hisalleged wife tried to get over with the troops—also a group of drunkenEnglishmen.Neitherpartysucceeded.

We then drove to theAllied Prisoner ofWar Camp atMoosberg, wheresomethirtythousandAlliedprisonersofwar,mostlyofficers,hadbeenconfinedand were still awaiting repatriation by air. The camp was commanded by anRAFGroupCaptainwithwhomIhaddinedinLondonin1942.TheexecutiveofficerwasColonelP.R.Goode,U.S.A.,whoseillnessduringthemarchfromPolandtosouthernGermanywasthereasonthatColonelWatersdidnot try toescape.Watersfelt that, ifheabandonedGoode, thelatterwouldprobablydie.NooneknewIwascoming,sotheconsiderableovationwhichgreetedmewasspontaneous.Theprisonerswerewelldisciplinedandquiteclean.

Iwentthroughseveralofthelivingquarters,andalsothecookingshacks,inwhichlatterweresomemostingeniouscookingdevices,mostlyinventedandconstructedbymembersoftheUnitedStatesArmyAirForce.Theywerebasedontheprincipleofablacksmith’sforgeandburnedpracticallyanything,duringthe course ofwhich incendiary operation they produced the densest andmostevil-smellingsmokeIhaveeverencountered.Withtheaidofthesecookers,theample andwell-selected supplies furnished by theAmericanRedCross1wereheated and made more palatable. During the last month the prisoners atMoosberg were wholly supported by American Red Cross packages, as theGermansmadepracticallynoattempttosupplyfoodwhichtheythemselvesdidnot possess. To their credit be it stated that they did not tamper with thepackages.

1These supplieswere bought by theArmy, packed by volunteerRedCrossworkers,

shippedbytheAmericanRedCrossvessels,anddistributedbytheInternationalRedCross.

FromherewedrovetoLandshut,wherethe99thDivisionwascrossingtheIsarRiver.ItwasatLandshut inthechateauonthesouthsideof theriver thatColonelCodmanspentquitealongperiodofconfinementduringtheFirstWorldWar,and fromwhichhe subsequentlyescaped. I tookapictureof thechateauandalsooneofCharleywiththechateauinthebackground.

During the trip,wepassedaGermancandyandcookyfactory,where,onthe previous day, General Van Fleet had found a mob of German civilianslooting.HaditnotbeenforthepromptandpersonalactionofGeneralVanFleetand his driver, the valuable store of sugar, chocolate, and flour stored in thefactory would probably have been utterly destroyed. As it was, we walkedthroughpassagewayswheresugarandchocolatelayonthefloorhigherthanmyshoetops.Apparently thedesire for rationed foodmade thenormallyquiescentGermancompletelycrazy.

When Igotback toHeadquarters, Idiscovered therewasamovementonfoot to turn over the reduction of the “Redoubt” to the Seventh Army. Itoccurred to me that, if we could secure a crossing over the Inn River atWasserburg,soastoretaincontroloftheroadfromWasserburgtoAltenmarktand Salzburg, we would pinch out the embryonic ambitions of the SeventhArmy.

IcalledVanFleetonthetelephoneandaskedhimtodohisdamnedest toget thecrossingatWasserburgandalso togetotherunitsacross theInn inhissector. He made a task force and forced the crossing at Wasserburg beforedaylight,whichwasoneofthemosthandsomeandfastestoperationsofthewar.

On the second, we were to move our Command Post from Erlangen toRegensburg,orRatisbon,whereNapoleonfoughtthefamousbattleandinspiredthepoembeginning:“Youknow,weFrenchtookRatisbon,aboutamileaway,Ona littlemoundNapoleonstood,”etc.Apparentlyarmycommandersdidnotgetasrelativelynearthefrontinthosedaysastheydonow.

Personally,IwasunabletoleavetheCommandPostuntil1330,asIhadtowait to find out fromGeneral Bradleywhether or notwewould continue theattackon the“Redoubt”or turn itover to theSeventhArmy.At1330hegaveme a new boundary,which answered the question; the SeventhArmy got thedecision.Thisboundarywas as follows: theoldboundaryThirdArmyand IIICorpsnorthwestofFreising;thenceinageneraleasterlydirectiontoMuhldorf;thence along the InnRiver to the junction of the Inn and the SalzachRivers;thencetoStrasswalchen;thencegenerallyparalleltotheEnnsRivertowhereitjoinstheDanubeatMauthausen,tenkilometerseastofLinz.TheRussianswereon the other side of this river. North of the Danube, the temporary boundarybetweentheUnitedStatesandtheRussianswastherailwayrunningnorthfrom

thepointwhere theEnnsRiverenters theDanube.Theresultof thisboundarywaspracticallytopinchouttheIIICorpsandalsotogiveusadefinitestopline.

Beingofahopefulnature,ItoldtheIIICorpstoholdonatWasserburg,andalsotogetanyotherintactcrossingsovertheInnRiverwhichtheycouldfind.

The Seventh Army asked us to take the 4th Infantry Division (MajorGeneral H. W. Blakeley) from them in exchange for our 86th Division atWasserburg.Sincetherewasnohelpforit,weagreed.However,wesucceededingettingthe23dReconnaissanceSquadron(commandedbyLieutenantColonelR.C.Adkinson)of the16thArmoredDivision,whichhadbeenwith the86th,pulledback,andalso twocompaniesof the14thArmoredDivisionwhichhadbeenoperatingwiththe86th.

IcalledtheIIICorpsandtoldthemwhathadhappened,buttokeepgoinginthesmallzonewhichwasstillopentothem.

IhadtheideaoflettingtheXIICorpsutilizethecrossingmadeatPassaubythe 65th Division of the XX Corps and move rapidly on Linz by the roadScharding—Linz.However,GeneralGay andGeneralMaddox, dissuadedme,astheyjudged,morerightlythanIdid,thesmallamountofoppositioninfrontoftheXXCorps.Ibelievetheyalsosensed,evenatthattime,thepossibilityofchanging direction to the northeast with the XII Corps. There had beenthroughout the operation a strange fatality about the times the Third Armymoved its Command Posts. Practically every time wemoved them, we got achangeindirectionorachangeinmission.

OnMay 3we heard over the radio of the unconditional surrender of theGermantroopsinItaly.

Boththe65thInfantryDivisionoftheXXCorpsandthe11thArmoredoftheXIICorps continued crossing the riverswhich had been holding themup,and advanced rapidly on Linz. I decided to send the 4th Infantry Division toNurembergonlineofcommunicationdutyand, in theeventofanoperationinCzechoslovakia, to give the III Corps a division from either the XII or XXCorps.

WenextvisitedtheXXCorpsHeadquarters,whichwefoundsituatedinarather nice country house, with an excellent collection of old firearms.Apparently the ancestors of the owner had been proprietary colonels of aninfantryregiment.

Driving back to ThirdArmyHeadquarters, we passed a large number ofHungarianswholookedextremelywellfed,andweremovinghappilyalongwithonlyoneofoursoldiersforaboutathousandprisoners.

Wewereverynearlykilledbyabull-cart,whichcameoutofasidestreetsothat the pole missed us only by about an inch. The American soldier is

absolutelyincapableofenforcingtherulethatciviliansstayofftheroadsduringactiveoperations.Hisgoodnessofheart isacredit tohim,butIamsureithascostusmanycasualties.Inwar,timeisvital,andbull-cartscausewasteoftimeandthereforedeath.

If Iwere to fight anotherwar, Iwouldmake it an inflexible rule that nocivilian vehicle, horse, cow, ormotor-drawn, appear on any axial road, and Iwouldenforcethisbyshootingtheanimalsanddestroyingthevehicles.IdidthisinSicilyandwascriticizedbyanignorantpress,whoconsidereditverybrutaltokicka fewdonkeysoffbridges,and ignored the fact thatbysodoingwe tookPalermoinonedayandatverylowcost.Again,duringtheSaarbattle,throughthe co-operationof the local authorities,wekept all the axial roads, includingthoseinthecityofNancy,clearedforouruse.

On May 4, the 11th Armored passed the north—and-south line throughLinz and therefore was about to run into the Russians. On the initiative ofGeneral Irwin, the 90thDivision, the 5thDivision, and the 2dCavalryGroup(commandedbyColonelC.H.Reed)all securedcrossingsover themountainsintoCzechoslovakia,sothat,incasewehadtoattackPrague,wewouldatleastbethroughthepassesbeforeanythinghitus.

TheVCorps, FirstArmy, underGeneralHuebner,was transferred to theThirdArmy.This gaveus thebiggest armywehadyet had; namely, eighteendivisions,orslightlymorethan540,000men.

Myold-time friendof 1912 at Saumur, theFrench five-starGeneral JeanHoudemon,calledtoseemeonthefourth.AcavalryofficerinWorldWarI,helaterbecameanaviatorandfoughtforFranceinWorldWarII,until,ashesaid,“levieuxPetainm’a renvoye.”1At that timehewas sixty-four, and the seniorflierintheFrenchArmy.HethenretiredtohishomeatPont-à-Mousson,wherehe acted asmayor andmaintained a hospital in his house during theGermanoccupation. Under pretext of negotiating some sort of armistice for theevacuationofhissick,heandhisdaughter,Catherine,aninfirmiere,crossedtheMoselleunderfireandcametomyHeadquarters.Asayoungcavalryofficeronmaneuvers,hehadlearnedallthefordsatthispointoftheMoselle,andhisrealpurposewastoindicatethemtome.Unfortunately,Iwasabsent,andtheofficerwhosawhimdidnot realize thathewasacting ingood faithandorderedhimback across the river with a parting shot at his boat for luck. He insisted,however,onleavinganoteformewithachartofthefordsandtheinformationthat themedievalchateauofMousson,onasteephillbehindthe town,wasanimportantGermanObservationPost.His.chartofthefordswastheonewelaterusedincrossingtheMoselle.Twodaysafterthisvisit tomyHeadquarters, theGermansevacuatedhimandwehadquiteasearchtryingtolocatehimandfora

longtimethoughthimdead.Hewasaveryfinemanandmostinterestinginhisconversation.I laterhadhimflowntoParis,whichheenjoyed,ashehadbeenchiefofthesouthernportionoftheFrenchAirForcepriortothefallofFrance.His daughter received the Croix de Guerre for her work in the war, whichincludedtheheroicrescuefromtheMoselleoftwowoundedAmericansoldiers.

1TheoldPétainsentmeback.”

At1930,GeneralBradleycalledupandsaid thegreen lightwasopenforthe attack on Czechoslovakia, and wanted to know when I could put it intoeffect.Itoldhimnextmorning.Hewassomewhatincredulous,but,aswewereprettywellusedtoeachother,hebelievedme.

I immediatelycalled theVCorpsand told them togetgoingwith the1st(thencommandedbyMajorGeneralCliftAndrus)andthe2dInfantryDivisions1and the16thArmored. I also told theXIICorps to attackasplanned.GeneralGay, who has a sixth sense, had already alerted the 16th Armored in theafternoon, becausehe felt that somethingwasgoing tohappen.Wewereveryanxioustogetthe16thintoafightbeforethewarstopped,andtheywereveryanxioustogetthere.

1OnMay 5, 1945, theVCorps (MajorGeneralC.R.Huebner)was assigned to the

ThirdArmy.

2GeneralHuebnerwassittingdowntodinner,aboutseven-thirty,whenhisG-3camein

withordersassigninghiscorpstotheThirdArmy.GeneralHuebnerremarked,“Well,I’llgiveus just about twelvehoursbeforeGeneralPattoncallsupand tellsus toattack something.”ThesoupwasstillhotwhentheChiefofStaffof thecorpswascalledfromthe table to thephone.Hecamebackwithagrinonhisface,saying,“General,it’sGeneralPatton.Hewantstotalktoyou.”Theconversationwentsomethinglikethis:

“Hello,Huebner?”“Hello,General.Howareyou?”“Fine.WhereinhellhaveyoubeensinceSicily-”“Oh,we’vebeenaroundmakinganuisanceofourselves.”“I’msuregladyou’rebackwithmeagain.”“Gladtobeback,General.”“IwantyoutoattackPilseninthemorning.”“Yes,sir.”“Canyoudoit?”“Yes,sir.”“Fine,movefastnow.Wehaven’tgotmuchtimeleftinthiswar.I’llbeuptoseeyou.

Good-bye.”

GeneralHuebner returned to his table and said, “Well, Imissed that one. Instead oftwelvehours,itwastwelveminutes.WeattackPilsenatdaybreak.”

Bothcorpsjumpedoffbetween0800and1000onthemorningofthefifth,the V Corps with the 97th and 2d Infantry Divisions land part of the 16thArmored.The1stDivisionwastojoinintheattackstartingonthesixth,alsoaportionofthe9thArmoredDivision.

I had instructions fromBradley,which I passed on to the corps, thatwewerenot toadvancebeyondanorthwest-southeast line throughPilsen in largeforce,butcouldandshouldreconnoitervigorouslytowardPrague.

The XII Corps jumped off with the 90th and 5th Divisions and alsocaptured Linz with the 11th Armored and 26th Divisions, which were thenreleasedforactiontothenorthbythe65thInfantryDivisionoftheXXCorps.

I remember that, during this offensive, I was talking to General Paul,commandingthe26th,andheremindedmethatwhenhisdivisionhadgoneingreenonOctober7, Ihad toldhim thathis soldierswereagroupof amateursabouttoplayinaprofessionalleague,anditbehoovedthemtobestirthemselvesinordertocompetewiththepros.HesaidthoseremarksappliedequallywelltohisfinalattackonLinz,because,owing tocasualtiesandattrition, thedivisionwas largely filled with un-battlewise soldiers. However, there is a greatdifferencebetweenanolddivision,irrespectiveoftheindividualscomposingit,andanewdivision.Wardevelopsasoulinafightingunit,andwhiletheremaynot bemanyof the oldmen left, it takes very little yeast to leaven a lumpofdough.IsupposeImightbefunnyandsayittakesveryfewveteranstoleavenadivisionofdoughboys.

Itisanunfortunatefactthatfewcommanders,andnopoliticians,realizetheindividualityofunitsandthenecessityofplayingonhumanemotion.SpeakingofthisremindsmethatthissamePauloncetoldme,withperfectsincerity,thatthegreatestmomentofhislifehadbeenattheBattleoftheBulgewhenIputmyarmaroundhimandsaid,“Howismylittlefightingsonofabitchtoday?”Hesaidthatthisremarkinspirednotonlyhim,buteverymaninthedivision,anditishighlyprobablethatitdid.

HuebnertoldmethatwhenandifImetanyRussians,Imustbepreparedformutualexchangeofmedals,flags,andpersonalequipment,andthatforthatreasonIhadbetternotwearmygoodpistolnormyexpensivewatch,asIwouldcertainly not get the equivalent from the Russians in a swapping match. Iimmediately calledGeneralBradley and askedwhat authority I had topresentmedals.We arranged that wewould givemedals approximately as follows: adivision could give six Legions ofMerit of the lowest grade, and six Bronze

StarstotheRussiandivisionwithwhichitmadecontact.Inthecorps,wecouldgivenineLegionsofMeritandthreeBronzeStarstotheoppositecorps.Inthiscase, half of theLegions ofMeritwere of the officer grade. In theArmy,wecould give twelveLegions ofMerit of assorted grades, including the third, orcommander, grade, and piece out with a few Bronze Stars if desirable. Weimmediatelysettoworkandsecuredtherequisitenumberofmedals.

In view of the radio reports that the Czechoslovakian citizens had takenPrague, I was very anxious to go on and assist them, and asked Bradley forauthority to do so, but this was denied. As a matter of fact, however,reconnaissanceelementsoftheThirdArmywereinthevicinityofPrague,andbythatactmarked thefarthestprogress to theeastofanywesternarmy.Also,theThirdArmyhadthedistinguishedprivilegeofbeingthelastwesternarmytomaintaintheoffensive.

Onthesixthitwasdefinitelyestablishedthatwewerenot topassbeyondthe stop line running through Pilsen for greater distances than required bysecurity reconnaissance—up to about five miles. I was very much chagrined,becauseIfelt,andIstillfeel,thatweshouldhavegoneontotheMoldauRiverand, if theRussians didn’t like it, let themgo to hell. I did not find out untilweeks afterward the reasons, which were sound, which implemented GeneralEisenhower’sdecisiontoorderustostopwherehedid.

WewerealsodirectedtostopouradvancesoutheastintheDanubeValleyandtostandfastwherewewereuntiltheRussiansmadecontactwithus.Asof1100,theleadingCombatCommandofthe16thArmoredDivision(commandedbyColonelC.H.Noble)enteredPilsen.WemovedtheIIICorpstothevicinityofNurembergtostartoccupyingBavariaundertheso-calledEclipsePlan.1

ItwasalsoreportedtousthatonehundredthousandWhiteRussianswereattempting to surrender. These people were certainly in a bad fix and had anumberofwomenandchildrenwiththem.Thesoldiersweretreatedasprisonersofwar,thewomenandchildrenasdisplacedpersons.

On the seventh,we knew thewarwould end atmidnight on the night ofMay8-9.BradleysentaRussiancolonelgeneral throughtheVCorps togotoPrague and inform the German Army Group Commander there, GeneralSthoerner,oftherulesforthesurrender.

GeneralGayhad the forethought todirect theChiefSurgeonof theThirdArmypersonallytoinspectMoosbergandtobesurethattheAlliedprisonersofwarweregettingpropermedicalattentionandamplefood.

JudgePatterson, theUnder-Secretary ofWar, spent the night ofMay6-7withusandontheseventhweflewtotheXXCorps,utilizingtwoCubs.DuringthisdaywecrossedtheEnnsRiverandalsotheIsarandatonepointsawatleast

onehundredundestroyedlocomotivesonasidetrack.OnarrivalatGeneralWalker’sHeadquarters,wefoundthattheXXCorps

had captured intact, at an adjacent chateau, thewhole of the Imperial SpanishRidingAcademywhichhad leftViennaon theapproachof theRussians.ThisAcademyhadbeenrunninginViennasincethetimeofCharlesVofSpain.

Originally the gyrations taught the. horses were of military importance.Thatis,thecourbette,orhalf-rear,wasforthepurposeoflettingthehorsecomedownatthesametimethattheswordwasswung,soastogivethelattermoreforce;thevolte,ordemi-volte,wasforthepurposeofavoidingattack;whiletheleap into theair, strikingout foreandaftwith the feet,was for thepurposeofextricatingtheriderfromtooclosecontactwiththeenemy,andsoon.Withthepassing years and changes in the art of war, the purpose of this form ofequitation was forgotten, and the movements were taught as of value inthemselves. Inotherwords,peoplebegan,as inmanyotherarts, toglorify themeansratherthantheendwhichthemeansweresupposedtoproduce.

1ThecodenameoftheplanfortheoccupationofGermany.

After lunch, General Walker arranged for us to witness one of theexhibitions, which was extremely interesting and magnificently performed.However,itstruckmeasratherstrangethat,inthemidstofaworldatwar,sometwenty young andmiddle-agedmen in great physical condition, togetherwithabout thirty grooms, had spent their entire time teaching a group of horses towiggletheirbuttsandraisetheirfeetinconsonancewithcertainsignalsfromtheheelsandreins.MuchasIlikehorses,thisseemedtomewastedenergy.Ontheotherhand, it isprobablywrong topermitanyhighlydevelopedart,nomatterhow fatuous, toperish from the earth—andwhicharts are fatuousdependsonthe point of view. To me the high-schooling of horses is certainly moreinterestingthaneitherpaintingormusic.

After leaving the XX Corps, the Under-Secretary and I flew over Linz,which was much more destroyed than I had thought. We then landed at theHeadquartersoftheXIICorps,whereweweremetbyGeneralIrwin.FromthereweflewbacktoHeadquarters,arrivingat2000o’clock.

TheUnder-Secretaryhasamostremarkablememoryfornames,andcouldtelltheofficerstowhomhewasintroducedwherehehadlastseenthem.Heisalsoexceptionallywellinformedonhistory,particularlythatoftheCivilWar,sowe had a very enjoyable talk together. He is the only member of the

Government,sofarasIknow,whopossesses theDistinguishedServiceCross,whichhewonintheinfantryinWorldWarI.

After he left on the eighth, Bradley and Allen came to lunch and wediscussedanumberofpointswhichwewishedtodetermineaboutthezoneswewouldoccupy.However,owingtothefactthatSHAEFhadasyetnotcometoadecision,itwasimpossibletodomorethansurmisewhatwasgoingtohappen.

Attheregularbriefingonthemorningoftheeighth,IspoketotheofficersstatingthatthiswasthelastbriefingwewouldhaveinEurope,emphasizingtheword“Europe.”IthinkmostofthemrealizedIwashopingtohavesomemorebriefingsinAsia,but“Thebest-laidplansofmiceandmen,”etc.Ithenthankedeachmemberof theStaff forwhathehaddone and assured them that nooneman can conduct an army, but that the success of any army depends on theharmonious working of its staff and the magnificent fighting ability of thecombat officers and enlisted men. Without this teamwork, war cannot besuccessfullyfought.

The eighth ofMaymarked exactly two and one-half years sincewe hadlandedinAfrica.DuringallthattimeuntilmidnightofMay8-9,wehadbeeninpracticallycontinuousbattle,and,whennotinbattle,hadbeenunderthestrainofcontinuouscriticism,whichIbelieveishardertobear.

At 1130 I said good-bye to the war correspondents after having a finalbriefingwiththem,duringwhichoneofthemsaid,“General,whydidn’twetakePrague?”Isaid,“Ican tellyouexactlywhy,”whereupontheyallgotout theirnotebooks and looked expectant. I said, “Because we were ordered not to,”which produced a laugh, even though they were disappointed. Afterward Isignedagreatmanyshortsnorternotesandposedforinnumerablephotographswiththem.ByandlargethecorrespondentswiththeThirdArmydidasplendidand loyal jobandsucceeded ingetting to thepeopleathomeanexcellent andintimatepictureofwaraswefoughtit.1

1Littleornothing isknownorhaseverbeensaidof theThirdArmy’sduplicationof

Hannibal’sfeat—crossingtheAlps.At war’s end, when the situation in Jugoslavia was not clear, the Third Army was

orderedtomovefivedivisionsintotheFifthArmyandBritishArea,southoftheAlps,northof Trieste.Without somuch as awink of an eyelash, the 3dUnited States CavalryGroupmovedout.Intwelvehours,ithadcrossedtheAlpsandwasthoroughlymixedupwithBritishtroopsinnorthernItaly.GeneralClark,whohadnotbeeninformedofsuchamovement,madehastetocongratulateGeneralPattononthealacrityandboldnessofhismovement;however,he lost no time in informing General Eisenhower that additional troops were not needed.GeneralClarkrequestedthatthetroopsbewithdrawn—foradministrativereasons.

Theywere—withthesamezestanddeterminationasaforementioned.

IreceivedaveryfineletterofcongratulationfromtheSecretaryofWar,Mr.Stimson,whichreadsasfollows:

IcongratulateyouandyourheroicsoldiersoftheThirdArmy.Icommend you for the dashing and spectacular victories which haveplayedagreatpartinbringingaboutthisgloriousday.TheexploitsoftheThirdArmyhavebeeninthehighest traditionsof thearmiesthathavedefendedAmericathroughoutitshistory.

Youandyourgallantforceswelldeservethenation’shomage.

This letter, I think,very fittinglymarks the terminationof thewar, and, Ifear,mylastone.

Icansaythis,thatthroughoutthecampaigninEuropeIknowofnoerrorImadeexcept thatof failing to sendaCombatCommand to takeHammelburg.Otherwise, my operations were, to me, strictly satisfactory. In every case,practically throughout the campaign, I was under wraps from the HigherCommand.Thismayhavebeen a good thing, as perhaps I am too impetuous.However,IdonotbelieveIwas,andfeelthathadIbeenpermittedtogoallout,the war would have ended sooner and more lives would have been saved.ParticularlyIthinkthisstatementappliestothetimewhen,intheearlydaysofSeptember, we were halted, owing to the desire, or necessity, on the part ofGeneralEisenhower inbackingMontgomery’smove to thenorth.At that timethere was no question of doubt but that we could have gone through and onacrosstheRhinewithintendays.Thiswouldhavesavedagreatmanythousandmen.

AstheChurchsays,“HereendeththeSecondLesson.”)

Thefinalcasualtyreport,thatofMay8,1945,follows:

1Theprisonersofwarscoredabovewerethosetakeninactualbattlepriortomidnight

ofMay8-9.Subsequenttothatdatethetakingofprisonerswasnotasportingevent,soIhave

notrecordedit,althoughthenumberswentintothemillions.Author'snote.

PARTTHREE

RETROSPECT

REFLECTIONSANDSUGGESTIONS

12

Probably there is nothingoriginal inwhat I shall nowput down,becausewarisanancientsubjectandI,anancientman,havestudiedandpracticeditforover forty years. So, what appears to me as original thought may be simplysubconsciousmemories.

I

CONCERNINGTHESOLDIER

ThesoldieristheArmy.Noarmyisbetterthanitssoldiers.Thesoldierisalsoacitizen.Infact,thehighestobligationandprivilegeofcitizenshipisthatofbearingarmsforone’scountry.Henceitisaproudprivilegetobeasoldier—agood soldier. Anyone, in any walk of life, who is content with mediocrity isuntrue tohimselfand toAmerican tradition.Tobeagoodsoldieramanmusthavediscipline,self-respect,prideinhisunitandinhiscountry,ahighsenseofduty and obligation to his comrades and to his superiors, and self-confidencebomofdemonstratedability.

Therehasbeen,and isnow,agreatdealof talkaboutdiscipline;but fewpeople,inoroutoftheArmy,knowwhatitisorwhyitisnecessary.

When aman enters theArmy, he leaves home, usually for the first time,andalsoheleavesbehindhimtheinhibitionsresultingfromhisrespectfor theopinion of his parents and his friends;which inhibitions, unknown to himself,havelargelyguidedhisexistence.Whenhejoinsaunitandlacksthiscorrectiveinfluence,heisapttoslipinmorals,inneatness,andinenergy.Administrativedisciplinemustreplacetheabsentinhibitions.

All human beings have an innate resistance to obedience. Disciplineremoves this resistance and, by constant repetition, makes obedience habitualandsubconscious.Wherewouldanundisciplinedfootballteamget?Theplayersreactsubconsciouslytothesignals.Theymust,becausethesplitsecondrequiredforthoughtwouldgivetheenemythejump.

Battle is much more exigent than football. No sane man is unafraid inbattle, butdisciplineproduces inhima formofvicarious couragewhich,withhismanhood,makesforvictory.Self-respectgrowsdirectlyfromdiscipline.TheArmy saying, “Who ever saw a dirty soldier with a medal?” is largely true.Pride,inturn,stemsfromself-respectandfromtheknowledgethatthesoldierisanAmerican. The sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and superiorscomes fromaknowledgeof reciprocalobligation, and from the sharingof thesamewayof life.Self-confidence, thegreatestmilitaryvirtue, results from thedemonstratedabilityderived from theacquisitionofall theprecedingqualitiesandfromexerciseintheuseofweapons.

It isanunfortunateand, tome, tragic fact that, inourattempts topreventwar, we have taught our people to belittle the heroic qualities of the soldier.They do not realize that, as Shakespeare put it, the pursuit of “The bubblereputationevenatthecannon’smouth”isnotonlyagoodmilitarycharacteristic,butalsoveryhelpfultotheyoungmanwhenbulletsandshellsarewhistlingandcrackingaroundhim.MuchmorecouldbedoneifthewomenofAmericawouldpraisetheirheroes,andifpaperswouldpublishthecitationsofsoldiersintheirhometowns;andfurther,iffoolishideasofsecuritydidnotmakethecitationssounrealistic. Perhaps the returning soldiers of this war may correct this veryunfortunatesituation.

OneofKipling’spoemsstartsasfollows:Whenthe’arf-maderecruitygoesouttotheEast,’Eactslikeababean’’edrinkslikeabeast,An''ewondersbecause'eisfrequentdeceasedEree'sfitfortoserveasasoldier..-3

Alloursoldiersdonotdrinklikebeasts.Infact,thelackofdrinkinginourArmy is remarkable. However, many do act like babes. What follows is anattempttomakecertainsuggestionswhichhaveproveduseful.

Do not dig slit trenches under trees if you can avoid it, because a shellpassingoverheadandstrikingthetreeactsasanairburstandthefragmentscomestraightdown, so thatyour slit trench isuseless toyou, although itmaybeof

someassistancetotheGravesRegistrationpeople.Slittrenchesforguncrewsmustbeintheclosevicinityofthegun,elsethe

menwastetoomuchtimegettingfromthetrenchestothegun.Alsotheyarejustasapttogetkilledwhilemakingtherunastheywouldbeiftheystayedbythegun.Finally, agun that isnot firing isuseless and its crewaredisloyal to thesoldiersinfrontofthem,whomtheyaresupposedtobesupporting.

The trick expression, “Dig or die,” is much overused and muchmisunderstood. Wars are not won by defensive tactics. Digging is primarilydefensive.Theonlytimeitisproperforasoldiertodigiswhenhehasreachedhisfinalobjectiveinanattack,orwhenheisbivouackingundercircumstanceswherehethinkshemaybestrafedfromtheairoriswithinartilleryrangeoftheenemy. Personally, I am opposed to digging under such circumstances, as thechanceofgettingkilledwhilesleepingnormallyonthegroundisquiteremote,and the fatigue from digging innumerable slit trenches is avoided. Also, thepsychologicaleffectonthesoldierisbad,becauseifhethinkshehastodighemustthinktheenemyisdangerous,whichheusuallyisnot.

“Hit thedirt” is another expressionwhichhasdonemuch to increaseourcasualties.FrequentlyinfightingGermans,andprobablyothertroopsinthenextwar, we will find that they have resort to their knowledge of our custom ofhitting thedirt.What theydo iswaituntilwehavearrivedat apredeterminedspotonwhichtheyhaverangedrockets,mortars,orartilleryandthentheyputonasuddenandviolentmachine-gunfire—frequentlystraightupintheair.Thesoldier,obsessedwith the ideaofhittingthedirt, liesdownandwaitssupinelyfor thearrivalof theshells from themortars, rockets,etc.Heusuallydoesnothavetowaitlong.

Theonlytimeitisproperforasoldiertodropiswhenheiscaughtatshortrange—under three hundred yards—by concentrated small-arms fire.But eventhenhemustnothitthedirtandstaysupine.Hemustshootfastattheenemy,orinthedirectionoftheenemy,becauseitisastruenowaswhenFarragutstateditintheCivilWarthat“Thebestarmor(andthebestdefense)isarapidandwell-directed fire.” It is a sadcommentaryonour troops that frequentlyweget thereport that suchand suchaunit ispinneddownunder fire, and later the sameunitcomesback.

When soldiers are caught in a barrage, either from mortars, rockets, orartillery,thesurestwaytogetoutofitistogoforwardfast,becauseitisalmosttheinvariablepracticeoftheenemytoincreaseratherthandecreasehisrange.

Inthedayswhenthechiefsmall-armsfireonthebattlefieldwasdeliveredbyrifles,itmayhavebeennecessarytoadvancebyrushinginordertobuildupthefiringline.Today,whenthechiefsmall-armsfireonthebattlefieldandthe

majority of the neutralizing fire is delivered by machine guns, mortars, andartillery, there is no advantage in advancing by rushes, because, until you getwithinthreehundredyards,small-armsfirehasverylittleeffect,whereaswhenyou lie down between rushes you expose yourself to the effect of shrapnel.When you get to three hundred yards, your own small-arms fire, which issuperior to anything now existing or which will probably ever exist, willneutralizethatoftheenemysmall-armsfire,sothatyoudonothavetoadvancebyrushes. I say thisvery feelinglybecause Ihaveseen,onmanyoccasions inmaneuversandinbattle, troopsadvancingbyrusheswhentheyweredefiladedbehindhillsandcouldhavegoneforwardinlimousines,hadtheybeenavailable,withperfectimpunity.

MarchingFire:Theproperwaytoadvance,particularlyfortroopsarmedwiththatmagnificentweapon,theM-lrifle,istoutilizemarchingfireandkeepmoving.Thisfirecanbedeliveredfromtheshoulder,butitisjustaseffectiveifdeliveredwiththebuttoftheriflehalfwaybetweenthebeltandthearmpit.Oneroundshouldbe firedevery twoor threepaces.Thewhistleof thebullets, thescream of the ricochet, and the dust, twigs, and branches which are knockedfromthegroundandthetreeshavesuchaneffectontheenemythathissmall-armsfirebecomesnegligible.

Meanwhile, our troops in rear, using high-angle fire, should put out theenemy’smortars and artillery.As I have stated, even ifwe fail to put out themortarsandartillery, themostfoolish thingpossible is tostopundersuchfire.Keepwalkingforward.Furthermore,thefactthatyouareshootingaddstoyourself-confidence, because you feel that you are doing something, and are notsittinglikeaduckinabathtubbeingshotat.

Inmarchingfireallweaponsmustbeused.Thelightmachinegunscanbeusedwhilewalking—onemancarryingthebelt,theothermancarryingthegun.Thesame is trueof theBrowningautomatic rifleand,ofcourse,aspreviouslystated,of theM-l.The60mm.mortar, advancedbyalternate sections, candomuchinthesameway.The81mm.usuallyshouldsupportfromoneposition.

I think, if we should say that “Fire is the Queen of Battles,” we shouldavoidarmargumentsandcomenearer tellingthetruth.Battlesarewonbyfireand bymovement. The purpose of themovement is to get the fire in amoreadvantageousplacetoplayontheenemy.Thisisfromtherearorflank.

60mm.Mortar

Every soldier should realize that casualties in battle are the result of twofactors:first,effectiveenemyfire,andsecond,thetimeduringwhichthesoldierisexposedtothatfire.Theenemy’seffectivenessinfireisreducedbyyourfireorbynightattacks.Thetimeyouareexposedisreducedbytherapidityofyouradvance.

Bravery and Courage: If we take the generally accepted definition ofbraveryasaqualitywhichknowsnotfear,Ihaveneverseenabraveman.Allmenarefrightened.Themoreintelligenttheyare,themoretheyarefrightened.Thecourageousmanisthemanwhoforceshimself,inspiteofhisfear,tocarryon. Discipline, pride, self-respect, self-confidence, and the love of glory areattributeswhichwillmakeamancourageousevenwhenheisafraid.

The greatest weapon against the so-called “battle fatigue” is ridicule. Ifsoldierswould realize that a large proportion ofmen allegedly suffering frombattlefatiguearereallyusinganeasywayout,theywouldbelesssympathetic.Anymanwhosayshehasbattlefatigueisavoidingdangerandforcingonthosewhohavemorehardihoodthanhimself theobligationofmeeting it. Ifsoldierswouldmakefunofthosewhobegintoshowbattlefatigue,theywouldpreventitsspread,andalsosavethemanwhoallowshimselftomalingerbythismeansfromanafter-lifeofhumiliationandregret.

Trench foot: Soldiers must look after themselves, particularly in wet orcoldweather.This applies particularly to “trenchfoot,”which,with reasonableassistancebytheHigherCommand,canbelargelypreventedifthesoldierwillonly take the trouble to massage his feet and put on dry socks. He is notresponsible for thearrivalof thedry socks,but,provided theydoarrive,he is

responsibleforputtingthemon.Thesamethingistrueofvenerealdisease.Soldiersdonothavetocontract

it if they will take the precautions which themilitary establishment provides.When they do contract it, they are disloyal to their comrades, because, whiletheyarerecovering,somebodyelseisdoingtheirwork.

II

SMALLUNITTACTICS

Squadsshouldseldombesplit.However,ifitisnecessarytosplitasquad,besurethattheunitseparatedisatleastcapableofmutualsupport.Thismeansthattheunitseparatedfromthesquadshouldnotbefewerthanthreemen.Thesquad possesses in itself the weapons necessary for a base of fire and amaneuvering element. This should be its invariable method of attack, but thesquadleadershouldnotspendsomuchtimethinkingwhichwayheisgoingtoenvelop that he suffers casualties which would have been avoided had heattackedatonce.

Insmalloperations,asinlarge,speedistheessentialelementofsuccess.Ifthedifferencebetweenthetwopossibleflanksforenvelopmentissosmallthatitrequiresthought,thetimewastedinthoughtisnotwellused.Rememberthatthelifeoftheinfantrysquaddependsonitscapacityoffire.Itmustfire.

Whenasmallunitdisposesboth60mm.and81mm.mortarsinanattack,the60mm.mortarsshouldfireon the front lineof the resistancewhile the81mm.firefordepthandtohitthesupportsandheavyweapons.

Fighting inWoods:Thebestwayfor infantry togo throughwoods in thedaytime is to advance in a skirmish line on a distant direct point, if such isavailable,or,moreprobably,onacompassbearing.Theskirmishlineshouldbeat reduced interval,andshouldmovestraight forward through thewood,usingmarching fire. If this isdone, itwillbe surprisinghow little resistancewillbeencountered,because,iftheenemyattemptstofirethroughthewoods,hisrifles,whichare always less effective thanours,will notpenetrate through the trees,whileourswillpenetrateandsogethim.

In fighting throughEuropeanwoods,whichare intersectedat rightangleseverythousandmetersbylanes,donotwalkdownthelanes,andbecarefulhowyou cross them—cross them fast—because the enemyusually has them sweptwithmachineguns.

81mm.Mortar

NightAttack inWoods: It isnotnecessaryoradvisable toattack throughwoodsatnight.Inthefirstplace,; thewoodsthemselvesgivethecoverwhichthedarknessdoesintheopen.Inthesecondplace,itisalmostim-!possibletomovethroughwoodsatnightexceptincolumnonroads.

Tanks and Infantry: The question of whether infantry or tanks lead inattacking is determined by the character of the ground and of the enemyresistance. Whenever the ground permits tanks to advance rapidly, even thecertaintyofalossfromminefields,theyshouldlead.Throughdensewoodsoragainst prepared positions or unlocated antitank guns, infantry leads, followedcloselybythetanks,whichactasclosesupportingartillery.But,irrespectiveofthe foregoing, some tanks must accompany the infantry when they reach theobjective.These tanks are for thepurposeof removingenemyweaponswhichemergeafterthepassageoftheleadingtanks.

Pillboxes:Pillboxesarebestattackedbytheuseofprearrangedgroups.AsatisfactorygroupconsistsoftwoBrowningautomaticrifles,abazooka,alightmachine gun, two to four riflemen, and twomenwith the demolition charge.SixtypoundsofTNT isample.Before initiatinganattackonapillboxarea, areconnaissance should be made to determine which boxes are mutuallysupporting. Those in such a groupmust be attacked simultaneously. The bestresultsareobtainedbyasilentnightattack,whichplaces theassaultgroups inposition close to their respective pillboxes at dawn. The apertures, areimmediatelytakenunderfireandsilenced.Whenfireisachieved,thedemolitioncharge,coveredbyriflemenandlightmachineguns,isplacedagainstthedoorattherearofthepillbox,thefuseislit,andthemenwithdrawaroundthecomerofthebuilding.As soonas thecharge is exploded, riflemen throw ingrenades—preferablyphosphorous.Anyenemyemergingarekilledorcaptured,accordingtotheframeofmindoftheenemy.

Whencircumstancespreventanightoperation,similarbutmoreexpensiveresultsareobtainedbyadvancingcloseinthewakeofanartilleryconcentration.

Anotheradjunct to theattackonpillboxesisaselfpropelled155mm.gunwhereconditionspermititsuse.Atshortrangetheeffectsareverysatisfactory.

BAR

StreetFighting:Streetfightingissimplyavariationofpillboxfighting.Asimilar group, but reinforced with more riflemen, is effective. The additionalriflemenaresplitonoppositesidesofthestreetsoastotakeunderfireenemy

personnelappearingin theupperstoriesonthesideacrossfromthem.Whenahouse offers resistance, the windows are silenced by fire as in the case ofpillboxes, and under cover of this immunity a bazooka crew fires one or tworoundsatthecornerofthehouseaboutthreefeetfromtheground.Whenaholehas been made by this means, phosphorous or high-explosive grenades arethrowninto the lower floorandcellar todiscourage thoseoperating there.Thedemolitionessentialinpillboxes'isreallynotneededinstreetfighting.

Instreetfighting,itisveryessentialtoavoidhurrying.Onegroup,asabovedescribed, can usually clear a city block in twelve hours. When tanks areavailable, theyreplace thebazookas inblowingholes in thewallsof the lowerfloor. However, they must be buttoned up to avoid grenades from the upperfloors,andshouldbefurtherprotectedbyriflementokeeptheenemyfromthewindows. Self-propelled 155 mm. guns are extremely useful in cities againstmoderatemasonryconstruction.Oneroundwithdelayedfusewillbreachallthehousesononesideofacityblockiffiredataveryobtuseangle.

Two-WayAttack:Whereverpossible,beginningwiththesquad,useabaseof fire and a maneuvering element. The maneuvering element should be thelargerof thetwoforces,andshouldstart itsattackwellbackfromthepointofcontactofthebaseoffire.Themaneuveringforcemustproceedsufficientlyfarbeyond the hostile flank to attack from the rear. As soon as the envelopingattack,or,better,therearattack,hasprogressedsufficientlytocausetheenemytoreact, thebaseoffire transformsitself intoadirectattackalongtheoriginalaxisofadvance.

River Crossings: In river crossings or assault landings, there is a highprobability that the boats containing a company or even a platoonwill not alllandatthesamepoint.Therefore,eachboatshouldbeorganizedonaboat-teambasisandcontainmeansforproducinga

baseoffireandanencirclement.Theseboatteamsshouldpracticeassuchbeforeembarking,andeachboatteamintheassaultwavemustbeinformedofthegeographicalfeaturetowhichtheassaultwaveissupposedtopenetrate.Thisgeographicalfeature,preferablyaroadorrailway,shouldbefarenoughfromthewater’sedgetopreventsmall-armsfirebearingonthebeach.Nobeachheadcanbe considered at all sure until it has advanced to a perimeter at least eightthousandyardsfromthebeachand/oroccupiesthecontrollingterrainfeatures.Inanight landing,desperateeffortsmustbemade togain thisdistancebeforedaylight.

Hill Fighting: During fighting in hilly or rolling country, platoons get

widelyseparated.Thebestpractice is for thesupportandreservesquadsofanattackingplatoon toenvelopon theuphill side.Whenyouhaveoncegainedaridgeorahogback,donotlosealtitude.

Neverattackalong thebottomofavalleyunlessyouhave theheightsonboth sides in your possession. In all valleys there are geographical featureswhichformobstaclestoadirectadvance,andsubjectthoseonthevalleyfloortoobservedfirefromtheheights.

Open Country: In open country with isolated groups of trees, avoidoccupying the trees, because they will invariably be attacked by the enemyartilleryandair.Inthistypeofcountry,usedispersalinopenfields.Youmaybeabletousethewoodsasadecoytodrawenemyfirebytheemplacementofbadcamouflagealongtheedge,butdonotgetintothewoodsyourself.

Bythesametoken,donotoccupyasaCommandPosttheonlyhouseonahill,asIhaveseendone,anddonotputyourCommandPost,asIhavealsoseendone, in the immediatevicinityofamonument locatedon themap,andwhichcouldbeseenforseveralkilometers.

LargeradiosetsshouldnotbeintheimmediatevicinityofaCommandPostor of each other. They should be separated, camouflaged, and communicatedwith by telephone. Otherwise, the enemy air will home on them and get theCommandPost.

Fireon InfestedAreas:Owing to thepernicious traditionsofourknowndistanceriflemarksmanship,wearepronetoholdourfireuntilweseetargets.Inbattle

theseare seldomvisible.Whenanygroupof soldiers isunder small-armsfire,itisevidentthattheenemycanseethem;therefore,menshouldbeabletoseetheenemy,butseldomare.Whenthissituationarises,theymustfireattheportions of the hostile terrain which probably conceal enemy small-armsweapons.Iknowforafactthatsuchprocedureinvariablyproducesaneffectandgenerally stops hostile fire. Always remember that it is much better to wasteammunitionthanlives.Ittakesatleasteighteenyearstoproduceasoldier,andonlyafewmonthstoproduceammunition.

Surrender:Anysoldierwhosurrenderswitharmsinhishandsisnotdoinghisdutytohiscountryandissellinghimselfshort,becausethelivingconditionsof the prisoner of war are extremely bad. Also the prisoner of war is apt tobecometheunintendedvictimofourownairandartillerybombardment.

Iftheenemyindicatesadesiretosurrender,makehimcometoyouwithhis

handsup.Don’tadvancetowardhim,anddonotstopshootinguntilhedoessosurrender himself. When the enemy has surrendered, he must be treated inaccordancewiththerulesoflandwarfare.

III

BATTLETRICKS

Bridges:Inrivercrossings,allbridgesmustbeoneway—towardtheenemy—until the situation has steadied. Prior to that time, wounded and emptytransportationcomebackinferries.

Inbuildinganassaultbridgeoverrapidwater,puttheanchorcableashighaspossible—atleasttenfeetabovethewater.Thiswillpreventthefloatsfromsubmerging.

MinesandBarbedWire:Donotuseminesorwireonthedefensiveexceptin the form of booby traps, to give warning of enemy prowlers. Mining andwiringapositionhasaverybadeffectonthemoraleofourtroops.Asafeint,however,miningandwiringmaybeuseful.Forexample,wecouldputlightwirein a dummymine field across a section of the front overwhichwe intend toattackandostentatiously leaveother sectionsof the frontunwired; then,whentheattackstarts,weneednotbotherabout thedummyminefieldand thewirecanbegotridofrapidly.

MethodsofAttack:If,inaunitthesizeofadivision,theattackisnotgoingwell four hours after it starts, it is necessary to make a careful personalreconnaissance and see if it may not be necessary to change the emphasis;becausefourhoursoffightingshouldproducesubstantialeffects.Thisdoesnotmean that aman should be wobbly about continuing in the face of uncertainvictory, but it doesmean that, after four hours, one should knowwhether thethingisgoingtobeagoornot,andifitisnot,heshouldslowuphisattackontheoldlinewhileimplementingitinanewdirection.

FrontalAttacks:Donottryasneakfrontalattackatnightorinthedaytimeagainst adug-inenemywhohasbeen facingyou for some time.Hewillhaveultimatebandsoffirearranged.Therefore,hemustbepoundedbyairandguns

before you attack. This does not apply to a pillbox line. If the enemy isoccupyingthepillboxesandnotthetrenchesoutsidethem,asneakattackisquiteall rightwith thepurposeofgettingthetroops in the immediatevicinityof thepillboxesjustatdawn.Iftheenemyisoccupyingtrenchesoutsidethepillboxes,hemustbepoundedconsistentlytomakehimtakeshelterinthepillboxes,whereheismuchlessdangerousthanoutside.

UseofTelephoneWire:Inallattacks,makethemaximumuseofwirelinesand use every effort to keep it up with the advancing units. Radio, whiletheoretically efficient, is not so good as wire, and should be considered as asecondarymeans of communication. On one occasionwe actually launched atank attack by quite a large number of tanks at the end of seventeenmiles ofwire.

PlacetoAttack:Neverattackwheretheenemyexpectsyoutocome.Itismuch better to go over difficult groundwhere you are not expected than it isover good ground where you are expected. This remark applies to units toincludethedivision.Forcorpsandlargerunitsanexceptionisnecessary,inthatsuchunitsmusttakegroundwhereroadsandrailwayspermittheestablishmentof lines of supply. These roads and railways will probably be defended. Thepointisthatthedivisionmustsecurethembyattackingoverhardgroundandnotbygoinguptherailwayorroad.

FireandMovement:Thepolicyofholdingtheenemybythenosewithfireandkickinghimin thepantswithmovement is justas trueaswhenIwrote it,sometwentyyearsago,andatthattimeithadbeentruesincethebeginningofwar.Any operation, reduced to its primary characteristics, consists inmovingdowntheroaduntilyoubumpintotheenemy.Itmaybeoneroadoritmaybeseveralroads.Whenyouhavebumped,holdhimatthepointofcontactwithfireaboutathirdofyourcommand.Movetherestinawideenvelopmentsothatyoucanattackhimfromhisrearflank.Theenvelopingattackshouldstartfirst.Theinitial nose attack starts to move forward only when the enemy has properlyreactedtotheenvelopingattack.Thenthedirectattackcangoineasilyandfast.

TimeFire:Eitherproximityornormaltimefireisveryefficientasameansofcoveringa tankattackandwill frequentlyprevent theenemyfrommanninghis antitank guns. Tanks can move with perfect impunity under time fireprovidedbyeither105mm.or155mm.projectiles.Proximity fuses inwoodsarewasteful,becausetheprojectileexplodesabovethetopofthetallesttreesand

thefragmentsareabsorbedinthewoodsbeforetheygetdowntowheretheywillhavemucheffectontheenemy.

Inshellingwoodstoproducecasualties,useslight-delayfusessothattheywillnotburstuntiltheyhitareasonablesizelimbortreetrunk.

Envelopments:Verticalorhorizontalenvelopmentfortacticaleffectshouldnot go too deep or be too large. The best results are attained when theenvelopmentarrivesinorjustbackoftheenemy’sartillerypositions.Hereyoudisrupthissupplyandsignalcommunicationsandhisguns,andarecloseenoughto the troops advancing along the axis to be sure of making contact in areasonabletime.

Cemeteries:Do not placemilitary cemeterieswhere they can be seen byreplacementsmarchingtothefront.Thishasaverybadeffectonmorale,evenifitaddstotheprideoftheGravesRegistrationService.

Haste and Speed: There is a great difference between these two words.Hasteexistswhentroopsarecommittedwithoutproperreconnaissance,withoutthearrangementforpropersupportingfire,andbeforeeveryavailablemanhasbeenbroughtup.Theresultofsuchanattackwillbetogetthetroopsintoactionearly,buttocompletetheactionveryslowly.

Speed is acquired bymaking the necessary reconnaissance, providing theproper artillery and other tactical support, including air support, bringing upeveryman,andthenlaunchingtheattackwithapredeterminedplansothatthetimeunderfirewillbereducedtotheminimum.Atthebattalionlevelfourhoursspent in preparation for an attackwill probably insure the time under fire notexceeding thirty minutes. One hour spent in the preparation of an attack willalmost certainly insure time under fire lasting many hours with bloodycasualties.

Covering Detachments: Make the maximum use of mechanized andarmored reconnaissance and covering detachments. In actualwar, thesemergeinto each other. In general, they should consist of a reconnaissance troopreinforcedbyatleastaplatoonofmediumtankswithinfantryridingonthem.

Maximum Use of Vehicles: In a modern infantry division, if everyavailable vehicle—tanks, armored cars, gun carriages,AA guns and trucks—isutilized, no soldier need, or should,walkuntil he actually entersbattle.Whilethesightofadivisionmovingunderthissystemisabhorrenttothebestinstincts

ofaFrederickansoldier,itresultsinrapidadvancewithminimumfatigue.Unitssomountedaredismountedbyplacingasign,orevenaguidon,onthesideoftheroadindicatingthedismountingpoint.

MISCELLANEOUSNOTES

Duringmobileoperationsitisbettertousesecondaryroadsfortheaxisofadvancethanprimaryroads.Inthefirstplace,thesecondaryroadsarelessapttobethoroughlyguarded,and,inthesecondplace,therewillbefewerdemolitionsonthem.Theprimaryroadsmustberepairedaspromptlyaspossiblebehindthefightingfronttosecureefficientsupplylines.

Obstacles and demolitions, unless defended, are of little value. It is notnecessary to sit on a demolition or obstacle in order to defend it, because theenemywillplace fire there.Thesepointsarebestdefended fromadistanceofseveral hundred yards for small arms and from normal artillery range for thatarm.

Administrative discipline is the index of combat discipline. Anycommanderwhoisunwillingorunabletoenforceadministrativedisciplinewillbeincapableofenforcingcombatdiscipline.Anexperiencedofficercantell,bya very cursory administrative inspection of any unit, the caliber of itscommandingofficer.

Themore senior the officer, themore time he has. Therefore, the seniorshouldgoforwardtovisitthejuniorratherthancallthejuniorbacktoseehim.Theexceptiontothisiswhenit isnecessarytocollectseveralcommandersfortheformulationofaco-ordinatedplan.

Inthatcase,thejuniorsshouldreporttothesuperiorheadquarters.Thereisaverygreatdangerinmakingretrogrademovementsatnight,even

whenthesemovementsareforacontinuationof the tacticaloffensive,becausetroopsnotinvolvedhearorseethemandbecomeworriedtotheextentofpanic.Ifaunitmustbewithdrawn,seethatallsoldiersalongthelineofwithdrawalareinformedwhyitistakingplaceandwhenitwilloccur.

Hospitalsshouldbesetupintheopensothattheenemyhasnoexcuseforthinkingthemotherthanwhattheyare.Theymustnotbeplacedinthevicinityofdumpsorairstrips.

Never halt on the near side of a river or mountain range. Secure abridgehead in both cases, because, even if you do not intend to exploit thecrossing, the possession ' of a bridgehead on the far side cramps the enemy’s

style.In an infantry or armored division, relief of the division or immediate

replacements are vitally necessary as soon as seventy-five per cent of theriflemenhavebecomecasualties.

Alwayscapturethehighestterrainfeatureinyourvicinityatonce,andstayonit.

Prisonerofwarguardcompanies,oranequivalentorganization,shouldbeasfarforwardaspossibleinactiontotakeoverprisonersofwar,becausetroopsheatedwithbattlearenotsafecustodians.Anyattempttoroborlootprisonersofwarbyescortsmustbestrictlydealtwith.

Wheneverofficersenteraprisonerofwarcage,allprisonersofwarmustcometoattention.

IV

COMMAND

UseofCodes:Thedecisionastowhethertouseclearorcoderadioorwirecommunications isveryeasily reachedon the followingbasis: if theperiodofaction is shorter than theperiodof reaction,useclear;otherwiseusecode.BythisImeanthatifyoutellacombatteamtoattackat1000andyourexperienceshowsthattheenemycannotreacttotheinformationuntil1100,useclear;andsoonforhigherunits.

JudgingReports:Whenyoureceivereportsofcounterattacks,findoutwhosent them—that is, the sizeof theunitwhich sent them.Asquadoccupyingapositionwillreportanenemysectionapproachingitasacounterattack,butsuchacounterattackhasnomaterialeffectonadivisionoracorps.

NightAttacks:Soldiersmustbetaughttomoveandfightatnight.Thisisbecomingmoreandmoreimperative,anditdoesnotmeantomakeanapproachmarch at night. Itmeans to conduct lethal operations in the dark. To do this,previous and very accurate daylight reconnaissance is desirable and limitedobjectiveattacksareessential.Inadditiontotheusualreservefollowingsuchanattack,asecondreserveshouldbeathandtomoveupafterdaylightincasetheenemycounterattacks.

Timely Thoughts on Supply: Reasonable study and a consultation of thealmanac will avoid situations in which, through lack of forethought, heavyclothing,etc.,havenotbeenorderedintime.

Similarly,aknowledgeofthetacticalsituationwillinsurethatgasolineandammunition are asked for in time. The Combat Service and not the SupplyServiceisresponsibleforfailuretogetsuchthings.

Inwetweatheritisvitalthatdrysockscomeupforthesoldiersdailywiththerations.Thesesocksshouldbewool,orananalogousthickmaterialtreatedsoitwillnotshrink.

With the advent of almost unlimitedmotor transport, it is foolish to loadsoldiers down with blankets, etc. This is particularly true in wet and coldweather. The answer is to see that light bedrolls go up to the ammunitiondistributing point prior to dark, where they are picked up by units and usedduring thenight, rolledupby themen, and left tobepickedup againby rearunits.Thissoundswasteful,becausethebedrollscannotbeaccountedfor,butitismuchcheaperthanpneumonia.

Thefightingsoldiershouldcarrynothingintobattleexceptwhathewears,hisammunition,hisrations,andhistoiletarticles.Whenhegoesback,heshouldgetnewuniform,newunderclothes,neweverything.

Thetwo-bagsystem(“A”and“B”)withwhichwebeganthiswarisutterlyfoolish, because by the time the “B” bags get up,many of their owners havebecomecasualties.

In landing operations and river crossingswheremen lose their clothes orbecomeverywet,assortedsizesofuniforms,completewithhelmet,belt,shoes,underclothes,etc.,shouldbeprovidedfortwentypercentofthecommandandshouldarrivewiththesecondechelonofthelanding.Thisinsuresthatthosewhohave lost their clothing are immediately reequipped with a minimum ofclutteringofthesupplylines.

The chief purpose of theGeneral and Special Staffs is to insure that thetroopsgetwhattheywantintime.Inbattle, troopsget temperamental,andaskfor things which they really do not need. However, where humanly possible,theirrequests,nomatterhowunreasonable,shouldbeanswered.

Supply and administrative units and installations are frequently neglectedbycombatcommanders.Itisverynecessarytotheirmoraleandefficiencythateachonebeinspectedbytheseniorgeneraloftheunitwithwhichitisoperating.

LengthofAttack: Infantry troopscanattackcontinuouslyforsixtyhours.Frequentlymuch timeandsufferingaresaved if theywilldoso.Beyondsixty

hours,itisratherawasteoftime,asthemenbecometoofatiguedfromlackofsleep.

MarchingatNight:Marchingatnightintheproximityoftheenemyisnoteconomical.It isbettertohalt twohoursbeforedark,seethatthemenarefed,theirsocksdriediftheweatheriswet,andthevehiclesservicedandmadereadyfor the next day. Then start before dawn. Except under very favorablecircumstancesof terrain,andwherevery thoroughdaylight reconnaissancehastakenplace,nightattacksbyarmorarenoteconomical.

LookBeforeChanging:IntheoldNavyofsailtherewasacustomthatthenewOfficeroftheDeckdidnotcallforanychangeinthesettingofthesailsforonehalfhour—thatis,foronebellafterhetookover.Thesamethingmightwellapply to commanders and staff officerswho take over new jobs inwar. Theyshouldwait at least aweek before theymake any radical changes, unless andexcepttheyareputintocorrectasituationwhichisinabadway.

Don'tDelay:Thebestistheenemyofthegood.BythisImeanthatagoodplan violently executednow is better than a perfect plan nextweek.War is averysimplething,andthedeterminingcharacteristicsareself-confidence,speed,andaudacity.Noneofthesethingscaneverbeperfect,buttheycanbegood.

Reports: In war nothing is ever as bad, or as good, as it is reported toHigherHeadquarters.Anyreportswhichemanatefromaunitafterdark—thatis,where the knowledge has been obtained after dark—should be viewed withskepticism by the next higher unit. Reports by wounded men are alwaysexaggeratedandfavortheenemy.

Identification: Legible unit signs in the clear are more valuable thandangerous,andtheyshouldbeplacedwheretheycanbeseen.

Sand-TableExercises:bystaffsuptoandincludingcorpsorarmy,evenonthemostrudimentarytypeofsandtable,areextremelyhelpfulpriortoanattack.

GeneralOfficers:Therearemoretireddivisioncommandersthentherearetired divisions. Tired officers are always pessimists. Remember this whenevaluatingreports.Generalsmustnevershowdoubt,discouragement,orfatigue.Generalsshouldadheretoonetypeofdresssothatsoldierswillrecognizethem.Theymustalwaysbeveryneat.

In coldweather, General Officersmust be careful not to appear to dressmorewarmlythanthemen.

Commanders and their staffs should visit units two echelons below theirown,and theirmapsshouldbesokept. Inotherwords,CorpsCommandersortheirstaffsshouldvisitDivisionandRegimentalCommandPosts; theDivisionCommander should visit Regimental andBattalionCommand Posts; the visitsabovereferredtoareforcommandpurposes.Whatmightbecalledinspirationalvisitsshouldgofartherup.Themoreseniortheofficerwhoappearswithaverysmall unit at the front, the better the effect on the troops. If some danger isinvolvedinthevisit,itsvalueisenhanced.

When speaking to a junior about the enemy confronting him, alwaysunderstate their strength. You do this because the person in contact with theenemyinvariablyoverestimatestheirstrengthtohimself,so,ifyouunderstateit,you probably hit the approximate fact, and also enhance your junior’s self-confidence.

Allofficers,andparticularlyGeneralOfficers,mustbevitallyinterestedineverything that interests the soldier. Usually you will gain a great deal ofknowledgebybeinginterested,but,evenifyoudonot,thefactthatyouappearinterestedhasaveryhighmoraleinfluenceonthesoldier.

Inmyexperience, all very successful commanders are primadonnas, andmustbesotreated.Someofficersrequireurging,othersrequiresuggestions,veryfewhavetoberestrained.

AGeneralOfficerwhowillinvariablyassumetheresponsibilityforfailure,whetherhedeservesitornot,andinvariablygivethecreditforsuccesstoothers,whethertheydeserveitornot,willachieveoutstandingsuccess.

Inanycase,lettersofcommendationandGeneralOrderspresentingtothecommandthegloryandmagnitudeoftheirachievementshaveagreatinfluenceonmorale.

CorpsandArmyCommandersmustmake itapoint tobephysicallyseenbyasmany individualsof theircommandaspossible—certainlybyallcombatsoldiers.Thebestwaytodothisistoassemblethedivisions,eitherasawholeorinseparatepieces,andmakeashorttalk.

When aunit leavesyour command, if its performance at all justifies it, aletteroffarewellandcommendationtotheunitshouldbesent.

Duringbattle, it is very important to visit frequently hospitals' containingnewlywoundedmen.Beforestartingsuchaninspection,theofficerinchargeofthe hospital should inform the inspecting General which wards contain menwhoseconductdoesnotmeritcompliments.

Generalsandtheirprincipalstaffofficersshouldkeepdiaries.

Avoid the vicious habit of naming the next superior as the author of anyadversecriticismwhileclaimingallcomplimentaryremarksforyourself.

Inspections: When a unit has been alerted for inspection, do not fail toinspect it and inspect it thoroughly. Further, do not keep it waiting. Whensoldiershavegonetothetroubleofgettingreadytobeinspected,theydeservethecomplimentofavisit.Besure to tell theunitcommanderpublicly thathisunit was good, if such is the case. If it is bad, tell him privately and in nouncertain terms.Besure tospeak toallenlistedmenwhohavedecorations,orwhohavebeenwounded,andaskhowtheygotthedecorationorhowtheywerewounded.

Infantry and Armored Divisions: The chief difference between infantrydivisions supplied with tanks and armored divisions is that, in the infantrydivision,thepurposeofthetanksistogettheinfantryforward.Inthearmoreddivision,thefunctionoftheinfantryistobreakthetanksloose.Intheinfantrydivision,thetanksusetheirgunstofacilitatetheadvanceoftheinfantry.Inthearmoreddivision,andtankusesitsguntobreakthroughtoarangewhereitcanuseitsmachineguns.Itisthereforeofvastimportancethattwo,insteadofone,co-axialmachinegunsbeplacedinthemantleofalltanks.

Air-GroundCo-operation:Theeffectivenessofair-groundco-operationisstillinitsinfancy.Airandgroundcommandersmustbeconstantlyonthealerttodevise,anduse,newmethodsofco-operation.

FirePower:Therecanneverbetoomanyprojectiles inabattle.Whetherthey are thrown by cannon, rockets, or recoilless devices is immaterial. Thepurposeofalltheseinstrumentsisidentical—namely,todelugetheenemywithfire.Norisitnecessarythattheseprojectilesbedischargedontheground.

IssuingOrders:Thebestwaytoissueordersisbywordofmouthfromonegeneral to the next. Failing this, telephone conversation which should berecordedateachend.However,inordertohaveaconfirmatorymemorandumofall oral orders given, a short written order should always be made out, notnecessarilyatthetimeofissuingtheorder,butitshouldreachthejuniorpriortohis carrying out the order; so that, if he has forgotten anything, he will beremindedof it, and, further, in order that hemaybe aware that his senior hastakendefiniteresponsibilityfortheoperationorderedorally.

It ismyopinion thatArmyordersshouldnotexceedapageandahalfof

typewritten text and it was my practice not to issue orders longer than this.Usuallytheycanbedoneononepage,andthebackofthepageusedforasketchmap.

Commandersmustrememberthattheissuanceofanorder,orthedevisingofaplan,isonlyabout5percentoftheresponsibilityofcommand.Theotherninety-five per cent is to insure, by personal observation, or through theinterposingofstaffofficers,thattheorderiscarriedout.Ordersmustbeissuedearlyenoughtopermittimetodisseminatethem.

Never tell people how to do things. Tell themwhat to do and they willsurpriseyouwiththeiringenuity.

Avoid as you would perdition issuing cover-up orders, orders for therecord.Thissimplyshows lackof intestinal fortitudeon thepartof theofficersigningtheorders,andeveryonewhoreadsthemrealizesitatonce.

Inplanninganyoperation,itisvitaltoremember,andconstantlyrepeattooneself,twothings:“Inwarnothingisimpossible,providedyouuseaudacity,”and“Donottakecounselofyourfears.”Ifthesetwoprinciplesareadheredto,withAmericantroopsvictoryiscertain.

Maps: In my opinion the use of large-scale maps by senior officers isdistinctly detrimental, because by the use of such maps they get themselvesenmeshedinterrainconditions.

Puttingitingeneralterms,ArmyandCorpsCommandersarenotsomuchinterestedinhowtobeattheenemyfromatacticalstandpointasinwheretobeathim.Thewhereislearnedfromacarefulstudyofroad,railway,andrivermaps.The question of the tactical means to be used by divisions in securing thesepoints is,ofnecessity,studiedfromlarge-scalemaps.However, thesizeof themapuseddoesnotcontinuetoincreaseasthesizeoftheusingunitdiminishes.Attheleveloftheregiment,amapshouldbesufficientlylargeandaccuratetoassistthecommanderinselectinghisObservationPostsandCommandPostandhisgeneral line.For therest,heshouldrelyonpersonal reconnaissanceon theground. From the battalion down, the use of maps is of no value and isfrequently fraught with great danger. I have never seen a good battalioncommander direct his units from a map. I have seen many bad battalioncommandersindulgeinthispusillanimousmethodofcommand.

StaffOrganization:TheHeadquartersofhigherunits—thatis,CorpsandArmy—should be arranged by sections as follows: the Forward EchelonconsistingoftheCommandingGeneral,ChiefofStaff,SecretaryoftheGeneralStaff,G-l,G-2,G-3,Engineers, FieldArtillery,Anti-Aircraft, Signal, andCo-

operating Air. Also subsections of the Provost Marshal, Special Troops,Headquarters Commandant, and liaison representatives from G-4, Ordnance,Medical, Quartermaster, and G-5 Sections. Where circumstances require, thisForward Echelon can be divisible into an advance Tactical Headquartersconsistingof theCommandingGeneral,ForwardEchelonChiefofStaff,andasmall operation section ofG-2,G-3,Engineers, FieldArtillery, andSignal. InthisAdvance Section it is desirable but not necessary to have a liaison groupfromG-4.

TheRearEchelonshouldbeunder thecommandofG-4andcontainG-5,Chemical Warfare, Finance, Medical, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal,Engineers, Adjutant General, Inspector General, Judge Advocate General,SpecialServices,andChaplain.

Wherever circumstances permit, and accommodations warrant, all threeechelonsshouldbetogether.TheRearEchelonmustbeinoneplaceandwithineasydrivingdistance,nottoexceedthreehours,oftheForwardEchelon.AmplewirecommunicationsbetweentheForwardandRearEchelonsmustexist.

Headquarters Arrangements: All Headquarters, from Regiment up toArmy,shouldbelaidoutonthesamegeneralplansothatanyvisitorwhofindshimself at theMessageCenterwill know inwhichdirection togo to find anysection.

TrucksarrangedforsleepingaccommodationsforGeneralandSeniorStaffOfficers save much time and promote efficiency. In addition, in the ForwardEchelon there should be three large office trailers—one for the CommandingGeneral andChief of Staff, one for theG’s, and one for the Secretary of theGeneralStaffandtheclerksandstenographers,sothatpaperworkandplanningmaybecarriedoutduringinclementweather.

A ruinedbuilding isbetter thanagood tent foroffices, dining room, andkitchen. In any staff office, or trailer, the telephone should be placed near theprincipalmap,sothattheofficerconsultingthemapmaytalkoverthetelephoneat the same time he scans the map. It is a strange commentary on humanweaknessesthattheThirdArmy,inoccupyingitstwenty-thirdCommandPost,placedthemapandtelephoneonoppositesidesoftheroom.

In my opinion, generals—or at least the Commanding General—shouldanswertheirowntelephonesinthedaytime.Thisisnotparticularlywearisomebecausefewpeoplecallageneral,exceptinemergencies,andthentheyliketoget him at once. At night the phone of the Commanding General should beanswered by an Aide, who should have means of buzzing either theCommandingGeneralortheChiefofStaff,dependingonforwhomthemessage

is intended.It isveryimportantthatastenographerorastenographicreportingmachine be constantly on duty, so that theChief ofStaff or theCommandingGeneral will have a written transcript of any telephone messages. This isparticularly important when they receive or issue orders by telephone. Thisrecord must show date, time, place, and the two speakers. Adherence to theforegoingwillsavemanymistakesandpreventmuchacrimoniousdiscussion.

In every type of Headquarters there are, during each twenty-four-hourperiod, two peak loads.During these peak hours all officers and enlistedmenshouldbepresentDuringtheslowperiods,themaximumnumberofofficersandenlisted men should be absent eating, sleeping, or exercising. Many officershave, to my knowledge, destroyed their future usefulness by being tooconscientious at the beginning of a campaign and being always at their desk.Thismustnotbedoneandtheymusttakeexercise.

AsecretaryfortheGeneralStaff,withacompetentDeputyChiefofStaff,is a vital necessity to see that the subsections and sectionsof theGeneral andSpecial Staffs do not get too independent and issue contradictory orders. TheDeputyChiefofStaffisthebottleneckthroughwhichtheseordersmustgo.

AttheArmy,Corps,andDivisionlevel,theForwardEchelonofeachstaffshouldhaveastaffmeeting,orbriefing,daily,asearlyastheHeadquartersunderconsideration can obtain the information for the day. Inmy opinion this timevariesasfollows:Division—onehourafterdawn;Corps—twohoursafterdawn;Army—threehoursafterdawn.

One officer from each staff section ofCorps andArmy should go to thefrontdailyandvisitcorrespondingofficersofthenextlowerechelon.However,heshouldalsocollectgeneralinformationnotnormallyapplicabletohisbranchorsection.AnythingofvitalmomentobtainedduringhisvisithewillreporttotheChiefofStaffimmediatelyonhisreturn.Ifitisnotvital,hewillbringitupat thestaffconference thenextday.TheCommandingGeneralor theChiefofStaffmustvisitpartofthefrontdailyafterthebriefing.

The Commanding General, or the Chief of Staff of the Tactical AirCommandoperatingwithanarmy,shouldbepresentatallstaffconferencesandplanning meetings. If this is not done, the maximum co-operation with thispowerfularmwillnotbeobtained.TheA-3mustworkwiththeG-3andtheA-2withtheG-2.

Staffofficersofinharmoniousdisposition,irrespectiveoftheirability,mustberemoved.Astaffcannotfunctionproperlyunlessitisaunitedfamily.

Decorations: It is vital to goodmorale that decorations get out promptlyandonanequitablebasis.ThereshouldbeineveryArmyandCorpsStaffone

member ofG-l Sectionwhose duty it is to prod divisions and attached lowerunits to get citations out.He should further see that they are properlywritten.When time permits, there should be a citation writers’ school attended byofficersfromCorps,Army,andDivisionG-lsections.

Casualty Reports: Similarly, there should be an administrative schoolattendedbyofficersfromDivision,Corps,andArmy,wherespecialattentionisgiventoCasualtyReports,etc.Inordertoknowconstantlythesituation,twosetsofCasualtyReports, both enemyandourown,mustbekept.One isbasedonfactualreports,theotheronestimates.Theonebasedonfactualdatausuallylagsfromtwotothreeweeksbehindtheestimatedone.However,ifproperlymade,theestimatedreportwillbewithintwoorthreepercentofthefactualreport.

EqualityofPunishments:TheJudgeAdvocateand the InspectorGeneralshould make checks and see that the schedule of punishments accorded foranalogous crimes in each unit below them is generally the same, so that agenerallevelandequalityofpunishmentwillexistthroughtheArmy.

V

GENERAL

Oneofthegreatdefectsinourmilitaryestablishmentisthegivingofweaksentences for military offenses. The purpose of military law is administrativerather than legal. As the French say, sentences are for the purpose ofencouraging the others. I am convinced that, in justice to othermen, soldierswhogotosleeponpost,whogoabsentforanunreasonabletimeduringcombat,who shirk in battle, should be executed; and theArmyCommanders orCorpsCommanders should have the authority to approve the death sentence. It isutterlystupidtosaythatGeneralOfficers,asaresultofwhoseordersthousandofgallantandbravemenhavebeenkilled,arenotcapableofknowinghowtoremovethelifeofonemiserablepoltroon.

Uniforms: The purpose of the uniform is to provide the soldier withsomethinghecanwearwhichmakeshimlooklikeothersoldiers,andwhichiswarmorcoolaccordingtocircumstances.Inmyopinion,theproperuniformfor

the American soldier is the helmet with liner, and olive-drab wool shirt andtrousers, the trousers cut reasonably narrow at the bottom, and combat boots.Whenweatherbecomescoolinthefall,theweightoftheshirtandtrouserscanbe increased up to twenty-six- or thirty-ounce cloth. At the same time, thesoldiershouldbeissuedheavyunderwearandsocks(allwool)andaforty-eight-inch woolen muffler which he can wear around his neck, around his head atnight,oraroundhisstomach.

In zero or sub-zero weather the soldier should, in addition, be issued anovercoatofthetrench-coatvarietywithaliner,butwithoutabelt,andprovidedinfrontwithamuffinwhichhecanthrusthishandssothathecanusehisguntriggerwithoutthenecessityofremovinghisgloves.

UseofSight:Thepeep-sightisnotadaptedtowarfare,sinceitisinefficientin the dark, or in a bad light. I have met only three or four officers, out ofhundreds questioned, who have ever seen a soldier set a sight in battle.Therefore,ourriflesshouldbeequippedwithtwoopensights—oneforarangeofonehundredyards,one fora rangeof threehundredyards.Thiswill insurethatthesoldiershootslowandwillcorrectforthefactthatintheexcitementofbattlehealwaystakestoomuchfrontsight.

GunSlings:The sameofficerswhom I questionedon the sight informedme that they had never seen a gun sling used, except on two occasions bysnipers,asanaidtofiring.Therefore,theheavyandexpensiveleathergunslingshould be dispensed with and a cloth sling, used solely for the purpose ofcarryingthepiece,shouldbesubstituted.

Mortars: Infantrymortarsshouldbeprovidedwithan illuminatingdevicefornightfiring.

RedCrossMarking:Ambulancesshouldbepaintedwhiteallover,exceptforalargeRedCrossontop,sides,back,andfront.

Attached medical personnel with front-line units should have a tabardcoveringthewholechestandbackasfarasthebelt.Forcombatthisshouldbewhite with a large Red Cross back and front.When approaching combat andwhitewouldbetooeasilyseenfromtheair,thereversesideofthetabard,olive-drab,withasmallredcross,isworn.

AirAttacks:Weknow theeffectofour attackson theenemy’smeansofsignal, rail, and road communication. We must therefore contemplate similar

attacksuponourmeansof communication, and thinkhowwecangetonwiththosemeanslimitedordestroyed.

Wherepossible, it isbest torequesttheAirtocutrailwaysfarfromcitiesandtocutthematthreepoints,becausethisentailsgreatdelayingettingtothecenterpointfromeitherdirection.Italsomakesitnecessarytomovetherepaircrewsoverconsiderabledistances,andforcesthemtoworkatpointsfromwhichtheycanmoreeasilybeattackedfromtheair;becauseout inthecountrythereare,asageneralthing,noanti-aircraftguns.

After-ActionReports:Assoonasanoperationstarts,agroupcomposedofofficers from G-2 and G-3 should start the compilation of the After-ActionReportwhichshouldbeorganizedona-calendarmonthbasis,sothateachmonthisacompleteentity.Attheterminationofhostilities, thedatathussecuredcanbe re-edited on a campaign basis. This report must contain copies of orders,lettersofinstruction,maps,etc.

Guards on Trains: Railroad trains, carrying rations, or fuel, or otherarticleswithasalesvalueontheblackmarket,mustbeguarded,andanypersonsattemptingpillagemustbeshotandthefactpublished.

Dead and Wounded Casualties: In order to evaluate properly theeffectivenessof enemy fire,more information than thatnowobtainableon thesubjectofcasualtiesisnecessary.Atthepresenttime,weknowonlythenumberofcasualtiesandthetypeofwoundsofthosereachingthehospitals,butevenintheircase,wedonotknowonwhatpartof thebattlefield theywerewounded.Wehavenoknowledgeofhow,orwhere,battledeathsoccurred. Incollectingwounded,amethodshouldbeprescribedwhichwouldshowthatamanwashitin the vicinity of such and such a point. The Graves Registration personnelshould state what type of missile caused death. No medical experience isnecessary.Anybodywhohas seen a fewwounds can tell a small-armswoundfromafragmentationwound.Thisinformationshouldbemadeof

record.The location of both types of casualties could be secured throughthe issue of sketch maps to Medical and Graves Registration personnel. Thepurposeincollectingtheforegoinginformationisthat,ifweknowwhatcausesourcasualtiesandwheretheyoccur,wecantakestepstoavoidthem.

OverheadCover:Owing to the certainty that, in thenextwar, the enemywill have proximity fuses,wemust contemplate the necessity of providing allmechanizedcombatweapons,includingartillerypieces,withoverheadcover.

Replacements:When the current infantry division has lost four thousandmen, its offensive value is zero, because ninety-two per cent of these fourthousandmenare riflemenand there are less than four thousand riflemen in adivision. The same fact applies, with slightly less emphasis, to armoreddivisions.Therefore;everydivisionmusthaveareplacementbattalionorganicinthe division. In an infantry division, this replacement battalion should containfifteenpercentoftheriflestrengthofthedivision,andfivepercentofallother,including company officers. There should be a company for each infantryregiment,andacompanyforallothers.

Asimilarunitinanarmoreddivisionshouldcontaintenpercentoftheriflestrength of the armored infantry, ten per cent of the personnel strength of thearmoredbattalions,andfivepercentofallothers,includingcompanyofficers.

Duringacampaign,thereturnedwoundedwilloccasionallyproduceastatewhere the strength of the replacement battalion is over the percentagesrecommended,butoneortwodaysofbattlewillinvariablycorrectthissituation.Itisvitaltomoralethatmenreturntotheiroldunitswithoutlossofrank.

AmericanIngenuity:TheAmericans,asarace,aretheforemostmechanicsintheworld.America,asanation,hasthegreatestabilityformassproductionofmachines.It thereforebehoovesustodevisemethodsofwarwhichexploitourinherentsuperiority.Wemustfight thewarbymachinesontheground,andintheair, to themaximumofourability,particularly inviewof the fact that thetwo races leftwhichwemay have to fight are both poormechanics but haveample manpower. While we have amply manpower, it is too valuable to bethrownaway.

Loyalty:Thereisagreatdealoftalkaboutloyaltyfromthebottomtothetop.Loyaltyfromthetopdownisevenmorenecessaryandmuchlessprevalent.

Interminatingtheseremarks,it issadtorememberthat,whenanyonehasfairlymasteredtheartofcommand,thenecessityforthatartusuallyexpires—either through the termination of the war or through the advanced age of thecommander.

—————

1Probably there is nothingoriginal inwhat I shall nowput down,because

warisanancientsubjectandI,anancientman,havestudiedandpracticeditforover forty years. So, what appears to me as original thought may be simplysubconsciousmemories.

2CONCERNINGTHESOLDIERThesoldieristheArmy.Noarmyisbetterthanitssoldiers.Thesoldieris

alsoacitizen.Infact,thehighestobligationandprivilegeofcitizenshipisthatofbearingarmsforone’scountry.Henceitisaproudprivilegetobeasoldier—agood soldier. Anyone, in any walk of life, who is content with mediocrity isuntrue tohimselfand toAmerican tradition.Tobeagoodsoldieramanmusthavediscipline,self-respect,prideinhisunitandinhiscountry,ahighsenseofduty and obligation to his comrades and to his superiors, and self-confidencebomofdemonstratedability.

Therehasbeen,and isnow,agreatdealof talkaboutdiscipline;but fewpeople,inoroutoftheArmy,knowwhatitisorwhyitisnecessary.

When aman enters theArmy, he leaves home, usually for the first time,andalsoheleavesbehindhimtheinhibitionsresultingfromhisrespectfor theopinion of his parents and his friends;which inhibitions, unknown to himself,havelargelyguidedhisexistence.Whenhejoinsaunitandlacksthiscorrectiveinfluence,317

3Barrack-RoomBallads,“TheYoungBritishSoldier.”

EARNINGMYPAY

The responsibilities of an officer are quite analogous to those of apoliceman or a fireman. The better he performs his daily tasks, the lessfrequentlydoeshehavetotakedirectaction.

Lookingbackovermyratherlengthymilitarycareer,IamsurprisedatthefewtimeswhenIhave,sotospeak,earnedmypay.Perhaps,however,thefactthat Ihavehad to takedrasticactionsoseldomindicates that, in the interim, Ididmyduty.

The following episodes stand out inmymind as occasions onwhichmypersonalinterventionhadsomevalue.

I

TheCadetsoftheMilitaryAcademyhave,onafewoccasions,takenuponthemselves thedubious responsibilityofbeingsupercriticalofofficers throughwhatisknownasa“Silence.”ThisactisperformedwhentheofficerwhomtheyconsidertobeinerrorenterstheMessHall.AllCadetscometoattentionanddonotmoveorspeakwhileheisthere.Ihavealwaysbeenopposedtosuchacts,as,tome,itisveryclosetomutiny.

Ononeoccasion,whenIhappenedtobeincommandoftheBattalionandhadmarched it to lunch, the officer in charge entered, and I immediately sawthat a “Silence” was about to be perpetrated. I felt that the Cadets weremisinformed upon this officer and, in any case, I was against “Silence.” Ithereforecalled theCorps toattentionandmarched themhomewithout lunch.Theofficer,whowassomewhatyoungandinexperienced,criticizedmeformyactionuntilIexplainedwhyIdidit

II

During the summerof1914, Ihappened tobe theonlyofficerondutyatFort Riley, Kansas, when one of the colored soldiers was accused of havingrapedawhitegirl in theneighboring town.Itwasrumoredthat the inhabitantsintendedtolynchthisman.NaturallyIamopposedtorape.However,IfeltthatitwasmydutyasanofficertoseethatthesoldieroftheUnitedStatesArmywasnotlynched.I,therefore,informedtheleadingcitizensthat,ifanysuchattempt

weremade, itwouldbeovermydeadbody.Asa resultofmystand, themanwasnotlynched,and,later,wasprovennotguilty.

III

During theborder troubles in1916,1wasonduty inchargeofapatroloftwentymenatHotWells,Texas.MymissionwastoprotectfromattacksbytheVillistas some forty miles of the Southern Pacific Railroad, over whichCarranzistatrainswereoperating.HotWellswasthecenterofmysector.Isentasergeantwithhalfmycommandtothewestandtooktheremaindertotheeast,havingpreviouslytelephonedtheCommandingOfficerofthe13thCavalrythatIwouldtakeovertoincludeacertainbridge.Asweapproachedthisbridgeinthedark,thepointcamebackandreportedtomethatheheardvoicesonthebridgespeaking Spanish. I therefore presumed that the Villistas were mining theBridge.Ithasalwaysbeenmybeliefthatasurpriseattackiscorrect.Ithereforeformedmygroupinlineandgavethecommand,“Raisepistols,Charge!”Justaswegotundertheveryshadowofthebridge,weranintoawirefenceandhadtostop. At the same time a number of rifles stuck over the top of the bridge. Ichallenged with much profanity, demanding who was there, and was greatlyrelieved when a voice replied, “Patrol, 13th Cavalry.” They had missed thebridgewheretheyweresupposedtostopandwereinmybailiwick.

Thisinstanceconvincedmeofthevalueofadheringtoaplan.

IV

During the operations of theAmerican Punitive Expedition inMexico in1916-17, General Pershing had his advance Command Post, consisting ofhimself,MajorRyan,andmyself,withfoursoldiers,ataplacecalledElCobre.LateoneeveningGeneralPershingdictatedanordertoMajorRyan,whichIwastocarrytoasquadronofthe13thCavalryatSacaGrande.Thismessagewastothe effect that the squadron would proceed to the vicinity of a ranch calledProvidencia and search the mountains to the west.When he wrote the order,GeneralPershingwaslookingatthemountainstothewestwhichIwasmorallycertainhedesiredtohavesearched.

Todeliverthismessage,itwasnecessarytodriveforaboutanhourandahalf in a broken-down Ford, using headlights, over roadless country full ofVillistas. I then securedahorseand, after ridingallnight inverybadweatherconsistingofrain,sleet,hail,andsnow,joinedthesquadron.Whenwearrivedat

Providencia, the Major assembled his captains and started to issue orders tosearchthemountainstothewestofProvidencia.Now,Providenciaisinavalleywithmountainsonbothsides,andGeneralPershing’sCommandPostwaseastof the mountains to the east of Providencia. I therefore told the SquadronCommanderthatheshouldsearchthemountainstotheeast.Heshowedmethewrittenorderandsaid,“Doyoutellmetoviolatethiswrittenorder?”Isaid,“Ido.”Hemadesomeuncomplimentaryremarksconcerningme,butstatedthathewouldcarryouttheorder.Wesearchedalldaywithoutsuccess,finallyreturningoverthemountainstoGeneralPershing’sCommandPost.

TheMajorsentformeandwerodetotheCommandPost,wheretheMajorstated that: “This young so and so had caused him to fail in his mission.”General Pershing said, “Whatever Lieutenant Patton ordered you were myorders.”Then,turningtome,hesaid,“Whatordersdidyougive?”IstatedwhatIhaddone,andhesaid,“Youwereperfectlycorrect.”

Atthat timethedifferencebetweenaSecondLieutenantandaMajorwasmuchgreaterthanthedifferencebetweenaSecondLieutenantandafullGeneraltoday,sothatmyact,inmyopinion,tookhighmoralcourageandbuiltupmyself-confidence,andwascorrect.

V

Shortlyaftertheprecedingincident,GeneralPershingsentmetodeliveramessagetoGeneralHowze.TheonlyinformationwehadastoGeneralHowze’swhereaboutswas thathehadpassed through theProvidenciaRanch. I reachedtheranchwithanautomobilejustatdark,andchancedtomeetthereapacktrainofthe7thCavalry.Isecuredtwosoldiersandthreehorsesfromthepackmasterandstarted to look forGeneralHowz.At that time itwas still light enough tofollowthetracksofthesquadron.Whenwehadproceededashortdistance,wemetapatrolof the10thCavalry,whourgedme togono fartherbecause theyassured me that the woods were full of Villistas. However, I continued, andfinallycame,nearmidnight,toaplacewhere,atthetopofadivide,twocanyonstookoff fromthecanyonIhadpreviouslybeen traversing. Itwasnecessary tomakeadecision.Lookingovertheground,IthoughtIsawaslightreflectionoffiresinthecloudsovertheeasternmostcanyon.Ithereforefollowedthiscanyonandmetapatrolofthe7thCavalryunderGeneralFechet,thenMajor,whourgedmetogonofartherbecausethecanyonwasfullofVillistas,andhedidnotknowwhetherornotGeneralHowzehadgonedownit,andratherbelievedhehadnot.However,wecontinuedandeventuallyfoundGeneralHowze.

While therewasno realdanger connectedwith thisoperation, therewerecertainlyagreatmanymentalhazards,allofwhichIhavenotrecounted.

VI

Once,whenIwasaninstructoratFortRiley,Ihadabachelorpartyatmyhouse for the members of the Second Year Class. Naturally, there wasconsiderablehilarity,butnoonebehavedinadrunkenorunseemlymanner.ThenextdaytheCommandingOfficer,whowashag-riddenbyhiswife,sentformeandstatedhehaddefiniteinformationthatacertainlieutenantwhohadbeenmyguest had been disgracefully drunk and he asked me to substantiate thisstatement.ItoldhimthatIdeclinedtodoit.Hesaid,“Youhaveonlyamonthandahalftogobeforeyourtourofdutyhereisover,andifyoudonotanswerme,Iwillrelieveyouatonceandspoilyourotherwiseexcellentrecord.”Ilied,stating that I was too drunk at the party to notice the condition of the otherofficers.NofurtheractionwastakenbytheCommandingOfficer.

VII

In the summer of 1918, a group of soldiers of the 301st Tank Brigade,which Icommanded,washaving37mm.gunpracticewhich Iwasobserving.Onedefectiveroundexploded in themuzzle,wounding twoor threemen.Thenext roundexploded in thebreech,blowing theheadoff thegunner.Themenwerereluctant tofire thenextround,so itwas incumbentonme,as theseniorofficer present, to do so—in fact, I fired three rounds without incident. Thisrestoredtheconfidenceofthemenintheweapon.ImustadmitthatIhaveneverinmylifebeenmorereluctanttopullatrigger.

VIII

During the Muese—Argonne Offensive, the tank crews of Captain MattEnglish’s company of the 301st Brigade were digging a breach through theGerman trencheswhenwe came under directmachine-gun fire at about threehundredyards.Thementookshelterandstoppedworking,so,inordertorestoreconfidence, Captain English and myself stood on top of the parapet. Thispersuaded themen to resume theirdigging.Strange to say, severalof themenwerehit,butneitherofuswastouched.Afterwegotfivetanksthroughthegapthus constructed, they advanced rapidly on the German machine guns, which

ceasedfiring.Ifollowedthetanksonfoot,passingthroughaboutthreehundreddisorganizedinfantryonthereverseslopeofahill,whichwasunderextremelyheavylong-rangemachine-gunandartilleryfire. Itwasverynecessarythat theinfantry follow the tanks inorder to exploit thebreak-through. I ordered themforward,withoutresult.Ithencalledforvolunteers,andsixmen,includingmyorderly,JosephAngelo,volunteeredtoaccompanyme.Westartedforward,withtheresultthattheremainingtroopsdidnotcontinuetheirretrogrademovement.Duringthecourseofthisoperation,fourofthevolunteerswerekilledandIwaswounded.Whenmore tanks cameup, the infantry followed, and theoperationwasasuccess.IreceivedtheDistinguishedServiceCrossforthesetwoefforts.

IX

AfterIwaswoundedintheSt.Mihieloperation,Ihadquiteahemorrhageand lay in a shell hole some thirty yards from theGerman lines for about anhour, during which time we were continually fired on by machine guns andmortars,butwithout result.Nothavingbeenwoundedbefore, I felt Iwas inaseriousconditionand, in fact, thought Iwasgoing todie.However, I insisted,againsttheadviceofthedoctor,onbeingtakentotheHeadquartersofthe35thDivision,whichIwasatthattimesupporting,inordertogiveanexactstatementof the affairson the front as I thenknew thembeforepermittingmyself tobetakentothehospital.Actually,mywoundwasnotparticularlyserious,butagain,thementalhazard,whichisasgreatasthephysicalhazard,playeditspart.

X

On the morning of November 9, 1942, I went to the beach at FedhalaaccompaniedbyLieutenantStiller,myAide.Thesituationwe foundwasverybad.Boatswerecominginandnotbeingpushedoffafterunloading.Therewasshellfire,andFrenchaviatorswerestrafingthebeach.Althoughtheymisseditbyaconsiderabledistancewhenevertheystrafed,ourmenwouldtakecoveranddelayunloadingoperations,andparticularlytheunloadingofammunition,whichwasvitally necessary, aswewere fighting amajor engagement notmore thanfifteenhundredyardstothesouth.

Byremainingonthebeachandpersonallyhelpingtopushoffboatsandbynottakingshelterwhentheenemyplanesflewover,IbelieveIhadconsiderableinfluenceinquietingthenervesofthetroopsandonmakingtheinitiallandingasuccess.Istayedonthatbeachfornearlyeighteenhoursandwaswetalloverall

of that time. People say that army commanders should not indulge in suchpractices. My theory is that an army commander does what is necessary toaccomplish his mission, and that nearly eighty per cent of his mission is toarousemoraleinhismen.

XI

At0230onthemorningofNovember11,1942,IwasawakenedbyColonelHarkins with the statement that a French officer had come down from RabatwithanorderfortheFrenchatCasablancatosurrender.WegavethisofficeranescorttogethimtoCasablanca.ThenthequestionaroseastowhetherornotIshouldcallofftheattack,whichwastobeginwithanairbombardmentatseveno’clock the samemorning.Many excellent officers advisedme to call off theattack. However, I was not content, because I believed that if we kept thepressure up, we would certainly force the French surrender, whereas if weshowedawillingness todebatewith them, theymightnotsurrender,andsincetheyoutnumberedustwotoone, timewasvital.Therefore,Igavetheorder tocontinuetheattack.Nextmorning,whenwereceivedat0645thesurrenderofferfromCasablanca,wehadaverybadeightminutesgettingaradiomessagetotheairplaneswhoweretobombat0700,andtotheNavywhowastoshellat0716.There was less than a minute and a quarter to go when the airplanesacknowledgedoursignal.

XII

At 1330 on the afternoon ofNovember 11, 1942,AdmiralMichelier, theSupremeFrenchCommanderinWestAfrica,andGeneralNogues,theResidentGeneral, camewith their staffs to theHotelMiramar at Fedhala to surrender.When I left Washington, I had been provided with two sets of surrenderconditions,onemore lenient than theother. Ihad,naturally, read themseveraltimes on the trip across, but owing to a lack of historical knowledge, did notrealizeuntiltheFrencharrivedthattheconditionsweredrawnforAlgiers,whichisaFrenchDepartment,whereasMoroccoisaprotectoratewheretheprestigeoftheFrenchArmy is theonly thingholding theArabs incheck. Inviewof thisfactitwasevidenttomethatneithersetofconditionswasapplicable.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that I was out of allcommunicationwithGeneralEisenhowerandhadnoknowledgeas tohowtheotherattacksinAfricawereprogressing.Ihadtomakeadecision,andIhadto

maintain Morocco as a gateway for the Americans entering the continent ofAfrica.Moroccocouldnotbeusedas agateway if itwere in the throesof anArabuprising.HenceIhadtomaintaintheprestigeoftheFrenchArmy.

Igotupandsaid,inmynottoogoodFrench,thatIwasaformerstudentattheFrenchCavalrySchool, that Ihad servedwith theFrench for twoyears inWorldWarI,andthatIhadgreatrespectforandbeliefinthewordofhonorofaFrenchofficer,andthatiftheFrenchofficerspresentwouldgivemetheirwordof honor that theywould not fire againstAmerican troops orAmerican ships,they could retain their weapons, man their seacoast forts, and carry on in allrespectsastheyhadcarriedonpreviously—butundermyorders.

Ihaveneverhadreasontoregretmydecision.HadIdoneotherwise,Iamconvinced that at least sixty thousand American troops would have had tooccupyMorocco;therebypreventingourusingittothemaximumandreducingouralreadyinadequateforces.

XIII

About 1000 o’clock on the night of March 5, 1943, General Walter B.Smith, Chief of Staff for General Eisenhower, phonedme to report by air toMaisonBlancheAirfieldatAlgiersonthemorningofthesixth,accompaniedbyanActingChiefofStaff and twoor threeStaffofficersprepared for extendedfieldservice.IcouldnottakeanyofmyregularGeneralStaffofficersbecauseitwasnecessaryforthemtocontinueplanningfortheSicilianoperation.

I tookmy twoAides, Captain Jenson and Lieutenant Stiller,my orderly,SergeantMeeks,GeneralGaffeyfromthe2dArmoredDivisionasActingChiefof Staff, Colonel Kent Lambert,myG-3whom I replacedwithMaddox, andColonel Koch, my G-2.We arrived atMaison Blanche shortly after noon onMarch6,whereIwasmetbyGeneralEisenhowerandGeneralSmith,whotoldme theywere going to relieveGeneral Fredendall and that Iwas to go to hisHeadquartersandassumecommandoftheIICorpswithaviewtoattackingonthefourteenth,theplansforsaidattackhavingalreadybeenmadeandapproved.I asked what authority I had for relieving General Fredendall. GeneralEisenhowersaidhehadtalkedtoFredendallonthetelephone,andhethenwroteinlonghand,onasmallpieceofpaper,anotetoFredendalltellinghimthathewastostaywithmeuntilIrelievedhim.

Weflewfromthere toConstantine,where I spent thenightandmade theacquaintanceofGeneralAlexander,whocommandedtheArmyGrouptowhichthe II Corps was attached. General Alexander toldme that, after the tenth of

March,theIICorpswouldberelievedfromtheBritishCommandandtreatedasaseparateArmy,althoughretainingthetitleofacorps.

I flew to Tebessa in the early morning of the seventh and arrived atHeadquartersoftheIICorpsabout0900o’clock,andfoundmostoftheofficersinbed.The situationwas evidentlyverypoor.Threeof the fourdivisionshadbeen roughlyhandled andhad an inferiority complex.Theother divisionshadhadvery limitedbattle experienceandhadnothingbut thevalorof ignorance.There was no discipline, and everymember of the General Staff was issuingdirect orders to everyone, to the extent that theG-3 could issue an order to adivisiontellingthemtosendareinforcedplatoontosuchandsuchaplace.

Betweenthemorningoftheseventhandthelateafternoonofthethirteenth,I personally talked to every battalion in the four divisions and restoreddiscipline.Thiswasaverydifficult job—I think themostdifficult Ihaveeverundertaken.However,wewereluckyinsecuringacompletevictoryinourfirstattackonGafsaonthemorningofthefourteenth.Thiscorrectedalltheevilsoflack of confidence, and from then on the II Corps fought in a magnificentmanner.

XIV

DuringouroperationinTunisia,wewereunderveryclosetutelagebytheBritish, and I had a British Brigadier General at my Headquarters. Sometimearound the beginning of the second week of April, I was making desperateeffortstotakethemountaincalledDjebelBerda.Aftersupperonthisparticularevening, General Eddy, commanding the 9th Division, which was conductingthe attack, came tomy quarters, and in the presence of the EnglishBrigadierstatedthat,whilehewouldcarryoutmyordersofcontinuingtheattack,hefeltthat itwashopeless,owingtothefact that theinfantryregimentsengagedinithadalreadysufferedtwenty-sixpercentcasualties.-

I was facedwith the necessity ofmaking a decision either to continue ahopeless attack or to lose face in front of the British and violate my ownprinciples of war by agreeing to stop the attack. I felt that, under thecircumstances, I was not justified in demanding further sacrifice. I thereforedirectedGeneralEddytodiscontinuetheattack.IthinkthiswasoneofthemostdifficultdecisionsIeverhadtomake.

Fortunately,onthenextdaythe1stDivisionacrossthevalleycapturedanObservation Post from which we could place a very effective artilleryconcentrationonthepartofthemountainwehadbeentryingtostorm.Weput

allthegunsinthecorpsandthetwodivisionsonthetargetandgavethem,justatdawn, twenty-five roundspergunof rapid firewithwhitephosphorus,withthe idea of persuading the enemy thatwewere going to launch an attack andhoping he wouldman his trenches. After a wait of tenminutes, we put on asecond twenty-five rounds per gun of high explosive. As a result of thisoperation,wetookthepositionwithoutcasualty,excepttotheGermans.

XV

In the early morning of July 10, 1943, General Gay, Colonel Odom,CaptainStiller,andmyselflandedatGela,Sicily.Thelandingbeachwasunderfire,butmostof theprojectileswerehittingabout twenty-five feetbeyond thebeach, in the water, where they did little harm. There was a great deal ofconfusion on the beach and nobodywasworking. I walked up and down thebeachforsometime,accompaniedbymyStaff,andwerestoredtheconfidenceofthepeoplethere,particularlywhenwefailedtotakecoverwhentheGermansflewalong,strafingthebeach.

LaterweenteredthetownofGela,andremainedthereforsometimeundervery intense artillery andmortar fire.We could see, on our left, a brigade ofItalianinfantryattackingourverythinlineconsistingoftwoRangercompanies,andonourright,twelvetankswhichhadcutinandwerenotoverfourhundredyardsfromthebeach.

It was necessary to drive along a road between these tanks and the 1stDivisioninordertofindGeneralTerryAllen.Thiswasasomewhathazardousoperation, as we were driving between two armies engaged in quite a battlebecausetheGermanshadlaunchedacounter-attackofsomesixtytanksagainstus.However,wefoundGeneralAllenandarrangedplansforthecontinuationoftheattackthenextmorning.Thismeetingwasmadevividinmyrecollectionbythe fact that shells were hitting in our vicinity during the whole of theconference,which,asaresult,wasprobablyoneoftheshorteststaffmeetingsinhistory. For this act I was given an Oak Leaf Cluster to my DistinguishedServiceCross,whichIfeelIdidnotearn,asIwasnotdoingmorethanmydutyand the situation was not too hazardous, although on one occasion a shell litwithin a very few feet ofGeneralGay andmyself, andon another occasion abombfelljustacrosstheroadfromus.

XVI

By thenightof the thirteenthof July,1943, Iwasof theopinion that theGermancounter-attackof theeleventhand twelfthwas the lastmajor counter-offensiveofwhichtheywerecapable.OnthisassumptionIrevisedmyplansforthe remainder of the operation in Sicily. Had I taken counsel ofmy fears, orbelievedwhat theG-2’s reported, the campaign could have beenmuch longerandlesssuccessful.

Themaking of such a decision sounds easy, but is, inmy opinion, quitedifficult.

XVII

OnthefourteenthofJuly,IreceivedatelegramfromGeneralAlexandertotheeffectthatIwouldtakeupadefensivepositioninthevicinityofCaltanissettatocovertheleftrearoftheBritishEighthArmy.Tohaveadheredtothisorderwould have been disloyal to the American Army. With the help of GeneralKeyes, General Wedemeyer, and General Gay, I drafted an order for anenvelopingattack,viaAgrigentoandCastelvetrano,onPalermo.

AccompaniedbyGeneralWedemeyer,IthenflewtoAfricaandpresentedthisordertoGeneralAlexander,statingthatIwasconvincedthatthiswaswhatheintended,andnotthatIshouldremaininadefensiveattitude.Iaskedhimtoinitial the order. He did so, but stated I should not attack Agrigento unless Icoulddoitwithareconnaissanceinforce.Ididitwithareconnaissanceinforce,using all the troops I had available—namely, the 3dDivision, part of the 82dAirborne, two Ranger Battalions, and a task force of the 2d Armored. Had Ifailed,Iwouldhavebeenrelieved.WetookPalermoonthetwenty-second.

XVII

During the advance on Messina, along the north road in Sicily, we hadmade one successful amphibious turning operation and were in the act ofexecutingasecondonewhen,shortlyaftersupper,GeneralKeyes,whowaswiththe3dDivision,telephonedmethatGeneralBradley,commandingtheIICorpsofwhichthe3dDivisionwasaunit,andGeneralTruscott,commandingthe3dDivision,were both convinced that this second amphibious operationwas toodangerousandthereforerequestedauthoritytopostponeit.ItoldGeneralKeyestotellthemitwouldnotbepostponedandthatIwouldbethereatonce.

I took General Gay with me, dropping him off at the beach where theamphibioustroopswerethentakingoff,withorderstoseethattheytookoff.I

thenwenttotheHeadquartersofthe3dDivision,whichwasunderlimitedshellfire, and foundGeneral Truscott, a most dashing officer, suffering from suchphysical fatigue that hewas convinced that the operation could not succeed. Idirected him to carry it out, stating that if he succeeded hewould get the fullcredit,andthatifhefailed,Iwouldtaketheblame.IthencalledGeneralBradleyon the telephone and told him the same thing. I stated to both of them that,having complete confidence in them, I was returning to my Headquarters,becauseifIstayedaroundIwouldfailtoshowconfidence.Ispentaveryrestlessnight,particularlyastheenemywasshootingatus,buttheyfailedtogetahit.Shortly after reveille,ColonelHarkins,whowasdutyofficer, calledup to saythattheattackhadbeenacompletesuccess.

It is a very difficult thing to order two officers inwhom you have greatconfidencetocarryoutanoperationwhichneitherofthemthinksispossible.

XIX

During the attack on Troina, I drove to the Headquarters of GeneralBradley,whowas conducting the attack, accompanied byGeneral Lucas. Justbeforewegotthere,Isawafieldhospitalinavalleyandstoppedtoinspectit.Thereweresomethreehundredandfiftybadlywoundedmeninthehospital,allof whom were very heroic under their sufferings, and all of whom wereinterestedinthesuccessoftheoperation.

JustasIwasleavingthehospital,Isawasoldiersittingonaboxnearthedressingstation.Istoppedandsaidtohim,“Whatisthematterwithyou,boy?”Hesaid,“Nothing;Ijustcan’ttakeit.”Iaskedwhathemeant.Hesaid,“Ijustcan’ttakebeingshotat.”Isaid,“Youmeanthatyouaremalingeringhere?”Heburst into tears and I immediately saw that he was an hysterical case. I,therefore,slappedhimacrossthefacewithmygloveandtoldhimtogetup,joinhisunit,andmakeamanofhimself,whichhedid.Actually,atthetimehewasabsentwithoutleave.

I amconvinced thatmyaction in this casewas entirely correct, and that,had other officers had the courage to do likewise, the shameful use of “battlefatigue”asanexcuseforcowardicewouldhavebeeninfinitelyreduced.

XX

Onthetwenty-eighthofJuly,1944,GeneralBradleyinformedmethattheThird Army would become operational at noon on August 1, but that in the

interim I was to take over control of the VIII and XV Corps—this withoutbecoming officially connected with the operations. On the afternoon of thetwenty-ninth,southofCoutances,IfoundanarmoreddivisionhaltedontheroadwhiletheHeadquarterswashavingamapstudyastothepossibilityofcrossingthe Sienne River with a view to advancing along the coast road towardGranville. Taking a glance at themap, I saw that the river waswithin a fewmiles, sowent down and reconnoitered it. I found itwas only about two feetdeepand,sofarasIcouldtell,defendedbyonemachinegunwhichmissedmebyagooddeal.Fortifiedwiththisinformation,IwentbacktotheCommandingGeneral and asked himwhy he didn’t get across the river. He said he didn’tknow whether the tide was in or out, and that he understood the river wasstronglydefended.ItoldhiminverystronglanguagewhatIhadjustdoneandtogetamoveonhimself,whichhedid.Fromthattimeon,thisdivisionwasoneoftheboldestintheThirdArmy,butsincethiswasitsinitiationtobattle,itneededjustthatsortofakicktogetitstarted.

XXI

After supper on July 31, 1944, General Galley, Colonel Harkins, and IdrovetotheHeadquartersoftheVIIICorps.ItoldGeneralMiddleton,whowascommanding thecorps, that Iwas takingover in themorning.HesaidhewasgladIhadarrivedbecausehehadobtainedhisobjective,whichwastheSeluneRiver.Iaskedhimifhewasacrossandhesaid,“No.”Itoldhimthatthroughouthistory,manycampaignshadbeenlostbystoppingonthewrongsideofariver,anddirectedhimtogoacrossatonce.HesaidthatthebridgebelowAvrancheswas out. While we were discussing ways and means of getting across, atelephonemessagecameinthatthebridge,whiledamaged,wasusable—further,that the 4th Armored Division had captured a dam to the east of Avranches,acrosswhichtroopscouldmove.IdirectedthattheVIIICorpsstartacrossthatnight, which it did. This is no criticism of General Middleton, who is anoutstandingsoldier,but it shows thata littleextrapushatacriticalmoment issometimes useful.Hadwe failed to secure a bridgehead that night, ourwholeoperationwouldhavebeenjeopardized.

XXII

Thepassageof theThirdArmythrough thecorridoratAvrancheswasanimpossible operation. Two roads entered Avranches; only one left it over the

bridge.Wepassedthroughthiscorridortwoinfantryandtwoarmoreddivisionsinlessthantwenty-fourhours.Therewasnoplan,becauseitwasimpossibletomakeaplan.IsimplyputtheCorpsandDivisionCommandersatcriticalpointsandsentunitsthroughastheyarrived.Itwasahazardousoperation,becausethetroops were jammed head to tail for miles, but there was no other way ofattainingthenecessaryspeed.TheoperationwasmadesuccessfulbythedrivingpoweroftheGeneralOfficers—particularlyMiddleton,Wood,Haislip,Gaffey,andGay—bythesuperlativeabilityoftheStaffoftheThirdArmytoimproviseunderpressure,andbythehelpofGod.

XXIII

DuringthecourseoftheadvanceoftheThirdArmyfromAvranchestotheMoselle,many instances occurredwhere it was necessary to use considerablepersuasiontopermittheuninterruptedprogressoftheThirdArmy,andnaturallytoassumeconsiderableriskshouldthespectacularadvancefail.

One of the more important hazards encountered was that of leaving therightflankoftheThirdArmycompletelyopenfromSt.NazairetoapointnearTroyes.ThisdecisionwasbasedonmybeliefthattheGermans,whiletheyhadample force, did not have sufficientmobility to strike fast, and that the ever-efficientXIXTacticalAirCommandwouldspotanyforcelargeenoughtohurtus and be able to hold it down long enough to permit the greatly superiormobilityoftheAmericantroopstointervene.Thesoundnessofthedecisionwasindicatedbytheresult.

XXIV

AboutthefifthofSeptember,itbecameapparentthatwewouldrunoutofgasoline.Idirectedthetwocorps,theXXandXII,tocontinuetheadvanceuntilthetanksranoutofgas,andthentogoonfoot.Thiswasactuallydone,andthebridgehead across the Moselle River was secured as a result. There wasconsiderableresistanceonthepartoftheCorpsCommanderstowhatappearedto them an unnecessarily dangerous operation. Its success again proved that itwasnotdangerous.

XXV

On the thirtiethofSeptember,1944, Ivisited theHeadquartersof theXII

CorpsatNancy,andwasinformedthattwocombatteamsofthe35thDivisionwere being violently attacked on a hill east of theMoselleRiver. I had givenordersthatnogroundwouldbegivenupanddirectedtheCorpsCommandertouse his last remaining reserves, which consisted of part of the 6th ArmoredDivision, to insure that the hill was held. Next day General Gaffey, the thenChief of Staff,was sent byme to see how thingswere going on.At 1400 hecalledup tostate thatordershad justbeen issuedfor twocombat teamsof the35thDivisiontofallback.ItoldhimtocountermandtheorderandtohavetheCorpsCommanderandtheDivisionCommandersofthe35thand6thArmoredDivisions present at theCommandPost of the 6thArmoredDivision,where Iwouldarrivebyairatonce.

Onreaching thispoint, I found thatall threecommandersweresomewhatoveranxious and had contemplated and issued the orders for thewithdrawal. Idirected that theseordersbe countermanded at once and that the6thArmoredDivisionbeputintoactioninthemorning.Itwasobjectedthatthe6thArmoredDivisionwasallwehadleft.Istatedthatitcoulddonogoodbeingleft,thatitwastheretofight.

Nextdaytheattackbythe6thArmoredandthe35thInfantrywasrenewedwithcomplete success,andovereighthundreddeadGermanswerecounted inone field. The officers concernedwere all of the highest caliber, butwere allveryfatigued,and,asIhavestatedbefore,fatigueproducespessimism.

XXVI

During the fighting west of the Moselle and west of Metz in October,GeneralWalker,commandingtheXXCorps,suggestedthatweattempttotakeFort Driant. The attack was started and, in spite of an initial success, it wasevident that, if continued, it would prove unduly expensive. It was thennecessarytogoagainstmystronglyheldopinionthatoneshouldneverfallbackand order that the attack be-suspended.Thiswas done. Itwas a very difficultdecision.Asaresultofthisdecision,wesavedagreatmanylivesandtookMetzonNovember25,withcomparativelylittleloss.

XXVII

By November 1, the Third Army had secured enough gasoline,ammunition, and replacements tomake it possible to renew the attackwith aview to breaking the Siegfried Line and establishing the bridgehead over the

RhineRiver, in thevicinityofMainz.Theattackwas to takeplaceat0430onthe morning of November 8. The weather was extremely bad and the floodconditionof the riverwasappalling.At2000on theeveningof the seventh, acorps and a division commander came to my house and stated that in theiropinion they would be unable to attack in the morning. The moral effect ofdiscontinuinganattack isverybad for the troops, andat sucha latehourwasalmost physically impossible of accomplishment, due to difficulty ofcommunications.Ithereforeaskedtheofficerswhomtheyrecommendedastheirreplacements in command of their respective units, because, I stated, I wouldkeeponrelievinguntilIgotsomebodywhowouldleadtheattack.TheystatedthatifIfeltthatwaytheywouldcontinuetheattack.

The attack next morning, in spite of atrocious weather, was entirelysuccessful. Of course, it is pertinent to remember that Corps and DivisionCommanderssufferfromgreaterphysicalfatigueanddangerthandoesanArmyCommander, and hence it is the duty of the ArmyCommander to supply thenecessarypunchwhenfatiguestartssappingtheenergyoftheotherofficers.

XXVIII

OnDecember19,1944,GeneralEisenhowerhadameetingatVerdunwithGeneral Bradley, General Devers, and myself and the members of his Staffpresent.ThedecisionwasmadefortheThirdArmytoattackthesouthernflankoftheBulge.IwasaskedwhenIcouldmaketheattack.IstatedthatIcoulddosowith threedivisionson themorningof the twenty-thirdofDecember. Ihadmade this estimate before going to Verdun, and had taken exactly eighteenminutes tomake it.GeneralEisenhowerstated that I shouldwaituntil Igotatleastsixdivisions.Itoldhimthat,inmyopinion,apromptattackwiththreewasbetterthanwaitingforsix—particularlywhenIdidnotknowwhereIcouldgettheotherthree.ActuallytheattackoftheIIICorpswiththe80th,26th,and4thArmoredDivisionsjumpedoffonthemorningofDecember22,onedayaheadofthetimepredicted.

Inmakingthisattackwewerewhollyignorantofwhatwasaheadofus,butwere determined to strike through to Bastogne, which we did on the twenty-sixth.Iamsurethatthisearlyattackwasofmaterialassistanceinproducingourvictory.

XXIX

On the twenty-seventh of December, the 87th Infantry Division and the11thArmoredDivisionweresupposedto join theVIIICorps in thevicinityofNeuf-chateaubymidnightofthetwenty-eighth,toattackat0900onthemorningofthetwenty-ninth.Owingtoroaddifficulties,thesedivisionsdidnotreachtherendezvouspointuntilneardaylightonthetwenty-ninth,andGeneralMiddletonrequestedadelayofonedayintheattack.Idemandedthatheattackanywaythatmorning,becausemysixthsensetoldmeitwasvital.Theattackjumpedoff,andrandirectly into the flankof aGermancounter-attack consistingof two and ahalf divisions. Hadmy divisions delayed one day, the German counter-attackmightwellhavecutoffthetenuouscorridorwehadbeenabletoestablishfromArlontoBastogne.

XXX

AllduringthebattleoftheBulge,Ihadbeenveryanxioustostartanattacknorth along theRidgeRoad fromEchternach. Finally, on February 6, theXIICorpsforcedacrossingovertheOurandSauerRivers,using,fromlefttoright,the 80th Division, the 5th Division, and one combat command of the 76thDivision. In my opinion the audacity of this operation was its chief virtue,because, to look at it, no human being could possibly have envisaged asuccessfulcrossing.ThecreditgoestotheXIICorpsandtothedivisionswhichmadethecrossings.TheonlyclaimIhaveismyinsistencethatitbemadeatthetimeitwasmade.

XXXI

OnFebruary19,GeneralWalkercalledmeonthetelephoneandstatedthathe felt that if I couldget anarmoreddivision fromSHAEFReservehecould,with it and the 94thDivision, clear up the SaarTriangle and take Saarburg. Isucceeded in getting the loan of the 10th Armored Division for that specificoperation,whichwasasuccessintwodays.Thereafter,bycontinuedpersuasionandwiththeassistanceofGeneralBradley,whoshuthiseyesandearstocertainrumors,wewere able to keep the 10thArmoredDivision and eventually takeTrier. I believe this is the only time in historywhen itwas necessary to beg,borrow,andevenstealtroopsinordertowinavictory.ThetakingofTrierwasthekeytothestartofthePalatinateCampaign.

XXXII

In March, 1945, the First and Third Armies were supposed to attack inechelonfromtheleft;thatis,theFirstArmy,andthentheThirdArmy,withtheideaofgettinguptotheRhinefromCoblentztoCologne.Iwastoldtowaituntilthe First Army had closed on the Rhine. However, after we crossed the KyllRiver,Istartedtobreakthe4thArmoredDivisionlooseand,fearingthatImightbeordered to stop it, I sent inno reports for twenty-fourhoursuntil itwas socommitted it could not be ordered to halt. It reached theRhineRiverwithoutdifficulty.Again,thedangerwasmoreapparentthanreal,but,personally,IamnotsurethatIdeservemuchcreditforthedecisionexceptthatitwasadecision.

XXXIII

About the eighteenthofMarch,webecameaware that if theThirdArmydidnotsecureabridgeheadovertheRhinepriortothecrossingoftheBritishontheleftwingofthegroupsofarmies,wemightlosetroopstothemandhavetoresume a defensive role. This was not at all to our liking. Therefore, I toldGeneral Eddy that hemust cross the Rhine before the twenty-third. The epiccrossingof theRhineby the5thDivisionof theXIICorpswas amagnificentfeat of arms for whichGeneral Eddy, Corps Commander, andGeneral Irwin,DivisionCommander,deserveallcredit.Mysolevirtuewashavingtheidea.Asa matter of fact, Eddy got across twenty-four hours earlier than I thought hecould.

XXXIV

THEPRESSCONFERENCEOFSEPTEMBER22,1945This conferencecostme the commandof theThirdArmy,or rather, of a

groupofsoldiers,mostlyrecruits,whothenrejoicedinthathistoricname,butIwas intentionallydirect, because Ibelieved that itwas then time forpeople toknowwhatwasgoingon.Mylanguagewasnotparticularlypolitic,but Ihaveyettofindwherepoliticlanguageproducessuccessfulgovernment.

Theone thingwhich I couldnot say then, andcannotyet say, is thatmychief interest in establishing order inGermanywas to preventGermany fromgoing communistic. I am afraid that our foolish and utterly stupid policy inregard toGermanywill certainly cause them to join theRussians and therebyinsureacommunisticstatethroughoutWesternEurope.

It israthersadtometothinkthatmylastopportunityforearningmypayhaspassed.Atleast,IhavedonemybestasGodgavemethechance.

AppendixAOPERATION“TORCH”

HEADQUARTERSWESTERNTASKFORCECommandingGeneral:MajorGeorgeS.Patton,Jr.DeputyCommandingGeneral:MajorGeneralGeoffreyKeyesChiefofStaff:ColonelHobartR.Gay1DeputyChiefofStaff:Lieutenant

ColonelPaulD.Harkins1G-l(Personnel):ColonelHughFitzgeraldG-2(Intelligence):ColonelPercyBlackG-3(PlansandTraining):ColonelKentC.LambertG-4(Supply):ColonelWalterJ.Muller1

AdjutantGeneral:ColonelR.E.Cummings1Artillery:ColonelJ.J.B.WilliamsEngineers:ColonelJohnConklin2

Ordinance:ColonelThomasH.Nixon1

SignalOfficer:ColonelEltonH.Hammond1MedicalOfficer:ColonelAlbertKennerNorthernLandingForce,MajorGeneralLucienK.Truscott60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, Colonel F. J. de Rohan

ArmoredTaskForce from2ndArmoredDivision,ColonelHarryH.Semmes3SupportingtroopsWithGeneralPattonthroughoutthewar.

Went toUnitedStates in 1943; returnedwith theThirdArmy.Wearer ofthreeDistinguishedServiceCrosses; servedwithGeneralPatton in twoWorldWars.

CentralLandingForce,MajorGeneralJonathanW.Anderson3d Infantry Division, General Anderson Armored Task Force from 2d

Armored Division, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Nelson Supporting troopsSouthern Landing Force, Major General Ernest A. Harmon, commanding 2dArmoredDivision

COMPOSITIONOFIICORPS

TheIICorpsofTunisiawascomposedof three InantryandoneArmoredDivision.TheCorpswassupportedbythe13thFieldArtilleryBrigadeandtheavailable lumber of supporting units; such as, Signal, Ordnance, Medical,Engineers,etc.

CORPSCOMPOSITIONHeadquartersandHeadquartersCompany,IICorps:1stArmoredDivision:1st InfantryDivision:Maj.Gen.Terryde laM.AllenMaj.Gen.Orlando

Ward,34thInfantryDivision:9thInfantryDivision:13thFieldArtilleryBrigade:Maj. Gen. Ernest A. Harmon Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder Maj. Gen.

MantonC.EddyBrig.Gen.JohnA.Crane

AppendixCOPERATION“HUSKY”

HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS AND SEVENTH ARMY Headquarters andHeadquarters Company, I Armored Corps, later redesignated as Headquartersand Head quarters Company, Seventh Army Headquarters II Corps: MajorGeneralO.N.BradleyHeadquartersProvisionalCorps(formedaftertheland^wing was made, and commanded by the Deputy Arm;^° Commander, MajorGeneralKeyes)1stInfantryDivision:MajorGen.TerrydelaM.Alle

45th Infantry Division: 3d Infantry Division: 2d Armored Division: 9thInfantryDivision:82dAirborneDivision:3RangerBattalions:

Major Gen. TroyMiddletonMajor Gen. Lucien K. TruscottMajor Gen.HughA.GaffeyMajorGen.MantonC.EddyMajorGen.MatthewRidgewayColonelWilliamDarby

ThenormalcomplementofsupportingunitsII

LETTERSOFINSTRUCTION

HEADQUARTERSTHIRDUNITEDSTATESARMYAPO9563U.S.ARMY

6March,1944

SUBJECT:LetterofInstructionNumber1.To:Corps,Division,andSeparateUnitCommanders

I.GENERAL

Thisletterwillorientyou,officersofthehigherechelons,intheprinciplesofcommand,combatprocedure,andadministrationwhichobtaininthisArmy,andwillguideyouintheconductofyourseveralcommands.

II.COMMAND

a.Leadership(1)FullDutyEach, inhisappropriatesphere,will lead inperson.Anycommanderwho

fails toobtainhisobjective,andwhoisnotdeadorseverelywounded,hasnotdonehisfullduty.

(2)VisitstoFrontTheCommandingGeneral or hisChief of Staff (never both at once) and

onememberofeachoftheGeneralStaffsections,theSignal,Medical,Ordance,Engineer, and Quartermaster sections, should visit the front daily. To saveduplication,theChiefofStaffwilldesignatethesectoreachistovisit.

ThefunctionoftheseStaffofficersistoobserve,nottomeddle.Inadditionto their own specialty, they must observe and report anything of militaryimportance.Rememberthatpraiseismorevaluablethanblame.Remember,too,thatyourprimarymissionasaleaderistoseewithyourowneyesandbeseenbyyourtroopswhileengagedinpersonalreconnaissance.

b.ExecutionIncarryingoutamission,thepromulgationoftheorderrepresentsnotover

ten per cent of your responsibility. The remaining ninety per cent consists inassuringbymeansofpersonalsupervisionontheground,byyourselfandyourstaff,properandvigorousexecution.

c.StaffConferencesDaily, at the earliest possiblemoment that theG-2 andG-3 can get their

maps posted, a Staff conference will be held, attended by the CommandingGeneral, the Chief of Staff, and the heads of all General Staff sections, theSurgeon, the Signal Officer, the Ordnance Officer, the Engineer Officer, andotherspecialStaffheadswhencalledon.AlsopresentwillbetheStaffofficersdescribedinparagraphIIa(2)above,whovisitedthefrontonthepreviousday.Anypersonpresentwithastatementtomakewilldosobriefly.(N.B.IfaStaffinspectorsawanythingduringhisvisit to thefrontrequiringimmediateaction,hewouldhavereportedthefacttotheChiefofStaffimmediatelyonhisreturn.)The Commanding General then gives his intentions, and the Chief of Staffallocatesthesectorsfortheday’sStaffinspectors.

d.RestPeriodsStaff personnel, commissioned and enlisted,who do not rest, do not last.

All sections must run a duty roster and enforce compliance. The intensity ofStaff operations during battle is periodic. At the Army and Corps levels thebusiesttimes

aretheperiodsfromonetothreehoursafterdaylight,andfromthreetofivehours after dark. In the lower echelons and in the administrative and supplyStaffs, the timeof theperiods is different, but just as definite.When theneedarises,everyonemustworkallthetime,buttheseemergenciesarenotfrequent:unfatiguedmenlastlongerandworkharderathighpressure.

e.LocationofCommandPostsThefartherforwardtheCommandPostsarelocated,thelesstimeiswasted

in driving to and from the front. The ideal situation would be for the ArmyCommandPosttobewithinonehalfhour’sdriveinaC&RcaroftheDivisionCommand Post. The driving time to the front from theCommand Post of thelowerunitsshouldbecorrespondinglyshorter.

Much time andwire is saved ifCommandPosts of higher units are at ornearoneoftheCommandPostsofthenextlowerechelon.

AllCommandPostsofaDivisionandhigherunitsmusthaveat least twoechelons;theforwardone—andthatistheonereferredtointhisparagraph(e)—should be kept as small andmobile as possiblewith theminimum amount ofradiotraffic.

COMBATPROCEDUREa.MapsWearetoopronetobelievethatweacquiremeritsolelythroughthestudy

ofmapsinthesafeseclusionofaCommandPost.Thisisanerror.Maps are necessary in order to see the whole panorama of battle and to

permitintelligentplanning.Further—andthisisveryimportant—astudyofthemapwillindicatewhere

critical situations exist or are apt to develop, and so indicate where theCommander should be. In the higher echelons, a layered map of the wholetheater to a reasonable scale, showing roads, railways, streams, and towns ismoreusefulthanalarge—

scalemapclutteredupwithgroundformsandamultiplicityt)fnonessentialinformation.

b.PlansPlansmustbesimpleandflexible.Actuallytheyonlyformadatumplane

fromwhichyoubuildasnecessitydirectsoropportunityoffers.Theyshouldbemadebythepeoplewhoaregoingtoexecutethem.

c.ReconnaissanceYoucanneverhave toomuchreconnaissance.Useeverymeansavailable

before,during,andafterbattle.Reportsmustbefacts,notopinions;negativeaswell as positive. Do not believe intercepts blindly; cross-check—sometimesmessagesaresentouttobeintercepted.

Informationislikeeggs:thefresherthebetter.d.Orders(1)FormalOrdersFormal orders will be preceded by letters of instruction and by personal

conferences.Inthiswaythewholepurposeoftheoperationwillbemadeclear,together with the mission to be accomplished by each major unit. So that, ifduringcombatcommunicationbreaksdown,eachCommandercanandmustsoactastoobtainthegeneralobjective.Theorderitselfwillbeshort,accompaniedby a sketch—it tells what to do, not how. It is really amemorandum and anassumptionofresponsibilitybytheissuingCommander.

(2)FragmentaryOrdersAfter the initial order, youwill seldomget another formal order, but you

willgetmanyfragmentaryorders,inwriting,ororally,byphoneorpersonally.Takedownalloralordersandrepeatthemback.Haveyourjuniorsdothe

sametoyou.Keepadiarywithallordersandmessagesandtheresultingactionpastedin

itinsequence.Keepyourownordersshort;getthemoutintime;issuethempersonallyby

voicewhenyoucan.Inbattleitisalwayseasierfortheseniortogoupthanforthejuniortocomebackfortheissuanceoforders.

Adivisionshouldhave twelvehours,and,better,eighteenhours,betweenthephysicalreceiptoftheorderatDivisionHeadquartersandthetimeitistobeexecuted.

(3)WarningOrders

Warning orders are vital and must be issued in time. This requirementappliesnotonlytocombatunitsbutalsototheSurgeon,theSignalOfficer,theQuartermaster, theOrdnanceOfficer, and the EngineerOfficer,whomust getwarningorderspromptly.They, too,haveplans tomakeandunits tomove. Iftheydonotfunction,youdonotfight.

Orders, formal or otherwise, concerning units further down than the nextechelonofcommand,arehighlyprejudicial.

(4)KeepTroopsInformedUseeverymeansbeforeandaftercombatstotell thetroopswhattheyare

goingtodoandwhattheyhavedone.IV.ADMINISTRATION

a.Supply(1)GeneralTheonusofsupplyrestsequallyonthegiverandthetaker.Forwardunitsmustanticipateneedsandaskforsuppliesintime.Theymust

standreadytousealltheirmeanstohelpmovesupplies.Thesupplyservicesmustget the thingsaskedfor to therightplaceat the

righttime.Theymustdomore:byreconnaissancetheywillanticipatedemandsandstartthesuppliesupbeforetheyarecalledfor.

TheDESPERATEDETERMINATIONtoSUCCEEDisjustasvitalasitistosupplythefiringline.

(2)ReplacementsReplacementsarespareparts—supplies.Theymustbeaskedforintimeby

thefrontline,andtheneedforthemmustbeanticipatedintherear.Aneducatedguessisjustasaccurateandfarfasterthancompilederrors.Duringlulls,youcanbalancetheaccount.Keepyourcombatunitsfull.Acompanywithoutriflemenisjustasuselessasatankwithoutgasoline.

(3)HospitalsEvacuationorfieldhospitalsmustbekeptclosetothefront.Visitthewoundedpersonally.b.DecorationsDecorations are for the purpose of raising the fighting value of troops;

therefore theymustbeawardedpromptly.Haveadefiniteofficeronyourstaffeducatedinwritingcitationsandseethattheygetthrough.

c.DisciplineThere is only one kind of discipline—PERFECT DISCIPLINE. If you do not

enforceandmaintaindiscipline,youarepotentialmurderers.Youmust set theexample.

V.RUMORS

Reports based on information secured through reconnaissance conductedafterdarkshouldbeviewedwithskepticism.Thesamethingappliestoreportsfromwalkingwoundedandstragglers.Theselatterseektojustifythemselvesbypaintingalarmingpictures.

It is risky and usually impossible to move reserves during darkness onevery call for help. Units cannot bewholly destroyed in a night attack. Theymuststick.Launchyourcounter-attackafterdaylightandsubsequenttoadequatereconnaissanceandseethatitiscoordinated.

VI.CONDITION

Highphysicalconditionisvitaltovictory.There aremore tired corps and division commanders than there are tired

corpsanddivisions.Fatiguemakescowardsofusall.Meninconditiondonottire.VII.COURAGE

DONOTTAKECOUNSELOFYOURFEARS.sG.S.PATTON,JR.G.S.PATTON,JR.Lt.GeneralU.S.Army,CommandingCONFIDENTIALHEADQUARTERSTHIRDUNITEDSTATESARMYAPO403U.S.ARMY

3April,1944

SUBJECT:LetterofInstructionNumber2.To:Corps,Division,andSeparateUnitCommanders.I.GENERAL

1.Thisletterstressesthosetacticalandadministrativeusageswhichcombatexperience has taught myself and the officers who have served under me toconsidervital.

2. You will not simply mimeograph this and call it a day. You areresponsiblethattheseusagesbecomehabitualinyourcommand.

II.DISCIPLINE

1. There is only one sort of discipline—PERFECT DISCIPLINE. Men cannothavegoodbattledisciplineandpooradministrativediscipline.

2. Discipline is based on pride in the profession of arms, on meticulousattentiontodetails,andonmutualrespectandconfidence.Disciplinemustbeahabitsoengrainedthatitisstrongerthantheexcitementofbattleorthefearofdeath.

3.Thehistoryofourinvariablyvictoriousarmiesdemonstratesthatwearethebest soldiers in theworld.This shouldmakeyourmenproud.This shouldmakeyou

proud. This should imbue your units with unconquerable self-confidenceandprideindemonstratedability.

4.Disciplinecanonlybeobtainedwhenallofficersaresoimbuedwiththesenseoftheirawfulobligationtotheirmenandtotheircountrythattheycannottoleratenegligence.Officerswhofailtocorrecterrorsortopraiseexcellencearevaluelessinpeaceanddangerousmisfitsinwar.

5.Officersmustassertthemselvesbyexampleandbyvoice.Theymustbepre-eminentincourage,deportment,anddress.

6.Oneoftheprimarypurposesofdisciplineistoproducealertness.Amanwhoissolethargicthathefailstosalutewillfallaneasyvictimtotheenemy.

7. Combat experience has proven that ceremonies, such as formal guardmounts, formal retreat formations, and regular and supervised reveilleformations, areagreathelp, and, in somecases, essential, topreparemenandofficers for battle, to give them that perfect discipline, that smartness ofappearance,thatalertnesswithoutwhichbattlescannotbewon.

8. In theThirdArmy,when troops arenot in the actual combat zonenorengaged in tacticalexercises,or rangefiring,etc.,CorpsandseparateDivisionCommanderswillsee:

a.Thatregularreveilleformationbeheld,inattendanceatwhichtherewillbe a minimum of one officer per company, or similar unit, and in additionthereto, when practicable, a minimum of one field officer per regiment orseparatebattalion.

b. That it shall be customary for all organizations to hold formal retreatunderarms.Attendance, inadditionto theprescribedenlistedmen,shallbeallofficers of company grade. In the case of regiments and separate battalions, aminimumofonefieldofficer.

c. That in the casewheremusic is available and it is practicable from abilletingstandpoint,frequentregimentalandbattalionretreatparadesandsimilarceremonieswillbeheld.

d. That unit and organizational guard shall be performed strictly inaccordancewithFM26-5.

Whenmusicisavailable,formalguardmountswillbeheldfrequently.e.Thatofficers in formationwearuniformanalogous to thatwornby the

enlistedmen,andthatallofficersparticipateinalldrillsandmarchesatalltimeswith their organizations or units. This includesmarching to and from trainingareasandranges.

9.Officersarealwaysondutyand theirdutyextends toevery individual,junior to themselves, in the U.S. Army—not only to members of their ownorganization.

10.Americans,with arms in their hands, are fools aswell as cowards tosurrender.Iftheyfighton,theywillconquer.

11.CasesofmisbehaviorbeforetheenemywillbebroughtbeforeGeneralCourtMartialandtriedunderthe75thArticleofWar.IthasbeenmyexperiencethatmanyCourtsMartialarepronetoviewthismostheinousoffense,forwhichthepunishmentofdeathmaybeinflicted,intoolenientamanner.Theyshouldrealizethatthelivesoftroopsaresavedbypunishmentoftheinitialoffenders.Cowardiceisadiseaseandmustbecheckedbeforeitbecomesepidemic.

III.TACTICALUSAGES

1.Generala.CombatPrinciples(1)Thereisnoapprovedsolutiontoanytacticalsituation.(2)Thereisonlyonetacticalprinciplewhichisnotsubjecttochange.Itis:

“Tosousethemeansathandtoinflictthemaximumamountofwounds,death,anddestructionontheenemyintheminimumtime.”

(3) In battle, casualties vary directly with the time you are exposed toeffective fire. Your own fire reduces the effectiveness and volume of theenemy’s fire,while rapidityof attack shortens the timeof exposure.Apintofsweatwillsaveagallonofblood!

(4)Battlesarewonbyfrighteningtheenemy.Fearisinducedbyinflictingdeathandwoundsonhim.Deathandwounds

are produced by fire. Fire from the rear ismore deadly and three timesmoreeffectivethanfirefromthefront,buttogetfirebehindtheenemy,youmustholdhim by frontal fire andmove rapidly around his flank. Frontal attacks againstpreparedpositionsshouldbeavoidedifpossible.

(5)“Catchtheenemybythenosewithfireandkickhiminthepantswithfireemplacedthroughmovement.”

(6) Hit hard soon; that is, with two battalions up in a regiment, or twodivisionsupinacorps,ortwocorpsupinanarmy—theideabeingtodevelopyourmaximumforceatoncebeforetheenemycandevelophis.

(7)Youcanneverbe toostrong.Geteverymanandgunyoucansecure,provided it does not unduly delay your attack. The German is the championdigger.

(8) The larger the force and the more violence you use in the attack,whether itbemen, tanks,orammunition, thesmallerwillbeyourproportionallosses.

(9)Neveryieldground.Itischeapertoholdwhatyouhavethantoretakewhat you have lost.Nevermove troops to the rear for a rest or to re-form atnight, and in the daytime only where absolutely necessary. Such moves mayproduceapanic.

(10)Ourmortarsandourartilleryaresuperbweaponswhentheyarefiring.Whensilent,theyarejunk—seethattheykeepfiring!

b.TacticalRulesinParticularSubjects(1)Useroadstomarchon;fieldstofighton.InFrancewewillfindroads

mined or demolished inmanyplaces, certainlywhenwe approach the enemy.Whenthathappens,getofftheroadsandkeepmoving.

But when the roads are available for use, you save time and effort bystayingonthemuntilshotoff.

(2)Troopsshouldnotdeployintolineuntilforcedtodosobyenemyfire.(3)Whenyouareadvancinginbrokencountryagainstpossibletankattacks

andusingtheleapfrogmethoddescribedinmySiciliannotes,besuretokeeptheantigunswellup.

(4) Inmountain country secure theheights.This is best donebydaylightreconnaissancefollowedbynightattackofaplatoonreinforcedatdawntwilight.

(5)Inforcingapasssecuretheheightsfirst.Therearealwaystrailsleadingto therearofhills.Remember that invitingavenuesofapproachare invariablydefended,andanadvancebysuchlanes,withoutsecuringtheheightscoveringthem,issuicidal.

(6) The effect of mines is largely mental. Not over ten percent of ourcasualties come from them.When they are encountered, theymust be passedthroughoraround.Therearenotenoughminesintheworldtocoverthewholecountry. It ischeaper tomakeadetour than tosearch;however, theEngineersshouldstart clearing the straight roadwhile theadvanceelementscontinueviathedetour.Seethatalltypesoftroopshaveminedetectorsandknowhowtousethem.Youmust—repeat—mustgetthrough!

(7)Neverpermit aunit todig inuntil the finalobjective is reached; thendig,wire,andmine.

(8) Slit trenches in artillery will be placed within ten yards of the guns.Theywillnotbeplacedundertrees,asthoseinduceairbursts.Camouflagenetsmustberiggedsothatwhentheycatchfiretheycanbeimmediatelypulledoff.

(9)Takeplentyoftimetosetupanattack.It takes at least two hours to prepare an infantry battalion to execute a

properlycoordinatedattack.Shovingthemintoosoonproducesuselesslosses.(10)Inbattle,smallforces—platoons,companies,andevenbattalions—can

dooneofthreethings,goforward,halt,orrun.Iftheyhaltorrun,theywillbe

aneveneasiertarget.Therefore,theymustgoforward.Whencaughtunderfire,particularly of artillery, advance out of it; never retreat from it.Artillery veryseldomshortensitsrange.

(11)Securitydetachmentsmustgetoutfarther,andmuststayoutatnight.Oneradiocar,wellofftheroad,orwhereitcanseetheroad,orwhereamemberof the crew can observe the road from close quarters, can send informationwhichwillbevital.

(12)Wearetooslowinputtingoutminefieldsandinwiringpositionsforall-around defense.More training time should be devoted to mine-laying andmine-removal.

(13) A battalion of 4.2 chemical mortars, when available, should beattached toan infantrydivision.Aninfantryregiment incombatshouldhavea4.2chemicalcompanyattached.

c.GeneralTraining(1)Moreemphasiswillbeplacedonthehardeningofmenandofficers.All

soldiers and officers should be able to run a mile with combat pack in tenminutesandmarcheightmilesintwohours.Whensoldiersareinactualcontactwiththeenemy,itisalmostimpossibletomaintainphysicalcondition,butifthephysicalconditionishighbeforetheygaincontact,itwillnotfalloffsufficientlyduringcontacttobedetrimental.

(2)Muchtimeiswastedinmountinganddismountingmortarsandmachineguns.Standinggundrillwillbepracticedso

that theoperationwillbeautomaticandcanbeaccomplished in thedark.Theladdermethodofrangingwithmortarsisrecommended.

(3)Ourabilitytofightatnight,asopposedtomovingintopositionatnightfor a dawn attack, is pitiably bad.Wemust learn to execute the attack in thedark.

(4)Sharpenaxes,pickaxes,andshovelsnow,andkeepthemsharp.(5)Battlesarefoughtbyplatoonsandsquads.Placeemphasisonsmallunit

combatinstructionsothatitisconductedwiththesameprecisionasclose-orderdrill.Agoodsolutionappliedwithvigornowisbetterthanaperfectsolutiontenminuteslater.

(6) In instruction from the squad to the regiment, sand tables should beused,andtheofficerornon-combeinginstructedshouldgivetheactualordershewillgiveincombat.Sandtablesneednotbecomplicated.Apieceofgroundintheleeofabuildingisjustasgoodandmuchsimpler.

(7)Officersandmenmustknowtheirequipment.Theymusttrainwiththeequipmenttheyintendtouseinbattle.EquipmentmustbeinthebestoperationalconditionwhentakentotheTheaterofOperations.

d.GuidesforOfficers(1)Officersmustpossessself-confidenceandtheconfidenceoftheirmen.

Twoof the bestways of producing this ismeticulously conducted close-orderdrill, conductedbyofficers, andplatoonmarchesof forty-eight to sixtyhours,duringwhichtheplatooniswhollyonitsown.

(2)Inthefirstactions,newtroopsmustreceiveaggressiveleadershipbyallgrades, including general officers, who must be seen in the front line duringaction.

(3)TheAdjutantGeneralorSecretarytoGeneralStaffmustkeepfortheimmediateinformationoftheCommanding

General a list showing casualties, materiel losses, prisoners of war, capturedmateriel, and replacements of both men and materiel received. Two lists arenecessary.Thefirstonebasedonrumor,thesecondcorrectedbydata.Thefirstonewillbefoundsurprisinglyclosetothesecondone.

(4)Notethetimeofyourrequestsfor,andthetimeofarrivalof,allartilleryandairsupportmissionscalledfor.Ifsupportfailstoarrive,sonote.

(5) There is a universal failure to repeat oral orders back. This failure iscertaintoresultingraveerrors.

(6)Messagesandordersmustuseconcisemilitaryverbiage.(7) Pushwire communications to the limit. Awire phone is worth three

radiosforbothspeedandsecurity.(8) Battalion and company commanders fail to use runners and walkie-

talkieradios.Theyfrequentlyfailtohaverunnerswithornearthem.(9)Militarypoliceatroadjunctionsmusthaveamapordiagramshowing

thepointstowhichvariousroadsleadandtheunitstobefoundonthem.(10)Don’t place large radio sets nearCP’s if theCP is to be in position

more than six hours. If radiosmust be used for longer periods, put themwellaway,scatterthem,anduseremotecontrol.

e.PrisonersGermanprisonersoverfortytalkmoreeasilythantheyoungerones.They

mustbeexaminedseparatelyandnotreturnedtothecagewheretheyoungonesare.PrisonersotherthanGermanusuallytalkfreelyandinaccurately.They,too,should be examinedout of the hearing of, and later separated from the youngNazis.

/.NeedlessFiringThe needless firing of artillery will be checked by the senior artillery

officer.g.NeedlessRequirementsThereisatendencyforthechainofcommandtooverloadjuniorofficersby

excessiverequirementsinthewayoftrainingandreports.Youwillalleviatethisburdenbyeliminatingnonessentialdemands.

2.Infantrya. Infantrymustmove inorder to closewith the enemy. Itmust shoot in

order to move. When physical targets are not visible, the fire of all infantryweaponsmustsearchtheareaoccupiedbyenemy.Usemarchingfire.Itreducesthe accuracy of his fire and increases our confidence. Shoot short. Ricochetsmakenastiersoundsandwounds.Tohaltunderfireisfolly.Tohaltunderfireand not fire back is suicide.Move forward out of fire. Officers must set theexample.

b. The heavy weapons set the pace. In the battalion the heavy weaponscompany paces the battalion. In the regiment the cannon company paces theregiment,butitisthefunctionoftheriflesandthelightmachinegunstoseethatthe heavy weapons have a chance to move. In other words, the rifles andmachinegunsmovetheheavyweaponsintodothekilling.

c.Mortars use great quantities of ammunition. The 81-mm.will fire 800rounds and a 60-mm. 500 rounds in 24 hours. To provide this ammunition,transportationofallkindsmustbeutilized,andinfantryriflemeninthevicinityof the mortars should each carry one round which they can dump at apredestinedspotongoingintothefirefight.Whennotonthemove,allmortars,machineguns,andantitankgunsoftheinfantrymustbeemplacedtofire.

d.Antitankgunsshouldbeplacedwheretheycannotseeorbeseenbeyondtheirlethalantitankrangeunlesstheyarebeingusedintheroleoflightartillery.

e. Few men are killed by the bayonet; many are scared by it. Bayonetsshould be fixedwhen the fire fight starts.Bayonetsmust be sharpenedby theindividualsoldier.TheGermanhatesthebayonetandisinferiortoourmenwithit.Ourmenshouldknowthis.

/.TheM-lrifleisthemostdeadlyrifleintheworld.Ifyoucannotseetheenemy,youcanatleastshootattheplacewhereheisapttobe.

g. Flat trajectory fire against machine guns must be delivered near andparalleltotheaxisofenemyfire.Thispinshimdownuntilthegrenadierswithbombandbayonetcankillhimfrombehind.

h.Firedistribution ispracticallynon-existent inourArmy,with theresultthatthoseportionsoftheenemywhoarevisiblereceiveallthefire,whilethoseportionswhoarenotvisiblefireonourmenwithperfectimpunity.Thisdefectwillbecorrected.

i.Theinfantrybattalionisthesmallestunitwhichcanbesentonaseparatemission. When so used, it is always desirable to reinforce it with artillery,antitankguns,AAguns,and,ifpossible,tanksandengineers.

/.Armoredinfantryshouldnotattackmounted.Itshoulduseitsvehiclestodeploymountedandalsotoassemblefromdeployedformation.

k. Night attacks mean attacks during darkness or by moonlight. Onmoonless nights the attack should start 2Vi hours before dawn twilight; onmoonlightnights,withthemoon.Nightattackmustbeprecededbycarefuldayreconnaissanceandamplewarning.Limitedobjectivesmustbesoughtandmustbeeasily recognizable in thedark.Attack formation is incolumnor in lineofcolumns.DistancesandintervalsarereducedDepthisnecessary.

l. Supporting fires must be arranged, first, to attack the enemy after ourinfantry has been discovered, second, to destroy counter-attacks at dawn.Assaultingcolumnsareprecededbya

security detachment which in turn is preceded by a patrol. The securitydetachment and patrol are absorbed when contact is made. In addition to theassaultingcolumns,areserveshouldbeavailableforexploitationafterdaylight.Countersign and challenge and identification marks on sleeve or helmet arenecessary.Offensivegrenadesshouldbeused.Whendiscovered,openrapidfireandmakeasmuchnoiseaspossible,whilerushingintousethebayonet.

m.Thedefensewillconsistofmutuallysupportingsmallgroupsarrangedindepthandcompletelywiredin.Mineswillbeplaced.

n.Allinfantryofficersmustbeabletoobserveanddirectartilleryfire.3.Artillerya.Sixty-fivetoseventy-fivepercentofallartillerytargetsareprovidedby

forwardobservers.Thesamepercentageof tactical informationoriginateswiththeseobservers,butmuchoftheinformationofbothcharacterstheobserversgetcomes from the infantry. Therefore, the forward observermust be in intimateassociationwiththeinfantry.Hemustbeunderthecontroloftheartilleryliaisonofficerwith thebattalion.Artilleryofficerswith infantrydonot return to theirbatteriesatnight.

b. As soon as a position is captured, the forward observer must reportthrough the liaison officer which of the possible channels of hostile counter-attackheisinapositiontocoverwithobservedfire.Thisinformationmustgototheinfantrybattalioncommander.

c.Observersmustbeabletooperatebothbydayandnight.Useanycaliberof gun at any time to hit any target of opportunity. For this reason forwardobserversoflargecalibersmustbeup.

d. Artillery observers on their own initiative will bring fire on enemyweaponsfiringonour infantry. Infantryofficersareequallyresponsible tocallforsuchfire.

e.Machinegunsgivinglocalprotectiontoartillerymustbesufficientlyfar

outtopreventsmall-armsfirebotheringthefiringbattery.f. Construct dummy batteries. In choosing sites for them, avoid places

wherefiredirectedatthemwilladverselyaffectotherarms.g. Tank attacks can be stopped by artillery concentration of white

phosphorusandhighexplosive.h. Artillery will be emplaced as far forward as possible and will move

forwardateveryopportunity.4.Armora. The primarymission of armored units is the attacking of infantry and

artillery. The enemy’s rear is the happy hunting ground for armor.Use everymeanstogetitthere.

b.Thetacticalandtechnicaltrainingofourarmoredunitsiscorrect.Addedemphasisshouldbeputontankcrewtrainingwithaviewtohittingtheenemyfirst.

c.Againstcounter-attacks, theoffensiveuseofarmorstriking theflank isdecisive.Henceadeeppenetrationbyinfantry,whoserearisprotectedbyarmor,isfeasibleandsafe.

IV.d. There is no such thing as “tank country” in a restrictive sense. Some

typesofcountryarebetterthanothers,buttankshaveandcanoperateanywhere.e.Theintegrityofarmoreddivisionsshouldbepreservedthroughtheuseof

GHQ tank battalions for special, close supporting missions with infantry. Onsuchmissions,thetanksshouldadvancebybounds,fromcovertocoverinrearof the infantry. They will only be exposed when the situation demands theirintervention.Insuchcasestheywillattackincloseassociationwiththeinfantry.

5.Reconnaissancea.Reconnaissance,particularlyonthepartoftheinfantry,mustbestressed,

especiallyatnight.Itisnecessarytosecureinformationeverynightthroughthecaptureofprisonersandtheobservationofhostileactions.Goodmenmustleadthosepatrols.Mechanizedobservationunitsshouldnotbeemployedforsecurityexceptincasesofdireemergency.

b. Junior officers of reconnaissance unitsmust be very inquisitive. Theirreports must be accurate and factual. Negative information is as important aspositiveinformation.Informationmustbetransmittedintheclearbyradioandatonce.Thelocationoftheunitgivingtheinformationshould,wherepossible,bein amodified code. The enemy should be located by amagnetic azimuth andrange from the point of observation. All members of a reconnaissance unitshould know what they are trying to do. The results of all reconnaissanceobtainedinfrontofonedivisionmustbetransmittedtoadjacentunits.

c. Reconnaissance must not lose contact. At night, when not in contact,listening posts should be at least six miles in front of our lines. Dayreconnaissancemustbepusheduntilcontact ismade.Theuseof light tanks innightreconnaissanceusuallyinducestheenemytofireanddisplayhisposition.

IV.AAANDANTITANKS1.AAa.Atleastone,preferablyself-propelled,AAweaponshouldbeattachedto

eachcompanyorbatteryofartillery, infantry,ortanks.ThereshouldbetwoatHeadquartersfromtheDivisionup.The155andlargergunsshouldhaveatleasttwoAAmountsperbattery.Owingtoourairsuperiority,AAshouldneveropenfireuntilattacked.AAisalsogoodforantitank.

2.AntiTanksa. Towed antitank guns should bewell to the front and located to cover

likely avenues of enemy tank approach. Theymust be emplaced so that theycannotseeorbeseenbeyondtheirlethalantitankrange.Self-propelledantitankweaponsshouldbeheldinreservetointervene

against enemy armored attacks. They should locate routes to and firingpositions from probable sites of future activities. All antitank guns should betrained to fire as artillery and be provided with a large proportion of high-explosiveshell.

V.MAINTENANCE

1.Weaponswillbekeptinperfectorder.2.Preventivemaintenancewillbeenforced.Particularattentionshouldbe

given to tirepressure, lubrication,battery,voltage,water in radiators.Vehicleswillbeservicedandmadeoperationalbefore theircrewsrest.Vehicleswillbemarkedinaccordancewithparagraph6-14,A-R850-5.

VI.CAREOFMEN

1.Officersareresponsible,notonlyfortheconductoftheirmeninbattle,butalsofortheirhealthandcontentmentwhennotfighting.Anofficermustbethelastmantotakeshelterfromfire,andthefirsttomoveforward.Similarly,hemustbethelastmantolookafterhisowncomfortatthecloseofamarch.Hemustseethathismenarecaredfor.Theofficermustconstantlyinteresthimselfin the rations of the men. He should know his men so well that any sign ofsicknessornervousstrainwillbeapparenttohim,andhecantakesuchactionasmaybenecessary.

2. Hemust look after his men’s feet, see that they have properly fittingshoes in good condition. That their socks fit—loose or tight socksmake sorefeet. He must anticipate change of weather and see that proper clothing andfootgearisaskedforandobtained.

3. Field and evacuation hospitals must be kept as close to the front asenemy fire permits. The shorter a haul of awoundedman to the hospital, thebetterhischancesofrecovery.

4.Hospitalsshouldbeplacedintheopenandclearlymarked.Donotpermitliaison planes or groups of vehicles to park near them. Such action gives theenemyanexcuseforattacking.

5. The successful soldier wins his battles cheaply so far as his owncasualtiesareconcerned,buthemust

rememberthatviolentattacks,althoughcostlyatthetime,savelivesintheend. Hemust remember that replacements need special attention and see thattheygetacclimatizedtotheirnewunitsasquicklyandharmoniouslyaspossible.

sG.S.PATTON,JR.G.S.PATTON,JR.Lt.GeneralU.S.Army,CommandingSECRETHEADQUARTERSTHIRDUNITEDSTATESARMYAPO403

25September,1944

SUBJECT:LetterofInstructionNumber4To:CorpsCommandersandtheCommandingGeneralXIXTacticalAirCommand

1. The acute supply situation confronting us has caused the SupremeCommander to direct that, until further orders, the Third Army, with itssupportingtroops,andthoseelementsoftheNinthArmyplacedintheline,willassumethedefensive.

2. It is evident that the successful accomplishment of this mission willrequireparticularconcentrationupontwopoints:

a.First, this change in attitudeonourpartmustbe completely concealedfromtheenemy,who,shouldhe learnof it,wouldcertainlymove troopsfromourfronttoopposeotherAlliedArmies.

b.Second,wemustbeinpossessionofasuitablelineofdeparturesothatwe canmove rapidlywhen theSupremeCommander directs us to resume theoffensive.

3.Inordertocarryouttherequirementsofparagraph2a,above,wewillnotdigin,wire,ormine,butwillutilizeathinoutpostzonebackedatsuitableplacesbypowerfulmobilereserves.Wewillfurtherinsurethatallpossibleavenuesoftank attacks are registered in by all batteries—Division, Corps, andArmies—whosegunscanbear.UnderthesupervisionoftheArmyArtilleryOfficerthesezonesofconcentrationwillbenumberedfromnorth

to south and recorded on a uniform map to be distributed to the unitsconcerned,sothatfiremayinstantlybeopenedinanyzone.Further,acopyofthismapwill be placed in the possession of the CommandingGeneral of theXIX Tactical Air Command so that he may coordinate the concentration ofplanesuponanycriticalareainthemostexpeditiousmanner.Counter-attacksbyour mobile reserves should be planned and executed to secure a doubleenvelopmentof thehostile effortwith thepurposeofnotonlydefeating it butdestroyingit.

4. To insure our possessing a suitable line of departure for the futureoffensive, we shall secure the dotted line shown on the attached overlay bymeansoflimitedoperationsinconsonancewithourreducedscaleofsupply.Toprovidethenecessarymeansforsuchlimitedoperations, theutmostparsimonywillbeusedintheexpenditureofgasolineandammunitionconsistentwiththeeconomyofthelivesofourtroops.

5.Wherevercircumstancesadmit,troopsnotintheimmediatepresenceoftheenemywillbebilleted.Assoonasthetroopssobilletedhaverestedandbeenequipped,theywillbegivenconstantpracticeinoffensivetactics.

6.Thedefensive instructionscontained in this letterwillnotbecirculatedbelowthegradeofGeneralOfficer.

7. In closing, I desire to again compliment all of you on themagnificentdashandskillwhichyouhaveshownintheoperationtodate.Weonlyawaitthesignaltoresumeourcareerofconquest.

sG.S.PATTON,JR.G.S.PATTON,JR.Lt.GeneralU.S.ArmyCommanding

COMPOSITIONOFANARMY

ThecompositionofanArmyisnotcleartomanypeople,anditmaybeofinteresttomanytogiveabriefresumeofitscompositionduringacampaign.

AnArmy’s aggregate total of men varies from one hundred thousand tothree hundred thousand, depending upon the number of corps and divisionsassignedtoit.(Thesefiguresdonotincludesupportingairunits.)First, itmustfight.Second,itmusteat.Third,itmustbecapableofrapidmovement.Andlast,but not least, it must be equipped with all essentials necessary to theaccomplishment of its mission. In reality, an Army provides most of thenecessitiesoflifefoundinacommunityofequalsize.

TheArmyHeadquartersismadeupofaHeadquartersCompanyandsomespecial troops toprovide itsownhousekeeping,protection,andadministration.Usually, three or four Corps Headquarters, similarly organized and equippedthoughmuchsmaller,areassignedtoanArmy.IntheCorps,thereareinfantryandarmoreddivisionswhichdothefighting,andmanysupportingtroops,whichhelp them toaccomplish theirmissions.Thesupporting troopsaremadeupoffighting units; such as Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Anti-Aircraft Artillery,TankDestroyer,andChemicalWarfareUnits.

ThereareMilitaryPoliceUnitstoenforcelawandorderandMedicalUnitstotakecareofthesickandwoundedandtosupervisethegeneralhealthofthecommand. TheQuartermaster handles the general supplies, such as gas, food,clothing, and so forth. The Transportation Corps hauls these supplies. SignalUnitsprovidealltypesofcommunication,andtheEngineershavemanytypesofunitswhich enable them to do anything from fighting the enemy and fires tobuilding railroad bridges over rivers. Civil Affairs Detachments handle thecivilian population in liberated and captured towns, and Special ServiceUnitsprovide entertainment for all the troops. Several miscellaneous detachments,such as Secret IntelligenceUnits, FinanceUnits, Prisoner ofWar Interpreters,andthelike,finishoffthelist.

Most of the units are complete with Transportation and CookingDetachments. If not, they are assigned or attached to other units which havefacilitiestoprovideforthem.

ROSTEROFPRINCIPALSTAFFOFFICERS

HEADQUARTERSTHIRDU.S.ARMY

ChiefsofStaff:MajorGeneralHughJ.Galley,ApriltoDecember,1944MajorGeneralH.R.Gay,December,1944,toendofwarDeputyChief of Staff:Colonel PaulD.HarkinsSecretary,General Staff:

LieutenantColonelG.R.PfannG-l:ColonelF.S.MatthewsG-2:ColonelO.W.KochG-2Air:ColonelH.M.FordeG-3:BrigadierGeneralH.G.MaddoxG-4:BrigadierGeneralW.J.MullerG-5:ColonelN.W.Campanole;ColonelR.L.DalferesAdjutantGeneral:ColonelR.E.CummingsAnti-Aircraft:ColonelF.R.Chamberlain,Jr.;ColonelT.F.Gallagher

Artillery:BrigadierGeneralE.T.WilliamsChaplain:ColonelT.H.O’NeillCWS: Colonel E. C. Wallington Engineers: Brigadier General J. F. ConklinFinance: Colonel G. B. Milliken Headquarters Commandant: Colonel R. C.BrattonInspectorGeneral:ColonelC.C.ParkJAG:ColonelC.E.Cheever

MedicalSection:BrigadierGeneralT.D.Hurley;ColonelT.J.HartfordOrdnance:ColonelT.H.NixonProvostMarshal:ColonelJ.C.MacDonald;ColonelP.C.ClaytonPRO: Lieutenant Colonel K. A. Hunter; Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Quirk

QM:ColonelEverettBuschSignal:ColonelE.F.HammondSSO:ColonelK.E.VanBuskirk

TankDestroyer:BrigadierGeneralH.L.Earnest;ColonelL.C.BerryXIXTACTICALAIRCOMMAND

Commander:BrigadierGeneralO.P.WeylandChiefofStaff:ColonelR.Q.Browne,

CORPSTHATSERVEDWITHTHIRDARMY

1August,1944,to9May,1945INCLUDING COMMANDERS AND CHIEFS OF STAFFS VIII Corps: 1 August,

1944,to5September,194421December,1944,to22April,1945Commander:MajorGeneralTroyH.MiddletonChiefofStaff.BrigadierGeneralC.H.SearcyXVCorps:1August,1944,to24August,1944

29August,1944, to29September,1944Commander:LieutenantGeneralWadeH.HaislipChiefofStaff:BrigadierGeneralPearsonMenoherXIICorps:1August,1944,to9May,1945

Commanders:MajorGeneralGilbertR.Cook1August,1944,to17August,1944MajorGeneralMantonS.Eddy17August,1944,to20April,1945MajorGeneralS.LeRoyIrwin20April,1945,to9May,1945ChiefofStaff:BrigadierGeneralR.J.Canine397XXCorps:1August,1944,to9May,1945Commander: Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker Chief of Staff:

BrigadierGeneralW.A.CollierinCorps:31October,1944,to11February,194518April,1945,to9May,

1945 Commanders: Major General John Millikin 31 October, 1944, to 11February,1945

MajorGeneralJamesA.VanFleet18April,1945,to9May,1945ChiefofStaff:ColonelJamesH.PhillipsVCorps:6May,1945,to9May,

1945Commander:MajorGeneralClarenceR.HuebnerChiefofStaff:ColonelS.

B.Mason

DIVISIONSTHATSERVEDWITHTHIRDARMY

1August,1944to9May1945INCLUDINGCOMMANDERSANDASSISTANTDIVISIONCOMMANDERS

DIVISION1stInf.2dInf.4thInf.5thInf.8thInf.26thInf.28thInf.29thInf.35thInf.42dInf.65thInf.69thInf.70thInf.71stInf.76thInf.79thInf.80thInf.83dInf.86thInf.87thInf.89thInf.90thInf.

COMMANDER

Maj.Gen.CliftAndrusMaj.Gen.W.M.RobertsonMaj.Gen.R.O.BartonMaj.Gen.H.W.BlakeleyMaj.Gen. S. Leroy IrwinMaj.Gen.A. E. BrownMaj.Gen.D.A.StrohMaj.Gen.W.S.PaulMaj.Gen.N.D.CotaMaj.Gen.C.H.GerhardtMaj.Gen. P.W.BaadeMaj.Gen.H. J. CollinsMaj.Gen. S. E.ReinhartMaj.Gen.E.F.RheinhardtMaj.Gen.A.J.BarnettMaj.Gen.W.G.Wyman Maj. Gen. W. R. Schmidt Maj. Gen. I. T. Wyche Maj. Gen. H. L.McBride

Maj.Gen.R.C.MaconMaj.Gen.H.M.MelaskyMaj.Gen.F.L.Culin,Jr.Maj.Gen,T.D.FinleyMaj.Gen.R.S.McLainMajGen.J.A.VanFleetMaj.Gen.H.L.Earnest

ASST.DIV.COMMANDER

Brig.Gen.G.A.TaylorBrig.Gen.J.A.VanFleetBrig.Gen.J.H.Stokes,Jr. Brig. Gen. J. S. Rodwell Brig. Gen. A. D.Wamock Brig. Gen. C. D.W.CanhamBrig. Gen. H. N. Hartness Brig. Gen. G. A. Davis Brig. Gen. L. H.WatsonBrig.Gen. E.B. SebreeBrig.Gen.B.B.MiltonbergerBrig.Gen.H.LindenBrig.Gen. J.E.CopelandBrig.Gen.L.H.GibbonsBrig.Gen.T.W.HerrenBrig.Gen.O.S.RolfeBrig.Gen.F.A.WoolfleyBrig.Gen.F.U.GreerBrig.Gen.J.S.Winn,Jr.Brig.Gen.O.SummersBrig.Gen.G.W.SmytheBrig.Gen.C.B.FerenbaughBrig.Gen.G.V.W.PopeBrig.Gen.J.L.McKeeBrig.Gen.J.N.RobinsonBrig.Gen.W.G.WeaverBrig.Gen.J.M.Tully

DIVISION94thInf.

95thInf.97thInf.99thInf.COMMANDERMaj.Gen.H.J.MalonyMaj.Gen.H.L.TwaddleBrig.Gen.M.B.Halsey

Maj.Gen.W.E.LauerASST.DIV.COMMANDERBrig.Gen.H.B.CheadleBrig.Gen.DonC.

FaithBrig.Gen.F.H.PartridgeBrig.Gen.H.T.Mayberry4thArmored5thArmored6thArmored7thArmored8thArmored9thArmored10thArmored11thArmored12thArmored13thArmored14thArmored16thArmored20thArmored17thAirborne101stAirborne

2dFrenchArmoredMaj.Gen.J.S.WoodMaj.Gen.H.J.GaffeyMaj.Gen.W.H.HogeMaj.

Gen.L.E.OliverMaj.Gen.R.W.GrowMaj.Gen.L.M.SilvesterMaj.Gen.R.W.HasbrouckMaj.Gen.J.M.DevineMaj.Gen.J.W.LeonardMaj.Gen.W.H.H.

Morris,Jr.Brig.Gen.C.S.KilburnMaj.Gen.H.EDagerMajGen.R.R.AllenMaj.

Gen.J.B.WoganMaj.Gen.JohnMillikinMaj.Gen.A.C.SmithBrig.Gen.J.L. PierceMaj.Gen.OrlandoWardMaj.Gen.W.M.MileyMaj.Gen.M.D.TaylorMaj.Gen.LeClerc

Brig.Gen.W.L.RobertsBrig.Gen.G.W.Reed,Jr.Brig.Gen.J.L.WhitelawBrig.Gen.G.L.Higgins

BackCover

FromtheinvasionofNormandytotheBattleoftheBulge,GeneralGeorgeS.Patton,Jr.,wasthemostflamboyant,audaciousAlliedleaderofWorldWarII.Brandishinghisfamouspearl-handledpistolsanddrivenbyaprofoundbeliefthatwarsarewonbykillingtheenemyasfastaspossible,PattonslammedthetanksandmenoftheThirdArmyacrossEuropeatabreakneckpace.Hebattlednot only the enemy but Supreme Headquarters; he complained SHAEF wasdoingall itcould todeny imearlyvictory.Nowin thesefascinatingandfrankmemoirs, Patton speaks out with intense personal feelings about the SecondWorldWar, the art ofwar, and the soldiers life.He gives us an unforgettableself-portrait of anAmericanProfessional soldier caught in the toilsof abrutalwar.

136387678300250ISBN[]-5S3-13Li3fl-D