war and peace e-book

Edited by

Mohammadbagher Forough

At War for Peace

Series EditorsDr Robert FisherDr Daniel Riha

Advisory Board

Dr Alejandro Cervantes-Carson Revd Dr Kenneth Wilson, O.B.EProfessor Margaret Chatterjee Martin McGoldrickDr Wayne Cristaudo Revd Stephen MorrisMira Crouch Professor John ParryDr Phil Fitzsimmons Paul ReynoldsProfessor Asa Kasher Professor Peter TwohigOwen Kelly Professor S Ram Vemuri

A Probing the Boundaries research and publications project.http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/probing-the-boundaries/

Hostility and Violence:‘War and Peace’

Probing the Boundaries

At War for Peace

Edited by


Inter-Disciplinary Press

Oxford, United Kingdom

© Inter-Disciplinary Press 2010http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/publishing/id-press/

The Inter-Disciplinary Press is part of Inter-Disciplinary.Net – a globalnetwork for research and publishing. The Inter-Disciplinary Press aims topromote and encourage the kind of work which is collaborative, innovative,imaginative, and which provides an exemplar for inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in aretrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without the priorpermission of Inter-Disciplinary Press.

Inter-Disciplinary Press, Priory House, 149B Wroslyn Road, Freeland,Oxfordshire. OX29 8HR, United Kingdom.+44 (0)1993 882087

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for thisbook is available from the British Library.

ISBN: 978-1-84888-035-1First published in the United Kingdom in eBook format in 2010. FirstEdition.

Table of Contents

Introduction viiMohammadbagher Forough

PART I War and Peace

The Changing Character of Military Labour and 3Its Effects on Public LifeMark Balawender

Blurring of the Lines? The Merging of Civil- 11Military Responses in Conflict Scenarios:Afghanistan and BeyondCorin Chater

Holy Peace and Holy War 21Nevin Climenhaga

The Myth of the Hundred Years Peace: War in the 33Nineteenth CenturyEric Royal Lybeck

Peacekeeping without Banisters: The Need For New 45Practices That Go Beyond Just War TheoryAnya Topolski

PART II War and Terrorism

On the Dangers of Innocents – or, Whose Suffering 59Shall we Value?Emília Brodencová

EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Security vs. Justice? 69Oldřich Bureš

Global Society must be Defended: War is On! 81Teresa Degenhardt

Blurring the Line Between War and Peace: The United 93States and Al Qaeda in the Global War on TerrorismSean N. Kalic

Income-Based Distribution of Terrorism 105Piotr Lis

Defining Two Categories of Non-State Actors: Do 117we Need to Gain more Control over Them toPrevent Specific Threats or is it against the BasicPillars of Democracy?Radana Makariusová

PART III War, Media, Communications

The Informational War against Terrorism: New 127Opportunities and New Risks (German Experience)Darya Bazarkina

Art as Infiltration: Drawing the Military-Industrial 135ComplexJill Gibbon

Information Warfare as a Part of Communication 145Management in Contemporary RussiaEvgeny N. Pashentsev

Peace and War: Communicating Total Spectrum 155DominanceVladimir Suchan

Communicative Aspect of the Activities of the 169British Intelligence Service (MI-6) NowadaysSvetlana V. Zudochkina

Introduction


‘I love the smell of napalm in the morning... The smell, youknow that gasoline smell... smelled like…victory.’

Apocalypse Now

‘War Is Peace,’ says one of the three slogans on the outside wall ofthe Ministry of Truth in George Orwell’s 1984. In 2002, eighteen years afterthe promised dystopia of the book, George W. Bush said: ‘I just want you toknow that, when we talk about war, we're really talking about peace.’1 In theFebruary of the same year, he and Tony Blair were jointly nominated for theNobel Peace Prize by a conservative Norwegian politician. In 2009, BarackObama, while running two of the longest and deadliest wars in recent history,was in fact awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Norway. ‘Something is rottenin the state of Denmark;’ and very probably in the state of our conceptualvocabulary!

It is, therefore, high time we paid serious scholarly attention toterms, such as war and peace, that are deliberately misappropriated bypoliticians and obliviously taken for granted in everyday life and the massmedia, redefine them, recast the boundaries that separate them from oneanother, trace the interconnections, and last but not least, map out as far andclearly as possible the gray areas where two or more of such terms overlapwith or cave in on one another. To undertake this task in respect of war andpeace and other relevant terms such as terrorism, military, intelligence,justice, etc., a very diverse group of scholars from all over the world gottogether for three days (April-May 2009) in the city of Prague for theconference War and Peace, and discussed these topics from a very diversearray of perspectives and academic backgrounds. This volume is meant to bea snapshot of what actually went on in the conference.

I would like to set out the discussion from my own academicbackground, political philosophy, with a word or two about war and peace asconcepts, by drawing on the geophilosophy of Gilles Deleuze and FelixGuattari, especially as far as their understanding of concepts is concerned, asone way to go about analyzing the concepts of war and peace. Geophilosophyaims at breaking free from the subject/object bipolar disorder that hashaunted Western thought and philosophy since Descartes down to thelinguistic idealism that is rampant in postmodern philosophy: ‘Subject andobject give a poor approximation of thought. Thinking is neither a line drawnbetween subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other; rather,thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth.’2

Introduction

______________________________________________________________

viii

In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy asthe art or the discipline that involves ‘creating concepts,’ and then enumeratesome characteristics of the concepts, some of which I will briefly mentionand expand upon in relation to war and peace in what follows. ‘There are nosimple concepts. Every concept has components and is defined by them. Ittherefore has a combination (chiffre). It is a multiplicity, although not everymultiplicity is conceptual.’3 This is the first characteristic of concepts. Ourfirst task in analyzing war and peace, then, I would argue, is to forgo thesimplistic Manichean perception of them and determine what componentsthey are made of. Who are the actors involved? What are the mechanismsthat initiate, sustain, and terminate war and peace? What are their conditionsof possibility? ‘Every concept’ Deleuze and Guattari further specify, ‘has anirregular contour defined by the sum of its components’4 Only when wespecify what these components are, will we be able to mark off theboundaries of the concepts, which must necessarily be irregular; that is tosay, no concepts can be defined once and for all as having regular boundariesand being dirempted from other concepts in a clear-cut radical way.

Every concept, put otherwise, is in a perpetual flux of change. ‘Allconcepts are connected to problems without which they would have nomeaning, and which can themselves only be isolated or understood as theirsolution emerges.’5 This is a very interesting development in analyzingconcepts. With this principle, Deleuze and Guattari choose to break free fromthe majority of postmodern philosophers who interpret all phenomena interms of the linguisticality of human experience. Deleuze and Guattari, intenton bringing philosophy down to the terra firma of reality, see concepts asrooted in real material problems. There could be, therefore, no war or peace(as concepts at least), if they are not analyzed in light of the problems thathave given rise to them, the ones they are meant or said to resolve, and theones they themselves engender. Wars could arise for instance from problemssuch as clashes of interests, imperialistic ventures, territorial disputes, theneed for (more) natural resources, etc.; they are meant, or so we are told, toresolve such problems as disposing of a dictatorship, bringing ‘freedom’ and‘democracy,’ stopping a regime from committing a grave crime, etc.; theyalso create problems, such as genocide, devastation, displacement,homelessness, etc. All these problems are totally interconnected and anyanalyses that do not take into account the problem-based nature of theconcept would go astray, according to the two thinkers.

The problem therefore always precedes the concept ingeophilosophy. The next principle is that ‘concepts are only created as afunction of problems which are thought to be badly understood or badlyposed.’6 This principle is definitely true about war and peace in that if theproblems that bring about wars for instance were posed correctly, and weretherefore resolved rationally, they would not lead to wars in the first place. A


______________________________________________________________

ix

territorial dispute, for instance, must necessarily be posed badly on at leastone of the two opposite sides for it to cause some sort of violent clash. ‘Aconcept requires not only a problem through which it recasts and replacesearlier concepts but a junction of problems where it combines with othercoexisting concepts that sometimes belong to other planes of life.’7 This isabsolutely true about war and peace as you will see in the contributions tothis volume. War and peace are intricately meshed with the concepts ofdemocracy, freedom, security, terrorism, public sphere, to mention only afew. Problems from all these spheres should plug into one another in orderfor a war to start. These interconnections among different concepts changethe nature and redraw the boundaries of our concepts and thereby our moraland conceptual vocabularies. Nowadays, it is somehow impossible to thinkabout war without taking into account other notions such as ‘freedom,’‘democracy,’ ‘evil,’ ‘terrorism,’ etc.

The very interconnectedness of concepts changes our perception ofthem and the concepts they are plugged into. The next principle is that aconcept ‘renders [its] components inseparable within itself. Components orwhat defines the consistency of the concept, its endoconsistency, are distinct,heterogeneous, and yet not separable.8 What glues the components of aconcept together? A gray in-between area, on which the Deleuzian concept of‘zone de voisinage’ (‘zone of neighborhood’) can shed some light. All thecomponents within the concept have zones of neighborhood among oneanother. Components remain distinct, but something cuts through them that is‘undecidable between them’. These zones are responsible for the internalconsistency of the concept; otherwise the concept would break apart or loseits concepthood, if you will, or become a totally different concept. Theconfusions that plague the discussions of war and peace usually stem fromsuch zones of indiscernibility that exist among the components of a conceptand/or among different concepts. In light of this principle, we can shed somelight on the quotes from the Orwellian Ministry of Truth and George W.Bush’s quote at the beginning of this introduction. War and peace could anddo certainly have zones of neighborhood and indiscernibility between them,but it would be a conceptual confusion or distortion, at least from theDeleuzo-Guattarian point of view, to argue that the two concepts completelyoverlap with each other, so that you could say war is peace or be talkingabout war while what you really mean is peace.

This volume is divided into three parts, each focusing on one aspectof war and peace. The first part, War and Peace, deals with the topic in moregeneral terms than the other two, and includes five contributions. MarkBalawender considers the widespread use of private military companies inthe Post-9/11 world and the lack of legal and political supervision on theiractivities as a Schmittian ‘state of exception,’ which compromises the abilityof the public sphere to have control over the use of military force. Corin

Introduction

______________________________________________________________

x

Chater examines the civil-military interactions amongst and between bothinternational and governmental and non-governmental actors in the contextof the war in Afghanistan, and argues that there has been considerableprogression in steps to address prospects for such interactions. Discussingreligion in the context of war and peace in national and international arenas,Nevin Climenhaga examines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which religionhas played a major role, and critiques the common assumption that religionexacerbates war and justifies violence. Eric Royal Lybeck questions the mythof the hundred years’ peace (1815-1914), as advocated by Polanyi amongothers, by arguing that it is solely based on the number of battlefield deaths,and calls for a theory that takes into account qualitative geopolitical andsocial significances. Studying two post-Cold War trends, just war theory andthe increase in UN-led peacekeeping operations, Anya Topolski contends thatthe norms of just war theory do not befit peacekeeping activities, and calls fora new practice of peacekeeping based in relationality and inspired by anArendtian form of reflection and judgment.

The second part, War and Terrorism, that includes six contributions,focuses on terrorism and the ways in which it relates to war, peace,democracy, etc. Emília Brodencová investigates the notions of innocence,suffering, and guilt in the discourse on terrorism in the context of modernwarfare, and critiques the discourse surrounding such notions as polarizingand ideologically laden. Oldřich Bureš builds on the analyses of thenormative debate concerning the nature of the relationships between freedom,justice and security in the context of European Union’s counterterrorismpolicy in recent years. Drawing on Foucault and Agamben’s analyses ofcriminology, Teresa Degenhardt examines the intersections between twosecurity mechanisms, war and punishment, by critiquing representations ofwars (e.g., in Afghanistan and Iraq) in terms of crime and punishment, asanother form of state apparatus used to depoliticize the conflict anddisqualify the enemy. Sean N. Kalic delves into the blurred boundariesbetween war and peace by evaluating and explaining the history of Al Qaeda(and the U.S. led response to it), as a non-state actor that is involved in thestate-based Westphalian political imaginary. Applying time series analysisand expanding upon the work of Enders and Sandler, Piotr Lis addresses thequestion of whether/how some major historical events (the end of the ColdWar, 9/11, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq) induced changes in the distributionof terrorism among countries by income class. Radana Makariusová calls intoquestion a definition of Global civil society that would put all the non-stateactors in one homogenous altruistic boat, and offers an alternative hypothesisthat would delineate two forms of non-state actors in the global civil society:the altruistic and the unsocial/dark. She then ponders on the question ofinstitutionalized control over non-state actors in the global civil society.


______________________________________________________________

xi

The third part, War, Media, and Communications, includes fivecontributions, and is centered on how different media and communicationsstrategies relate to war and peace. Darya Bazarkina addresses the question ofinformational war against terrorism and the risks and opportunities that sucha war creates. She discusses the experience of German special services in thesphere of informational counteraction against terrorism, and the reaction ofthe German society to such measures. Jill Gibbon discusses how arts,especially the caricature, relate to academic research about war, and usesdrawings made in arms fairs to analyze the new marketing strategiesimplemented by arms companies in the face of pressures on the military-industrial complex in 2009-2010. Evgency N. Pashentsev investigates therole and features of information warfare in the contemporary Russianbusiness and politics, in the larger backdrop of world tendencies in theeconomic, political, and military spheres of life. Drawing on Hobbes’Leviathan, Vladimir Suchan addresses the twisted question of war and peace(or the Orwellian ‘War Is Peace’) by pitting the common narrative of the U.S.Global War on Terror (GWOT) against the imperialist geopolitical andstrategic thinking with respect to Eurasia. Svetlana V. Zudochkina studiesthe communicative nature of the current activities of the British IntelligenceService (MI-6) as compared with such activities during the Cold War era,especially those activities involving Russia, and argues that intelligencenowadays occupies a position very different from the ‘spy versus spy’ styleof the Cold War era.

Notes

1 GW Bush, addressing addressing the Department of Housing and UrbanPlanning, June 18, 2002.2 G Deleuze & F Guattari, What is Philosophy? H Tomlinson & G Burchill(trans), Verso, London, 1994, p. 85.3 Ibid, p. 15.4 Ibid, p. 16.5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 Ibid, p. 18.8 Ibid, p. 19.

PART I

War and Peace

The Changing Character of Military Labour and Its Effectson Public Life

Mark Balawender

AbstractIn this paper I discuss how current use of military contractors (privatemilitary companies or PMCs) represents a ‘state of exception’ in theSchmittian sense, and try to reach some conclusions about the effect this hason the ability of the public sphere to make political decisions about the use ofthe military. I argue that military contractors exist in a legal anomic zone andthat their increased usage has compromised the ability for public reason todictate the use of military power. PMCs consist of private employees ratherthan being a public resource, reducing the ability of the public to dissentagainst their use. PMC’s also are politically power economic agents whoseinstrumental interests coincide with strategic state interests in a way thatprevent the use of public regulation.

Key Words: Military contractors, state of exception, public sphere, publicrationality, democracy, instrumental rationality.

*****

One of the most distinctive features of the post 9/11 wars in Iraq andAfghanistan is the heavy use of ‘private military contractors.’ Privatecontractors have been used in all US wars, however, their use has been on therise since the end of the Cold War and has exploded in current conflicts. TheIraq war involves the largest number of private military personnel used by theUnited States to date, and, in Afghanistan close to 70% of the military forceis composed of private contractors.1 This rise has been attributed to thereduction of army sizes after the end of the cold war and the availability ofsurplus military labour. However, it also appears that the US employscontractors because of the lack of legal and political regulation on theiractivities.

I argue that military contractors represent a form of Carl Schmitt'sState of Exception in two important ways. First, there are no legal structureswhich can regulate and provide sanctions for illegal behaviour of PMCs. As aresult they may take on tasks or be deployed in circumstances where theinstrumental effectiveness of uniformed military is reduced by internationallaw. Second, their use circumvents public sphere democratic as well ascongressional controls on the deployment of soldiers. It’s not controversial tosay that the US would have needed a draft to fight the current wars had theynot been able to hire a huge proportion of private contractors.

The Changing Character of Military Labour

______________________________________________________________

4

I believe there is a fundamental tension present in this use of PMCs.On the one hand, if PMCs are a part of the state of exception, then in thismode they enhance executive power and fulfil Schmitt’s notion of sovereignpower as the ability to suspend the law. The commodification andprivatization of military labour is the suspension of both the democratic,domestic and the international legal regulations on the use of military force.On the other hand, as Georgio Agamben notes, the suspension of the law in astate of exception also paradoxically threatens the institution of the sovereignstate. While PMCs have allowed the Iraq and Afghanistan wars to proceedwithout many of the political hindrances they would have faced (morecasualties, the necessity for a draft), the lack of regulation that themarketplace brings also empowers PMCs to act autonomously in ways thatseverely threaten state sovereignty. In addition to possessing more militaryforce than most developing nations, the largest PMCs have also becomepolitical lobbyists for their own economic interests. They have lobbied to aidregimes with which the US has a non-interaction policy, and in this waychallenge both public democratic power and sovereign executive power.Thus, their effectiveness at supporting a state of exception and sovereignpower that results from their private status also, paradoxically, threatens statesovereignty (in addition to democratic power). The turn to the marketplaceand the development of Private Military Corporations has made the use ofmilitary force more flexible for the US government and at the same timereduced the control and legitimacy of a state that formerly possessed amonopoly on the legitimate use of violence.

1. Schmitt/Agamben and the State of ExceptionThe state of exception is an idea initially presented in Carl Schmitt’s

Dictatorship (1921) and further elaborated on in his work, Political Theology(1922). It refers to actions taken by a government in order to preserve itself ata time of emergency, when that institution is threatened. Because agovernment is threatened with being destroyed, it must sometimes resort toextra legal actions that supersede the legal powers of the government and therestrictions upon it. This is justified through the idea of necessity.

A recurrent opinion posits the concept of necessity as thefoundation of the state of exception. According to atenaciously repeated Latin adage, necessitas legem nonhabet, ‘necessity has no law,’ which is interpreted in twoopposing ways: ‘necessity does not recognize any law’ and‘necessity creates its own law’.2

For Schmitt, this is a theory of sovereign power. Sovereignty does not comefrom legislating or enforcing laws, but from the ability to act outside of them.

Mark Balawender

______________________________________________________________

5

One is sovereign to the extent that one can create a state of exception andsuspend the law. ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. …Thesovereign stands outside of the normally valid juridical order, and yet belongsto it, for it is he who is responsible for deciding whether the constitution canbe suspended in toto.’ 3

Many of the actions of Bush administration have fit this type ofexecutive action—specifically domestic surveillance, the authorization of theuse of torture, and the classification of enemy combatants between criminaland POW. Military contractors fall under the concept of a state of exceptionin a primary sense because there is no legal structure under which they can beprosecuted. While there are a number of legal structures that contractorscould fall under, none of them actually function as law for contractors. Forinstance, consider the following three legal structures:

Official military personnel fall under the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice (UCMJ) which applies to all uniformed soldiers. In 2005 amendmentswere made to the UCMJ to make prosecution of contractors possible, but thelegal community remains reluctant about trying civilians in military courts.Many express worries that such an extension could put reporters and othercivilians in war zones under military control, due to broad language in theextension. Military Contractors, thus, have not fallen under the UCMJ.Contractors are not under a chain of command from the military, asuniformed soldiers are. Their legal relationship to the military is contractual,and punitive measures take the economic form of having contracts revoked.

Under the Protocol One Addition to the Geneva Convention, addedin 1977 though never ratified by the U.S., military contractors who engage infighting are considered unlawful combatants and do not have access toprisoner of war status. They would be considered criminals, for instance, ifthey violated laws in Iraq. However, Iraqis have been unable to prosecutemilitary contractors, for the same reasons they have no legal authority overmembers of the U.S. military. In 2007, the Coalition Provisional Authority,the transitional government in Iraq, under the administration of PaulBremmer, enacted Order 17 which stated that ‘Contractors shall not besubject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms andconditions of their Contracts…’4 The Iraqi government still has no authorityover private military companies, although there have been attempts to changeOrder 17 to give Iraq jurisdiction.

Under U.S. federal law it is possible for contractors to be prosecutedunder the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). In 2004, theMEJA was revised to include personnel working for the US StateDepartment, and in fact, the five Blackwater shooters involved in killingseventeen Iraqi civilians in 2007 have been charged in the US under theMEJA (and have subsequently been acquitted). Despite this, critics argue thatthe MEJA does not actually function as law for military contractors because


______________________________________________________________

6

they are charged by prosecutors from within the US, which presentssignificant practical barriers to carrying out the legal procedure. First, the USmust send US investigators to the location of incident to conduct their owninvestigations—necessarily, long after the fact. Second, trials in federalcourts have strict evidence requirements. A solid chain of custody over theevidence must be established to determine guilt, along with otherrequirements (such as bringing witnesses to the US) that are difficult toobtain in such a long distance legal procedure.

The result of this legal atmosphere is that, As of 2007 there had yetto be single prosecution of contract workers in Iraq. As Peter Singer hasnoted: ‘Imagine a town of 100,000 people, and there hasn’t been aprosecution in three years, how do you justify that?’5

2. The Instrumental Effectiveness Generated by Anomic StatusSince private security contractors are able to act in a manner not

legally available for uniformed personnel, they have a practical advantage insome circumstances. For instance, contractors guard most diplomats andAmericans abroad in Iraqi and Afghani war zones, as well as militarylocations such as the ‘Green Zone’ in the Baghdad, and reconstructionlocations. One of the ostensible reasons for their use in this capacity is thatthey have less legal injunctions against engaging with potential enemysoldiers. When facing an enemy that blends in with civilian populations,being able to engage in firefights without fear of consequences for violatingthe laws protecting civilians makes private military soldiers more effective atguarding diplomats, convoys and locations with respect to the issue ofrestraints on violence.

Likewise, contract workers have been involved in many instances ofillegal interrogation (they were a significant percentage of the workers at theAbu Ghraib prison6), without any legal consequences. From the military’sperspective this is another way to effectively outsource torture, since thoseare individuals free from fear of legal consequences.7 The increased use ofmilitary contractors for practical reasons is, therefore, connected in manyways to their private status, and the lack of legal restrictions on actors withthis status. In effect, the US has adopted a state of exception with regard toprivate soldiers, making use of their increased effectiveness in an unregulatedsphere.

3. Loss of Public Oversight on the Use of Military Force:The shift to military contractors also functions to promote a state of

exception by freeing the government from some of the public-relationshipconstraints it has historically been held to in using the military. The state ofexception functions in this way mainly to mask or launder government use ofmilitary force.

Mark Balawender

______________________________________________________________

7

First of all, one of the most serious PR risks during a war is thenumber of casualties the war generates. This can mobilize politicalopposition to a war very quickly. The use of contractor in the case of the Iraqwar has allowed the government to report official casualties that are muchlower than the actual number of US citizens hurt or killed in the conflict.With the number of contractors currently equalling or exceeding the numberof uniformed military, it’s clear that on the U.S. side, the number ofcasualties far exceeds the official reported amount.

In a related consequence, the ability of the public to protest the puttingof Americans who serve in a public-duty capacity in danger is reduced by thechange in status of those who serve. Once in the public military soldiers haveno private ability to refuse to serve in particular conflicts—This creates theneed and ability for the public to protect them by only exposing them todanger when absolutely necessary. Soldiers who serve in a private capacity,on the other hand, are purely economic actors, who can take or refusecontracts—negating the ability for the public to protest a violent conflict ontheir behalf. The public cannot complain that we’re ‘sending our sons anddaughters to die’ with the same force when the contract is economic ratherthan public-service based. These factors reduce the PR burden and publicaccountability the government faces when going to war.

Being able to mobilize military force through private channels alsoallows them to be ‘unofficially’ engaged in military operations without publicdeclaration and approval. For instance, in 1998, in the Balkans, the US wasable to promote one of its foreign policy goals without official involvementby encouraging the Croatian government to utilize the company MilitaryProfessional Resources Inc. (MPRI) for military training. That companytrained the Croatian Military, which was then able to successfully attack theSerbs in Operation Storm. Over 150,000 Serbs were uprooted in act manycritics called ethnic cleansing. ‘MPRI involvement in these areas allows thegovernment to achieve foreign-policy goals free from the need to secureCongressional approval and safe in the knowledge that, should a situationdeteriorate, official US participation can be denied.’8 In South and CentralAmerica, the US remains involved in the drug wars through privatecompanies, since public involvement is illegal.

Federal law bans U.S. soldiers from participating inColombia's war against left-wing rebels and from trainingarmy units with ties to right-wing paramilitaries infamousfor torture and political killings. There are no suchrestrictions on for-profit companies, though, and since thelate 1990s, the United States has paid private militarycompanies an estimated $1.2 billion, both to eradicate cocacrops and to help the Colombian army put down rebels who


______________________________________________________________

8

use the drug trade to finance their insurgency.9

Additionally, contracts with private military companies are not publicallyavailable through the Freedom of Information Act.

Using military force without the approval of congress puts thedecision firmly within the executive branch of the government and putsforeign policy control one degree further away from public involvement.There are no official avenues for public opposition to these actions, if andwhen their existence is made public knowledge. The public cannot hold itscongressional members responsible for such decisions, limiting the potentialfor public political backlash. Hence, the use of private military companiesengenders a significant loss of public ability to negate or veto military actionthrough popular dissent. While on the one hand the use of PMCs outside oftraditional regulations seems rational for the use and expansion of executivepower, their rise as corporations allows them to act in ways that compromiseexecutive as well as democratic. Because of this, I believe there aresignificant tensions generated by the funding and use of PMCs.

There are at least a few significant documented cases of a PMCchanging US foreign policy, and collectively seventeen of the largest militarycontracting companies contributed over $12.4 million to political campaignsbetween 1999- and 2003.10 In 1998, MPRI wanted to provide contractingservices that were requested by Equatorial Guinea, but was not approved todo so by the US State Department in light of significant human rightsconcerns about that regime. Equatorial Guinea has a history of torture and themurdering of politics dissidents leading to State Department sanctions againstrelations with them. This did not stop MPRI, however, which mobilized aprivate political campaign to change this decision

MPRI launched a full-scale blitz to overturn the decision,quietly dispatching company officials to work the hallwaysof the Pentagon, State Department, and Capitol. … ‘This isnot something they want a wide discussion on inCongress.’ MPRI's executives argued that the United Statesshould be engaging Equatorial Guinea, both to improve itsrecord on human rights and to ensure access to its oilreserves.11

The end result of this action was that the US state department reversed itsdecision in 2000, giving MPRI approval to do contract work for EquatorialGuinea. The details of this contract remain private.

Mark Balawender

______________________________________________________________

9

4. ConclusionThe rise of executive sovereign power has occurred simultaneously

through the creation of an anomic zone for military contractors and the moveto increasingly commodify that type of labour. These phenomena existsymbiotically, in that both situations are necessary for either to exist. WhilePMCs lobby to maintain their current legal status and promote their use, theyalso lobby to open new markets of violent conflict that are not directly withinthe purview of state interests. Thus while it while they may be deployed forexecutive sovereign interests, their status in the market place makes thempowerful political actors that can influence sovereign power. This tension intheir relationship to sovereign power exists in addition to their devastatingeffects on the ability to democratically control the use of military force.

Notes

1 J Glanz, ‘Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Afghanistan’, New YorkTimes, September 1, 2009.2 G Agamben, State of Exception, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,2005, p. 25.3 C Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept ofSovereignty, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, MIT Press,Cambridge, MA, 1985.4 ‘Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised),’ ed. CPA.5 S Horton, specialist in Military Law at Columbia University, as quoted by:A J Rubin & P Von Zielbauer, ‘Blackwater Case Highlights LegalUncertainties’, New York Times, October 11, 2007.6 ‘This state of affairs had grave consequences in the Abu Ghraib prisonabuse case. A reported 100% of the translators and 50% of the interrogatorswere private contractors from the Titan and CACI firms respectively. TheU.S. Army found that contractors were involved in 36% of the proven abuseincidents and identified 6 PMF employees in particular that were culpable inthe abuses. However, not one of these individuals has yet been indicted,prosecuted, or punished. This is despite the fact that the US Army has foundthe time to do so for the enlisted soldiers involved.’ P Singer, ‘The PrivateMilitary Industry and Iraq: What Have We Learned and Where to Next?’,Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF),Geneva, 2004).7 ‘Last year, the C.I.A. director, Michael Hayden, told Congress thatcontractors employed by the C.I.A. had water boarded detainees.’, SChesterman, ‘Blackwater and the Limits to Outsourcing Security’, New YorkTimes, November 12, 2009.


______________________________________________________________

10

8 D Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper OxfordUniversity Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford,1998. p. 62.9 B Yeoman, ‘Soldiers of Good Fortune’, Mother Jones, http://barryyeoman.com/articles/soldiersfortune.html., Viewed 28-7-10.10 Ibid.11 Ibid.

Bibliography

Agamben, G., State of Exception. University of Chicago Press, Chicago,2005.

Chesterman, S., ‘Blackwater and the Limits to Outsourcing Security’. NewYork Times. November 12, 2009.

Glanz, J., ‘Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Afghanistan’. New YorkTimes. September 1, 2009.

Rubin, A.J. & von Zielbauer, P., ‘Blackwater Case Highlights LegalUncertainties’. New York Times. October 11, 2007.

Shearer, D., Private Armies and Military Intervention. Adelphi Paper OxfordUniversity Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford,1998.

Singer, P., ‘The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What have We Learnedand Where to Next?’. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of ArmedForces (DCAF), Geneva, 2004.

Yeoman, B., ‘Soldiers of Good Fortune’. Mother Jones. http://barryyeoman.com/articles/soldiersfortune.html., Viewed 28-7-10.

Mark Balawander is a PhD student at the Department of Philosophy atMichigan State University.

Blurring of the Lines? The Merging of Civil-MilitaryResponses in Conflict Scenarios: Afghanistan and Beyond

Corin Chater

AbstractThis paper focuses on an evolution in civil-military interfaces and relations inAfghanistan amongst and between both international governmental and non-governmental actors. In the context of a conflict environment, state andmultilateral militaries and associated bodies have, through a variety ofmechanisms, had a major role in coordinating and delivering developmentand humanitarian assistance while simultaneously carrying out offensivetactical operations against an active insurgency. Such an unprecedentedfunction has, with certain justification, been severely criticized by the non-governmental aid community, who have lamented the ‘Militarisation ofHumanitarian Assistance’, and the consequential impact upon their activitiesin the field. However, over the course of the multilateral deployment inAfghanistan, there has emerged a tacit acceptance that in order to protect thesecurity of civilian individuals, both sides offer considerable expertise that isnot worthy of immediate dismissal. Through the lens of ProvincialReconstruction Teams (PRTs) and International Non-GovernmentalOrganizations (INGOs) presently operating in Afghanistan, the paperexamines the slowly emerging nexus and evolving interactions between thecivilian and military communities in a conflict environment. It will argue thatwhile there remain many challenges in civil-military responses in complexsecurity situations, there has been a marked progression in steps to addressprospects for a greater level of cohesion and understanding that takefundamental concerns of both sides into account. The paper will conclude byarguing that collaboration between civilian and military elements willincrease in the short-term, with associated alterations at the policy level ofboth that will include more knowledge about the other, dedicated roles forinterface, and the conduct of war and peace-building. Finally, possiblescenarios for more effective civil-military interaction in potential futuredeployments where security and humanitarian circumstances closely mirrorthe current deployment in Afghanistan will be presented.

Key Words: Civil-military relations, conflict, humanitarian assistance,development, NATO, counter-insurgency, peace-building, non-governmentalorganisations, Afghanistan, ISAF.

*****

Blurring of the Lines?

______________________________________________________________

12

1. Civil-Military Development and Reconstruction Activities inAfghanistan

In many ways, international intervention in Afghanistan since theinitial deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) inearly 2002 has proved to be a grand experiment in nation building. Followingover two decades of internecine conflict and repressive rule, external actors,be they international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) or countryrepresentatives of ISAF are facing formidable challenges in repairing thepolitical, social, and economic fabric of a shattered country. However, whileAfghanistan is not unique in terms of implementing development andreconstruction activities following a traumatic event(s), there are distinctivecircumstances in evidence that have proved to fundamentally impact upon thestrategy employed to carry out this goal. Chief amongst them is the realitythat Afghanistan remains, over much of the country, a conflict environment,where the already dismal state of living conditions and services hasincreasingly been compounded by escalating threats to the human security ofthe Afghan population from violent non-state groups.

For member-states that comprise ISAF, this reality has necessitateda certain duality of strategy in order to achieve the stated goals of security forthe population, effective governance and rule of law, and economic andsocial development.1 On the one hand, the dire state of Afghan poverty andcivil society has prompted international actors to undertake small and large-scale development, reconstruction, and humanitarian initiatives. On the other,direct offensive operations aimed at defeating, through force of arms, anactive and intensifying insurgency are also of critical importance.Consequently, separate battles (against poverty and against a robust physicalenemy) are being fought simultaneously, an eventuality which has very littleprecedence in the annals of armed conflict, especially in a country as diverseas Afghanistan. This paper will focus exclusively on the former tactic,bearing in mind that the two are somewhat interrelated.

For the INGO community who are, of course, primarily concernedwith development and humanitarian goals, Afghanistan has proved to be avery challenging and frustrating environment, primarily due to theaforementioned lack of security that has impacted upon their programming(and safety of their staff), but also more significantly, the oftentimesantagonistic relationships that have developed with the official developmentmechanisms of ISAF states: the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),where a large majority of the funds for development assistance are beingchannelled, coordinated, and delivered.

Indeed, the PRT is a curious creation. They are typically comprisedof representatives from three separate divisions of government: the militaryarm, the diplomatic/foreign affairs arm, and the development arm.2 Thistripartite approach is meant to facilitate the differing levels of expertise

Corin Chater

______________________________________________________________

13

required for the coordination and delivery of aid in an operating environmentthat is acknowledged as being insecure. Variously termed the 3D(Development, Diplomacy, and Defence), whole of government, integrated,or comprehensive approach on behalf of participating ISAF states, the PRT isthe physical manifestation of nation building policy on the ground inAfghanistan. Twenty-six PRTs are currently spread over the majority ofAfghanistan’s provinces. In theatre, they generally maintain a physicalseparation from the main ISAF country Task Force, who serve no aidfunction, per se.

What emerges is a new paradigm where two completely separategroups of actors (ISAF state representatives and INGOs) with differingmotivations are ultimately seeking similar goals while sharing the sameoperating environment. Traditionally, there been a deep-seated distrustbetween the two that is now, by necessity, slowly beginning to be overcome

This paper will briefly explore the nature of the debate regarding themilitary and PRTs being responsible for a large portion of aid delivery. It willthen examine the evolution in understanding on behalf of each side todevelop a better understanding of the other’s activities. Next, it will arguethat these steps are producing a ‘blurring of the lines’ between governmentand INGO responses to development, humanitarian, and reconstruction goals.Finally, the paper will conclude by outlining some potential policyimplications of this convergence for INGOs and state governments shouldsimilar conflict environments manifest themselves in the future.

2. The DebateOne of the most intriguing features of the current conflict in

Afghanistan has been the emergent fight for ‘humanitarian space’ betweenthe military/PRT and INGO communities. However, the term itself issomewhat inaccurate, for it implies certain homogeneity amongst the INGOcommunity. A more accurate characterization would involve a debate on thedelivery of foreign assistance, thereby bringing both humanitarian anddevelopment INGOs under the same tent.3 In either case, however, the cruxof the argument is clear: Whereas in the past, conflict and post-conflicthumanitarian aid and development reconstruction was identified astraditionally being within the purview of international and nationalaid/development organizations, this paradigm has recently, in the case ofAfghanistan, been altered. ISAF country governments through the PRTs arenow stepping into insecure areas to provide aid and assistance in lieu ofINGOs, justifying this action by the commonly used catchphrase, ‘nodevelopment without security and no security without development’. Itshould be clearly pointed out, however, that the PRTs (and their militarycomponents), except in minor cases, do not actually deliver the assistance


______________________________________________________________

14

themselves: local Afghan NGOs are typically contracted to do so, under thecoordination, guidance, and in some cases security of ISAF forces.

Traditionally, there has been much distrust between both camps, forreasons that are not entirely unjustified. The INGO community has forwardedthree main arguments against the ISAF governments and their PRTrepresentatives. First, many INGOs are reliant upon funding fromgovernment agencies to operate, and are thus, to varying degrees, dependentupon the latter for their very institutional survival. If the governmentdevelopment agency (USAID, CIDA etc.) promotes focusing on, as manyare, foreign assistance projects in geographical areas in Afghanistan wheretheir PRT is present, then this puts the INGO in a difficult position. Second,and emanating out of the first point, is the fact that many INGOs areperceived by the Afghan population (and insurgents) as having abandonedtheir neutrality.4 By definition, ISAF member governments are not neutralplayers in Afghanistan. They are formally in the country to support andextend the writ of the Karzai government. Thus, where country governmentsare directly funding INGO programming, this has served to severely undercutthe perception of their traditional neutrality in the field, which has alsocontributed to their insecurity. Finally, there is a very real sense amongstmany INGOs that they aside from the aid role they play, they have alsoindirectly and unwittingly been co-opted by ISAF governments as part oftheir general military and reconstruction strategy, serving as a ‘forcemultiplier’ in ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, especially in circumstanceswhen INGOs arrive directly following ISAF operations.5

For their part, ISAF military representatives have been much lessreticent in their relations with INGOs, but have generally regarded them ashindrances to their operations, as their focus on impartiality has at timesresulted in INGOs (from the military perspective) providing assistance toindividuals or groups that may be considered direct enemies of the state ofAfghanistan, and thus, by extension, ISAF forces themselves.

3. On the Ground RealitiesWhile the debate over the role of the PRTs in the delivery and

coordination of aid in Afghanistan, and the resultant impact upon INGOs, hasbeen briefly outlined above, it is significant that such disagreements oftenoccur at the policy level (mostly at HQ) rather than in the field itself. Thisdoes not necessarily imply in any way that on the ground in Afghanistan theprevious concerns on behalf of INGOs towards PRTs are minimized. Simplythat the reality of the situation at field level has served to impact upon therelationships between both actors, and not always in a negative sense.

As noted above, the contextual environment in Afghanistan isimmensely complex. There are a plethora of actors involved in thestabilisation and reconstruction effort (various United Nations Departments,

Corin Chater

______________________________________________________________

15

country representatives of ISAF, NATO, the Afghan government, INGOs,local Afghan NGOs, private enterprises), which has served to create a lack ofpolicy coherence and operational approaches or guidelines towards aidregimes. For example, fourteen ISAF countries currently operate PRTs inAfghanistan, but the representation of various arms of government withineach (military, diplomatic, and development) differs greatly from one countryto another. Nor has there been a forum where PRT representatives may sharethere experiences and discuss best practices or challenges they have faced. Tobe fair, the former eventuality may in part be attributed to the securitysituation in a given province, for Afghanistan is by no means monolithic interms of the threat of insurgent violence throughout the country. However,the lack of discussion amongst them illustrates the fragmented nature andterritorialization of the supposedly common reconstruction agenda.Consequently, many PRTs and national-level have instead begun to turn tothe INGO community for expertise on such best practices and effectivemethods of aid coordination and delivery.

At the same time, the impact of the lack of security in Afghanistanon INGOs has also been profound. While it is true that their operations andperceptions amongst the civilian population have been undermined byperceived lack of neutrality, the fact remains that given the level of violenceon many parts of the country, it is simply impossible for them to operatewithout threat of violence towards their staff of the Afghan populations whoare benefiting from their efforts. In the past three years, attacks andabductions on Aid workers have steadily increased, prompting many toabandon their programming.6

As a result of these factors, relationships between INGOs and thevarious PRTs at field level have tended to be less antagonistic. In discussionswith representatives from both communities, each side has stated thatalthough they do not work together directly, they do provide information onthe security situation in a given area where both share an operatingenvironment. Curiously, some INGOs have used their relative greater level ofacceptance amongst the civilian population (though as has been noted, this isalso increasingly suspect) to promote humanitarian or development initiativesto the PRTs. Thus, there is a level of positive interaction between the PRTsand INGOs at field-level that rises above the often-polarized discourse seenat the policy level.

4. Blurring of the Lines?While it would be a mistake to characterize the relationships

between and amongst the government/PRT and INGO communities to beevolving in a truly positive manner, there have been recent actions aimed atachieving a better understanding of the motivations and principles of the


______________________________________________________________

16

other. In conflict environments such as Afghanistan, both groups require eachother’s expertise and capabilities perhaps more than they are willing to admit.

The INGO community has begun to grudgingly recognize that theinvolvement of the military in future deployments in conflict environmentsmay be the wave of the future, especially in cases where strategies to addressgeopolitical and counter-terrorism/insurgency imperatives involvesimultaneous relief efforts. As such, many INGOs have begun to take steps toaugment their expertise regarding the military and the relationships they mayencounter with them in the field, including: the hiring of ex-military staff asprogram advisors and liaisons, the development of codified guidelines onhow to interact with military bodies, and increased participation of INGOrepresentatives at multi-disciplinary conferences involving militarystrategists.

Within the PRT structure itself, there has been an incremental shiftaway from a military-dominated leadership structure to a more civilian onewhere the development and diplomatic arms have primacy. When the PRTsystem was in its infancy, all PRTs were commanded by a militaryrepresentative. Many now possess a civilian commander. This is againindicative of a move away from a military-led aid structure. Finally, ISAFmilitaries themselves have taken steps to address their own shortcomingswith respect to knowledge about INGOs and international humanitariannorms. Increasingly, pre-deployment training for PRT personnel from manyISAF countries involves learning about the role, mandates, and functions ofINGOs in the same operating theatre. Moreover, some ISAF members havedeveloped their own codified manuals and guidelines for working with thenon-governmental community, although many militaries have not as yet doneso.7

All of these developments on behalf of both militaries and INGOsare indicative of a general effort, admittedly bourn not of interest but insteadof necessity and pragmatism, to become more familiar with the complexitiesof working in a shared operating conflict environment. The fact that each sideis taking these steps may certainly be viewed as positive. However, whetherthe lines between the military and INGO communities are being blurred isdoubtful. There remains a clear fundamental separation between that will notlikely be altered anytime soon. As was stated by many members of themilitary interviewed for this research, militaries are not interested in doingdevelopment or humanitarian work: that is not their raison d’etre.Circumstances in Afghanistan have dictated that they must undertake such arole, but they fully understand that they lack the expertise to carry it out. Inthe end, such moves towards mutual understanding may not necessarily resultin a more collaborative relationship, but perhaps a more informed one.

There appears to be, at present in Afghanistan, a renewed focus onthe primacy of human security as a key strategic focus. Under the

Corin Chater

______________________________________________________________

17

assumption, currently subscribed to by both sides in Afghanistan (either as afundamental moral principle or incremental tactic), that protection of civilianpopulations is an imperative, then future deployments in similarcircumstances will possibly hold this to be key element of what is essentiallya macro counter-insurgency strategy.

5. Towards the FutureIt is always difficult to foresee the nature of future conflict, but it

seems likely, as the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, thatthere will again be instances where intervening international actors are facedwith the dual imperatives of combat and aid operations. The ISAF and INGOexperiences in Afghanistan have shown that there is much to learn on behalfof both communities in terms of coordination and interaction, but there havebeen concrete steps taken to address some of the problems in civil-militaryrelations.

It is very unlikely that the lines will be completely blurred betweencivilian and military functions in conflict environments, as principles ofneutrality are too fundamental to be abandoned by the INGO community.Still, there are further concrete steps that could be taken in addition to thoselisted above that would serve to further clarify the roles and responsibilitiesof militaries and INGOs in conflict environments.

First, it is imperative that general guidelines for civil-militaryinteractions and roles in conflict environments be developed and uniformlyaccepted and applied by all actors, regardless of affiliation. Such guidelineswould include a clear delineation of INGO and public sector responsibilitiesin the field and at HQ level. Indeed, the Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is developing a codified manual forinteraction.

Second, a positive step towards mutual trust and understandingwould be to initiate military or INGO representation, either as observers ordirect participants, at policy and field level meetings of the other. This wouldensure that the concerns of both parties are noted and would also serve tomitigate confusion in the field.

Third, for the military, hiring of development and humanitariancivilian experts that would operate at field level and act as advisors directlyto military bodies on aid norms as well as interaction with INGOs operatingin the same environment.

Civil-Military relations in Afghanistan are slowly evolving frommistrust to understanding. While there remains much to do, a slow andincremental march towards an effective and integrated civil-military responseis nonetheless occurring.


______________________________________________________________

18

Notes

1 These were imperatives agreed upon at the main donor London Conferenceon Afghanistan in 2006, which has hitherto served as the core-guidingdocument between the international community and the Afghan government.Please see: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),The Afghanistan Compact, UNAMA, retrieved April 14, 2010,http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/AfghanistanCompact-English.pdf .2 For example, in the Canadian context, the PRT is comprised ofrepresentatives from the Department of Defence (Military), the Departmentof Foreign Affairs (Diplomatic), and the Canadian International DevelopmentAgency (ODA).3 For an excellent overview of this debate, please see A Donini, Afghanistan:Humanitarianism Under Threat, Tufts University, 2009, pp. 2-5.4 NGO, Consultative Group, Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers ofMilitarized Aid in Afghanistan. Retrieved February 2, 2010, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/quick-impact-quick-collapse-jan-2010.pdf.5 Ibid.6 Donini, op. cit., p. 7.7 For example, the British Ministry of Defence has produced an excellentmanual for military personnel outlining the roles of and how to engage withmembers of the non-governmental community, entitled, Sharing the Space: AGuide to Constructive Engagement with Non-Governmental Organizationsand the Aid Community.

Bibliography

British Agencies Afghanistan Group, Aid and Civil-Military Relations inAfghanistan (Policy Briefing). BAAG, 2008.

CARE, Policy Framework for CARE International’s Relations with MilitaryForces. Geneva, 2009.

Civilian Actors Advisor (CIVAD) Concept. NATO (Unclassified). July 2009.

De Boer, M., Development and Diplomacy: Implementing a Cautious andFully-Balanced Approach Against the Odds in Uruzgan. 2008.

Corin Chater

______________________________________________________________

19

Department of National Defence (Canada), Evaluation of CF/DNDParticipation in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. ChiefReview Services, 2007.

Donini, A., Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat. Tufts University,2009.

Feinstein International Centre, Understanding the Relationship Between Aidand Security. Tufts University, Viewed December 19, 2009, http://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Understanding+the+relationship+Between+Aid+and+Security+%28Summary%29.

Ferris (ed), ‘Civil-Military Coordination: Challenges and Opportunities inAfghanistan and Beyond’. Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies.Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, vol. 3, 2008.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), Overview of ProvincialReconstruction Team. Viewed December 27, 2009, http://ukinafghanistan.fco.gov.uk/en/working-with-afghanistan/prt-helmand/overview-prt-helmand.

Jelinek, E., A Study of NGO Relations with Government and Communities inAfghanistan. ACBAR, 2006.

LaRose-Edwards, K., NATO and Militaries as Trusted Partners in Civil-Military Interaction. The Pearson Papers. Vol. 11, Spring 2008.

_______, NATO Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction. Discussion Paper,2007. Permission received by Author.

Ministry of Defence (UK), Sharing the Space: A Guide to ConstructiveEngagement with Non-Governmental Organizations and the Aid Community.Viewed January 2, 2010, http://dcdc.mod.uk.

Nixon, H., Aiding the State? International Assistance and the StatebuildingParadox in Afghanistan. Briefing Paper. Afghanistan Research andEvaluation Unit, 2007.

Patrick, S. & Brown, K., Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Assessing theWhole of Government Approach to Fragile States. International PeaceAcademy, 2007.


______________________________________________________________

20

Rietjens, S., ‘Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: Experiences from theDutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan’. Armed Forces andSociety. Vol. 34, 2008, pp. 173-207.

Sedra, M., Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan: The ProvincialReconstruction Team Debate. Foreign Affairs Canada, 2007.

Stapleton, B., The Provincial Reconstruction Team Plan in Afghanistan: ANew Direction. ACBAR, 2003. Unpublished Paper: permission to citereceived by author.

Corin Chater is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Military and StrategicStudies, University of Calgary. Additionally, he also acts as an Advisor to theCanadian International Development Agency and several NGOs involved indevelopment and humanitarian work globally. His main research interests liein armed groups and counter-insurgency policy, as well as evaluation ofinternational governance and poverty reduction projects.

Holy Peace and Holy War

Nevin Climenhaga

AbstractPolitical actors in the contemporary world are becoming increasingly awarethat religion is an important factor in national and international affairs,especially war and peace. However, there is continued confusion over exactlywhat role it plays. In particular, there is a widespread assumption thatreligion’s contribution to conflict has to do with religious teachings about‘holy war’ – that religion causes or exacerbates conflict when religionscondone or command violence on the part of their adherents. Throughexamining a contemporary conflict in which religion has played a particularlysalient role – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – I will argue that thisassumption is incorrect. In Israel-Palestine, religious teachings about therightness or wrongness of war and how war should be waged contribute tothe conflict only minimally. Religion has contributed to the conflict far morebecause of teachings about ‘holy peace’ – what true peace is, what it meansto pursue it, and what the attitude of the religious believer should be towardshuman and secular efforts towards peace. I will argue that exclusivist andabsolutist theologies of peace, combined with prejudice against religiousoutgroups, have led, and continue to lead, to support for violence against theother and the rejection of practical peace efforts. As we look for ways to endthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as other conflicts around the world inwhich religion plays a part, attention to this dynamic is crucial.

Key Words: Religion, peace, violence, conflict, holy war, Israel, Palestine.

*****

1. IntroductionThe Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not fundamentally a conflict

between competing religions, but competing nationalisms. But while Zionismand Palestinian nationalism were predominantly secular at their inception,1

since the 1967 War, religion has become increasingly central to both. Anunexpected victory that put holy sites such as the Western Wall, TempleMount, and much of the ancient Land of Israel into Jewish hands convincedmany Jews that God was at last bringing about their redemption.2 Shortlyafter the war, Jewish messianists began building settlements in the WestBank; they would later form Gush Emunim, an influential religious Zionistpolitical movement.3 For the Palestinians and the Arab states surroundingIsrael, the unexpected loss to Israel meant the failure of secular Arabnationalism, the creed of the major Arab players in the conflict. Many Arabs


______________________________________________________________

22

responded by turning to political Islam. In Palestine, Hamas eventually aroseas a radical religious alternative to the secular PLO. It has grown continuallymore influential, and in 2006 won the Palestinian parliamentary elections.

Not only have radical groups like Gush Emunim and Hamashindered peace efforts, surveys have found more religious Palestinians andIsraelis in general less supportive of political peace agreements, whetheractual or hypothetical.4 This is important because the attitudes of constituentsconstrain politicians. It is difficult for leaders to reach an agreement if it goesagainst the people’s will – and if they do, it may well be perceived asillegitimate, and destroyed by reactionaries on both sides.

2. Holy PeacePrecisely what about Judaism and Islam as they have been practiced

in Israel-Palestine has made so many of their adherents hostile to peaceefforts? Many people assume that religion contributes to conflict primarilythrough teachings about ‘holy war,’ causing or exacerbating conflict bycondoning or commanding violence. However, in the Israeli-Palestinianconflict at least, religious teachings about the rightness or wrongness of warand how war should be waged have not significantly contributed to theconflict. Religion has exacerbated the conflict much more through teachingsabout holy peace – what true peace is, what it means to pursue it, and whatattitude the religious believer should have towards human and secular effortstowards peace. Among all parties in the conflict, exclusivist and absolutisttheologies of peace, combined with prejudice against the religious outgroup,have led to support for violence and the rejection of practical peace efforts.

Peace is a contested notion. Many peace scholars differentiatenegative peace, the absence of direct violence, from positive peace, theabsence of indirect/structural violence. Religions, too, tend to have elaborateconceptions of peace as more than mere absence of hostilities. The Hebrewword for peace, shalom, suggests physical, relational, and moral wellbeing.Peace is indivisible from truth, integrity, justice, etc.: ‘Within [shalom]…allother human virtues and values are…subsumed.’5 Shalom is central toJudaism: ‘If one were to describe in one word the essence of Jewishmentality…the word would have to be peace.’6 Peace is similarly central toIslam. The Arabic cognate of shalom, salaam, has the same root as the word‘Islam,’ and implies virtues like social justice and right relatedness betweenhuman beings and with God.

But how is peace, understood in these broader senses, to be realized?Many Muslims will say that true peace is found in submission to God – i.e.,(the literal meaning of) ‘Islam.’ The Qur’an describes Paradise as dar al-Salam (10:25), commonly translated ‘the abode of peace,’ and subsequentIslamic tradition would equate dar al-Salam with dar al-Islam, the abode ofIslam, and differentiate it from the rest of the world: dar al-harb, the abode

Nevin Climenhaga

______________________________________________________________

23

of war.7 True (social) peace, medieval Islamic jurists would affirm, was onlypossible under the ‘banner of Islam’: ‘Because peace was…[in part] apolitical social order characterized by a justice in which all submit to God, allearthly peace required an Islamic ruler and law.’8

Envisioning peace as only possible under Islam is understandable ifone believes Islam God’s full and final revelation to humanity. However, thisdoctrine has obvious potential for conflict when Muslim political leaders facea non-Muslim world unwilling to live under Muslim rule. It is tempting, ifone believes in this vision of peace strongly enough, to conclude that violentstruggle to realize it is justified. And when politicians propose peace with anon-Muslim state, clearly this peace must be opposed, because it is only anillusion, a ‘negative peace’ that is only a shadow of the true positive peacethat would exist in an Islamic Palestine.

It is unsurprising, then, to find the following passage in Hamas’scharter, which earlier describes Hamas as a movement ‘which owes itsloyalty to Allah, derives from Islam its way of life and strives to raise thebanner of Allah over every inch of Palestine’:

Hamas…cares for human rights and is committed to thetolerance inherent in Islam as regards attitudes towardsother religions.…Under the shadow of Islam it is possiblefor the members of the three religions: Islam, Christianityand Judaism to coexist in safety and security. Safety andsecurity can only prevail under the shadow of Islam, andrecent and ancient history is the best witness to that effect.The members of other religions must desist from strugglingagainst Islam over sovereignty in this region. For if theywere to gain the upper hand, fighting, torture and uprootingwould follow.

Add to this the belief that ‘the land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf9

throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection,’ and it is onlynatural to conclude that ‘[Peace] initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions,and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are allcontrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement.’10

Through the logic of religious triumphalism, extremist groups likeHamas can believe Islam a religion of peace – indeed, the only way to peace– yet support a violent struggle to retake all of historic Palestine from theJews. Paradoxically, the centrality of peace to Islamic thought leads to itspractical rejection by Islamic fundamentalists.

In this, however, Islam is not unique. Certainly, Judaism has nothistorically emphasized the need to bring others under ‘the banner ofJudaism’ for their own sakes. But Judaism’s criteria for true peace are as


______________________________________________________________

24

rigorous as Islam’s, and Jews have traditionally seen prospects for such peacein the non-Jewish political realm as equally slim. From the prophets onward,Jewish writing has viewed international society as ‘a state of war, whereviolence is the norm and fighting is continuous, or at least endemic.’11 InJudaism, shalom is explicitly ‘not the normal state of the world in thishistorical age.’12 World peace is impossible through diplomacy becauseviolence is endemic to the world, and the nations of the world are naturallyhostile to Israel; it is impossible through military means because Israel simplydoes not have such means.13 True peace belongs properly to the next era ofhistory – the messianic era.

The prophetic books of the Hebrew Bible contain many well-knownimages of peace. Isaiah imagines the nations ‘beat[ing] their swords intoplowshares/And their spears into pruning hooks…and never again know[ing]war’ (2:4).14 In their original context, however, such images implied ‘Israel’sdominance over all nations who might threaten her and often their coming toaccept Israel’s own world-view and her God.’15 The aforementioned versealso speaks of God ‘judg[ing] among the nations/And arbitrat[ing] for themany peoples’ – and of course this God is not the one presently worshippedby the peoples surrounding Israel. This is an eschatological vision, to befulfilled with the coming of the Messiah. This will be a violent coming,involving God ‘mak[ing] the earth a desolation…[and] wip[ing] out thesinners upon it’ (Isaiah 13:9). In the messianic era that will follow,knowledge of Israel’s God will fill the world (Isaiah 11:9), and peopleeverywhere will come to the Jews for spiritual guidance (Zechariah 8:23).This vision is markedly similar to the Islamic vision of world peace. As merevisions, these are harmless to those who do not share them – but when thoselonging for them try to realize them, conflict naturally follows.

Traditionally, Judaism eschewed attempts to bring about redemptionby human efforts. In the early twentieth century, however, Rabbi AvrahamKook argued that while messianic redemption could not be attained solely byhuman efforts, humans could participate in bringing it about.16 While Kook’stheology was not widely accepted at first, the seemingly miraculous victoryof Israel in 1967 vindicated his beliefs for many. Many Jews have come tobelieve that redemption is at hand, and that the state of Israel is (and shouldbe) helping bring it about. But in order for the Messiah to come, Israel mustassert ownership over all the land God has given her, including the OccupiedTerritories, and especially the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Jewisheschatology sees not only the Jews returning to their ancient homeland butalso the Temple being rebuilt. The traditional view is that only the Messiahcan rebuild the Temple; however, a minority of Orthodox Jews believe theJewish people should rebuild the Temple themselves, or at least hasten theMessiah’s coming by making preparations for such rebuilding.17

Nevin Climenhaga

______________________________________________________________

25

This minority is small, but it is also vocal, especially in Jerusalem.Organizations like the Temple Institute and Temple Mount Faithful advocatebuilding the Third Temple now,18 and call for various ways to solve the‘problem’ of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock, Muslim holy siteslocated on the Temple Mount.19 A few have tried to take matters into theirown hands. In 1979, a group of Israeli settlers plotted to blow up the Dome,and secured the necessary explosives – only to call off the plan at the lastminute because their leader caught hepatitis.20

Plots to destroy the Dome of the Rock do not exhaust the dangers ofJewish beliefs about holy peace. Many West Bank settlers see themselves ashastening redemption, which will culminate in a peace far greater than any apolitical settlement could bring. And just as Hamas members say Islamic rulewill bring true peace to the Jews, so some radical settlers claim Jewishredemption will bring true peace to the Palestinians.21 If settling the entireLand of Israel, or rebuilding the Temple, will bring a peace so all-encompassing that the wolf lies down with the lamb, it makes sense tooppose a political peace agreement, which by its very nature impliescompromise.

3. Peace for Whom?Some Jews and Muslims truly believe that the peace the triumph or

dominance of their religion will bring is not only for their coreligionists butalso the religious other. However, both theological teachings and the actualattitudes of religionists are ambivalent about this. Biblical scholars notepassages in the Hebrew Bible that speak of healing and reconciliationbetween former enemies and ones that portray peace as ‘a state-of-beingexperienced only by the winning side’ (the Israelites).22 Among PalestinianMuslim leaders preaching their own versions of eschatology, some say theJews will ultimately – after conversion to Islam – be saved, whereas otherssay they will be destroyed or punished.

The line between genuinely wanting peace for the other and simplywanting victory and domination for one’s own group is thin. Visions of peacecan become visions of the triumph of one’s own religion, and these can twistinto simple hatred of the religious other.23 Although prejudice need notaccompany absolutist visions of holy peace, the potential for this seemsstrong. Psychologists have found that religiosity tends to correlate withprejudicial attitudes, especially towards religious outgroups.24 Many believethat such prejudice is caused by a strong association with one’s religiousingroup – what some researchers call ‘religious ethnocentrism.’25

In many cases, religious believers’ conceptions of peace may bedifficult to disentangle from an attitude favoring the religious ingroup overthe outgroup. When visions of peace combine with prejudice towards thosewho (through identification with an opposing religion) deny that peace,


______________________________________________________________

26

religion becomes truly dangerous – violence against the other can seempermissible, even obligatory. Unfortunately, these often do go together inIsrael-Palestine. Despite including statements about commitments totolerance and peace (understood as coming about through the triumph ofIslam), Hamas’s charter is filled with prejudicial rhetoric, comparing Jews toNazis, calling them ‘the merchants of war,’ and directly referencing theProtocols of the Elders of Zion as laying out the Zionist ‘agenda.’26 In therecent conflict in Gaza, military rabbis promoted a vision of religious peaceas only possible through the subjugation of an inherently evil and viciousenemy. Pamphlets distributed to soldiers told them both that the Torahforbade their ‘surrendering a single millimetre of [the Land of Israel] togentiles,’ and that this was ‘a war on murderers,’ one in which they should‘show no mercy on the cruel.’27 On both sides, exclusivist conceptions ofpeace have combined with prejudice against the other to contribute toviolence and the rejection of practical peace efforts.

4. Holy WarAlthough I cannot here detail Jewish and Muslim teachings on war,

I want to explain why I do not think they have substantially influenced theconflict.28 Firstly, these doctrines were removed from reality even when theywere formulated. Jewish scholarship on just war was done at a time whenJews no longer had political power, and the possibility of a Jewish statewaging war (the focus of rabbinic writing on war) no longer existed.29

Islamic jurisprudence assumed a unified umma (Islamic political community)confronted by a hostile world, and only allowed for temporary peace withnon-Muslim states, when the umma was weak.30 In reality, the umma wasoften fragmented and warring amongst itself, and alliances and agreementswith non-Muslim states were common.31 Secondly, one can find little directinfluence of these teachings on the actions of Palestinians and Israelis in theconflict. Secular political considerations have guided Israel’s wartime actionsmuch more than Jewish theories of war.32 And ordinary Jews’ beliefs aboutthe justifiability of violence today are far more influenced by the experienceof the Holocaust than medieval rabbinic scholarship.33 Similarly, Palestinianresistance has not been systematically guided by Islamic theories of war –after all, such theories were not written with such a context in mind.34

Moreover, many actions that have been so injurious to the peaceprocess – attacks on civilians, suicide bombing, disproportionate uses offorce – would be condemned by classical Jewish or Muslim teachings on theproper conduct of war.35 The main explicitly religious motivators36 for suchactions are not beliefs about war, but beliefs about what war and politicsshould aim at (i.e., beliefs about ‘positive peace’), as well as prejudicetowards the religious other being fought.

Nevin Climenhaga

______________________________________________________________

27

5. ConclusionI have attempted to draw attention to an aspect of religion that has

contributed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s intractability. I have notargued, and do not believe, that religion is a uniformly negative force. Theconceptions of peace I have discussed are by no means entirely bad. Socialjustice, right relatedness between humans and the divine, moral uprightness –these are laudable goals. What is bad is religionists seeing them asexclusively realizable through their own religion, and focusing so much onthem that they lose sight of more attainable goals. For there to be peace in theMiddle East, religionists there need to come to appreciate the possibility ofother religious traditions contributing to at least a limited peace, and see apeace less total than that they believe possible through the triumph of theirreligion as worth striving for. How peacemakers in Israel-Palestine can bringabout this change in attitudes I leave to another time. What is clear, though, isthat they cannot afford to ignore religion altogether.

Notes

1 Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, was stridently antireligious,and most religious Jews initially opposed Zionism (WJ Frost, A History ofChristian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim Perspectives on War andPeace, The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, 2004, p. 657). As for Palestiniannationalism, many of its most prominent early proponents were ArabChristians, and they explicitly separated religious and national identity (CMSennott, The Body and the Blood: The Middle East’s Vanishing Christiansand the Possibility for Peace, Public Affairs, New York, 2003, pp. 148-60).2 G Aran, ‘Redemption as a Catastrophe: The Gospel of Gush Emunim’,Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East, p. 158.3 Ibid., pp. 157-59.4 CS Liebman, ‘The Jewish Religion and Contemporary Israeli Nationalism’,Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East, p. 78 (more religiousJews are less likely to support trading land for peace); M Mi’Ari, ‘Attitudesof Palestinians toward Normalization with Israel’, Journal of PeaceResearch, Vol. 36, no. 3, May 1999, p. 346 (religiosity among Palestinians isnegatively correlated with support of normalization with Israel); T Hermann& E Yuchtman-Yaar, ‘Divided Yet United: Israeli-Jewish Attitudes towardthe Oslo Process’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, no. 5, September2002, pp. 605-08 (less religious Jews were more supportive of the Osloprocess than more religious Jews).5 SS Schwarzschild, ‘Shalom’, The Challenge of Shalom: The JewishTradition of Peace and Justice, M Polner & N Goodman (eds), New SocietyPublishers, Philadelphia, 1994, pp. 17-18.


______________________________________________________________

28

6 Schwarzschild quoting Hermann Cohen, in ibid., p. 16.7 B Tibi, ‘War and Peace in Islam’, The Ethics of War and Peace: Religiousand Secular Perspectives, T Nardin (ed), Princeton University Press,Princeton, 1996, pp. 129-30.8 Frost, p. 193. This does not mean that, in medieval Islamic thought, peace inthe political realm required the conversion of all to Islam; while polytheismand paganism were to be unequivocally opposed, Christianity and Judaismwere recognized as religions of ‘the book,’ legitimate though flawed, andpeoples of the book living in the dar al-Islam were to be allowed to practicetheir religion freely, accepting a status as religious minorities (dhimmi) andpaying a special poll tax (jizya) (ibid., pp. 199-201; Tibi, p. 130).9 A waqf is similar to a legal trust – the idea is that God owns Palestine andMuslims manage it for his purposes.10 ‘The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement(Hamas)’ (1988), The Jerusalem Fund (website), Accessed 27 April 2010,http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html., Articles 6, 31, 11, and 13, emphases mine.11 M Walzer, ‘War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition’, The Ethics of War andPeace, p. 97. The similarity to the medieval Muslim notion of dar al-harb isstriking.12 Ibid., p. 96.13 This is not to say that the Hebrew prophets would have promotedexpansionist war as a means to peace had Israel the capability. The propheticcritique of war suggests a disdain for not only the ends but also the methodsof war. Nevertheless, this aversion to violence apparently only went so far, assuggested by the following discussion of eschatology.14 Hebrew Bible citations are taken from The Jewish Study Bible, A Berlin &MZ Brettler (eds), Oxford University Press, New York, 2004.15 S Niditch, War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics of ViolenceOxford University Press, New York, 1993, p. 134.16 A Ravitsky, ‘Religious Radicalism and Political Messianism in Israel’,Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East, E Sivan & M Friedman(eds), State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990, pp. 20-23.17 G Gorenberg, The End of Days: Fundamentalism and the Struggle for theTemple Mount, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, p. 9.18 Organizations like this get nearly as much financial support from AmericanChristians as they do from Jews (ibid., pp. 171-72, 174). Although I cannothere give this issue the attention it deserves, the influence of evangelicalChristian eschatology on the conflict should not be ignored. Like manyreligious Jews, many evangelical Christians believe that true peace can onlycome after the Jews settle the entire Land of Israel and rebuild the Temple,

Nevin Climenhaga

______________________________________________________________

29

and the Messiah comes – but of course the Messiah they mean is Jesus, andthe coming is the second, not the first (ibid., pp. 27-28). Such Christians havebeen crucial in lobbying the American government to ‘support Israel’unequivocally (i.e., support right-wing actors in Israel who oppose giving upland for peace) and in financially supporting Jewish messianic organizations.19 The Temple Mount Faithful suggest that they be moved to Mecca;‘Objectives of the Temple Mount Faithful,’ The Temple Mount and Land ofIsrael Faithful Movement, Accessed 27 April 2010, http://www.templemountfaithful.org/obj.htm., while some in the Temple Institute imagine thatone day the Arabs will realize the truth and ‘come down from theMount…and say ‘build it [the Temple]’; Gorenberg, op. cit., p. 175.20 Ibid., pp. 132-37. Years earlier, as Israeli troops captured the TempleMount in the 1967 War, the chief rabbi of Israel’s army had reportedly urgedthe general on the site ‘to put one hundred kilos of explosives in [the Dome],and that’s it, once and for all we’ll be done with it.’ The general refused, andafter the war management of the site was given by the Israeli government to aMuslim council; ibid., p. 100.21 Aran, op. cit., p. 172.22 Niditch, op. cit., p. 135.23 Gorenberg, a Jewish journalist, recounts attending a (Jewish) Templerestoration organization meeting in Jerusalem. Questioned by a reporter as towhy he wanted to rebuild the Temple, when doing so was ‘likely to plungethe Middle East into bloodshed,’ the first speaker replied that ‘Building theTemple will bring peace, will bring security, will cure all the ills of society!’But when a video promoting the movement showed Muslims praying on theTemple Mount, people in the audience began ‘shouting, booing at the screen,… [expressing] hatred at the others, the unbelievers’. Hope for Messianicredemption was transformed into vilification of the religious other.24 For a summary of this research, see B Spilka, RW Hood, Jr., B Hunsberger& R Gorsuch, The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach, TheGuilford Press, New York, 2003, pp. 457-78.25 Several studies have lent support to this ‘intergroup’ perspective, findingthat religious group identification, especially in situations of perceivedconflict, is one of the best predictors of religious outgroup prejudice (ibid.,pp. 474-75). Religious ethnocentrism may contribute to prejudice againstother outgroups as well, inasmuch as religionists who learn (especially inchildhood) to make ‘us versus them’ discriminations in the realm of religionbecome more likely to make ingroup-outgroup discriminations in all areas oftheir life (B Altemeyer, ‘Why Do Religious Fundamentalists Tend to bePrejudiced?’ International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, Vol.13,no. 1, 2003, pp. 20-27). Indeed, studies have found correlations, among


______________________________________________________________

30

Israelis and Palestinians both, between religiosity and both strongeridentification with one’s ethnic/national group (see, for example, LWeissbrod, ‘Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society’, Review ofReligious Research, Vol. 24, no. 3, March 1983, pp. 198-202; O Ichilov,‘Pride in One’s Country and Citizenship Orientations in a Divided Society:The Case of Israeli Palestinian Arab and Orthodox and Non-Orthodox JewishIsraeli Youth’, Comparative Education Review, Vol. 49, no. 1, 2005, p. 58),and more prejudiced attitudes towards the other (religious, ethnic, national) inthe conflict (see, for example, Mi’Ari, op. cit., pp. 346-47; B Mollov & CLavie, ‘Culture, Dialogue and Perception Change in the Israeli-PalestinianConflict’, International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 12, no. 1,2001, pp. 74-75; Liebman, op. cit., p. 78).26 ‘The Charter of Allah,’ Articles 20, 31, and 32.27 A Harel, ‘IDF Rabbinate Publication during Gaza War: We will Show noMercy on the Cruel’, Haaretz, 26 January 2009, Accessed 27 April 2010,http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1058758.html.28 I do think it is important that both religions have, from their beginnings,regarded violence as sometimes necessary. A prior commitment to pacifismwould presumably make religionists more reluctant to use violence to realizetheir visions of positive peace (although it might not make them more willingto accept a political agreement they see as working against that peace).29 Walzer, op. cit., pp. 95-96.30 Frost, op. cit., p. 210; Tibi, op. cit., p. 130.31 Frost, op. cit., pp. 207, 216-17; Tibi, op. cit., p. 129. The advent of themodern nation-state further disconnected medieval Muslim just war theoryfrom reality.32 Walzer, op. cit., pp. 107-10.33 H Fein, ‘Reading the Second Text: Meanings and Misuses of theHolocaust’, Shalom, pp. 71-76.34 Admittedly, Hamas’s charter draws on medieval ideas of spreading the daral-Islam through jihad. But Hamas’s actions (for example, targeting Jewishcivilians) are not consistent with Islamic teachings on the proper conduct ofwar. Also, in Islam, warfare is often explicitly justified (both by medievaljurists and contemporary scholars) on the grounds that it will bring about the‘true peace’ described above (Tibi, op. cit., p. 130).35 Medieval Islamic jurisprudence prohibited the targeting of non-combatantssuch as women, children, and the elderly. It also contained other regulationson the waging of war: for example, oaths were to be honoured, andplundering and destruction were forbidden (Frost, op. cit., pp. 211-13; Tibi,op. cit., p. 133). Rabbinic Jewish scholars drew on the Torah to identify

Nevin Climenhaga

______________________________________________________________

31

standards of conduct in war, which similarly aimed to protect non-combatantsand limit the destruction caused by warfare (Walzer, op. cit., pp. 106-10).36 There are, obviously, many non-religious motivators as well.

Bibliography

Altemeyer, B., ‘Why Do Religious Fundamentalists Tend to be Prejudiced?’International Journal for the Psychology of Religion. Vol. 13, no. 1, 2003,pp. 17-28.

Aran, G., ‘Redemption as a Catastrophe: The Gospel of Gush Emunim’.Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East. Sivan, E. & Friedman,M. (eds), State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990.

‘The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement(Hamas)’ (1988). The Jerusalem Fund (website). accessed 27 April 2010,http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html.

Fein, H., ‘Reading the Second Text: Meanings and Misuses of theHolocaust’. The Challenge of Shalom: The Jewish Tradition of Peace andJustice. Polner, M. & Goodman, N.(eds), New Society Publishers,Philadelphia, 1994.

Frost, W.J., A History of Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and MuslimPerspectives on War and Peace. The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY,2004.

Gorenberg, G., The End of Days: Fundamentalism and the Struggle for theTemple Mount. Oxford University Press, New York, 2002.

Hermann, T. & Yuchtman-Yaar, E., ‘Divided Yet United: Israeli-JewishAttitudes toward the Oslo Process’. Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 39, no.5, September 2002, pp. 597-613.

Ichilov, O., ‘Pride in One’s Country and Citizenship Orientations in aDivided Society: The Case of Israeli Palestinian Arab and Orthodox andNon-Orthodox Jewish Israeli Youth’. Comparative Education Review. Vol.49, no. 1, 2005.


______________________________________________________________

32

The Jewish Study Bible. Berlin, A. & Brettler, M.Z. (eds), Oxford UniversityPress, New York, 2004.

Mi’Ari, M., ‘Attitudes of Palestinians toward Normalization with Israel’.Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 36, no. 3, May 1999, pp. 339-348.

Mollov, B. & Lavie, C., ‘Culture, Dialogue and Perception Change in theIsraeli-Palestinian Conflict’. International Journal of Conflict Management.Vol. 12, no. 1, 2001, pp. 69-87.

Niditch, S., War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics of Violence.Oxford University Press, New York, 1993.

‘Objectives of the Temple Mount Faithful’. The Temple Mount and Land ofIsrael Faithful Movement. Accessed 27 April 2010, http://www.templemountfaithful.org/obj.htm.

Sennott, C.M., The Body and the Blood: The Middle East's VanishingChristians and the Possibility for Peace. Public Affairs, New York, 2003.

Spilka, B., Hood, Jr., R.W., Hunsberger, B. & Gorsuch, R., The Psychologyof Religion: An Empirical Approach. The Guilford Press, New York, 2003.

Tibi, B., ‘War and Peace in Islam’. The Ethics of War and Peace: Religiousand Secular Perspectives. Nardin, T. (ed), Princeton University Press,Princeton, 1996.

Weissbrod, L., ‘Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society’. Review ofReligious Research. Vol. 24, no. 3, March 1983, pp. 188-205.

Nevin Climenhaga is a graduate student in the Department of Philosophy atWestern Michigan University. His primary interests are ethics, epistemology,philosophy of religion, and the intersection of philosophy with other fields.

The Myth of the Hundred Years Peace:War in the Nineteenth Century

Eric Royal Lybeck

AbstractIn The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi described the period between1815 and 1914 as the ‘Hundred Years’ Peace.’ Indeed, relative to previousand subsequent centuries, battlefield deaths were considerably lower betweenthe Napoleonic and Great Wars. The European Great Powers’ reluctance togo to war, Polanyi suggested, was due to the growing interdependencegenerated by the new capitalist system – what he termed ‘market society’.However, applying a different sociological theory of war - one that does notreduce the significance of war to battle death tolls, but rather considers wars’qualitative geopolitical and social significances - establishes a newframework through which we can better understand this ‘peaceful’ 19thcentury. Furthermore, we should expand the frame of reference beyond theEuropean stage as the globalising trajectory of capital in this period broughtnon-European regions into a unifying economic world system. Wars in theperiphery of the system at this time would therefore have greater significanceand would further qualify Polanyi’s thesis. The assumption that the 19thcentury was a uniquely pacified society undermines our ability to understandthe crucial links between war, society, and economics in the present era, andneeds to be reassessed using new theoretical tools and insights.

Key Words: War, nineteenth century, geopolitics, world systems,transnational capitalism, imperialism, Karl Polanyi, military.

*****

Since 1953, the end of the Korean War, the ‘Global North’ has beenat peace with itself. The Cold War never led to World War III. Europe let itseconomic interdependence trump its historic political and ethnic differencestoward the creation of the E.E.C. and the E.U. International Relationstheorists, raised in the era of nuclear deterrence and superpower, havedebated whether this peace was caused by market integration, democratic-peace, balance-of-power, or American hegemony. Interest in the causes ofwar and peace clearly has instrumental purposes: what are we doing right?Can we keep doing it, do it in more places, or realize when we have stoppeddoing it? Though this effort is not in vain if it can help prevent inter-state warbetween the ‘Great Powers’ - many of which have nuclear weaponscapability – a picture of the post-war period as an era of world peace isclearly off the mark. The division between East and West Europe and North

The Myth of the Hundred Years Peace

______________________________________________________________

34

and South Korea ended the era of ‘hot’ world wars, but was followed, not bya ‘Cold War,’ but by what Niall Ferguson terms, ‘The Third World’s War.’1

The United States, the Soviet Union, China, and other ‘advanced’ nationsnever ceased fighting each other via proxy wars, which were safe in so far asthey did not disrupt the global balance-of-power. The Third World’s War wasfought by the likes of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the Derg in Ethiopia, and theKhmer Rouge in Cambodia. To the millions in these ‘developing’ nationswho fell victim to these wars, the notion of a post-war peace might soundludicrous and grotesque.

Yet this is precisely the way we tend to perceive the 19th century inhistory. Between the Napoleonic Wars (which belong to the 18th century) andWorld War I (which belongs to the 20th) there lies ‘a phenomenon unheard ofin the annals of Western civilization, namely a hundred years’ peace – 1815-1914.’2 So stated Karl Polanyi in 1944 amidst the ruins of that verycivilization. An economic historian concerned with the social ramificationsof what he called ‘market-society,’ Polanyi began his magnum opus, TheGreat Transformation, with the puzzle of this unusual peace. 19th centurycivilization, he said, rested on four institutional pillars – the balance-of-powersystem, the international gold standard, the self-regulating market, and theliberal state. Two of these institutions were political; two were economic. Inanother configuration, two were domestic and the other two wereinternational. The hundred years’ peace was maintained by the internationalbalance-of-power political system and the international economy maintainedthrough the gold standard. Though the breakdown of these systems were theproximate causes of World Wars I and II, Polanyi considered the domesticpolitical-economic configuration of the self-regulating market, artificiallymaintained by the liberal state, to be the underlying root cause of theseemingly stable, but ultimately superficial 19th century civilization.3

Polanyi has not been alone in suggesting the concept of a 19th

century peace.4 Indeed, in terms of average battle durations, battle deaths peryear, and a host of other statistical criteria, 19th century Europe does not ratewith either the 18th or the 20th century versions of itself.5 As Polanyi figures it– ‘apart from the Crimean War – a more or less colonial event - England,France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia were engaged in war among eachother for altogether only eighteen months,’ compared to an average of sixtyto seventy years of major wars in the 17th and 18th centuries.6 Though Polanyidoes not provide his data sources, the proportions of his facts seem to bearout according to his criteria. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the GreatPowers were involved in war 94% and 78% of the time, respectively,compared to 40% of the time in the 19th century (including the NapoleonicWars of 1800-1815).7 If we focus on wars between Polanyi’s ‘Great Powers’- the Austro-Sardinian War (1848-49), the Roman Republic War (1849), The

Eric Royal Lybeck

______________________________________________________________

35

War of Italian Unification (1859), The Seven Weeks War (1866), and theFranco-Prussian War (1870-71) amounted to a total of 17.7 months.8

However, before accepting Polanyi’s claim outright, his calculationneeds to be examined further. For one, there is no reason why the CrimeanWar should be left out – it was not ‘a colonial event,’ as Polanyi suggested,but was rather one of the century’s most significant wars, involving Britain,France, and Turkey against Russia. The war dramatically shifted the balance-of-power as Austria-Hungary became isolated from the Holy Alliance;9

Russia stalled its persistent incursion through the Caucasus and Black Sea inthe hopes of seizing Constantinople;10 while Britain preserved the OttomanEmpire and its communications network to India. As Winfried Baumgartsuggests, ‘if the fighting had carried on during 1856, the First World Warwould then have taken place 60 years earlier.’11 Adding this conflict’s 28.3months back into the calculation brings the ‘Great Power’ total to 46.0months – nearly 4 years. This is still a long shot from previous centuries’ 60to 70 years of major wars.

But, Polanyi’s six powers, while the greatest, were not the onlyEuropean, or ‘Western’ powers during this period as states declined out of, orentered into the core inter-state system. One could add the Ottoman Empire(Turkey), Holland, Spain, the United States, Japan, and China by the end ofthe period. Wars between these twelve powers would yield an additional 95months of war between ‘Western’ powers.12 Finally, if one adds all of thewars that were not between these powers, but involved one or more of thepowers against weaker states, like the newly independent Latin AmericanorBalkan states an additional 125.5 ‘nation-months’ of war can be accountedfor.13 Adding colonial wars by these powers against non-state actors yieldsan astonishing additional 790.8 months. All of these figures combinedamounts to approximately 88.11 years of war in which major powers wereinvolved. There is no way to characterize states as peaceful during thisperiod of time. They were involved in nearly constant preparation for, andexecution of, war at home or abroad. Using a slightly different data setfrom 1648-1989, Kalevi Holsti determined that the ninety-nine years after theCongress of Vienna had only a 13% lower occurrence rate of war than theprevious period - one war every 3.3 years compared to one every 2.8 years.14

Yet, Holsti notes:

Except for the three brief wars of German nation-buildingand Russia’s armed interventions into Hungary and Polandat mid-century, the centre of Europe running from London,through Paris, Berlin, and Vienna constituted a significantzone of peace.15


______________________________________________________________

36

Indeed, this was part of Polanyi’s point. Rather than peace between powers,one can think of ‘pacified regions’ upon which a transnational economycould take place. Several sociologists have noted the way the war-makingnation-state in this period ‘caged’ citizens within boundaries.16 AnthonyGiddens, employing some of Foucault’s categories, suggested that this wasdue, in part, to a routinised system of surveillance, which allowed for anexternalisation of military functions.17 ‘It involves…not the decline of warbut a concentration of military power ‘pointing outwards’ towards otherstates in the nation-state system.’18

Yet, during the 19th century, the military was still called up duringlabour and bread riots, fought irregular revolutionaries, and was onlygradually supplemented by (not replaced by) police and paramilitary forces.19

Polanyi described the first third of the hundred years’ peace, as being underthe firm grip of the Holy Alliance (Prussia, Austria, and Russia): ‘Its armieswere roaming up and down Europe putting down minorities and repressingmajorities.’20 This was partially true within the territories they wereresponsible for, which included the minimally militarised remnants of theHoly Roman Empire. The army did not exist solely for repressive purposes,however, nor could a military achieve such ends without political andlegislative mechanisms in the form of local concessions and alliancesbetween middle classes (Bürgerlich) and old regime nobles and patricians.Still, Giovanni Arrighi, following Polanyi, described the Holy Alliance andthe Concert of Europe, the two primary diplomatic mechanisms to emergefrom the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, as ‘an instrument of British governance ofthe continental balance of power.’21 While the novelty of the post-Napoleonic international system, arranged primarily through PrinceMetternich of Austria, was a commitment toward domestic order,22 Britainwas actually notably absent from Continental diplomatic issues and spentmost of the period consolidating its overseas empire.

Jeremy Black outlined the three main functions of the military in the19th century: international, domestic and colonial.23 The weaponry,organizational systems, logistics and communications employed weresimilar, but in the case of domestic conflict, for example, the fighting tookplace in urban environments, quite different from the traditional open fieldbattles of previous eras. Colonial action consumed much of the military’sattention, particularly in Britain and France – the two dominant colonialpowers throughout the period. Michael Mann suggested that many colonialconflicts, such as those against the Zulu, the Mahdi, and the Sheriffians wereoften considered ‘war games’ by military staffs in which new technologiescould be experimented with and opportunities for promotion could bedetermined.24 The British empire grew at an average annual pace of about100,000 square miles between 1815 and 1865,25 and by the 20th century held

Eric Royal Lybeck

______________________________________________________________

37

a quarter of the world’s land surface and nearly the same proportion of theworld’s population.26

Though Lenin, adapting J.A. Hobson’s ‘surplus capital’ theory,27

considered imperialism to be driven by the economic necessity ofincorporating ‘outside’ markets into the capitalist ‘inside,’28 materialistconsiderations were not always dominant for the imperial players. As theGolden Age of capitalist growth (1848-1873)29 settled into its deflationaryand big industrial phase,30 imperialism had become a cultural necessity.Though British military support was never removed from materialconsiderations, the Empire was not always cost-effective. Some happyaccidents like the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa (which ledto the Boer War of 1899-1902)31 had demonstrated to Cecil Rhodes andothers - no territory, however barren, should be left unclaimed. As otherpowers, notably Germany and Russia, began encroaching on key regions,especially those along communications routes, ‘geopolitical imperialism,’32

that is, imperialism for its own sake became the order of the day.For the era of two Industrial Revolutions, the impact of war-making

and the military-as-customer is rarely given due credit. For example, inBritain, new coke-fired blast furnaces were installed in Wales and Scotlandduring the Napoleonic Wars despite substantial investment risk and expense.Both the absolute volume and the mix of products that came from Britishfactories and forges between 1793-1815 were profoundly affected bygovernment expenditures for war purposes.33 These ironworks, inconjunction with the substantial organizational apparatus at dry-docks fornaval construction, were the prime industrial advantages in British hands asthey entered the 19th century. Similarly, across the Atlantic, mass-productionof arms by New England factories for the Civil War and overseas exportwere a part of that region’s industrial dominance and were among the earlysites to popularise F.W. Taylor’s scientific management techniques.34 Muchof the entrepreneurial innovation in the period was directed towards weaponsof mass destruction, by men like Hiram Maxim and Alfred Krupp, and lesserknown crackpot engineers enticed by stricter patent rights.35 Furthermore, itmust be remembered that this was primarily a naval century and the evolutionfrom wooden galleons to ironclads to torpedo boats to Dreadnaughtbattleships was one of the notable achievements in an era excited byengineering. By the 1880s this development in ships, artillery, rifles, andshells was being accomplished by what William McNeill termed, a‘command technology’ system,36 which was essentially a military-industrial-complex eighty years before Dwight Eisenhower coined the term.

Certainly, rationalized organization was the major developmentwithin militaries during the long peace. As medieval colleges in Göttingen,Berlin, and elsewhere codified their curricula to become modern researchuniversities, military colleges, originating first in France at the École Spéciale


______________________________________________________________

38

Militaire de Saint-Cyr in 1802, were established to expand the technicalcapabilities of soldiers. Initially education was only required of artillerymen,who needed special engineering skills, but the mathematically-mindedNapoleon encouraged further knowledge within the ranks. As militarytheorists like Antoine-Henri Jomini codified the principles of Napoleonicwarfare, which emphasized flexible corps and sharp, direct attack, the armiesof Europe became academically imitated and uniform.

The application of scientific principles to military affairs led to thecreation of General Staffs and the autonomous power of militaries.37 Thiswould have devastating consequences during World War I when militarystrategies like the rapid mobilization schedule in Russia and the GermanSchlieffen Plan were executed by default without leaving time for diplomatsto negotiate.38 In the latter case, geopolitics by map had the Germansautomatically invade Belgium to eliminate France, ensuring Britain’s entryinto the war, without the foreknowledge of either the chancellor or the kaiser!

Though the need for technical skills allowed a certain amount ofmeritocracy to enter the nepotistic military hierarchy, war was still left, byand large, to the old regime. The vast majority of officers were drawn fromlanded nobility and gentry, especially in the General Staffs, whichrepresented a sharp contrast to the democratising societies at large. The sameholds true of diplomats, as Michael Mann pointed out: ‘Foreign policyremained the private domain of a small group of notables, plus specialinterest groups advising the few politicians who aspired to be ‘statesman’.’39

Routine foreign policy was handled by a small ruling elite, even inparliamentary countries like Britain, France, and the United States, as,indeed, it still is today. Only in crises and wars were outside partiesconsulted.

Yet, it was precisely at this stage that the transnational economicclass Polanyi identified as haute finance became involved.40 After all it wasthe members of this elite class of bondholders, embodied in the Rothschildsand J.P. Morgan, who would have to float the loans required to pay for wars.The international financial class, which owed allegiance to no singlegovernment, was, in Polanyi’s view, primarily responsible for the hundredyears’ peace. Though he noted:

They were anything but pacifists; they had made theirfortune in the financing of wars; they were impervious tomoral consideration; they had no objection to any numberof minor, short, or localized wars.41

Ultimately, the transnational capitalist class was interested in thepreservation of the core international markets. Significant disruptions ofeconomic activity within Western countries would jeopardize long-term

Eric Royal Lybeck

______________________________________________________________

39

investments, like railroads, while a decline of commerce between warringnations could amount to substantial economic losses. Even the threat of warcould impact bond markets reflecting the credit-worthiness of Europeangovernments.42 Though Polanyi overestimated the ‘intimate contact betweenfinance and diplomacy,’43 for, as we have seen, the old regime still ruled theday in inter-state politics, the effect of financial variables was a real andnovel factor in 19th century considerations of war and peace.

Polanyi, however, was wrong to suggest that economics was thesole and primary cause of peace during this period. Cultural, political, racial,and pure military considerations were just as important at various times indeflecting Great Power statesmen away from war with each other. And, inany case, the option to go to war with weaker peoples overseas was the roadmost frequently travelled. The pacification of the core of the emerging worldeconomic system was an important step in the spread of the Westernfinancial system, but more importantly, the spread of Western civilization.As we consider the instability and fragility of this financial system today, wemust recall that one hundred years ago a world war was considered bothimpossible and probable, as Henri Bergson pointed out.44 We must not takeour Fifty-Seven Years’ Peace (and counting) for granted, and neither shouldwe ignore the violence within and without our ‘advanced’ societies.

Notes

1 N Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and theDescent of the West, Penguin Press, New York, 2006, pp. l.2 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Originsof Our Time, Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 2001, p. 5.3 The notion of the Hundred Years’ Peace is not the core of Polanyi’sargument in The Great Transformation. Rather, the process by which themarket economy became ‘disembedded’ from society during the EnglishIndustrial Revolution consumes the bulk of the book. The following critiqueof Polanyi’s notion of 19th century geopolitics should not invalidate hisseminal contribution to the field of economic sociology and economichistory.4 H Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994; K Holsti,Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York, 1991.; M Mann, TheSources of Social Power V ol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States,1760-1914, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993.5 C Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, Blackwell,Cambridge, Mass., 1990, pp. 72-74.6 Polanyi, op. cit., p. 5.


______________________________________________________________

40

7 Ibid., p. 72; Tilly’s of definition of Great Powers is slightly more inclusivethan Polanyi’s, see Tilly, Ibid., p. 1708 Calculation based on JD Singer & M Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965:A Statistical Handbook, Wiley, New York,, 1972.9 Kissinger, op. cit., p. 93-94.10 A Avtorkhanov & M Broxup. The North Caucasus Barrier: The RussianAdvance Towards the Muslim World, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992.11 W Baumgart, The Crimean War: 1853-1856, Oxford University Press,London & New York, 1999.12 Calculation based on Singer and Small, as is the calculation below.13 M Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America,Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa., 2002; J Black,War in the Nineteenth Century: 1800-1914, Polity, Cambridge, 2009.14 Holsti, op. cit., p. 142. Holsti excludes some conflicts, like the Mexican-American War, which did not ‘impact’ the system of mutual relations.15 Ibid., p. 142.16 A Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique ofHistorical Materialism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985;Mann, loc. cit.; Tilly, loc. cit.;17 See M Foucault, Power, Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, NewPress, New York, 2000. Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’ dictum was:‘politics is the continuation of war by other means’ M Foucault, Security,Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-1978,Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 123.; see C Clausewitz, On War,Penguin, London, 1968.18 Giddens, op. cit. p. 192; Mann, op. cit. pp. 405-406.19 Mann, loc. cit..20 Polanyi, op. cit. p. 7.21 Arrighi, op. cit. p. 54.22 Kissinger, loc. cit.; P Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics,1763-1848, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.23 Black, War in the Nineteenth Century: 1800-1914, p. 204.24 Mann, op. cit., p. 436.25 P Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change andMilitary Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Vintage Books, New York, 1989.26 N Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order andthe Lessons for Global Power, Basic Books, New York, 2003.27 This is still the dominant Marxist analysis of imperialism, in which capitalcannot find enough domestic outlets for its surplus and must export itimperially. For the modern version of this theory, which corresponds withthe idea of ‘Military Keynesianism,’ see P Baran & P Sweezy, Monopoly

Eric Royal Lybeck

______________________________________________________________

41

Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, MonthlyReview Press, New York, 1966.; M Hardt & A Negri, Empire, HarvardUniversity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000.; For an effective critique of thisperspective, see R Aron, The Century of Total War, Doubleday, Garden City,N.Y., 1954, pp. 56-73.28 VI Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A PopularOutline, Foreign Languages Pub. House, Moscow, 1917; see also the SecondInternational Socialist Congress, ‘Resolution Adopted at the SecondInternational Socialist Congress at Stuttgart’, http://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/1907/militarism.htm. Accessed 11-29-09 2009.29 E Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875, Vintage Books, New York,1996.30 A Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism,Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990.; J Schumpeter, Business Cycles: ATheoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process,McGraw-Hill, New York, London,, 1939; E Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire,1875-1914, Pantheon Books, New York, 1987.31 T Pakenham, The Boer War, Random House, New York, 1979.; B Nasson,The South African War 1899-1902, Oxford University Press, New York,1999.; H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, A Harvest Book, HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, New York,1973, pp. 198-200.; Ferguson, Empire, loc. cit.32 Mann, op. cit., p. 34. Mann identified 6 ideal strategies of capitalistimperialism: 1. Laissez-faire; 2. National protectionism; 3. Mercantilistdomination; 4 Economic imperialism; 5. Social imperialism; 6. Geopoliticalimperialism33 McNeill, op. cit., p. 211.34

MR Smith, Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives onthe American Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985.35 McNeill, loc. cit.36 Ibid., 278-85.37 Mann, loc. cit.38 Kissinger, op. cit.; Mann, op. cit.39 Mann, op. cit., p. 416.40 Polanyi, op. cit., p. 7.41 Ibid., p. 11.42 N Ferguson The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World,1700-2000, Basic Books, New York, 2001, p. 277.43 Polanyi, op. cit., p. 10.44 H Herwig, The Outbreak of World War I: Causes and Responsibilities 5thedn., D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass., 1991, p. 10.


______________________________________________________________

42

Bibliography

Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, NewYork, 1973.

Arrighi, G., The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins ofOur Times. Verso, London & New York, 2010.

Baumgart, W., The Crimean War: 1853-1856. Oxford University Press,London & New York, 1999.

Black, J., War in the Nineteenth Century: 1800-1914. Polity, Cambridge,2009.

Ferguson, N., The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and theDescent of the West. Penguin Press, New York, 2006.

Gay, P., The Cultivation of Hatred: The Bourgeois Experience - Victoria toFreud. Oxford University Press, New York, 1984.

Giddens, A., The Nation-State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique ofHistorical Materialism. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985.

Herwig, H., The Outbreak of World War I: Causes and Responsibilities, 5thedn. D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass., 1991.

Hobsbawm, E.J., The Age of Empire, 1875-1914. Pantheon Books, NewYork, 1987.

_______, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875. Vintage Books, New York, 1996.

Holsti, K., Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York, 1991.

Kiernan, V.G., The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to OtherCultures in the Imperial Age. Serif, London, 1995.

Lenin, V.I., Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline.Foreign Languages Pub. House, Moscow, 1917.

Eric Royal Lybeck

______________________________________________________________

43

Levy, J. & Thompson, W., Causes of War. John Wiley & Sons, Malden,Mass, 2010.

Mann, M., The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge & New York, 1986.

_______, States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology.Blackwell, Oxford & New York, 1988.

_______, The Sources of Social Power Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993.

McNeill, W.H., The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, andSociety since A.D. 1000. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

Mumford, L., Technics and Civilization. Harcourt, New York, 1963.

Polanyi, K., The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Originsof Our Time. Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 2001.

Singer, J.D. & Small, M., The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A StatisticalHandbook. Wiley, New York, 1972.

Tilly, C., Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1990. B.Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., USA, 1990.

Weber, M., Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Vol.2, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978.

Eric Royal Lybeck is currently pursuing his PhD in Sociology at theUniversity of Tennessee – Knoxville.

Peacekeeping without Banisters: The Need for NewPractices that go Beyond Just War Theory1

Anya Topolski

AbstractWhile there may be nothing new under the sun in terms of warfare, there aretwo new trends in the post-Cold war era that are strikingly at odds with eachother: the resurgence of just war theory and the increase in UN ledpeacekeeping operations. On the one hand, there has been an explosion ofjust war theory since 9/11 because of the crisis of the nation state seeking tofind new rhetoric to legitimate violence, while on the other hand,peacekeeping, in its UN Blue beret guise, has had over fifty new UNpeacekeeping missions since the 1990s. These two trends seem to workagainst each other not only in theory but also in practice. Because of therelatively new appearance of peacekeeping missions, there has been a lacunain the need to develop a distinct theoretical ground – one which bothchallenges the theoretical foundations of just war theory but also one whichrehumanises the military’s mission. It is my contention that the norms of justwar theory are unsuitable for peacekeeping activities and that there is anurgent need to seek new practices for the latter. According to Julian Lindley-French of NATO, ‘The distinctions between peacekeeping, peacemaking andwarfighting are becoming rapidly meaningless in the context of a ‘three-block’ war, that is war involving humanitarian activities, stabilisation andhigh-intensity war fighting’. If...and I mean to stress if, there can be adifference between war and peacekeeping, this difference is lost in the fog ofpeacekeeping and its paradoxically normative basis in just war theory.2

Key Words: Arendt, 9/11, UN peacekeeping mission, war theory, NATO,military mission.

*****

It is incongruous to assume that peacekeeping can differsignificantly from war if it relies upon the same personnel, the sametechnology and most importantly the same norms – that of the just wartradition. If we consider only a few of the radical transformations that haveoccurred within the world and specifically within a military context such asthe new technologies, the return of the tactics of guerrilla warfare taken up byterrorists, and the rejection of warfare by nations whose soldiers now serve inpeace-keeping/enforcing missions, it is essential that peacekeeping seek itsown roots in a humanising logic based in relationality and an Arendtian formof reflection and judgement. To prove my point, I provide two examples of

Peacekeeping without Banisters

______________________________________________________________

46

the misapplication of the norms of just war theory to peacekeeping. First,given that the just war tradition assumes a simplistic duality between invaderand invaded, it does not address the reality of most international militarymissions - which are of an OOTW nature and involve a variety of thirdparties. Secondly, with the introduction of an immense variety of technology,transforming the battlefield into a computer laboratory, Network EnabledOperations (NEO) have completely altered the space and contents of suchmissions. By developing these examples, I will demonstrate the continuousmisapplication of the just war approach to the realities of conflict-resolutionin the 21st century.34 In response, I provide an early sketch of model for logicof peacekeeping. I put forward a notion of relationality, which undercuts theus/them frame. Secondly, I argue that the NEO allows for shared knowledge,which leads to a shared responsibility, and thirdly I develop a pedagogicalmodel, which challenges the current product of the post WWII process ofdehumanising soldiers in order to increase their ability to kill withoutremorse.

1. A Just War is not the same as a Just PeaceWhile Clausewitz spoke of the fog of war, he could never have

imagined the fog of peacekeeping – soldiers who have for centuries clung totheir norms and orders are sent across the world without either. It is thisambiguity, this uncertainty that makes ‘operations other than war’ (OOTW),such as peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian interventions, suchdifficult notions to delineate. While such interventions were born in the cold-war period, they have only recently come into their, this however does notmean that their growing pains are at an end. In fact, as the recent surge inrequests for UN peacekeepers demonstrates, this potential alternative towarfare is just beginning to mature. If peacekeeping is to become anautonomous adult and free itself from the violent chains of its roots, those ofwarfare legitimised by just war theorists, it is imperative that the adjectiveother find both meaning and depth. ‘In international law the motive forembarking on a war (jus ad bellum) is crucial to its legality: initiatinghostilities in self defence is authorized by international law’. I argue that theontological basis of just war theory makes peacekeeping impossible becauseit relies on a ‘logic of war’, that is an us vs. them frame that dehumanises theother. This frame is the product of any argument rooted in self-defence (jusad bellum) which cannot escape the simplistic vision of a self attacked by another, enemy or stranger. It is but a small theoretical step, and immenseindoctrination, that leads from this us/them frame to a dehumanising logicthat results all too often in genocide. Kaldor makes a similar claim in heraccount of ‘new wars’ in which civilian causalities approach 80%. Thissimplistic ‘logic of war’, a logic that is rooted in a frame of us vs. them,

Anya Topolski

______________________________________________________________

47

which must slowly be dismantled in order for peacekeepers to have a chanceof succeeding.

Without going into the history of the just war tradition, it isimportant to recall that both its roots within antiquity and its early praxiswithin the medieval period were times when the notion of war was not asmorally contested as it is today, times when the equation of stranger withuncivilized or inhumane barbarians was both widespread and politicallycorrect. While contemporary post-war theorists have sought to keep thistradition up-to-date thereby reducing these immoral and antiquated aspects, Iwould argue that traces and gaps remain.5 It is impossible to completelyeliminate the roots of a doctrine that has played such a pivotal role in‘Western’, and specifically Christian, imperialism. This type of discourse,does nothing to further peace – rather it thwarts its stated end. This logic isrooted in a division, identity politics like frame of us/them that denies ourrelationality and common humanity. This kind of logic can never lead toperpetual peace. On the contrary, the result of the current approach hasproduced problematic consequences for those involved. The list of UNpeacekeeping missions that have gone terrible awry in the recent past is quitepossibly the result of an inadequate reflection on the distinct nature ofpeacekeeping and the importance of seeking a ground other than that of justwar theory.

2. Peacekeeping within a Networked Enabled Operation‘In this hyper-electronic age, security and defence are merging to

create global interdependence and mutual vulnerability’. While one may wishto reflect upon operations other than war in abstract, the reality of all armedforces – which rarely work in isolation – is that most missions are enabled bymeans of a vast complex and dynamic network. One would be hard pressedto find a mission that is not at least a combination of military operations(joint); the reality being that the vast majority are either coalition/combinedoperations or multi-agency (comprehensive/whole of government). Inaddition to supporting my claim that the essence of conflict, and conflictresolution, is radically different today, a network enabled operation (NEO)whether peacekeeping or warfare presents new ethical dilemmas to all armedforces.6,7,8 NEO is largely based on the technological capability of connectinginformation systems (sensors, databases) for fast distribution and accessibilityof information. The assumption is that with the capability of informationsharing the parties will involve in active linking with each other and developa higher form of collaboration, which is however not a natural developmentin an arena with very diverse parties. Part of the logic of peacekeeping I aimto put forward as an alternative to the default logic of war justified by meansof JWT is that this increased knowledge and communication should be


______________________________________________________________

48

understood as a moral imperative for greater shared responsibility withinnetworked enabled operations.

Today’s ‘weapons’ range from the traditional arms of the past, tolaptops, gsms, robots etc (amidst a diversity of yet classified technologicalinnovations). The introduction of technology does more to military ethicsthan is often recognised. It allows for the introduction of new relationalnotions of shared responsibility. This is precisely the argument made in‘Moral Fitness for Peace Operations’ that ‘the scale, complexity, and scope ofoperations of operating systems and technology in the military operations-other-than-war are leveraging moral dilemmas in new ways’.9 One of themost underemphasized changes concerns the means by which decisions aremade from communications to judgments and responsibility. While themilitary has always been seen as the trope of the hierarchical relation withvery little space for feedback loops and challenges to authority, theintroduction of a networked approach has forced the military to come into the21st century defined by intersubjective and interactional dynamiccommunications. Rather than the traditional pyramid structure, NEO hasgiven room to develop a dynamic tension between horizontal and verticalforms of relationality each of which is marked by different values, norms ofjudgment and standards of responsibility. It is this somewhat ‘post-modern’reality that the military today must strive to understand and to train itspeacekeepers to think from within a NEO rather than view themselves assomehow separate from the network.10

3. Peacekeeping without BanistersBy ways of a conclusion, I would like to briefly sketch an alternative

logic of peacekeeping greatly inspired by Arendt and consequently labelled‘peacekeeping without banisters’. In agreement with Kaldor, ‘in theglobalised new wars, thinking based on inside and outside has less meaning... borders are blurred’, it is therefore imperative that peacekeeping withoutbanisters aims to think, judge and act beyond an us/them frame. To do so atminimum three steps are required:

1) A re-humanising logic of relationality that denies thelegitimacy of us/them thinking.11

2) A moral imperative associated to the usage of NEO, suchthat knowledge implies responsibility.

3) A pedagogical model of 2-in-1 thinking and judging to helpprepare soldiers for the above.

The first step towards peacekeeping without banisters is to seek ameans to justify peacekeeping without recourse to JWT. While Arendt doesnot provide a ready-made alternative, she does advice against theoretical

Anya Topolski

______________________________________________________________

49

models that are often to rigidly tied to rules. In addition, she provides a modelof the world that is not rooted in the autonomous liberal self or the absolutesovereignty of nation-states. This alternative phenomenological model of theworld is one rooted in relationality of persons that does not end withartificially created borders. It is this web of relations that implies sharedresponsibility for the world recognising the networked or interconnectedreality of our times. Such a worldly approach offers a great many avenues ofjustification for peacekeeping that are not fundamentally rooted in disguisedself-defence or personal gain. Furthermore, the dynamic and non-hierarchicalcommunication of networked operations makes it such that communication iseither one-dimensional or uni-directional. The traditional picture of themilitary as hierarchical vertical and absolutely autonomous is being replacedby a dynamic and horizontal network of interdependence.12 The type ofsituational, relational, and responsible thinking that is necessary cannot belocated in an ethical approach that provides clear rules or easy answers. Thereare no easy answers or clear rules for taking responsibility for therelationality of the world. This is precisely the reality of peacekeeping thatcannot be underestimated. It is the reality that one chooses to help another,putting oneself at risk by so doing, without knowing precisely how to do soand without the certainty of success.

The above is markedly different from war, which is rooted in self-interest, such as self-defence, which provides a different justification for suchrisks and has very concrete goals and aims that can be defined by thoseengaging in war.13 Peacekeeping without banisters is rooted in relationality, aperspective from which to judge and justify that challenges the us/them frameand thinks in an interdependent and inter-responsible dynamic networkedframe. Peacekeepers must accept the risk, asymmetry and uncertainty of theircommitment. Conflicts, like those that contribute to them (human beings) arenot predictable, they are irrational, chaotic and all too often (from anoutsiders perspective) inconsequential. A theory is sought specifically toavoid the realities of conflict – chaos, risk, asymmetry and uncertainty. Ifpeacekeepers really wish to serve others, they must embrace these realitiesrather than seek to conceal them by means of theories. Rather than turn to thefixed and non-particular standards of traditional ethical theories, Arendtproposes that we seek the standards for our judgments in the between, that isin the relations between people, in our fundamental relationality. Arendtdescribes a type of thinking process, the 2-in-1, which demands that oneconsider the perspective of others; thereby integrating differentunderstandings, in one’s own reflective process. This relational thinkingallows the person required to make decisions to consider the needs, goals anddignity of the other and to go beyond her own limited and often dogmaticperspective.14 This allows for one’s conclusions and actions to be rooted inrelationality, in a perspective that understands the world to be shared by all


______________________________________________________________

50

human beings. By means of communication, by exchanging stories rich withexamples from which we can all learn, by listening, we create a web ofrelations that provides a post-foundational ground for judgment.15 Such a webis not externally imposed by military educators, it arises from the interactionsand experiences of the peacekeeper. While the military approach remains thedominant influence in this web, there is space for other perspectives, whichcan serve both to support or challenge, when necessary. As such a web is partof the peacekeeper, it helps them to make difficult choices in difficultsituations with or without the presence of others.16

By making relationality central to reflection and judgment, apeacekeeper has the ability to make better judgments, to always turn ‘in’ tofind their own voice and reason for engaging in peacekeeping, to makechoices without clear rules of engagement and to be able to justify tothemselves, to other members of the network, to the media and latter tosociety. It is precisely such a skill of thinking, judging and acting withoutbanisters that is fundamentally necessary for peacekeepers in networkedenvironment. It is a way of thinking and acting that transcends the self-perpetuating and destructive logic of war that cannot be avoided by theoriessuch as that of just war that are rooted in frames of us vs. them. It is theselatter frames that fail to appreciate the basic relationality that prioritizesresponsibility rather than blame. An ethics of relationality requires thatpeacekeepers ask themselves how am I responsible, what can I do rather thansimply assuming there is a ‘them’ that is somehow distinct from the self, orthe ‘us’. While there are no guarantees attached to such an approach, we mustalso remember that the guarantees provided by just war theory are similarlyillusive. The reality of human interaction and certainly of conflict is such thatguarantees are impossible. Peacekeepers must therefore learn to think withoutbanisters. Rather we must strive to embrace the unicity of peacekeeping in anetworked environment and with it the importance of thinking, judging andacting relationally. This is the basis of our responsibility to the other and forthe world we all inhabit.

Notes

1 This research is part of the research program ‘Moral fitness of militarypersonnel in a networked operation environment’, which is supported by theNetherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) under grant number313-99-110.2 Again, if there can be a difference, this difference, I want to argue is rootedin the intentions for intervention. War cannot escape egoistic intentions oftendisguised as self defence, while peacekeeping might arise out of a sense ofguilt or responsibility – past or present (usually both) – connected to such

Anya Topolski

______________________________________________________________

51

desires to engage in warfare for selfish reasons. While this is also a form ofrepressed egoism, it is an egoism that is humanising and not dehumanising.3 While many just war theorists claim that the dilemma for the military is dueto the rise of the Enlightenment ideas of humanism, and as such call for itsend, they have failed to appreciate that the alternative means the end of theuniversalists roots of just war theory itself.4 ‘It wasn’t only that they wanted to avoid anything like the My Lai massacrein future wars; they wanted, like professional soldiers everywhere, todistinguish their profession from mere butchery. And because of theirVietnam experience, they believed that this had to be done systematically; itrequired not only a code but also a theory.’.5 Without intending to deny the noteworthy attempt to introduce the categoryof jus post bellum, its principles and interpretation remain highly disputed. Tolearn more about the disputed status of jus post bellum see: D McCready,‘Ending the War Right: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War Tradition; and ABellamy, ‘The Responsibility of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War’,Refining Jus Post Bellum. Bosanquet seeks to sort through thesedisagreements and comes to the conclusion that ‘the jus post bellumbandwagon, if you will, has filled up with musicians who have yet to get onthe same sheet of music’. This musical cacophony cannot be ignored, it is awarning sign of the limitations of just war theory with regard to operationsOTHER than war. While just war theory and its rapidly growing list ofadaptations (jus post bellum, jus ante bellum and jus in disciplina bellica)may speak to the moral needs of warfare, the same cannot be said whenapplied to peacekeeping missions. While certain needs are similar, thedifferences cannot be denied. The current approach could be likened to tryingto put a right-handed glove on one’s left hand. It might be possible in theshort term, but in the long term it is clear that it simply does not fit.6 The notion itself of ‘armed’ forces – that is weaponised soldiers and drones– comes into question in an NEO.7 This has clearly been recognised by advocates of the terms NetworkEnabled Capabilities (NEC) and Network Enabled Operations (NEO), both ofwhich aim to eliminate traces of warfare that were transparent in the termNetwork Centric Warfare (NCW).8 NCW as concept arose from the evolution of information technology andcompetitive business concepts that transformed operational capabilitiesperspectives from a location or platform level orientation to a network levelorientation. It enables a much faster and more effective warfighting style,characterized by the new concepts of speed of command and self-synchronization. The follow-up NEC and NEO concepts focus on the abilityto couple various capabilities – resources, expertise, knowledge – of the


______________________________________________________________

52

mission partners through an information and communication infrastructure.Whereas the sound is humanistic, the concepts cover a strong technologicalorientation with unwarranted psychological and almost mechanisticassumptions that give an infrastructure participants in the network who mayhave large differences in goals and intentions will naturally sharedinformation and collaborate.9 See also F Iersel, T van Baarda and D Verweij. ‘Preparing Soldiers forResponsibility.10 Those who have gone beyond just war theory, have in fact begun to askthese questions. Appreciating the novelty of networks in the military, Essens,Punte and Cornelissen describe how the military notion of temporality andthe spatial means of dynamic discourse are altered by means ofcommunication networks, a change that needs to be further studied11 The temptation is of course to argue that such a logic is natural and hassimply be trained/indoctrinated ‘out’ of soldiers in order to make them moreefficient in a post WWII climate. While there is certainly evidence andresearch that point in this direction, I will not address the question of what isnatural/human nature with regard to killing in this paper.12 In addition, as a result of the increasing numbers of missions in poorconflict ridden corners of the globe, soldiers need to be trained to beculturally sensitive. Cultures transcend such norms which themselves areculturally bound. One only has to consider how tensions connected to genderand heternormativity were played out both in Iraq and Afghanistan to realisethe importance of such training.13

With regard to the second blind spot of just war theory, given the reality ofconflicts, such as that of terrorism, and the fog of peacekeeping, what isneeded in terms of training is precisely contrary to what was valued intraditional warfare. Rather than simply following orders, like Eichmann did,soldiers need to be able to think, to make decisions and to justify theirchoices. While traditionally this was the task of officers, it is slowly beingrecognised that such skills are needed at all levels. While the Canadianmilitary is the only one to have chosen to train all its soldiers in this manner,many other armed forces are considering similar steps.14 Ideally this process happens in dialogue with others but if this is notpossible, which is certainly the case in interlinguistic and interculturalenvironments such as that of peacekeeping, it is important to learn how tothink beyond one’s own norms.15

While this web may not be as tangible as the norms of just war theory, itbrings several practical advantages for peacekeeping. In his retelling of theevents that lead to the Rwandan genocide, Lt. General Roméo Dallaire oftenengages in such an exercise before making a decision. While this activity

Anya Topolski

______________________________________________________________

53

alone was not able to stop the genocide, it certainly helped Dallaire and thesoldiers under his command to justify their choices to themselves and othersand to continue to serve the people of Rwanda in a situation where so manyothers quit.16

This is what Arendt refers to as the Socratic 2-in-1. Through one’sinteractions with others, which of course includes one’s military training, twovoices develop within one’s mind, that of the plurality of perspectivesdiscovered by means of dialogue and one’s own voice (which is by no meansfixed). Judgments, in this picture, are best made by means of a 2-in-1,whether real such as within a public space, or virtually, as in within one’smind. However, in both cases, a plurality of other perspectives is available.While traditional military approaches may desire to silence this latterplurality, it is precisely the reality of having to consider other options thatforces one to think through one’s choice helping one to understand oneschoice, helping one to justify this choice and making it very difficult to denyone responsibility for this choice. What more, such a plurality helps onenever to forget the nature of relationality and the importance of consideringthe needs and perspectives of all those involved in the situation.

Bibliography

Arendt, H., Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.Penguin Books, New York, 1992.

_______, Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954. Harcourt Press, HoughtonMifflin, 1994.

_______, Responsibility and Judgment. Ed. Jerome Kohn, Schocken Books,New York, 2005.

Asad, T., ‘Thinking about Terrorism and Just War’. Cambridge Review ofInternational Affairs. Vol. 23:1, 2009, pp. 3-24.

Bellamy, A., ‘The Responsibility of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the JustWar’. Review of International Studies. Vol. 34 (4), 2008, pp. 601-25.

Blocq, D., ‘The Fog of UN Peacekeeping’. Journal of Military Ethics. Vol.5(3), 2006, pp. 201-213.


______________________________________________________________

54

Bosanquet, Lt. C., ‘Refining Jus Post Bellum’. Religion and the Military andThe Military and Codes of Ethics. Springfield, Virginia, 2007. http://www.usafa.edu/isme/ISME07/Bosanquet07.html.

Brown, W., ‘Porous Sovereignty, Walled Democracy’. Seattle DistinguishedKatz Lecture. Thursday April 10th 2010. (Book Forthcoming).

Butler, J., Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? Verso, London, 2009.

Cebrowski, A. & Garstka, J., ‘Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin andFuture’. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 124, no. 1, January 1998, pp.28–35.

Cloud D., ‘Pentagon Review Calls For No Big Changes’. New York Times.Feb 2, 2006.

Croser, C., ‘Commanding the Future: Command and Control in a NetworkedEnvironment’. Defense & Security Analysis. Vol. 22(2), 2006, pp. 197-202.

Dallaire, R., Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity inRwanda. Da Capo Press, 2004.

Essens, P., Punte, P. & Cornelissen, M., Human Systems Integration forNetwork Centric Warfare. RTO-TR-HFM-155, 2009.

Essens, P., Spiegeleire, S. , Treurniet, W. & Spaans, M. ‘C2 That! Commandand Control in the Post-Industrial Age’. TNO Report. Soesterberg TheNetherlands, 2010.

Evans, M., ‘Moral Responsibilities and the Conflicting Demands of Jus PostBellum’. Ethics and International Affairs. Vol.l. June 22, 2009, pp. 147-164.

Garstka, Alberts & Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing andLeveraging Information Superiority. CCRP, 2000.

Iersel F., van Baarda, T. & Verweij, D., ‘Preparing Soldiers forResponsibility, Integrity and Transparency in the Dutch Armed Forces:Exploring the Realm of Dilemma Training’. Journal of Power and Ethics: AnInterdisciplinary Review. Vol. 2(1), 2006, pp. 42-67.

Anya Topolski

______________________________________________________________

55

Lindley-French, J., ‘News Big World, Big Future, Big NATO’. NATONewsletter. Jan 18th 2006.

Kaldor, M. & Basker, V., New Wars. Pinter, London, 1997.

Kaldor M., New & Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. StanfordUniversity Press, Stanford, 2002.

Marchart, O., Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference inNancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh,2007.

McCready, D., ‘Ending the War Right: Just Post Bellum and the Just WarTradition’. Journal of Military Ethics. Vol. 8 (1), 2009, pp. 66-78.

Mitcham, C., ‘The Spectrum of Ethical Issues Associated with the MilitarySupport of Science and Technology’. Annals New York Academy of Sciences.Vol. 577, 1989, pp. 1-9.

O’Driscoll, C., ‘Introduction to James Turner Johnson and the Recovery ofthe Just War Tradition’. Journal of Military Ethics. Vol. 8, e 3., 2009, pp.163-164.

Orend, B., The Morality of War. Broadview Press, 2006.

Richardson, Verweij and Winslow, ‘Moral Fitness for Peace Operations’.Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Vol. 24(1), 2004, pp. 99-113.

Robinson, P., De Lee, N. & Carrick, D., Ethics Education in the Military.Surrey, Ashgate, 2008.

Schott, R., ‘Just War and the Problem of Evil’. Hypatia: A Journal ofFeminist Theory. Vol. 23 (2) April-June, 2008, pp. 122-140.

Smith, R., ‘The Utility of Force’. The Art of War in the Modern World. AllenLane, 2005.

Pfaff, T., Peacekeeping and the Just War Tradition. Strategic StudiesInstitute, United States Military Academy, 2000.


______________________________________________________________

56

Verweij, D., ‘The Dark Side of Obedience: The Consequences of HannahArendt’s Analysis of the Eichmann Case’. Professional Ethics. Vol. 10(2-4),2002, pp. 143 – 158.

Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars A Moral Argument With HistoricalIllustrations. Basic Books, 2000.

Walzer, M., ‘The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success)’.Empowering Our Military Conscience: Transforming Just War Theory andMilitary Moral Education. Ashgate, Farnham, 2010.

Wertheimer, R., ‘The Moral Singularity of Military Professionalism’.Empowering Our Military Conscience: Transforming Just War Theory andMilitary Moral Education. Ashgate, Farnham, 2010.

Anya Topolski holds two bachelor’s degrees from McGill University inMontreal, Canada: A BSc in Biochemistry (1999) and an BA Honours inPhilosophy (2000). She recently obtained her PhD in Philosophy (MagnaCum Laude) at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Her dissertation wasawarded the Auschwitz Foundation Stichting Prize and is currently underreview for publication. In 2008 she completed a postdoctorate at theKULeuven on the relation between ethics and politics. She is currentlyengaged at the TUE and the Netherlands Defence Academy as an NWOresearch fellow in the field of military ethics, post-Srebrenica research,responsibility and judgment.

PART II

War and Terrorism

On the Dangers of Innocents – or, Whose Suffering Shall weValue?

Emília Brodencová

AbstractTerrorism has been increasingly recognised by many as a new, or as another,type of modern warfare. Yet unlike in the case of warfare analysis, in mostdiscussions on terrorism and modern or postmodern terror the focus is laidnot on the objectives or causes, on the definition of which no consensusexists, but on the practice – namely, the practice of indiscriminate andrandom targeting of the innocent. What is often forgotten is that it wasprecisely state dominated modern warfare that introduced the strategy oftargeting the innocent. Furthermore, one should be prudent with the use ofthe term ‘innocent’ which rather than advancing humanness and servinghumanity can cause deep polarisation and fragmentation in both, implyingthat there is a substantial difference between the victimisation and sufferingof the innocent and the ‘guilty’. The aim of my paper is to reflect on andquestion this categorisation and the political, moral, symbolic or rationalterms in which it is expressed in the discourse on terrorism, mainly in light ofcertain pragmatically-ideological extension of the understanding of theinnocent as someone whose suffering has bigger moral weight and value thanthe suffering of the non-innocent/guilty and whose suffering is considered to

be unjustifiable.

Key Words: Terrorism, definitions of terrorism, morality, suffering,guilt/innocence.

*****

Terrorism has been increasingly recognised by many as a new, or asanother, type of modern warfare. Yet unlike in the case of warfare analysis,in most discussions on terrorism and modern or postmodern terror the focusis laid not on the objectives or causes, on the definition of which noconsensus exists, but on the practice – namely, the practice of indiscriminateand random targeting of the innocent. In fact, the majority of definitionsagree on this element as being characteristic of and even key to thephenomenon of terrorism (understood mostly as the modus operandi of non-state insurgent actors) and its moral reprehensibility. What is often forgottenin this rather selective identification of terrorism with modern warfare is thatit was precisely state dominated modern warfare that introduced the strategyof targeting the innocent. It is thus somewhat hypocritical to consider this

On the Dangers of Innocents

______________________________________________________________

60

strategy as illegitimate and morally reprehensible in one instance and asjustifiable and legitimate in another instance, and this even more so in the ageof hyper-technologisation of warfare in which the difference between theintended killing and foreseen but unintended killing can hardly bemaintained. Furthermore, one should be prudent with the use of the term‘innocent’ which rather than advancing humanness and serving humanity cancause deep polarisation and fragmentation in both, implying that there is asubstantial difference between the victimisation and suffering of the innocentand the ‘guilty’. For example, by their strategy of reducing own casualties thestates waging modern wars give clear indication whose suffering should beavoided and whose suffering is marginalised as ‘collateral damage’. The aimof my paper is to reflect on and question this categorisation and the political,moral, symbolic or rational terms in which it is expressed in the discourse onterrorism, mainly in light of certain pragmatically-ideological extension ofthe understanding of the innocent as someone whose suffering has biggermoral weight and value than the suffering of the non-innocent/guilty andwhose suffering is considered to be unjustifiable.

Let’s, first of all, have a brief look at the notion of ‘new terrorism’as a new type of warfare. The proponents of this notion claim the novelty onthe level of objectives, scope and mode. As Igor Primoratz, a professor ofphilosophy who has extensively written on terrorism, sums up these threeelements, ‘(…) while old- style terrorism focused on specific, intelligible, andachievable political objectives, the ‘new terrorism’ has large and nebulousaims that can never be achieved.’1 ‘New terrorism’ is further operating in analmost exclusively international scope and environment and finally it isperceived as ‘distinctively Islamic and inherently given to suicide attacks’.2

Primoratz rightly rejects these claims as they are all rather problematic andthey can be all refuted. What Primoratz proposes is that ‘the true watershed inthe history of terrorism was in the early twentieth century, when ‘direct’ or‘individual’ terrorism was replaced by its ‘indirect’ or ‘mass’ variety.’3 Withregard to ‘direct’ or ‘individual’ terrorism he refers to the Russianrevolutionaries of the 1880s, whose movement would become known as the‘Anarchist wave’4 and as the first wave of modern terror, who would nottarget the whole population by their attacks but would only resort to targetedpolitical assassinations since they perceived violence as intrinsically andmorally wrong and thus only applicable as the last measure. This line ofaction and thinking was not followed by the following generations of theRussian revolutionaries of the Red Terror and the Great Terror who did notdiscriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Ever since theRussian Revolution terrorism has come to mean ‘indiscriminate killing,maiming and destruction’.5

While Primoratz’s distinction is certainly quite original in manyaspects, it is also problematic. The definition of terrorism that Primoratz

Emília Brodencová

______________________________________________________________

61

offers is the definition that centres on ‘the deliberate use of violence, or threatof its use, against innocent people’.6 His definition, as many definitions ofterrorism that try to capture the most common public complaint aboutterrorism, namely that terrorism attacks ‘the innocent’, in Primoratz’s ownwords, ‘highlights violence against non-combatants, civilians, the innocent,as the central defining trait of terrorism.’7 In view of this definition, targetingthe government officials or the military personnel, which is precisely whatthe Russian Anarchists did, cannot be considered as terrorism. If we thusfollow the reasoning of Primoratz with regard to the definition of terrorism,‘direct’ or ‘individual’ terrorism as he describes it would seem as thecontradiction in terms. The question remains whether there is indeed such asubstantial difference between political assassination and terrorismunderstood from the point of the view of the target; that is whether politicalviolence against morally legitimate targets, broadly understood as ‘guilty’,‘deserving’ or ‘responsible’, can be justified while political violence againstmorally illegitimate targets, ‘the innocent’ is unjustifiable. Or in other words,how innocent can the innocent be if their status implies the category ofassassinability?

Since we are addressing the issue of suffering mainly in terms of thephenomenon of terrorism, let’s try to look for the questions I mentioned inthe definition(s) of terrorism. As it is well known, there is no definition ofterrorism that would be generally accepted. As Michael Kronenwetterremarks, ‘terrorism, then, is often in the eye of the beholder. When ourpeople are killed, that is terrorism. When we kill other people, that is not.’8 It,of course, does not help the matter that terrorism has become such a loadedterm. If the Russian Anarchists in the 1880s were proud to be called‘terrorists’ and the terrorists in the 1920s were termed, with much sympathy,as ‘freedom fighters’, the twentieth century made terrorists equivalent of, oreven worse, than killers and murders, with not much sympathy left for them.We might not know what terrorism exactly is but as Kronenwetter puts it,‘[one]ne thing we know for sure: terrorism is wrong.’9

What of the definition of terrorism then in view of this ‘moralisticblanket condemnation of terrorism’?10 Alex P. Schmid reported in 1985 thatthere existed at least 100 definitions of terrorism in theoretical literature.11

More than 20 years later, and after 9/11, I would venture to say that thisnumber has certainly doubled, if not tripled. While these definitions maydiffer with regard to the element(s) they regard as key to the concept ofterrorism, they would generally refer to one of the following aspects: theeffect of fear; the attack on the state; the strategic purposes; the supposedlyrandom nature; the targets; secrecy.12 However, most definitions used areeither too broad or then too narrow, depending on the purpose they serve andon the audience they are designed for. The former describe terrorism ingeneral terms as a use of force or threats with the aim of demoralizing,


______________________________________________________________

62

intimidating and subjugating; the latter usually focus only on one aspect ofterrorism – its targets. For example, Caleb Carr defines terrorism as ‘thedeliberate military targeting of civilians as a method of affecting the politicalbehaviour of nations and leaders’ In Coady’s definition, terrorism is ‘theorganised use of violence to attack non-combatants (‘innocents’ in a specialsense) or their property for political purposes.’13 For Primoratz terrorism is‘the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people,with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action theyotherwise would not take.’14 Where Carr’s definition radically differs is bynaming the target ‘civilians’ rather than ‘non-combatants’ or ‘innocentpeople’. While the latter two are also rather problematic, Carr’s terms is quiteuntenable in any form of guerrilla or insurrection warfare in which civilianscan be combatants and a pregnant woman or a small girl or a boy, all incivilian clothes, can turn out to be a suicide bomber. Since the U.S. StateDepartment considers its military personnel, which is off-duty as ‘non-combatants’, this term is only slightly more tenable than the term ‘civilians’.

The category of ‘innocent people’ is even more complex categorysince it is directly related to the conception of moral justifiability ofterror(ism) as opposed to justifiability of other forms of political violencesuch as political assassination. Terrorism is claimed not to discriminatebetween the innocent and the guilty and hence it is morally reprehensiblesince as Primoratz claims, in most cases the terrorist is aware of innocence ofhis/her victims. Primoratz talks here of ‘the distinctive obscenity of muchterrorism’15, further claiming that innocence should not be understood inabsolute terms but rather that the innocent are not responsible ‘on anycredible understanding of responsibility’ for the ‘real or alleged injustice orsuffering’ of the terrorist and therefore they do not deserve suffering that isinflicted on them and this also from the point of view of the terrorist.16

Innocence and immunity to harm is something we all start with, as alsoMichael Waltzer points out, and we can then lose it by our actions. It is worthpointing out that the categories of innocence and immunity are suspended andbecome irrelevant in the case of collateral damage understood as civiliancasualties which are perceived as foreseen but not intended side-effects oflegitimate attacks. While this doctrine may have been applicable within theframework of just war theory at the time of Waltzer’s famous book (1977),some may claim that it is hardly justifiable in the era of super-modern andhyper-technological warfare. In fact, in this era it may be rather perceived asa convenient excuse for negligence or carelessness on the part of superiorforces. It is often forgotten that just war theory also stipulates proportionalityof the harm – not bombing the whole village in order to kill one rebel – andthat it is a duty of soldiers to save civilian lives – ‘and if saving civilian livesmeans risking soldiers’ lives, the risk must be accepted.’17 Looking at the

Emília Brodencová

______________________________________________________________

63

recent and current wars (conflicts) in Iraq and Afghanistan none of theserules have been much observed, on the contrary.

Another issue which needs to be addressed with regard to theperception of suffering in terms of the guilty/innocent and this link mayappear as rather surprising is whether state can be also recognised as aterrorist actor. The importance of this question is reflected in a certainpragmatically ideological assumption that acts of state as a legitimatepolitical entity are by definition legitimate while acts of entities or groups,which are not recognised as legitimate political structures are by definitionnot legitimate. Even if nation-states may seem to be disappearing in our post-modern inter-permeable world of fluid borders, it is still rather helpful tohave own flag, territory and borders if one wants to claim the legitimacy ofits actions.

If we then have a brief look on the state-terror discussion, Carrseems to imply in his definition that the term ‘terrorist’ should be used solelyfor non-state, insurgent actors and this seems to be implied also by manypublic discussions of terrorism and it is explicitly stated in mostconsiderations of terrorism from the point of view of social sciences. ArielMerari, professor of psychology who studied political terrorism for 30 years,claims that:

[t]he purposes, circumstances, and methods involved in astate’s violence against its own citizens are entirelydifferent from those that characterize violence by statesagainst other states or by insurgent groups againstgovernments. The application of the term ‘terrorism’ to allthree situations is obfuscating (…).18

Similarly, Walter Laqueur, another authority on terrorism, writesthat state and non-state terrorism ‘fulfil different functions and manifestthemselves in different ways’.19 While these arguments carry some truth it isalso true that ‘historically, the state has been the biggest terrorist’, asPrimoratz from his philosophical perspective poignantly puts it.20 Rather thandenying that state can be in any way or form associated with the terroristterror, it is worthwhile to nuance between terror as it is used by state againstits own citizens in mostly totalitarian regimes and some militarydictatorships, what Primoratz calls ‘incessant terrorism’21; terror as a strategicand military instrument used for specific purposes, mainly in war situations,even by democratic and liberal states; and terror employed by non-stateactors to achieve their particular objectives. While both Laqueur and Merariare right to point out that these three may differ with regard to their purposes,circumstances, methods and functions, although they do not have to and oftenthey do not differ, their raison d’être is intimidation and coercion for political


______________________________________________________________

64

purposes by creating the atmosphere of terror and they thus substantiallyremain the forms of the terrorist terror.

In conclusion, Brian Keenan who was kidnapped in Beirut in 1985and who was held captive for the next four and a half years writes in his EvilCradling, a diary of his captivity, and let me quite him here in length, that:

there is a capacity in each of us and sometimes I think evena need to reach out to others in pain. (…) The more wediscover the different degrees and different aspects of ourown unhappiness the greater our capacity to sympathizeinstinctively or to reach out to someone in distress. Maybeit’s a hangover from those days when we practiced asympathetic magic: by reaching out and touching someoneelse’s distress or suffering, we took a little of it onourselves as a kind of protection against the fullness ofsuch suffering taking hold of us.22

Maybe it is thus inevitable precisely because of our own sufferingthat we chose and prioritise suffering that should touch us and that weexclude some suffering from our human register on the basis of its moralstanding and its deserve. I do not think that many of us stand still whenreading a yet another report on victims of an attack or even a naturalcatastrophe which specifies that so and so many were killed under which somany children and women, or as the case may be, so many terrorists orinsurgents, or so many western soldiers – implying that suffering of all thesehuman beings can and even should be somehow ranked and valued againsteach other. It is as if we needed the guidance to which and whose sufferingwe should value (more).

In the common world of humanity the feeling of belonging, thesense of the community is crucial yet it is hardly ever the feeling ofbelonging to this common world of humanity that matters. It is ratherbelonging to the certain given group or community within this commonworld – identity has always had precedence over humanity. The whole, if wecan talk of the whole of humanity, is thus subdued by its own parts and thefeeling of belonging is inevitable accompanied by fragmentation andpolarisation. If there is ‘us’, there is always ‘them’ and ‘us versus them’ isnever far away. Yet no matter how shattered, and no matter what form ormode humanity in any particular case may have adopted, the common worldof humanity will never let go. The worst criminals and murderers may not beparticularly human but they will always be humans. Maybe this is one of thecurses of humanity – that it can never really purify itself of its own humanity;and maybe it is one of the blessings of humanity – that it may never reallypurify itself of its own humanity.

Emília Brodencová

______________________________________________________________

65

Notes

1I Primoratz, ‘A Philosopher Looks at Contemporary Terrorism’, Cardozo

Law Review, Vol. 29-1, October 2007, p.34.2 Ibid., p.34.3 Ibid., p.51.4 DC Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’, AttackingTerrorism. Elements of a Grand Strategy, Georgetown University Press,Washington, 2004, p. 47.5 Primoratz, ‘A Philosopher Looks at Contemporary Terrorism’, p. 36.6 Ibid., p.40.7 I Primoratz, ‘Introduction’, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, I.Primoratz (ed), Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke, 2004, p.xii.8 M Kronenwetter, Terrorism: A Guide to Events and Documents,Greenwood, Westport, 2004, p. 8.9 Ibid, p.4.10 SK Anderson & S Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, Scarecrow,London, 2002, p.1.11 AP Schmid, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories,Data Bases and Literature, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1985.12 CAJ Coady, ‘Defining Terrorism’, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues,Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke, 2004, p. 4.13 Coady, op. cit., p. 5.14 I Primoratz, ‘What is Terrorism?’, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues,Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke, 2004, p. 24.15 Ibid., pp. 18-19.16 Primoratz, ‘A Philosopher Looks at Contemporary Terrorism’, pp. 41-42.17 M Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 2006, p. 155.18 A Merari, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency’, The History ofTerrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda, G Chaliand & A Blin, (eds),University of California Press, Berkeley, 2007, p. 13.19 W Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1987, p.146.20 I Primoratz, ‘Introduction’, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, PalgraveMacmillian, Basingstoke, 2004, p. xx.21 I Primoratz, ‘State Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism’, Terrorism: ThePhilosophical Issues, Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke, 2004, p. 115.22 B Keenan, Evil Cradling, Vintage, London, 1992, p. 46.


______________________________________________________________

66

Bibliography

Anderson, S.K. & Sloan, S., Historical Dictionary of Terrorism. Scarecrow,London, 2002.

Carr, C., The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians: WhyIt Has Always Failed and Why It Will Always Fail. Random House, NewYork, 2002.

Coady, C.A.J., ‘Defining Terrorism’. Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues.Primoratz, I. (ed), Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke, 2004.

Keenan B., Evil Cradling. Vintage, London, 1992.

Kronenwetter, M., Terrorism: A Guide to Events andDocuments. Greenwood, Westport, 2004.

Laqueur, W., The Age of Terrorism. Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1987.

Merari, A., ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency’. The History ofTerrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda. Chaliand G. & Blin, A. (eds),University of California Press, Berkeley, 2007.

Primoratz, I., ‘A Philosopher Looks at Contemporary Terrorism’. CardozoLaw Review. Vol. 29-1, October 2007, pp. 33-51.

_______, ‘Introduction’. Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues. Primoratz, I.(ed), Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke, 2004.

_______, ‘What is Terrorism?’. Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues. I.Primoratz (ed), Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke, 2004.

_______, ‘State Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism’. Terrorism: ThePhilosophical Issues. Primoratz, I. (ed), Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke,2004.

Rapoport, D.C., ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’. AttackingTerrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Cronin, A.K. & Ludes, J.M. (eds),Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2004.

Emília Brodencová

______________________________________________________________

67

Schmid, A.P., Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories,Data Bases and Literature. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1985.

Waltzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars. Basic Books, New York, 2006.

Emília Brodencová is a PhD Candidate and an Assistant at the Institute ofPhilosophy of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.

EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Security vs. Justice?

Oldřich Bureš

AbstractThis paper offers an analysis of the European Union’s (EU) counter-terrorismpolicy with a special focus on the wider ‘security versus justice’ debate.Based on official EU documents, internal reports, and secondary sources, itsurveys the human rights, transparency, (lack of) oversight, and legitimacycritiques of the key EU counter-terrorism measures. A brief overview of thelarger normative debate concerning the trade-offs between justice andsecurity in the context of the EU’s Third Pillar is also provided.

Key Words: European Union, terrorism, counter-terrorism, oversight, humanrights, liberty, justice, freedom, security.

*****

1. IntroductionWhen it comes to counter-terrorism, debates about trade-offs

between liberty, transparency, accountability, justice and greater security areneither new, nor specific to the EU. The post-9/11 EU counter-terrorismpolicy, however, has been criticized for failing on both fronts – e.g. ‘forbeing ineffective, slow and incoherent as well as for taking disproportionate,self-serving and partly illegal measures that undermine democratic andjudicial oversight as well as civil liberties.’1 This paper does not and cannotprovide a comprehensive account of all issues and questions involved.2

Instead, building on an analysis of the larger normative debate concerning thenature of relationships between freedom, justice and security in the context ofEU’s counter-terrorism policy, it offers brief accounts of the specific humanrights, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy critiques of both the keyEU counter-terrorism measures. The hope is that these reviews will providethe reader with sufficient amount of information to make his/her own opinionon this complex, yet fundamental, topic.

2. The Larger Normative DebateAccording to Edwards and Meyer, the larger freedom and/or/versus

security, or in their terms the ‘erosion of norms debate,’ can be subdividedinto three sub-strands, depending on the underlying relationship between thegoal of policy-effectiveness and legitimacy:

EU Counter-terrorism Policy: Security versus Justice?

______________________________________________________________

70

1. Those who take the effectiveness in fighting terrorism asthe sole and only benchmark for measuring the EU’sperformance regardless of legal and normative questions;

2. Those who feel that there is some sort of trade-off betweenachieving security and the protection of citizens vis-à-visthe instruments and agencies of the state;

3. Those who assert that democracies would be underminingtheir own foundations if they allowed any infringement ofcivil rights and liberties for the sake of security-enhancingmeasures, placing civil rights and democratic processeffectively outside the realm of political discretion andtrade-offs.3

An alternative conceptualization of the relations between freedom andsecurity was offered by Didier Bigo, who argued that there are at least sixcursors that should be distinguished in order to acknowledge that freedomand security are often in a hierarchical, rather than equal or balanced, relation(e.g. one is seen as a principle while the other as an exception):

1. Freedom is the only principle with no limits (the anarchistview);

2. Freedom may be considered as the principle, and securityas the exception. Security is the way to regulateinteractions between freedom and the risk of anarchy (thelibertarian view);

3. Security could be analyzed as the freedom of the individualunder the name of safety. Freedom encompasses security(the constitutionalist view);

4. Security may be considered as the first freedom of theindividual under the name of safety. No freedom is possibleif you are dead or at risk of being killed. It may be thesurvival of the collectivity or survival of the individual.The former may imply the lack of the latter. Freedom existsonly after security is ensured so security encompassesfreedom at the beginning, but not after (the ‘exceptionalistview’);

5. Security is considered as a collective common good and asthe first freedom because life exists only if survival exists.Security is a right and a freedom because it is the way toprevent danger and violence. Freedoms as practices are theexception, even if freedom as discourse is emphasized.Security is ‘our’ security and could imply the suspension of

Oldřich Bureš

______________________________________________________________

71

rights of others, but always in the name of more freedom(the permanent emergency view),

6. Security is the only principle with no limits. Democracy isweakness. Order and obedience are better values thanfreedom (the fascist view).4

In addition, Bigo argued that the relationship between freedom and security isfurther complicated by the fact that they are both related to two additionalconcepts – danger and justice. Regarding the latter, he contrasteddispassionate ‘serene justice’ with securitized ‘accusers’ justice’ (e.g. justiceseen through the eyes of the prosecutors, police, intelligence officers etc.),whose primary purpose is ‘to help security by providing a quickpunishment.’5 Regarding the former, Bigo notes that ‘a society withoutdanger (insecurity) does not exist and some dangers are part of life.’Consequentially, security may have a negative connotation to both freedomand danger and therefore it is not always a ‘good thing’ that ought to be‘maximized’:

Does the acknowledgement of some element of danger inlife render security the contrary to insecurity? We cannotbe certain. Security is more like an expanding envelope andinsecurity is the environment in contact with this sphere, sothe two phenomena expand at the same moment. Moresecurity may create more insecurity.6

To students of Security studies, this will sound familiar – security, as well asperceptions of specific security risks, are inherently subjective so there isalways plenty of room for a security dilemma, where even the bestintentioned efforts to increase one’s own security may lead to the decrease of(or perception of) security of the others.

Balancing all four elements in Bigo’s matrix (security, freedom,justice and danger) appears to be a daunting, if not impossible, challenge.Even among the more specialized academic disciplines (Philosophy, Law,Security studies), there is much discussion about the ontology andepistemology of these complex concepts, as well as their practical, policy-making implications. In the Security studies field, for example, there is aplethora of often-contradictory answers to such basic questions such as whatis to be secured, by whom, by what means and at what cost.7 Similarquestions can certainly be raised when it comes to liberty and justice. It isbeyond the scope of this paper to provide and exhaustive treatment of evenone of these important questions. The discussion will therefore be limited tothe application of the aforementioned conceptualizations of the relationshipbetween freedom and security to the EU’s counter-terrorism policy after


______________________________________________________________

72

9/11. Specifically, if we take out the extreme anarchist and fascist positionsfrom Bigo’s conceptualization and apply his principle versus exception logicto Edwards and Meyer’s categories, we can arrive at the followingcategorization:

1. The ‘security first’ approach, where security is the firstfreedom and/or a common good (category one by Edwardsand Meyer and categories four and five by Bigo);

2. The ‘balancing freedom and security’ approach, wheresomehow both security and freedom should be the principlevalues that ought to be in balance (category two by Edwardsand Meyer, no category by Bigo);

3. The ‘freedom first’ approach, where freedom of theindividual is the first principle (category three by Edwardsand Meyer and categories two and three by Bigo).

The following section of this paper offers a succinct review of the availablehuman rights, transparency and legitimacy critiques of the key EU counter-terrorism measures. Due to size restrictions, they build on my previousresearch of the EU counter-terrorism policy not presented in this brief text.8

They should nonetheless indicate which of the aforementioned approaches tothe freedom-security relationship have prevailed in the EU in aftermath of the9/11 terrorist attacks.

3. Current State of Affairs and Future ProspectsConcerning the ‘security first’ strand, the aforementioned analyses

of key EU legal and institutional mechanisms in the fight against terrorismsuggests that the impact of the Madrid and London terrorist attacks hasindeed been occasionally used as a justification for security taking priorityover freedom. Some experts have even pointed out that underlyingexpectation of the Council has been that an effective EU counter-terrorismpolicy ‘will, as a consequence, lead to greater freedom, not the reverse.’9

According to Amnesty International, this may eventually lead to the portrayalof human rights ‘as a potential barrier to effective protection from ‘terrorist’acts,’ which in turn has allowed some to argue that ‘the threat of ‘terrorism’can justify limiting or suspending human rights.’10 It should be also notedthat further explicit calls for more securitization and less concern for humanrights when it comes to counter-terrorism have been made at the nationallevel in several EU MSs, especially those most affected by terrorism. Afterthe London terrorist attacks in July 2005, for example, the Former UK’sHome Secretary Charles Clarke addressed the European Parliament with thefollowing words: ‘European Union States may have to accept an erosion ofsome civil liberties if their citizens are to be protected from organized crime

Oldřich Bureš

______________________________________________________________

73

and terrorism … [T]he human right to travel on the underground on aThursday morning without being blown up is also an important right.’11

These words were accompanied by a vigorous diplomatic action aimed atupgrading the EU counter-terrorism policy along the lines of the then newlyintroduced British Terrorism Bill, which stirred acute controversy during thesummer of 2005, at both the national and European levels.12

The second ‘balancing’ strand has been presented by many analystsas a possible middle ground that would somehow satisfy those opinionswhich acknowledge the need to adopt new, and possibly harsher, counter-terrorism measures, but which also recognize the existing concerns regardingthe lack of democratic input and control, along with the importance of therule of law and protection of human rights. In the context of the EU counter-terrorism policy, these concerns have become especially paramount to manylegal commentators due to the exceptional swiftness with which the EUCouncil adopted its own counter-terrorism measures, as well as due to theoften uncritical adoption of external standards and measures with minimaltransparency, scrutiny and accountability at the EU level. While on the onehand speedy adoption of new law can be seen as an exercise in exceptionallyefficient decision making, on the other hand it can be argued that the swifterthe EU law making, the bigger the tension between democratic accountabilityand efficiency within the EU.13 Alternatively, as a report by AmnestyInternational put it:

Unfortunately, amid the flurry of recent counter-terrorisminitiatives both in the EU and beyond, the concept ofhuman rights and the rule of law as the basis for genuinesecurity has been lost all but in the rhetoric. In its policiesand legislation on counter-terrorism, the EU has failed sofar to properly address the serious issue of the protection ofFundamentals rights. While one element of the creation ofthe EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is thepromotion and protection of fundamental rights, this aspecthas not been manifest in concrete proposals on counter-terrorism.14

The wisdom of the hitherto of a swift and often uncritical adoption of newcounter-terrorism standards by the EU has also been questioned on justicegrounds and a growing number of legal challenges are pending in the EUcourts.15

The third ‘freedom first’ strand of opinions considers the very ideaof a balance between freedom and security as misguided. This view has beenparticularly advanced by several scholars participating in the CHALLENGEProject, whose aim was to respond to ‘widespread concerns about the resort


______________________________________________________________

74

to specific illiberal practices by contemporary liberal regimes.’ In their finalproject report, Bigo, Carrera and Guild argued that the balance metaphorerroneously considers liberty and security as analogous ‘values’ which can becompared (and evaluated) with and weighed against each other:

Our research has shown that such a ‘balancing picture’ hasactually favoured the development of a conception ofsecurity equal to coercion, surveillance, control and awhole series of practices of violence and exclusion. Aconcept of security has also favoured claims aboutcollective security, ‘global threats’ and ‘worst casescenario’ situations, which have too often led to measuresand practices outside of democratic accountability andjudicial oversight (rule of law) and constituting a challengeto fundamental human rights.16

Instead, the CHALLENGE project report suggested that security actually‘only comes from the respect and protection of human rights andfundamental freedoms through the rule of law’ and liberty should thereforebe placed ‘as the starting principle on which the EU’s AFSJ should be rootedand developed.’17 This is because even the Treaty on European Union states‘the EU is rooted in the principle of freedom’18 and security should thereforerepresent ‘only a tool in support of freedom.’19 In practice, however, thereverse has often been the case: ‘The Hague Programme appears tomarginalise the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms (liberty), theprinciple of equality and of democratic accountability and judicial control.The overall priority, which guides the programme, remains clear:strengthening security understood as coercion.’20 Another CHALLENGEproject report has argued that already the 1999 Tampere Programme had infact rejected the balancing metaphor in the relationship between freedom andsecurity by advocating a ‘shared commitment to freedom based on humanrights, democratic institutions and the rule of law’ as the starting paradigm.21

Similar concerns about the dominance of security in EU counter-terrorism policy have been also expressed by several Members of theEuropean Parliament. For example, Johanna Boogerd-Quaak, a DutchMember of the European Parliament stated that ‘if we [Europeans] give awayour freedoms in the fight against terrorism, the terrorists will have won.’22 Inthis context, it should be also noted that some experts have even suggestedthat ‘unbalanced powers being given to law enforcement bodies and securityservices can of itself lead to a breeding ground for terrorism.’23 Alternatively,David Spence stated in the conclusions of his edited volume on EU counter-terrorism policy that after years of debate about Guantanamo bay, it is nowclear that constitutional judicial processes might be boon to counter-terrorism

Oldřich Bureš

______________________________________________________________

75

efforts, rather than a hindrance: ‘If it is possible to prosecute terrorists underexisting criminal justice systems, the argument for more robust and specificcounter-terrorism action may lose sway. Indeed, treating terrorist humanely,in contrast to the brutality of their actions, might well significantly underminesupport for their cause.’24 This, in turn, highlights the need of human rights,data protection provisions, and due process of law to effectively operate inthe counter-terrorism framework.

It should be, however, also noted that according to some experts, themetaphorical liberty-security pendulum has already begun shifting backtoward liberty due to lack of new terrorist attacks since the terrorist attacks inMadrid and London. As the memories of the last major attacks fade, ‘thesecurity-liberty pendulum has clearly swung back, as the questions of civilliberties and data protection have become increasingly central in Brussels,particularly at the European Parliament, as shown in the passionate debateson the Commission’s proposal to criminalize incitement.’25 Similarly, anumber of experts participating at a recent conference titled Internal SecurityPolicies in the European Union - After the Stockholm Programme: An Areaof Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union? argued theStockholm program priorities try to strike a more nuanced relationshipbetween security due to the realization that effectiveness of AFSJ policiescannot be assessed outside of a larger normative framework. As one speakernoted, ‘the justice argument is making a comeback. After 9/11 the prevalentthinking was that the primary right is security but this is no longer the case.’26

It also appears that European courts have, albeit perhaps belatedly, becomean increasingly used avenue for both individuals and entities unduly affectedby some of the EU’s legal counter-terrorism measures. The Lisbon Treatyshould be also helpful in this regard, although it is yet too early to assess itsreal impact on the complex relations between liberty, justice and security atboth the national and EU levels.

Notes

1 G Edwards & CO Meyer, ‘Introduction: Charting a ContestedTransformation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 46, January 2008,p. 15.2 Many have also been covered elsewhere. See for example T Balzacq & SCarrera (eds), Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future,Ashgate Publishing Company, Aldershot, 2006; E Guild & F Geyer (eds),Security Versus Justice: Police and Judicial Cooperation in the EuropeanUnion, Ashgate Publishing Company, Aldershot, 2008.3 Edwards & Meyer, op. cit., p. 16.


______________________________________________________________

76

4 D Bigo, ‘Liberty, Whose Liberty? The Hague Programme and theConception of Freedom’ Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge forEurope’s Future, T Balzacq & S Carrera (eds), Ashgate PublishingCompany, Aldershot, 2006, pp. 38-39.5 Ibid., p. 41.6 Ibid., pp. 38-39.7 For a basic overview, see A Collins, Contemporary Security Studies,Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.8 O Bures, EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? Ashgate, 2011(forthcoming).9 Balzacq and Carrera, op. cit., p. 18.10 Amnesty International, Human Rights Dissolving at the Borders? Counter-terrorism and EU Criminal Law, IOR 61/013/2005, 31 May 2005, viewed on5 June 2009, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR61/013/2005/en/b280c0de-d4e3-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/ior610132005en.pdf.11 C Clarke, Liberty and Security: Striking the Right Balance, EuropeanParliament, October 2005, Viewed on 14 January 2006, http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speeches-archive/sp-euro-parliament-1005.12 United Kingdom Presidency of the European Union, Liberty and Security.Striking the Right Balance, 12 October 2005, Viewed on 15 April 2008http://www.edri.org/docs/UKpresidencypaper.pdf.13 S Douglas-Scott, ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union - Putting theSecurity in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, European LawReview, Vol. 29, 2004, p. 220.14 Amnesty International, op. cit., p. 2.15 For the most recent updates on new cases, see Statewatch, Latest News andDocumentation - Statewatch Terrorist Lists Site, March 2010, Viewed March2010 http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.html.16 D Bigo, S Carrera & E Guild, The CHALLENGE Project: Final PolicyRecommendations on the Changing Landscape of European Liberty andSecurity, Center for European Policy Studies, September 2009, Viewed on 17March 2010 http://www.ceps.be/book/challenge-project-final-policy-recommendations-changing-landscape-european-liberty-and-security.17 Ibid., pp. 3-4.18 ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity,freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for humanrights…[Its] aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of itspeoples…In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold andpromote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of itscitizens.’ Treaty on the European Union, Articles 2, 3(1) and 3(5)respectively.

Oldřich Bureš

______________________________________________________________

77

19 D Bigo et al., The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security:Mid-Term Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE Project, Center forEuropean Policy Studies, February 2007, Viewed on 20.03.2007,http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_ChallengeMidReport.pdf.20 Ibid., p. 14.21 Ibid.22 Cited in A Tsoukala, ‘Democracy Against Security: The Debates AboutCounter-terrorism in the European Parliament September 2001-June 2003’,Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, August-October 2004: pp.417-40.23 M O'Neill, ‘A Critical Analysis of the EU Legal Provisions on Terrorism’,Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20, January-March 2008, p. 26.24 D Spence, ‘Conclusion: The Continuing Quest for Coherence: Sovereignty,Human Rights and EU Coordination’, The European Union and Terrorism, DSpence (ed.), John Harper Publishing, London, 2007, p. 171.25 J Argomaniz, Counter-Terrorism Policy-Making in the EU, PhDdissertation, School of Politics & International Relations: University ofNottingham, 2008, p. 116.26 University of Salford, Centre for European Security, January 28-29, 2010.Chatham House Rule applies.

Bibliography

Amnesty International, Human Rights Dissolving at the Borders? Counter-Terrorism and EU Criminal Law. IOR 61/013/2005, 31 May 2005, Viewedon 5 June 2009, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR61/013/2005/en/b280c0de-d4e3-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/ior610132005en.pdf.

Argomaniz, J., Counter-Terrorism Policy-Making in the EU. PhDDissertation. School of Politics & International Relations: University ofNottingham, 2008.

Balzacq, T. & Carrera, S. (eds), Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge forEurope’s Future. Ashgate Publishing Company, Aldershot, 2006.

Bigo, D., Carrera, S. & Guild, E., The CHALLENGE Project: Final PolicyRecommendations on the Changing Landscape of European Liberty andSecurity. Center for European Policy Studies. September 2009, Viewed on 17March 2010 http://www.ceps.be/book/challenge-project-final-policy-recommendations-changing-landscape-european-liberty-and-security.


______________________________________________________________

78

Bigo, D., ‘Liberty, Whose Liberty? The Hague Programme and theConception of Freedom’. Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge forEurope’s Future. Balzacq, T. & Carrera, S. (eds), Ashgate PublishingCompany, Aldershot, 2006, pp. 35-44.

Bigo D. et Al., The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security:Mid-Term Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE Project. Center forEuropean Policy Studies, February 2007, Viewed on 20.03.2007,http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_ChallengeMidReport.pdf.

Bures, O., EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? Ashgate,Aldershot, Forthcoming in 2011.

Clarke, C., Liberty and Security: Striking the Right Balance. EuropeanParliament. October 2005, Viewed on 14 January 2006,http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speeches-archive/sp-euro-parliament-1005.

Collins, A., Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford University Press,Oxford, 2007.

Douglas-Scott, S., ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union - Putting theSecurity in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. European LawReview. Vol 29, 2004, pp. 219-242.

Edwards, G. & Meyer, C.O., ‘Introduction: Charting a ContestedTransformation’. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 46, January 2008,pp. 1-25.

Geyer, F., ‘Court of Justice of the European Communities Judgment of 3May 2007. Case C-303/05. Advocaten Voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden Vande Ministerraad’. European Constitutional Law Review. Vol. 41, 2008, pp.149-161.

Guild, E. & Geyer, F. (eds), Security Versus Justice: Police and JudicialCooperation in the European Union. Ashgate Publishing Company,Aldershot, 2008.

Megie, A., ‘Mapping the Actors of European Judicial Cooperation’. TheField of the EU Internal Security Agencies. Bigo, D. (ed), L'Harmattan, Paris,2007, pp. 67-96.

Oldřich Bureš

______________________________________________________________

79

O'Neill, M., ‘A Critical Analysis of the EU Legal Provisions on Terrorism’.Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 20, January-March 2008, pp. 26-48.

Spence, D. ‘Conclusion: The Continuing Quest for Coherence: Sovereignty,Human Rights and EU Coordination’. The European Union and Terrorism.Spence, D. (ed.), John Harper Publishing, London, 2007, pp. 168-176.

Statewatch, Latest News and Documentation - Statewatch Terrorist Lists Site.March 2010, Viewed March 2010, http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.html.

Tsoukala, A., ‘Democracy Against Security: The Debates About Counter-terrorism in the European Parliament September 2001-June 2003’.Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. Vol. 29, August-October 2004: pp.417-40.

United Kingdom Presidency of the European Union, Liberty and Security.Striking the Right Balance. 12 October 2005, Viewed on 15 April 2008http://www.edri.org/docs/UKpresidencypaper.pdf.

Oldřich Bureš is the Head of the Department of International Relations andEuropean Studies, Metropolitan University Prague. His research is focusedon United Nations peacekeeping operations, private military companies, andthe EU counter-terrorism policy.

Global Society must be Defended: War is On!

Teresa Degenhardt

AbstractThe wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been portrayed as mechanisms topunish criminals in the international sphere by both former US PresidentGeorge W Bush and ex-UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. The notion of crimeand punishment to represent war speaks to a blurring of the disciplines ofinternational relation and criminology. Drawing on Foucault and Agamben’sanalytics and previous literature in criminology, this work examines points ofcontact between two hitherto distinct security mechanisms - war andpunishment - and suggests possible effects of this discursive blurring.

Key Words: War, punishment, war on terror, global sphere, sovereignty.

*****

1. IntroductionSince 9/11, much study has focused on understanding how

discourses, rationalisations, and justifications of war have intertwined andmerged with those of crime in such a way that the borders between the twonotions are no longer clear1. In line with these studies, this piece suggests aconnection between how we conceptualise military intervention and punitiveactions. To this end, it shows how former US President George W. Bush andex-UK Prime Minister Tony Blair legitimated the wars in Afghanistan andIraq as punitive reactions to the crime of 9/11 or as the enforcement ofinternational law. Where once ‘wars on crime’ were waged within criminaljustice discourse, we are now reversing this trend, with the language ofcriminal justice increasingly applied to the context of war. Drawing onFoucault and Agamben’s analytics of power and on previous literature incriminology, I argue that while modernity has taught us to view punishmentand war as two distinct security systems, one directed to the inside and theother to the outside, current rhetorical practices highlight a much morecomplex relationship. War and punishment are mechanisms to establish notonly sovereignty, as has frequently been claimed, but political community intheir identification of a suitable enemy/criminal/danger.

It is not my intention to suggest that the ways in which wars arejustified have dramatically changed since 9/11. Indeed, wars that follow amore traditional inter-state trajectory still exist - for instance, the recent warbetween Russia and Georgia - and the legitimation of war as punishment wasrecognised by just war theory in the ancient past. The present intention is toforeground the punitive intent of the two current military campaigns, in the

Global Society must be Defended

______________________________________________________________

82

hope that this reading will contribute to our understanding of current militarycampaigns and the overlapping of discourses of war and crime.

2. Early Signs of Blurring: War on Crime and the New PenologyIn the US, the rhetoric of ‘war on crime’ and ‘war on drugs’ was

established in discourses about the criminal justice system long before thecurrent war against international terrorism made the conflation of thediscourses of war and crime evident. Scholars have underlined how the use ofthe language of war, and the consequent perception of the criminal as theenemy, have had profound implications on institutional structures and thepractice of penalty.2 The discourse of the war on crime has legitimised themilitarisation of the police inside the state and the sending of military forcesabroad for policing operations,3 facilitated the rejection of due process, andincreased the power of the executive over the legislative.4 It is consideredresponsible for the dramatic changes in how we punish, identified by the term‘new penology.’ The new penology is recognised as allowing the use ofintransigent and violent practices against whole categories of people; further,it has focused our attention on groups rather than individuals, ranked by theirlikelihood of being dangerous. Being dangerous is assessed in relation to a setof characteristics extrapolated by profiling techniques: penalty is thus basedon the principle of prevention and the notion of risk. An emblematicconsequence of this shift is the huge increase in incarceration rates in mostcountries. Some criminologists have suggested that these practices re-establish sovereignty at a time of crisis; more specifically, they utilise somesections of the population as ‘suitable enemies,’ thus ensuring politicallegitimacy.5 In short, the language of war within the criminal justicediscourse is correlated to changes in techniques of governance and a movetowards utilising crime as a way to govern.

Despite these existing analyses of the blurring of discourses within anational dimension, there has been little consideration of the effects of suchblurring outside national borders. By using Foucault’s and Agamben’sinsights on war and the power to punish, I will make a good start at this typeof analysis.

3. Foucault on War and Agamben on the Power to PunishFoucault’s contribution to the analyses of penalty as a mechanism of

governance is generally acknowledged. Less well known are his insights onwar; some of these have recently been published as a series of lectures inwhich he touches on changes in our understanding of war. He notes, forexample, that in the Middle Ages, war was conceived of as an act of justice;with the Peace of Westphalia, however, it became an instrument to maintainsecurity and guarantee the strength of the state.6 He suggests this shift was

Teresa Degenhardt

______________________________________________________________

83

related to a fundamental change in the structure of society, namely theconstitution of states. He claims that the discourse of war, formerly a way tointerpret political relations and challenge power inside the social body, wasappropriated by the state and exported outside for use against an inferiorgroup. In this way, a sovereign state could govern its own population by law,discipline, and surveillance, while manifesting its power to kill outside thestate. Foucault believes there is a connection between the establishment oflaw, the denial of conflict inside, and the exporting of war outside.In elaborating on Foucault’s analysis, Giorgio Agamben suggests that theconstitution of sovereignty and political communities are interrelated and arebased on the exclusion of the outlaw, the ‘homo sacer’ who can be killedwith impunity but cannot be sacrificed. In positing this connection, he arguesthat the power to punish is ‘the original political element’ 7 by which thesovereign state excludes the outlaw - the bandit - and this exclusion givesshape to the political community by signalling its borders.

Such analyses argue for a strict connection between the power tolaunch wars and the ability of the established sovereignty and politicalcommunity to punish a defined enemy/criminal group. The exclusion of thisgroup from the social body allows the sovereign state to establish itslegitimacy and permits the political community to take shape by discipliningtheir various subjectivities against their definitions of outlaws.

In the next section, I show a similar overlapping in the rhetoricalrepresentations of the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq by the USand British administrations of the time.

4. Overlapping War and Punishment in the Context of the War onTerrorThe war in Afghanistan was described as a response to Ground Zero and away to achieve justice by both former US President George W. Bush and ex-UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Bush said, ‘Whether we bring our enemies tojustice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.’8 He added, ‘Ourmilitary action is designed to drive terrorists out and bring them to justice,’9

referring to the retributive function of penal policies. In short, the delivery ofpain will restore justice. Similarly, former UK Prime Minister announced,‘We must bring bin Laden and Al Qaeda leaders to justice and eliminate theterrorist threat that they pose,’10 making evident the connection between thepower to punish and war.

After the war began, Blair called Osama bin Laden ‘wicked’ and of‘murderous intent,’11 constructing him as a criminal and de-politicising theconflict. Similarly, the Taliban were criminals in their harbouring ofterrorists. Blair said, ‘They are guilty and they will face justice.’12 Here,reference is made to the notion of responsibility – essential for theadjudication of punishment and equally apparent in Bush’s claims:


______________________________________________________________

84

The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection ofloosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as AlQaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombingAmerican embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, andresponsible for bombing the USS Cole. 13

And again,

‘The men on the wall here have put themselves on the listbecause of great acts of evil. They plan, promote andcommit murder. … They must be found, they will bestopped; and they will be punished.’14

Clearly, those launching the campaign (and acting as judges) are contributingto the blurring of the boundaries between war and punishment in theirconstruction of Osama and Al Qaeda as global criminals who can attackanywhere (in the US, Tanzania, or Kenya) and in their adjudication ofresponsibility and guilt. The global dimension of crime in theserepresentations is pronounced.

In the following speech, Blair refers to criminal procedures:

We must bring to justice those responsible. Rightly,President Bush and the US Government have proceededwith care. They did not lash out. They did not strike firstand think afterwards. Their very deliberation is a measureof the seriousness of their intent. They, together with allies,will want to identify, with care, those responsible. That is ajudgment that must be based on hard evidence. Once thatjudgment is made, the appropriate action can be taken. Itwill be determined, it will take time, it will continue overtime until this menace is properly dealt with and itsmachinery of terror destroyed.15

He evokes notions of evidence, responsibility, and guilt, thereby framing themilitary response as the adjudication of a specific act and making thisstatement appear part of a proper proceeding. As the objective of the war is tocapture and punish the individuals responsible, we see the overlapping of warand punishment.

The blurring is also based on the definition of those groups andstates who allow criminal actions to be planned in their territory as‘dangerous’ to the whole community. Just as terrorists are defined ascriminals, so too states are labelled as ‘rogue’ in the US National SecurityStrategy, issued in September 2002. This Strategy transposes the label of

Teresa Degenhardt

______________________________________________________________

85

criminality onto entire nation states, thus enabling the criminalization ofwhole populations and demanding a punitive response.16 Terrorists and roguestates are linked as a threat which calls for reaction and exclusion. The notionof imminent threat is used as a reminder of danger, producing fear andauthorising violent practices by those who proclaim themselves sovereign.The concept of deterrence traditionally used within the international sphere isabandoned in favour of preventive self-defence, much like the new penologywhere ‘We know from experience that some enemies cannot be deterred.’17

Similarly, the war in Iraq was initially framed as a reaction to 9/11 and thethreat of terrorism. Bush defined Iraq as a ‘threat,’ obviously referring to theUN Charter and the notion of ‘threat of the peace’ as an element that couldjustify military action, but also signalling the risk of further harmful eventswhen he said: ‘We have no ambition in Iraq except to remove a threat andrestore control.’18 Saddam Hussein was a ‘murderous tyrant’ and a‘homicidal dictator;’ he was compared to Hitler, a ‘monster’ who had ‘killedhis own people.’19 Bush reiterated that Hussein was in violation ofinternational law, specifically citing UN Resolution 1441. The formerPresident argued: ‘Saddam Hussein has a long history of reckless aggressionand terrible crimes’ 20and ‘should be held accountable,’21 adding, ‘[The] Iraqregime has violated all … obligations.’22

Echoing his American colleague, Blair pointed out the need to ‘actwithin the terms set out in Resolution 1441’ and to enforce internationalnorms: ‘To pass Resolution 1441 and then refuse to enforce it would do themost deadly damage to the UN’s future strength, confirming it as aninstrument of diplomacy and not of action.’23 Blair asks rhetorically: ‘Whowill believe us [next]? What price our credibility with the next tyrant?’24 Insuch statements, war is a mechanism of law enforcement reacting againstSaddam’s defiance of UN Resolutions, even though the military operationwas clearly against international legal standards.25

In both campaigns – Afghanistan and Iraq – as part of the ongoingwar on terror, criminal justice discourse was used to legitimise illicit militaryviolence and to disqualify Al Qaeda violence. A superior set of norms wasevoked – albeit fictitious and used to cover up a crime. The enemy wasconstructed as a criminal who posited a danger to the globe, and specificstates were criminalised as ‘rogue.’ It is especially interesting to note theidentification of specific threats/dangers against which to authorise violenceand to unite the community.

Echoing back to Foucault and Agamben, these speeches show theoverlap between our understanding of war and our understanding ofpunishment on the basis of their common function of setting sovereignty andthe political community against an enemy/criminal/danger. In what follows, Isummarise the overlap and suggest possible effects of the discursive blurring.


______________________________________________________________

86

5. War and the Construction of the Global SphereIt is crucial to note the definition of some groups and states as

criminal in these discourses. When set against this danger and potentialviolence, the coalition of the willing is legitimised. Reference to a superior(albeit specious) set of norms is used to distinguish between legitimate andillegitimate violence. The notion of crime is used to depoliticise the conflictand disqualify the enemy. When a group is established as criminal/enemywho should be fought against, we see again certain mechanisms underlinedby Foucault and Agamben: namely, sovereignty and political community areestablished on the definition of the outlaw and the construction of an inferiorgroup. This, in turn, reveals how the current overlapping of the notions ofwar and punishment is based on their common function: both are mechanismsto establish governance. Further, these wars constitute an attempt atestablishing sovereignty and the political community in the global sphere intheir exclusion of inferior/dangerous/criminal groups.

The blurring of borders between war and law enforcement, andenemy and criminality can be related to the establishment of similarmechanisms of exclusion– defining a specific section of the population asinferior and excluding it through violence thinly disguised as law.

Notes

1N Feldman ‘Choices of Law, Choices of War’, The New Era of Terrorism:

Selected Readings, G Martin (ed), Sage, London, 2004, p. 72; D Bigo‘Globalised (In)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon’, Illiberal Practicesof Liberal Regimes: The (In)Security Games, L’Harmattan/ Culture andConflicts, Paris, 2005, p. 25; R Sparks ‘Ordinary Anxieties and States ofEmergency: Statecraft and Spectatorship in the New Politics of Insecurity’,Perspectives on Punishment, The Contours of Control, Oxford UniversityPress. Oxford, 2006, p. 31.2 PB Kraska (ed), Altered States of Mind: Critical Observations of the DrugWar. Garland Publishing, New York, 1993. See Also PB Kraska (ed),Militarising the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles ofthe Armed Forces and the Police, Northeastern University Press, 2001; PBKraska ‘Militarization and Policing-Its Relevance to 21st Century Police’,Policing,Vol 1, Number 4, 2007, p 501. K Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Lawand Order in Contemporary American Politics, Oxford University Press,1997. C Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and Prison in the Age of Crisis,Verso, London, 1999; D Garland, ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State:Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society’, The British Journal ofCriminology, Vol. 36, Number 4, 1996, p 445; D Garland, The Culture ofControl: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, University of

Teresa Degenhardt

______________________________________________________________

87

Chicago Press, 2001; J Simon, Governing Through Crime, Oxford UniversityPress, 2007.3 P Andreas & E Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and CrimeControl in International Relations, Oxford University Press, 2006.4 M Delmas-Marty, ‘The Paradigm of the War on Crime’, Journal ofInternational Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, 2007, pp 584; A Huq & C Muller,‘The War on Crime as Precursor to the War on Terror’, International Journalof Law, Crime and Justice, Vol. 36, 2008, pp 215; Simon, op cit. 2007.5 Garland, op cit, 2001; Simon, op. Cit. 2007.6 M Foucault Society Must Be Defended. Picador, New York, 2003.7 G Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, StandfordUniversity Press, California,1998, p. 101.8 GW Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the AmericanPeople’, 20 September 2001, Viewed on February 2007, http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html .9 GW Bush Address to the Nation, 7 October 2001, Viewed on February2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html.10 T Blair, ‘Prime Minister Statement to Parliament’, October 4 2001. Viewedon April 2007, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1606.asp.11 T Blair, ‘Prime Minister Statement to House of Commons’, October 82001, Viewed April 2007, http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1621.12 T Blair, ‘Prime Minister Statement to Parliament on the War on Terror’, 14November 2001, Viewed April 2007. http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1668.13 GW Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the AmericanPeople’, 20 September 2001, Viewed February 2007,http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html.14 GW Bush, ‘Attorney General announcement with President Bush,Secretary of State Powell and FBI Director Mueller, FBI Headquarter, 10October 2001, Viewed February 2009.http://old.911digitalarchive.org/crr/documents/ 2801.pdf.15 T Blair, ‘Prime Minister Statement to Parliament’, 14 September 2001,Viewed February 2009, http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1598.16 J Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, Stanford University Press,Stanford, California, 2005.17 National Security Strategy of the United States of America Washington,White House, September 2002, Viewed on December 2006, Available onlineat http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf., p. 30.18 GW Bush, ‘President Bush Address to the Nation’, 19 March 2003.Viewed April 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html.


______________________________________________________________

88

19 GW Bush, ‘President Bush outlines Iraqi Threat’, 7 October 2003, ViewedApril 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html.20 GW Bush, ‘President’s Radio Address on the War on Terror’, 8 March2003, Viewed in 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030308-1.html.21 Bush, 2002, loc. cit.22 Bush, 2002, loc. cit.23 T Blair, ‘Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Statement Opening the Iraq Debate,18 March 2003, Viewed February 2007, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3294.asp.24 Blair, 2003, loc. cit.25 P Sands, Lawless World: America and the Maxing and Breaking of GlobalRules, Allen Lane, London, 2005.

Bibliography

Agamben, G., Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. StandfordUniversity Press, California, 1998.

Andreas, P. & Nadelmann, E., Policing the Globe: Criminalization andCrime Control in International Relations. Oxford University Press, 2006.

Beckett, K., Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary AmericanPolitics. Oxford University Press, 1997.

Bigo, D. (ed), Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: The (In)SecurityGames. L’Harmattan/ Culture and Conflicts, Paris, 2005.

Blair, T., ‘Prime Minister Statement to Parliament’. October 4 2001. Viewedin April 2007. http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1606.asp.

_______, ‘Prime Minister Statement to House of Commons’. October 8 2001.Viewed in April 2007.http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1621.

_______, ‘Prime Minister Statement to Parliament on the War on Terror’. 14November 2001. Viewed in April 2007. http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1668.

_______, ‘Prime Minister Statement to Parliament’. 14 September 2001.Viewed in February 2009. http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1598.

Teresa Degenhardt

______________________________________________________________

89

_______, ‘Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Statement Opening the Iraq Debate. 18March 2003. Viewed in February 2007. http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3294.asp.

Bush, G.W., ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the AmericanPeople’. 20 September 2001. Viewed in February 2007.http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html.

_______, ‘Address to the Nation’. 7 October 2001. Viewed in February 2007.http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html.

_______, ‘Attorney General Announcement with President Bush, Secretary ofState Powell and FBI Director Mueller’. FBI Headquarter. 10 October 2001.Viewed in February 2009. http://old.911digitalarchive.org/crr/documents/2801.pdf.

_______, ‘President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat’. 7 October 2002. Viewed inApril 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html.

_______, ‘Presidential Letter to the Congress’. 19 March 2003. Viewed in April2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-1.html .

_______, ‘US President George W Bush Discusses the Future of Iraq’. 26February 2003. Viewed in February 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html.

_______, ‘President Bush Address to the Nation’. 19 March 2003. Viewed inApril 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html.

_______, ‘President’s Radio Address on the War on Terror’. 8 March 2003.Viewed in April 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030308-1.html.

Delmas-Marty, M., ‘The Paradigm of the War on Crime’. Journal ofInternational Criminal Justice, Vol 5, 2007, pp 584-598.

Derrida, J., Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Stanford University Press,California, 2005.


______________________________________________________________

90

Feldman, N., ‘Choices of Law, Choices of War’. The New Era of Terrorism:Selected Readings, Sage, London, 2004.

Foucault, M., Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College the France.Picador, New York, 2003.

Garland, D., ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Controlin Contemporary Society’. The British Journal of Criminology. Vol. 36,Number 4, 1996, pp 445-471.

_______, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in ContemporarySociety. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001.

Huq, A.Z. & Muller, C., ‘The War on Crime as Precursor to the War onTerror’. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice. Vol. 36, 2008, pp215-229.

Kraska, P.B., ‘Militarising the Drug War: A Sign of the Times’. AlteredStates of Mind: Critical Observations of the Drug War. Garland Publishing,New York, 1993.

_______, ‘Crime Control as Warfare: Language Matters’. Militarising theAmerican Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed Forcesand the Police. Northeastern University Press, Boston, 2001.

_______, ‘Militarization and Policing: Its Relevance to 21st Century Police’.Policing. Vol. 1, Number 4, 2007, pp. 501-513.

National Security Strategy of the United States of America Washington,White House. September 2002. Viewed in December 2006.http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf .

Parenti, C., Lockdown America: Police and Prison in the Age of Crisis.Verso, London, 1999.

Sands, P., Lawless World: America and the Maxing and Breaking of GlobalRules. Allen Lane, London, 2005.

Simon, J., Governing Through Crime. Oxford University Press, 2007.

Teresa Degenhardt

______________________________________________________________

91

Sparks, R., ‘Ordinary Anxieties and States of Emergency: Statecraft andSpectatorship in the New Politics of Insecurity’. Perspectives on Punishment:The Contours of Control. Oxford University Press, 2006.

Teresa Degenhardt is Lecturer in Criminology at the School of Sociology,Social Policy and Social Work, Queen’s University Belfast. Her research areais mostly in theoretical criminology.

Blurring the Line between War and Peace: The UnitedStates and Al Qaeda in the Global War on Terrorism

Sean N. Kalic

AbstractSince September 2001, the United States has struggled with non-state actorsand a new era of warfare characterized by a blurred line between war andpeace. The Westphalian system established in 1648 codified the basicstructure of the international community, which has spawned the modernnation-state and established the basic parameters through which states, andlater nations, interacted with one another. The development of internationallaws, treaties, diplomatic missions, and international organizations haveevolved from the tenets of the traditional international system. However, onSeptember 11, 2001 a non-state actor (Al Qaeda) suddenly burst onto theinternational scene and challenged the tenets of the system. The majorquestion became how does a coalition of nations conduct war on a non-stateactor within the context of a system designed for nation-states? At the heartof this study is an evaluation and explanation of the history of Al Qaeda andthe U.S. led response to combat this new trans-national security threat. Thispaper highlights critical insights in the major issues that face the internationalcommunity in the twenty-first century as the distinction between war andpeace becomes increasingly unclear.

Key Words: United States, al Qaeda, global war on terrorism.

*****

1. IntroductionSince September 11, 2001 the United States and its allies have

struggled with transnational terrorism as a new era of warfare has emerged.In the aftermath of the Thirty-Years War the Westphalian system emerged asan international system for states to form an official forum to negotiate andestablishment the ‘fundamental rights and duties of states.’1 The Westphaliansystem codified the structure of the international community and spawned theinteraction among modern nation-states. The development of internationallaws, treaties, diplomatic missions, and international organizations hasevolved from the tenets of the traditional international system.2

However, on September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda, burst into theinternational spotlight and fundamentally challenged the tenets of theWestphalian system. Arguably, a new era of warfare emerged. On September30, 2001 U.S. President George W. Bush announced before a joint session of

Blurring the Line Between War and Peace

______________________________________________________________

94

Congress that the United States had initiated a ‘war on terrorism that focusedon Al Qaeda,’ as well as the ‘ defeat of every other terrorist group of globalreach.’3 This new era focused not on a traditional nation, but rather atransnational terrorist structure, e.g. a non-state actor. Lacking a nationalcontext, Al Qaeda operates outside the traditional elements of theinternational community. Because of this transnational orientation, the UnitedStates and the international community have used a variety of actions tocontain, isolate, and eradicate the threat posed by Al Qaeda. In its quest tosecure its objective however the United States and its allies have had to blurthe lines between war and peace.

2. Rise of al QaedaPrior to its attacks on the United States, Al Qaeda and its leader

Osama Bin Laden were relatively unknown.4 Using his experience as amujahidin in Afghanistan in the 1980s, bin Laden developed a transnationalorganization of Islamic extremists to rollback the expanding influence of the‘ideas and influence of the unbelievers.’5 Using his vast material resources,as well as operational experience gained in Afghanistan, bin Ladenestablished a trans-national terrorist organization focused on ‘re-establishingthe caliphate’ by reaching out to all Muslims.6 Al Qaeda emerged in the early1990s as the primary transnational terrorist organization.

Bin Laden urged Muslims to fight the forces of Westernglobalization in Bosnia, Kashmir, the Philippines, and the Muslim republicsof the former Soviet Union.7 Through the 1990s, as Al Qaeda grew, it movedfrom Sudan to Pakistan, before settling in Afghanistan, which the Talibancontrolled.8 Bin Laden used his business education to build an impressiveorganizational, as well as an international financial support network.

Al Qaeda has a core of several subordinate committees and cells. Atthe top is bin Laden who serves as the leader of the organization. To assist inmanaging and operating the transnational terrorist organization, Shura majilisserve ‘consultative council.’9 The Shura majilis receive information fromcommittees, that provided details on ongoing military operations, financialmatters, religious/legal, and media issues.10 A loose confederation of cellsprovides information to the committees on ongoing regional and countryspecific operations.11 The way to get approval and funding from Al Qaeda isthat a cell, either affiliated or unaffiliated, presents an operations plan,justified within the context of Jihad. The committees and Shura majilisreceive briefings and approve, or veto, the cell’s proposed operations. Ifrecommended for approval, the finance committee aligns funding and themilitary committee assists in training the terrorists.

There are two important elements to this process. The first isfunding. Al Qaeda generates money, legally, through constructioncompanies, furniture making, fishing boats, and agriculture products to

Sean N. Kalic

______________________________________________________________

95

generate capital for their operations.12 These businesses operate throughoutthe world and donate revenue to Al Qaeda. The second funding stream usesphilanthropic Islamic organizations.13 This loose international network ofbanks and non-governmental organizations present a rich and diverse coffer.Moreover, this stream presents an issue as the West’s attempts to freezeaccounts. Any action taken against these structures can result in a mediabacklash against the West, as Al Qaeda portrays as an attempt to stifleassistance to Muslims in need.

The second important element in Al Qaeda’s operational planning isthe justification of action. The Religious/Legal Committee as well as theShura Majilis provides a ‘religious’ justification for every operation. In thiscontext, Al Qaeda maintains strict control over its support of operationsdesigned to advance the objective of re-establishing the caliphate.

With a robust structure and international network, Al Qaeda becamea dynamic and impressively flexible non-state actor by 2001. From 2001, theUnited States has led a robust effort to eradicate and capture Al Qaeda’sleadership. While achieving success in killing or detaining approximatelyseventy-five percent of Al Qaeda’s key leadership by 2007, the organizationcontinues to operate as a modern hydra.14 One reason for this limited successis that fact that Al Qaeda operates well outside the parameters of thetraditional Westphalian system. While at times behaving like a traditionalstate, Al Qaeda also possesses elements of transnational criminalorganizations, international philanthropies, and hardcore terrorist groups. Theproblem therefore is a complex process calling for a variety of response thatblurs the line between war and peace.

3. Blurring the LineAlthough the international community had been dealing with ‘new

terrorism’ since 1968, Al Qaeda represents a different paradigm. As theUnited States and its ‘Coalition of the Willing’ charged headlong into a‘global war on terrorism,’ they were unsure about how to combat theelements of a transnational terrorist organization. To prosecute thisendeavour the United States uses a variety ‘peaceful’ and ‘warlike’ measures.

First, the United States applies international criminal and financiallaws to stop Al Qaeda. This method proved promising because it allowed theWest to use law enforcement functions that had proven successful in theinternational community’s fight against transnational organized crime andterrorism.15 Specifically, by classifying Al Qaeda as a criminal enterprise, theUnited States leveraged well-known international networks such as theINTERPOL to combat the terrorist group. Furthermore, since 1972 theFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defined and detailed its abilities totrack and arrest members of terrorist organizations and transnational criminalsyndicates.16 By applying traditional criminal legislation, the United States


______________________________________________________________

96

weakened the leadership and degraded Al Qaeda’s operational ability. Thepattern for this success stemmed from the international community’s fightagainst transnational organized crime.17 These law enforcement functions arenot war like, but rather standard elements used by law enforcementorganizations throughout the globe.

The second non-military method to attrite Al Qaeda was the use ofthe Banking Secrecy Act and the Money Laundering Control Act to freezeand limit the capital generated by Al Qaeda.18 Using this proven method theUnited States and the international community froze vast assets of Al Qaeda.Furthermore, the United States used legislation such as the RacketeerInfluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to further erode theorganization’s operational capabilities.19 The use of criminal and financiallegislation by the United States works in conjunction with one another andconstitutes a ‘peaceful’ method for the United States and its allies to attackAl Qaeda.

In addition to using criminal and financial legislation, the UnitedStates specifically also made use of Executive Orders, which provides theU.S. president with extraordinary powers. President William J. Clinton usedthis power in January 1995 with Executive Order (E.O.) 12947 in an attemptto dissuade terrorist organizations from disrupting the Middle-East peaceprocess. The order read: ‘grave acts of violence committed by foreignterrorists that disrupt the Middle-East peace process constitute an unusual andextraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy ofthe United States.’20 Furthermore, E.O. 12947 outlined that individuals orgroups that provided ‘financial, material, or technological support’ to terroristgroups bent on disrupting the peace process would be held criminallyaccountable.

Beyond using criminal legislation, financial legislation, andexecutive orders to fight terrorism, military force emerged in the twenty-firstcentury as the preferred tool to curb transnational terrorism.21 Prior toPresident George W. Bush’s open declaration of a ‘Global War onTerrorism,’ the military option remained the most reserved and guardedresponse used by U.S. presidents. In the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attackson September 11, 2001, the United Nations and the Security Councilfundamentally embraced the position of President Bush in his efforts toeradicate the threat posed by terrorism by initiating a ‘global war onterrorism.’ Although efforts to combat terrorism before September 11, 2001had been well established, the severity and high casualties in the Al Qaedaattacks reinforced the sentiments within the United States that terrorism needto become a higher security priority. The United States and its allies opted fora strong military posture, but still embraced the usefulness of the ‘peaceful’measures of prosecution.

Sean N. Kalic

______________________________________________________________

97

Beyond stating that the United States would use all means necessaryto combat the forces of terrorism, U.S. President George W. Bush furtherwarned that nations assisting, supporting, or conducting terrorist operationswould be held accountable for their actions.22 Bush’s declaration was a directre-statement of the language used by Clinton in Executive Order 12947, withthe expressed recognition that the international security threat posed by AlQaeda demanded military power, as they were ‘acts of war.’ 23 Henceforth,the Bush administration, having identified bin Laden and Al Qaeda asresponsible for the attacks, initiated a military campaign.24

Stopping short of an official declaration of war, the U.S. Congress‘approved a joint resolution authorizing the use of armed force against thoseresponsible for the attacks.’25 On October 7, 2001 Operation ENDURING

FREEDOM began. The phased attack consisted of an initial strike using‘aircraft and cruise missile attacks on Taliban forces, Al Qaeda fighters,training sites, command and control systems, and radar installations’ inAfghanistan, while the second phase consisted of operations conducted byU.S. Special Forces and US Army Rangers units.26 Next, United StatesMarine Corps Expeditionary Units entered the country of Afghanistan toestablish a base in Kandahar from which U.S. and Allied forces could fight toeradicate the Taliban.27

Although led by the United States, the operations in Afghanistanwere an international effort supported the British, Russian, and Pakistanigovernments as well as other nations who contributed to the combat effort.28

The sustained combat operations in Afghanistan by the United States and itsallies against the Taliban and Al Qaeda represent a fundamental break withhow nations attempted to combat terrorism prior to September 2001. Theoverwhelming use of military force in conjunction with criminal andfinancial legislation simply blurred the line between war and peace. In effect,the United States and its allies continue to fight, a transnational terroristgroup, as if it was a traditional nation. While there are merits to this method,the international community has also used traditional criminal and financialmethods to carry out a second front in the ‘war on terrorism.’

Embracing a wide variety of approaches to combat terrorism after2001, the non-military precedents established prior to 2001 becamefundamentally significant because as they provided a foundation upon whichthe United States and the international community began to build and expandcommon links found throughout the international system. ‘The link oftransnational organized crime, arms traffickers, and narcotics traffickers toterrorist organizations proved to be one such connection made and pursued inthe international community’s fight to eradicate transnational terroristgroups.’29 Likewise, the international community’s use of criminal, financial,and immigration legislation, backed by strong law enforcement


______________________________________________________________

98

commitments, converged to offer the allied nations a wide variety of optionsthat obscured the traditional line between war and peace.30

4. ConclusionDetailing the development of Al Qaeda and the response by the

United States brings us back to the Peace of Westphalia and the subsequentcongresses and international agreements that have defined the lexicon ofinternational relations since 1648. At their core, these agreements havedetailed and maintained that nations are the primary agent in the course ofinternational relations. Periods of peace and war have come to berepresentative of strong nations or unified blocs of state power. Seldom hasthere been a threat that operated well outside the parameters of the system.Combating Al Qaeda is a fundamental break with the past.

Although currently the United States and its allies are involved in aglobal war against terrorism that maintains two active military fronts and aconstant state of awareness, there has not been an official declaration of warby the United States Congress. The lines of war and peace blur as the militaryservices of the U.S. and its allies continue conduct combat operations, whilethe vast majority of the citizens remain far removed from the conflict. U.S.President George W. Bush even tried to convince the public of the wartimestance by consistently referring to the global war on terrorism as the ‘firstideological fight of the 21 century.’ However, the American public remainslargely unconvinced.

In many ways the juxtaposed perceptions between the military’sconsistent and steady involvement in combat operations and the public’sperception of ‘life as normal,’ mimics the nation’s treatment of its primarythreat--Al Qaeda. While lacking a traditional national structure, as enemies ofthe past have tended to have, the United States used criminal, financial,immigrations and military processes in an attempt to dissuade the enemy.This blend of military, criminal, and legislative approaches further obscuresthe distortion between war and peace.31

The fundamental difference in this new era of warfare is that thenations of the global community are allying against a transnational non-stateactor. In trying to eradicate the threat, they have been forced to use all meansnecessary to combat a foe that is flexible, adaptive, and relatively resilience.As a historian, I am weary of making a grandiose declarations about thedénouement of the Westphalian system, as the primary actors, nations havenot withered. However, I am willing to concede that the present era doesindicate a need to alter the system to meet the demands posed by non-stateactors, which seem to have become a permanent part of the system. For thetime being, we need to become comfortable with the blurred line between

war and peace.

Sean N. Kalic

______________________________________________________________

99

Notes

1 AS Hersey, ‘History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia’,The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 6 No 1, January 1912, p.33.2 L Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’, The American Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 42, No1 (January 1948), p. 20.3 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001, U.S. Department of State, WashingtonD.C., May 2002, p. i.4 R Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, Berkely Books,New York, 2002, p. xlii; Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997, U.S. StateDepartment, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 30.5 O Bin Laden, ‘World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad Against Jewsand Crusaders’, Al Qaeda in its Own Words, G Kepel & J-P Milelli, (eds),Belknap press, Cambridge, 2008, p.52-56; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p.74.6 O Bin Laden, Ibid., p. 60-65; Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 74.7 BM Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation andSuggestions for Strategy, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2003, p. 3.8 Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 56.9 R Gunaratna, ‘Blowback’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2001, p.43.10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 M Basile, ‘Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network isLikely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing’, Studies inConflict and Terrorism, May-June 2004, p. 169-170.13 Gunaratna, op. cit., pp. 90-91.14 Although the United States and its allies have been able to attrite the coreleadership of Al Qaeda, the organization has proven to be resilient.15 A Baveja, ‘America’s ‘War’ on Terrorism: Can the U.S. Learn from ItsWar on Drugs?’, Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International,January 2001, p. 16.16 RM Nixon, ‘Memorandum Establishing a Cabinet Committee to CombatTerrorism’, September 25, 1972, Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy,Vol. I, Y Alexander & MB Kraft (eds), Praeger Security International,Westport, 2008, p. 47-48.17 Baveja, op. cit., p. 16.18 PJ Smith, ‘USA Adopts Financial Legislation for Counterterrorism’, Jane’sIntelligence Review, August, 2004, p.35.; See also 12 United Stated Code,1829, b and 13 United States Code, 1956-57.19 See, 18 United States Code, 1961-68.


______________________________________________________________

100

20 WJ Clinton, ‘Executive Order 12947: Prohibiting Transactions withTerrorism Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process’, TheFederal Register, January 25, 1995, p. 5079.21 President Reagan’s authorization of operation EL DORADO CANYON in1983 and President Clinton’s use of cruise missiles against targets in Sudanand Afghanistan in the wake of Al Qaeda bombing on US embassies remainthe two primary examples of the use of military force against terrorists in theyears prior to the Al Qaeda attacks on the Unites States on September 11,2001.22 GW Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the AmericanPeople’, US Capital, Washington D.C., September 21, 2001, transcript postedon http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html.,Viewed on June 11, 2008.23 CH Briscoe, RL Kiper, JA Schroder & KI Sepp, Weapon of Choice: USArmy Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, Combat Studies InstitutePress, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003, p. 33.24 Ibid.25 Ibid. The approval by Congress was not a declaration of war, but rather theauthorization and support of the president’s decision to use military forceagainst Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Under the War Powers Act, thepresident must inform Congress of his decision to use military force, uponwhich those forces can only be deployed for 60 days. If the presidents needsan extension, he may appeal to Congress for an additional 30 days before thetroops then either need to be removed or approved by Congress.26 SM Duncan, A War of a Different Kind: Military Force and America’sSearch for Homeland Security, Naval Institution Press, Annapolis 2004, p.53.27 Ibid., 34.28 Approximately 12 nations supported and assisted the United States in itsoperations in Afghanistan. The activity of support ranged from thecommitment of combat forces by nations such as Britain, to fly-over rightsgranted by several republics of the former Soviet Union.29 SN Kalic, Combating a Modern Hydra: Al Qaeda and the Global War onTerrorism, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, 2006, p. 31.30 Ibid.31 S Wilson & A Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror is Given a New Name,’Washington Post, online edition, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html.Viewed on March17, 2010.

Sean N. Kalic

______________________________________________________________

101

Bibliography

Alexander, Y. & Kraft, M.B. (eds), Evolution of U.S. CounterterrorismPolicy. Vol. 1. Praeger Security International, Westport, 2008.

________, Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy. Vol. 2. Praeger SecurityInternational, Westport, 2008.

________, Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy. Vol. 3. Praeger SecurityInternational, Westport, 2008.

Basile, M., ‘Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network isLikely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing’. Studies inConflict & Terrorism. No 27 (May-June 2004), 169-185.

Baveja, A., ‘America’s ‘War’ on Terrorism: Can the U.S. Learn from its Waron Drugs?’. Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International. Vol. 8no. 1, January 2001, pp. 16-20.

Boulden, J. & Thomas G.W. (eds), Terrorism and the U.N.: Before and AfterSeptember 11. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004.

Daphne, J. & Framework, W. (eds), Non-State Actors in World Politics.Palgrave Press, New York, 2001.

Duncan, S.M., A War of a Different Kind: Military force and America’sSearch for Homeland Security. Naval Institution Press, Annapolis, 2004.

Enders, W. & Sandler, T., ‘Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold WarEra’. International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 43, No. 1, (March 1999). pp. 145-167.

Gross, L., ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’. The American Journal ofInternational Law. Vol. 42, No. 1, (January 1948), pp 20-41.

Gunaratna, R., Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. Berkeley Books,New York, 2002.

________, ‘Blowback’. Jane’s Intelligence Review. Vol. 13, No. 3, (August2001), p. 45.


______________________________________________________________

102

Hersey, A.S., ‘History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia’.The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 6, No. 1, (January 1912),pp. 30-69.

Jenkins, B., Countering Al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation andSuggestions for Strategy. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2003.

Kalic, S.N., Combating a Modern Hydra: Al Qaeda and the Global War onTerrorism. Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, 2006.

Kepel, G. & Milelli, J-P. (eds), Al Qaeda in its Own Words. Belknap Press,Cambridge, 2008.

Laqueur, W., The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of MassDestruction. Oxford University Press, New York, 2000.

Leblanc, B., ‘Sources of Terrorist: Funding the Drug Trade’. Journal ofCounterterrorism & Homeland Security International. Vol. 10, No. 2,(Summer 2004), pp. 26-34.

Murphy, J.F., Sword of Islam: Muslim Extremism from the Arab Conquest tothe Attack on America. Prometheus Books, New York, 2002.

Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990-2003, U.S. State Department,Washington D.C., 1991.

Risen, J., ‘Evolving Nature of Al Qaeda is Misunderstood, Critics Says’.New York Times. http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20041108335596.html.,Viewed on November 8, 2004.

Simon, B. & Simon, S., The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s WarAgainst America. Random House, New York, 2003.

Smith, P.J., ‘USA Adopts Financial Legislation for Counterterrorism’. Jane’sIntelligence Review. No. 16, August 2004, 34-36.

Wilson, S. & Kamen, A., ‘Global War on Terror is Given New Name’. TheWashington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html. Viewed on March 17, 2010.

Sean N. Kalic

______________________________________________________________

103

Sean N. Kalic is an Associate Professor in the Department of MilitaryHistory at the United States Army’s Command and General Staff College. Hehas published on topics dealing with the Cold War, which is one of his areasof expertise, as well as on Al Qaeda and transnational terrorism.

Income-Based Distribution of Terrorism

Piotr Lis

AbstractThe study applies time series analysis to establish whether income-basedtransference of international terrorism took place in reaction to the rise of thefundamentalist-based terrorism, the end of the Cold War, 9/11, and the 2003Iraq invasion. It introduces several extensions to an article by Enders andSandler (2006), for instance it uses two independent datasets and presents analternative approach to the events in Iraq. The differences in results betweenthis paper and Enders and Sandler (2006) are caused by the lack ofconsistency in employing the World Bank’s income classification by the twoauthors. This study finds that the rise of fundamentalist terrorism broughtincreases across all countries, while the post-Cold War era resulted in areduction in attacks only in high and medium income countries. 9/11appeared to have had no long lasting impact on distribution of terrorism,while the Iraq invasion seemed to have reduced international terrorism in richstates.

Key Words: Terrorism, distribution, Iraq war, time series.

*****

1. IntroductionThis study seeks to answer whether major historical events induced

changes in the distribution of international terrorism among countries byincome class. It also explores the effects of discrepancies between twoterrorism datasets – MIPT and ITERATE – on the obtained results. I start byattempting to replicate the work of Enders and Sandler (2006), henceforthE&S, and find that although some of their results hold up, their unclearincome classification prevents me from reproducing many of the estimates.Similarly to the two authors, I follow the World Bank’s (1978-2008) incomeclassification, which distinguishes high-, medium- and low-income countries(HICs, MICs and LICs, respectively). Then I apply time series analysis toevaluate whether terrorists have altered their target locations categorized bycountries’ income in response to the rise of religious fundamentalism, the endof the Cold War, the September 11 attacks, henceforth 9/11, and the Iraq war,which is not accounted for in E&S. Subsequently, I introduce severalextensions. First, I analyze the MIPT (2008) database in addition to theITERATE dataset used by E&S. Second, I follow the World Bank’s incomeclassification more closely1. Third, I suggest an expanded analysis of the


______________________________________________________________

106

Iraqi conflict by incorporating domestic events under the presumption thatthey affect foreign audience.

I base my considerations on the rational actor model (Anderton,Carter 2005), which implies that terrorists choose venues that promise ahigher ratio of expected benefits to expected costs. This framework allowsfor a substitution between targets. For instance, wealthy nations can affordmore effective measures than their poorer counterparts. Thus, in periods ofincreased threat, when countries boost their security, we may observetransference of terrorism to less developed states that are unable to affordwidespread counterterrorism measures.

2. Terrorism DataThe data on international terrorist attacks is drawn from two

sources: the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, which was managed by theOklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism,and the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE),which has been developed by Mickolus et al. (2008). MIPT records 10,237international incidents between 1 January 1968 and 31 December 2007, whileITERATE reports 12,975 events over the same period. Notably, MIPTdismisses any hoaxes, foiled or failed plots, while ITERATE is moreinclusive and incorporates a wider range of events including hoaxes, andthose aborted by terrorists or authorities at any stage of planning orexecution.

Using the described datasets, I aggregate the observations overthree-month periods, which minimizes the risk of having intervals with zeroor near-zero observations. Subsequently, I generate two time series. First, ‘allincidents’ includes quarterly totals for all types of international attacks.Second, the ‘casualty’ time series lists only attacks with either a death and /or injury.

Figure 1 (See Appendix) depicts numbers of terrorist events perquarter and by income class between 1968 and 2007. Plots in the bottom ofeach panel present differences between the two datasets computed bydeducting the MIPT counts from the ITERATE totals.

All panels of Figure 1 (See Appendix) give the impression of anincrease in terrorist activity with the advent of the fundamentalist violence.The end of the Cold War seems to be associated with a noticeable decline inthe number of incidents in all series but LICs, which suffer from a furtherescalation of terrorism. The post-9/11 period seems to bring immediateincreases across all four panels, while the Iraq invasion is likely to benefitHICs. At the same time, Panel 3 suggests a drastic expansion of terrorism inthe MIC group that includes Iraq. Discrepancies between the datasets inrecent years, when MIPT totals exceed those of ITERATE, can be largelycontributed to the way the databases handle attacks in Israel, Iraq and

Piotr Lis

______________________________________________________________

107

Afghanistan. Table 1 shows that MIPT’s record of 351 attacks in Israel,which constitutes 62 per cent of all HIC incidents, is ten times higher thanITERATE’s count of 33 attacks. MIPT also appears to be doing a better jobwhen reporting incidents in Iraq. It lists nearly three times more internationalattacks than the rival dataset. When I match the ITERATE’s records of allattacks that took place in Iraq in 2005 with the MIPT content, I find thatITERATE omits tens of incidents which are undoubtedly international andshown in MIPT.

3. Estimation Method and ResultsI employ an autoregressive process of order p, AR(p), augmented by

adding five intervention variables2:

,εDαIRAQαSEPTαPOSTαFUNDαyaay tP54321it

p

1ii0t

where yt is the number of attacks in period t, a0 is a constant and εt is an errorterm. The intervention variables take the following values:

fundamentalist terrorism: FUND = 1 for t ≥1979:4 and 0 otherwise,

the end of the Cold War: POST = 1 for t ≥ 1992:1 and 0 otherwise,

9/11 (permanent effect): SEPT = 1 for t ≥ 2001:3 and 0 otherwise,

9/11 (pulse dummy): DP =1 if t = 2001:3 and 0 otherwise,

the Iraq war: IRAQ = for t ≥ 2003:3 and 0 otherwise.

Regression results are presented in Figure 2 (See Appendix). Eachbar represents a confidence interval (CI) for an estimate, which is markedwith a horizontal line. Table 2 (See Appendix) facilitates further discussionby summarizing the effects found by E&S and stating whether my resultsconfirm (‘yes’) or contradict (‘no’) their findings. Cases where E&S reportsignificant effects, but my estimates are not statistically different from zeroare coded as ‘maybe’.

The advent of the religious fundamentalism (FUND), increasedterrorism by around 20 attacks per quarter, but it did not seem to affectcasualty incidents. I show that the effect of fundamentalist terrorism spreadsacross all income groups. The estimates of the effect of the end of the ColdWar (POST) confirm E&S’s finding of the decline in incidents of all typesand no impact on casualty incidents. On the income group level my resultsback the drops across the MIC and HIC samples. Nonetheless, I findevidence of transference of terrorism to LICs. This effect can perhaps beattributed to the fact that both sides of the Iron Curtain lost their interest in


______________________________________________________________

108

destabilizing each other, and therefore support for terrorists was reduced.This was accompanied by emergence of new LICs and diminished efforts tomaintain the Soviet or Western influence in peripheral countries, whichdeprived of assistance, became unable to control internal ethnic hatreds.Also, the atmosphere of global changes might have been exploited byinsurgents in underdeveloped states who wanted reforms.

My estimates do not show permanent changes in the distribution ofterrorism following 9/11 (SEPT). The rise of terrorism in HICs shown byMIPT is attributed to the dataset’s much higher number of incidents in Israel.It should not be generalized for the entire HIC sample as the regression doesnot return any change when attacks in Israel are excluded. The picture ismore complicated when it comes to the immediate effect of 9/11 (Dp). Iconfirm E&S’s result of transference of casualty incidents to HICs. The risein terrorism in rich countries could be attributed to the increase of perceivedmarginal benefits, as well as an ease of causing anxiety immediately after9/11, which in turn decreased the marginal cost of terrorism. In the long run,however, security upgrades in rich countries seem to have raised the marginalcost enough to deter terrorists.

The Iraq war did not seem to have a noticeable impact on the global,LIC and MIC series (see Figure 2 in the Appendix). The MIPT estimatesreveal a considerable drop in the number of all incidents and casualtyincidents in HICs. This may imply that the increased presence of the Westernforces in terrorists’ homelands have engaged them enough to keep them awayfrom launching attacks in rich countries, or that further advances in securityin HICs have paid off3.

MIPT and ITERATE give similar results, with the largestdiscrepancies in the instant effect of 9/11. The reason for that is thedatabases’ different handling of events in recent years. The comparison of theITERATE coefficients with those of E&S shows differences in estimates forMICs and LICs, which are a result of discrepancies in the used incomeclassifications.

4. Iraq – An Alternative ApproachThis section looks closer at terrorism in Iraq after the 2003 invasion.

I argue that attacks in which only Iraqi nationals are involved are ‘weakly’international as they are likely to affect audiences beyond the host country.Since those incidents occupy news nearly every day, the Western publicopinion must be somewhat influenced by them. Terrorists try to convince thecoalition countries’ citizenry that the war in unwinnable. This message mayreduce public support for the war, which is crucial for democraticgovernments to carry out their operations, particularly foreign militarymissions, which may be perceived as unnecessary loss of resources and lives.In addition, prolonged instability is associated with larger costs being paid

Piotr Lis

______________________________________________________________

109

from the coalition states’ budgets, as well as prevents their businesses fromobtaining expected benefits. Moreover, unpopularity of operations in Iraqmay reduce general support for governments and hinder internal reforms.

Based on the above arguments, I extend the terrorism series bytaking the MIPT dataset with only international events and adding 9,063attacks that took place in Iraq after 1 May 2003 and did not involve foreigntargets. The time series obtained through this exercise are plotted in Figure 3(See Appendix). Since the violence generating process in Iraq is unique anddifferent from other countries, I separate Iraq from MICs.

The analysis relies on testing for structural breaks in the time seriesat unknown date τm. As before, I use an AR(p) process, and estimate thefollowing model:

,)()(1

2201

110 tm

p

iitim

p

iitit tIyaatIyaay

where yt is the number of incidents in period t, a10 and a20 are constants and εt

is an error term. The indicator function, I(.), takes the value of zero before thetested break date, and I(.) = 1 otherwise. I follow the procedure described byBai (1997) to find the break points. I consider break dates in the central 85per cent of the sample.

Table 3 (See Appendix) reports estimated break dates andcoefficients. I do not show results for the ‘MIC without Iraq’ sample as itdoes not experience any significant changes related to the Iraq war. Alldisplayed series show breaks in the second quarter of 2004. The long-runmean of all incidents worldwide rises from 65.9 before to 184.5 after thebreak. This is largely influenced by the events in Iraq, where thecorresponding measure soars to 149 attacks per quarter. A similardevelopment is present in the casualty series, where long-run mean rises to96.7 incidents per quarter in Iraq and nearly four-fold in all countries. Theescalation of violence in Iraq combined with the decline of attacks in HICs,which is shown in the previous section, implies transference of terrorismfrom the latter to rich countries.

The analysis shows changes in the terrorism series a year after theinvasion. There may be several explanations for this delay. First, terroristsneeded time to organize resources. Second, scandals such as the abuse at AbuGhraib could have further aroused insurgents’ determination. The outrageamong Iraqi public could have raised the support for the insurgency. Third,terrorists started to target the newly forming Iraqi police and military, as wellas people who wanted to join them4. By making the Iraqi security forcesappear unable to defend themselves, terrorists were sending a message thatthe coalition’s efforts were failing.


______________________________________________________________

110

These results should be read with caution as the above analysis mayoverestimate the number of international terrorist attacks. But taking intoaccount only those incidents in Iraq that are classified as international ignoresthe fact that attacks, which directly involve only Iraqi nationals, may alsoaffect international audience. The real impact of the Iraq war on internationalterrorism is likely to lie somewhere between these two extremes.

5. Concluding RemarksThis study shows that 9/11 did not have as large impact on

international terrorism as religious fundamentalism or the end of the ColdWar. It also shows that such controversial steps as the Iraq war may enhancesecurity at home and keep terrorists away from their prime targets. However,providing security to citizens is increasingly difficult as terrorists can easilycommunicate, travel across countries, and react strategically to securityupgrades by identifying and exploiting soft targets. States should exert effortsto protect the weakest links, but doing so they ought to be aware thatcounterterrorism policies are likely to create externalities.

This study also exposes sensitivity of E&S’s findings. Since thediscrepancies are largely attributable to the fact that I follow the WorldBank’s income classification in a more consistent way, it provides a caveatagainst the dangers of using cross-national income data in time seriesanalysis. The differences between estimates obtained with MIPT andITERATE are caused mainly by different approaches to coding incidents,particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel.

Appendix

Table 1. Incidents in Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan

All incidentsIncidents in

IraqIncidents inAfghanistan

Incidents inIsraelYear

MIPT IT. MIPT IT. MIPT IT. MIPT IT.

2001 205 52 0 0 2 1 79 42002 298 130 0 0 13 5 106 132003 276 164 46 25 33 12 52 72004 395 234 246 133 24 12 6 42005 311 109 177 45 30 13 4 02006 241 83 75 12 30 8 55 32007 149 91 48 6 11 15 49 2

Total 1875 863 592 221 143 66 351 33

Piotr Lis

______________________________________________________________

111

Table 2. Comparison of findings in E&S with my results

Confirmed E&S ConfirmedIncident type andcountry class

E&SIT. MIPT IT. MIPT

Fundamentalist terrorism The end of the Cold WarWorld rise yes* yes decline yes yesLIC rise yes* yes decline no noMIC decline no no decline yes yes

Allincidents

HIC no effect yes no decline yes yesWorld no effect yes yes no effect yes yesLIC no effect yes no no effect no yesMIC decline maybe maybe no effect no yes

Casualtyincidents

HIC no effect yes no no effect yes no

Permanent effect of 9/11 Temporary effect of 9/11

World no effect yes yes decline yes maybeLIC no effect yes yes decline yes maybeMIC no effect no yes decline yes maybe

Allincidents

HIC no effect yes no no effect yes yesWorld no effect yes yes no effect yes noLIC no effect yes yes decline yes maybeMIC no effect yes yes no effect no yes

Casualtyincidents

HIC no effect yes yes rise yes yes

* significant at 10% confidence lev

Table 3. Estimated break dates and coefficients

Long-run meanTimeseries

p Breakdate

Sup-Wald

5%crit.

value

R2 a10 a11 a12 a20 a21 a22 a23

beforebreak

afterbreak

All countries (extended series)

21.74 0.39 0.28 180.76 0.40 -0.01 -0.37All

incidents4 2004:2 17.69 17.27 0.93

(4.39) (3.76) (3.98) (2.60) (1.68) (-0.06) (-2.62)65.9 184.5

2.83 0.64 0.27 130.76 0.30 -0.44Casualtyincidents

4 2004:2 18.33 17.27 0.94(1.81) (4.92) (2.52) (2.67) (1.20) (-1.93)

29.3 114.8

Iraq (extended series)

0.24 1.85 -0.89 183.04 -1.02 0.80Allincidents

5 2004:2 54.83 19.27 0.96(1.08) (11.67) (-3.61) (2.54) (-3.75) (2.52)

5.6 149.3

0.13 1.95 -0.86 127.31 -0.98 0.67Casualtyincidents

4 2004:2 19.15 17.27 0.95(0.88) (7.36) (-1.89) (2.57) (-2.84) (1.33)

-1.54* 96.7

* Value not significantly different from zero. p - number of coefficients allowed to change when testing for breaks;regressions are run on the 1968:1-2007:4 sample; t-statistics in parentheses; a1i denotes pre-change coefficients; a2i relatesto post-change coefficients.


______________________________________________________________

112

Fig

ure

1.In

cid

en

tsb

yIn

co

me

Cla

ss

(qu

art

erl

yto

tals

)

Piotr Lis

______________________________________________________________

113

Fig

ure

2.O

LS

esti

mate

san

d95%

co

nfi

den

ce

inte

rvals


______________________________________________________________

114

Notes

1 The World Bank distinguishes two subgroups of MICs – Lower Middle andUpper Middle Income Countries. From the example given by E&S oneconcludes that they treat the two sub-groups as one class. But they also saythat Mexico moved from LICs to MICs, while Poland shifted in the oppositedirection. In fact none of these countries was ever classified as LIC and theonly moves they made were within the middle income category.2 Compare with E&S. I also obtain maximum likelihood estimates based onthe negative binomial distribution, which enables me to overcome limitationsassociated with OLS estimation for ‘thin’ series. However, here I presentonly OLS estimates as they can be interpreted intuitively and are consistentwith results obtained using negative binomial.3 Results for the incidents against U.S. targets (not shown) suggest that thewar did not increase the vulnerability of the U.S. interests.4 Attacks against the Iraqi police and military, which are not a part of theoccupying forces, constitute terrorism. However, only 0.6% of all terroristattacks in Iraq after the invasion were against military targets. Analogously,

Figure 3. Extended terrorism series and estimated break periods

Piotr Lis

______________________________________________________________

115

attacks on civilians waiting to volunteer for these services constituteterrorism.

Bibliography

Anderton, C.H. & Carter, J.R., ‘On Rational Choice Theory and the Study ofTerrorism’. Defence and Peace Economics. Vol. 16(4), 2005, pp. 275-282.

Andrews, D.W.K., ‘Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural ChangeWith Unknown Change Point’. Econometrica. Vol. 61(4), 1993, pp. 821-856.

Atkinson, S.E., Sandler, T. & Tschirhart, J., ‘Terrorism in a BargainingFramework’. Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 30(1), 1987, pp. 1-21.

Bai, J., ‘Estimation of a Change Point in Multiple Regression Models’.Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 79(4), 1997, pp. 551-563.

Cameron, A.C. & Trivedi, P.K., Regression Analysis of Count Data.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.

Enders, W. & Sandler, T., ‘Distribution of Transnational Terrorism amongCountries by Income Class and Geography After 9/11’. International StudiesQuarterly. Vol. 50(2), 2006, pp. 367-393.

_______, ‘Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates’. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 46(2), 2002, pp. 145-165.

_______, ‘Transnational Terrorism in the Post–Cold War Era’. InternationalStudies Quarterly. Vol. 43(1), 1999, pp. 145-167.

Hamilton, L.C. & Hamilton, J.D., ‘Dynamics of Terrorism’. InternationalStudies Quarterly. Vol. 27(1), 1983, pp. 39-54.

Hoffman, B., ‘Terrorism Trends and Prospects’. Countering the NewTerrorism. Lesser, I. (ed), Document MR-989-AF Edn., RAND, SantaMonica, 1999, pp. 7-38.

Long, J.S., Regression Models for Categorical and Limited DependentVariables. Sage Publications, Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1997.


______________________________________________________________

116

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), TerrorismKnowledge Base. Accessed on 13 Mar 2008 from http://www.tkb.org/, nolonger available online.

_______, The MIPT Terrorism Annual. National Memorial Institute for thePrevention of Terrorism, Oklahoma City, 2002.

Mickolus, E.F., Sandler, T., Murdock, J.M. & Flemming, P., InternationalTerrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968 - 2007. Vinyard Software,Dunn Loring, VA, 2008.

Sandler, T. & Enders, W., ‘Economic Consequences of Terrorism inDeveloped and Developing Countries’. Terrorism, Economic Development,and Political Openness. Keefer, P. & Loayza, N. (eds), CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 17-46.

World Bank, World Development Report. Oxford University Press, NewYork, 1978 – 2008.

Piotr Lis is a PhD student at Royal Holloway University of London. Hisresearch interest is in economics of armed conflict, particularly terrorism andchanges in public opinion in response to war.

Defining Two Categories of Non-State Actors: Do we need toGain more Control over Them to Prevent Specific Threats or

is it Against the Basic Pillars of Democracy?

Radana Makariusová

AbstractNon-state actors are entities which have an irreplaceable position in thecurrent global system. In the last decades they have become so influentialthat the analysis of the current global system is impossible without theircharacterisation. Individuals and non-state actors are the pillars of globalcivil society and the appropriateness of the terms ‘global’ and ‘civil society’is subject to many discussions. Global civil society is an arena in whichnon-governmental actors are active and influence the lives of people allover the world. As Mary Kaldor says: ‘global civil society (societas civilis)is a peaceful political community based on an implicit or explicit consensusof all its members’. But is it true in reality? Or do we specify, on thecontrary, a specific ‘dark zone’ which requires a more detailed observation?The proposed paper advances an alternative hypothesis that the existence ofglobal civil society and the structure of global governance inadvertentlysupport the participation of ‘unsocial’ non-state actors. My hypothesis leadsto a discussion whether non-state actors may be defined with twocontradictory aspects – the positive altruistic approach and the negativeaspect supporting the emergence of war, terrorism, radicalism etc. Non-stateactors are very heterogeneous and the lack of their control might lead tonegative tendencies in the current global system. The core of my paper liesin the endeavour to find an answer to the following question: Shall wecreate specific institutions which would be responsible for gaining controlover non-state actors? Is this procedure the right approach in eliminating thepotential of specific global threats? The current global system - the systemof global governance is based on a unique interconnection ofintergovernmental relations and non-state actors therefore we shallconcentrate on solutions of specific threats resulting from the lack of controlof non-state actors.

Key Words: Non-state actors, global civil society, global governance, weakstates, UN Global Compact.

*****

Defining Two Categories of Non-State Actors______________________________________________________________118

1. IntroductionNon-state actors are entities, which have an irreplaceable position

in the current global system. In the last decades they have become soinfluential that the analysis of the current global system is impossiblewithout their characterisation. Individuals and non-state actors are thepillars of global civil society and of the institutional structure of globalgovernance. The appropriateness of the terms ‘global’ and ‘civil society’ issubject to many discussions. Global civil society is an arena or space inwhich non-governmental actors are active and influence the lives of peopleall over the world. As Mary Kaldor says: ‘global civil society (societascivilis) is a peaceful political community based on an implicit or explicitconsensus of all its members’. But is it true in reality? Or do we specify, onthe contrary, a specific ‘dark zone’ which requires a more detailedobservation?

I advance an alternative hypothesis that the existence of globalcivil society and the structure of global governance inadvertently supportthe participation of ‘unsocial’ non-state actors which might have globalimpact. My hypothesis leads to a discussion whether non-state actors maybe defined with two contradictory aspects – the positive altruistic approachand the negative aspect supporting the emergence of war, terrorism,radicalism etc. Non-state actors are very heterogeneous and the lack of theircontrol might lead to negative tendencies in the current global system. Thecore of my paper lies in the endeavour to find an answer to the followingquestion: Shall we create specific institutions which would be responsiblefor gaining control over non-state actors? Is this procedure the rightapproach in eliminating the potential of specific global threats? I dividenon-state actors into two categories: non-profit (NGOs, charities, etc.),profitable (multinational corporations), and come to a solution that eachnon-state actor on all levels of analysis occupies a very specific andsometimes very powerful potential to influence others in a positive or anegative way. The current global system - the system of global governanceis based on a unique interconnection of intergovernmental relations andnon-state actors which stresses the deepening of mutual cooperation andpolitical coordination. Therefore, we shall concentrate on solutions ofspecific threats resulting from the lack of control of non-state actors.

These problems are linked and examining the better-developedspace of non-state actors and it throws light on how to develop the world ofnon-state actors in other words the space of global civil society. We candefine meaning ‘civil’ by a dual inherent meaning. Which raises twoquestions:

Radana Makariusová

______________________________________________________________

119

1.) how to handle the dark side of the non-state worldrepresented by various kinds of organised terrorists andcriminals?

2.) how to handle the global economy and its non-state actors.We need the concept that captures the non-state politicaluniverse, whether is nice or nasty.1

2. Democratic Principles of GlobalityWith globalization, many social relations substantially transcend

territorial geography, territorialist governance has become impracticable.National and local governments are quite unable by themselves toeffectively regulate phenomena like global terrorism; global arms trade orglobal ecological problems. Transborder flows cannot be tied to a strictlydelimited territorial space over which a state might endeavour to exerciseunilateral full control. Moreover globalisation has also loosened someimportant cultural and psychological underpinnings of sovereign statehood.2

Governance of global spaces is not only different, but also lacks democraticlegitimacy. On the whole, current arrangements to regulate globalcommunications, global conflict, global terrorism, global ecology, globalfinance and global production rest on very limited explicit consent from theaffected populations. In each area of global policy, public participation andpublic accountability are generally weak. So it is no exaggeration to say thatcontemporary globalization has provoked a crisis of democracy. This crisisderives from major structural problem, which in turn reflected in a host ofinstitutional deficiencies. The structural problem relates to the changingcontours of the disjunction between supraterritorial spaces and territorialself-determination. While many social relations have gained a substantialglobal dimension, practices of democracy have largely failed to keep pace.Yet even if territorial democratic mechanisms are not adequate to bringtransborder actors and flows under collective control of the people theyaffect. Democratic global governance cannot be derived from democraticgovernment alone.3

Current global system is a space within which participatethousands of non-state actors, but without any inner systematic control.There is no superordinate body, which would be responsible for monitoringand supervision over non-state entities. Our current global system is a newphenomenon and we have not yet devised a tool that would help us adapt tothe current new conditions that the system offers. States are the mostpowerful entities, but in some cases only formally, because there are states,which not even remotely attain the power position of some non-state actors(for instance the turnover of some multinational corporations exceedsmanifold the GDP of the poorest countries of the world).


On the one hand we can argue that non-state actors are undercontrol, because they have to adapt to the conditions and legal forms of thestate on whose territory they are active, but what is the situation in caseswhere we speak of failing states or the least developed countries which donot have sufficient opportunities for forming good governance? These arethe cases we should try to solve. It is the interior non-functional politicalsystem of these countries that is a threat to the whole global community.We should learn to solve such threats and to create functional democraticcriteria with which to fill the so-far ineffectively governed trans-nationalspace. We can ask ourselves – Is the formation of a supranational bodysupervising non-state actors in conflict with the principle of statesovereignty as the basic and unrivalled criterion of the existence of stateunits? It is not, because some non-state actors can be a real and significantthreat to the whole international/global community.

3. Weak StatesWeak states have become current issues on the agendas of

politicians, military personnel and academia in the West, due tocrystallization of the understanding that these states and regions have turnedinto a significant threat to the security and interests of the West. Weakstates stem from the collapse of the governmental and political structure inthe country and the loss of the state´s ability to enforce law and order. Theprocess is initiated and accompanied by manifestations of anarchy and formof violence. A weak state is one in which the government does not haveeffective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by asignificant services to its citizens, and lacks a monopoly on the use of force.A weak state may experience active violence or simply be vulnerable toviolence.4 The state not only lacks an effective government, but also thesituation includes the collapse of the system that composes the state entity.Therefore the term ‘failing states’ actually refers to countries that havedisintegrated.5 From the sociological aspect, the weak state is characterizedby what the sociologist Max Weber calls ‘loss of monopoly over power’.6

In this type of reality, the legal system, the police, and other entities thatserve the role of maintaining law and order stop functioning or cease toexist. These entities may join various armed groups or criminal elementsthat take over the state infrastructures and resources for their own needs andestablish a ‘government’ of their own within various regions and populationof the state, or in certain cases – criminalization. In this type of situation theceases to exist and society reverts to a status of pre-state chaos.7

From a legal point of view, it is possible to claim that a failingstate is an entity defined as a ‘state’ but in practical term lacks the ability tofunction as a state entity.

Radana Makariusová

______________________________________________________________

121

We should take the responsibility and give order to the‘interconnectedness’ and ‘globality’ of our current global system and toform an international body, which will be responsible for the control of non-state entities within failing states or within the least developed countries. Inmy opinion this is the only means of protection and the only way to preventthe spread of potential security threats. Let´s form specific parameters andcriteria on the basis of which we identify countries which need to bemonitored and let us intermediate through an independent body a sufficientcontrol over local activities of non-state actors. It is a question of interestfor us all and for our children. This is the only way in which we caneffectively eliminate a possible potential global security threat.

On the level of profit-making non-state actors – multinationalcorporations we can already notice a certain development in the monitoringof the activities of multinational corporations, even though it is voluntary,within Kofi Annan’s original initiative – the UN Global Compact.8

4. ConclusionThe Global Compact can establish a new practical model for the

theory of international relations, because it is an excellent example offorming structures, norms and identities between international institutions.It helps understand the formation of a legitimate and more democraticmultilateral cooperation. Currently thousands of firms from all worldregions and thousands of non-governmental organisations participate on thefulfilment of this international initiative and their basic objective is thefulfilment of the ten basic principles. That is why the future development ofthe UN Global Compact and the intensification of the cooperation betweennon-profit making and profit-making international actors can have asignificant impact on the formation and future development of the globalcorporate governance.

Let’s form a similar body for all non-governmental actors both onthe regional levels as well as on the global level within the UN, let’seliminate terrorism and the potential terrorist threat. The example of thefunctioning of the UN Global Compact can be a unique model for theformation of such an initiative for the control and cooperation of non-governmental and charity organisations working and originating in failingstates or in the least developed countries. The disadvantage of the UNGlobal Compact lies in the fact that it is a voluntary initiative based onvoluntary participation, but my proposal goes towards another level ofcooperation – the ‘obligatory monitoring’ on non-governmental actors inthe countries that meet specific criteria. At the start of my paper I claimedthat the current global relations lack democratic legitimacy and thus it isnecessary to form it. It is an issue very similar to the one being solved in thecase of humanitarian intervention – when does the international community


have a right to intervene and violate the sovereignty of a state to protect acertain group of inhabitants? It is an important question, which has been anissue for many decades. In the case of the formation and functioning ofterrorist groups we do not speak of just a ‘certain group of inhabitants’ – wespeak of the whole global community. That is why I think that the time hascome for us to realise that state sovereignty is not absolutely sacrosanct,because during the last 20 years there have been significant changes ininternational relations and the activity of non-state actors is not limited bystate borders. To protect the future of the humanity it is necessary to createnew tools which would differ from the original intention of the UN Charterfrom 1945. We cannot stop progress and we are on the threshold of a periodwhen it is necessary to decide and make a change and an improvement.When the UN Charter was formulated from the point of view of the thenexisting international relations it was necessary to establish mutual relationson the immunity of state sovereignty, but nowadays the situation is differentand it is necessary to adapt to the new conditions. That is why we shouldrealise that there are exceptional serious cases when the internationalcommunity should take over the responsibility. Such exceptional cases arestates whose inability to enforce the law and order on their territory has apotential to threaten the whole community and in such cases it is necessaryto start to act and formulate rules which will help solve this issueinstitutionally; rules on the basis of which an international organisation willbe established, an organisation which will have the right to monitor theactivities of non-governmental actors; rules which have the potential tochange the existing understanding of the principle of the immunity of statesand start a new era of acceptance of the significant potential of non-stateactors. It would thus open a new chapter in the history of mankind, ininternational relations and in institutionalisation of global relations ingeneral.

Notes

1 B Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theoryand the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge University Press,2004, p. 77.2 JA Scholte, ‘Civil Society and Democracy’, The Global GovernanceReader, Routledge, 2005, p. 327.3 Ibid, p. 329.4 S Shay, Somalia between Jihad and Restoration, Transaction Publishers,2008, p. 142.5 Ibid, p. 144.6 M Weber, Staatssoziologie, Berlin, 1997, p. 27.7 Ibid, p. 144.

Radana Makariusová

______________________________________________________________

123

8 The formation of the UN Global Compact as an international initiative ofthe United Nations was proclaimed at the World Economic Forum in Davoson 31st January 1999 in the speech of the former UN General SecretaryKofi Annan. He called upon prominent businessmen and representatives offirms to cooperate with UN agencies and civil society organisations

Bibliography

Alice, B.D. & Hoffmann, M.J., Contending Perspectives on GlobalGovernance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order. Routledge, 2005.

Barnett, M. & Duvall, R., Power in Global Governance. CambridgeUniversity Press, 2005.

Baudot, J., Building a World Community, Globalisation and the CommonGood. University of Washington Press, 2001.

Buzan, B., From International to World Society? English School Theoryand the Social Strucutre of Globalisation. Cambridge University Press,2004

Clarke, J.N., Global Governance in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan,2004.

Cooper, A.F., Enhancing Global Governance, Towards a New Diplomacy.United Nations University Press, 2002.

Groom, A.J.R., Frameworks for International Cooperation. Pinter, 1990.

Held, D., Governing Globalisation: Power, Authority and GlobalGovernance. Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

Hewson, M. & Sinclair, T., Approaches to Global Governance Theory.State University of N.Y. Press, 1999.

Keohane, R.O., Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World.Routledge, 2002.

Rosenau, J.N., ‘Governance in Twenty-First Century’. Global Governance:A Review of Multilateralism and International Organisations. 1995.


Shay, S., Somalia between Jihad and Restoration. Transaction Publishers,2008.

Scholte, J.A., ‘Civil Society and Democracy’. The Global GovernanceReader. Routledge, 2005.

Whitman, J., The Limits of Global Governance. Routledge, 2005.

Wilkinson R., The Global Governance Reader. Routledge, 2000.

Radana Makariusová is senior lecturer at the Department for InternationalRelations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague andvisiting senior lecturer at Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences,Department of International Relations. Research Interests: Globalgovernance, Global Terrorism, Non-state actors. Email Address:[email protected].

PART III

War, Media, Communications

The Informational War against Terrorism: NewOpportunities and New Risks (German Experience)

Darya Bazarkina

AbstractThere is a new meaning of the problem of terrorism in contemporary world incause of global economic crisis. The governments and special services tellabout the danger of the mass protests, which are able\allowed to provoke theacts of terrorism.1 At the same time, there is an activation of the counter-terroristic policy, which is often followed by negative reactions to state’sactivity. We shall try in our paper to analyze the experience of Germanspecial services in the sphere of informational counteraction to the terroristictreatments and to research the effect made by the proclamations, PR- andCM-actions and the propagandistic campaigns of the special services in thesphere of public opinion in FRG. We shall also examine the reaction ofGerman society upon the counter-terroristic measures and upon theircommunication maintenance. The object of our research is the publicopinion’s transformation in FRG under the counter-terroristic policy’sinfluence and the reputation risks of the state in this area. We consider it’snecessary to demarcate the meanings ‘social protest’ and ‘terrorism’ and toresearch, how the statements about the potential danger of the acts ofterrorism in the protest movement influent on the protest groups.

Key Words: Social protest, terrorism, global economic crisis,communication.

*****

One of the positive features of the modern counter-terrorist strategyin EU and in Germany in particular is the consecutive institutionalization ofthe authorities’ special measures. One of the leading counter-terroriststructures in FRG today is the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre which took upactivities in Berlin on 14 December 2004. The Joint Counter-TerrorismCentre brings together analysts from the Federal Criminal Police Office(BKA) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). Itprovides excellent conditions to share information in real time, to producefast and targeted analyses of potential threats, and to coordinate operationalmeasures to combat terrorism.

A joint centre ensures a smooth flow of information in all directionsand is an intelligent way of sharing knowledge. Significant advantages are:

The Informational War against Terrorism

______________________________________________________________

128

Accelerated information-sharing, and Strengthened and focused analytical expertise.

The Centre regularly and intensively performs the following tasks:

1. Daily briefings: At these daily meetings participantsexchange up-to-date police and intelligence information,draw up preliminary assessments and plan relevantmeasures.

2. Threat assessments: Daily reports, warnings and newinformation are immediately analyzed and assessed.

3. Operational information-sharing: The aim is to establish adirect link between information-sharing and thecoordination of operational measures.

4. Case assessment: Individual aspects of terrorism, such asthe procurement of falsified identity documents or weaponsand explosives, are jointly assessed to find effectiveprevention strategies.

5. Structural analyses: This essential task entails analyzinglong-term effects of international terrorism.

6. Gathering intelligence on terrorists: Information onpotential terrorists and relevant persons is verified andimproved to effectively combat terrorist organizations andtheir supporters and to prevent terrorist recruitment.

7. Sharing resources: Using available synergies, for exampleregarding Internet research or when consulting Islamexperts and translators.

8. Additional measures concerning legal status: The aim is todetermine at an early stage whether it is necessary to takemeasures under foreigners or asylum law.

The information aspect of counter-terrorist counteraction is ratherimportant also in the activity of the Federal Office for the Protection of theConstitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz/BfV). Of course, it isnecessary to protect the society from the terror danger, and there are a lot ofreally useful materials on BfV website, like the instructions for the citizensexplaining, how to prevent the terrorist act.. But in time of economic crisisthe burden of responsibility for any word and deed is much harder than usual.

Attempts to use spontaneous mass actions in interests of the influencegroups are not a new phenomenon. Performances of participants of«students’ revolution» 1968 and mass protests of the next years became anoccasion for some provocations from police. Today, during an epoch of a

Darya Bazarkina

______________________________________________________________

129

postindustrial society, mass communications get a special urgency. Thepublic effect of a mass action is amplified by its illumination in mass-media.The reactionary and repressive structures could take advantage in it.

Before the crisis arrived the communication activities of law-enforcement services in Germany were rather sufficient. Thus traditionallythe protest movement here was identified with extremist activities, and thetheoretical foundation of the left movement was presented as the basic sourceof extremist tendencies in public opinion. This phenomenon is reflected, forexample, as in section «Left extremism» of Department on Protection of theConstitution of FRG and in numerous publications of its regionaldepartments:

‘Left-wing extremists are avowed opponents of the state and socialorder of the Federal Republic of Germany, which they defame as an order ofcapitalism marked by racism and fascism. Depending on their ideological-political orientation – revolutionary-Marxist or anarchist – they are aiming atestablishing a socialist/Communist system or a ‘society free from rulers’(anarchy). The left-wing extremists´ forms of action are manifold: Theycomprise public manifestations, overt agitation with flyers, calls for actionvia posters, periodic publications, electronic communications media andrunning in elections and attempts to covertly influencing social groups.Violations of the law including overt or covert offences like causing damageto property, mass militancy and also inflicting bodily harm are partlyregarded as a means to pursue their political objectives’.2

Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution distinguishes inGerman left-wing extremism the following ideolgical trends:

a revolutionary-marxist wing, comprising i.a. the ‘DeutscheKommunistische Partei’ (DKP / German CommunistParty), the ‘Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands’(MLPD / Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany) andindividual overtly extremist structures within the ‘Parteides Demokratischen Sozialismus’ (PDS / Party ofDemocratic Socialism) and the ‘Left-wing Party PDS’ likethe ‘Kommunistische Plattform’ (KPF / CommunistPlatform).

among the Trotzkyist groups which have been particularlyactive in the past years are ‘Linksruck’ (Swing to the Left)and ‘Sozialistische Alternative’ (SAV / SocialistAlternative).

the major part of the violence-prone left-wing extremists ismade up of anarchist groups, among them those callingthemselves ‘Autonomists’.3


______________________________________________________________

130

There are a number of publications in which the legal left parties andmovements such as German Communist Party, were identified as dangerousextremist organizations. These publications have often the bright headers like‘The Enemies of Democracy’. We suppose that the economic crisis led to thesuspension of such publications. At the same time mass protests in Germany,headlined by media, are often accompanied by comments capable only toflare up social tensions. Sometimes the official statements on terrorism do thesame negative job. There are articles in newspaper of German CommunistParty ‘Unsere Zeit’ (‘Our Time’) which include the answer on anti-recessionary measures with the photos of DKP demonstrations.4 One of thereasons of these demonstrations is a communication barrier betweenauthority and opposition, which exists today in many European countries andRussia and which, we consider, became the reason of the long-termedpolitical crisis in Greece.

The world economic crisis became the reason of that thousands ofpeople across all Europe have taken part in pickets and demonstrationsasking for radical democratic reforms. The mass protests caused by crisis, areoften accompanied by violent actions of ultra leftists or ultra rightists that arecapable to provoke demonstrators on the violent actions. So, the police ofAthens has shot fifteen years old young man who with thirteen comrades (inpress they are named by representatives of independent groups) showeredwith stones the police car in the center of the Greek capital in December,2008. This incident has provoked a new wave of protest actions in Greeceduring which demonstrators overturned cars, beat windowpanes, burnedshops. Such events not only displease citizens, but also entail armed conflictsof demonstrators with police that is extremely negatively influence onopportunity to adjust dialogue between the state and citizens.

It is possible at the analysis of mass protests to allocate two groupswhich go through the reputation risks. It’s the demonstrators who canundergo to provocations and discredit the upheld idea by rash actions, andauthorities, which can admit a number of communication mistakes atinteraction with protesting.

It is reflected in publications of press in which, depending on positionin each separate country, is possible to make a game with ultra leftist andultra rightist organizations.

Mass protests in the East Europe, in comparison with Western, areless influenced by counterculture, therefore in the East Europe the externalattributes of the protest are much poorer, and actions are much moredesperately. Therefore it is much easier during communication counteractionto mass actions in the West to give to an event more character of theatricalaction, rather than the public or political action.

As an example it is possible to cite the description of mass protests inLondon in Russian RBC Daily on the materials of British The Economist:

Darya Bazarkina

______________________________________________________________

131

A huge brown pig Winnie did not manage to reachDowning Street. She was stopped on the way to Whitehalltogether with several hundreds of pig breeders who strodesinging a hymn «Support your own meat». They havearrived to London on March, 4th to complain to thegovernment of a disastrous condition of the branch... Weekearlier... the opponents of construction of the third runwayat Heathrow have lowered the slogans from a roof of theWestminster palace and have thrown paper planes all areabelow... .

Similar character of public performances though does not lead, as arule, to collisions of demonstrators with police; in some cases theperformance form discredits the claims of democratic transformations. On theother hand, frankly scornful tone of conservative press is capable to hardenprotesting and to push them to the ‘ultra leftist’ actions. For the prevention ofpolitical risks we represent a constant dialogue of authorities with employeesof every branch in crisis, and with representatives of protest movement as themost comprehensible decision.

The common tendency for Western and the East Europe on abackground of a world economic crisis is strengthening of ultra righttendencies. The example of Germany where crisis tendencies were showed inattacks of neo-Nazi youth on representatives of police is most indicative inthe Western Europe. Both representatives of the land governments, and thefederal government, notice the new quality of neo-Nazi attacks, such, asimprobable frankness of murder attempts. Also the actions of German neo-Nazis more often began to pass in the central cities of FRG whereas beforethey have been concentrated in boundary areas.

The rejuvenation of neo-Nazi contingent is marked alongside withexasperation of actions. If till now the ideological leaders in it were old right(for example, former member ultra leftist Horst Mahler) today the circle ofneo-Nazis has narrowed by young functionaries with essentially increasedreadiness for violent measures.

The informational society gives the new opportunities to use theinformation technologies in counter-terrorism policymaking. The experts onrisk management pay an attention on communication defense too: ‘Externalrisk communications are not aimed merely at informing and instructing themedia and those affected; rather, they seek a dialogue tailored to a specificaudience. Here one must always remember to communicate risk relatedtopics in such a way that no misunderstandings can arise between sender andreceiver. For example, empirical research has demonstrated differences in theway experts and ordinary persons perceive risk. In order to avoidunacceptable results, risk communications should always be timely,


______________________________________________________________

132

unambiguous, audience-appropriate, consistent and reliable. For riskcommunications to be effective, the audience must trust the source and find itcredible.5

Surveillance of Islamists on the Internet has become vital in the battleagainst terrorism, Germany’s top anti-subversion official, Federal ProsecutorGeneral Monika Harms, said Dec. 14, 2010. ‘The Internet has developed intothe decisive means of communication within international Islamist terrorism,’she said during a press conference in Karlsruhe to review the year. Harmssaid a Berlin-based team, the Joint Internet Center (GIZ), consisting of about30 German police and intelligence officers, had been working full time sinceJanuary, monitoring Islamist activity on the Internet and analyzing IslamistWeb sites.6 These opportunities are very useful for the communicationalcounteraction to terrorist groups, but the activity of the security agenciescould impair the state reputation too. There are many risks related to theinformation policy of German authorities. According to a law passed by theGerman parties CDU, CSU and SPD, from 2008 on is possible to trace whohas contacted whom via telephone, mobile phone or e-mail for a period of sixmonths. In the case of mobile calls or text messages via mobile phone, theuser's location is also logged. Anonymising services will be prohibited as of2009. ‘The data that is collected about the entire population allows ourmovements to be traced, any calls or communications with personal andbusiness contacts to be monitored and removes privacy in our personalrelationships. Information regarding the content of communications can bededuced relating to personal interests and the individual life circumstances ofthe persons communicating. Access to the data is granted to the police, publicprosecutors, secret services and foreign states which hope for betterprosecution of crimes.’7

These measures begun the action ‘You are the terrorist’, when theGerman Working Group on Data Retention (GWGDR) uploaded onYouTube the video with the following subtitles:

‘Just recently we found out that there are more than 82 Millionterrorists hiding in Germany. You are one of them. So from now on we willrecord all of you activities for 6 months... And because you are a Terrorist,the BKA is allowed to investigate your Computer (trojan-horse)...’8

There is an explanation on GWGDR website: ‘You are a terrorist’ is apersiflage of two official German social-marketing-campaigns... ‘You are aterrorist’ is the answer to today’s politics in Germany. All Citizens are undergeneral suspicion. Germany becomes a preventive surveillance society. Byvisualizing the already passed and future laws, it shows what the Germany ofthe present and the very near future does look like.9

These examples of informational attacks and the measures ofauthorities’ control make us to reflect on the aftereffects of communicationmeasures in counter-terrorist struggle. It is possible to conclude, that

Darya Bazarkina

______________________________________________________________

133

reputation and the political risks caused by a world economic crisis, arecoincide in many respects and equally capable to damage the commonEuropean house’s architectonics.

The means of PR and communication management can render seriousinfluence on process of situation’s settlement. Among possiblecommunication methods of the decision it is possible to name adjustment ofdialogue between the governments and the nongovernmental organizations,mainly, trade unions. The propagation of struggle against poverty, whichexperts both in the West and Russia recommend to spend, can be enteredwithin the limits of communication policy of the large companies. Thecreation of the regional organizations, similarly to TransparencyInternational, investigating a level of a transparency of actions of authoritiesand business-elite, can become an essential help in struggle againstcorruption. The minimization of political risks in the Europe is possible onlyat the similar balanced actions of authority, large business and thenongovernmental organizations and at appropriate information andcommunication maintenance of anti-recessionary policy.

Notes

1 The paper was prepared within the bounds of Federal Target Programme‘Scientific & Pedagogic Personnel of Innovative Russia in 2009 – 2013’.2 Left-wing extremism, in Federal Office for the Protection of theConstitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz/BfV), viewed on 14 March2010, http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en_fields_of_work/leftwing_ extremism/.3 Ibid.4 Unsere Zeit. 12.03.2010.5 Protecting Critical Infrastructures – Risk and Crisis Management: A Guidefor Companies and Government Authorities. Federal Ministry of the Interior,Berlin, 2007, p. 16.6 Top German Prosecutor Backs Online Terror Surveillance, in DeutscheWelle, Viewed on 14 March 2010, http://www.dw-world.de/article/0300472000.html.7 The Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung (German Working Group onData Retention), Viewed on 14 March 2010, http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/index.php?lang=en.8 You are a Terrorist! A Campaign against Terrorists, Viewed on 14 March2010, http://www.dubistterrorist.de/en/.9 Ibid.


______________________________________________________________

134

Bibliography

Author Unknown, ‘Left-Wing Extremism’. Federal Office for the Protectionof the Constitution. (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz/BfV). Viewed on 14March 2010, www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en_fields_of_work/leftwing_extremism/.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure, Risk and Crisis Management: A Guide forCompanies and Government Authorities. Federal Ministry of the Interior,Berlin, 2007, p. 16.

The Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung. (German Working Group on Data

Retention). Viewed on 14 March 2010, http://www.vorratsdaten

speicherung.de/ index.php?lang=en.

‘Top German Prosecutor Backs Online Terror Surveillance’. Deutsche Welle.Viewed on 14 March 2010, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article

/0300472000.html.

You are a Terrorist! A Campaign against Terrorists. Viewed on 14 March2010, http://www.dubistterrorist.de/en/.

Darya Bazarkina – PhD, programme coordinator of public relations andcommunication management studies at the International Centre for Socio-Political Studies and Consulting (ICSPSC), associated researcher at theCommunication Management Centre at the Russian-German GraduateSchool of Management (the Academy of National Economy under theGovernment of the Russian Federation). Lecturer of the CommunicationManagement specialism at the PR Department of the Faculty of Philosophy,Lomonosov Moscow State University. Author of a monograph ‘Ultra-leftistterrorism in the FRG: major trends in the activity of the Red Army Fraction(RAF) and its communication support (1971-1992)’, as well as articles on thecommunication aspect of the terrorist activity in Russia, Germany andSweden. E-mail: [email protected].

Art as Infiltration: Drawing theMilitary-Industrial Complex

Jill Gibbon

AbstractThis paper uses drawings made in arms fairs and an arms company AGM todiscuss pressures on the military-industrial complex in 2009-10, and the waysarms companies are responding with new marketing strategies. In particular,the paper identifies a new emphasis on ‘civil security and borders’ astechnologies developed for war zones are promoted for state and corporateuse. Potentially more ominous than the technology, is the use of fears ofimmigration to justify the extension of military surveillance to domesticsettings. The paper also discusses the kind of knowledge produced bycaricature and other practice-based methods, and their relevance to academicresearch about war.

Key Words: Drawing, dada, caricature, arms trade, military-industrialcomplex, surveillance.

*****

Last year at War, Virtual War and Human Security I introduced aproject I am currently working on, drawing the arms trade. I explained that Iam attempting to reverse the usual focus of war reportage from the war zoneto the military-industrial complex. The reason is that, although the military-industrial complex is frequently cited as a factor in war, it is largely invisible.An informal network of alliances between arms companies, politicians andarmed forces, it is difficult to pin down. It is perhaps most visible at armsfairs - but even here, the transnational arms dealing is veiled behind adecorous facade. Last year I explained that I have managed to get inside theseevents as a war artist, under the pretext of sketching tanks. But once inside, Ihave attempted to caricature the marketing strategies of the arms trade, tostrip away its polite façade. Today, I will give an update on the project. Inparticular, I want to discuss the emergence of new sales slogans in arms fairsthis year, perhaps as post-cold war marketing strategies have becomepolitically embarrassing.

Solomon Hughes suggests that the reduction of military budgets atthe end of the cold war posed a real threat to arms companies. Supported bythe UK and US governments, they responded by merging, expanding intonew markets and diversifying. BAE Systems, for instance, used aggressivesales tactics to secure contracts with developing countries such as SouthAfrica in 1999 and Tanzania in 2001. Meanwhile the privatisation of parts of

Art as Infiltration

______________________________________________________________

136

the prison service and the military opened up new domestic markets indefence and security. Then, came the ‘war on terror’. Solomon Hughessuggests that the ‘war on terror’ was opportunistic, coined by the military-industrial-complex to justify a return to high military spending, and allowingprivate defence and security firms to capitalise on the September 11th

attacks.1 However, in the past year, many of these post-cold war marketingstrategies have begun to unravel. BAE Systems is currently facing briberyallegations in relation to its arms deals in the late 1990s, and the invasionsinitiated as part the war on terror have proved costly, ineffective, andpolitically unpopular. Using drawings made in the BAE Systems AGM, Iwill suggest that these political difficulties are causing unease in the armstrade. Then I will discuss the ways arms companies are perhaps respondingwith new sales strategies.

But first, I want to say something about presenting the drawingshere, as caricature might seem out of place in an academic context. Indeedcaricature is at the opposite extreme of the dominant expectations ofacademic research. Whereas caricature is subjective and deliberatelyexaggerated, academic research usually aspires to objectivity, accuracy, andis based on reason. Now, I do not want to underestimate the value of suchmethods; I will give an example of this later. But, partisan, practice-basedapproaches perhaps offer a different kind of knowledge. To explain this, it isnecessary to trace the historical separation of art from academic enquiry.Terry Eagleton dates this to the C17th and the rise of rationalism.2 As reasonbecame the dominant route to knowledge, the word ‘aesthetic’ came to referto subjective, sensuous ways of understanding the world. And art became themain preserve of aesthetic approaches. From the C20th, in examples such asDada, these alternative approaches also included performance and reversal -parodying and inverting dominant forms to reveal their political affiliations.So, art has come to stand for a set of subjective, sensuous and occasionallysubversive approaches to knowledge. This makes it particularly useful – itcan perhaps offer insights not available to other methods. But, because arttends to be separated from analytical approaches, these insights can be easilylost, misconstrued or incorporated into dominant ideologies. So, I wouldsuggest that there is potential in combining aesthetic and analyticalapproaches. One reason is that some subjects defy rational explanation.Arms fairs are an example. The marketing of weapons with wine, pretzelsand fashion is difficult to convey with reasoned analysis. Having said this, Istruggle to describe it with drawing. But I will give a brief description of howI attempt to do so.

Jill Gibbon

______________________________________________________________

137

I always draw on location. This is not to valorise direct observationas a source of truth. Rather, in the antiwar tradition of Dada, there is anelement of performance in the project. I suggested at the beginning that theproject reverses the focus of war reportage. I am also attempting to reversethe surveillance that has come with the war on terror by getting around itssecurity systems. I will return to this aspect of the project at the end of thepresentation. When I draw, I combine observational and expressivetechniques. To indicate that the drawings are produced in an actual place, Istart with observational methods - perspective and contour line. Howeverobservational techniques are unable to show things that cannot be seen –political issues, emotional reactions. To convey these aspects, I useexaggeration and satire. And, whenever I notice a slip in the polite façade, anexpression of greed or unease, I attempt to emphasize it.

Art as Infiltration

______________________________________________________________

138

This brings us to the BAE Systems AGM last year, where such slipswhere particularly evident. BAE Systems is the world’s largest armsmanufacturer. Formed in 1999 from the merger of two UK arms companies -British Aerospace and Marconi, and since acquiring Vickers tankmanufacturers and warship division of the VT Group, it is a cornerstone ofthe military-industrial complex. An AGM is mainly a PR exercise whereaccounts from the previous year are presented to shareholders in asfavourable a light as possible. In 2009 this was a fairly easy task for BAE.Although stock markets crashed around the world in 2008, at BAE profitswere up. After nearly a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the armsbusiness is booming. In 2008 BAE sales exceeded £18.5 billion.3 But, inspite of this, there was a sense of problems on horizon.

Every year the chair, Dick Olver, opens the AGM with a speechabout the company’s performance. The rest of the meeting is taken up withquestions from the audience - a mixture of protestors, who have got in with atoken share, and conventional shareholders. Olver is impeccably polite, andfields each question with careful rhetoric. He does not flinch when a protestoraccuses him of murder. And, when asked if he has qualms about the use ofBAE products on civilians, he says he is proud to serve the men and womenat the front line. But this year, as he turned to take a question, anuncharacteristic ripple of fear passed over his face.

The questioner was Andrew Feinstein, a former ANC M.P.Feinstein opposed the arms deal between BAE systems and South Africawhen he was an MP arguing that it diverted money from health care when thecountry faced an AIDs epidemic but no military threats. And, when the dealwent ahead, he resigned. Since 2004, the serious fraud office in Britain hasinvestigated allegations of bribery in relation to the South African contract

Jill Gibbon

______________________________________________________________

139

and BAE deals with a list of other countries. The investigations arepotentially devastating for BAE. If they are proved, anticorruption legislationwould prohibit it bidding for defence contracts in Europe.4 Perhaps for thisreason, the inquiries are repeatedly stalled. In 2006 the British governmentstopped an investigation of a BAE deal with Saudi Arabia. And in Februarythis year, it seemed that the South African investigation would meet a similarfate when BAE was allowed to plead guilty to ‘accounting irregularities’,neatly side-stepping the bribery issue. Feinstein condemned the agreement,and a coalition of campaign groups secured an injunction against it. Neverdoubt the power of methodical research. It now seems that the injunction willfall through. Even so, Olver was clearly aware of the threat posed byFeinstein and colleagues. He attempted to regain authority by arguing thatdubious business practices were in the past. In 2007 BAE employed theformer Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf to chair an ethical review of thebusiness. Woolf’s report was highly critical of the company. BAE respondedby writing a global code of conduct, ‘Being a Responsible Company’5, andOlver referred to this as evidence of a new era of ethical practice.

However, he was clearly unnerved. And, soon after, he made asecond slip in response to a question from a conventional share holder whowas concerned about the impact on profits of the withdrawal of troops fromIraq. BAE Systems is careful to avoid any suggestion that the company has avested interest in war. At previous AGMs Olver has avoided even using theword arms, insisting that BAE is a defence company.6 But, caught off guard,he presented the continuing war in Afghanistan as a reason for optimism.Even here, problems are looming for the company. A series of polls in the USand UK over the past year suggest that public opinion has turned against thewar.7 There is more specific criticism from within the military. DouglasBorer and David Clukey, a US major, argue that the US is losing war inAfghanistan because of a ‘culture of attrition’ in the US military, held inplace by its dependency on technology. As an example, they suggest thatunmanned aerial vehicles of the kind supplied BAE Systems, lead to a gulf ofcommunication between those operating the technology and those on theground.8

Art as Infiltration

______________________________________________________________

140

With the ‘war on terror’, the main focus for arms sales since 2001losing credibility, and previous sales strategies under investigation forcorruption, the military-industrial complex seems more vulnerable now thanat any time since the end of the Cold War. It seems likely that it will respondas it did in the last crisis with new marketing strategies. If so, they are likelyto be on show at arms fairs. In September last year I drew at DSEi, theDefence Systems Exhibition international, one of the world’s largest armsfairs.

The immediate impression is business as usual. Arms fairs areexercises in decorum. There are all of the usual rituals of business. A sign atthe entrance insists on polite dress. And, as in previous years there are showcatalogues, wine and cakes, alongside tanks, spy planes and warheads.

Jill Gibbon

______________________________________________________________

141

However, there was also a change. The BAE stand was targeting‘civil security and borders’. I mentioned at the beginning that armscompanies diversified into security in 1990s. So, what is new about civilsecurity? Defined in opposition to military contexts, civil implies a differentemphasis from the war on terror. The reference to borders suggests what thismight be. Borders usually refer to immigration. This is confirmed by adocument obtained by the Guardian under the Freedom of Information Act9 -a record of meetings of the South Coast Partnership, an alliance betweenBAE Systems, the UK Border Agency, the Serious Organised Crime Agencyand a range of police forces. According to the Guardian the group hasidentified a number of domestic uses for drones – the unmanned spy planesdeveloped for use in Iraq and Afghanistan, including policing urban spaces,political protests and immigration. The document recognises that this will bedifficult to sell the plan to the public, and suggests promoting it primarily asimmigration control. In the words of the South Coast Partnership, this willallow it to be presented as ‘a good news story’.10 Selling military equipmenthas always required an enemy, and in times of recession, asylum seekers arean easy target.

This use of one of the most vulnerable social group as an ‘other’, tojustify an expansion of spy technology, seems more ominous than theequipment itself. As Clukey and Borer suggest, too much technology createsinefficiency.11 I will finish with an example of this from the part of theproject I mentioned earlier –being present at arms fairs. As I explained, I gota pass to DSEi in 2007 by describing myself as a war artist. I have circulatedthe drawings since then and, perhaps for this reason, my application to DSEi

Art as Infiltration

______________________________________________________________

142

2009 was refused. I got in this time, past the wall of police, security guardsand surveillance technologies, simply by joining the end of a queue.

Notes

1 S Hughes, War on Terror, Inc: Corporate Profiteering From the Politics ofFear, Verso, London, 2007.2 T Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990.3 CAAT, BAE Systems, http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/bae/, 2010, Accessed11 March, 2010.4 S Hope, ‘BAE Systems Problem: How to Resolve SFO Probe and not LoseBillions in EU Contracts,’ Daily Telegraph, 2009, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/christopherhope/100017648/bae-systems-problem-how-to-plead-guilty-and-not-lose-billions-in-defence-contracts/. Accessed 6 April, 2010.5 BAE, Being a Responsible Company: What it Means to Us, BAE Systems,London, 2009.6 D Olver, Opening Address BAE Annual General Meeting, London, 9 May2007.7 J Agiesta & J Cohen, ‘Public Opinion in US Turns Against Afghan War’Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/19/AR2009081903066.html, 2009, accessed March 31, 2010; GLanger, ‘Poll: Afghan War Support Slips’ ABC News, 2009.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/19/AR2009081903066.html, Accessed March 31, 2010. M Morris & K Sengupta,‘Voters Turn Against Afghanistan’ in The Independenthttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/voters-turn-against-war-in-afghanistan-1763227.html, 2009, accessed March 31, 2010; BBC,‘Newsnight Poll: Most Think the Afghanistan War Unwinnable’, Newsnight,

Jill Gibbon

______________________________________________________________

143

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/8530761.stm, Accessed 3.31. 2010.8 D Borer & D Clukey, Strategic Theory and Operational Practice: How toWin in Afghanistan, The International Studies Association AnnualConvention, New Orleans, 18th February 2010.9 P Lewis, ‘CCTV in the Sky: police plan to use military-style spy drones’,The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/23/cctv-sky-police-plan-drones, 2010, accessed April 5th, 2010.10 Ibid.11 op. cit.

Bibliography

Agiesta, J. and Cohen, J.,‘Public Opinion in US Turns Against Afghan War’.Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/19/AR2009081903066.html, 2009, Accessed March 31, 2010.

BAE Systems, Being a Responsible Company: What it Means to Us. BAESystems, London, 2009.

BAE Systems, Our Brand. http://www.baesystems.com/AboutUs/CorporateIdentityGuidelines/index.htm., 2010, Accessed 7th April 2010.

BBC, ‘Newsnight Poll: Most Think the Afghanistan War Unwinnable’.Newsnight. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/8530761.stm,2010, Accessed March 31, 2010.

Borer, D.A & Clukey, D., Strategic Theory and Operational Practice: Howto Win in Afghanistan. The International Studies Association AnnualConvention, New Orleans, 18th February 2010.

CAAT, BAE Systems. http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/bae/, 2010, Accessed 11March, 2010.

Eagleton, T., The Ideology of the Aesthetic. Blackwell, Oxford, 1990.

Feinstein, A., After the Party. Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg andCape Town, 2007.

Art as Infiltration

______________________________________________________________

144

Feinstein, A. & Hawley, S., ‘An Affront to Justice’. The Guardian.http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/feb/07/bae-systems-case-corruption-settlement, 2010, Accessed 1 April 2010.

Hope, S., ‘BAE Systems Problem: How to Resolve SFO Probe and not LoseBillions in EU Contracts’. Daily Telegraph. 2009, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/christopherhope/100017648/bae-systems-problem-how-to-plead-guilty-and-not-lose-billions-in-defence-contracts/, Accessed 6 April, 2010.

Hughes, S., War on Terror, In: Corporate Profiteering From the Politics ofFear. Verso, London, 2007.

Langer, G., ‘Poll: Afghan War Support Slips’. ABC News. 2009.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/19/AR2009081903066.html, Accessed March 31, 2010.

Lewis, P., ‘CCTV in the Sky: Police Plan to use Military-Style Spy Drones’.The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/23/cctv-sky-police-plan-drones, 2010, Accessed April 5th, 2010.

Moore, J., ‘Woolf’s BAE Ethics Review Calls for Tougher Anti-BriberyControls’. The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/woolfs-bae-ethics-review-calls-for-tougher-antibribery-controls-822230.html, 2008, Accessed March 31, 2010.

Morris, N. & Sengupta, K., ‘Voters Turn Against Afghanistan’. TheIndependent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/voters-turn-against-war-in-afghanistan-1763227.html, 2009, Accessed March 31, 2010.

Olver, D., Opening Address. BAE Annual General Meeting. London, 9 May2007.

Plaw, A., Sudden Justice? Evaluating the US Predator Drone Campaign inPakistan. The International Studies Association Annual Convention, NewOrleans, 18th February 2010.

Jill Gibbon is an associate lecturer at the Open University. Her researchinterests include reportage, war art, and interdisciplinary uses of drawing.

Information Warfare as a Part of CommunicationManagement in Contemporary Russia

Evgeny N. Pashentsev

AbstractThe contributor of the present paper assumes that communicationmanagement (CM) is above all the professional target groups and capitalmanagement by means of communications. Information warfare (IW)consists of overt and secret purposeful informational influences of systems(states, parties, profit and nonprofit organizations) on each other with the aimof liquidating (or appropriation) the intangible assets of the other part. Toinfluence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automateddecisions-making while protecting your own with the aim of getting somematerial dividends is the very nature of the IW. Evidently IW very oftenbeing a part of CM programmes, sometimes in the atmosphere of intenseinternal and external conflicts dominates CM. The paper gives an analysis ofthe role and features of information warfare in the contemporary Russianbusiness and politics. The contributor of the present research will try to do itin the context of world tendencies in the economic, political and militaryspheres of life. The main elements of the communication security system inRussia are also examined in the paper.

Key Words: Information warfare, PSYOP, communication management,Russia, media war, perception manipulation, psychological warfare, Russianbanks.

*****

1. How the World and National Experience Forced Russia to goForward in IW

The technologies of IW as a whole and PSYOPS particularly wereone of the key factors of the collapse of the Soviet Union, later numerousdefeats of Russia in the sphere of international relations though they hadprimarily internal roots (the rising backwardness, corruption, socialinequality etc.) finally increased the interest of the ruling elite to thepossibilities of CM and IW.

In the 1990s, the Russian state had no clear position concerning thisproblem. It was not until September 2000 that the President of Russia signedthe ‘Doctrine of information security of Russia’. In contrast to the USapproach, in the Russian doctrine it is the issue of individual, group and massconsciousness security that is of primary importance.

The goals of the anticipatory management of information flows byRussia, of using the latest developments in this field, as well as the problem

Information Warfare as a Part of Communication Management

_____________________________________________________________

146

of the rational use of information resources, make it necessary for Russia tomaster and to use new instruments in the state policy. We may say thatRussia needs to build as fast as possible a system of communicationmanagement and information attack resistance.

The technologies of the communication management used by someprivate corporations recklessly at best and by way of gaining profit by anymeans at worst turned into serious damage for millions of people, impairednational security not only in the USA, the countries of the Western Europeand Russia but in the whole world at the present economic crisis. Anartificially high share of intangible assets in the cost of enterprises provokesvarious information attacks of the competitors against them, suggesting theself-organization of such attacks in order to underbid the stock value due totheir massive sell-out and then buy-in through shoeing-horns reinforcing theirpositions in the enterprise. It’s evident that the higher the share of theintangible assets of the enterprise the easier and more effective it is toconduct such a transaction. The bankruptcy of a variety of investmentvehicles in the USA was accompanied with obviously instigated rumours,mass media reports which helped someone to get out of the crisis.

Such a scenario of social and economic development becamepossible in a much more educated society than back in 1929 not least of alldue to effective use of communication management technologies at theglobal level with a mercenary motive which led to a decrease in social andpolitical activity of the population and as a consequence to the weakening ofcontrol of authorities and corporations actions.

The field of information warfare has deeply shifted into economy.The main reason for it is the growth of the intangible constituent in thecompanies’ cost. It is a well-known fact that in the last 25 years the cost oftangible assets of western companies has fallen from 80 to 20-30% of thetotal cost. The remaining part is made up by the reputation, well-promotedbrands, etc.

The example of Western and Russian Internet companies shows thehigh potential of information wars’ efficiency in virtual economy. Havingminimal tangible assets these companies demonstrated an impressive growthof revenues. The dramatic fall of this market in the late 1990ies was causedby the information about these companies being not cost-effective.Consequently, the profitability of these companies was based on reputation.

Putting it differently, tangible assets and basic intangible assets orintangible assets of the first level (such as, intellectual property, the level ofthe personnel’s professional skills, etc.) characteristic for any more or lesssuccessful organization and defining its stage of development and actualvalue have become the object of ‘hype’ by means of intangible assets of thesecond level (advertising, propaganda, PR, etc.). The latter have practicalsocial value only when serving the interests of individuals or organizations


______________________________________________________________

147

and performing various useful functions related to informing andmanagement and not interfering with the interests of the society butanswering to its objective needs, contributing to its civic self-organizationand guaranteeing communication support to the progressive models ofdevelopment.

In Russia, the amount of intangible assets in the total cost of abusiness is in general not very large. That is why wars aimed at ruining areputation are not so efficient. In Russia, information warfare is mainlyconnected with the redistribution of property. The most sensational scandalsrefer not to the competition for the customer but to conflicts betweenproprietors and directors or between shareholders. Among the most well-known conflicts are those at NTV, KGOK ‘Vanadium’, Himmash,Energomash, SEMZ, PSM Hydraulics and many other companies.

The efficiency of information warfare in Russian business has adubious character. Judging by the experience, because of the absence ofexpensive reputations these wars not necessarily have impact on theeconomical state of the business but almost always affect the reputation ofthe company’s top manager. Thus, what seems to be inefficient today canresult in a significant damage to the business in the long-term outlook.

In internal politics the information warfare is less intense now to becompared with 1990s, because of more stable political situation anddomination of one party in the political landscape. Traditional propagandabecame for the last years more important instrument of CM then IW but thesituation could changed as a result of any prolonged all national crisis ifhappens so.

In the majority of Western countries and in Russia the quantity of tradeunions dropped drastically, the role of political parties in decision makingbecame less prominent and the parties themselves were more and morepersonified represented by their leaders widely promoted with the help ofmodern mass media. If before communications used to be a means ofconnecting a party and electorate to mobilize its support, now the parties to acertain extent represented by their leaders make themselves over to thesystem of indirect management of population by shady oligarchic clanswhich prevents them from making decisions suitable for the public interest.

Acts of terrorism, local conflicts are also intricately interlaced in thefabric of communication management. Moreover on account of ‘spin’ (spin –whirl, swirl, that is necessary turn of coverage in mass media) and othercommunication technologies a way can be carved from the event to radicalpolitical and military decisions, which would be impossible withoutcommunication technologies. For example after the terrorist attack on WorldTrade Center in New York and the Pentagon the Bush administrationmanaged to twist public opinion in the USA and to a large extent outside thecountry in such a manner that it made possible to invade oil-producing Iraq


_____________________________________________________________

148

without any convincing excuses for its actions. In the book published severalyears ago under the editorship of K. Borisson, the most distinguishedAmerican journalists told about advanced manipulative technologies in massmedia.1

Recently the Russian-Georgian conflict has been represented by theworld’s leading news channels in such an overweighed form that only theobvious inadequacy of the Georgian president in solving his problemscharacterised by chewing on his tie and an active communication policy byRussia partially helped to overcome the fear of ‘resurgent Evil Empire’emerging in the West.

It does not mean that the present day Russia has no very seriousproblems with human rights or corruption, mass poverty and criminality etc.But the evident partiality of the leading media world media channels toRussia hardly help to save the country from its evils but only increase theposition of those ones who want to draw the attention of public from theinternal reasons of these problems and to impose all responsibility for thedifficulties on foreign forces. Finally it helps to continue the bureaucratic andoligarchic domination in Russia and weaken it even more than now. Thus theinterests of internal and external egoistic elite groups with all their very oftenoutward conflict work in one direction: less progressive and weaker Russiaand that is not in the interests of democracy and peace in our country, inEurope and in all the world.

The armament race has been unwrapping since the end of the XXthcentury with incomparable speed unseen from the times of the Cold War, butnevertheless partly due to the corresponding informational policy this factdoes not noticeably affect the public conscience in different countries.Meanwhile even without the war armaments race, which obviouslyaggravates multiple problems of the ‘ailing’ world economy and does notencourage growth in prosperity and security of all countries of the world. Thesame we can find in Russia, more accent in media on tests of new weapons inour country and abroad, successes and defeats of Russia in selling arms allover the world than on a rising danger of the arms racing for global peace andsecurity.

Information wars became a regular practice of international life longago and there is a valid layer of fundamental scientific research on thismatter,2 but in the period of further perfection of information technologiesagainst a progression of the crisis in the world economy and serious tensionin foreign affairs we should probably be prepared for new battles for thecontrol of people’s minds and behaviour. All civil and military structures arepreparing for this. And Russia is not an exception from this general tendency.

2. Communication Security in Russia


______________________________________________________________

149

It’s evident that the issues of information and communicationsecurity are gaining more and more significance in the activity of the Russianstate and leading companies. But the main content of the documentsmentioned above is aimed on the problems of information security. Thecommunication security aspects seem to be ‘diluted’ in the issues ofinformation management and information security.

In the author’s view-point, these terms have much in common butare not equal. Information security is providing the security of both theinformation which is considered to be a trade secret and the information vitalfor the continuous functioning of the enterprise. Information security usuallysuggests security measures for using confidential information of all kinds,private technical intelligence services counteraction, and all kind of actionsaimed at protection of the local computers as well as internal networks etc.

In a democracy, communication security at the state level is asystem of measures for the usage of public communications with thepurpose of protecting the population from the negative influence of self-interested manipulators. To our opinion it implies the usage of a highposition of a state authority as well as the financial resources.

These measures include:

the research of communicational risks and problems of thestate;

system control over the management of state and privateinformation holdings (with the forms of controlcorresponding to the forms of ownership);

neutralizing antisocial target manipulations in the massmedia;

to develop the international Russia TV broadcasting. Thecreation in 2006 of a satellite TV-channel ‘Russia Today’was an important step in the development ofthe information attack resistance system. It is noteworthythat CNN, the leading western news-channel, was foundedin 1980. The USSR spent great sums of money on thecreation and development of nuclear-missile forces but hadno money for a satellite TV-channel.

control over rumours and other kinds of informalcommunications (not with the purpose of persecutingdissidents but with the purpose of creating thebackground necessary for the neutralizing of targetcampaigns of secret influence inspired, organized andfinanced from abroad or by the oligarchical criminalgroups inside the country);


_____________________________________________________________

150

the system of NGOs is a system Russian nongovernmentalorganizations functioning on the territory of CIS, EU andUSA (by comparison, in Russia there function numerousAmerican NGOs financed by the USA government, thebright analysis of their communication activities was doneby Sergei Mozgovoy in his research3).

organizing communication protection of the population aswell as the specific target publics. The foundation of theInformation crisis centre as suggests Igor Panarin4. Russianauthorities should be able to manage the information flowby cooperating with the media, both Russian and foreign.The situation of August 8-11, 2008 when Saakashvily tookup more time in the news than the Russian leaders must notrepeat itself. At that time the information sphere wasinvaded for a certain period by the enemy’s comments withthe help of information and propaganda actions preparedbeforehand.

the usage of CM technologies to neutralize faults in theoperation of governmental bodies (not with the purpose ofkeeping secret the mistakes of the authorities but with thepurpose of establishing constructive cooperation with thepublics in order to minimize the damage from thesemistakes as well as to overcome their consequences);

cooperation in the field of communication securitybetween authorities and specialists of state and privatestructures of different countries which suggests thenetwork character of communication security;

arranging of training in the field of communicationsecurity. It is necessary to select the main institutes ofhigher education where specialists able to take part ininformation warfare should be trained. For example, topmanagers can be trained at the Russian Academy of StateService under the President of the Russian Federation, theAcademy of National Economy at the Government ofRussian Federation, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs of Russia. As for middle management,it can be trained at Moscow State University, HigherSchool of Economics, Moscow State University ofInternational Relations. The course on communicationsecurity (32 academic hours) as well as the course onIW(32 academic hours) with 50% of time devoted totraining of practical skills have been already introduced in


______________________________________________________________

151

the framework of the specialization ‘communicationmanagement’ at Lomonosov MSU and in thecorresponding modules at ANE under the academicguidance of the contributor of the present paper.

It is clear that the issues of communication security are part of theagenda of authorities and the leading corporations. However, the solutionof such problems is rather a job for state and corporate security specialists.In this case the major problem is the problem of coordinating thecommunicational policy (from the point of view of its managerial ratherthan informational function) at the national and international levels, in thefield of international relations as well as the activities of transnationalcorporations. It is obviously a functional task of the government and the topmanagement of leading corporations. But to what extent are they ready forthe solution of such a problem taking into account the present level of thedevelopment of information technologies and the establishing of the wholesystem of communication management disciplines as well as theglobalization process? And to what extent are we ready to control thetechnologies that are being actively used while remaining imperceptible forthe society and will be used in future against it? The future academicresearches in this sphere will inevitably develop in civil and militarysectors and influence more and more the national and global politics.

Notes

1 K Borisson (ed), Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose the Myth ofa Free Press, Prometheus Books, 2004.2 ГГ Почепцов, Информационные войны. Рефл-бук, Ваклер, 2000 (Pocheptsov G. G. Informatsionnyje voiny); Манойло, А. В., Петренко, А. И., Фролов, Д. Б. Государственная информационная политика в условиях информационно-психологической войны. Горячая линия – Телеком, 2009. Gosudarstvennaja informatsionnaya politika v uslovijakhinformatsionno-psikhologicheskoj voiny); Панарин, И. Н. Информационная война и дипломатия. Городец, 2004. (Informatsionnaya voina Idiplomatija); Цыганов, В., Бухарин, С. Информационные войны в бизнесе и политике. Издательство «Академический проект», 2007. (Informatsionnyje voiny v Biznese I politike); MC Libicki, What isInformation Warfare? National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C.,1995; N Snow, Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech, andOpinion Control Since 9/11, New York Publishers, 2007.


_____________________________________________________________

152

3See: CA Mозговой, Религиозный фактор в коммуникационном

менеджменте внешней политики США: новые явления и тенденции (Religiozny factor v kommunikatsionnom menedjmente vnechney politikiSSHA: noviye yavlenia I tendentsii) in Пашенцев, ЕН (Ред.) Коммуникационный менеджмент в мировой политике и бизнесе. Т. 1. Международный центр социально-политических исследований и консалтинга, Центр коммуникационного менеджмента РНВШУ АНХ при Правительстве РФ и др., 2007 (EN Pashetsev (ed), Kommunikatsionnymenedzhment v mirovoj politike I biznese), c. 154 – 188.4

Prof. Igor Panarin an information war expert conceived a number of ideas,among them the foundation of the Informational-psychological subunits ingovernment and military directorates (proposed in 1997); would developstrategic and operational measures to prevent or neutralise attempts to controlthe psyche of Russian society (i.e. a strategy of psychological defence). AChief Directorate in Support of Psychological Security would ensure thepsychological component of Russian national security. He proposed also theInformation Service for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) withheadquarters in Moscow: proposed in his book Information warfare and theworld (2003) for more effective information-analytical support of SCOactivities and more reliable presentation of analytical information to theleadership of SCO countries etc.

Bibliography

Borisson, K. (ed), Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose the Myth ofa Free Press. Prometheus Books, 2004.

Information Operations Roadmap. Department of Defence, United States ofAmerica, 2003, October 30.

Libicki, M.C., What is Information Warfare? National Defense UniversityPress, Washington, D.C., 1995.

Коммуникационный менеджмент в мировой политике и бизнесе. T. 1 –2. Международный центр социально-политических исследований и консалтинга, Центр коммуникационного менеджмента РНВШУ АНХ при Правительстве РФ и др., 2007.


______________________________________________________________

153

Манойло, А. В., Петренко, А. И., Фролов, Д. Б., Государственная информационная политика в условиях информационно-психологической войны. Горячая линия – Телеком, 2009.

Mозговой, С. А., Религиозный фактор в коммуникационном менеджменте внешней политики США: новые явления и тенденции Пашенцев, (Ред.) Коммуникационный менеджмент в мировой политике и бизнесе. Международный центр социально-политических исследований и консалтинга, Центр коммуникационного менеджмента РНВШУ АНХ при Правительстве РФ и др., 2007.

Орлова, Т. М., Коммуникационный менеджмент в управлении экономическими системами. Изд-во РАГС, 2002.

Панарин, И. Н., Информационная война и дипломатия. Городец, 2004.

Пашенцев, Е. Н. (ed), Паблик рилейшнз и коммуникационный менеджмент: Зарубежный опыт. Международный центр социально-политических исследований и консалтинга, Центр коммуникационного менеджмента РНВШУ АНХ при Правительстве РФ и др., 2002.

Почепцов, Г. Г., Информационные войны. Рефл-бук, Ваклер, 2000.

Цыганов, В., Бухарин, С., Информационные войны в бизнесе и политике. Издательство «Академический проект», 2007.

Evgeny N. Pashentsev is a research supervisor of the specializationcommunication management at Lomonosov Moscow State University, theFaculty of Philosophy. Head of the Communication Management Centre atthe Russian-German Graduate School of Management – the Faculty of theAcademy of National Economy under the Government of RF. Director of theInternational Centre for Social and Political Studies and Consulting. Email:[email protected] [email protected].

Peace and War: Communicating Total SpectrumDominance

Vladimir Suchan

AbstractThe question of peace and war is the most important question of our time,which is the time of the Global War on Terror. The GWOT is also alreadybecoming one of the longest U.S. wars. Two countries were invaded andoccupied—with a combined population of 60 million people. The U.S. hasalready spent on the Global War on Terror more than on any other war exceptfor World War II. U.S. military spending already significantly exceeds itsCold War levels. All these vast military efforts are meant to eliminate thethreat of terrorism represented by al-Qaeda. Yet no al-Qaeda were present inIraq before the invasion of that country in 2003. Globally, al-Qaedamembership is officially estimated to run between five hundred and onethousand persons. U.S. intelligence officials report only about 100 al Qaedafighters in the whole of Afghanistan. To contain the al-Qaeda threat, the U.S.has already spent about one billion dollars per one al-Qaeda militant.Politically, economically, and strategically, the offered explanations seemodd, irrational, and incongruous. In the name of the war against al-Qaeda, theU.S. military is, nevertheless, engaged in its possibly largest strategic andlogistical manoeuvre and redeployment since the World War II and thebeginning of the Cold War. Already back in 1997, Brzezinski called for aconquest of the heart of Eurasia, which he saw as the key to globalhegemony. On the occasion NATO’s 60th anniversary, Brzezinski identifiedan unprecedented political, anti-colonial mass awakening in this broaderregion as the greatest security threat. Such geopolitics and strategic thinkingfundamentally alter and amend the common narrative and rationale of theGlobal War on Terror, that is to say, its inherent Hobbesian rhetoric thatrecasts the permanent nature of the imperial Leviathan’s war as an article ofits virtual peace.

Key Words: War, peace, full spectrum dominance, Global War on Terror,Brzezinski, Hobbes, military spending, Iraq, Afghanistan, informationsuperiority.

*****

Peace and War

______________________________________________________________

156

‘Roman imperialism was the result of continuous war, andcontinuous war was the result of the Roman system.’1

The Oxford Companion to Classical Civilization

‘Winston could not definitely remember a time when hiscountry had not been at war …’ George Orwell, 19842

1. Encountering the Global War on Terror with a Simple CounterOur time is an age of the Global War on Terror. This war has also

been dubbed the ‘perpetual war’ or more modestly ‘the long war’.In terms of its duration, the GWOT is also already becoming one of

the longest U.S. wars. In its process, two countries were invaded andoccupied—with a combined population of 60 million people.

One of these wars—the war in Iraq—has gained notoriety as anexemplary war launched under false pretences, while leading to the death ofhundreds of thousands and the displacement of millions more. The wholestory of the so-called weapons of mass destruction is already sufficiently wellknown and established.

Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, one of the principalofficial cheerleaders of the war, explained the rationale for the war in termsstrangely evocative of the images later leaked from Abu Ghraib prison:

What they needed to see was American boys and girlsgoing house to house, from Basra to Baghdad, um andbasically saying, ‘Which part of this sentence don't youunderstand?’ You don’t think, you know, we care about ouropen society, you think this bubble fantasy, we’re justgonna to let it grow? Well, Suck. On. This...We could havehit Saudi Arabia. It was part of that bubble. Could have hitPakistan. We hit Iraq because we could. That’s the realtruth...3

Later, Friedman offered a more polished argument stretchedbetween ‘none’ and ‘whatever’: ‘[W]hatever the cost, [the war] has givenfreedom and decent government to people who had none.’4

In his 2009 Cairo speech, President Obama declared the Iraq war tobe ‘unnecessary.’5 This does not, however, mean that the war would stop. Itcontinues now into its eighth year.

The U.S. has already spent on the Global War on Terror more thanon any other war except for World War II: ‘The Korean and Vietnam Warswere fought on 2/3 the current defense budget, … US defense spendingduring the Cold War (1946-1991) averaged $400 billion per year in 2008dollars, including both the Korean and Vietnam wars.’6 The Department of

Vladimir Suchan

______________________________________________________________

157

Defence’s budget for 2010 has already passed the $700 billion mark. Thecosts of the Global War on Terror already reached more than $1.15 trillion,as reported by the Congressional Research Service reported in July 2010.7

Two other facts are also striking: 1) with 5% of the worldpopulation, the U.S. spends 50% of the world’s combined military budget,and 2) with 13% of the world population, the whole of NATO (including theUS) controls over 70% of the world’s war budget.

U.S. military spending thus not only matches but actuallysignificantly exceeds its Cold War levels, and is ‘still geared toward ColdWar-type scenarios.’8

2. The Virtual and the Real: The Spectre and the Full SpectrumDominance

These vast military efforts under the banner of the Global War onTerror are meant to eliminate the threat of terrorism represented by al-Qaeda.Yet no al-Qaeda were present in Iraq before the invasion of that country in2003. Even today, the presence of al-Qaeda in Iraq is minimal. Official U.S.estimates of the number of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan place the number ataround a hundred persons.9

Yet President Barack Obama continues to declare that al-Qaedaremains the ‘greatest threat to the United States’ security.’10 According toBritish Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the war in Afghanistan must,nevertheless, continue because al-Qaeda is still ‘the biggest source of threatto our national security.’11

Globally, al-Qaeda membership was officially estimated to runbetween five hundred and one thousand persons. Surely this is one of thegreatest oddities of the Global War on Terror, yet it is also one of the leastreported. As Ken Silverstein of the respectable Harper’s Magazine said:

Al Qaeda isn't the all-powerful group that it is oftenportrayed to be; its strength and reach have beenexaggerated, partly because of the extraordinary impact ofthe 9/11 attacks, and partly because the BushAdministration has found it politically useful to hype thegroup's capabilities. Two years ago, I interviewed JackCloonan, a 25-year veteran of the FBI who, between 1996and 2002, served on a joint CIA–FBI task force that trackedbin Laden. ‘How many members of Al Qaeda do you thinkthere are?’ he asked me. Cloonan laughed when I peggedits membership at several thousand. The real numbers, hesaid, ‘are miniscule.’ Documents discovered by the jointtask force, Cloonan said, showed that Al Qaeda had 72

Peace and War

______________________________________________________________

158

members when it was founded in 1989. Twelve years later,the task force got its hands on an updated membership list… It showed that bin Laden had a grand total of precisely198 sworn loyalists. … ‘Al Qaeda’ is less of anorganization than it is an impulse. And while bin Ladenisn’t the all-powerful terrorist mastermind he’s oftenportrayed to be, the war in Iraq, Guantánamo, extraordinaryrenditions, and other Bush Administration brainstorms haveensured that his message is broadcast loud and clearthroughout the world.12

In an interview with CNN in October 2009, Obama’s NationalSecurity Adviser, Gen. James Jones, put the number of al-Qaeda at ‘fewerthan a hundred.’ The same number was also affirmed in a session of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee in October 2009.13 When PresidentObama announced the Afghan ‘surge’ in his West Point speech of December1, 2009, he made only vague reference to the size of the al-Qaeda: ‘[A]lQaeda has not re-emerged in Afghanistan in the same number as before 9/11,but they retain their safe havens along the border.’14 When asked about al-Qaeda’s size, a spokesperson at the White House's National Security Council,Chris Hensman, said he ‘could not comment on intelligence matters.’15 InJune of 2010, CIA Director Leon Panetta confirmed the miniscule size of theAl Qaeda presence in Afghanistan. In an interview for the ABC ‘Week,’ hesaid: ‘I think the estimate on the number of Al Qaeda is actually relativelysmall. Almost, we’re looking at 50 to 100, maybe less.’16

In this light, the economics of the Global War on Terror and itsstrategic rationale can only be seen as highly irrational, even absurd. If wetake the upper estimate of al-Qaeda membership at 100 and compare thatwith the running price tag of the Global War on Terror at some $1 trillion, weare compelled to infer that, in order to contain the al-Qaeda threat, the U.S.has already spent about ten billion dollars per one al-Qaeda militant. Yet thetaxi meter simply keeps on running, and the cost per minute shows no sign ofdecreasing.

The Economist mercifully dubbed this glaring oddity ‘the impossiblequestion’ when it referred to the leaked, teasingly Machiavellian 2003 memofrom Donald Rumsfeld, then the U.S. Secretary of Defence: ‘Today, we lackmetrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are wecapturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day thanthe madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deployingagainst us?’17 Politically, economically, and strategically, the offeredexplanations make no sense. Not only are the ‘metrics’ lacking, butapparently also common sense itself.

Vladimir Suchan

______________________________________________________________

159

The closer one looks, however, the more one is struck by themassive and persistent incongruity. Thus, as Jason Ditz put it, ‘claims ofdubious veracity [are being issued] aimed at convincing the public of thenecessity of continuing the war, already in its ninth year.’18

Even though al-Qaeda has no significant presence either in Iraq or inAfghanistan, according to U.S. State Secretary Hilary Clinton the war andhence heavy U.S. military presence must continue ‘to get al-Qaeda.’ At thesame time, Secretary Clinton also stated that ‘the US has no illusions thatAfghanistan will ever become a modern democracy.’19 As President Obamaalso reminded us, NATO itself has been mobilized to fight the al-Qaedamenace. ‘For the first time in its history,’ President Obama said in his WestPoint speech, ‘the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 – thecommitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. …America, our allies and the world were acting as one to destroy Al Qaeda’sterrorist network, and to protect our common security.’20 It is worth notingthat the Alliance’s total population numbers some 840 million, and NATO’sactive armed forces include 4 million troops.21 Currently, NATO fields some150,000 troops in Afghanistan with the help of at least the same number of‘civilian contractors.’

Some seventy years ago, on August 20, 1940 in the midst of the airBattle of Britain, Winston Churchill famously declared: ‘Never in the field ofhuman conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.’ Today, withrespect to the Global War on Terror constructed as a global mobilization forwar against al-Qaeda, one might add that never in history has so much beenspent in the pursuit of so few.

And so, in the guise of the war against al-Qaeda, the U.S. military isnow engaged in its possibly largest strategic and logistical manoeuvre andredeployment since the World War II and the beginning of the Cold War.

3. The Spectrum of Global Political Awakening as Dominance’sImminent Threat

On the occasion last year of NATO’s 60th anniversary, the foremostU.S. strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski made it clear that, for the US and NATO,the key perceived threat is the unprecedented political, anti-colonial, globalawakening of mankind:

The basic challenge that NATO now confronts is that thereare historically unprecedented risks to global security. …The paradox of our time is that the world … isexperiencing intensifying popular unrest … Yet there is noeffective global security mechanism for coping with thegrowing threat of violent political chaos stemming from

Peace and War

______________________________________________________________

160

humanity’s recent political awakening. The three greatpolitical contests of the twentieth century (the two worldwars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakeningof mankind, which was initially unleashed in Europe by theFrench Revolution. Within a century of that revolution,spontaneous populist political activism had spread fromEurope to East Asia. On their return home after WorldWars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africanswho had been conscripted by the British and Frenchimperial armies propagated a new awareness of anti-colonial nationalist and religious political identity amonghitherto passive and pliant populations. The spread ofliteracy during the twentieth century and the wide-rangingimpact of radio, television, and the Internet accelerated andintensified this mass global political awakening. … Thedispersal of global power and the expanding mass politicalunrest make for a combustible mixture. … There is noother way to shape effective security arrangements for aworld in which politically awakened peoples - whoseprevailing historical narratives associate the West less withtheir recent emancipation and more with their pastsubordination - can no longer be dominated by a singleregion.22

Already in 1997 in his de facto blueprint of the current war, TheGrand Chessboard, Brzezinski had identified the current central battlefield ofthe Global War on Terror not only as ‘likely [to be] a major battlefield’ of thenew U.S. geopolitical game, but also as the centre of gravity in securing forU.S. lasting ‘global supremacy’ or ‘hegemony of a new type,’ i.e.,‘seemingly consensual American hegemony.’23 According to Brzezinski, thezone stretching from Iraq to Central Asia is ‘geopolitically axial,’ and thus ‘apower that dominates [it] would control two of the world’s three mostadvanced and economically productive regions … and control over Eurasiawould almost automatically entail Africa’s subordination …’24 For the U.S,then, ‘the chief geopolitical prize is [thus to be] Eurasia,’ which dictatescontrolling the area that coincides with what is now held to be the centralbattlefield of the Global War on Terror. Control of this would-be globalheartland in Eurasia will, as Brezinski believes, provide access to ‘itspotential wealth,’ ‘motivate corporate interests,’ and ‘revive imperialaspirations.’25 What is also notable is that nowhere in the strategy-settingGrand Chessboard does Brzezinski deem al-Qaeda or Osama bin Ladenworth mentioning even once.

Vladimir Suchan

______________________________________________________________

161

4. Figuring out Wise Men’s Counters, Fools’ Money: Peace andWar

Brzezinski’s strategic thinking is embedded in the Pentagon’s globalstrategy of ‘full spectrum dominance,’ which denotes ‘control over allelements and assets.’ This objective was introduced in Joint Vision 2020released by the U.S. Defense Department of Defense on May 30, 2000. Thekey in full spectrum dominance is ‘information superiority,’ a factor that is‘the core of every activity,’ and which should provide for ‘enhancedawareness.’ Another key concept in full spectrum dominance is ‘dominantmaneuver,’ which goes ‘beyond the actual physical presence of the force,’ forit ‘creates an impact in the minds of opponents and others.’ Information, i.e.,deception, is ‘a force multiplier.’

As Joint Vision 2020 put it, ‘we must have information superiority,’and that requires ‘both offensive and defensive information warfare (IW).’No information warfare, no information superiority, and no informationsuperiority, no full spectrum global dominance. To achieve conversely means‘denying [others the ability] to do the same’—to have superior information.26

This also means to ‘confuse or deceive.’The emphasis on superior information and, respectively, superior

deception, raises a question as to what such superior information ordisinformation might be and to what it might pertain. I think that we can nowanswer this quintessential question. Above all, superior information, first andforemost superior deception and disinformation, pertains to war and peace,the most important question of our time, but also the question that formed thecornerstone of Hobbes’ Leviathan—the modern empire.27

The new imperial Leviathan is presented as Peace, and all else as thestate of war in which ‘the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, andshort.’28 For Hobbes, international relations typically define wartime, as infact does the duration of anyone’s independence (‘the notion of time is to beconsidered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather’).

The presence of Hobbesian ‘peace’ as a state of mind then dependson whether the permanence of war is ‘sufficiently known’ or not, or whetherone receives from someone else an ‘assurance to the contrary.’

According to Hobbes, the greatest and most decisive form ofinequality among men concerns their comprehension and interpretativeskills—in their power ‘grounded upon words.’29 And, for Hobbes, words are‘wise men’s counters’ and ‘the money of fools.’ The peace of Hobbes’sLeviathan, being then grounded upon (Hobbes’) words (read: Hobbesianrhetoric of peace), then becomes a fool’s peace—a continuous war for thosewho can correctly ‘reckon’ (figure out) how to read the Empire’s dictionaryof war and peace.

Peace and War

______________________________________________________________

162

What does this mean for us in relation to the Empire’s Global War onTerror? It means that before we can put an end to such madness and find realpeace, we must first determine who is playing the Hobbesian fool.

If peace and war are what matter most, imperial policies will twisttheir meanings from beginning to end. On that deception you may depend,for the empire’s fate too depends on that one thing above all.

Notes

1 Slightly modified from S Hornblower & A Spawforth, The OxfordCompanion to Classical Civilization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998,p. 610.2 G Orwell, 1984, Penguin Books, New York, 1990, p. 35.3 ‘Thomas Friedman Sums Up the Iraq War: Suck. On This’, Charlie RoseShow, PBS, 2010, Viewed on 4 April 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOF6ZeUvgXs.4 T Friedman, ‘It’s Up to Iraqis Now: Good Luck’, The New York Times, 9March 2009, Viewed on 4 April 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/opinion/10friedman.html.5 B Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on a New Beginning’, CairoUniversity, Cairo, Egypt, 4 June 2009, Viewed on 4 April 2010,http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/.6 ‘U.S. Defense Spending is Out of Control’, True Cost – Analyzing ourEconomy, Government Policy, and Society through the Lens of Cost-Benefit,2 March 2009, Viewed on 22 August 2009, http://truecostblog.com/2009/03/02/us-defense-spending-is-out-of-control/.7 ‘Report: Tab for ‘War on Terrorism’ Tops $1 Trillion,’ CNN, Viewed 28July, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/07/20/war.costs/index.html.8 A Shah, ‘World Military Spending’, GlobalIssues.org, 1 March 2009,Viewed on 22 August 2009, http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world -military-spending.9 ‘US Commander: No Sign of al-Qaeda Presence in Afghanistan’,Antiwar.com, 11 September 2009, Viewed on April 4, 2010,http://news.antiwar.com/2009/09/11/us-commander-no-sign-of-al-qaeda-presence-in-afghanistan/.10 B Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town Hall Meetingwith Future Chinese Leaders’, Museum of Science and Technology,Shanghai, China, 16 November 2009, Viewed on 4 April 2010,http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-town-hall-meeting-with-future-chinese-leaders.

Vladimir Suchan

______________________________________________________________

163

11 P Webster, ‘Al-Qaeda still biggest threat to British security, says GordonBrown’, Times, 16 November 2009, Viewed on 4 April 2010,http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6918483.ece.12 K Silverstein, ‘The Al Qaeda Clubhouse: Members Lacking’, Harper’sMagazine, 5 July 2006, Viewed on 5 April 2010, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2006/07/sb-al-qaeda-new-members-badly-needed-1151963690.13 R Esposito, M Cole & B Ross, ‘President Obama’s Secret: Only 100 alQaeda Now in Afghanistan’, ABC News, 2 December 2009, Viewed on 5April 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/president-obamas-secret-100-al-qaeda-now-afghanistan/story?id=9227861&page=2.14 ‘Full Transcript: President Obama's Speech on Afghanistan’, op. cit.15 Esposito, op. cit.16 ‘CIA: At most, 50-100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan’, ABC, 27 June 2010,viewed on 10 July 2010, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/06/cia-at-most-50100-al-qaeda-in-afghanistan.html.17 ‘Winning or Losing?’ The Economist, 19 July 2008, Vol. 388, specialsection, p. 5.18 J Ditz, ‘Officials Defend Afghan Escalation, Citing Dubious al-Qaeda TiesWith Taliban’, Antiwar.com, 2 December 2009, Viewed on 5 April 2010,http://news.antiwar.com/2009/12/02/officials-defend-afghan-escalation-citing-dubious-al-qaeda-ties-with-taliban/.19 J Ditz, ‘U.S Doesn’t Have Long-Term Designs on Afghanistan’,Antiwar.com, 15 November 2009, Viewed on 5 April 2010,http://news.antiwar.com/2009/11/15/clinton-insists-us-doesnt-have-long-term-designs-on-afghanistan/.20 ‘Full Transcript: President Obama's Speech on Afghanistan’, op. cit.21 NATO Review: Military Matters Beyond Prague, Autumn 2002, NATO,Viewed on 5 April 2010, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/military.html.22 Z Brzezinski, ‘An Agenda for NATO - Toward a Global Security’, speechdelivered at the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, Bratislava, Slovakia,October 17, 2009, also published in Foreign Affairs, September / October2009. Volume 88 No. 5, Viewed on 5 April 2010, http://www.ata-sac.org/ncbc/highlights-news/an-agenda-for-nato---toward-a-global-security-web/ New Challenges Better Capabilities. Emphasis Added.23 Z Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Basic Books, New York, 1997,chapter 1 and p. 52.24 Ibid.,p. 31.25 Ibid., p. 125.26 Joint Vision 2020, U.S. Defense Department, 2000, Viewed on 5 April2010, http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/aspc/pubs/jv2020.pdf.

Peace and War

______________________________________________________________

164

27 T Hobbes, The Leviathan, Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994, xiii, 8,9, 12, pp. 76, 78. Original Emphasis.28 Ibid., xiii, 9, 14, pp. 76, 78.29 Ibid., xiii, 2, p. 74.

Bibliography

Author Unknown, ‘Defense Budget/QDR Announcement as Delivered bySecretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’. Arlington, VA, Monday, February01, 2010, U.S. Department of Defence. Viewed on 4 April 2010,http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1416.

–––, ‘Full Transcript: President Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan’. WestPoint, December 1, 2009, ABC News. Viewed on 5 April 2010,http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=9220661.

–––, ‘List of Countries by GDP’. Wikipedia.com. Viewed on 4 April 2010,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29.

–––, ‘Obama to Help Troops, Rethink Defense Spend’. AFP. 25 February2009, Viewed on 22 August 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jQmlNuequei36TCBuV0mAgUP7dAw.

–––, ‘Seven Ways NATO Broke International Law’. U.S. Foreign PolicyIndex Page. Viewed on 4 April 2010, http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org/intnalaw.html.

–––, ‘Thomas Friedman Sums Up the Iraq War: Suck. On This’. CharlieRose Show. PBS, 2010, Viewed on 4 April 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOF6ZeUvgXs.

–––, ‘U.S. Defense Spending is Out of Control’. True Cost – Analyzing ourEconomy, Government Policy, and Society through the Lens of Cost-Benefit.2 March 2009, Viewed on 22 August 2009, http://truecostblog.com/2009/03/02/us-defense-spending-is-out-of-control/.

–––, ‘US Commander: No Sign of al-Qaeda Presence in Afghanistan’.Antiwar.com. 11 September 2009, Viewed on April 4, 2010, http://news.antiwar.com/2009/09/11/us-commander-no-sign-of-al-qaeda-presence-in-afghanistan/.

Vladimir Suchan

______________________________________________________________

165

–––, ‘Winning or Losing?’ The Economist. 19 July 2008, Vol. 388, SpecialSection, p. 5.

–––, Joint Vision 2020. U.S. Defense Department, 2000. Viewed on 5 April2010, http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/aspc/pubs/jv2020.pdf.

–––, NATO Review: Military Matters Beyond Prague, Autumn 2002, NATO,viewed on 5 April 2010, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/military.html.

Beslie, L., ‘What Obama's Afghan War Plan will Cost You’. ChristianScience Monitor. 3 December, 2009, Viewed on 4 April 2010,http://www.csmonitor.com/Money/new-economy/2009/1203/what-obamas-afghan-war-plan-will-cost-you.

Bettts, R.K., ‘A Disciplined Defense’. Foreign Affairs. November/December2007.

Brzezinski, Z., ‘An Agenda for NATO - Toward a Global Security’. Speechdelivered at the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, Bratislava, Slovakia,October 17, 2009.

_______, The Grand Chessboard. Basic Books, New York, 1997.

Ditz, J., ‘Officials Defend Afghan Escalation, Citing Dubious al-Qaeda TiesWith Taliban’. Antiwar.com. 2 December 2009, Viewed on 5 April 2010,http://news.antiwar.com/2009/12/02/officials-defend-afghan-escalation-citing-dubious-al-qaeda-ties-with-taliban/.

________, ‘U.S Doesn’t Have Long-Term Designs on Afghanistan’.Antiwar.com. 15 November 2009, Viewed on 5 April 2010,http://news.antiwar.com/2009/11/15/clinton-insists-us-doesnt-have-long-term-designs-on-afghanistan/.

Drew, C., ‘High Costs Weigh on Troop Debate for Afghan War’. The NewYork Times. 15 November 2009, Viewed on April 5, 2010,http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/us/politics/15cost.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=afghanistan%20costs&st=cse.

Peace and War

______________________________________________________________

166

Esposito, R., Cole, M. & Ross, B., ‘President Obama’s Secret: Only 100 alQaeda Now in Afghanistan’. ABC News. 2 December 2009, Viewed on 5April 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/president-obamas-secret-100-al-qaeda-now-afghanistan/story?id=9227861&page=2.

Farrell S. & Bumiller, E., ‘No Shortcuts When Military Moves a War’. TheNew York Times. 31 March 2010, Viewed on 5 April 2010,http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/world/01logistics.html?sq=U.S.%20military%20move&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=print.

Friedman, T., ‘It’s Up to Iraqis Now: Good Luck’. The New York Times. 9March 2009, Viewed on 4 April 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/opinion/10friedman.html.

Hobbes, T., The Leviathan. Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994.

Hornblower, S. & Spawforth, A., The Oxford Companion to ClassicalCivilization. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.

Kwiatkowski, K., ‘American Military Policy and the War on Terrorism’.Viewed 4 April 2010, http://www.lewrockwell.com/kwiatkowski/kwiatkowski244.html.

Obama, B., ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town Hall Meetingwith Future Chinese Leaders’. Museum of Science and Technology,Shanghai, China, 16 November 2009, Viewed on 4 April 2010,http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-town-hall-meeting-with-future-chinese-leaders.

Obama, B., ‘Remarks by the President on a New Beginning’. CairoUniversity, Cairo, Egypt. 4 June 2009, Viewed on 4 April 2010,http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/.

Orwell G, 1984. Penguin Books, New York, 1990.

Seely, H., Pieces of Intelligence: The Existential Poetry of Donald H.Rumsfeld. Free Press, New York, 2003.

Vladimir Suchan

______________________________________________________________

167

Shah, A., ‘World Military Spending’. GlobalIssues.org, 1 March 2009,Viewed on 22 August 2009, http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world -military-spending.

Silverstein, K., ‘The Al Qaeda Clubhouse: Members Lacking’. Harper’sMagazine. 5 July 2006, Viewed on 5 April 2010, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2006/07/sb-al-qaeda-new-members-badly-needed-1151963690.

Thompson, L., ‘America’s Economic Decline’. Armed Forces Journal.Viewed on 22 August 2009, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/03/ .

Webster, P., ‘Al-Qaeda Still Biggest Threat to British Security, Says GordonBrown’. Times. 16 November 2009, Viewed on 4 April 2010,http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6918483.ece.

Vladimir Suchan is an Associate Professor of Foundations and SocialStudies at the University of Maine at Fort Kent and an Associate ResearchFellow with the Communication Management Centre at the Russian GermanGraduate School of Management at the Academy of National Economy underthe Government of the Russian Federation. He is a Platonist with a keeninterest in international relations and communication management.Email Address: [email protected]

Communicative Aspect of the Activities of the BritishIntelligence Service (MI-6) Nowadays

Svetlana V. Zudochkina

AbstractMI-6 provides the British Government with a global covert capability topromote and defend the national security and economic wellbeing of theUnited Kingdom. MI-6 operates word-wide to collect secret foreignintelligence in support of the British Government‘s policies and objectives.Regional instability, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and illegal drugs are among the major challenges of the 21st

century. MI-6 assists the government to meet these challenges. MI-6 usesmass media, the Internet in their activity to call into operation:disinformation, manipulation, shredding of the myths and rumors. MI-6collects secret intelligence and mounts covert operations overseas enquiriesfrom the media are conducted through a subordinate FCO Press Office. Mi-6is the participant of modern information operations, military conflicts inYugoslavia, Iraq. Communication management in British foreign policytowards Russia mainly touches upon the problems of Russia in the imagemaking of the country, difficulties in seeking new investments, incorrectactivities of the Russian commercial and governmental organizations indifferent parts or the world, problem of safety of citizens etc. Communicationmanagement in British foreign policy towards Russia forms public opinionthat justifies actions of the country and promotes preservation of her stabilityin the world. Intelligence service activity being a part of the communicationactivity plays a key role in the relations between the UK and the RF. Itcommunicates with people, creates its own and country‘s image. Its decisioninfluences the forming strategies and tactics of the state. The Britishintelligence service uses information from the Internet. British intelligenceservices cooperate with Russian intelligence in order to fight internationalterrorists.

Key Words: Secret intelligence service, special operations, communicativesource, communication management, RF, UK.

*****

Communication management is a professional management of peopleand capitals with the help of communications.1 Secret intelligence servicesuse communication management for effective activity. Information of secretservice forms public opinion, influences the government, individuals, and attimes can cause crisis situations.2

Communicative Aspect of the Activities of BIS (MI-6) Nowadays

______________________________________________________________

170

The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) is responsible for supplying theBritish Government with foreign intelligence. It is more often referred to inthe mass media and popular parlance by its former name MI6.3

Around 1920, it began increasingly to be referred to as the SIS, a titlethat it has continued to use to the present day and which was enshrined instatute in the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Its headquarters, since 1995, isat Vauxhall Cross on the South Bank of the Thames. In 1994 newheadquarters at Vauxhall Bridge was officially opened by the Queen. ForGuardian columnist Hugo Young, the new headquarters was a sign that MI6still had clout in Whitehall. These agencies' emergence means that they arenot afraid to announce their central role in government. MI6 is still viewed asa major national asset by Whitehall mandarins.

MI-6 is under the control included in the state of MFA of GreatBritain. Played a leading role in activity of MI-6 is by a prime minister. MI-6collects secret intelligence and mounts covert operations overseas enquiriesfrom the media are conducted through a dedicated FCO Press Office.Because of the secret nature of MI-6 work it has been the policy of MI-6 andsuccessive Governments not comment on operations, staff, agents, orrelations with foreign intelligence services.4

In Brunel Centre there are important sources about activity of MI-6.For Intelligence and Security Studies is an academic research unit based atBrunel University. Department specializes in teaching and research relatingto the evaluation of intelligence service activities. Main focus of research isthe UK however, there is also some comparison with services in theEuropean Union and USA.

Web site offers details on the aims of the centre, its courses, staff andresearch projects. It also includes information about recent publications.intelligence, weapons of mass destruction and the 2003 Gulf War against Iraqand Saddam Hussein (commentary on the Hutton report and the Butlerreport), national security and intelligence, covert operations and espionage.

There is in Internet the UK Intelligence Community Online. This is aUK government website whose aim is to explain the United Kingdomnational intelligence machinery. It provides an overview of intelligenceprovision in support of Government and law enforcement and providesdetails of the threat levels system which outlines the national security threatfrom international terrorism. It also provides access to full text publicationsinformation on how to access intelligence records. These pages reflect theUK Government's desire to be as open as possible about intelligence matters,while recognizing the constraints imposed by national security. Theintelligence agencies themselves share in the blame though for the currentproblems.5

The most successful operations — actions in Ireland, Holland,Germany. Participated in thousand operations from Sahara to Malaysia. The


______________________________________________________________

171

most known operation — clearing of hostages in the Iranian embassy inLondon in 1980. Summary group of employees of regiment Incrementoperates in interests of external investigation MI6. Mi-6 is the participant ofmodern information operations, military conflicts in Yugoslavia, Iraq.

MI-6 uses mass media, the Internet in their activity to call intooperation: disinformation, manipulation, shredding of the myths and rumors.MI 6 and SIA supervised Serbia and prepared plot on overthrow of presidentMilosevic and carried it to the international tribunal in the Hague. TheSerbian sources inform, that scouts MI-6 has stolen Milosevic from theBelgrad prison, have thrown to the Hague where he has been killed.6

It was an important example of where the service was more then asimple collector of intelligence. Here it performed a major analytical role. Anew era of international co-operation appeared. Western intelligencespecialists argued that the Iranians had taken the place of the Soviets.Newspaper reports smacked more of disinformation than any recourse toreliable information.

Iran does attack its opponents and the campaign, using hit squads, hasbeen bloody, leading to the murder of a number of dissidents exiled in theWest. MI-6 funds to have been allocated to ‘fighting drug trafficking in theeastern Mediterranean and a new policy of direct action, including the use ofspecial forces to intercept shipments, has been agreed.’

In 1995 the police National Criminal Intelligence Service produced areport on the Russian mafia in Britain, ‘Ivan 1’, ‘Ivan 2’. Having spentbillions of dollars on attempting to control the supply of drugs, the StateDepartment has admitted that the number of addicts is increasing. The drugswar has already been lost and the emphasis has to be on prevention andtreatment programmes.

Britain did not have the funding to compete at the level at which theAmericans operated, with much of GCHQ's budget needed to update itsexpensive computers. Outdated ideas of national security preventedcooperation and participation by Britain in European Union.’

It is a maxim of intelligence that there are no friendly intelligenceservices, and MI6 has been known to target its European partners. Tenofficers in the UKB Unit at MI6 headquarters had been running OperationJET-STREAM which directs economic espionage against France, Germany,Spain, Italy and Switzerland. In 1996, MI6 cooperated with the CIA's stationchief in London, Thomas Twetten, in a botched operation in northern Iraq.The CIA and MI6 invested millions of dollars in the London-based IraqiNational Accord whose leader once a member of the ruling Baath Party.Unfortunately for MI6, the INA was riddled with informers and doubleagents. In November 1998 CIA and MI6 to construct an Iraqi opposition outof a number of disparate and bitterly divided exile groups.


______________________________________________________________

172

In September 2002 government produces dossier about alleged Iraqiweapons of mass destruction, including claim they could be deployed within45 minutes. In Britain a campaign to protect the independence and funding ofthe BBC started. Hundreds joined a demonstration outside Television Centrein west London and further rallies were held at offices including Glasgow,Cardiff and Bristol.7

Tony Blair has dismissed fears about the intelligence gathered aboutIraq and again defended his decision to go to war.

Conservatives press Blair to sack MI6 chief Dossier was the reactionof quarrel between The American and British Intelligence Service. Londongot the information about Saddam who wanted to buy African uranium inItaly and France. The citizens of Britain and USA are pressurized by the ideaof terrorism. The rumors which are spread among the people are consideredto be the manipulation of citizens' mind in order to justify The British andAmerican government.8

Nowadays British mass-media told that the United States made keydecisions about the future of Iraq without consulting Britain, the chief of MI6has said. Sir John Sawers, a former foreign policy adviser to Tony Blair whois now the head of Secret Intelligence Service, was drafted in as Britain‘sSpecial Representative to Iraq with less than a week to prepare.

He said when he was Tony Blair's private secretary for foreign affairs,discussions took place on political actions which could help undermineSaddam Hussein‘s regime short of military action.

When the information was acquired by MI6, a footnote was written onthe page of an intelligence report sent to No 10 stating that the claim wasverifiably inaccurate. But the footnote was ignored by Downing Street, MrHolloway claimed. He said that a security official in the United Statesknowing about the pre-war MI6 reports confirmed to him that the footnotewas ignored. The allegations are due to be published in a report on the Iraqwar by Mr Holloway on a website called www.firstdefence.org.

Sir John Scarlett, the former MI6 chief was responsible for drawing upthe dossier, is expected to be questioned about it when he gives evidence tothe inquiry head by Sir John Chilcot today. But he is unlikely to be publiclyquizzed about MI6 sources. Mr Holloway says that pressure was put on MI6to come up with intelligence after Mr Blair met President George W Bush inTexas in April 2002. The Chilcot inquiry has heard that this was the meetingat which a plan for Iraq was first discussed.

In his report The Failure of British Political and Military Leadership inIraq, Mr Holloway writes: Under pressure from Downing Street to findanything to back up the WMD case, SIS were squeezing their agents in Iraqfor anything at all...

Today the sphere of application of management has changed. It isconnected with development of information technologies. In 2004, the MI6


______________________________________________________________

173

station was still using floppy disks to transfer files but staff decided it wouldbe quicker to use the memory capacity of a digital camera to transfer largefiles.

This was a breach of procedure. The memory stick was not labeled orheld securely in the MI6 station nor was it destroyed. The managerialinfluence of the information operations of MI-6 on the society is analyzed.The Sunday Times said that Egypt has been training British MI6 agents inhow to combat Islamic terrorists, underlining Cairo's growing importance inthe war against terror and the Middle East peace process.

A senior Middle Eastern military intelligence official revealed lastweek that British officers had undergone the training as part of a cooperationprogramme with Egypt that began after the September 11 attacks on Americain 2001 and continued until last year.

Details have not been revealed, but it is believed to have includedinstruction in specialized interrogation techniques and in the terminologyused by terrorists which will enable agents to understand monitoredtelephone conversations.9

Agents from MI6 are engaged in secret talks with Taliban leadersdespite the British government‘s claims that there are no negotiations withterrorists.

Intelligence service activity being a part of communication activityplays the main role in relations between UK and RF play. It communicateswith people, creates its own and country's image. Its decision influences theforming strategies and tactics of the state. 10

Nikolai Patrushev, who heads the Federal Security Service, the mainKGB successor agency, in the interview to the Russian newspaperArgumenty I Fackty, said that foreign spies were focusing their efforts ongathering information related to Russia's elections. ‘They are trying toinfluence protest feelings and demonstrations in Russia.’

He singled out Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, or MI 6, saying itsagents ‘aren't only gathering intelligence in all areas, but they are also tryingto influence the development of the domestic political situation in ourcountry. Agents have been guided by the principle the aim is justifying themeans. Money, bribery, blackmail, exemption from punishment for crimescommitted are their main recruitment methods.

British intelligence has relied on people who fled abroad to avoidcriminal charges in Russia - an apparent hint at Kremlin critics living inBritain, such as tycoon Boris Berezovsky and Chechen rebel leader AkhmedZakaev. Russia has vainly sought their extradition.

Litvinenko was a critic of Putin administration claiming that Putin isturning Russia into a police state. From British point of view, this wholematter was very suspicious and may be Russian authority is directly &indirectly responsible for these multiple murders & attempts by poisoning.


______________________________________________________________

174

From Russian point of view, especially considering statements &demonstrations of Nashi, British authority has engineered the murders ofseveral Russian citizens to malign the reputation of Putin administration. Butlater, two journalists of British Daily Mail Stephen Wright and DavidWilliams, Alexander Litvinenko was an MI6 agent under direct supervisionof MI6/SIS Chief Sir John Scarlett. According to .unnamed intelligence &political sources., they claimed Litvinenko received .2000 per month & wasdirectly recruited by Director Scarlett.

In the late nineties English investigation has suffered a large failure inRussia when its agent, the employee the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federation Platon Obuhov has been detained. It has been revealed, inspite of the fact that Englishmen have supplied with its up-to-date equipmentfor communication, allowing to transfer the espionage data without directcontact to scouts.

N. Patrushev also alleged that foreign spies were using non-governmental organizations ‘both for gathering intelligence information andas an instrument for having a hidden influence over political processes.’ Hepointed at the revolutions that ousted unpopular governments in the formerYugoslavia, Ukraine and Georgia as a product of such activities.

‘There is a danger of foreign NGOs being used to finance activities toundermine Russia’. He claimed that some NGOs were also being used byinternational terror groups to support militants in Russia's volatile NorthCaucasus.

The CIA and MI6 were actively relying on the special services ofPoland, Georgia and the Baltics to spy on Russia.11

BBC said that the main aim of British intelligence service was thesafety of the country and rebirth of global opposition.12

The British intelligence service use information from the Internet. InRussia there are such websites as vkontakte.ru, odnaklasniki.ru, which givethe information about people in Russia. But at the same time Britishintelligence services cooperate with Russian intelligence in order to fightinternational terrorists.13

What and how they do (even partly mythologizing public opinion) tocreate their own country‘s image. Although 'MI6' fell into official disuseyears ago, many writers and journalists continue to use it to describe SIS.

A number of intelligence operatives have left SIS. Usually they havefound new employment in the civilian world. In late 1990s, an SIS officerRichard Tomlinson was dismissed and later wrote a story of his experiencesentitled ‘The Big Breach’. The British intelligence service housed threats oflegal action to force publishers in several European countries to abandonplans to publish this book.14

In August 2004, both the MI6 and CIA bureau in Кiev had bееn strengthened. Western-sponsored NGOs, such as Freedom House Inc from


______________________________________________________________

175

America, helped to fund аn international оbserver mission to ensure the elections would bе free and fair. Freedom House volunteers went to cafes and рор-соncerts encouraging young people to vote. Western intelligence officers were available for advice and occasional aid. А direct link between reformists within the Ukrainian secret police and MI6 was established via theYushchenko campaign office. А senior Yushchenko official told that earlier in the campaign, а friendly SBU general had bееn assigned to the campaign оffice. Тhe information included а warming about а possible threat to Yushchenko‘s life.15

SIS assists the government to meet these challenges. To do thiseffectively SIS must protect the secrets of its sources and methods NowadaysSecret Intelligence Service try to destroy the myths of their activities. Theirwebsite appeared in 2005. The motivation comes from two related areas.

Firstly, there is a desire to clarify what the organization actually does.The second motivation is a desire to use the website to make it easier forpeople to apply to join the service.

Many of the pages on the site are dedicated to outlining the differenttypes of jobs performed at SIS and providing 'profiles' of people's work. Thewebsite is a recognition that intelligence now sits in a very different positionfrom that of the days of the Cold War and 'spy versus spy'. The arrival of theSIS website is to some extent an acknowledgement of this rising tide ofpublic interest.

Notes

1 EN Pashetsev, Kommunikatsionny menedzhment: strategija uspekha v sovremennom biznese, IM, Slovo, 2007.2 A Hough, UK Terror Threat Raised to ‘Severe’, Home SecretaryAnnounces. Published: 8:37PM GMT 22 Jan 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7056220/UK-terror-threat-raised-to-severe-Home-Secretary-announces.html.3 S Sayenko, British Intelligence Service Marks 100th Anniversary Aug 6,2009, 12:52 Moscow Time, http:// english.ruvr.ru/2009/08/06/273651.html.4 SIS Or MI6: What's In A Name? SIS Website., http://www.sis.gov.uk/output/sis-or-mi6-what-s-in-a-name.html.Retrieved 2008-07-11.5 Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, http://www.bciss.org/.6 Angelu Democratii//Sovetskaya Rossia, N32 (12949), 10 March 2007,http://www.sovross.ru/old/2007/32/32_3_4.htm.7 S Dorril, (2001) MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations London: FourthEstate, ISBN 1-85702-701-9.8 Iraq Inquiry: Blair Claim ‘Separate from Dossier’ Former M16 Boss SirJohn Scarlett has distanced himself from Tony Blair's claim over Saddam


______________________________________________________________

176

Hussein and Weapons of Mass Destruction.http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newsvideo/6767091/Iraq-Inquiry-Blair-claim -separate-from-dossie.html, Published: 8:03AM GMT 09 Dec 2009.9 Machine Translation, The Sunday Times, http://revolution.allbest.ru/programming/00001289_0.html.10 Official Urges Better State PR Campaign, Moscow Times, 10/29/2007.11 Spy Chief: West Wants to Split Russia, http//www.iraq-war.ru/article/143914, 10/10/200712 BI Lyubimov, Obshestvennoje veshanie Britanskaya Model, 2006.13 Internet Protiv Shpionov, http://www.rbcdaily/2007/focus/300091.14 The Big Breach: From Top Secret t o Maximum Security, RichardTomlinson, http://books.imhonet.ru/element/44213/.15 Kak zapad pomogal mugestvennum ludyam Ukrainu, http://censor.net.ua/go/viewTopic--id--132518.

Bibliography

British Intelligence Service Marks 100th Anniversary Aug 6, 2009. 12:52Moscow Time. http://english.ruvr.ru/2009/08/06/273651.html.

Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies. http://www.bciss.org.

Dorril, S., MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations. Fourth Estate, London,2001.

Gossiping Taxi driver Source of Iraq 45-Minute WMD Claim. The Times.December 8, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6948283.ece.

Internet Protiv Shpionov. http://www.rbcdaily/2007/focus/300091.

Iraq Inquiry: Blair Claim ‘Separate from Dossier’. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newsvideo/6767091/Iraq-Inquiry-Blair-claim-separate-from-dossie.html Published: 8:03AM GMT 09 Dec 2009.

Machine Translation in The Sunday Times. http://www.revolution.allbest.ru/programming/00001289_0.html.

Pashetsev, E.N., Kommunikatsionny Menedzhment: Strategija Uspekha vSovremennom Biznese. Slovo, Moscow, 2007.


______________________________________________________________

177

SIS or MI 6: What's In A Name? SIS Website. http://www.sis.gov.uk/output/sis-or-mi6-what-s-in-a-name.html. Retrieved 2008-07-11.

Spy Chief: West wants to Split Russia, http://www.iraq-war.ru/article/14391410/10/2007.

Tomlinson, R., The Big Breach. From Top Secret To Maximum Security.http://www.books.imhonet.ru/element/44213/.

UK Terror Threat Raised to ‘Severe’, Home Secretary Announces.Published: 8:37PM GMT 22 Jan 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7056220/UK-terror-threat-raised-to-severe-Home-Secretary-announces.html.

Svetlana V. Zudochkina – associated researcher at the CommunicationManagement Centre at the Russian-German Graduate School of Management(the Academy of National Economy under the Government of the RussianFederation). Lecturer of the Communication Management specialism at thePR Department of the Faculty of Philosophy, Lomonosov Moscow StateUniversity. E-mail: [email protected]