Vol. II May 1991

CONTENTS

Loving the Other: An Inter-Subjective Alternative to Sartre's

Analysis, Steven Corinth ................................................................... 1

Nietzsche on Description & Interpretation, J. Cruz ........................... 10

Rights, Duties, and the Future, Timothy A. Duffy .............................. 20

Indeterminacy and the Data ofIntrospection, Paul A. Gregory ........ 34

The Pure Ego and Sartre's Transcendence orthe Ego,

James T.I-Iong .................................................................................. 45

Aquinas' Principle ofIndividuation, Patrick Hughes ......................... 54

The editors would like to express their deepest gratitude to the Denison University Research Foundation and to President Michele Myers for assistance from Presidential Discretionary funds. Without their generous financial support over the past two years, publicaLion of lhis journal would not have been possible.

We would also like to gratefully acknowledge Gail Weiss for acting as faculLy advisor for the previous edWon.

Loving the Other: An Inter-Subjective Alternative

to Sartre's Analysis

Steven Corinth

Denison University

My purpose in this essay is to outline a theory of the ontological basis oflove by postulating a structure ofinter-subjectivity which might be compatible with the ontology established by Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness. It is futile to believe that inter-subjectivity-which Sanre rejects-could simply be appended to his analysis. The implications ofany such possibility must be worked out elsewhere. Sanre's account oflove is inadequate, however, without this possibility. My discussion-which considers love to be a paradigm case of inter-subjectivity or being-with-is intended to show three things: first, why inter-subjectivity is necessary to the concept oflove; second, what an alternative to Sanre's analysis would look like; and third, why the theory carmot be immediately dismissed by Sanre's ontology. For the purposes of this essay, the explicit treatment of Sanre's analysis of love must be all too brief.

According to Sartre, "love has for its ideal the appropriation of the Other qua Other (Le., as a subjectivity which is looking at an object)," and "this ideal can be projected only in terms of my encounter with the Olhcras-subject, not with the Other-as-object" (BN: 488), This forrnulationofthe project "to love" is acceptable, for it in itself does not claim that love is nOl a project ofinter-subjectivity. But according to the ontological condition of for-others, to engage "this concrete Other as an absolute reality" means that the only possible relation between the lover and the beloved is the lover's being-as-object (BN: 476). In Sartre's analysis, the project has an internal contradiction: each lover wants the beloved to maintain herself as pure subjectivity in confronting the lover, but as soon as the beloved confronts the lover, she experiences the lover's being-as-subject and assumes her objcctstate.

Because the only mode of relation between the lover and the beloved is the lover's being-as.:.object, the project to love becomes "the project of making oneself be loved" (EN: 488), Since the beloved's freedom is the foundation of the lover's alienated self, this leaves the lover

2 STEVEN CORINTH

suspendedin radical contingency. The lover. therefore. desires the beloved's freedom "first and foremost" to choose the lover as the a priori objective limit to her transcendence (EN: 482). The lover's part in this relation is to fully assume his object state. The relation between them would then be "closed and secured" in the form of the For-itself-In-itself.

The beloved. however, "is a look," and as such cannot "employ [her] transcendence to fix an ultimate limit to [her] surpassings, norcan [she] employ [herl freedom to captivate itself' (EN: 484). As a result, there occurs "the lover's perpetual dissatisfaction" (BN: 491). Even in fully assuming his object-state. the lover still faces the reality ofbeing surpassed for other objects in the world. A pledge of love by the beloved does not satisfy the lover since it is not a real engagement of the beloved's freedom.

What we need to understand from this situation is the futility, the actual absurdity, of "making amove" towards the Other. I cannot meet the Other as subject since this would make an object ofthe Other-and it is the Otherqua freedom I want (Sartre has this part correct). And in assuming my object stale, I deny both the beloved's desire to have me as subjectivity and myown being-as-subject. This ontological conflict actually makes a project which would be comprehensive of the Other qua person-like-me a pure fiction of the imagination; for I only apprehend the Other in her distOlted character. That is, her reing is revealed through the filter of my selfrecognition. As a result, all projects towards the Other are fundamentally self-oriented projects. A project which is comprehensive of the Other-by "comprehensive" we mean a recognition of the Other which is not selforiented-is impossible. This is a distressing result of Sartre's ontology.

Sartre makes reference, quite casually, in his writings to people being in love and to friendships. I do not believe that he wants to destroy these relations for cynical reasons. His concern is freedom and the maintaining of this freedom on an absolute, concrete level. But his ontological system has left him no possibility ofthe being-with, and any sort of "secure" relation with the Other implies a bad faith move to psychologically supersede the Oliginal relation of contlict. As he so triumphantly declares, it is "useless for human-reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: onc must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be transcended by him" (BN: 555).

3 LOVING THE OTHER

I think one must interpret this challenge as a statement that all comprehensive projects towards the Other implicate one in bad faith. Ifthis is the case, then the construction of the For-itself-In-itself is the only possible recourse in attempting to sunnount the conflict or to escape one's gratuitousness because there is "nothing else to do." Thus, Sartre has implicitly infected his own system with an insidious disease which is constantly undercutting the positive effects of the system.

If, on the other hand, we want to consider love as a relation with the Other which is comprehensive of the Other and not merely a project of self, then to fix Sartre's analysis within the framework of being-far-others cannot be fruitful. It is necessary t therefore, to establish a concrete relation of being-with-others. Since being-far-others considers subject to object relations, the being-with will involve subject to subject relations, or intersubjectivity. The problems which plague the lovers in Sartre's analysis are derived from the condition of being-far-others. Iflove can be established on grounds different from the for-others. then the same set of problems cannot be necessarily involved.

In Sartre's analysis, the lover desires to appropriate the Othcr qua Other to make himself be loved. In other words, the lover wanL..:; the beloved's transcendence to be completely occupied in founding him. The alternative, inter-subjective account proposes that to the extent thHt the lover wants to appropriate the Other's freedom, he wants the Other as a subjectivity which is looking at an object which is not the lover because then the beloved's being is not modified by having to directly apprehend the lover. For this to be possible, love must point away from the lovers to what is to be fulfilled if the Other loves me: the "making" oflove. A distinct thi rd element enters the relation: a common object of transcendence which founds the being-with. This third element is not itself contained in the lover's desire for the Other, or in the lover's desire to be loved.

The above requires a distinction between the thematic expression oflove-my love for the Other, and my desire to be loved-and the concrete experience of love-that which is love per sc and which can be considered as Ule criterion by which I know ifthere is anything to support my thcmatized desire. If this distinction is not made, then love is either just desire or just psychology and the project is without direction. With these two meanings of the word "love," one does not have to constantly experience love in order

4 STEVEN CORINTH

to be in love. It also makes sense to say that there is a difference between "loving this person" and "knowing the person you love." The "knowing" occurs in the strict relation of being-far-others; but since the relation is thematized by love, it directs the lovers to the experience oflove-the mode of "being-with."

In my account, the concrete experience of love comes through I

instances ofinter-subjectivity. This does not imply that the inter-subjective experience needs to come prior to the original relation of conflict. Nor does it imply that the experience needs to be ofany certain duration (or that it will happen at all). But it is the inter-subjective experience which provides the objective validity for asserting love thematically. (For the sake of argument, assume that the For-itself-In-itselfwas possible to effect~ then, its construction would be the objective validity for thematic love in Sartre's analysis.) The consequence of this thematic/concrete distinction is that love is very much a thematic expression. Projects thematized by love bring the lovers togetherin pursuing the fulfillment oftheir desire: to experience love intersubjectively in the mode ofbeing-with by undertaking a project together. In these instances they love the Other qua Other.

By inter-subjectivity we mean nothing more than the recognition by one subjectivity of another subjectivity. In as much as the for-itself is a transcending being, this transcendence cannot be directed toward the Other, for this will destroy the Other's being-as-subject. Transcendence, for both, must be directed towards some common third thing. This means that the recognition of the Other qua subject "is effected laterally by a non-thetic consciousness" while "a common action or the object of a common perception" is "explicitly posited" (BN: 535). Direct apprehension ofthe Other's freedom is achieved through the self-recognition ofmy object state. So we can understand that in the lateral apprehension of the Other's freedom I retain my own being-as-subject.

With inter-subjective love, we escape the acute fear which arises in Sartre's analysis because love completely relied on my being-for-the-Other. The introduction ofthe third element (which founds the being-with) does not require the Other's transcendence to have an ultimate limit by being fixed exclusively on me. The instability caused by this impossibility does not occur. The Other does not so much choose me as she chooses "to do " with me. Though it is the case that the "to do with" often drops out of OUf

5 LOVING THE OTHER

speaking and explicit awareness, it is nonetheless necessary. There is an infinite number of ways that our transcendences can be employed in this relation to effect inter-subjectivity. The quality of the inter-subjective experience is the motivation for the two people to stay together under the thematic expression oflove. It is also the motivation for the splitting apart of the lovers-Le., if inter-subjectivity fails to be effected and they are left with an empty theme which does not fit their ontological relation ofconflict. But this does not at all indicate that love is "destructed" in the sense of a structural failure-love either fails to be fulfilled. or it ends.

Importantly, love is not concretely established within the ontological conflict, and. therefore, cannot meet its doom there. The for-others is endured under the thematic expression oflove by the lovers as people. Why, then, is this employment of a pledge not necessarily dissatisfying? For Sartre, the pledge was rejected because it was not a concrete engagement of the Other's freedom in the very "stuff' oflove-the ontological conflict. In my account, the pledge is not used to supersede a necessary conflict, so it does not have the same objectifying and deceptive connotations. Furthermore, a pledge here refers to what can be effected-so it is not, either, deceptive by being an empty concept (though it will be dissatisfying if it turns out to be empirically empty).

Thus far we have not said exactly what inter-subjectivity is orhow it might be compatible with Sartre's ontology. Sartre admits that the intersubjective experience-the experience of a We-is real, but that it is a purely psychological phenomenon occurring in a single consciousness. Such events do not "appear on the foundation of a concrete ontological relation with others"-they are "a question only of a way of feeling myself in the midst of others" (BN: 550). Thus it is a simple psychological trick in which I reject my own personal ends. It is only a "material channeling of my transcendence" (BN: 550). Some might be inclined to accept that we at least have, as humans in love, a psychological salve to soften the ontological conflict. It can be seen, however, that such a psychological answer would most likely be interpreted metaphysically. Few people would be satisfied with actually meaning that there is nothing real between them when they say "itjust feels right." The psychological answer must be taken at its strength-it gives no ontological motive for love, and does not diminish Sartre's account in any way. If inter-subjectivity is to be of any merit, it must be an ontological structure.

6 STEVEN CORINTH

Sartre has three key objections to the concrete reality of intersubjectivity which I intend to accept as conditions for inter-subjectivity. First, he claims that it is strictly dependent "on the various forms of the forothers," making it "only an empirical enrichment ofcertain of these forms" (BN: 553). In accepting this objection, we must admit a sort ofparadox in the nature of the being-with. Being-with is nothing more than me, in my subject state, being for the Other who is also being forme inher subject state. The "distance" ofthe for-others relation allows me to retain comprehension ofmy self-ness and the self-ness ofthe Other. The second objection follows from the first; Sartre claims that the "subjectivities remain out of reach and radically separated" (BN: 550). We want the subjectivities to remain separated, for if they were not, we would have only subjectivity and not inter-subjectivity. Furthermore, it seems to me that the split is radical only in the for-others; in that relation, the subjects suffer their alienated selves constituted by the Other's freedom. But in the being-with, the subjects are in relation "as themselves" and do not experience their alienated freedom. The third objection is that the being-with is dependent upon "particular organizations in the midst of the world" for its super-structure and is therefore capricious and unstable (BN: 550). We have already accommodated this objection by positing the common object of transcendence; also, because of this third element, the inter-subjective experience will be "capricious and unstable," but this is no more remarkable than the metastable of the for-itself.

Keeping these conditions in mind, we need to attempt a characterization of the concrete relation of being-with, or inter-subjectivity. To do this we will consider a comprehensive look, as it is distinguished from the Sartrean look, which is the apprehending of the Other-as-subject through one's object state. The nature of the comprehensive look is such that its direct focus is a common third element while its lateral, non-thetic awareness is the Other's subjectivity. It should also be noted that the look need not be understood only as a look with the eyes; it is the concrete experience in which my being, and the being of the Other, are revealed.

For example, The Other may look at me laterally-she is expecting proofofm y subjectivity by my looking back laterally. The explicit object of her apprehenSion is some common "event." The Other looks with confidence to me. I may have a direct apprehension of the Other's

7 LOVING THE OTHER

subjectivity through my being-as-object. But the look persists, and inasmuch as I am aware of the third element, I cannot then realize myself as object for I feel the Other's transcendence "flowing off' in the direction of that something else. I still must choose my attitude in relation to my beingas-subject-for-the-Other. IfI reject the common object of transcendence, I fix my transcendence directly on the Other, who will then have a direct apprehension of my subject-state through her being-as-object. Or, I can assume my object state by looking away, bringing the Other's look to fall directly upon me; this will destroy the structure since the Other needs my look for proof ofmy subjectivity: she does not want me as an object, or as a subject with a different project.

The experience is most fleeting when it occurs spontaneously without the intentional explicit positing of a third element. Since the third element is not explicitly known or recognized, the structure collapses. There existed only a trace of a common element, but no actual material condition to sustain the structure. Thus we had to fall back on the material conditions that did exist-Le., ourselves simply as for-the-Other. Nonetheless, this is not simply psychological intentionality, for as long as the minimum necessary material conditions exist-Le., the Other, a trace ofsome third element, and myself-the structure can have fleeting life. This indicates that the common object of transcendence must be established concretely, and iliat if this is not done, only then is the structure psychological-then the subjects are not engaging each other as subjectivities, but assuming the Other's perspective of the situation.

In this structure lies the motivation for experiencing love intersubjectively. With the "looking away" the beloved and I become transparent, to be revealed to each other purely in our mutual project. The freedom ofthe Otheris not apprehended as opaque over and against my object-state. Nor is my freedom apprehended opaquely by an objectification ofthe Other. We are not pitted against each other; we are fmally in the mode of beingwith. In this relation, there is a conspicuous lack ofconflict; the metastable applies to the structure as a whole, but does not occur within it.

Ifwe accept this mode of relation, we still need to show why intersubjectivity cannot occur on the ground of individual psychology. Sartre. cannot admit that the ontological condition does not have the power to shatter psychological fabrications; ifhedid, he would not discuss the lovers'

8 STEVEN CORINTH

"perpetual dissatisfaction:" in essence, his ontology would become purely academic. Therefore, if the supposed psychological condition (intersubjectivity) exceeds the ontological condition (conflict), then the psychological situation must still apply in some way to the ontological condition of the being-for-others. The only way available to Sartre for making the application is bad faith.

Bad faith involves intentionality; I deny my situation to escape responsibility. For example, I can deny that I am my hand on the beloved's shoulder so that I do not have to bear the responsibility ofthe consequences it might entail. Or, having engaged the beloved in conversation, I can deny my transcendence-for cowardly or self-serving reasons-and take on the role ofthe lover to become a lover; hence I become a part ofthe deterministic world. I amjustified and do not need to take responsibility forhavingchosen this Other and this situation. This would amount to my rejectingmy personal ends for the ends of this "We." Attitudes ofbad faith are chosen because of something; they are chosen for a reason.

Bad faith, then, cannot apply to the inter-subjective experience, for both lovers freel y choose the action-they take responsibility for it. In this respect, the experience is not unlike acting independently, except that each chooses it in terms ofchoosing itwith the Other-the Other's free choosing is expected and apprehended laterally. Is it possible that one might freely choose it, but the Other might be "of a different mind"? If this is the case, inter-subjectivity fails to happen: one knows the difference, one knows when the Other's "heart is not in it" These are concrete events which are informative, they are not abstractions.

Still, might it be the case that the two are in mutual bad faith by both claiming their transcendence while denying they are their situation? But there is no reason for a denial to occur-there is no reason to deny ei ther their facti city or their transcendences. This objection-which I think Sartre would confidently employ-stems from an assumption which the lovers did not make. If the lovers believed themselves to be "one," then they could act in mutual self-deception by denying their factual separateness and claiming themselves as their possibilities which are expressed and discovered to be the same. This situation is a result of wanting security against the contingencyofthe world-ofwantingto feel themselves to be fated and necessary. But this is a psychological contingency which in no way is necessary to the

9 LOVING THE OTHER

experience of being-with, which presupposes the lovers' factual separateness.

At this point we should see that if inter-subjectivity is not granted on the ground ofa concrete relation ofbeing-with, then any effort to love the Other is an attitude of bad faith in which I attempt to take the Other's perspective ofthe world and myself. It should be clear, however, that intersubjectivity does not involve the lovers' giving up their freedom. Actually. the being-with allows the for-itself to retain his being-as-freedom since he is not required to assume attitudes of bad faith in relating to the Other.

My account oflove is not intended to replace Sartre's analysis. but to add to it. Sartre's analysis is appropriate for many experiences, and can easily be seen as the period of "seduction," or of "trapping" the Otherthough in some muted form, and without the cynical connotation of the phrases just spoken. Furthermore, it should be apparent from this discussion thatthe being-with is not exclusive ofthe being-for. Without the possibility of inter-subjectivity, Sartre's analysis is unable to account for much that does occur in the world under the theme ofbeing a comprehensive relation with the Other-and I do not find rampant bad faith a suitable answer. Nonetheless, my account is not at all meant to exonerate or justify alllhosc who claim to be in love.

Work Cited

Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press, 1966.

Nietzsche on Description & Interpretation

J. Cruz

Williams College

The debate between the realist and the anti-realist is-in a sensethe debate between the possibility of pure passive description versus the necessity ofinterpretation. The realist argues, broadly, that there is a single way the world truly is. Describing this world without the bias of interpretation has been the project of the philosophical realist. The realist hopes to engage in what Nietzsche calls "that general renunciation of all interpretation (of forcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing, falsifying, and whatever else is ofthe essence of interpreting)" (Genealogy afMorals, 587). On the other hand, the anti-realist argues that a reduction of the world into purely factual propositions is impossible; in other words, the anti-realist believes that every proposition about the world involves interpretation, so that a solely descriptive account of reality is impossible. A potential consequence of the anti-realist position is that there is no single 'real' way the world is. By this view there is only the variety ofinterpretive perspectives.

My project is to outline a reading ofNi etzsche that allows us to place him within these two compcting account.;; ofreality. Nietzsche is commonly ignored or misrepresented in contemporary Analytic Philosophy, even though he is often credited (Taylor, 1987) with furnishing some of the most devastating critiques of Analytic Metaphysics and Epistemology. So, my goalis to furnish a miniature map that locates Nietzsche in relation to one of the questions engaged by analytic philosophy. I will attempt a textual analysis that argues-as many might suspect-that Nietzsche is properly an anti-realist because of his view on language and valuation.

Nietzsche and, lately, Foucault are taken as enemies of Analytic Epistemology because they argue that knowledge and the belief-making process is guided by wntingentcultural conditions. Since the conditions are contingent, there is no way to isolate solid criteria for justified-true-belief or whatever. I agree that this is the reason for Nietzsche's distaste for Epistemology, but, left unexamined, it potentially leads to what I take to be misunderstanding (or understatement) of Nietzsche's anti-realist position.

11 NIETZSCHE ON DESCRIPTION & INTERPRETATION

Alan White writes in Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth, "The problem [for Nietzsche] ... is not that there are no facts, but that there are too many facts. There are too many in that not all can be registered, and not all can be interrelated" (48). White argues that human beings are too limited to absorb all possible propositions about the world. This limitation requires that some propositions be taken seriously at the expense of others, and this taking seriously of one proposition over another is an interpretive act, since one must interpret which are the serious facts versus the frivolous facts. Moreover, the interpretive act is fueled and guided by relations of power in a culture.

My worry is that White's account-and accounts like it--of Nietzsche's view offact and interpretation leaves Nietzsche open to attack from a savvy correspondence theorist (Cf). The traditional Cf argues that a sufficiently powerful "viewer" of the world would be able to collect all factual propositions and synthesize them into a single, truthful, perfectly corresponding account of reality. Because Nietzsche's position has to be reconstructed by stressing the limitation ofhumankind, the correspondence theory is left a viable option. Just because human beings now are unable to digest all the facts or see all the interrelations or transcend power relationships, the Cf argument would go, nothing is said against the possibility of a God's eye viewpoint attainable, by, say, expert honest science as it progresses into the future. Recall the position ascribed to Charles S. Peirce: Peirce argued that there was a method-the method of science-that could overcome the limitations inherent in the ways people "fix their beliefs." Where, then, does Nietzsche stand in relation to the objectivity ofscience? (Nietzsche gives us a rough hint when he writes, " ... physics, too, is only an interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, ifI may say so!) and not world explanation; [physics] ... strikes an age with fundamentally plebeian tastes as fascinating, persuasive, and convincing--after all, it follows instinctively the canon oftruth ofeternally popular sensualism" (BGE, 212) .)

If we are to take Nietzsche as a full-blown anti-realist, we must understand how he evades the optimistic realist's challenge, fueled by a position such as Peirce's. In other words, we must investigate whether Nietzsche believes that a God's eye view is presently unattainable or that a God'seyeviewisinprincipalincoherent. My view is the latter. I shall argue that, although White's reading has shown an important sense (pemaps the

12 J. CRUZ

most important sense) in which Nietzsche is an anti-realist, a deeper antirealist tendency can be traced in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Genealogy of Morals. I will also engage the traditional argument against relativism-as some might think that I am painting Nietzsche as a relativist-and show how Nietzsche evades the venerable Socratic charges against the relativist.

The cr argues that the Truth is correspondence between certain linguistic propositions and the way the world really is. In this way, the cr feels that a statement such as "there is a tree" is true if, in fact, a tree is in the area indicated by"there." Nietzsche's Zarathustra is no friend ofthe cr: the correspondence theorist's way of waiting for the truth of the world to come to light is to remain "mere spectators ... Like those who stand in the street and gape at the people who pass by" (237). Zarathustra charges that these 'scholars' are as blind to the (sun)light of truth as someone who never leaves "dusty rooms."

Zarathustra gives a more obvious critique of the cr in the Convalescent. He awakens after confronting his most abysmal thought and marvels at the chattering of his animals:

... Are not words and sounds rainbows and illusive bridges between things which are eternally apart? ... ForMe-how should there be any outside-myself? There is no outside. But all sounds make us forget this; how lovely it is that we forget. Have not names and sounds been given to things that man might find things refreshing? Speaking is a beautiful folly: with that man dances over all things (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 329).

The position Nietzsche is suggesting here argues that although words may bridge the gap between the self (a single limited human perspecti ve) and the world, there can never be a direct correspondence between propositions and observations made by the self and factual features about the world: how should there be any outside-myselfl" Zarathustra wonders. We can reconstruct Nietzsche's argument this way: when anyone uses a word, he or she is creating a link between a sound and the world that in no way 'contains' the feature of the world picked out. How could a sound 'contain' anything but noise? So, if the sound's link to the world is an arbitrary link, there is no reason to suspect that the link specifies the essential, true, eternal nature

13 NIETZSCHE ON DESCRIPTION & INTERPRETATION

of the world. At best the sound allows speakers to "dance over all things." This dancing is not necessarily either careful or precise.

InNietzsche's view, it is impossible in principle that dancing over all things would allow someone to grasp all things unambiguously. Except for the difficult cases ofonomatopoeia, the relationship between sounds and the world is contingent. Moreover, the words themselves are not bridges of steel and concrete. They are not bridges of permanence, but rather bridges made of rainbows and illusions. There is flux in the relationship between words and the world and flux in the meanings of words. " ... The form is fluid," (the relationship between words and the world) "but the 'meaning' [of words considered in isolation from the world] even more so" (Genealogy a/Morals, 514). The argument against the cr has two branches. The first denies the possibility for a word to link-up with reality in any objectively convincing way, and the second denies that any word has a single transcendent meaning. In this way the possibility of a God's eye point of view is negated: the complete set of propositions about the world that God would have can, at best, be made of concepts that have no fixed meaning; even if they did, they could not' contain' all of the features of what they are picking out in the world. Again, the reason the containment is impossible is that there is no way, when naming things in the world, to capture or contain the essential features of the thing in the world. " ... How should there be any outside myself. .. ," that is not accessed via" ... illusive bridges ...."

If it is the case that words are fluid over time, the cr might here attempt to "fix the meaning" ofa word-atleasttemporarily-so that a word can pick out a distinct feature of the world. This would help the cr in her or his project in that it would allow a word with a fixed meaning to 'link to' a fixed reference in the world. Given a very powerful mechanism forlinking all these fixed references in the world, the cr might think that a God's eye perspective is yet possible.

Nietzsche's suggestion is that the gap between words and world is a chasm that cannot be crossed by permanent, solid bridges. In response, the cr attempts to make a word-bridge solid by stipulating the meaning of a word. This is " ... a metaphysician's ambition to a hopeless position ... " (BEG, ~7). Nietzsche evaluates the move to fix a reference as follows: "The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part

14 1. CRUZ

of the rulers: they say 'this is this and this,' they seal every thing and event with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it" (OM, 463), The problem, in Nietzsche's view, is not that a cr cannot fix the reference of a word, but rather that the reference that is fixed is arbitrary. This is another way toward White '8 critique offacts, but it brings out more carefully the plight of the cr. Where the cr attempts to fix the meaning of a word so that it picks out a single thing in the world, what actually happens is that the cr picked out a thing in the world and forced that as a meaning ofa word. Ifthis is the caseif giving names is a lordly right and an act of taking possession-what is taken is chosen arbitrarily by the cr. In practical terms, picking out something in the world and calling it, for example, a tree ends up not fixing any reference: what deteITIlines if the dirt in the five-meter circle around the roots is contained in the word 'tree'; or who decides ifleaves and branches are part of a tree--or if only the trunk (not counting the bark) is a tree?

The problem arises when the cr attempts to use this newly stipulated word to link to reality and to make the claim that it picks out exactly what is really there: ofcourse the word links to a reality, because that reality is just what was put into the word. But filling up a word (fixing a reference) with an arbitrarily chosen thing goes nowhere in showing that lhatmeaning is the single possi ble meaning. At best, fi xing a meaning places inside a word a reference that is relevant to some perspective. And, of course, there is no reason to suspect that this perspective, powerful in its abilily to temporarily fix the meanings ofwords, is able to access the Truth. While the cr thinks that he or she has pursued reality outside the cave, something else has happened in Nietzsche's view .

... purposes and utilities [of words for describing the world] are only signs that a will to power has become master ofsomething less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function; and the entire history of a "thing," and organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous signchain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one another but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion (OM, 513).

NIETZSCHE ON DESCRIPTION & INTERPRETATION 15

Nietzsche elaborates on the position I am ascribing to him by arguing that the meaning of any "thing" or "organ" (or word) is constantly contingent-that the appropriation of language by the cr for a certain purpose is no more legitimate than the appropriation by anyone else to fix the reference in a different way (make the word 'tree', forinstance, describe the juxtaposition ofleaves, branches, trunk, roots and a one-foot deep space of air around the trunk). How the reference is fixed can "succeed ... in a purely chance fashion." Nietzsche's view denies the possibility of some way to describe the world that is essentially more right than any other. Nietzsche argues that even an exact science of giving more complex and complete meanings will fail to get closer to an objective meaning.

The "evolution" ofa thing, a custom, an organ is ... by no means itsprogressus towards a goal ...-buta succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transfonnation for the purpose ofdefense and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions (OM, 514),

So, subduing a word by fixing its reference docs not further the pursuitoftruth as correspondence. All itdoes is su bd ue words in an arbi trary way. This is why White argues that "Even to register a fact then, is to interpret, in that the registering invol ves the singling out ofthat specific fact" (WNL, 48). But this is not solely, as White argues, because there is a necessary exclusion ofother facts. Nietzsche's critique of realism is more serious: even if there was a mechanism-say, science-that could catalog every fact, itis not clear, by Nietzsche's view, what should count as a 'fact'. When any proposition is made about the world and held up as an example ofa' fact' , the words that comprise that proposition are either in flux or have a fixed reference. Ifthey are in flux, then there is no way they can pick out one truthful state of affairs in the world. !fthe meaning of the words is fixed in the way the cr attempts to fix a reference, all that is fixed is one subjective perspective of the world, and thus the proposition does not describe the single truthful state of affairs.

16 J.CRUZ

Traditionally, the cr has held up the curious coincidence between the perception and philosophical descriptions made by many cultures. Surely, argues the realist, if dividing up the world is a purely arbitrary practice, there would be much more diversity in the ways the world is divided up. But the absence of this diversity indicates to the realist that world/word making is not arbitrary. Nietzsche challenges this inference:

The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and Gennan philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is affinity oflanguages, it cannot fail, owing to the common philosophy of grammar-I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical functions-that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation (BOE, ~20).

Nietzsche recommends that one ought not to conclude from cultural coincidences of' facts' that everyone is latching on to some essential, true feature ofLhe world. One ought to conclude from this coincidence only thatthe ways ofdividing up world, as they rely on a 'philosophy ofgrammar', come from very similnr philosophies of grammar and thus look very similar.

Nictzsche's view has serious consequence for science, the traditional tool of the correspondence theorist. Of science, Nietzsche writes, "StricUy speaking, there is no such thing as science 'without any presuppositions' ... a philosophy, a 'faith,' must always be there first of all, so that science can acquire from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to cxist" (OM, 587-88), From the correspondence theorist's standpoint this view of science would be startling. Science is supposed to be the tool by which all references can be fixed and the truth of the world can be told. But in light ofNietzsche'S critique or the CTposition. his view on science is not surprising at all. Science is engaged in the pursuit of a certain kind of thing that it believes-because of the will of some lord of names-to be facts. Even if science could collect all ofthese 'facts', what counted as a fact would itself be arbitrary. Ofcourse, the plight of the scientist is deepened to a third degree when we attempt to make sense of the significance of those things

17 NIETZSCHE ON DESCRIPrION & IN1ERPRETATION

that are called facts. This is White's critique, what I am calling the third critique, of the pursuit of truth: " ... as soon as this truth or fact--or any other-is selectively registered, the problem of interpretation arises once again: what is the significance ofthe fact?" (49). The situation for the realist in Nietzsche'S view is precarious. Truth as correspondence loses its coherence as Nietzsche points out that the bridge between projX)sitions about the world and the world itself are always illusory and tenuous.

A brief recap ofNietzsche's critique ofcorrespondence theory: A) Our only means of describing the world, our only access to the world are subjective states and the words used to describe subjective states. Wordbridges are illusory. B) No description can have a non-arbitrary fixedreference. C) Even if the problems of A and B could be solved, the facts acquired about the world would need to be placed into some system of significance which, by definition, would be subjective (Le. significance to whom?).

If this is Nietzsche's view, one might be tempted to label him a relativist. But ifNietzsche is a relativist, he could fall prey to the venerable critique against relativism that Socrates used againstProtagoras. Forthe rest ofthis paper! will give the framework forperspectivism that Nietzsche more rightly fits into. In the process I will show how perspcctivism evades the critique of Protagorean relativism.

Relativism is the position that every proposition about the world is as correct as any other proposition. According to the relativist, 'truth' depends on your point ofview. When Protagoras articulated a view like this Socrates charged him with an incoherence that is now famous: "How could you, Protagoras, argue that relativism is true ifrelativism argues that nothing is true?"

Relativism seems to be sclf-refuting because if relativism was right, there would be no reason to believe that relativism was right-truth depends on your point of view. Whether or not this critique of Protagoras is devastating is not clear (I think it is not), but the dangeris that Nietzsche may be charged with the same incoherence. Is Nietzsche's perspcctivism just a perspective, no more right than any other-say, the correspondence theorist's-perspective?

Although strict relativism is consistent with Nietzsche's point of view, it leaves no room for objectivity through diversity. This feature of

18 J. CRUZ

objectivity through diversity ofperspectives is the way Nietzsche answers Protagorean incoherence. The relativist seems to throw his or her hands up in the air and proclaim that 'everything is right.' Nietzsche needs to do no such thing, as his view allows for valuations to arise from engaging many perspectives. In an often cited passage from Genealogy, Nietzsche writes,

... let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject'; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as 'pure reason,' 'absolute spirituality,' 'knowledge in itself'; these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, inwhich the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing. only a perspective 'knowing'; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 'objectivity,' be (GM, 555).

The first halfof the quote is the critique of realism that developed in the first halfofthe paper. Alone. it makes Nietzsche sound relativist and thus subject to Socrates' s challenge. The second half ofthe quote illuminates Nietzsche's view by explaining the role of a variety of perspectives. Not every perspective is as right as any other, and the only way to make value judgements between perspectives is to be aware ofthe diversity ofper spectives. Our concepts of a thing is made rich by noting as many ofthe possible perspectives one can. Only in light of this richness is valuation (viz. objectivity) in knowledge possible:

'objectivity' ... understood not as 'contemplation without interest' (which is nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to contro[one'sPro and Con and to dispose ofthem. so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge (GM,555).

19 NIETZSCHE ON DESCRIPfION & INTERPRETATION

So, even though Nietzsche is no realist, he is not a relativist either. This is a way in Nietzsche's view to evade the charge of 'everything is correct.' Valuation is possible, given a diversity ofperspectives on the world-that is, given a diversity in what is considered important and what is considered a 'fact.' The framework for perspectivism is one where many views on the world are weighed in light of the kind oflife a person wishes to lead and the kind ofworld a person wishes to live in. This perspectivism has a strong antirealist tendency, but does not leave the anti-realist helpless.

Works Cited

Nietzsche. Friedrich, "Beyond Good and Evil," in Portable Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin U.S.A., 1977.

____, "Genealogy of Morals," in Basic Writings of Nietzsche.

Translated and Edited by Walter Kaufmann. New York:

Random House. 1977.

____, "Thus Spoke Zarallmstnl," In Portable Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin U.S.A., 1977.

Taylor, Charles, "Overcoming Epistemology," in After PhilQSQQh~. Ed. by Baynes, et. al. MIT: 1987.

White, Alan, Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. New York, New York: Routledge. Chapman & Hall Inc . 1990.

Rights, Duties, and the Future

Timothy A. Duffy

University of Colorado, Colorado Springs

Our age is unique in that we currently possess the technological ability to alter drastically the lives of succeeding generations to an extent never before possible. Within minutes we could effectively destroy allUfe on our planet. While our actions, hopefully, will not be so drastic, there is precious little life on earth not being affected, for better or for worse, by the environmental and social practices of our time. Yet to bemoan this state of affairs is pointless; all history is an account of actions, changes, and effects, and if this be the path to humanity's destruction, it must also be the path to humanity's survival. What we can rightfully deplore, however, is the lack of anticipation and forethought in ourconceptions ofproper action. I am not speaking of the all too common blatant disregard for future conditions in favor of immediate self-interests, but of the lack of a consistent philosophical articulation of any moral obligation we have to humanity as a whole: past, present, and future, even among those highly concerned with social improvement, environmental protection, and the like. To be sure, all conscientious moral theories implicitly provide for a "better" future through theirprescriptions, but ifwe expect our collective actions, cultural practices, and philosophical thought to be moral, in the sense that they serve, in Washington's words, as "a meliorating influence on all mankind," not just for a few days, a few years, or even a few centuries, but absolutely, we must have a clear understanding of the rights and duties concerning the future inhabitants of our planet (qtd. in Tuchman 299).

Philosophically speaking, the issue of rights is extremely complex and controversial. In light of the plethora of uses and misuses of the word "right," both past and present, we must first establish a clear, basic definition of the concepts involved. Basically, a right is most easily understood as a claim. However, as Joel Feinberg points out, this definition is somewhat circular, since a claim is usually defined as something like a right (qtd. in Beauchamp 197). But the idea of a claim is somewhat more useful in that it implies both an activity and a recipient. In other words, a claim is necessarily an action performed by an individual, or group of individuals, with respect to another individual, or group of individuals. Even claims

21 RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND THE FUTURE

upon material objects entail certain relationships with others by restricting or mandating the actions of others with regard to the objects. This act of claiming is essentially a pronouncement of what is "correct" in the relationship between the maker(s) and receiver(s) of the claim. Now, there are, of course, many senses ofthe word "correct," and this is one wayto distinguish among certain types of rights. For instance, the possessor of a legal right may properly claim to judge (or have judged for him) a certain action as legal; the possessor of a moral right has the ability to pronounce (or to have pronounced for him) the morality ofthe relevant activity or state of affairs. In short, a right is a statement of what is. right, or correct, or proper with regard to relationships and associations within a given community: legal, moral, etc.1

Under our current defInition of a right, the source for authority for any such claim, or right, is necessarily found within the elements of the relationship involved in the activity ofclaiming. What this means is that the authority for a right originates in the individual or group upon which the claim is made. And, as before, rights may be further defined and classifIed according to the association which makes them possible. For example, a legal right of a citizen of the United States is based upon the internal rules

I believe that this definition offers a good clue to the philosophical distrust and/or distaste for the concept of rights. A right is often seen as some sort of semi-mystical possession which governs human interaction, and failing to find a proper basis for such governance, philosophers reject the notion of rights, or at least claim that rights are secondary to some other necessary basis for decisions, such as a theory of ethics or justice in general (see Margaret Macdonald, qtd. in Beauchamp 208-210; and Ruth Macklin, qtd. in Beauchamp 214-215). And it is the case that a strong argument can be made that in our present definition of a right assessments of their ultimate value cannot be made any more than "good" or "right" can be defined anywhere without the help of a more fundamental outlook. However, to realize these limitations is not to render the concept or consideration of rights pointless. What an analysis of rights doos allow is a more practical and immediate judgment of the consequences of more general ethical theories. An articulation of rights, within any conLcxt, forces consistent interpretation and formalizes conclusions, which arc two areas of concern which general theory all too often leaves open to dispute. Particularly for our purposes, an articulation of the nature of the rights of future individuals will not so much proscribe specific action as force consideration of future beings regardless of the ultimate standard of "good" employed in any given ethical analysis.

22 TIMOTHY A. DUFFY

of political association present, and the assertion of such a right takes the fonn of a claim upon the United States government for the protection, rectification, or retribution made necessary by a confirmation ofthe right of the claimant. (Similarly. the government may make a claim upon the individual, a right to tax, for instance, to the extent which the formal associ ation between the individual and the government allows.) Other legal rights, likewise, fmd their origin and authority in the applicable political association. Rights involving any sort ofcontract necessarily arise from the association defined by the contract, and those parties involved are hence the makers and receivers of claims regarding that contract. Certain rights may be conferred, even without the consent ofthe recipient, ifagiven association provides for such actions (e.g., children, citizens in a totalitarian state, etc.), and again claims are made upon the issuing authority. Equal rights would be those conferred or agreed to on the basis of some type of equality: as humans, as citizens, as adults, etc. Thus far we have a fairly consistent notion that a right is the statement of a valid claim, in relation to a given association, and that it is from this association that the right derives its existence and meaning. This may not be as lofty and noble conception of rights as some people are used to, in that it portrays all rights as contingent and mutable, but it does not necessarily degrade the rights we possess as individuals who have entered into, or at least accepted, different associations. On the contmry, it makes the rights we do possess, as citizens of the United States, for example. all the more valuable in that they represent a highly evolved and civilized form of association, not merely the longawaited articulation ofsome supposed standard which humans have always been endowed with.2

Here the important question arises: do humans possess any natural rights which exist prior to any social or political associations? If this were the case, a claim concurrent with such a right would have to be made in relation to nature in general.3 Considering the precariousness which dominates the association between m ankind and nature, the only valid claim

Many will no doubt see a danger in defining rights as so contingent and mutable. I admit to this danger, but maintain that it is inescapable, and that only by acceptance of it may we fully guard against it (see Richard Rorty's essay The Contingency of a Liberal Community" in Contingency, Irony, and Sglidarity).

3 By "nature" I mean that physical set of conditions which exists for all humans, regardless of social or cultural associations.

23 RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND THE FUTURE

which one could make, or right which one could possess, would be the right to survive to the best of one's abilities; nature guarantees nothing but a chance, and in some cases a slim chance at that. Yet this simple right to a chance for survival may be more significant than itseems at first glance. For if a human, through his or her action, deprives another human ofthat chance for survival which that individual would have had if notfor his or her actions, has not that which all humans-as creatures of nature-possess been altered, has not a right possibly been violated? Ifa human perishes through the actions of a hungry tiger, the violence of a lightening bolt, or the force ofan earthquake, nothing unnatural has occurred, and hence no natural right could have been violated or moral rule transgressed (assuming, of course, that no other human was responsible for the victim's presence in such dangerous circumstances). But in as much as human action changes the conditions ofan individual's relation to his or hernatural circumstances and lessens the chance for survival which would have otherwise been present, a right may be said to have been violated. Iffhis analysis is correct, it would mean that there is one right which may be regarded as absolute, which applies to all humans by virtue of their being creatures of nature (or, if you prefer, by necessarily existing within a certain range of physical conditions and conforming to certain physical restrictions and standards): each human has a right to survive to the best of his orher abilities. Of course, under the det1nition and theory that the maintenance of a right, yours or another's, is what is. right, if every human possesses this right absolutely, it is restrictive in the sense that no person may rightfully deprive another ofthis right, even in the assertion of his or her own right.

How, then, does this view of rights concern future individuals? Clearly, in as much as most rights are contingent upon associations and/or agreements made, individuals who do not yet exist cannot be said to possess any such rights. True, some current political associations, for instancc, will grant certain rights concurrcnt with the existence of a new individual life, and it certainly seems proper and moral for us to guarantee that those rights which we currently value should be available to new individuals, but they certainly cannot possess them prior to existence.4 However, in as much as any absolute right exists rorall humans regardless of any associations, acase

4 This is true not so much because claims could not be made, although that would be somewhat problematic, but because no association has been fanned.

24 TIMOTHY A. DUFFY

can be made that the right of survival to the best ofone's abilities exists ~ forallindividuals who will come into being,5 In other words, the individuals ofthe future may be said to atemporallypossess arightofsurvival to the best their abilities, free from any hindrance by other individuals, prior to the fact of their existence,6 Hence. the right to survival to the best ofone's abilities is not merely absolute in the sense that every human has, does, and will automatically possess it, but that all humans who do and will exist possess that right at any given time,'

!fthe rightto survival to the best ofone 's abilities exists, what duties or obligations does it entail, if any? First, we should consider the notion of correlative rights and duties in general. Tom Beauchamp summarizes this thesis as follows, "One person's right entails someone else's obligation to refrain from interfering or to provide some benefit, and all obligations similarly entail rights" (202). The standard criticism of this view is that not all rights entail duties and/or that not all duties entail rights. Beauchamp asks, "Such goods as adequate housing, clothing, food, health care, education, and a clean environment populate the United Nations list of 'human rights,' yet does anyone have a corresponding duty" (205)? I would assert that under a definition of rights as valid claims upon associations that an individual deprived ofonc or more of these goods could make a valid claim

Of course, when we enter the world our right 10 survival to the best ofour abilities on our own is not much of a right, but we shall discuss the extent to which other humans are obligated to help us assert our right when we examine correlative duties to this right.

6 As to the metaphysics of possession without being, I would offer that perhaps as an absolute right applies to all humans, it also applies 10 humanity as a whole. And if humanity has a right to survive to the best of its abilities, this right is effectively represented by a conception of the rights of not yet existent humans.

, As to the possession of this universal right by individuals who have died, they have presumably exercised their right to survive to the best of their abilities and failed at some point, thus sacrificing any possible future assertion of that right. This is not to say that their rights may not have been violated during their lives to such an extent that they did die, or that some sort of compensation to humanity should not be extracted fTOm the violators of their rights, but it is to say that any further protection of their right is futile. As Ernest Partridge points out, "The distinction [of rights between the unborn and the dead] follows from the fact that we (or perhaps others) can affect the conditions of life of the unborn, but we cannot alter the completed lives of the dead" (249).

25 RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND THE FUTURE

upon the United Nations and rightfully demand that the situation be rectified to the extent which the association makes such rectification possible. The organizations and agencies of the United Nations no doubt think that they are, to the best of their ability given the limited authority vested in their association with citizens of member nations, working to establish and protect these rights as is their duty. Certainly in a situation where the maintenance of these rights is rendered impossible, members ofthe United Nations consistently appeal to the association as a whole to fulfill a duty to come to their aid. The problem here is that some rights can only be stated as futile claims owing to the lack of authority present in the association responsible for the creation of these rights. This does not mean no duty exists, but that the right itself is insubstantial since a right, as a claim, divorced from effective duty, is essentially empty rhetoric. g Likewise, Joel Feinberg argues that there exist duties which do not correlate with rights. He says, "Duties of charity, for example. require us to contribute to one or another ofa large group ofeligible recipients, no one ofwhom can claim our contribution from us as his due" (qtd. in Beauchamp 204). But what is the origin of these "duties of charity?" Under Feinberg's analysis a "charity judge" could presumably be appointed to go to individuals, in the name of all in need of charity, and reprimand them for not giving to someQne. This idea is absurd: for there simply exists no such duty beyond promises made by individuals explicitly orirnplicitly, by membership in an association. For example, as a Catholic a given person, in the affirmation of his or her religious beliefs, may have acquired a duty to be charitable, and the Catholic Church would then certainly have a right to demand that person fulfill his or her duty and be charitable toward someone in need. In essence, the confusion here is caused by the broad sense ofthe word "duty." Duties exist, as rights do, as the result ofassociations and the ensuing repayment of debts or fulfillment of promises, but we often inappropriately (at least from a strictly philosophical perspective) see the duty as toward the object of the promise, for instance, as opposed to the individual or group to which the promise was made.9

I would, however, agree that these rights are "claimable" only in so far as individuals are involved, through the aegis of their own government, with the U.N., not as humans in general.

26 TIMOTHY A. DUFFY

How does the correlativity thesis then apply to the aforementioned absolute right of survival to the best of one's abilities? An absolute right would have to be correlated to an absolute duty, or a duty which is binding universally, upon all aspects of the association between humanity and nature. In a sense, nature fulfills its duty by being consistent, in that certain actions will, according to the so-called Laws of Nature, always produce certain results. But humans also JX)ssess a duty to 1) survive to the best of their abilities and 2) ensure that others are able to survive to the best oftheir abilities. In otherwords. human beings have an absolute obligation to adopt practices (environmental, cultural, social, philosophical, etc.) which allow all existing, and future existent. human beings to survive to the greatest extent which they are capable ofsurviving. This would necessarily entail the creation and maintenance of the most effective institutions, mechanisms, and associations JX)ssible to maximize the survival possibilities of all humanity. This rather encompassing duty goes beyond a simple principle of non-interference in an individual's "natural" ability to survive because the abilities of the individual in question are, under humanity's absolute duty, to be given every JX)ssib1e chance of manifestation in so far as another individual's possibilities are not mitigated. And to the extenl which nature-as it exists within each human-can act to fulfill this obligation, it is morally bound to do so. Summarily, human beings are absolutely obligated La maximize the survival possibilities contained within other humans, and all future humans, to the extent which the knowledge and ability of those thus obligated permits. Thus a human being, as an absolute possessor of the right to survive to the best of his or her abilities, is also, by the nature ofhis or her humanity and material existence, the embodiment of the absolute duty to protect and promote this same right in the rest ofnature as it exists in other present and future human beings.

9 A further distincLion is oftcn made in this regard, as Mill and Kant have done, in discussions of perfect and imperfect duties. In Mill's case this seems to be just a distinction between what is basically an articulated, legal right (a perfeet duty) and more implicit types of rights resulting from some sort of moral association (imperfeet duties) (see Utilitarianism 48-49). In Kant's case, this distinction secms to reflect a difference between absolute and contingent standards which could be translated as absolute and contingent rights (see Foundations of the Metaphysics of Moral~ 5,39-42). In both cases, the argument for strict correlativity can still be made.

27 RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND THE FUTURE

This admittedly somewhat polemical conclusion may be valid ifwe accept the given definition of a right, a claim, and a duty. But what are the consequences of such a view from an ethical perspective? In order to best answer this question, I shall attempt an analysis ofsome other philosophical positions and evaluate their stance on the problem of rights and obligations concerning the future, and thus demonstrate the implications and meanings of the view set forth above.

Many philosophers have recently maintained that the idea of rights being possessed by the future is not a sound basis for ethical decisions. Richard T. DeGeorge offers three compelling reasons against the idea of "future rights." First, he states, "Future generations by definition do not exist now. They cannot now, therefore, be the present bearer or subject of anything, including rights" (95). On one level, of course, this makes perfect sense, in as much as rights are considered a "possession" equivalent to a material object. But there are numerous cases one can think of that lead to a different conclusion. Ifa baby is born, and there is no clean air for that child to breathe, and he or she dies after a few months, certainly, if there is anything like a right to a chance for survival free from the debilitating effects of another human's actions, it has been violated. Now, the violation, or action which caused an improper situation, could have happened at any time before the birth of the child, but may not have become physically evident until the child was born. We may say, then, that DeGeorge's viewpoint confuses violation of a right with evidence of that violation. Practically, there is little difference, but without a philosophical position which accepts violation as possible before it is evidenced, the prevention of violations would be rendered exceedingly difficult. Under our previous analysis, humanity, as a species, would also possess the right to survive to the best of its abilities, and if future children cannot survive that right has certainly been violated. Whether or not the "possession" ofthe right is actually had by the child before it exist.;; or by humanity as a whole actually, again, makes little difference. For the child of the future effectively serves as the instantiation ofany rights ofhumanity, and thinking in tenns ofthe child possessing rights is the most practical way to ensure nothing is violated.

Secondly, DeGeorge states that "Such future generations could at least in theory be prevented from coming into existence. If they were never produced itwould be odd to say that their rights had been violated. Forsince

28 TIMOTHY A. DUFFY

they do not now exist they can have no right to exist or be produced. Now, they have no present rights at all" (96). Again, if we consider a right of humanity to survive-and thus also a duty to allow, even promote its survival, in the sense of making such survival more likely-we see that preventing future generations from coming into existence m.&lviolates this right of humanity as a whole, and thus the right of every individual which would have existed. Now, ofcourse the objection and/or concern here is the question ofpossible humans verses actual future humans. BryonG. Norton recognizes this problem when he states, "There is a distinction between possibleorpotential individuals and future individuals .... Future people, ... are people who will, in fact exist at some subsequenttime. Itmightbe argued that even possible people have rights, for instance, a right to life... . Hence every avoidable failure ofconception would involve the violation ofa right to exist" (321). The solution to this problem ofdistinction between possible and actual future individuals maybeclarifiedby a restatement ofmyoriginal position. All human beings who will come into existence possess an absolute right to survive to the best oftheir abilities. Likewise, humans have an absolute duty to maximize survival possibilities of every human who comes into existence. Ofcourse, we seemingly have no way ofdistinguishing between possible individuals and actual individuals until they are, in fact, actualized. But, let us consider how they are actualized. For it is through the actions of existing humans that a possible being is made an actual being. Thus, while we do not know ~ will exist 100 years from now, we do have control over, and a duty toward, those beings. And, ifwe are to maximize the survival potentials ofthose beings, as well as humanity as a whole, a large measure of this may be accomplished simply by manipulation oftheirnumber. Basically, what I am arguing here is that our correlative duty to the absolute right ofall individuals to survive to the best of their abilities entails responsible procreation, simply because this is an extremely important way in which we presently affect, through our actions, the lives ofthose future individuals who will exist. This is not the "easy way out" in that, as James L. Hudson says, " ... we can always avoid violating the rights of future people by preventing their coming into existence" (101). Nor does it represent, as Hudson later states. " ... a sort of !!!Q!1ll coereion which is equally illegitimate" since it violates a right to "blameless procreation" (102). Rather, it represents a proper acknowledgment of the right of

29 RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND THE FUTURE

all future humans and our duty towards them. To be sure, there was a time when it was a duty to procreate as much as possible in order to ensure the sUIvival of the race and maximize survival possibilities for the future, but, at present, achieving this same goal defmitely requires different actions.

Derek Parfit raises a similar sort ofobjection in his construction of what has come to beknown as "Parfit' s Paradox." Essentially, he claims that a policy ofhigh consumption of environmental resources, which is clearly not acceptable to us, will produce different future individuals than a more restrained policy would, for a variety of reasons. But those individuals produced under a period of high consumption would not exist but for the depletion of resources, and it would be more against their interests not to exist than to be deprived ofany given resource (qtd. in Norton 322-3). What Parfit's supposed paradox actually does is provide us with a good reason not to blame the past for our difficulties, but this does not abrogate any responsibility we have to the future. Again, it is up to presently existing individuals to maximize the survival possibilities of future humans, whomever they may actually be. It is also up to present individuals to create future humans in a way which does not undermine, in fact which enhances, Lhose same survival possibilities. Thus, high consumption would entail a responsibility to low procreation, which may be necessary owing to already committed acts of high consumption. But, such a continued policy obviously jeopardizes Lhe survival of humanity as a whole thus violating everyone's rights.

Another aspect of Parfit's argument will be dealt with in considering the final point of DeGeorge. His third objection is that "Speaking of the rights of future generations as if Lheir rights were present rights ... leads to impossible demands on us" (97). Essentially, he states that iffuture person..

30 TIMOTHY A. DUFFY

perfectly possible for the full exercise ofhuman potential wi thout its use. If we, therefore, deplete the supply of uranium, we are not necessarily violating any right held by future individuals, cxCcpt in so far as we bring them into a world which. Wcause of over,population. destruction of other environmental resources. Of just plain stUpidity. we make the usc of such a non-renewable resource nec~ssaty for their survival. In other words, if we construct a society which depends on crude oil for its functioning, and make no provisions for the inevitable depletion of that resource, and thus leave individuals 200 years from now faced with the well-nigh impossible task of a total, sudden restructuring ofsociety once the oil runs out, wehave violated their rights by failing to maximize their survival potential to the extentwhich we could have done so without adversely affecting our own survival. Certainly, this is an awesome duty to live up to, made no less difficult by the actions ofour predecessors, but it certainly does not paralyze us to the point of inaction.

There are, however, some philosophers who have suggested ways in which "rights of the future" may be made more plausible. Bryon Norton suggests that it is the individualistic nature of basic rights theory which causes most of the problems which arise in any discussion of rights of future beings. He says, for instance, "Indeed Rousseau's ethical categories. where the General Will (the interests of an organic community not reducible to individual interests) is sharply distinguished from the will-of-all (the aggregated interests ofindividuals), may be revived as an important possibility in modem ethics" (337). This approach, also, would have some problematic aspects. Namely, that the classical liberal tradition responsible for so much of basic concept of rights in general lacks a vocabulary of discussion removed from the cases of individual interactions and individualistic assertions of rights. But Norton definitely has a point. For instance, in my arguments above, I often mentioned a right of humanity to survive as a species to the best of its abilities that somehow went along with an individual's right to survive to the bcstofhis or her abilities-in as much as the species and the individual are both objects of the ubiquitous set of conditions and circumstances we call nature. Perhaps what is needed is an articulationofa "species right" somewhat along the linesofMarx's "species being." But I believe my position stands well enough without such an articulation in as much as my considerations of future rights are based only

31 RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND THE FUTURE

upon what I have taken to be an absolute right-ne which categorically applies to all instances ofhumanity, and which thus may be said to apply to humanity as a whole.

Rolf Satorius also maintains the existence of the rights of future individuals. He states quite simply that"~generations ofcourse do not existllQ.S,; they have no interests now, vital or otherwise, and they can make no claims upon us. But the nature of the vital interests they will have is a valid basis for claims upon us as to how we oUght to behave" (197). And he even goes so far as to say, " If ~have a right that government protect Ql!! right through an effective exercise of the guardianship with which it is entrusted, ~ have a similar right. My suggestion is that judicial recognition of that right may be required to full secure it" (201). I believe his statements to be plausible in that he implies that a denial of future rights would probably entail a denial of rights absolutely, since there would be no denying the fact that it makes no sense to claim for ourselves what we will not grant to others who will be in the same situation. His suggestion oflega! representation does, however, bring up an interesting problem. Any consideration of rights of the future entails some sort of knowledge about future conditions and the future consequences of present actions. Our knowledge in this area is obviously limited and conditional, so how can we insure an effective basis lor decisions? Just as our duty to the future entails responsible procreation, I maintain that it also entails responsible investigation. By that I mean we must, to the full extent ofour abilities, seek to know the possible and probable consequences of our actions. Ignorance of the scope to which a right is being infringed upon does not mean it has not been violated. Although responsibility may certainly be mitigated in this way. it may only be lessened to the point to which possible investigation was done concerning the effects of present actions. Basically, we have a duty to know as much as we can so as to maximize both present and future survival possibilities. But, the ultimate 1ack of certainty in dealing with the future can not be conscientiously turned into a denial ofcither rights or responsibilities; it can only be turned into reasonable caution.

Before concluding, I would add a word about the quality of that survival which results from the exercise of a human's right to survive to the best of his or her abilities. There are, of course, many forms of "survival" which no one would wish upon the future. But a guarantee of a chance for

32 TIMOTHY A. DUFFY

survival is not enough to fulfill our duty toward the future, for it must be a survival free from any sort of deprivation (environmentally, culturally, socially) caused by current action or practice. For to the extent which we deprive future individuals of choice, possibilities, and freedom of action, we shall deprive them of that which is the unconditional due to all humans-a fighting chance. Ofcourse, some impositions are inescapable because ofthe simple fact that our existence always takes place within a given context, but contextual restraints are not the same as negligent deprivations. For humans are also bound to their own struggle for survival, but within our own struggling, we are not simply struggling for ourselves, but for the future as well.

We have seen how the adoption of a certain conception of rights as claims leads to both an accountofthe contingency of most of what we speak of as "rights," and to the fundamental nature ofa right to survive to the best of our abilities--as individuals and as a species. We have seen how this absolute right entails an absolute obligation, not only to other recognizable beings, but to all beings who do or will exist, since they will unconditionally possess the same right. And we have seen how this position answers some of the problems inherent in a philosophical clarification in an area of increasing concern in our lifetimes. Indeed, there are no doubt other conceptions of responsibility to the future which could serve in this capacity (theological duties, for instance), but these arguments tend to be weak in the sense that we have trouble even applying their consequences to the present, let alone the future. My point is this: in our lives we presently invoke the notion ofrights a great deal, reflecting the fact that our mind-set is somewhat comfortable with their use. This is not to say rights theories are free from problems and contradictions by any means; it is merely to say that a rightsbased account ofresponsibility toward the future may be whatis needed to actualize and vivify our increasingly necessary concern with the ethical repercussions of our actions, not just within a currently existing moral community, but within the spectrum of human existence as a whole.

33 RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND THE FUTURE

Works Cited

Beauchamp, Tom L. Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1982.

DeGorge, Richard T. "The Environment, Rights, and Future Generations," in Ethics and Problems of the 21~Century. ed. K.E. Goodpaster and K.M. Sayre. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979.

Hudson, James L. "Rights and the Further Future," Philosophical Studies. 1986: 99-107.

Kant, Immanuel, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Lewis White Beck. New York: Macmillan, 1959.

Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Edited by George Sher. Indianapolis; Hackett, 1979.

Norton, Bryon G. "Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future Generations," Environmental Ethics. Winter 1982: 319-338.

Partridge, Ernest, "Posthumous Interest

Indeterminacy and the Data of Introspection

By Paul A. Gregory

Syracuse University

I

In his article "Indeterminacy. Empiricism, and the First Person",l John Searle attempts to show that W.V. Quine's indeterminacy thesis provides a reductio ad absurdum of linguistic behaviorism. Linguistic behaviorism understands linguistic acts in terms of stimulus situations which create dispositions to verbal behavior. The indeterminacy thesis, a result of this linguistic behaviorism, states that there is no fact of the m alter which determines the correct translation of any term of a language into another language. That is, there will be a number of coherent yet mutually incompatible translations of any language into another. Searle, believing that there is determinate meaning, maintains that Quine's argument. and therefore linguistic behaviorism, must be flawed. In order to make this point, Searle invokes the first person point of view. Such introspective evidence. he claims, demonstrates the obvious absurdity ofthe thesis and the resulting concept of inscrutable reference.

I will attempt to show that linguistic behaviorism can easily account for this introspective data without abandoning indeterminacy. I also hope to make evident the reasons why Searle's objection, as well as ones similar to it, are at first glance so intuitively compelling. Before considering Searle's position, however, let us briefly outline the indeterminacy thesis and its logical results.

II

In order to isolate and examinc meaning, Quine begins by describing a situation ofradical translation. In such a situation, though the linguistic utterances of one language differ greatly from those of the other, meaning is somehow preserved in translation. Examining the evidence by which a linguist arrives at a viable translation, then, will lead to an objective,

lSearle, "Indetenninacy, Empiricism, and the First Person" (The Journal of Philosophy, March, 1987).

INDETERMINACY AND THE DATA OF INTROSPECfION 35

empirical rendering of meaning. Since "All the objective data he [the linguist] has to go on are the forces that he sees impinging on the native's surfaces and the observable behavior, vocal and otherwise, of the native,"2 Quine does not posit some intentional definition of linguistic meaning. Instead, he takes a behavioristic point of view by concerning himself with "language as the complex ofpresent dispositions to verbal behavior". 3 The actual internal processes by which such dispositions come about after a given stimuli are irrelevant for two reasons. First. they are unobserv able and therefore cannot be part ofan empirical project. Second, they will vary from person to person within a linguistic community, yet a uniformity ofcommunication will reSUlt, indicating their future irrelevance to the project. 4 Thus, meaning in the intuitive sense is redefined as stimulus meaning: the class of all non-verbal stimulus situations in which a speaker would assent to a query about a term contrasted with those situations in which the speaker would dissent.

The example of radical translation that Quine uses is that of the imagined native term 'gavagai.' A linguist in a foreign land has just witnessed a rabbit scampering across the trail, and the native she was with has shouted "Gavagai!" while pointing towards the rabbit. Thus, the linguist may hypothesize that the one word sentence 'Gavagai!' translates into the English sentence "A rabbiU" (or, simply, "Rabbit!"). Then thelinguistmay question the native while presenLinghim with various stimulus situations, in order to zero in on the stimulus meaning. If the stimulus meaning of 'gavagai' is the same as the stimulus meaning of 'rabbit', then she may translate 'gavagai' as 'rabbit' in English.

Indeterminacy comes in when it is realized that there may be more than one translation of the native's sentence into English which fits with the totality of stimulus situations. Two examples which Quine uses are 'undetached rabbit part' and 'stage in the life ofa rabbit'. If' rabbit' hac;; the

2Quine, Word and Object. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1960), p.28.

3Ibid. p.27. 40n page 8 of W & 0 Quine illustrates this point masterfully: "Differ

ent persons growing up in the same language are like different bushes trimmed and trained to take the shape of identical elephants. The anatomical details of twigs and branches will fulfill the elephantine form differently from bush to bush, but the overall outward results are alike."

36 PAUL A. GREGORY same stimulus meaning as gavagai', then so would these other two translations, because they have the same stimulus meaning as 'rabbit'. Stimulus meaning being the only evidence admissible, there is no way to determine which translation is the correct one. Thus, the linguist (or a number oflinguist working separately) could arrive at a number of translations, all of which facilitate communication, but which are not compatible with one another.

To illustrate this point imagine two linguists, each independently working opposite sides of a village, yet unaware of each other. After each has painstakingly formulated a manual of translation they chance to meet. One night about the campfire the two enterinto a conversation with the same native. After each of the native's utterances the two riffle through their respective manuals, arrive at English translations (separately), formulate (separate) responses in English, translate the responses back into the native's language, and finally each responds to the native. The three have an intelligent and entertaining (albeit arduous) conversation. Thus we see that both translations are coherent. Ifthe two should decide to compare notes afterwards, however, they will be surprised to find that while the one linguist believed they were having a conversation about the native's religious beliefs, the other believed they were having a conversation about particle physics. Even greater confusion would have ensued if the linguists had compared notes during the conversation orhad jointly attempted to translate the native's utterances.

While this example may seem slightly exaggerated in order to demonstrate the mutual incompatibility ofthe two translation schemes, such an incompatibility will nonetheless exist. It must be stressed that I am working with what might be called a "strong" conception ofindeterminacy. That is, I do not view indeterminacy as simply the possibility of a certain amountof"play" in translation. I expect that Searle would not object to that view. Instead, I understand indeterminacy as expressing the possibility of a number of different configurations of utterance/stimulus-situation correspondences, while still accounting for all dispositions to verbal behavior (Le., preserving effective communication). Further, there is no fact (knowable or otherwise) that will determine a "correct" cOnfiguration.5

5There is, of course, a debate over the "extenl" or "range" of indeterminacy. For further work in this area see Jonathan Bennett,Linguistic Behavior; or Mark Lance, "From a Normative Point of View."

INDETERMINACY AND THE DATA OF INTROSPEcrION 37

A second result ofthe behavioristic stance which Quine takes is the inscrutability of reference. Because there is no fact of the matter about whether the native's term 'gavagai' is correctly translatable as 'rabbit', 'rabbit stage' , or 'undetached rabbit part', there can be no fact of the matter about what, exactly, he is referring to. The only objective fact is the totality of stimulus situations in which he would assent to our lingu