Vietnam War in Retrospect

Strategy of Revolutionary War

1954-1965: Phase I (guerrilla warfare)

• 1961-1965: Heated Politburo debate on transition

1965-1967: Phase II (guerrilla & conventional warfare)

• Increased large unit actions (Ia Drang, Khe Sanh)

Tactical Victory

1968 (early): Phase III (Tet Offensive) (conventional warfare)

• Military disaster (VC destroyed)

• “General Uprising” did not occur

• Strategic victory for the Communists none the less

, Strategic Defeat

• For US:

What went wrong in Vietnam?

“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American colonel.

Conversation 25 April 1975 in Hanoi between Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., then Chief, Negotiation Division, U.S. Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team, and Col. Tu, North Vietnam (DRV) Delegation

The North Vietnamese colonel pondered his remark for a moment. “That may be so,” he relied, “but it is also irrelevant.”

In 1975, at negotiation talks in Hanoi, a US colonel and an NVA colonel met. After a period of silence, the American spoke.

What Went Wrong?

US had no clear strategy in Vietnam

• Never mobilized the American people

• Never committed sufficient force to win

• Never defined what “win” meant

What Went Wrong?

• Interviewed senior officials, military and civilian:

After Tet offensive, LBJ “removed” McNamara• February 29, 1968; became president of World Bank

Clark Clifford new SecDef

Summers

• none of them could tell him what constituted victory in Vietnam

• found that US had no military plan to win war

What is War?

War is not an extension of politics, as Johnson thought.

War begins when politicians cannot achieve their goals through negotiations.

Gary Showalter“The Misunderstood Object of War”

Timeline

7 Aug 64 Tonkin Gulf Resolution

Operation Rolling Thunder (bombing of North) begins

Marines land at Da Nang

Siege of Khe Sanh begins

Tet Offensive begins

Nixon becomes president, begins “Vietnamization”

Heavy bombing of Hanoi, Haiphong (Operation Linebacker II)

US, North Vietnam sign cease-fire in Paris

Last US troops leave South Vietnam

Congress votes to cut funds for SEA ops after 15 Aug 73

Saigon Falls

2 Mar 65 8 Mar 65

31 Jan 68

20 Jan 69

18-29 Dec 72

27 Jan 73

29 Mar 73

29 Jun 73

30 Apr 75

Early 1960’s NVA troops begin moving into South Vietnam

Spring 67

Significant Events in Vietnam War

The Ending

US Exit from Saigon

30 April 1975

What went wrong in Vietnam?

Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it.

-- George Santyana (1863-1952), 1905

McNamara on Vietnam

YouTube (5:26)Robert McNamara (1916-2009)

Recorded 2002

Lessons Learned from Vietnam War

Weinberger Doctrine

• Secretary of Defense under President Reagan

• Drafted by his military assistant, Colin Powell

"The Uses of Military Power"

Caspar W. Weinberger

National Press Club, Washington, D.C.

Nov. 28, 1984

• The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . .

Weinberger Doctrine

• If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning . . . .

• If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives . . . .

• The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary . . . .

• Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress . . . .

• The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

What Would Weinberger Do?How would US decision to fight in Vietnam have stood up against the test of the Weinberger Doctrine?

Vital to our national interest?

Clear intent to win?

Clearly defined political & military objectives?

Objectives, forces committed continuously reassessed?

Support of the American people?

Last resort?

What if …

“I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, ‘an enemy of the people’ which has the sympathy and covert support of the people."

Senator John F. KennedySpeech to the US SenateApril 6,1954

Source

Course Overview

Review