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Vertical Integration and Firm Productivity
Hongyi LI∗ Yi LU† Zhigang TAO‡
This version: November 2015
Abstract
This paper uses three cross-industry datasets from China and other
developing countries to study the effect of vertical integration on firm
productivity. Our findings suggest that vertical integration has a neg-
ative impact on productivity, in contrast to recent studies based on
U.S. firms. We argue that in settings with poor corporate governance,
vertical integration reduces firm productivity because it enables inef-
ficient rent-seeking by insiders.
Keywords: Vertical Integration; Firm Productivity; Instrumental
Variable Estimation; Panel Estimation; Rent-Seeking; Corporate Gov-
ernance
JEL Codes: L22, D23, L25
∗UNSW Australia, [email protected]†National University of Singapore, [email protected]‡The University of Hong Kong, [email protected]
1
1 Introduction
This paper examines the impact of vertical integration on firm productiv-
ity. To do so, we analyze two different cross-industry datasets of Chinese
manufacturing firms and another dataset of firms in developing countries.
We find that firm productivity, as measured by labour productivity, is
negatively correlated with vertical integration in each of our datasets. Taken
together, our results are in contrast to recent empirical findings, largely based
on U.S. data (e.g., Hortacsu and Syverson, 2007; Forbes and Lederman, 2010)
that vertical integration improves firm efficiency. Later in the paper, we pro-
pose a simple explanation for the negative relationship that we observe in
our data: in developing-country settings characterized by poor legal protec-
tions for firms’ investors, vertical integration serves as an inefficient means
for parties in control to extract private benefits.
A number of issues arise when estimating the causal impact of vertical
integration. One concern is a mismeasurement problem: the extent of verti-
cal integration may be mismeasured in conventional (indirect) measures for
vertical integration such as the value-added ratio. A second concern is an
endogeneity problem:1 simple correlations may not capture the true impact
of vertical integration because the vertical integration decision is endogenous
to unobserved factors such as task difficulty. For each of our three datasets,
we take a distinct approach to address these issues.
Our first dataset is based on a 2003 World Bank survey of Chinese manu-
facturing firms. One key feature of this dataset is a direct measure of vertical
integration: the percentage of parts that are produced in-house. This mea-
sure allows us to avoid the mismeasurement problem associated with indirect
measures of vertical integration. Further, we use the degree of local purchase
(a proxy for the extent of site-specificity) as an instrument for vertical in-
tegration. Both OLS and IV estimates indicate that the degree of vertical
integration is negatively correlated with firm productivity.
Our second dataset is based on comprehensive annual surveys of Chinese
industrial firms between 1998 and 2005. Here, we rely on the value-added
ratio as a measure of vertical integration. To control for the fact that the
value-added ratio may potentially vary with the nature of production, we
perform our analysis with a detailed set of 4-digit industry dummies, and then
with firm dummies. To further control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, we
1Gibbons (2005) aptly labels this the ‘Coase-meets-Heckman’ problem.
2
exploit the panel structure of the dataset to study how within-firm variation
in vertical integration over time correlates with firm productivity. We find,
as above, that the degree of vertical integration is negatively correlated with
firm productivity.
Our third dataset draws upon a series of World Bank Enterprise Surveys
in six developing countries (i.e., Brazil, Ecuador, Oman, the Philippines,
South Africa and Zambia) from 2002 to 2006. It contains firm-level sur-
vey information about changes from outsourcing to in-house production of
major production activities. First-difference estimation shows that bringing
major production activities in-house leads to a decrease in firm productivity,
consistent with our findings from the other two datasets.
Our results do not constitute a “smoking gun” for causality. However, our
finding of a negative relationship between vertical integration and firm pro-
ductivity is consistent across datasets and econometric specifications. In par-
ticular, two of our datasets allow for tight empirical identification of within-
firm variation in vertical integration, which is relatively rare in such cross-
industry studies. Taken as a whole, our results provide suggestive evidence of
a general negative relationship from vertical integration to firm productivity
in the developing-country context.
In light of our empirical results, we develop a simple, stylized model
where vertical integration increases firm insiders’ ability to extract private
benefits, and thus strengthens their incentives to engage in expropriatory
activities. Consequently, in poor legal environments where insiders can easily
expropriate, vertical integration has a negative effect on firm productivity.
The model thus provides a potential causal mechanism to explain why vertical
integration may be associated with lower productivity.
On the other hand, when corporate governance is strong and expropria-
tion is difficult, our model predicts that vertical integration improves insiders’
incentives to make productive investments, and thus has a positive effect on
productivity. This model allows us to reconcile existing findings of a positive
relationship between vertical integration and firm productivity in the U.S.
(where investors’ legal protections are strong) and our findings of a nega-
tive relationship in China and other developing economics (where investors’
protections are relatively weak).
This paper is part of a developing literature that studies the relationship
between vertical integration and organizational outcomes.2 In particular, and
2A number of other papers study the impact of vertical integration on market outcomes.
3
in contrast to our results, a number of papers find a positive relationship be-
tween vertical integration and organizational productivity. We discuss these
papers briefly, but first we note a key distinction between these papers and
our analysis: these papers mostly study U.S. firms (and other developed-
country settings), whereas we study China and other developing countries.
We argue in Section 4 that differences in corporate governance between de-
veloping and developed countries may explain the differences between their
results and ours.
Gil (2009) exploits a natural experiment in the Spanish movie industry
to show that vertically integrated distributers make more efficient decisions
about movie run length. Forbes and Lederman (2010), studying U.S. air-
lines, find that vertical integration increases operational efficiency. David,
Rawley, and Polsky (2013), studying U.S. health organizations, show that
integrated organizations exhibit less task misallocation and produce better
health outcomes relative to unintegrated entities. Besides the distinction be-
tween developed- and developing-country settings, these papers focus on a
single industry, whereas our data allow us to draw broader conclusions about
the integration-productivity relationship across manufacturing firms.3
Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2014) systematically document differ-
ences between integrated and non-integrated U.S. manufacturing plants.4
Perhaps most interestingly, they find that vertical integration is associated
with higher firm productivity, but argue that this relationship is due to a
selection effect (more productive firms happen to be larger, and larger firms
tend to be more vertically integrated), rather than a causal effect of vertical
integration.5 Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2014) also find that verti-
Chipty (2001) argues that vertical integration results in market foreclosure in the cable
television industry, and that such foreclosure actually improves consumer welfare. Gil
(2015) shows empirically that vertical disintegration results in higher prices for movie
tickets, and attributes this change to a double marginalization effect.3More broadly, limited by data availability, existing studies of the integration-
productivity relationship are generally industry-specific (e.g., Levin, 1981; Mullainathan
and Scharfstein, 2001).4See Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) for a related analysis of cement manufacturing
plants in the U.S.5They write, “ these disparities [between vertically integrated plants and non-integrated
ones] ... primarily reflect persistent differences in plants that are started by or brought
into firms with vertical structures. In other words, while there are some modest changes
in plants’ type measures upon integration, most of the cross sectional differences reflect
selection on pre-existing heterogeneity.”
4
cal ownership structures do not imply substantial production linkages (i.e.
in-house shipments) from upstream divisions to downstream divisions, thus
challenging conventional notions about vertical integration. We skirt this
issue by instead using the proportion of in-house production as a measure of
vertical integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. Data, variables and estimation strategies
are described in Section 2, and empirical findings are presented in Section
3. Section 4 analyzes a simple model of the relationship between vertical
integration and firm productivity. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data Sources and Variables
In this study, we conduct three separate analyses, using three different cross-
industry datasets (i.e., two within-country datasets and one cross-country
dataset). We tailor a distinct econometric strategy for each dataset, based
on the associated data limitations.
The dependent variable in this study is a measure of firm productivity.
Across our three datasets, we focus on labour productivity as a simple, stan-
dard measure of firm performance. Following Hortacsu and Syverson (2007),
we measure labour productivity as the logarithm of output per worker (de-
noted by Labour Productivity). Table 1 presents summary statistics. The
mean and standard deviation of Labour Productivity are 4.322 and 1.562,
respectively, for the first dataset (the SCE), and are 4.917 and 1.193, respec-
tively, for the second dataset (the ASIF).6 The mean and standard deviation
of Change in Labour Productivity for the third dataset (the PESPIC) are
0.154 and 0.799, respectively.
There are two key challenges in investigating the causal impact of vertical
integration. First: in datasets where the vertical integration decision is not
directly observed, conventional proxies may mismeasure the extent of vertical
integration. For example, the value-added ratio is used extensively in the
literature as a measure of vertical integration, but may be sensitive to the
stage of the production process in which a given firm specializes.7
6While both the first and second datasets are about Chinese manufacturing firms, mean
productivity in the ASIF is higher than that in the SCE, presumably because the ASIF
covers non-state-owned enterprises above a certain sales threshold.7Specifically, the value added ratio is generally lower for firms specializing in later stages
of the production process (Holmes, 1999).
5
Second: the degree of vertical integration is endogenous to transaction
difficulty. In particular, Gibbons (2005) argues that integration is compara-
tively advantageous at high-difficulty transactions (which are likely to pro-
duce inefficient outcomes relative to the first-best), and thus that simple
correlations should naively produce a negative relationship between vertical
integration and firm productivity.
The rest of this section describes of each of our three datasets and briefly
summarizes the associated econometric strategy.
Survey of Chinese Enterprises
The Survey of Chinese Enterprises (SCE) was conducted by the World Bank
in cooperation with the Enterprise Survey Organization of China in early
2003. The SCE consists of two questionaires. The first is directed at senior
management, and focuses on enterprise-level information such as market con-
ditions, innovation, marketing, supplier and labour relations, international
trade, finances and taxes, and top management. The second is directed at
the senior accountant and personnel manager, and focuses on ownership, var-
ious financial measures, and labour and training. A total of 18 Chinese cities
were chosen, and 100 or 150 firms from each city were randomly sampled from
the 9 manufacturing industries and 5 service industries.8 In total, 2,400 firms
were surveyed. We focus on the sub-sample of 1,566 manufacturing firms, for
which our instrumental variable for vertical integration can be calculated.
The SCE dataset contains a survey question explicitly designed to mea-
sure the degree of vertical integration: “what is the percentage of parts used
by the firm that are produced in-house (measured by the value of parts)?”
Our measure of vertical integration, Self-Made Input Percentage, is based on
the response to this question. As a direct measure of vertical integration, Self-
Made Input Percentage avoids many of the mismeasurement issues associated
8The 18 cities are: 1) Benxi, Changchun, Dalian and Haerbin in the Northeast; 2)
Hangzhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen and Wenzhou in the Coastal area; 3) Changsha, Nan-
chang, Wuhan and Zhengzhou in Central China; 4) Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming and
Nanning in the Southwest; 5) Lanzhou and Xi’an in the Northwest. The 14 industries are:
1) manufacturing: garment and leather products, electronic equipment, electronic parts
making, household electronics, auto and auto parts, food processing, chemical products
and medicine, biotech products and Chinese medicine, and metallurgical products; and
2) services: transportation services, information technology, accounting and non-banking
financial services, advertising and marketing, and business services.
6
with the conventional alternatives.9 However, this measure is self-reported
and subjective: managers at different companies may have a different under-
standing of what constitutes an input, or how to enumerate parts. In fact,
Self-Made Input Percentage is reported to be 100% for some firms and zero
for others, resulting in substantial amounts of noise: the variable has a mean
value of 0.339 and a standard deviation of 0.401. Consequently, industry
dummies are included in the regression analysis; this mitigates the subjec-
tivity problem because amongst firms in the same industry, managers have a
more or less common understanding of what constitutes parts used in their
production activities.10
Because our variation in Self-Made Input Percentage is cross-sectional,
endogeneity problems may arise from unobserved permanent firm-level het-
erogeneity. In response, we instrument for Self-Made Input Percentage using
Local Purchase: the ratio of inputs purchased from the province where the
firm is located to all purchased inputs. The argument underlying this choice
is that firms with higher site-specificity (as measured by Local Purchase)
vis-a-vis their suppliers are more vulnerable to hold-up,11 which leads to a
9We consulted with the designer of the SCE, who explained that the rationale for
including a survey question on the degree of vertical integration was precisely because of
the well-known problems associated with the conventional measure of vertical integration.10The actual survey was carried out by the Enterprise Survey Organization of China’s
National Bureau of Statistics – an authoritative and experienced survey organization.
Further, as far as we are aware, the survey participants did not raise any issues about
potential ambiguity of the question on vertical integration.11Site specificity could go hand in hand with asset specificity. For example, an electricity-
generating plant located next to a coal mine may adjust its production technology to suit
the quality of locally-obtained coal, which may lead to severe holdup problems ex-post.
Nonetheless, we control for input specificity in one of our robustness checks and find similar
results.
Moreover, even in the absence of asset specificity, monopolistic suppliers may hold up
their nearby customers by demanding higher prices because such customers would have
to pay higher transport costs if purchasing from alternative and more distant suppliers.
Indeed, BHP and Rio Tinto of Australia demanded extra price increases for iron ore pur-
chased by Chinese steel makers in 2005 and 2008 respectively, simply because they are
geographically closer to China than is CVRD of Brazil, despite the same free-on-board
prices of iron ore applying (Png, Ramon-Berjano, and Tao, 2006, 2009). Subsequently,
many Chinese steel makers have been trying to acquire iron ore mines in Australia. Mean-
while, within China, due to high transport costs and local protectionism, both of which
inhibit cross-regional trade, firms have limited options other than purchasing locally, which
further exacerbates the holdup problems associated with local purchases.
7
higher degree of vertical integration; see, e.g., Williamson (1983, 1985).12
Annual Survey of Industrial Firms
The Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) was conducted by the Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics of China during the 1998–2005 period. This is
the most comprehensive firm-level dataset in China; it covers all state-owned
and non-state-owned industrial enterprises with annual sales of at least five
million Renminbi.13 The number of firms varies from over 140,000 in the
late 1990s to over 243,000 in 2005. This panel dataset allows us to exploit
within-firm time-series variation in the degree of vertical integration, thus
eliminating any potential endogeneity problems due to permanent firm het-
erogeneity.
The ASIF consists of standard accounting information on firms’ opera-
tions and performance. Our analysis of the ASIF dataset thus relies on the
conventional, albeit objective, measure of vertical integration: Value-Added
Ratio. This variable has a mean value of 0.244 and a standard deviation of
0.164. To mitigate mismeasurement issues, we control for a full set of 4-digit
industry dummies.
Private Enterprise Survey of Productivity and the In-
vestment Climate
The Private Enterprise Survey of Productivity and the Investment Climate
(PESPIC) is a standardized cross-sectional firm-level dataset based on World
Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBESs) conducted by the World Bank’s Enter-
prise Analysis Unit in 68 developing economies during the 2002–2006 pe-
riod.14 The PESPIC’s structure is similar to that of the SCE. The first part
is a general questionaire directed at senior management, focusing on firm
structure and performance, sales and suppliers, investment and infrastruc-
ture, government relations, innovation, and labour relations. The second
part is directed at the senior accountant, and focuses on various financial
measures.
12This theoretical prediction has been supported empirically, e.g., by Masten (1984),
Joskow (1985), Spiller (1985), and Gonzalez-Daz, Arrunada, and Fernandez (2000).13As of July 2015, the exchange rate was approximately 1 Renminbi to 0.15 U.S. dollars.14More information about the dataset can be found at
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
8
Although the PESPIC is cross-sectional, it also has some time-series as-
pects. Importantly, this dataset contains a survey question designed to di-
rectly measure changes in the degree of vertical integration: “Has your com-
pany brought in-house major production activities in the last three years?”
The reply to this survey question is used to construct a dummy variable,
Change in Vertical Integration, which equals 1 if the firm answers yes and
0 otherwise. The PESPIC thus allows us to exploit within-firm variation in
the degree of vertical integration and avoid endogeneity problems that might
arise from firm-level heterogeneity. As with the SCE, the PESPIC’s measure
of vertical integration is direct and less prone to potential mismeasurement
problems. Further, by focusing only on “major production activities”, the
PESPIC measure is arguably less prone to subjective interpretation by man-
agers than the corresponding SCE measure.
As the PESPIC was compiled from a series of WBESs employing differ-
ent questionnaire designs and survey methodologies in different countries,
information about the change in the sourcing strategy adopted for major
production activities is available in only 6 countries (i.e., Brazil, Ecuador,
Oman, the Philippines, South Africa and Zambia). After deleting observa-
tions missing valid information about vertical integration choices, we have a
final sample of 3,958 firms in these 6 developing countries. The mean value of
Change in Vertical Integration is 0.097 and the standard deviation is 0.296.
3 Empirical Analysis
This section presents details of our econometric specifications and results.
We devote one subsection to each of the three datasets.
3.1 Survey of Chinese Enterprises: Results
Benchmark Results: OLS To investigate the relationship between ver-
tical integration and firm productivity in the cross-sectional SCE dataset, we
estimate the following equation:
Yf = α + β · V If +X ′ficγ + εf (1)
where f , i, c denote firm, industry and city, respectively; Yf is firm f ’s
productivity; V If is firm f ’s degree of vertical integration (specifically, Self-
Made Input Percentage, constructed on the basis of firm f ’s reply to the
9
survey question “what is the percentage of parts used by the firm that are
produced in-house (measured by the value of parts)?”); X ′fic is a vector of
control variables including firm characteristics,15 CEO characteristics,16 city
dummies and industry dummies; and εf is the error term. Standard errors are
clustered at the industry-city level to correct for potential heteroskadasticity.
The OLS regression results for various specifications of equation (1) are
reported in Table 2. For all specifications, the estimated coefficients of Self-
Made Input Percentage are consistently negative and statistically significant:
a higher degree of vertical integration is associated with lower firm produc-
tivity. Taking the most conservative estimate, a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in the degree of vertical integration leads to a 2.2% decrease in firm
productivity at the mean level.
Note that the regressions produce reasonable estimates for the effects of
control variables. For example, younger firms and those with higher capital
intensity have higher productivity, consistent with findings in the literature.
Firms with a higher percentage of private ownership also have higher produc-
tivity. This is consistent with the observation that state-owned enterprises
in China are charged with multiple mandates: they are required to focus
not only on profit maximization, but also on maintaining social stability, the
latter of which involves excessive hiring and consequently lower productivity
(Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang, 2000). The coefficient on Firm Size is positive and
significant in all specifications, suggesting the presence of economies of scale.
This is consistent with evidence of local protectionism within China (Young,
2000; Bai, Du, Tao, and Tong, 2004), which results in production at a sub-
optimal scale. Finally, government appointments have a negative impact on
firm productivity. This result is consistent with the view that government
15Variables related to firm characteristics include: Firm Size (measured as the logarithm
of firm employment), Firm Age (measured as the logarithm of years of establishment),
Percentage of Private Ownership (measured as the percentage of equity owned by parties
other than government agencies) and Capital Intensity (measured as the logarithm of
assets per worker).16The CEO characteristics include measures of human capital – Education (years of
schooling), Years of Being CEO (years as CEO) and Deputy CEO Previously (an indi-
cator of whether the CEO had been the deputy CEO of the same firm before becoming
CEO); and measures of political capital – Government Cadre Previously (an indicator of
whether the CEO had previously been a government official), Communist Party Mem-
ber (an indicator of whether the CEO is a member of the Chinese Communist Party)
and Government Appointment (an indicator of whether the CEO was appointed by the
government).
10
appointments of CEOs in China are based on political considerations rather
than managerial talent.
IV Estimates Because our variation in Self-Made Input Percentage is
cross-sectional, endogeneity problems may arise from unobserved permanent
firm-level heterogeneity. We thus instrument for Self-Made Input Percent-
age using Local Purchase. The IV estimation results are presented in Table
3. Only the industry dummy is included in Column 1, whereas all control
variables are included in Column 2. The IV estimate of Self-Made Input
Percentage remains negative and statistically significant. In fact, the IV es-
timates are substantially larger than the OLS estimates. One possibility is
that the self-reported degree of vertical integration involves some measure-
ment errors, which biases the OLS estimates downward (towards zero).
As shown in Panel B, Local Purchase is found to be positive and sta-
tistically significant. The Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic and
the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic (reported in Panel C) further confirm that
our instrument is relevant. The F-test of excluded instrument is statistically
significant at the 5% level, but has a value of around 5, which is below the
critical value of 10 – a value suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) as the
“safety zone” for a strong instrument. This raises possible concerns of a weak
instrument for our analysis. In response, we conduct two additional tests:
the Anderson-Rubin Wald test and the Stock-Wright LM S-statistic, which
offer reliable statistical inferences under a weak instrument setting (Anderson
and Rubin, 1949; Stock and Wright, 2000). Both tests produce statistically
significant results, implying that our main results are robust to the presence
of a weak instrument.
Instrument Validity Our instrumental variable estimation should satisfy
the exclusion restriction: the instrument Local Purchase should not affect
firm productivity through channels other than the degree of vertical inte-
gration. Note that our instrumental variable estimation includes industry
dummies to control for omitted-variable bias due to technological differences
across industries, as well as city dummies to control for any locational ad-
vantages that may simultaneously affect local purchases, vertical integration
and firm productivity. In addition to these controls, we conduct two sets of
robustness checks on the exclusion restriction.
First, we identify four possible channels other than vertical integration
11
through which the instrument may affect firm productivity and then explic-
itly control for these channels in the IV estimation. First, when a firm sources
more of its parts and components locally, it may incur lower transportation
costs, which subsequently leads to higher firm productivity. Second, the
shorter distance to suppliers under local sourcing implies lower inventory re-
quirements, leading to higher productivity. Third, locally purchased inputs
may be made to firms’ unique specifications, which adds more value to their
final products. Fourth, local purchases could reduce delays in delivery and
consequently minimize lost sales.
From the SCE dataset, we construct four variables corresponding to each
of these four possible alternative channels: Transportation Cost (measured
by transportation costs divided by sales), Inventory (measured by inventory
stocks of final goods over sales), Input Specificity (measured by the percent-
age of a firm’s inputs made to the firm’s unique specifications) and Delivery
Loss (measured by the percentage of sales lost due to delivery delays in the
previous year). We include linear and quadratic terms for each of these chan-
nel variables in the IV estimation. As shown in Columns 1 – 5 of Table 4, our
main results regarding the impact of vertical integration on firm productivity
remain robust to these additional controls for potential alternative channels.
Further Robustness Checks Our results could potentially be driven by
a few outlying observations. To address this concern, we exclude the top
and bottom 1% of observations by firm productivity and repeat the analysis
using both OLS and IV regression methods. As shown in columns 1 and 2
of Table 5, our main results regarding the impact of vertical integration on
firm productivity remain robust to these exercises.
We then carry out the analysis using two sub-samples. First: for firms
with many businesses, the degree of vertical integration could vary from one
business to another. Thus, our measure of vertical integration may reflect the
average degree of vertical integration across various businesses, which may
bias our estimations of the impact of vertical integration on firm productivity.
To address this concern, we restrict attention to the sub-sample of firms with
focused business (defined as firms whose main business accounts for more
than 50% of total sales); these results are reported in Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 5. Second: China’s state-owned enterprises, as legacies of its central
planning system, are burdened with social responsibility mandates, and thus
tend to be vertically integrated and inefficient. To check that our results are
12
not driven by these state-owned enterprises, we focus on the sub-sample of
private firms; these results are reported in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. Our
finding that vertical integration and firm productivity are negatively related
continues to hold in both sub-samples.
3.2 Annual Survey of Industrial Firms: Results
Panel Analysis We now turn to the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms
(ASIF). As the ASIF is a panel dataset, we use the following regression
specification:
Yf,t = αf + β · V If,t + γt + εf,t, (2)
where Yf,t is the productivity of firm f in year t; V If,t is the value added ratio
of firm f in year t, measuring the degree of vertical integration; αf is the firm
dummy, capturing all time-invariant firm characteristics; and γt is the year
dummy, capturing all the effects affecting firms in year t. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm-level to deal with the potential heteroskadasticity
problem.
As an initial benchmark, pooled OLS estimation results are reported in
Column 1 of Table 6. There, we replace the firm dummy αf in Equation 2
with a full set of 4-digit industry and province dummies. We find that Value
Added Ratio has a negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient,
consistent with our findings obtained using the SCE dataset.
Returning to Equation 2, panel fixed effect estimation results are reported
in Column 2 of Table 6. The estimated coefficient of Value Added Ratio is
still negative and statistically significant: a within-firm increase in vertical
integration is associated with a decrease in firm productivity. Note, how-
ever, that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient falls from -1.274 to
-0.627 when we move from pooled OLS to panel fixed-effects. This drop in
magnitude could be attributed to the control for time-invariant firm-level
unobserved characteristics (e.g., the level of transaction difficulty) correlated
with both the degree of vertical integration and firm productivity. It is also
possible that some variations in the degree of vertical integration occur at
the inter-firm rather than the intra-firm level, as a result of which intra-firm
variations have a muted impact on firm productivity in the panel fixed effect
estimation.
While we have controlled for all time-invariant firm-level unobservables
through the panel fixed-effect estimation, time-varying omitted variable bias
13
remains a concern. Proxying for time-varying omitted variables using the
lagged dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2002), we estimate the following
equation:
Yf,t = αf + β · V If,t + δ · Yf,t−1 + γt + εf,t. (3)
The estimation results are reported in Column 3 of Table 6. After controlling
for time-varying unobservables, the impact of vertical integration on firm
productivity remains negative and statistically significant.
Further, with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the panel
estimation, dynamic estimation bias – whereby the lagged dependent variable
is correlated with the error term – may arise, leading to biased estimates. To
address this concern, we conduct a panel instrumental-variable estimation a
la Anderson and Hsiao (1982). More specifically, in the First-Difference trans-
formation of equation (3), we instrument ∆V If,t and ∆Yf,t−1 with V If,t−1and Yf,t−2, respectively. The Anderson-Hsiao IV estimation results are re-
ported in Column 4 of Table 6. Our main finding that vertical integration
has a negative impact on firm productivity continues to hold here.
Robustness Checks First, to address the concern that firm entry and exit
during the sample period may drive our findings, we restrict our analysis to
a balanced panel, comprising firms present for the whole sample period. The
panel fixed-effect and Anderson-Hsiao IV estimation results are reported in
Columns 1-2 of Table 7. Our main finding continues to hold in this balanced
sub-sample.
Second, we exclude the top and bottom 1% of observations for firm pro-
ductivity to check whether our results are mainly driven by outlying obser-
vations. The panel fixed-effect and Anderson-Hsiao IV estimation results are
reported in Columns 3-4 of Table 7. Our main finding continues to hold after
excluding outliers.
Third, in the context of China, one may be concerned that our results
are driven by state-owned enterprises, which are usually less productive but
highly integrated. To address this concern, we restrict our analysis to the
sub-sample of private firms. The panel fixed-effect and Anderson-Hsiao IV
estimation results are reported in Columns 5-6 of Table 7. Our main finding
continues to hold in the sub-sample of private firms.
Fourth, to account for the within-industry firm heterogeneity in techno-
logical capability (which could in turn affect firm productivity and ownership
structure), we include Capital Intensity (measured as the logarithm of assets
14
per worker) as an additional control. The panel fixed-effect and Anderson-
Hsiao IV estimation results are reported in Columns 7-8 of Table 7. Our
main finding is robust to this additional control.
3.3 PESPIC: Results
First-Difference Estimation The key independent variable in our anal-
ysis of the cross-country PESPIC dataset is Change in Vertical Integration,
which provides a source of within-firm variation in vertical integration. We
estimate the following First-Difference equation:
∆Yf,t = α + β ·∆V If,t +X′
f,t−3γ + ∆εf,t, (4)
in which ∆Yf,t is the change in firm productivity, ∆V If,t is the change in the
degree of vertical integration for major production activities, and X′
f,t−3 is
a vector of firm-level variables (Initial Firm Size and Initial Sales Change,
reflecting firm size and year-on-year sales growth at time t − 3). Standard
errors are clustered at the firm-level.
First-Difference estimation results of equation (4) are reported in Column
1 of Table 8. The coefficient of the Change in Vertical Integration is nega-
tive and statistically significant, suggesting that bringing major production
activities in-house leads to a decrease in firm productivity.
While First-Difference estimation allows us to effectively control for all
time-invariant characteristics, there could still be some time-varying charac-
teristics correlated with the change in vertical integration, which would then
lead to biased estimates. To address this concern, we include several mea-
sures of important operational changes in the past three years as robustness
checks.
The PESPIC dataset contains the following questions: (1) “Has your
company introduced any new technology that has substantially changed the
way that the main product is produced in the last three years?”; (2) “Has
your company agreed any new joint venture with a foreign partner in the last
three years?”; (3) “Has your company obtained any new licensing agreement
in the last three years?”; and (4) “Has your company developed any major
new product line in the last three years?”. Accordingly, we construct four
control variables – Introduction of New Technology, Introduction of New Joint
Venture, Introduction of New Licensing Agreement, and Introduction of New
Major Product Line – each of which takes the value of 1 if the firm replies
15
affirmatively to the respective question and 0 otherwise. In addition, we
construct a variable related to the change in capital intensity (i.e., measured
as the change in logarithm of assets per worker) to control for possible within-
industry heterogeneity in technologies.
We include these five additional control variables in the model in a step-
wise manner in Columns 2-6 of Table 8. Our regressor of interest, Change in
Vertical Integration, continues to produce a negative and statistically signif-
icant impact on firm productivity, implying the robustness of our findings in
Column 1 to possible time-varying characteristics.
Robustness Checks We conduct two further robustness checks on our
PESPIC analysis. First, to address the possibility that our results could be
driven by outliers, we exclude the top and bottom 1% of observations for
firm productivity and repeat the analysis. As shown in Column 1 of Table
9, our main finding remains robust to this exercise.
Second, casual observations suggest that state-owned enterprises in de-
veloping countries tend to be inefficient, yet they shoulder their social re-
sponsibilities by becoming more vertically integrated, which may explain the
negative impact of vertical integration on firm productivity. To ensure that
our results are not driven by the presence of state-owned enterprises, we fo-
cus on a sub-sample of private firms. As shown in Column 2 of Table 9, our
main finding continues to hold in this sub-sample.
3.4 Discussion
There are tradeoffs involved in each of our datasets. The SCE dataset in-
cludes a direct measure of vertical integration (the independent variable), but
cross-sectional regressions may suffer from endogeneity problems due to un-
observed firm-level heterogeneity. Our analysis utilizes a plausible instrument
for vertical integration; controls for a large set of variables including industry
dummies, city dummies and CEO and firm characteristics; and conducts a
number of robustness checks. Nonetheless, we cannot exclude the possibility
that the exclusion restriction is violated to some degree by our instrument.
The ASIF and PESPIC datasets allow us to conduct panel analyses that
exploit within-firm variation in vertical integration over time. This allows
us to control for any endogeneity problems arising from permanent firm het-
erogeneity. That said, we cannot completely eliminate potential firm-specific
16
time-varying shocks that drive both vertical integration decisions and firm
productivity, although we do include a host of relevant controls for the PE-
SPIC dataset. That ASIF dataset also relies on Value Added as a measure of
vertical integration, which may be susceptible to mismeasurement problems;
this issue is partially alleviated by our inclusion of a detailed set of 4-digit
industry dummies (and, in some specifications, firm dummies). On the other
hand, the PESPIC analysis utilizes a direct (albeit potentially subjective)
measure of vertical integration.
Despite the limitations of each dataset, our overall analysis paints a pic-
ture of a significant negative relationship between vertical integration and
firm productivity that is robust to various specifications and measures of ver-
tical integration, and holds in a variety of cross-industry developing-country
contexts. This suggests that there might be robust economic mechanisms
leading to such a negative relationship; we discuss one potential mechanism
in Section 4.
4 A Simple Model: Vertical Integration, Rent-
Seeking, and Firm Performance
This section presents a simple and very stylised model of vertical integration.
In the model, integration corresponds to firm insiders (e.g. firm manage-
ment) retaining key decision-rights that determine the outcome of produc-
tion, whereas outsourcing corresponds to the (partial) transfer of decision
rights to outside suppliers.
As a quick preview: the key source of inefficiency in the model is that inte-
gration gives insiders more control over the production process, and thus en-
ables their rent-seeking activities. Outsourcing, by reducing insider control,
reduces incentives for such rent-seeking because the returns to rent-seeking
have to be shared between insider and supplier. The dark side of outsourcing
is that it also suppresses insiders’ incentives for productive investments.
There is a single insider (who we may think of as an entrenched man-
ager, or the firm’s majority shareholder), and a unit mass of infinitesimally-
weighted tasks to be performed. Mass m ∈ (0, 1) of tasks are integrated (i.e.
the insider performs the task), and the remaining 1−m tasks are outsourced
(an outside supplier performs the task). Outside suppliers are specialized,
so each supplier can perform a maximum of one (infinitesimal) task for the
17
firm. Each task θ produces revenue πθ. Firm revenue is simply the integral
of revenue across all tasks:
π =
∫ 1
0
πθdθ. (5)
For each task θ, the player performing the task chooses two investments:
a productive investment iθ ≥ 0 and a rent-seeking activity jθ ≥ 0, incurring
private cost cθ = 12i2θ + 1
2αj2θ . Parameter α represents the ease of expropri-
ation: higher α represents weaker legal protections which allow the player
performing the task to expropriate from the firm more easily.
The investments iθ and jθ have to be implemented, which requires the
cooperation of the manager; the underlying premise is that insourcing of task
θ corresponds to the insider having “sole control” over θ, whereas outsourcing
corresponds to “joint control” by insider and supplier.17
If implemented, the productive investment increases firm revenue, whereas
the rent-seeking investment increases the player’s private benefit vθ at the
expense of revenue:
πθ = iθ − jθ, (6)
vθ = jθ. (7)
For each task θ, revenue πθ and private benefits vθ are not contractible,
so formal incentive contracts cannot be offered to outside suppliers.18 The
insider receives fraction b ∈ (0, 1) of total revenue π; note that she is not a
residual claimant.19
The overall timing of the model is as follows:
1. For each task θ being outsourced, the insider makes the outside supplier
a participation offer κθ. If the supplier accepts, then he receives κθ
17We may alternatively assume that if activity θ is outsourced, then the supplier has
sole control and appropriates all surplus from his investments. This assumption would
produce similar results.18We may allow for a verifiable, noisy signal of firm revenue y = π + ε to be available.
However, because each task is infinitesimal, firm revenue would be uncorrelated with
revenue from each task, and thus incentive contracts for suppliers based on firm revenue
would be ineffective. The premise is that because there are many suppliers who each
make only a small contribution to firm revenue, incentive provision based on firm revenue
becomes prohibitively costly, especially in the presence of contracting frictions such as
supplier risk-aversion.19Think of the remaining share of revenue as going to passive shareholders who have no
say in firm decision-making.
18
from the insider; otherwise the task is not performed, and the supplier
receives zero utility.
2a. For each task θ being performed, the player performing the task chooses
iθ and jθ.
2b. For each task θ being outsourced (and performed), the insider and sup-
plier bargain over whether to implement the investment. If bargaining
fails, then the outcome is zero value-added and zero private benefits:
πθ = 0 and vθ = 0. We impose efficient Nash bargaining, so insider and
supplier split the bargaining surplus equally. (Under integration, the
manager appropriates all the bargaining surplus.)
Total surplus, computed over all tasks, is total revenue plus total private
benefits, less private costs:
surplus =
∫ 1
0
(πθ + vθ − cθ) dθ.
4.1 Integration versus Outsourcing
Lemma 1. Suppose task θ is integrated. Then the manager chooses i∗θ = b
and j∗θ = (1− b)α. Revenue from the task is i− j = b− (1− b)α.
Proof. Under insourcing, the insider chooses iθ and jθ to maximize his payoff
b(iθ− jθ) + jθ− 12i2θ − 1
2αj2θ , i.e. i∗θ = b and j∗θ = (1− b)α. Net revenue for the
task is then i− j = b− (1− b)α.
Under integration, as the fraction b of revenue that the insider receives
increases, he decreases his rent-seeking investment (which increases private
benefits but at the expense of revenue). Also, the insider’s rent-seeking
investments are increasing in the ease of expropriation α. On the other
hand, as b increases, the insider increases his productive investment.
Lemma 2. Suppose task θ is outsourced. Then the supplier for that task
chooses i∗θ = b/2 and j∗θ = (1−b)α2
. Revenue from the task is i− j = b2− 1−b
2α.
Proof. The supplier’s disagreement payoff is κθ− 12i2θ− 1
2αj2θ , while the insider’s
disagreement payoff is −κθ. On the other hand, the total payoff (insider
plus supplier) following implementation is b(iθ − jθ) + jθ − 12i2θ − 1
2αj2θ . The
19
bargaining surplus is thus b iθ + (1 − b)jθ, and the supplier’s net payoff is
κθ + b2iθ + 1−b
2jθ − 1
2i2θ − 1
2αj2θ . To maximize his payoff, the supplier chooses
i∗θ = b2
and j∗θ = (1−b)α2
. Revenue from task θ is thus i− j = b2− 1−b
2α.
Compared to the insider’s choices under integration, the (supplier’s) pro-
ductive investment and rent-seeking investments under outsourcing are each
halved. Under outsourcing, the supplier has to share the returns from his
productive and rent-seeking investments with the insider; thus his incentives
for both investments are suppressed relative to the insider’s incentives under
integration, where the insider keeps the “full” returns from his investments.
The tradeoff between integration and outsourcing is thus as follows: in-
tegration increases productive investments, but also results in more costly
rent-seeking. Importantly, an increase in the ease of expropriation α in-
creases the extent of rent-seeking, and consequently makes outsourcing more
profitable relative to integration.
Proposition 1. Firm revenue is
π =1− b
2
(b
1− b− α
)(1 +m) ,
which is decreasing in the extent of integration m if α > b1−b , and increasing
in m otherwise.
Proof. From Lemmas 1 and 2, integrated tasks contribute b − (1 − b)α of
revenue per unit mass, whereas outsourced tasks contribute b2− 1−b
2α of
revenue per unit mass. Mass m of tasks are integrated and mass 1 −m are
outsourced, so firm revenue is
π = m (b− (1− b)α) + (1−m) (b/2− (1− b)α/2)
= (1− b) (b/(1− b)− α) (1 +m) /2.
Thus integration is more profitable than outsourcing if and only if the
ease of expropriation α is large.20
20Similarly, we may show that total surplus (revenue plus managerial and supplier
payoffs) is increasing in the degree of integration if and only if α is small, i.e., ex-
propriation is difficult. Each task θ produces surplus iθ − i2θ/2 − j2θ/(2α). In particu-
lar, integrated tasks produce b − b2
2 −(1−b)2α
2 of surplus per unit mass, and outsourced
tasks produce b2 −
b2
8 −(1−b)2α
8 of surplus per unit mass. Consequently, total surplus is
m(b− b2
2 −(1−b)2α
2
)+ (1 −m)
(b2 −
b2
8 −(1−b)2α
8
), which is increasing in m if and only
if α < 43b(1−3b/4)(1−b)2 .
20
In other words: the effect of an increase in the degree of firm integration
on revenue depends on the quality of the legal environment. In good (bad)
legal environments where expropriation is difficult (easy), an increase in firm
integration results in an increase (decrease) in firm revenue. In particular, the
case of high α matches our setting of China and other developing countries,
where legal protections are relatively weak and expropriation is easy. In that
case, Proposition 1 predicts that firm productivity (as measured by revenue)
is decreasing in the degree of vertical integration. This matches the empirical
findings from Section 3.
4.2 Discussion
Our model exogenously specifies the degree m of firm integration. We do
not take a stand on the source of variation in the integration decision across
firms. One potential source of variation is managerial capability: more capa-
ble insiders can handle more integrated tasks without relying on suppliers,
and thus choose a greater degree of integration for the firms they manage.21
Under this interpretation, our model suggests that in poor legal environ-
ments, competent managers actually decrease welfare, because they apply
their capabilities towards rent-seeking rather than productive activities.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of vertical integration on firm productiv-
ity. This line of research is fraught with mismeasurement and endogeneity
problems; our approach is to analyze, separately, three different datasets that
address the mismeasurement and endogeneity problems in different ways.
Throughout our analysis, we consistently find that the degree of vertical in-
tegration has a negative and statistically significant impact on firm produc-
tivity. This consistency, as well as the cross-industry nature of our samples,
suggests that our findings may be quite broadly applicable, with the following
21Similarly, we take the share b of insider’s revenue as exogenous; this could represent
the shareholdings of a controlling shareholder, or the incentive scheme offered to the CEO.
Under the premise that insiders’ capability varies across firms, our implicit assumption
is that the insider’s managerial capability is private information, and that sophisticated
mechanisms to elicit this private information are unavailable / infeasible; consequently, m
and b cannot be conditioned on managerial capability.
21
caveat.
Our results (based on Chinese and other developing-country firms) con-
trast with recent empirical findings (largely based on U.S. firms) that vertical
integration is positively correlated with firm productivity. We propose that
the differences between their results and ours are driven by differences in the
ease of rent-seeking in developed versus developing countries. In particular,
weak legal environments complement integrated firm structures in enabling
rent-seeking by firm insiders, so the costs of integration are exacerbated in
developing countries where legal protections are weak.
22
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max SCE Dataset
Labour Productivity 1557 4.322 1.562 ‐3.989 11.893
Vertical Integration 1459 0.339 0.401 0.000 1.000
ASIF Dataset
Labour Productivity 1115452 4.917 1.193 ‐8.120 13.017
Vertical Integration 1016918 0.244 0.164 0.000 1.000
PESPIC Dataset
Change in Labour Productivity 6212 0.154 0.799 ‐8.177 13.080
Change in Vertical Integration 31107 0.097 0.296 0.000 1.000
Table 2: Analysis of the SCE Dataset, OLS Benchmark
1 2 3 4 Dependent Variable Labour Productivity Self-Made Input Percentage -0.307*** -0.278*** -0.298*** -0.237*** [0.100] [0.079] [0.079] [0.086] Firm Characteristics Firm Size 0.200*** 0.181*** 0.110*** [0.037] [0.038] [0.036] Firm Age -0.526*** -0.458*** -0.413*** [0.062] [0.069] [0.066] Percentage of Private Ownership 0.442*** 0.253* 0.268**
[0.130] [0.132] [0.122]
Capital Intensity 0.383*** 0.384*** 0.347***
[0.037] [0.034] [0.036]
CEO Characteristics Human Capital Education 0.041*** 0.040**
[0.016] [0.016]
Years of Being CEO 0.018** 0.007
[0.007] [0.007]
Deputy CEO Previously -0.004 -0.008
[0.070] [0.068]
Political Capital Government Cadre Previously 0.019 0.090
[0.222] [0.231]
Communist Party Member -0.192** -0.096
[0.082] [0.077]
Government Appointment -0.348*** -0.317***
[0.088] [0.092]
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes City Dummy Yes No. of Observation 1,451 1,431 1,410 1,410
Robust standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are reported in the bracket. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3: Analysis of the SCE Dataset, IV Estimates
1 2
Panel A, Second Stage: Dependent Variable is Labour Productivity Self-Made Input Percentage -13.290** -5.182* [6.360] [2.803] Firm Characteristics Firm Size 0.180*** [0.063] Firm Age -0.291** [0.127] Percentage of Private Ownership 0.371 [0.234] Capital Intensity 0.323*** [0.054] CEO Characteristics Human Capital Education 0.061** [0.030] Years of Being CEO 0.033* [0.020] Deputy CEO Previously 0.096 [0.146] Political Capital Government Cadre Previously -0.451 [0.448] Communist Party Membership -0.24 [0.180] Government Appointment -0.408** [0.173] Industry Dummy Yes Yes City Dummy Yes
Panel B, First Stage: Dependent Variable is Self-Made Input Percentage Local Purchase 0.066** 0.067** [0.030] [0.029] Firm Characteristics Firm Size 0.016* [0.009] Firm Age 0.021 [0.018] Percentage of Private Ownership 0.019 [0.033] Capital Intensity -0.003 [0.008] CEO Characteristics Human Capital Education 0.005 [0.005] Years of Being CEO 0.005** [0.003]
Deputy CEO Previously 0.025 [0.025] Political Capital Government Cadre Previously -0.105* [0.059] Communist Party Membership -0.029 [0.030] Government Appointment -0.022 [0.025] Industry Dummy Yes Yes City Dummy Yes
Panel C, Various First-Stage Statistical Tests Relevance Test Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic [4.96]** [4.57]** Cragg-Donald Wald Statistic [4.83]** [4.48]** Weak Instrument Test F Test of Excluded Instrument [4.95]** [5.25]** Anderson-Rubin Wald Test [43.67]*** [9.13]***
Stock-Wright LM S Statistic [23.07]*** [8.05]***
Number of Observations 1,445 1,404 Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are presented in the bracket. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Table 4: Analysis of the SCE Dataset, IV Estimates, Checks on Identification
1 2 3 4 5 Dependent Variable Labour Productivity
Estimation Method IV Panel A, Second Stage Local Purchase
Self-Made Input Percentage -5.205* -5.023* -6.844* -4.729* -5.210*
[2.803] [2.735] [3.827] [2.465] [2.821]
Transportation Cost -3.590 -9.801**
[3.804] [4.543]
Transportation Cost ^2 -0.865 61.447**
[4.020] [26.725]
Inventory -0.150*** -0.347***
[0.047] [0.063]
Inventory ^2 0.001*** 0.005***
[0.000] [0.001]
Input Specificity 0.602 0.688
[1.588] [1.169]
Input Specificity ^2 -0.821 -0.749
[1.741] [1.296]
Delivery Loss -0.177 -1.878
[2.423] [2.391]
Delivery Loss ^2 -0.946 5.370
[9.232] [7.602]
Panel B, First Stage: Dependent Variable is Self-Made Input
Percentage Local Purchase 0.068** 0.068** 0.063** 0.073** 0.070** [0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.029]
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are presented in the bracket. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. The first Stage of the two-step GMM estimation contains same controls as the second stage but results of these control variables are not reported to save space (available upon request).
Panel C, Various First Stage Statistical Tests
Relevance Test Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic [4.66]** [4.65]** [3.83]** [5.35]** [4.73]** Cragg-Donald Wald Statistic [4.58]** [4.55]** [3.80]** [5.25]** [4.72]** Weak Instrument Test F Test of Excluded Instrument [5.34]** [5.27]** [4.69]** [6.19]** [5.81]** Anderson-Rubin Wald test [9.88]*** [9.05]*** [12.99]*** [8.81]*** [11.54]*** Stock-Wright LM S statistic [8.70]*** [8.22]*** [10.69]*** [7.80]** [10.04]***
Included Control Variables Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes CEO Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes City Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,401 1,403 1,307 1,391 1,281
Table 5: Analysis of the SCE Dataset, Robustness Checks
1 2 3 4 5 6 Dependent Variable Labour Productivity Sample Exclusion of Outliers Focused Businesses Private Firms Estimation Method OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV Self-Made Input Percentage -0.200** -5.897* -0.302*** -4.051* -0.210** -7.246 [0.085] [3.174] [0.087] [2.225] [0.099] [7.301]
Included Control Variables Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes CEO Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes City Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,380 1,374 1,298 1,292 1,151 1,148 Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are presented in the bracket. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Table 6: Analysis of the ASIF Dataset, Main Results
1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable Labour Productivity
Estimation Pooled OLS Panel Fixed-Effect Panel Fixed-Effect Anderson-Hsiao IV
Value Added Ratio -1.274*** -0.627*** -0.552*** -0.470***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.009] [0.015]
Lagged Labour Productivity 0.176*** 0.286***
[0.003] [0.007] Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry Dummy Yes
Province Dummy Yes
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 943,257 943,257 634,141 398,380 Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are presented in the bracket. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Table 7: Analysis of the ASIF Dataset, Robustness Checks
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable Labour Productivity
Sample Balanced Exclusion of Outliers Private Firms Whole
Estimation Panel Fixed-
Effect Anderson-Hsiao IV
Panel Fixed-Effect
Anderson-Hsiao IV
Panel Fixed-Effect
Anderson-Hsiao IV
Panel Fixed-Effect
Anderson-Hsiao IV
Value Added Ratio -0.460*** -0.467*** -0.397*** -0.679*** -0.479*** -0.485*** -0.558*** -0.502***
[0.014] [0.023] [0.007] [0.016] [0.011] [0.017] [0.009] [0.016]
Lagged Labour Productivity 0.347*** 0.374*** 0.164*** 0.529*** 0.126*** 0.334*** 0.175*** 0.381***
[0.005] [0.013] [0.002] [0.007] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.007]
Capital Intensity 0.193*** 0.026***
[0.002] [0.001] Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 187,992 148,344 575,174 362,682 395,902 253,080 630,027 396,066 Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are presented in the bracket. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Table 8: Analysis of the PESPIC Dataset, Main Results
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent Variable Change in Labour Productivity
Change in Vertical Integration -0.091** -0.095** -0.095** -0.095** -0.092** -0.076**
[0.036] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.036] [0.037]
Initial Firm Size 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.076***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025]
Initial Sales Change 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.017**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008]
Introduction of New Technology 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.022 0.005
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029]
Introduction of New Joint Venture -0.024 -0.029 -0.027 0.014
[0.058] [0.064] [0.064] [0.056]
Introduction of New Licensing Agreement 0.016 0.018 -0.003
[0.054] [0.054] [0.052]
Introduction of New Major Product Line -0.018 -0.002
[0.027] [0.026]
Change in Capital Intensity 0.258***
[0.045]
Number of Observations 2,672 2,671 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,583 Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are presented in the bracket. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Table 9: Analysis of the PESPIC Dataset, Robustness Checks
1 2
Dependent Variable Change in Labour Productivity
Sample Exclusion of Outlying Observations Private Firms
Change in Vertical Integration -0.057*** -0.090**
[0.021] [0.036]
Initial Firm Size 0.084*** 0.085***
[0.022] [0.026]
Initial Sales Change 0.035*** 0.026***
[0.006] [0.008]
Number of Observations 2,637 2,658 Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are presented in the bracket. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.