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Background

General Plan Colombia BackgroundWikipedia background information on Plan Colombia – Pros and Cons

Wikipedia, no date, Plan Colombia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Colombia

Plan Colombia is the name of a United States military and diplomatic aid initiative aimed at combating Colombian drug cartels and left-wing insurgent groups in Colombian territory. The plan was originally conceived between 1998 and 1999 by the administrations of ColombianPresident Andrés Pastrana Arango and US President Bill Clinton, with the goals of ending theColombian armed conflict and creating an anti-cocaine strategy.

Critics of the initiative claim that elements within the Colombian security forces, which received aid and training from the U.S., were involved in supporting or tolerating abuses by right-wing paramilitary forces against left-wing guerrilla organizations and their sympathizers. Another controversial element of the anti-narcotic strategy is aerial fumigation to eradicate coca. This activity has come under fire because it damages legal crops and has adverse health effects upon those exposed to the herbicides. Furthermore, the plan awarded monetary compensation for the dead bodies of guerrilla members and therefore incentivized the murders of hundreds of people, including innocent civilians.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbicide

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coca_eradication

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fumigation

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitarism_in_Colombia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitarism_in_Colombia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Forces_of_Colombia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cocaine

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombian_armed_conflict

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Clinton

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Pastrana_Arango

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgent

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-wing

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drug_cartel

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_aid

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States

History of the Conflict in Colombia

Basics of the conflict

Martin Arostegui has covered Latin America for The Telegraph, Wall Street Journal and other news organizations, and is the author of Twilight Warriors, November 2, 2016, The Telegraph, Colombia’s peace deal with FARC risks dragging it further down the vortex of guerilla politics, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/02/colombias-peace-deal-with-farc-risks-dragging-it-further-down-th/

How did the conflict start?

The 1948 assassination of populist firebrand Jorge Eliecer Gaitan led to a political bloodletting known as “The Violence”. Tens of thousands died, and peasant groups joined with communists to arm themselves. In 1964, a military attack on their main encampment led to the creation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC.

What do the rebels want?

Though nominally Marxist, the FARC’s ideology has never been well defined. It has sought to make the conservative oligarchy share power and prioritise land reform in a country where more than 5 million people have been forcibly displaced, mostly by far-right militias in the service of ranchers, businessmen and drug traffickers.

What is the toll of the conflict?

More than 220,000 people have been killed, most of them civilians. In the past two decades, most of the killings were inflicted by the militias. The FARC abducted ranchers, politicians and soldiers and often held them for years in jungle prison camps.

History of the conflict in Colombia


May 1964

First confrontation between Farc and government troops

Late 1970

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/02/colombias-peace-deal-with-farc-risks-dragging-it-further-down-th/




Farc begins trafficking cocaine to pay for its activities

1980s

First peace talks get underway but soon collapse. Farc forms a political wing, and paramilitaries join forces with the government to try combat Farc and its political wing

1999

Farc’s membership and kidnapping peak at 18,000 and 3,000 respectively

2000

United States and Colombia initiate Plan Colombia, a $9 billion US military aid program meant to help the Colombian government combat the drug trade, reassert authority and increase its capacity throughout the country

2002

Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, a French-Colombian, is kidnapped and held for a further six years

June 2015

Farc’s last attack: bombing the Tansandio oil pipeline, causing 10,000 barrels of oil to contaminate waterways in what the government says is the worst environmental disaster in Colombia’s history

2016

Talks which originally began back in 2012 result in a deal. It includes previously agreed-on provisions on land reform, combatting drug trafficking, guerrillas’ political participation and punishment for war crimes on both sides

June 2016

Negotiators announce a blueprint for how Farc fighters will lay down their weapons once the peace accord is implemented

August 2016

A ceasefire between the Farc and the government comes into effect. However, Colombian voters reject a peace deal with Farc guerrillas in a close referendum

Topicality

All aid to Colombia constitutes “Plan Colombia” – it is not a literal thing

Sibblya Brodzynsky, February 3, 2016, The Guardian, Plan Colombia’s Mixed Legacy: coca thrives but peace may be on the horizon, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/03/plan-colombia-cocaine-narcotics-farc-peace-deal

Plan Colombia has become a catch-all phrase for several different strategies. It is most widely understood as a US aid package to Colombia which has totaled about $10bn since 2000. More broadly, it was a joint US-Colombian strategy to strengthen the military, state institutions and the economy. “There is this idea that it is some vast orchestrated project but Plan Colombia doesn’t exist as such,” says Winifred Tate, author of Drugs, Thugs and Diplomats, a study of US policymaking in Colombia. Rather, it has been a series of programs whose emphasis has expanded and recalibrated over the years, she says.

Aid is “Peace Colombia,” not Plan Colombia

Lauren Carasik is a clinical professor of law and the director of the international human rights clinic at the Western New England University School of Law., Washington Should Avoid Repeating Plan Colombia’s Failure, February 9, 2016http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2016/2/washington-should-avoid-repeating-plan-colombias-failures.html

Costs of post-conflict reconstruction are estimated to be more than $90 billion over the next 10 years to cover development aid, especially for rural areas, and to assist in demobilizing and reintegrating FARC fighters. Obama announced that he will seek more than $450 million — a 25 percent increase from the year before — from Congress under a new plan called Peace Colombia.

Many components – rule of law, human rights, ex-combatant reintegration, support for Afro-Colombians and indigenous communities, climate change mitigation and emissions reductions

US Agency for International Development, February 6, 2016, US Assistance for Plan Colombia: Our Challenge, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/usaid-assistance-plan-colombia

Committed to Colombia’s development, peace, and security, the United States launched Plan Colombia in 2000. Through Plan Colombia, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has helped Colombia promote social and economic development, rule of law, human rights,

http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/12/economics-of-peace-colombia-lacks-post-conflict-funding/

http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/12/economics-of-peace-colombia-lacks-post-conflict-funding/

https://www.theguardian.com/society/drugs

reintegration of ex-combatants, support to victims and vulnerable populations including Afro-Colombians and indigenous communities, climate change mitigation, and low-emissions development.

PC has 10 parts

Jonathan Rosen, 2014, The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond, Research Professor at the Universidad del Mar, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card.

The final version of Plan Colombia passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by Clinton had ten major elements or components:

1. an economic strategy;

2. an international strategy;

3. a peace strategy;

4. a human development strategy;

5. a fiscal and financial strategy, including austerity and economic adjustment measures;

6. a military strategy;

7. a judicial and human rights strategy;

8. a social participation strategy;

9. a counternarcotics strategy; and

10. an alternative development strategy. R

Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 741-742). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Most of Plan Colombia is military aid

Amnesty International, no date, US Policy in Colombia, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/americas/colombia/us-policy-in-colombia

"Plan Colombia" -- the name for the US aid package since 2000, was created as a strategy to combat drugs and contribute to peace, mainly through military means. The US government began granting large amounts of aid to Colombia in 2000 under the Clinton administration. Since the beginning of Plan Colombia, the US has given Colombia over $5 billion with the vast majority going to Colombia's military and police. These amounts are significantly higher than what is being given in economic and social assistance.The social and institutional reform components are not significant


Although Plan Colombia includes components which address social aid and institutional reform, the initiative has come to be regarded by its critics as fundamentally a program of counternarcotics and military aid for the Colombian government.

“Plan Colombia” and “Peace of Colombia” are the same thing

Nahal Toosi, February 4, 2016, Politico, Obama reveals plan to boost aid to Colombia $450 million, http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/obama-colombia-aid-217640

President Barack Obama unveiled plans Thursday to increase U.S. aid to Colombia to at least $450 million next year, a boost of more than $100 million designed to help the government in Bogota spread and solidify its rule once it reaches a peace deal with the Marxist-inspired FARC rebels.The new funding initiative, which must be approved by Congress, would move a nearly 16-year-old U.S. aid package known as Plan Colombia into a new phase — called Peace Colombia — in the event of a peace deal.

80% of the money is spent on military hardware and drug interdiction


The United States and Colombia have both promoted improving democracy as well as the rule of law and value them as an important aspect of Plan Colombia. This is largely rhetoric because the statistics demonstrate that the United States has spent 80 percent of the money on hard components, such as the military, and only 20 percent of the money on soft programs, such as alternative development, human rights, and democracy promotion. 84 The United States reengineered Plan Colombia as a supply-side initiative designed to combat the cultivation of coca and drug production. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 880-885). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

US Policy

US sends substantial military aid to Colombia

Roger D. Harris is on the State Central Committee of the Peace and Freedom Party, the only ballot-qualified socialist party in California, October 3, 2016, Plan Columbia Vndicated, Columbia Rejects Peace, http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/10/03/plan-colombia-vindicated-colombia-rejects-peace/

The Obama administration, while giving lip service in support of the peace process, has massively increased lethal aid and transfer of the latest military technology to the Colombian government under the rubric of Plan Colombia. Presumptive president-elect Hillary Clinton has been on the campaign trail stomping for Plan Colombia as the world model for the military subjugation of those who oppose the extension of the US neoliberal empire.

http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/10/03/plan-colombia-vindicated-colombia-rejects-peace/

http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/10/03/plan-colombia-vindicated-colombia-rejects-peace/

http://www.peaceandfreedom.org/home/

General Consensus of the Literature

Summary –

Taran Vocklausen, February 4, 2016, Colombia Reports, 15 years of Plan Colombia: Victories and Failures, http://colombiareports.com/plan-colombia-victories-and-failures-after-15-years/

Plan Colombia has undisputedly contributed to strengthening Colombia’s state apparatus, economic growth and a major drop in violence, even if it failed its initial objective to seriously disrupt the country’s flow of cocaine to the United States and has come at a major humanitarian cost.

Imperialism

Imperialism Bad LinksAn additional 3, 800 lives per year were lost

Daniel Meja, Uiversity de los Andes, July 2016, Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Its Effectiveness and Costs, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Mejia-Colombia-final-2.pdf

No one can deny that Colombia has worked tirelessly to fight illegal drug production, trafficking, and organized crime groups linked to these activities. Since 1994, more than two million hectares of coca have been sprayed with glyphosate, 1,890 metric tons of cocaine have been seized, and 28,344 coca leaf processing laboratories have been destroyed. The costs that Colombia has paid in this “war” are very high. Since 2000, the country—with partial funding from the U.S. government—has invested more than US$1.2 billion, or about 1 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), per year into the military component of Plan Colombia.1 However, the costs have not solely been public financial resources. More than 57,000 Colombians are estimated to have been killed between 1994 and 2008 as a consequence of growing illegal drug markets and resulting confrontations between drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the Colombian government during the war on drugs.2 This translates into approximately 3,800 additional homicides (or about 25 percent of total homicides) per year from drug-related violence alone. Y

Plan Colombia enables the US to support widespread military presence in ColombiaLaura Carlsen is the director of the Americas Program in Mexico City and advisor to Just Associates (JASS) , January 20, 2016, The Permanent War and the No Vote, http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/10/20/plan-colombia-permanent-war-and-the-no-vote/

The U.S. government also has a vested interest in continuing the war. The conflict justified Plan Colombia, the $10 billion dollar counterinsurgency, counternarcotics plan that allowed the Pentagon to establish military presence in Colombia, both physically and by proxy. With the pretext of the internal conflict, the U.S. government built up a platform not only for control in Colombia, but also with regional strike capacity, as leaked in the proposed agreement to establish seven US military bases.

Plan Colombia and its later incarnations kept U.S. contracts for weapons, espionage and intelligence equipment and military and police training flowing to the most powerful lobbying industries in the nation. Billions of dollars have been poured into Plan Colombia and national security investment that ended up in the pockets of political elite and defense companies. In the 2010-2017 budgets, the United States has allocated $2.13 billion in military and police aid–most of that during the peace talks.

The country was converted into a testing ground for the latest in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare techniques and equipment from the United States. The blood spilled on its soil feeds the global war machine, to

http://securityassistance.org/latin-america-and-caribbean/data/country/military/country/2010/2017/is_all/

mailto:http://www.cipamericas.org/wp-content/uploads/wp-post-to-pdf-cache/1/6351.pdf

mailto:http://www.cipamericas.org/wp-content/uploads/wp-post-to-pdf-cache/1/6351.pdf

http://www.cipamericas.org/

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Mejia-Colombia-final-2.pdf


such an extent that Colombia has been groomed as an exporter of counterinsurgency and “security” training, despite its reputation as a gross violator of human rights and the disastrous humanitarian impact of its prolonged war. So very powerful interests saw the peace agreement as a threat. In addition to Uribe followers who viewed it as soft on the FARC, the war economy of the nation and its ally, the United States, was at stake.

Patriarchy/Militarism Bad Links

Plan Colombia driven by patriarchy and militarism

Laura Carlsen is the director of the Americas Program in Mexico City and advisor to Just Associates (JASS) , January 20, 2016, The Permanent War and the No Vote, http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/10/20/plan-colombia-permanent-war-and-the-no-vote/

This is the patriarchal mentality that the war industry thrives on. Plan Colombia has fomented this mentality since it began. It conflated a war on drugs with a counterinsurgency war to justify foreign intervention and broaden the war. The U.S. government knew that military funding was going directly to paramilitary groups. A 2010 empirical study demonstrated a measurable relationship between increases in US security funding and paramilitary homicides. War propaganda presented the FARC as the sole culprit, when terrible atrocities were being committed on both sides. With the exceptions of Arauca and Norte de Santander, the departments on Colombia’s borders that have suffered most in the war voted to end it. They know what it’s like to feel their houses shaken by bombs, to risk life and limb walking through minefields, to lose their loved ones in crossfire. They know that to stop the violence in their day-to-day lives is far more important than the political games of how punishment and power are dished out. War as a policy is almost always favored by those farthest from the battlefields.


Drug War

Drug War FailsColombia remains the world’s largest producer of Cocaine


According to the latest United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report, Colombia continues to be the world’s main producer of cocaine and the second largest producer of coca leaves after Peru.3 About 60 percent of the cocaine consumed in the world is still produced in Colombia. Likewise, most of the cocaine produced in Colombia is exported, with about 55 percent of production sold in North America, and the remaining 45 percent exported to European markets, increasingly via Venezuela and West Africa.

Sure, reductions PRODUCTION, but Colombia is still the leading cocoa exporter

Taran Vocklausen, February 4, 2016, Colombia Reports, 15 years of Plan Colombia: Victories and Failures, http://colombiareports.com/plan-colombia-victories-and-failures-after-15-years/

Miami Herald, February 2, 2016, Plan Colombia: 15 years later much has changed, but much remains the same, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/colombia/article58037878.html DOA: 11-4-16

The United States has pumped some $10 billion into the initiative since it was first conceived in 1999 — most of it in military aid. But millions also went into carrot-and-stick approaches to eradicating coca: dusting crops with glyphosate while providing farmers with economic alternatives. The program helped Colombia cut its coca production by more than half from 2000 to 2014, but like Quenguan’s wild plant, the problem persists.

“Our success has been relative,” President Juan Manuel Santos said last week at a symposium about the drug trade. “We were able to end the big cartels and we’ve eliminated more than 100,000 hectares of coca crops, but we’re still the number one exporter of cocaine in the world.”

Interdiction fails to reduce drug production




http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/colombia/article58037878.html




Regarding the effects of cocaine-laboratory interdiction on coca cultivation, one ongoing study finds that for every lab that is detected and destroyed by the authorities, coca cultivation decreases by about three hectares. In addition, and contrary to aerial spraying programs, this type of interdiction carries no negative environmental, human health, or political capital impacts. Rather, it is the intermediate inputs’ markets that face negative impacts that ultimately affect cultivation. For example, once cocaine-processing labs are eliminated, there is then no way to convert coca leaves into coca base and cocaine, and without such labs, demand for coca leaves falls, and coca cultivation diminishes (at least in the short run).35

Reducing major players increases violence among smaller players


Another interdiction strategy regularly carried out in Colombia is the effort to dismantle DTOs by going after their top leaders. Although hundreds of DTO leaders have been captured or killed in Colombia over the past few decades, we do not know how these policies affect the amount of drugs produced and trafficked or the vitality of DTOs. However, informal evidence suggests that these strategies create organizational power gaps that may lead to pronounced cycles of violence. For example, the arrest of a cartel leader may lead to internal conflict within the organization over who should assume power. Competing organizations might also attempt to overtake the market or territory of the organization whose leader was captured or killed. And as more fragmented or atomized groups compete over control of the drug trade, levels of violence increase. Thus, this high-value targeting interdiction strategy often seems to generate cycles of violence that continue until the markets and territorial control of the DTOs reach a new equilibrium.

Plan Colombia failed to reduce cocoa production and increased violence


Colombia President Juan Manuel Santos and his United States counterpart Barack Obama will meet Thursday to celebrate 15 years of Plan Colombia, a US-financed strategy to curb drug trafficking in the South American country that has seen major victories and epic failures.The Plan, originally drafted under former Colombian President Andres Pastrana and US President Bill Clinton, has failed to remove Colombia of its questionable title as the world’s top cocaine producer. Furthermore, it has contributed to a number of major displacement crises and an abundance of human rights violations throughout the 15 years.

Plan Colombia fragmented drug trafficking, making it harder to reduce





Natalio Cosoy, February 4, 2016, Has Plan Colombia Really Worked? http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35491504

The plan has made drug trafficking fragmented, making it harder to fight against, argues Diana Rojas, a specialist on Colombia-US relations from the National University of Colombia. It also had international consequences, according to British journalist Johann Hari, who criticises the "war on drugs" in his work. Mr Hari says that Plan Colombia has helped some of the narco-related violence move from Colombia to northern Mexico. "If I was a Colombian, I'd be glad it wasn't happening here, but that is not a solution," he told the BBC.

Where coca is grown has just shifted


Plan Colombia’s first target was to reduce the amount of coca in Putumayo by half in five years. It did that and more. The total area planted with coca dropped from just over 66,000 hectares (163,020 acres) in 2000 to less than 9,000 hectares (22,230 acres) in 2005. But the crops and related violence moved elsewhere in the country, and after some 4m hectares (9.88m acres) of coca were sprayed with herbicide in 15 years, coca production is on the rise again and Colombia remains the world’s top producer of coca and cocaine.Latin American drug war has failed


The U.S. has a long tradition and history of antidrug policies and regimes. With the end of the cold war, drug trafficking, particularly from countries in the Andean region, became the major security threat for the United States. In the early 1980s, President Reagan managed to securitize the war on drugs and make it a national security issue. 86 Reagan viewed drugs as evil and believed that the United States had a major problem and more resources were needed to combat the supply. 87 Like Reagan, President George W. Bush increased aid to Latin America, particularly in the form of military and police financing. Bush implemented the Andean Regional Initiative, designed to combat cultivation and drug trafficking in the Andean region. Despite all of these efforts, drug trafficking remained constant and cultivation continued. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 889-896). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Drug interdiction fails


http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35491504

Increasing the presence of the Colombian Navy and overall efforts to interdict products may appear at first glance to deter traffickers; however, minor successes in confiscation of drug shipments should not be mistaken as victories in the war on drugs. One must first briefly examine several problems with interdiction efforts. Stories in leading newspapers frequently report the successful interdiction of shipments from drug traffickers. Scholars note that marketing the notion that the war on drugs is being won to the public is easy regardless of whether interdiction efforts really result in an increase in shipments confiscated. For instance, an increase in the interdiction of drugs enabled politicians and government officials to proclaim victory and demonstrate that law enforcement efforts have worked and have resulted in large quantities of illicit substances being seized from organized criminal networks and, subsequently, not only preventing these substances from reaching the market but also causing the drug traffickers to lose money. Likewise, several months of low statistics in terms of drugs interdicted by law enforcement teams can be deemed a victory in the war on drugs because it demonstrates that fewer shipments must have been sent by drug traffickers. Such logic fails to recognize that drug traffickers constantly adapt in order to survive in this clandestine business. As a result, drug traffickers determine which regions and routes law enforcement officials are targeting and they then alter their shipping routes accordingly to avoid interdiction. Drug traffickers are experts at noticing areas that are less commonly patrolled and alter their routes to exploit such weaknesses. Therefore, neither Colombian law enforcement authorities nor various U.S. organizations have the ability to stop drugs from entering into the United States or other regions. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 1309-1318). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.Coca production increasing in the Amazon


Rural Colombia has witnessed increases in coca cultivation. According to the country report by the UNODC for 2011, coca cultivation in Putumayo increased dramatically to 9,951 hectares in December 2011 from 4,785 hectares in December 2010, or a 108 percent increase. Another region in Colombia that has witnessed a dramatic increase in cultivation is Norte de Santander, which in December 2010 recorded 1,889 hectares of coca being cultivated, increasing 85 percent in December 2011 to 3,490 hectares. Guaviare saw a 20 percent increase in the hectares under cultivation from 5,701 hectares in December 2010 to 6,839 hectares in December 2011.32 Other regions in Colombia have experienced decreases in the net change of coca cultivated from December 2010 to December 2011. Cordoba, for instance, recorded a 72 percent decrease from 3,889 hectares in December 2010 to 1,088 hectares in December 2011; Amazonas recorded a 64 percent decrease from 338 hectares to 122 hectares during that same period. 33 That said, we need to recognize that the decreases may appear large but the overall hectares produced in regions such as the Amazonas are much smaller than the total hectares cultivated in other locations such as Putumayo. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2753-2763). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Coca production has increased in Peru and Bolivia


The data reveals several key trends. While Colombia experienced an overall decrease in the acreage of coca cultivation, Peru and Bolivia have experienced increases over the past several years, which is a prime example of the balloon effect. The balloon effect is one of the best studied phenomenons by drug trafficking scholars; 37 it is similar to a law like the theory of relativity because it can be proved empirically. When a balloon is squeezed, the air is displaced to another part of the balloon, but it does not go away. Likewise, the balloon effect in coca cultivation occurs when the routes shift to another region as a result of increases in law enforcement and interdiction efforts in one region. Enforcement activities, therefore, merely cause coca cultivation to shift to other regions. Individuals who grow coca can easily move their crops to areas of the forest that are hard to spot from an airplane and that are difficult to detect from a satellite. Individuals who cultivate coca also can replant the crop after it has been sprayed with herbicides, spreading— ballooning out— it to regions that are harder to spray. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2777-2784). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Reducing production just increases prices


Marten Brienen argues that “the demand for the product is inelastic. There is a certain demand for this product. … The more you hamper the availability of this product, the higher the price is, the more attractive it becomes for people to grow it.” 39 Therefore, coca will continue to be grown because of the profits for farmers. Brienen declares, “If you manage to eradicate 80 percent of the total acreage, you would have raised the price to the point where every farmer will want to switch to this particular crop. … It provides you with a constant income throughout the year.” 40 With the support of the U.S. government, Colombia has received billions of dollars to help combat drug trafficking and has witnessed some decreases in coca cultivation. Because Colombia has been the epicenter of the war on drugs in South America for decades, Peru and Bolivia have received less attention in terms of coca cultivation; therefore, both countries have witnessed a proliferation in coca cultivation. 41 Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2809-2813). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Plan Colombia simply shifted the drug routes through Mexico


The United States has been quick to praise Plan Colombia as a success, although this is debatable. Indeed, Uribe successfully combatted the FARC and the guerrillas, but the country still has an internal armed conflict and Uribe by no means has eliminated the various internal armed actors. Colombia continues to confront drug trafficking and organized crime has returned to the country

as a result of the changing trafficking routes. As a result, U.S.-led policies have had negative consequences for Colombia as the routes shifted from Colombia to Mexico and now back to Colombia. 20 Simply shifting coca cultivation and drug routes away from Colombia and toward other countries does not make Plan Colombia a success. It is, then, premature for the Colombian government to claim victory in the war on drugs when in reality the overall landscape has not changed but rather countries continue to volley the drug problem back and forth between each other; the overall framework remains the same and drugs continue to be produced and trafficked in the region. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2705-2710). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

War on drugs is centered in Mexico, not Colombia


As of 2013, Colombia no longer appears to be the major drug trafficking epicenter in the war on drugs during the Obama administration. The routes began to shift toward Mexico and the various cartels began to battle for territory as well as control of the drug trade, leading to extreme levels of violence. Mexico, not Colombia, became the priority for several reasons. First, Mexico and the United States share a vast border and have many interconnections. The ease with which Mexican cartels can infiltrate the United States and impact the security of American lives caused many politicians to call for more protection along the border and resources to combat drug trafficking in Mexico. Governor Rick Perry of Texas called for Obama to place the National Guard on the border to help secure the border region and decrease the large levels of violence. 19 Mexican cartels have successfully penetrated the U.S. border as elements of Mexican cartels operate in more than 230 U.S. cities. 20 Americans are concerned about the extreme levels of violence and their security, particularly those living in the states that border Mexico. Nearly every day one can read or hear a news report about the extreme levels of violence in Mexico as a result of the war on drugs and war among various organizations. As of 2012, more than 50,000 Mexicans have died as a result of the war on drugs. 21 Violence has spilled over the border and dead bodies have appeared on the U.S. side of the border. As a result, the United States has become very concerned about the extreme levels of violence within Mexico. The U.S. border is porous and organized criminal networks have been able to penetrate the border. Today, Mexico has become the Colombia of the 1990s. Drug trafficking and organized crime has appeared in Mexico leading U.S. politicians and the American public to pay less attention to Colombia and focus on the violence resulting from the drug war occurring in Mexico. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2117-2128). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Plan Colombia did not reduce drug trafficking


In 2000, President Clinton signed into law Plan Colombia, providing the Colombians with billions of dollars in aid to combat drug trafficking. Plan Colombia has been one of the most exhaustive drug packages ever passed. This work provides a critical analysis of Plan Colombia, which sought to reduce the cultivation, trafficking, and production of drugs by 50 percent. 2 Despite spending more than $ 8 billion, Plan Colombia failed to achieve its drug objectives: drugs remain cheaper and more readily available than ever before. 3 Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 67-70). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Major study proves drug interdiction fails


The US Defense Department funded a two-year study which found that the use of the armed forces to interdict drugs coming into the United States would have minimal or no effect on cocaine traffic and might, in fact, raise the profits of cocaine cartels and manufacturers. The 175-page study, "Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction," was prepared by seven economists, mathematicians and researchers at the National Defense Research Institute, a branch of the RAND Corporation and released in 1988. The study noted that seven previous studies in the past nine years, including ones by the Center for Naval Research and the Office of Technology Assessment, had come to similar conclusions. Interdiction efforts, using current armed forces resources, would have almost no effect on cocaine importation into the United States, the report concluded.[15]

Plan Columbia has not reduced drugs


During this period examined, Plan Colombia has been a failure in terms of stemming the trafficking of drugs. Plan Colombia allocated billions of dollars for aerial spraying of herbicides. Despite spending large amounts of money, coca cultivation actually increased in some areas of Colombia. The next chapter addresses the failures of Plan Colombia to decrease drug cultivation and narco-trafficking, the plan’s initial goal. 150 Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 1646-1649). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Colombia#cite_note-15

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAND_Corporation

Aerial Spraying FailsThree reasons aerial spraying fails


The ineffectiveness of aerial spraying in reducing coca cultivation is explained by the fact that coca growers have developed various methods to protect coca crops from herbicide: (1) spraying molasses over the foliage of the coca plant prevents herbicide from penetrating the leaves and destroying the plant; (2) if coca growers cut the stem of a coca bush a few hours after an aerial spraying mission, the herbicide does not have enough time to kill the plant, which can quickly recover and produce again within just three or four months; and (3) even if the plants are killed by aerial spraying campaigns, coca growers often have additional seed beds prepared, ready to be planted.

Spraying didn’t reduce coca production and the herbicide is carciogenic


According to the US non-governmental organisation, Washington Office on Latin America (Wola), Plan Colombia helped in the aerial fumigation of more than 1.6 million hectares of coca in the country, using the controversial herbicide glyphosate. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), that might have put Colombia's population in danger because glyphosate is "probably carcinogenic". And according to Wola, the fumigation strategy didn't even work. Land cultivated with coca went up from 48,000 hectares in 2013 to 69,000 in 2014, the UN said. Cocaine production does not appear to have gone down either - in 2015, Colombian security forces seized a record 252 tonnes of the drug.

Arieal spraying means farmers plant more cocoa


Plan Colombia has had some partial victories in terms of decreasing violence and combatting the FARC. 60 However, Plan Colombia has not achieved its goals in terms of drugs. In many respects, aspects of Plan Colombia— like the aerial spraying initiatives— have been counterproductive as they have destroyed the Colombian countryside. Despite the failures of aerial spraying, the United States continued this activity for many years, and more recently it has supported manual eradication programs. The aerial spraying initiatives in Colombia have been both ineffective and counterproductive. Mejía states, “What we’ve seen is that aerial spraying does not work as a strategy,” 61 and maintains that rigorous studies using quasi-natural experiments, structural models, and economic strategies prove that aerial spraying does not work. He continues, “It does not reduce coca cultivation in the medium, or short-term, or long-run. What it does is create incentives so that farmers, in the presence of aerial spraying … plant more coca.” Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James





N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 1958-1966). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Farmers spray the plants with molasses to protect them


Coca cultivators, then, adapt to external conditions to survive. For instance, molasses can be sprayed on the plants in order to protect it from the herbicides. The United States has financed aerial spraying, which has had many negative consequences in terms of health and environmental effects, but continues to argue that aerial spraying is safe. Washington counters critics by defining the accuracy of the spraying, arguing that pilots control for wind, but research demonstrates that spray drift has been a major issue. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 1967-1970). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Spraying failed


Despite spending a tremendous amount of money on spraying coca cultivated in Colombia, drug cultivation increased over time. The program, then, cannot be deemed a success if the number of hectares being sprayed led to increases in cultivation, or barely impacted the percentage of coca being cultivated. While accurate reporting of the impacts of aerial spraying is difficult, one must note that agencies have different mechanisms for calculating coca, and, therefore report different results. Washington calculated that the area under cultivation decreased by 7 percent since 1999. On the other hand, U.N. research resulted in a much different number, reporting that the aerial spraying initiatives since 1999 resulted in a 50 percent decrease in the area being cultivated in Colombia, which suggests that the aerial spraying programs have been effective, whereas the 7 percent decrease the United States reports implies a much less effective program. This also raises another important issue in terms of how agencies measure coca being cultivated and the difficulty in finding such information. 64 Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 1978-1979). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Spraying Bad

Spraying causes disastrous health problems


Aerial spraying enabled pilots to spray large number of hectares from the air with a version of Roundup ®, a common herbicide designed to kill weeds that can be purchased in stores. The airplanes began spraying an effective concentration of Roundup Ultra ®, a compound of Cosmo-Flux and glyphosate, which is a weak type of organic acid. 59 Research indicates that glyphosate has disastrous health impacts and has led to various cases of poisoning. Buffin and Jewell discuss the problem of toxicity, stating: “Some literature suggests that glyphosate can cause chronic health effects in laboratory animals. Lifetime glyphosate feeding studies have shown reduced weight gain, liver and kidney effects and degradation of the eye lens. These effects were significant only at the higher doses tested. … In spite of animal tests showing a low mammalian toxicity, significant poisoning effects caused by both intentional and accidental exposure to glyphosate have been recorded in humans and laboratory animals.” 60 Further research demonstrates that glyphosate can have negative health impacts on reproduction. Research on animals found that glyphosate can indeed reduce the sperm count for men. Other research has suggested that glyphosate also can cause problems with pregnancy. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 780-789). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Spraying destroys the environment and threatens the food supply


Destroying coca crops by aerial spraying also has damaging effects on the environment. Research indicates that Roundup Ultra ® is damaging to the environment. At times, the wind factor is uncontrollable, and it can blow the herbicides to different regions. 62 The State Department asserts that the aerial spraying programs are executed in a manner that minimizes harm and spray drift. Ramírez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh argue that spray drift is a major problem that Washington underplays, stating: “However, the sheer number and consistency of the reports of damage lend them credibility, and many complaints have been verified by Colombian state agencies, intergovernmental commissions, or independent parties. Herbicide spray drift is a [sic] probably a major cause of the damage; models created by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) show that herbicide can drift up to 600 feet downwind from their targets. Although, on paper, a procedure exists to compensate small farmers whose legal crops are destroyed by spraying, in practice it has not functioned.” 63 As a result of the spray drift, Roundup Ultra ® can enter into the water, polluting the water and causing significant damages to the ecosystem. The chemicals in the herbicides have had negative impacts on various crops and resulted in damages to their production, which is an integral part of the food supply. Rosen,

Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 791-802). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Spraying violates constitutional rights of Colombians


The aerial spraying program also has been criticized on the grounds that it is illegal and violates the Colombian constitution. Importantly, no other country in Latin America— except Colombia— permits the spraying of herbicides from airplanes. 66 The Administrative Court in Cundinamarca determined that the aerial fumigation program is unconstitutional for several reasons. First, citizens living in Colombia have the constitutional right to public health and security, and a Colombian court ruled that the government has the obligation to provide people living within Colombia a healthy environment in which to live. 67 President Uribe refused to suspend the aerial spraying program and ignored the ruling of the court. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 815-817). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Answers to: Spraying Stopped

Glyphosate is still being used

Mike LaSousa, February 2016, Human Rights Activists Dispute “Success” of “Plan Colombia” http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/34951-human-rights-activists-dispute-success-of-plan-colombia

For years, US officials strongly defended the controversial program, despite its failure to substantially reduce the supply of cocaine in the international market and despite serious humanitarian concerns about the practice. The Colombian government recently suspended aerial spraying of herbicides, but glyphosate is still being used in manual eradication efforts.

http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/8203el-herbicida-glifosato-se-sigue-utilizando-en-la-erradicacion-de-matas-de-coca/20160129/nota/3048521.aspx

http://www.wola.org/commentary/good_riddance_to_a_bad_policy_twilight_hour_of_coca_fumigation_campaign_highlights_its_in

http://eltiempo.com/politica/justicia/fumigacion-de-cultivos-ilicitos-con-glifosato-entrevista-con-subsecretario-de-estado-de-estados-unidos/15643395

Crop Substitution

Crop Substitution AnswersCrop substitution programs fail because growers make less money


Washington has attempted to help coca cultivators grow other legal products, such as rice, coffee, citrus fruit, grains, maize, and bananas. 76 U.S. efforts have been futile as coca growers continue to grow coca, which is more profitable. The reasons that growers cultivate coca are purely economic, yet the United States fails to understand the reality of life for campesinos in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Mejía notes that farmers earn more money when they make coca paste or coca base as opposed to strictly cultivating the coca leaf. 77 Basic economics teaches us about the laws of supply and demand and rationality. Brienen argues, “If you look at the price of raw coca, … it is relatively stable.” 78 Therefore, one does not need a complicated game theoretic model to understand that coca cultivators will continue to grow coca because of the earning potential despite the fact that it is illegal. In addition, the laws of supply and demand help explain the logic and rationale for growing coca. Coca growers have a market for their goods because they play an integral part in the cocaine supply chain. As long as cocaine is in demand and profits can be earned, then coca growers will have a market to sell the coca that they cultivate. As a result of the demand, coca growers can earn more money growing and selling coca than they can from bananas or other legal products. In fact, research indicates that growers can earn between four to ten times the money growing coca than other legal alternatives, such as bananas. 79 Coca growers earn a living growing this product, and, therefore, it is a rational choice for them to want to maximize their income. 80 Another reason coca is more profitable is that it requires less effort to maintain and to transport. In an interview, Brienen raises an important point regarding the infrastructure problems in Colombia, stating, “Coca lasts for a good long time. It [coca] can be stored away. If you grow bananas, or oranges or any kind of fruit, what people care about is what it looks like. …” 81 People do not want to eat a fruit that looks unappealing. He continued, “An attractive fruit can’t be dented. If you are going over a bunch of not great roads through the Andes, it is hard to get fruit from one place to the other, especially at a point of export and to keep it in shape so that you can market it internationally.” 82 This is not true at all for coca; the only thing that buyers care about is the total bulk weight of the coca. Thus, problems would still exist even if oranges grew in the Andes. One of the major issues with fruit like oranges is determining a way to transport the product to market without damage. Rural Colombia has major problems with infrastructure, particularly roads, and transporting oranges from the highlands to the market before the product spoils would be difficult. Ted Galen Carpenter also describes the situation for coca cultivators, stating: Because they operate outside the law, drug-crop growers do not have to deal with many of the obstacles that farmers of legal crops must endure. Those obstacles include poor transportation infrastructure, lack of access to credit, lack of reasonable and consistent government standards for recognizing titles to property (as well as lack of efficient enforcement of property rights), and volatile, unpredictable markets for agricultural products. Buyers for trafficking organizations merely purchase the crops, pay the growers well, and haul off the crops. Not surprisingly, a significant percentage of Latin American farmers prefer to do business that way even if it means dealing in an illegal product. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 865-868). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Carrying baskets of oranges from the highlands to market without machinery is difficult and inefficient. Purchasing a wheelbarrow or other types of transportation requires a peasant to have money to purchase such products. A peasant may not have access to capital and cannot sign a loan for money in order to develop a productive business. Even if access to credit exists, contractual issues could arise and less developed regions of Colombia, for instance, do not have strong enforcement of property rights. Legal issues can be complicated and enforcing the law requires time, and perhaps, a lawyer to represent a client to ensure justice. Hiring a lawyer and educating oneself with regard to one’s rights requires capital. This brief scenario helps demonstrate that growing legal crops and transporting them to the market is very challenging. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 869-875). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Lack of security kills crop substitution


Another important element hindering the growth of legal goods is the security dynamic. Peasants are forced to grow coca because the armed actors, such as the FARC, could harm them if they do not grow coca. An individual residing in rural Colombia does not have the choice to grow other crops because the FARC demands that coca must be cultivated because it is an integral part of the processing of cocaine. In other words, the money from cocaine trafficking cannot be obtained if coca is not refined into cocaine. People are rational when their lives are threatened and will continue to grow coca if they are pressured by illegal armed actors who demand that they cultivate coca leaves. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 876-879). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Human Rights

Plan Colombia Undermines Human Rights

Human rights activists have been targeted and millions have been displaced


For example, Fabián Laverde of the Social Corporation for Community Advisory and Training pointed out that while violence associated with the armed conflict hasdecreased significantly since the start of Plan Colombia, attacks against human rights defenders like himself have risen to levels described by the country's top United Nations official as "extremely alarming." Various politicians and commentators have cited generally declining murder and kidnapping rates as achievements attributable to Plan Colombia. But much less public attention has been paid to the more than 6 million Colombian citizens victimized since the program began - including more than 4 million people displaced from their homes and more than 3,500 civilians murdered by Colombian security forces, who disguised many of the victims as guerillas in order to inflate the tally of "enemies" killed. Luz Elena Galeano, of the Medellín-based organization Women Walking for Truth, described operations carried out by state security forces that resulted in massacres and enforced disappearances. "They were the ones that raided our homes," she said, referring to members of the security forces. "And pointing to young people who had nothing to do with the war, they took them out of their houses, killed them and then disappeared many of them." "As for Plan Colombia, I think it's the worst support that went to Colombia," Galeano continued. "Because the United States gave money for war, and to assassinate our loved ones and to disappear them."


But glowing reviews of Plan Colombia obscure its ineffectiveness and the devastating human costs of the country’s militarization. The crackdown has led to massive upheaval, with more than 4 million people internally displaced since 2000. Of those, most were women and children, with Afro-Colombian and indigenous people disproportionately affected. The staggering number — about a tenth of the country’s nearly 50 million people — adds to those previously dispossessed, leaving Colombia second only to Syria in terms of internally

http://lawg.org/storage/documents/Human_Rights_Costs_during_Plan_Colombia.pdf

http://www.wola.org/commentary/interactive_data_presentation_explore_plan_colombias_legacy

http://lawg.org/storage/documents/Human_Rights_Costs_during_Plan_Colombia.pdf

http://www.abcolombia.org.uk/subpage.asp?subid=608&mainid=23

http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2015/09/21/violence-in-colombia-falls-to-175-level/

displaced people. The National Unit for the Integral Attention and Reparation of Victims has registered more than 6 million people seeking restitution for harms inflicted during Plan Colombia’s operation. The crackdown was also accompanied by egregious human rights abuses. Since the plan’s inception, more than 1,000 trade unionists and at least 370 journalists have been killed; at least 400 human rights defenders were murdered, with many more activists tortured, disappeared, kidnapped or detained; and nearly half a million women were subjected to sexual violence from 2001 to 2009.

Plan Colombia increased human rights violations


Plan Colombia provided funds that helped human rights organisations - but some argue that militarisation has only increased risks. For Ricardo Vargas Meza, a Colombian sociologist who has studied the history of the plan, those worst-affected are civilians. "There were very tough measures against the civilians, like food control," he explained. The aim of that was to prevent the guerrillas from getting supplies through third parties, Mr Vargas Meza said. The Wola report also points to the collaboration between Colombian security forces and paramilitary groups, as well as "false positive cases" (where civilians were killed by the army and passed as rebel fighters) and abuses by the intelligence services. In the most recent years of Plan Colombia, though, the human rights situation has been improving.


http://www.usofficeoncolombia.org/uploads/application-pdf/2011-03-23-Report-English.pdf

http://www.usofficeoncolombia.org/uploads/application-pdf/2011-03-23-Report-English.pdf

https://cpj.org/americas/colombia/

http://lawg.org/component/content/article/76/1562

Human Rights -- Answers to: Monitoring Solves

Lack of transparency kills monitoring


Key details of U.S. assistance and logistical support for the training programs remain shrouded in secrecy. For example, it is unclear who is conducting the training, which forces are being trained and whether they are being properly vetted for compliance with human rights norms. Without transparency, the programs cannot be subject to proper monitoring and assessment. It is ironic that Santos is now exporting the militarized and prohibitionist aspects of the war on drugs, the logic and effectiveness of which he has openly questioned.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/13/colombia-juan-santos-war-on-drugs

http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-us-shouldnt-export-colombia-drug-war-success

Answers to: Alternative Livelihood Programs GoodAlternative livelihood programs have little benefit and Colombia discontinued them


Alternative livelihood programs are designed to provide coca-growing communities with new options for social and economic development. Programs encourage coca farmers to abandon coca cultivation for legal crops in exchange for governmental support, which includes training, monetary incentives, and assistance in commercializing new products. Colombia has invested heavily in various alternative livelihood programs—ranging from coca crop substitution programs to Familias Guardabosques and Productive Projects—yet the effectiveness of such programs remains in question. Many of the programs have faced implementation problems, and those implemented have been limited to training or monetary incentives, without providing farmers the necessary resources to market their products and ensure that the projects are ultimately self-sustaining. Farmers that do not have the means to market legal products often end up returning to the cultivation of illicit crops. Political and economic constraints exist as well. For example, a lack of land titles in coca-growing regions discourages farmers from cultivating crops that require long-term planning and investment prior to seeing any financial returns. It is therefore critical that alternative livelihood programs be designed in a way that ensures they are self-sustaining, at the very least, in the medium term. An alternative livelihood program in Colombia that has worked, however, is the Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena (PCIM), which successfully integrated state presence into a coca-growing region through a variety of programs focused on health, education, justice reform, and police presence. The PCIM not only significantly reduced illicit crops, but also improved economic indicators, school enrollment rates, and health outcomes and reduced homicides in a very short period of time.36 Yet for reasons that are still unknown, the Colombian government discontinued the expansion of this model.



Economy

Answers to: Plan Colombia Increased Growth

Growth created by Plan Colombia only benefits the elites


Parts of Colombia, particularly the southern Pacific coastal area, have experienced a troubling recent spike in paramilitary activities. The bacrims remain active in the increasingly violent port city of Buenaventura. The economy is more stable, yet poverty and inequality have been exceptionally stubborn in rural areas. But Plan Colombia mostly benefited the country’s elites.

https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/03/20/crisis-buenaventura/disappearances-dismemberment-and-displacement-colombias-main

Violence

Answers to: Reduced ViolenceMore violence during Plan Colombia


Although the aim of Plan Colombia was to reduce violence, in the first eight years there was an increase in the number of victims affected by the internal conflict. More than 800,000 people said they were victimised in 2008, according to the government's Unit for Victims. From the total 7.8 million people registered with the Unit, about 75% said the crime they were subjected to took place during Plan Colombia. The main culprit has been forced displacement, carried out mainly by guerrillas, paramilitary groups and illegal groups. But there was a reduction in other forms of violence. "I don't think in 2002 anyone in their right mind expected that by 2005, homicides would have been cut by almost half," said Adam Isacson, who produced the Wola report. There was also a sharp drop in kidnappings and massacres.

Plan Colombia caused massive displacement and didn’t reduce the drug trade

Plan Colombia — a massive U.S. military and counternarcotics aid package to the Colombian government — began in 2000. A decade and a half and $10 billion later, it has had little impact on coca cultivation, cocaine production or the cocaine trade (Colombia is again the world’s leading coca producer). But it has had a devastating impact on Colombia and its people.

Under Plan Colombia, US taxpayer dollars have financed gross and widespreadviolations of human rights. It has paid for thousands of people murdered, disappeared, tortured, raped. It has forced millions of people to flee their homes - fueling a conflict that has resulted in more internally displaced people than nearly any other. It has funneled monies to paramilitary death squads guilty of some of the conflict’s most heinous atrocities. It has funded Colombian military units guilty of assassinating dissidents, labor leaders, and students in order to silence political opposition and crush social movements. It has paid security forces that murder thousands of civilians and dress them up as guerillas in the so-called “false positive” scandal - which Colombia’s top brass knew about as it happened. It has funded aerial fumigation using toxic chemicals that poison people and environment but fail to make a dent in the

https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/24/colombia-top-brass-linked-extrajudicial-executions

https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/24/colombia-top-brass-linked-extrajudicial-executions

http://www.latintimes.com/colombia-military-scandal-generals-knew-about-extrajudicial-killings-punished-324805

http://www.internal-displacement.org/blog/2014/a-record-33-3-million-now-displaced-by-conflict-and-violence-worldwide-as-one-family-flees-inside-syria-every-60-seconds

http://www.internal-displacement.org/blog/2014/a-record-33-3-million-now-displaced-by-conflict-and-violence-worldwide-as-one-family-flees-inside-syria-every-60-seconds

http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/americas/colombia/us-policy-in-colombia

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-a-blow-to-us-policy-colombia-is-again-the-worlds-top-producer-of-coca/2015/11/10/316d2f66-7bf0-11e5-bfb6-65300a5ff562_story.html?postshare=7921447252474020

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42982.pdf



drug trade. And it has enriched U.S. military contractors and otherdrug war profiteers.

Plan Colombia and other similar programs result in murder, rape, and other forms of violence

Daniel Robelo is the research coordinator for Drug Policy Action, November 13, 2015, Huffington Post, Sorry, Hillary, Plan Colombia has been a drug disaster, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-robelo/hillary-clinton-plan-colombia_b_8557396.html DOA: 11-4-16

U.S. soldiers themselves have been implicated in numerous human rights abuses while deployed during Plan Colombia operations - including allegedly raping dozens of Colombian women and girls between 2003 and 2007. This is the legacy of Plan Colombia, and try as she might, Clinton can’t run from it. Yet shamefully it’s being rolled out as a model and exported throughout the region. First it was Mexico, to which the US has given $3 billion in military assistance since 2007. The results have been predictable: murders, disappearances, displacement, torture, and extrajudicial executions have all skyrocketed - many perpetrated by security forces armed, trained and equipped by the US of A.

“Success” was achieved by killing innocent people


To burnish claims of the plan’s success, security forces killed more than 5,700 civilians from 2000 to 2010, many lured to their deaths by the promise of jobs. Military members later staged combat scenes to make it appear as if the deaths were caused by warfare. Impunity has been widespread. Out of some 3,500 killings investigated by Colombia’s prosecutor general, only 402 resulted in convictions, mostly of low-level forces. Last year, Prosecutor General Eduardo

http://forusa.org/content/report-rise-fall-false-positive-killings-colombia-role-us-military-assistance-2000-2010


http://ustired2.com/facts/

http://ustired2.com/facts/

http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/plan-colombia-in-central-america-foreign-policy-stavridis

http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/plan-colombia-in-central-america-foreign-policy-stavridis

http://colombiareports.co/more-than-54-colombian-girls-sexually-abuses-by-us-military-report/

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-robelo/hillary-clinton-plan-colombia_b_8557396.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-robelo/hillary-clinton-plan-colombia_b_8557396.html

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-06-15-colombia_N.htm

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-06-15-colombia_N.htm

Montealegre announced that 22 generals are being investigated, but their long overdue prosecution is far from certain. In fact, some top officers associated with the scandal have been nominated for promotions.

Claimed “success” based on false positives

Steven Cohen is a reporter-researcher at The New Republic. A former freelance journalist and editor at Colombia Reports, his work on Colombia has appeared in ThinkProgress, The Nation, The New Republic, Vice, and others., July 17, 2015, Rewriting the History of Plan Colombia, https://nacla.org/news/2015/07/17/rewriting-history-plan-colombia

Last month, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published "On their Watch," a 95-page

report that should eliminate any doubt as to the maliciousness of Kelly's intentions. Having reviewed months of in-depth interviews and research, the report's authors concluded, "There is abundant evidence indicating that numerous senior army officers bear responsibility" for the widespread Colombian military practice known as "false positives." False positives is a euphemism, an innocuous technical-sounding shield for a phenomenon HRW Americas Director Jose Miguel Vivanco has characterized as "one of the worst episodes of mass atrocity in the Western Hemisphere in recent years." That it has stuck, and that even people who understand what it means still use it, is just one testament to the extent to which Kelly and company have been able to dictate the terms of the narrative "battle." What false positives actually entails is the systematic cold-blooded murder of civilians for profit and political gamesmanship, a coherent military strategy to inflate statistics by passing off executed civilians as rebels killed in combat. Often, units involved in the practice--and virtually every brigade in the Colombian Army has been--targeted the most vulnerable elements of society: the poor, drug-addicted, and mentally handicapped. In some cases, soldiers received fresh corpses from right-wing death squads and dressed them in rebel fatigues. This barbaric enterprise was, at the very least, condoned by the highest levels of the military and executive office and explicitly incentivized with bonuses, paid vacations, and promotions. No one has ever accused Colombian justice of being among the "strong institutions" Kelly claims to admire, and false positives offers a fairly representative case study. According to HRW, prosecutors are assessing some 3,000 alleged false positive extrajudicial executions committed between 2002 and 2008. (In 2014, an authoritative report from the Fellowship of Reconciliation recorded 5,763 alleged cases between 2000 and 2010.) Of the roughly 800 soldiers thus far convicted, none rise above the rank of



https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/24/their-watch/evidence-senior-army-officers-responsibility-false-positive-killings

http://www.wola.org/news/colombia_set_to_promote_military_officers_linked_to_false_positives_scandal_other_abuses


colonel. The Colombian Attorney General recently announced that 22 generals are under investigation for their role in the killings, but no general has been so much as indicted to date, and there is little reason to expect one will be soon. This skepticism stems partly from the fact that three of the five brigade commanders who oversaw the largest numbers of false positives have gone on to become commander general of the Colombian Army, including General Jaime Lasprilla Villamizar, who quietly retired last month. Alvaro Uribe, the hardline former president who formalized the false positive incentive structure and lit the political flame under the Army's results-based offensive, is now a sitting senator and the leader of a prominent opposition party that has likened the investigation of military war crimes to political terrorism. Juan Manuel Santos, whose term as defense minister coincided with the most dramatic spike in incidents, is now the president of the country. Undermanned and overworked, the Attorney General's Office has mismanaged its resources and failed to coordinate its false positives investigations. Prosecutors contend with the obstruction of a recalcitrant military, which believes itself to be the victim of “judicial warfare,” a vast conspiracy of rebel-infiltrators and terrorist-sympathizing NGOs and journalists working to undo the laudable achievements of the Uribe years. And soldiers who do speak out face threats and violent reprisals--presumably from those isolated, rogue elements within the military that have not, as Kelly puts it, "embraced human-rights training." The Santos administration has dealt with these impediments by repeatedly pushing "reforms" that would cede jurisdiction over false positives to the military court system, where they have been met with utter impunity. The only conclusion to be drawn from this sad state of affairs is that the Colombian government lacks the ability or political will to reign in the fanatical criminality the United States has spent the last several decades empowering. Following the transparent sham of the demobilization they negotiated with the Uribe government in 2006, Colombia’s paramilitaries have reformed into splinter groups that continue to terrorize labor organizers, journalists, and community leaders in much of the country. The “para-political” nexus of moneyed interests, mafiosos, and reactionary extremists that backed Mr. Uribe’s militant rise to the presidency remains largely in-tact. And Mr. Santos’ Victim’s Law has done more to legitimize the largest land grab in Colombian history than it has to repair Colombia’s more than six million internal victims of forced displacement, the second largest such population in the world.

…. Essential to this final re-casting of Plan Colombia as a beacon of peace is the depiction of false positives--when they’re mentioned at all--as an aberration, rather than a centralized military tactic indicative of a far more pervasive total war logic. But embassy cables reveal that U.S. officials were aware of the Colombian military's "body count mentalities" as early as 1994, long before the massive surge in aid and training that came with Plan Colombia. Within a limited but revealing sample, commanders who spent time at the U.S. Army’s infamous School of the Americas (SOA, now the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation--WHINSEC) have been shown to be significantly more likely to preside over multiple false positives killings.

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB266/

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB266/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR23/031/2014/en/

http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/01/17/colombia-demobilization-scheme-ensures-injustice

http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/01/17/colombia-demobilization-scheme-ensures-injustice

http://colombiareports.com/colombia-investigating-22-generals-over-extrajudicial-killing-scandal/

Militarization prolonged the bloodshed


Aside from the catastrophic humanitarian toll, crediting Plan Colombia with paving the way for peace by weakening FARC and forcing the insurgents to the bargaining table is misleading. In fact, the militarization prolonged the bloodshed by helping derail peace talks from 1999 to 2002 between then-President Andrés Pastrana and FARC. U.S. investment in the military buildup helped embolden his government to reject a negotiated settlement in favor of a battlefield victory.

Demobilized fighters joined criminal gangs


With Plan Colombia already in place, between 2003-2006 about 30,000 men demobilised from paramilitary groups after an agreement with the government. The process was partially successful. A significant number of fighters - 15%, suggests the Wola report - became involved in what the government calls "Bacrims", or criminal gangs, focusing on drug trafficking and extortion. Such is the power of some of these gangs, that the government has even authorised the use of air raids against them.

Training created paramlitary security forces


They now even train soldiers and officers from around the world and allow them to provide support to countries where the US has an interest in intervening. However, there have been reports of Colombian soldiers quitting their jobs to offer their services as mercenaries - for example, joining the United Arab Emirates forces to fight in Yemen.

Plan Colombia undermined another peace process, delaying peace


There is a belief in Colombia that the tough offensive against Farc guerrillas, aided by Plan Colombia, weakened the rebel group to a point that forced it to negotiate with the government in Havana. The two




sides have been engaged in peace talks for the past three years. But Virginia Bouvier, from the Washington-based United Institute of Peace, reads history differently. When Plan Colombia was implemented in 2000, there was another peace process going on. "I think the prospect of a militarised plan to strengthen the Colombian military at a time when peace was being negotiated tilted the balance of power towards the military," Ms Bouvier said. Those peace talks failed - and so, for her, Plan Colombia "postponed the prospect of peace for another decade"

Plan Colombia caused massacres and food insecurity


William Rivas, who has served as the head of the Community Council of the Peasant Association of the Atrato, one of the country's largest land rights organizations, also criticized Plan Colombia.

"It created displacement, it created massacres … It has created the loss of food security, the dispossession of territories," Rivas said. "The resources that the United States now wants to provide to Colombia should be invested to repay the injuries [caused by] the previous resources."

Any security gains have come at high costs


Plan Colombia has achieved some security gains, but they have come at high costs. Adam Isacson also believes that Plan Colombia should not be a model. He writes, “looked at more closely … though, Colombia’s security gains are partial, possibly reversible, and weighed down by ‘collateral damage.’ ”53 Collateral damage includes a plethora of human rights abuses and lost lives as a result of the war on drugs in Colombia. In an interview, Lisa Haugaard of the Latin American Working Group questioned how one could call Plan Colombia a model, arguing that the costs in terms of human lives as a result of human rights abuses have been far too grave to consider exporting Plan Colombia as a model. She notes that from 2004 to 2008, members of the Colombian army recruited young men convincing them that they would be working as brick layers or at other day jobs, but later murdered them in order to falsify the results against the armed groups. She continues, “I have seen a huge increase in direct violations of human rights …” because more than 3,000 people have been killed in extrajudicial executions (far more as a result of the war; in excess of 3,000 just in extrajudicial executions allegedly by members of the army) and more than 3 million people displaced during Plan Colombia. 54 Haugaard also emphasized the Uribe administration’s role in protecting human rights abusers. She points out that the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), an intelligence service operating in Colombia, often functioned more as the secret police. 55 The first director, Jorge Noguera, reportedly had linkages with the paramilitaries and even provided the AUC with information about Colombia’s military operations. Noguera provided the AUC with secret information about names of human rights defenders as well as leaders of labor organizations. 56 Isacson agrees with

Haugaard, stating that approximately 21,000 police, soldiers, paramilitaries, and guerrillas have been killed as a result of Plan Colombia and the attempt to bring peace to the country. Experts estimate that 14,000 civilians also have been killed since 2010.57 The increases in security, therefore, have cost a tremendous amount in terms of blood and treasure. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2870-2882). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Answers to: It’s a Good Model

US funded programs being exported and destabilizing the rest of Latin America


Second, the effect of Colombia’s militarization extends far beyond its borders. Thanks to its well-funded military forces — trained by the U.S. in counternarcotics and counterinsurgency — Colombia has evolved into a security exporter, providing training to foreign military forces throughout the rest of South America, the Caribbean and West Africa. U.S.-funded international training programs are seen as a way of capitalizing on the skills acquired under Plan Colombia and providing secure employment for demobilized Colombian troops.

http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-us-shouldnt-export-colombia-drug-war-success

http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-the-united-states-and-security-cooperation-by-proxy

Answers to: “Plan Colombia Led to a Peace Agreement”

The voters rejected the peace agreement


The Colombian people voted NO to peace. Or to be exact, 50.2% of 37% of the eligible population voted no. In the referendum held Oct. 2, the majority of voters decided to scuttle four years of peace talks dedicated to ending 52 years of bloodshed. The vote came just days after the celebratory signing of the agreement, considered exemplary for achieving a bridge between historic enemies and dealing broadly with the root causes of the conflict. The rest of the world was stunned. Most pundits have begun the post-mortem analysis of the referendum saying something like “Colombians did not vote against peace.” They go on to discuss factors including people’s ignorance of the accords, or their mistaken belief that after four years it could simply be renegotiated. But the fact of the matter is that the NO voters voted clearly and unambiguously to continue the war. The words on the ballot read: “Do you accept the final agreement to terminate the conflict and build a stable and lasting peace?” It’s almost inconceivable that any population would vote no on this proposition, but they did. So why? Although even former president Alvaro Uribe, the nation’s lead warmonger, now makes the politically correct statement that the ultimate goal is peace, the macho sentiments of total domination and punishment (of one side), along with a strong dose of Cold War hysteria (yes, in the 21st century) won the day. The NO promoters knew what they were doing. They were not promoting an alternative peace. As a 32-year old NO voter quoted in the New York Times put it, “If ‘no’ wins, we won’t have peace, but at least we won’t give the country away to the guerrillas.” His statement reflects the patriarchal logic that has started and perpetuated wars since time immemorial–the only good enemy is a dead enemy, and if I don’t win, nobody wins. At least some NO voters and many of

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/world/colombia-peace-deal-defeat.html?emc=edit_th_20161003&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=62170141


http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/19204


the leaders are betting on continuing war until they gain by force their entire military and political agenda–a prospect that, given the war’s longevity to date could easily be another half century. Or never.

Plan Colombia didn’t bring FARC to the negotiating table


Before the NO vote, the U.S. press hailed Plan Colombia for making peace possible. President Obama, in his self-congratulatory last speech to the UN stated we “helped Colombia end Latin America’s longest war.” The logic of this bizarre argument went that were it not for the military debilitation of the guerrilla thanks to the US-Colombian military alliance, the FARC could never have been brought to the negotiating table.

The NO vote is the classic example of the fallacy of that logic. The war fomented by Plan Colombia built up a mentality that made peace an unacceptable solution for many. It revealed the fundamental clash of perspectives between diplomacy and annihilation.

The lesson couldn’t be clearer: War is a terrible preparation for peace. Peace depends on much more than a favorable correlation of forces. Peace, at its core, is a rejection of force as the way to confront differences, and a search for non-violent solutions to conflict and conflict prevention.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/20/address-president-obama-71st-session-united-nations-general-assembly


Answers to: “Plan Colombia Promotes Human Rights”

Widespread human rights violations continue

Amnesty Interational, no date, US Policy in Colombia, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/americas/colombia/us-policy-in-colombia

Despite overwhelming evidence of continued failure to protect human rights the State Department has continued to certify Colombia as fit to receive aid. The US has continued a policy of throwing "fuel on the fire" of already widespread human rights violations, collusion with illegal paramilitary groups and near total impunity.

Furthermore, after 10 years and over $8 billion dollars of US assistance to Colombia, US policy has failed to reduce availability or use of cocaine in the US, and Colombia's human rights record remains deeply troubling. Despite this, the State Department continues to certify military aid to Colombia, even after reviewing the country?s human rights record.

Despite the government sponsored "demobilization" process both Colombian and international human rights organizations have repeatedly documented and reported on continued military-paramilitary collaboration, including reports issued by the United Nations, are abundant. We see on-going use of military courts to handle cases of human rights violations and failure to take decisive action to combat impunity.

Human rights organizations also worry about extraditions of paramilitary leaders to the U.S. as another obstacle to justice. A 2010 report by the International Human Rights Law Clinic of the University of California, Berkeley, Truth Behind Bars: Colombian Paramilitary Leaders in U.S. Custody, describes how the extraditions of paramilitary leaders to the U.S. have had adverse consequences for Colombia's ongoing human rights and corruption investigations and undermine U.S. counternarcotics efforts. The report recommends that the United States incentivize the extradited leaders? cooperation with accountability efforts and improve cooperation with Colombian prosecutors and judges.

Answers to: Improved EnvironmentPlan Colombia increased illegal mining


While all the focus was on other security issues, illegal mining started to thrive and became an important source of income for illegal groups. "That was never factored into Plan Colombia," said Mr Vargas Meza. That was because the main sources of income for the rebel groups originally identified by the authorities were drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, he explained. But the problem became serious only after 2007, with the increase in the price of commodities.


General

General Benefits to Plan Colombia

Multiple benefits to Plan Colombia

US Agency for International Development, February 6, 2016, US Assistance for Plan Colombia: Our Challenge, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/usaid-assistance-plan-colombia

SAID’s successes since 2000, in partnership with the Colombian government, include:

Bolstered economic growth, contributing to a 30% decrease in rural poverty levels over 10 years.

Increased private investment in rural Colombia, leveraging over $600 million of private capital from $47 million of USAID targeted investments.

Planted more than 350,000 hectares of farmland with licit crops, like cacao and specialty coffee, increasing the security and economic benefit of hundreds of thousands of farmers.

Supported 1,400 community-led projects, valued at over $487 million dollars, developed to strengthen communities and increase licit economic opportunities in conflict-affected municipalities.

Ensured government protection for at-risk or threatened individuals, such as union leaders, human rights defenders, journalists, and municipal leaders, to carry out their activities.

Enabled the establishment of more than 100 justice centers, providing citizens with quick, effective, and free access to justice services. Since 1995, 15 million cases, 65% of which are from women, have been reviewed.

Helped ensure financial compensation by the Colombian government for more than 600,000 victims. While only 10 percent of registered victims, this is the largest number of reparations ever provided.

Increased Colombia’s capacity to address land conflicts and register titles through trained public defenders, improved access to vital land records, and the identification of over 1.2 million hectares of land available for restitution.

Supported the reintegration of 13,000 demobilized ex-combatants and more than 20,000 community members into society. Provided 6,000 disengaged child soldiers with basic needs (food, shelter, health, education, and security) and rehabilitation support, while preventing the further recruitment of children by illegal armed groups.

Developed job training program for 9,000 Afro-Colombian and indigenous youth; more than 8,000 of which have graduated and begun employment.

Protected 800,000 hectares of Pacific Coast forest, capturing 2 million tons of CO2 yearly, through the forest conservation-focused business plans of 19 Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.

Improved gold mining practices and reduced mercury use by legalizing and formalizing 150 small scale mining operations. Over 600 hectares degraded by illegal mining are now forestry plantations.

Uniqueness – Colombia Stabilizing Now

Colombia has stabilized, peace now


Today, Colombia is a country transformed. It has one of Latin America’s healthiest economies, violence has dropped dramatically and the country is on the verge of ending more than half a century of internal conflict with Farc guerrillas who appear prepared to sign a peace deal in coming months.

Colombia is now a stable democracy

Jose Cardenas, February 1, 2016, ForeignPolicy.com, Plan Colombia shouldn’t be the price of peace with FARC, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/01/plan-colombia-shouldnt-be-the-price-of-peace-with-the-farc/ Cardenas was the acting assistant security of state for Latin America under Bush

Likely unbeknownst to most Americans, Colombia is a country that has undergone a profound transformation over the past 15 years, and that more than $10 billion of Americans’ hard-earned tax dollars have been invested to help make that happen. Today, in stark contrast to the image conveyed in the current Netflix series Narcos — a land of drug lords and criminal impunity — Colombia is a strong, financially stable democracy, a member of the free-market Pacific Alliance trade bloc, and a regional leader in training other countries’ police and military forces to combat drug-trafficking and other threats to security.


https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/colombia-farc-rebel-group-civil-war-us-terrorist-organization-list-peace-deal

US Assistance Has Worked

Many forms of valuable US assistance

Mark Moyar, et al, 2014, Joint Special Operations University, Persisent Engagement in Colombia, http://jsou.socom.mil/pubspages/jsou14-3_moyar-pagan-griego_colombia_final.pdf, Dr. Mark Moyar, Brigadier General (retired) Hector Pagan, and Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Wil R. Griego analyze United States Special Operations Forces’ (USSOF)

The subject matter of the U.S. training and education administered to Colombian forces has varied widely. Some of it has been more valuable than others, suggesting that considerable care be taken in shaping future training and education strategies. A substantial amount of the training that SOF has provided to the Colombian armed forces consisted of basic marksmanship and other basic skills. Such training persisted into the 21st century, which to many seasoned Colombian and American officers, constituted an inefficient use of 7th Group resources since the Colombians had plenty of their own instructors who could conduct such training and were in need of more advanced training. When asked which types of USSOF training have been of greatest value to Colombia’s ground forces, Colombian military officers most often mentioned intelligence, planning, reconnaissance, communications, close-quarters combat, heavy weapons, and combat medicine. Many officers from elite units emphasized the value of training in the use of sophisticated equipment, along with the provision of the equipment itself, in combating a sophisticated enemy.131 Colombian personnel also noted that air force special operations training enabled Colombian airmen to take over critical skilled jobs that had previously been filled by expensive expatriate contractors.

…

USSOF have transferred newfound unclassified sensitive-site exploitation (SSE) skills that it acquired in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have concentrated the training on Colombian police units, who by law are responsible for investigating sites after combat no matter which security forces participated in the fighting. These skills have enabled the police to collect information that would have been missed in years past and to undertake fruitful operations on the basis of that information. They have also improved the police’s capability to collect evidence that can stand up in a court of law. Colombian commanders wanted some high end capabilities, such as highaltitude parachuting, which were not needed in the operating environment. These capabilities were “glamorous,” as they required sophisticated equipment and high-end skills, which explained the interest in acquiring them. The United States had to be firm in resisting requests for this type of support, for resources were scarce and providing one type of support meant reducing or eliminating another type of support. Through training, education, and support, the Americans imparted a wide range of cultural attributes that were beneficial to partner-nation security and governance. “The most important thing that Colombia gained from U.S. military assistance was the transfer of culture,” said General (Retired) Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle. “The Americans served as our role models. We watched their behavior, their discipline, their humility, and their commitment to their country, and tried to emulate them.”132 J. M. Eastman, a Vice Minister in the Colombian government, has cited some of the most important aspects of U.S. culture transmitted by American personnel, both civil and military. The United States “brings a rigor of training, focus, organization that we Colombians lacked,” Eastman observed. “It has speeded up what may have been a much slower process. U.S. assistance brings decisiveness, and helps us to make decisions.”133

http://jsou.socom.mil/pubspages/jsou14-3_moyar-pagan-griego_colombia_final.pdf

…

The Colombians embraced American planning methods, which are much more detailed and systematic than prior Colombian planning methods. They have adopted the U.S. Army’s Military Decision Making Process and other military planning processes, although most Colombian officers have said that these processes have been modified based on the peculiarities of Colombia’s situation. With their emphasis on using information to drive logically towards a conclusion, these processes have made the Colombians more rigorous in their thinking and decision-making. The education of Colombian officers at American military institutions contributed to the development of more rigorous operational and strategic thinking in the Colombian armed forces. Year-long courses promoted the absorption of American ways of analysis and problem solving. General Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle, who served as army commander and then commander of all the armed forces, credits his time at the U.S. Army Infantry School and U.S. National War College as the inspiration for several of his most important initiatives. His study of the U.S. Marine Combined Action Program of the Vietnam War, for example, influenced his implementation of the soldados campesinos program. His attendance of a course on joint warfare at the National War College helped guide reforms that increased interoperability among Colombia’s armed forces.134 U.S. assistance also promoted independent and creative thinking within the Colombian security forces. Ironically, the absorption of U.S. open-mindedness led to greater scrutiny of U.S. doctrine and advice and a willingness to generate new ideas that did not conform to U.S. conventional wisdom. The Colombian military leadership discerned a flaw in much of the U.S. thinking on counterinsurgency—the overwhelming preoccupation with guerrillas. When military forces dispersed to contend with guerrillas in accordance with the U.S. conventional wisdom, they rendered themselves more vulnerable to devastating attack by conventionally organized forces, as they lacked mass and centralized command and control. As the insurgents had learned from Mao Zedong, conventional warfare was essential to the ultimate defeat of the government forces and the conquest of its cities. To thwart the FARC’s conventional operations, the Colombian military had to develop the ability to mass forces and firepower rapidly and in overwhelming strength.

No Justification for Ending the Whole Plan Colombia

We could just cut the military aid to Colombia


Amnesty International USA has been calling for a complete cut off of US military aid to Colombia for over a decade due to the continued collaboration between the Colombian Armed Forces and their paramilitary allies as well the failure of the Colombian government to improve human rights conditions.

Colombia has been one of the largest recipients of US military aid for well over a decade and the largest in the western hemisphere. Since 1994, AIUSA has called for a complete cut off of all US military aid until human rights conditions improve and impunity is tackled. Yet torture, massacres, "disappearances" and killings of non-combatants are widespread and collusion between the armed forces and paramilitary groups continues to this day. In 2006, US assistance to Colombia amounted to an estimated $728 million, approximately 80% of which was military and police assistance.

We could require that Colombia meets human rights standards to get the aid


In addition to its call for a cut off of aid, AIUSA has supported the inclusion of a human rights "certification" provision in US aid packages for Colombia that require the Secretary of State to certify Colombia's progress on human rights criteria before aid can be distributed. The criterion includes suspension of military personnel who have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations, apprehension of leaders of paramilitary organizations, as well as others. While these provisions originally applied to 100% of U.S. security assistance to Colombia, Congress has changed the provision so it now only applies to the last 25% of U.S. assistance.

Answers to: Colombia Did it Themselves

No, the US provided essential assistance


While the immediate causes of the Colombian government’s successes were primarily the result of Colombian leadership rather than American largesse, America’s persistent presence and support constituted a strong underlying cause. The Colombian political and military leaders who turned the war around in the late 1990s and 2000s began receiving American training, education, and support in the 1970s or 1980s. Long-term engagement was required in order to influence a generation of leaders from their formative years through their rise to positions of senior leadership.


Drug War

Answers to: Spraying Bad

Colombia is no longer spraying


Santos has said that warrants a change in drug policy. “It’s like being on a stationary bicycle. We make a huge effort, we sweat, and we end up in the same place,” he told a recent forum in Bogota. In October, Colombia halted its aerial spraying program after a World Health Organisation body found the herbicide used, glyphosate, was probably carcinogenic. The United States balked at dropping the spraying program but said it would respect Colombia’s decision.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/06/colombia-air-war-drugs-last-flight-looms-health-cost

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/06/colombia-air-war-drugs-last-flight-looms-health-cost

Drug War Good LinksPlan Colombia reduced drug production


From 2000 to 2013, Colombia succeeded in reducing coca cultivation from 160,000 hectares to 48,000 hectares. • Similarly, the estimated value of Colombia’s drug-related economy shrank from US$7.5 billion in 2008 to US$4.5 billion in 2013.



Economy

Plan Colombia’ Improved the EconomyPlan Colombia reduced Colombia’s economy and contributed to a massive increase in drug violence


Colombia has paid a high price to fight the “war on drugs,” with costs amounting to approximately 1.1 percent of its GDP per year from 2000 to 2008. • Colombia has also paid a high cost in human lives. An estimated 25 percent of intentional homicides between 1994 and 2008 were drug-related.

Plan Colombia increased economic growth and reduced poverty in Colombia


At the same time, however, Plan Colombia has brought unprecedented security gains to important regions of the country, facilitates significant economic growth and has been critical in bringing the FARC guerrillas to negotiate an end to more than half a century of guerrilla warfare against the state.

. Plan Colombia supports sustained economic growth in Colombia

Bond is vice president for the Americas at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, The Hill, Plan Colombia; A Geopolitical and Bipartisan Triumph, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/267969-plan-colombia-a-geopolitical-and-bipartisan-triumph

One could be forgiven for opting to turn a blind eye to current events these days. After all, it certainly seems that political partisanship is capable of hijacking any issue of consequence, domestic or foreign. But this week provides an important reminder that things haven’t always been this way. That’s because we have the privilege of celebrating what is both the 21st century’s most inspiring international turnaround story and a triumph of U.S. political bipartisanship. Juan Manuel Santos, president of Colombia, will visit Washington to commemorate the success of Plan Colombia, a testament to Colombian national fortitude and arguably the boldest international reconstruction effort undertaken since the Marshall Plan.

When devised by the administrations of President Bill Clinton and Colombian President Andrés Pastrana, Plan Colombia was the act of a desperate nation teetering on the brink of

http://thehill.com/people/bill-clinton





becoming a failed state. An infusion of U.S. resources was initially deployed to enhance Colombian counter-narcotics capabilities and provide critical security across swaths of the country paralyzed by conflict. Gradual pacification of regions once marred by violence permitted an increasing proportion of Plan Colombia resources to be dedicated to vital institution building.

Subsequently, the Plan laid the foundation for systematic and inclusive economic growth that has lifted millions of out of poverty and made Colombia one of the most dynamic markets in the Western Hemisphere. Since 2000, Colombia’s nominal GDP has nearly quadrupled and its 4.6 percent rate of economic growth in 2014 was among Latin America’s highest. Important to this turnaround was The Andean Trade Preferences Act which eliminated American import tariffs on Colombian products, thus supporting industries that provided legitimate employment alternatives to the narcotics trade.

From the perspective of the U.S. business community, the most significant economic legacy of Plan Colombia is the implementation in 2012 of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement. In addition to permanently cementing the bilateral trade relationship, the FTA has seen U.S. exports rise 40 percent since its implementation. At the same time, nearly 2,000 Colombian companies – 75 percent of which are small- and medium-sized businesses – have exported to the U.S. for the first time. As President Santos and his government take courageous steps to negotiate an end to the violence, the U.S. private sector has reaffirmed its commitment to being a pivotal driver of investment and economic development in the post-conflict era.

Make no mistake, Colombia’s miracle turnaround is a wholly Colombian triumph of national consensus, resolve and courage. But when Santos graciously conveys the thanks and appreciation to the U.S. of a grateful nation this week, it should also remind us of an exceedingly rare capacity for bipartisanship in our domestic politics we urgently need to make commonplace. Plan Colombia would be but a footnote in history – and Colombia itself very likely a failed “narco” state – were it not for the staunch and unwavering support the Plan has received from both sides of the U.S. political aisle from the outset. The administrations of presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama each grasped the national security imperatives of the strategy and expended critical political capital to assure its success. An otherwise polarized U.S. Congress has authorized more than $8 billion of funding since the initiative’s inception to ensure the survival of both the Plan and a treasured ally.

So as an alternative to following the political theater of the Iowa caucuses, I ask you to instead turn your attention this week toward the international comeback story of a generation. As we welcome Santos, let’s celebrate the valor and conviction of a resolute Colombian people. Let’s appreciate the magnitude of accomplishment possible from our own political system when it speaks with one resolved, unified and bipartisan voice. And let’s envision a day in the near future when such is the norm rather than the exception.

Plan Colombia responsible for the economic turnaround

GW Today, October 19, 2016, Colombian Ambassador Says Peaceful Transition is Underway, https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/colombian-ambassador-says-peaceful-transition-underway , GW Today

https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/colombian-ambassador-says-peaceful-transition-underway

Mr. Pinzón said the issues facing Colombia are the same ones countries around the world are dealing with. With more communication and networking than ever before, issues in one part of the world have a global impact. Colombia is the third most populated Latin American country, and with 60 percent of the population under age 30, the country is ready to integrate and ripe for technological innovation, Mr. Pinzón said. Colombia today is a far cry from the place it was 20 years ago, Mr. Pinzón said. In the 1990s Colombia became the most violent country in the Western Hemisphere and had a soaring homicide rate. Drug trafficking was a growing problem, and armed conflicts were escalating. “At the same time the economy started to have consequences,” Mr. Pinzón said. “Because of security, a lot of my own generation left the country.” Through investment from the United States in the form of Plan Colombia, a military and diplomatic aid initiative, conditions started to improve. Today the homicide, poverty and unemployment rates have dropped drastically. The improvements also scaled back the influx of illegal drugs coming into the United States from Colombia. One area that still needs to be improved is education, Mr. Pinzón said. He encouraged Colombian students who can to go abroad and get a college education. See the world, and then come home and apply what you have learned, he said.

State Failure

Plan Colombia Stops State FailurePlan Colombia has prevented Colombia from becoming a failed state


Plan Colombia is credited with helping revitalize the Latin American country — once almost a failed state — and paving the way for the government’s gains on the rebels, who have fought the state for more than 50 years. Human rights activists and some lawmakers have raised concerns about the peace agreement, which officials say could be reached this spring. Peace Colombia also will focus on security, counter-narcotics and other areas Plan Colombia invested in, but it will include initiatives such as helping the rebels reintegrate into society. A country once "on the brink of collapse is now on the brink of peace," Obama said Thursday evening alongside Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, who was visiting the White House to celebrate Plan Colombia. Santos thanked the U.S., noting that his country's "advances are due in great part to the fact that 15 years ago, when we were in such serious straits, the Colombians received a friendly hand. That friendly hand came from here in Washington, from both sides of the aisle, Democrats and Republicans."

Plan Colombia has strengthened Colombia’s governance


Although Plan Colombia was initially pitched in the U.S. as being primarily an anti-drug initiative, the results on that front have not lived up to hopes. Colombia is still a major source of drugs, including coca. However, the U.S. billions invested in Colombia helped strengthen the country's security forces, justice system and its economy.

Plan Colombia has prevented Colombia from becoming a failed state and has reduce the threat from FARC


Conversely, advocates of Plan Colombia who believe that it has accomplished its job argue that the war on drugs should be desecuritized because Plan Colombia resulted in many great successes. Although Plan Colombia did not decrease drug cultivation or trafficking, it did have success, particularly under Uribe, in increasing the presence of the state in remote regions of Colombia and regaining formerly FARC-controlled territories. Uribe successfully combatted the FARC and forced them to retreat, which ultimately led to a decrease in violence in Colombia. As a result of the Plan Colombia successes, Colombia is no longer on the brink of becoming a failed state and currently is not a major priority for the United States in terms of national security. 53

Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2324-2328). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Plan Colombia a success – has stabilized Colombia

President Santos hopes that moment arrives soon. When it does, Plan Colombia will have fulfilled its promise to help create a better Colombia.

Mack McLarty, former chief of staff to President Bill Clinton, is chairman of McLarty Associates. Andy Card, former chief of staff to President George W. Bush, is presidentof Franklin Pierce University, USA Today, February 4, 2016, Approaching a victory for Plan Colombia, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/02/04/colombia-peace-negotiations-farc-santos-uribe-plan-colombia-column/79710006/

t would be hard to imagine today a major U.S. foreign policy initiative with all of these ingredients: sustained bi-partisan support, a consistently flexible strategy against big odds and undisputed evidence of a successful outcome. Yet such an example exists. Its name is Plan Colombia.

Over the last decade and a half, the United States has contributed almost $10 billion under to fighting drug trafficking and leftist guerrillas in the south American nation. From the start, however, the plan had the more ambitious goal of assisting in the rescue of Colombian democracy. Once seeming on the brink of becoming a failed state , Colombia has become a success story thanks to determined leadership and the courage of the Colombian people.

To commemorate the launch of the plan, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos will meet with President Obama Thursday at the White House. President Santos will also be seeking support for what he describes as the plan’s crowning legacy: a peace dealnearing completion that would end the war in Colombia, the longest conflict in the Western Hemisphere.

This is a good moment to reflect on Colombia’s accomplishments, and to take some lessons from the U.S. side of the relationship. Plan Colombia is a model of positive engagement by the United States in the hemisphere. It was possible only because of focused presidential involvement over several administrations and the kind of bi-partisan cooperation that often goes missing today in the face of tough decisions.

Plan Colombia was the creation of President Clinton and then-president Andres Pastrana. President Clinton had formed a deep interest in Colombia early in his presidency through a

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relationship with President Cesar Gaviria. By 1998, conditions in the country had deteriorated alarmingly. Drug trafficking and the Marxist RevolutionaryArmed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, threatened U.S. national security and Colombia’s future. Often depicted as principally an anti-narcotics strategy, the plan did much more. Alongside Colombian funds, which far exceeded the U.S. contribution, U.S. assistance helped support social and economic development and a robust counter-insurgency plan.

President Bush expanded the program, and Congress increased funding and the number of U.S. military advisers. President Bush had a strong ally in President Álvaro Uribe, whose security policies battered the FARC and arguably helped drive them to negotiate. Juan Manuel Santos was President Uribe’s defense minister before he was elected president in 2010.

By starting peace negotiations more than three years ago, President Santos has sought to end conflict that has lasted 50 years, killed 220,000 people, most of them civilians and produced six million refugees. The peace deal would disband the FARC rebel group, which has sustained itself through killings, thousands of kidnappings and hundreds of millions of dollars in drug trafficking profits.

Santos’s persistence has kept the talks alive. He secured a breakthrough last fall over contentious issues of “transitional justice,” or how to assign responsibility and punishment for human rights violations and other crimes. That cleared the way for setting a March 23 deadline for a final deal. The FARC’s thousands of fighters woulddisarm under United Nations supervision within 60 days after that.

The deal is not without intense opposition in Colombia. The reason is simple: the vast majority of Colombians despise the FARC. More than 90% favor prison terms for its members according to an Ipsos Napoleon poll; the peace deal would allow those who confess their crimes to avoid jail . Among the most vocal opponents is former President Uribe. Polls show that Santos has a fight on his hands to win the public’s approval for a final deal.

President Santos, an economist whose family once owned Colombia’s leading newspaper, has argued that diplomacy, while politically and morally complex, is preferable to further bloodshed. “It is much more difficult to make peace than to make war,” he has said. “Making war is quite popular ... Making peace is much more difficult.”

President Obama has been an active supporter of the peace process. When the FARC requested a U.S. representative at the talks, he assigned Bernard Aronson, a distinguished diplomat who helped secure peace in Central America during the George H.W.

http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/02/237688.htm

http://www.cfr.org/colombia/colombian-president-santos-peace-process-social-policies-economic-growth/p35725

http://www.colombia-politics.com/president-juan-manuel-santos-a-political-biography/

http://colombiareports.com/majority-of-colombians-believe-there-will-be-no-peace-deal-with-farc/

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/efe02232028e48feac6afa3f7cdd58d7/ap-interview-uribe-questions-colombias-peace-breakthrough

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/efe02232028e48feac6afa3f7cdd58d7/ap-interview-uribe-questions-colombias-peace-breakthrough


http://colombiareports.com/farc-truce-fails-to-curb-colombias-pessimism-over-peace-talks/

http://time.com/3600172/colombia-rebels-on-the-defensive/

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/world/americas/colombia-close-to-a-peace-accord-with-farc-rebels.html?_r=0

http://wreporter.com/world/colombia-un-oversee-disarmament-farc/


http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/29/politics/colombia-president-us-visit/

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/farc-peace-talks-colombia-nears-historic-deal-after-agreement-on-justice-and-reparations

http://www.unric.org/en/colombia/27013-the-guerrilla-groups-in-colombia

http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-02-06-voa42/406453.html


http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article24920620.html

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/25/colombia-conflict-death-toll-commission

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/15/colombia-end-in-sight-longest-running-conflict


http://world.time.com/2012/07/13/in-colombia-the-war-between-the-presidents/

http://world.time.com/2012/07/13/in-colombia-the-war-between-the-presidents/

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http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3787

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http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6573.pdf

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46190

Bush administration. Aronson has worked to persuade FARC leaders that a deal is their best chance for peace and a better future for Colombia.

Like many countries in our hemisphere, Colombia is a place of contradictions. While suffering appalling violence it has nurtured a sophisticated and capable political culture. The country of 50 million has a growing economy. With peace, it would be able to turn more of its energies towards building the country and looking outward. To paraphrase its greatest author, Gabriel Garcia Márquez, it would escape the solitude imposed by decades of internal warfare.

President Santos hopes that moment arrives soon. When it does, Plan Colombia will have fulfilled its promise to help create a better Colombia.

Plan Colombia stopped the overthrow of the government


Andres Pastrana, the Colombian president under whom Plan Colombia began, says the strategy was a turning point in the country’s decades-old war. “Before the Plan, security forces were on the defensive and on the verge of military defeat [by guerrillas],” he told the Guardian in an emailed response to questions.

Violence is down in Colombia, Plan Colombia avoided state collapse


President Juan Manuel Santos is heading to Washington this week to celebrate 15 years since the beginning of Plan Colombia — a joint initiative that aimed to bolster Colombia’s institutions, strengthen its military and, principally, eradicate coca, the raw material for cocaine. A decade and a half later, that push is being credited with turning the country around. Once synonymous with bloodshed and kidnappings, violence is down dramatically and the government is nearing a peace pact with the country’s largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). “Before Plan Colombia, everyone, including the United



http://www.biography.com/people/gabriel-garca-mrquez-189132

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/colombian-economy-grew-faster-than-expected-3-in-second-quarter

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html

http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-envoy-bernard-aronson-pushes-peace-in-colombia-1444422249

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20150624/103679/HHRG-114-FA07-Bio-AronsonB-20150624.pdf

States, believed that we were on the verge of being a failed state,” said former President Andrés Pastrana, who launched the initiative with his U.S. counterpart Bill Clinton. “Now Colombia is a viable nation, and that’s thanks to Plan Colombia.”

Sustained engagement with Colombia strengthened its state building capacityMark Moyar, et al, 2014, Joint Special Operations University, Persisent Engagement in Colombia, http://jsou.socom.mil/pubspages/jsou14-3_moyar-pagan-griego_colombia_final.pdf, Dr. Mark Moyar, Brigadier General (retired) Hector Pagan, and Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Wil R. Griego analyze United States Special Operations Forces’ (USSOF)

This monograph demonstrates that a combination of high quantity and high quality USSOF engagement bolstered Colombian capacity, and that it did so primarily by promoting the development of Colombia’s human capital. Decades of exposure to USSOF personnel, together with training and educational programs established by USSOF, gave Colombian security professionals newfound technical expertise, which enabled them to make use of advanced technologies and techniques provided by the United States. These capacity building activities also implanted in rising generations of Colombian military and governmental personnel certain cultural attributes that made them more effective in their jobs. It should be added that other elements of the U.S. Government also contributed heavily to capacity building, which serves as reminder that SOF are well-advised to coordinate their capacity-building activities with those of other U.S. organizations.

How the US helped Colombia’s security develop


The ability of the Pastrana administration to install better generals and the ability of those generals to install better company-grade and fieldgrade officers were dependent on long-term U.S. capacity building efforts. Replacing commanders is effective only when there exists a reservoir of good replacements, and in the case of senior commanders the reservoir must contain individuals with multiple decades of experience. Persistent SOF presence in Colombia, together with the training and education of Colombian officers in the United States, helped cultivate the generation of general officers that Pastrana empowered from 1998 onward, along with those who came after them. The scope and duration of SOF engagement in Colombia also enabled the United States to exert great influence over the content and structure of Colombia’s military educational and training institutions. American experts helped set up these institutions, and they infused the curricula with American doctrinal and cultural principles. American advisors worked full-time at some of these institutions, providing instruction to Colombian instructors or directly to students. The United States helped establish training institutions for Colombian non-commissioned officers, particularly those in elite units. The emphasis placed on NCOs has led to greater empowerment of NCOs in the Colombian forces with which U.S. personnel have worked. In other parts of the armed forces, where the United States has not been active in pushing NCO development, officers generally have not delegated significant authority to NCOs.130 USSOF further contributed to the advancement of Colombia’s military and police leadership by concentrating training on highly talented officers. This practice helped develop individuals who



under other circumstances would not have risen through the ranks because of a lack of political or personal connections. Of the Colombian officers who received 7th Group training and mentoring while serving in elite units, a sizable number subsequently moved into other parts of the military and police, spreading the influence of USSOF assistance across the security forces. Some of the top officers in the Colombian security forces today worked extensively with USSOF earlier in their careers, including General Alejandro Navas, the Commander of the Colombian Armed Forces; General Tito Saul Pinilla, Commander of the Air Force; General Sergio Mantilla, Commander of the Army; Brigadier General Albert José Mejia, Commander of the Aviation and Air Assault Division; Major General Juan Pablo Rodriguez, Commander of CCOES; and Colonel (P) Jorge Vargas, the director of Police Intelligence.

Plan Colombia eroded the combat capability of FARCAdmiral Stavridis was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and is Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, October 27, 2016, 5 reasons the US should do all it can to see the peace accord come to fruition, http://time.com/4547870/colombia-peace-accord-americas/

When I served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command, which is responsible for U.S. military activities in Central and South America, a key part of my job was to support our military, intelligence and diplomatic partners in Colombia as they fought the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). At one time, FARC boasted nearly 20,000 armed combatants, held sway over large tracts of the country and ran a multi-billion dollar cocaine business. But its fortunes have been falling for years, as the Colombian people turned against it, and the Colombian military—aided by the U.S. as part of the Plan Colombia —gradually eroded its combat capability.

Plan Colombia strengthened governance


USSOF personnel also assumed important advisory roles in governance and development. Since the 1990s, SOF civil affairs teams have worked in areas of Colombia that USAID and other civilian U.S. agencies avoided because of security conditions, leaving them as the vanguard of governance and development in many of the areas most important to the counterinsurgency. They have served as the eyes and ears for civilian agencies that intended to move in as security conditions improved. By the time the civilian agencies were ready to enter an area, the civil affairs personnel had identified the key government officials and established relationships with them, which expedited civilian agency activities.




Colombia-US Relations

Colombia-US Relations Good LinksPlan Colombia cements ties between the US and ColombiaJonathan Rosen, 2014, The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond, Research Professor at the Universidad del Mar, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card.

The second strand of liberalism is referred to as neoliberal institutionalism and, as the name suggests, emphasizes the importance of institutions to promote ooperation, coordination, promote efficiency, and decrease transaction costs. 28 This type of liberalism is useful for understanding the attempts to institutionalize Plan Colombia. Said differently, the United States sought to construct a model of security between Colombia and the United States under the auspices of Plan Colombia that was institutionalized in this liberal sense. The institutionalization process enabled the United States and Colombia to increase connections between the two countries and promote cooperation and collaboration. For instance, the U.S. ambassador played a major role in Colombian relations and such cooperation could not have occurred without the institutionalization of Plan Colombia. Colombia is more dependent on the United States for aid, trade, and access to markets, and, therefore, the relationship is not one of complex interdependence. In terms of the numeric percentages, Colombia accounts for less than 1 percent of U.S. trade. In addition to trade, the United States also has many economic investments in Colombia, and, therefore, stability is necessary in order to attract investors. 42 Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 711-714). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Human Rights

US assistance improve human rights


The U.S. emphasis on human rights in training and education altered cultural attitudes towards human rights. U.S. special operations soldiers provided much of this training and education, over a period of several decades. As warriors and as representatives of the world’s greatest military power, they enjoyed the respect of Colombian officers and helped alter a military culture that had traditionally demonstrated less concern than U.S. military culture for issues of human rights. Better treatment of the population by the Colombian security forces led the citizenry to cooperate more willingly with the government and to lose interest in supporting the insurgents.


Conservation GoodConservation critical to prevent deforestation

Camila Bustos is a lead researcher and Marcela Jaramillo is a policy adviser on climate finance at Nivela, October 24, 2016, The Guardian, What does peace in Colombia have to do with the environment? https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/oct/24/peace-colombia-government-guerrilla-environment

Conservation and deforestation are some of the most complex environmental problems linked to conflict and peace. While the conflict has contributed to deforestation and the destruction of ecosystems, it has also limited the exploitation of resources such as wood, mining, and agribusiness in several rural and difficult to access areas, many of which are characterised by high biodiversity. In other places around the world, post-conflict internal migration has led to increased pressure on natural resources and in many cases, an increase in deforestation. In this sense, the accord establishes that the reform must guarantee socio-environmental sustainability. There is also an important focus on the protection of natural reserves. In addition, the section about economic and social reincorporation in the accord establishes that programmes for ex-combatants will pay special attention to environmental protection and recovery and humanitarian de-mining. In a similar fashion, the component regarding the conflict’s victims explains that, as part of victims’ reparation, the Farc is committed to participate in programmes to repair environmental damages like reforestation.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/farc

Answers to: Drug War FailedIt doesn’t matter if the drug war failed, Plan Colombia was really a counter insurgency strategy

Economist, January 23, 2016, A new plan for Colombia, http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21688936-juan-manuel-santos-seeks-support-peace-washington-new-plan-colombia

The critics missed the point. Plan Colombia was sold politically in the United States as a crackdown on drugs, but in reality it was always first and foremost a counter-insurgency strategy. For Colombia to be a viable democracy, it needed a stronger state able to provide security to its citizens and to tame the illegal armies, which were financed by the world’s cocaine habit. It worked. Colombians backed the strategy—American aid was more than matched by increased domestic spending on security. Under Álvaro Uribe, who followed Mr Pastrana as president, the paramilitaries demobilised and the FARC guerrillas were battered so hard that they agreed, in 2012, to start peace talks with the government of Juan Manuel Santos, Mr Uribe’s successor (and his former defence minister).Coca has decreased, it’s just that they are discovering new uncounted areas

James Mack, Department of State Director, Office of Andean Affairs, 1989-1991, January 2016, http://adst.org/2016/01/billion-dollar-plan-colombia-to-end-decades-of-civil-war/,

In 2000, we had negotiated with the Government of Colombia the conditions under which we would provide the Plan Colombia assistance. The biggest issue was getting the Colombian Government, the Pastrana government, to agree to specific targets for eradication. And after an enormous amount of back and forth during two weeks at the Colombian foreign ministry in Bogota, the Colombians agreed to reduce their coca cultivation by 50% by 2006.That is what has happened if you use the UN coca figures. According to the CIAD (International Center for Tropical Agriculture) figures, there is as much coca as there ever was, but the CIA keeps discovering new coca areas that have been there all along, which distorts the figures.In any event, these results made were possible because of aerial eradication. I should note that while then-President Pastrana would occasionally place temporary restrictions on spraying for political reasons, or as a sign of good faith in his on-and-off again and eventually fruitless negotiations with the FARC, the current Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe, has been unwavering for his support for coca eradication.

Agriculture

Rural DevelopmentPlan Colombia now focused on rural development

Economist, January 23, 2016, A new plan for Colombia, http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21688936-juan-manuel-santos-seeks-support-peace-washington-new-plan-colombia

And then it must be implemented. Mr Santos will go to Washington with a request for a new Plan Colombia—some $500m or so a year for up to ten years for rural development, public services and justice in former conflict areas. Though there will be a “few voices of dissent” from Mr Uribe’s supporters, there will be “broad bipartisan support” in the United States Congress, according to Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue, a think-tank in Washington. But at a time of fiscal constraint, the applause may not be backed with much money.Colombia has a lot of agriculture potential

Fresh Plaza, November 2, 2016, Analysis of the Conflict and Impact of the Referendum on Africa, http://www.freshplaza.com/article/166079/Colombia-Analysis-of-the-conflict-and-impact-of-the-referendum-on-agriculture

It is clear that this South American country has great agricultural potential, but the reality is that it suffers from a deficit in production and domestic consumption. "To this situation we must add that of the country's 114 million hectares that are suitable for agriculture, forestry and livestock, an average of 30% are subject to conflict. Of the total, 22 million hectares are suitable for agriculture, but only 5.3 million are currently in use. If we get the peace agreement signed, many investors will come to our country and help boost our economy," states Moreno.

Return to conflict means mass violence

New Internationalist , November 2016, Peace in Colombia? https://newint.org/features/2016/11/01/peace-in-colombia/

eturn to violence is a terrifying prospect. Colombians know only too well what it means. For 52 years, the longest armed conflict in the western hemisphere has scarred the lives of more than eight million people – 15 per cent of the country’s population.1 Though comparable in numbers to Afghanistan, Colombia’s conflict has attracted far less international attention.Official figures show 280,619 people killed and more than seven million internally displaced.1 In addition, there were over 29,000 kidnappings, 45,000 forced disappearances, 11,000 victims of landmines, 10,000 victims of torture, and 13,000 victims of sexual violence.1 2Women were disproportionately affected. According to Claudia Mejia Duque from the organization Sisma Mujer, ‘Women and girls [are] weapons of war and the biggest affected group across society.’Then, in the summer of 2016, after three failed attempts and almost four years of negotiations, FARC and the Colombian government achieved a historic peace agreement (see box), the innovative nature of these negotiations capturing the attention of international peace brokers.3

https://newint.org/features/2016/11/01/peace-in-colombia/#fn3




Could Increase Agriculture Funding

More money could be spent on alternative crop development


Critics of aerial spraying argue that Plan Colombia should have allocated more money toward issues of economic development rather than to spraying the countryside with herbicides. Developmental programs could aid farmers, providing them with legitimate alternatives to growing coca, although some issues and challenges exist that must be considered when talking about alternative development strategies. Daniel Mejía argues: “It [alternative development] has been, in a lot of cases, a complete waste of money.” 68 First, coca grows anywhere and is very resilient, unlike many other products, and many farmers cultivate coca in order to survive. Second, coca tends to be grown in impoverished regions. 69 Third, coca has many uses beyond being refined into cocaine. For instance, coca is chewed by people in the highlands to avoid altitude sickness. Coca also is an ingredient used to make tea and other products such as toothpaste. Fourth, coca plays an important role in indigenous rituals in the Andean countries and is exchanged between individuals as a cultural practice. 70 Vidart notes that, “the Andean Indian chews coca because that way he affirms its identity as son and owner of the land that yesterday the Spaniard took away and today the landowner keeps away from him. To chew coca is to be Indian … and to quietly and obstinately challenge the contemporary lords that descend from the old encomenderos and the old conquistadors.” 71 Coca also is used by indigenous groups in various religious ceremonies. 72 Sanho Tree argues that growing coca is a rational choice for many peasants living in the highlands because it grows everywhere, is easily produced, and acts as the primary source of income for coca farmers living in the highlands. 73 Marten Brienen, an expert on Bolivia and development, argues that coca functions like a weed. He states, “That plant is indestructible. It does not matter how you treat it, it will grow.” 74 This is important to note because other legal crops cannot grow in such remote regions of Colombia where the texture of the soil is poor and not conducive to cultivation. 75 Even if a peasant wanted to grow other crops such as oranges, they will not grow in such high altitudes. Growing other products also requires expertise, which is not the case for coca. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 827-838). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Crop Substitution GoodCrop substitution reduces deforestation


One of the factors that contribute to deforestation and thus, to this sector being one of the largest carbon emitters is the production of illicit drugs like marijuana, cocaine and heroin. The accord creates voluntary crop substitution programmes to ensure that alternatives are sustainable from an environmental and economic point of view. Substitution plans must include actions for the mitigation of environmental damage in areas of special environmental interest and for forest recovery

Answers to Common Pro Arguments

Answers to: Imperialism

Most of the decisions were made by Colombians


U.S. decisions on which Colombians to engage, how to engage them, and what to teach them accounted for many of the capacity-building successes, as well as a considerable number of the failures. Consequently, a detailed analysis of those decisions yields rich insights on the qualitative side of capacity building, which should be valuable to both historians of the Colombian experience and practitioners seeking to build capacity in other countries today. At the same time, many of the key decisions were made by Colombians, independently of any foreigners, which has its own implications for capacity building.


Answers to: Human Rights Abuses

Human rights abuses would have occurred without Plan Colombia


Some experts, however, caution that analysts must not conflate human rights abuses with Plan Colombia. Sandra Borda states that the “human rights problem is one that you will have if you have a war on drugs with or without the war on drugs.” 126 In other words, Colombia would have experienced human rights abuses regardless of Plan Colombia because such abuses are the consequences of the internal armed conflict. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 1525-1528). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Answers to: Troop Diversion/Undermines US Military Readiness

The best US forces have been diverted to Afghanistan and other more pressing conflits


The demands for 7th SFG(A) manpower in other theaters nonetheless continued to impede 7th Group activities in Colombia and other Latin American countries. Most of the detachments assigned to Colombia in the spring of 2013 had spent more time in Afghanistan than in the USSOUTHCOM AOR in the past five years. Many of their junior personnel were serving in Latin America for the first time, leaving units with few experts on regional cultures and politics. Repeated deployments outside of Latin America had caused language skills to atrophy, requiring remedial language education prior to deployment to Colombia. Most team members were able to reach a 1/1 level of Spanish language proficiency, which was required for deployment to the USSOUTHCOM AOR, but few had higher levels of proficiency. The multiple Afghanistan deployments left 7th Group deployments to the USSOUTHCOM area shorter in duration than in the past. Several years earlier, deployments had been reduced from six months to three months in order to facilitate more and longer deployments to Afghanistan, and in 2013 they remained at three-to-four months in order to allow units to spend more time in Afghanistan in the future. Teams that were spending three months in Colombia in 2013 had spent nine months in Afghanistan the previous year. Most team members observed that three months afforded too little time for understanding the operating environment and building relationships with Colombian personnel. During a visit to Colombia in the spring of 2013, the authors were informed that support to Colombian planning of military operations was impeded by shortages of experienced personnel. The 7th Group planners working with Colombians at the brigade and division level were usually captains or NCOs with little experience planning at such a high level. In earlier times, during the Uribe era, the United States had provided better support at the brigade level with Planning Assistance Training Teams because those teams were led by majors

US military not directly involved in Colombia


The history of persistent U.S. engagement in Colombia provides lessons beyond those gleaned from Afghanistan and Iraq, and bears greater similarity in many respects to the contemporary operating environment than either Afghanistan or Iraq. American assistance to Colombia has been marked by sharp constraints on the number of U.S. advisors and major restrictions on the nature of U.S. advice and support, both of which will be features of most future foreign engagements. USSOF involvement in Colombia has consisted almost entirely of capacity building rather than direct action, as it will be in most other countries going forward



Answers to: Your Evidence is About the Past, Plan Colombia Isn’t Still Needed

US assistance to stabilize Colombia is still needed


Today, Colombia is far more secure and stable than it was 15 years ago. The cities are now nearly free of terrorism, and insurgents are largely absent from most rural municipalities. The Colombian government is much more capable of handling threats to its internal security than in the past. But, as many Colombian and U.S. officials note, Colombia still needs American help, and the United States still stands to gain much from providing that help. The FARC continues to pose a threat to the nation’s security, requiring the maintenance of large security forces. The political situation is still sufficiently fragile that the FARC and other far-left groups could win electoral victories in the future, and gain by political means what they were unable to obtain militarily. Drug production continues at high levels, fueling instability in Central America and Mexico and imposing heavy costs in the United States. Therefore, it would be mistaken to conclude that the successes achieved to date warrant the discontinuation of U.S. assistance.


Colombia Stability Impacts

ModelingColombia’s stability is a model for other countries


Since the onset of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Americans seeking lessons from the past have most often looked to the irregular conflicts in Vietnam and Malaya. As the United States contemplates additional engagements today, Afghanistan and Iraq are becoming new wellsprings of lessons learned. So is Colombia, on account of the remarkable improvements in security since the late 1990s. Colombia’s dramatic gains serve as a beacon of hope for other countries that today are besieged by the violence and blight of insurgency and drug trafficking. They demonstrate that nations can, with internal political will and persistent American support, overcome seemingly intractable obstacles.


Colombia War Impacts

EnvironmentConflict in Colombia destroys the environment


After 52 years of war, the government finalised a peace accord to cease conflict and construct stable and long lasting peace in Colombia. After four years of negotiations and almost 300 pages, the accord delves into different key points for the ceasefire, the guerrilla demobilisation, the integral rural reform, transitional justice, political participation of ex-combatants and drug policy, among others. The Colombian people narrowly rejected the accord on 2 October – there is no clarity yet regarding what would be the implications of this result for the future of the peace agreement. Without a doubt, the armed conflict has left a footprint on Colombian landscapes and ecosystems. According to the Colombian organisation Dejusticia, the armed conflict has been accompanied by bombings of oil pipelines, fumigations of illegal crops with glyphosate, chemical pollution due to illegal mining, the presence of armed groups and anti-personnel mines in protected areas, and the expansion of the agricultural frontier as a result of forced displacement. According to the government, the country could save $2.2bn (£1.8bn) a year in environmental damages. From 1990 to 2013, 58% of the deforestation in the country took place in areas affected by the conflict, with 3m lost hectares. Numerous attacks to oil pipelines during the last 35 years have resulted in 4.1m spilled barrels, the equivalent to 16 disasters like Exxon Valdez. The end of the conflict brings opportunities to repair the environmental damage and rethink the country’s development. There are many environmental reasons to be happy about the peace accord, not least the potential to decrease deforestation; have greater control over the restoration, recovery and conservation of ecological areas (such as natural parks andparamos); and to create a more sustainable, efficient and diverse economy. The impact of the war on Colombia’s natural richness has been huge. Sections on “integral rural reform” and the “solution to the illegal drugs problem” in the peace accord show that post-conflict policy will have an impact on economic, social and environmental development. As well as increasing the opportunities, we have to empower the country in its natural resource management.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C3%A1ramo

http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/03/the-exxon-valdez-oil-spill-25-years-ago-today/100703/

http://www.co.undp.org/content/colombia/es/home/presscenter/articles/2016/03/11/medio-ambiente-el-gran-dividendo-de-la-paz/

http://www.co.undp.org/content/colombia/es/home/presscenter/articles/2016/03/11/medio-ambiente-el-gran-dividendo-de-la-paz/

https://www.dnp.gov.co/Paginas/%E2%80%9CPor-cada-a%C3%B1o-de-paz,-Colombia-ahorrar%C3%ADa-$7,1-billones-en-degradaci%C3%B3n-ambiental%E2%80%9D-Sim%C3%B3n-Gaviria-Mu%C3%B1oz.aspx

http://www.dejusticia.org/#!/index

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc

https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/sites/default/files/24_08_2016acuerdofinalfinalfinal-1472094587.pdf

Insecurity/War Spreads to Latin AmericaColombia security important to overall Latin America security


In terms of security, Colombia occupies a strategic position in the region, which has historically been the “backyard” of the United States ever since the Monroe Doctrine. Instability within Colombia not only negatively impacts Colombia but also the security of its neighbors. Colombia borders on the Panama Canal, which is a key location for the trade and the transportation of goods and services. In reality, the “Panamanian security forces are no match for well-armed guerillas and narco-traffickers that use Panamanian territory to conduct operations.” 40 Ecuador also is concerned about its security as many of the FARC members are located near the borders. Reports also indicate that Venezuela “may secretly support both the FARC and the ELN, given the leftist tendencies of [former] Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez.”

Colombian state collapse spreads


In addition, Colombia shares an unguarded border with Brazil, a rising economic power. Therefore, “Colombia’s long and largely unguarded border with Brazil provides a safe-haven for the FARC and is a source of tension between the two nations.” 44 The internal problems in Colombia upon Uribe’s ascension to power posed many threats to the United States, especially since Colombia is located only a couple of hours from Miami. Phil McLean echoes such sentiments, stating: “If failed states on the other side of the globe threaten U.S. interests, then Colombia, a country just two hours from Miami … is truly a scary prospect.” 45 In September 2002, Army Brigadier General Galen Jackman of the U.S. Southern Command declared that the FARC had begun to expand into its neighboring regions, representing a major security threat. 46 The internal situation within Colombia also creates tension between countries in the region as well as the United States because of problems with human migration. The internal dynamics within Colombia can cause refugees to flee their country, worried about their security. The neighboring countries, therefore, are concerned about a mass exodus of Colombians, which could result in increases in the number of refugees entering other countries. As a result of the high levels of violence during this period, many Colombians also began fleeing Colombia and relocating to the United States. 47 Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 1139-1140). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

New Instability Possible

Terrorist groups could resurge


Plan Colombia’s partial victories have increased security and decreased violence in Colombia, resulting in President Obama decreasing resources to Colombia, in essence desecuritizing Colombia as a major U.S. priority. 54 The situation in Colombia could regress, however, and instability within the country could increase. Smaller organizations such as Bandas Criminales (BACRIM) have emerged and could increase instability in Colombia. Some experts note that suggesting Colombia is now a success, free of problems is both wrong and premature. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2329-2333). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

FARC could become a threat again


In an interview, Jennifer Holmes stated, “Things can always get worse” when asked if the FARC could resecuritize and become a major security threat. 56 Holmes argues that the FARC’s history demonstrates that such a scenario is quite possible. 57 Thus, the possibility exists that drug trafficking in Colombia could become securitized and efforts might be made to provide the Colombian government with the necessary resources to combat such organizations. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2337-2341). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

FARC is a threatening terrorist organization


FARC has one of the world’s largest and most sophisticated terrorist arsenals, financed with a budget that runs to billions of dollars. Unofficial estimates place the number of weapons at about 40,000 automatic rifles and machine guns, thousands of anti-personnel mines and tons of high grade explosives. The group may have acquired a new batch of Russian arms while the peace talks were in progress. Documents recovered from computer files of a FARC leader killed by the Colombian army in the province of

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7272832.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7272832.stm



Putumayo bordering Ecuador contain inventories of a $90 million purchase in 2013 which included: 150 heat seeking Iglas SA-18 missiles; 50 SA-7 missiles; 300 ATGN anti tank missiles and about 20,000 firearms including AK-47 assault rifles, Draganov sniper rifles and heavy machineguns.

The internal situation could worsen


The emergence of the groups that together are referred to as the BACRIM represent a major security challenge for Colombia. These groups participate in drug trafficking and use their power and influence to corrode the institutions and various actors in Colombia, such as the police and military. These groups, along with an increasingly more powerful FARC, demonstrate that Colombia has not escaped the violence of the past, but rather continues to be plagued by violence and organized crime. The power of the various internal armed actors in Colombia is frightening. As the title of this chapter indicates, the reality is that Colombia could return to the same levels of violence and drug activity, which contradicts Uribe, who believes that Colombia has reached a critical time period and is not going to go back but only forward toward a more secure and peaceful future. The reality, however, appears to be the opposite because the internal situation can always worsen. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 3022-3029). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Latin American Conflicts Escalate

Latin American escalation high nowOppenheimer ‘13 [Andrés Oppenheimer, Pulitzer Prize winner, Master's degree in Journalism from Columbia University, Latin American editor and syndicated foreign affairs columnist with The Miami Herald, “Andres Oppenheimer: Escalating border disputes hurt Latin America,” http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/09/21/3639908/andres-oppenheimer-escalating.html]

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European

diplomats, escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region.¶ U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ • Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ • Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste.¶ Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ • Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ • Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months. U.S. officials say that Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told

me that while the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation .”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”¶ My opinion: Regardless of who is right on each of these border disputes, it’s time to isolate them from regional and international negotiations. Border disputes should be subject to a diplomatic quarantine, as if they were animals with dangerously contagious diseases.¶ With the regional economy expected to grow slower this year because

of stagnant commodity prices and other external factors, Latin America cannot afford to allow century-old disputes to delay its much-needed economic integration within itself, and with the rest of the world.

Latin America is key to global stability and existential crisesDemocracy, warming, econ, prolif, poverty, energy

O’Neil ’13 [Shannon O’Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Latin America’s Secret Success Story,” http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/16/latin-america-s-secret-success-story.html]

Ahead of the Biennial of the Americas conference, Shannon K. O’Neil on how the U nited S tates’ neighbors to the south have quietly been surging in global importance . ¶ Latin America rarely looms large on the global scene, overshadowed

by Europe, the Middle East, and Asia on the agendas and in the imagination of policymakers, business leaders, and the global chattering classes. But under cover of this benign

neglect, the region has dramatically changed, mostly for the better. ¶ Its economies have flourished. Once known for hyperinflation and economic booms and busts, Latin America is now a place of sound finances and financial systems. Exports—ranging from soy, flowers, copper, and iron ore to computers, appliances, and jets—have boomed. GDP growth has doubled from 1980s levels to an annual average of 4 percent over the past two decades, as has the region’s share of global GDP, increasing from 5 percent in 2004 to nearly 8 percent in 2011.¶ Many of the countries have embraced globalization, opening up their economies and searching for innovative ways to climb the value-added chain and diversify their production. Trading relations too have changed: U.S. trade has expanded at a fast clip even as these nations diversified their flows across the Atlantic and Pacific. These steps have lured some $170 billion in foreign direct investment in 2012 alone (roughly 12 percent of global flows). Led by Brazil and Mexico, much of this investment is going into manufacturing and services.¶ Already the second largest holder of oil reserves in the world (behind

only the Middle East), the hemisphere has become one of the most dynamic places for new energy finds and sources. From the off shore “pre-salt” oil basins of Brazil to the immense shale gas fields of Argentina and Mexico, from new hydrodams on South America’s plentiful rivers

to wind farms in Brazil and Mexico, the Americas’ diversified energy mix has the potential to reshape global energy geopolitics. Democracy, too, has spread, now embraced by almost all of the countries in the region. And with this expanded representation has come greater

social inclusion in many nations. Latin America is by all accounts a crucible of innovative social policies, a

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/16/latin-america-s-secret-success-story.html

http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/09/21/3639908/andres-oppenheimer-escalating.html

global leader in conditional cash transfers that provide stipends for families that keep kids in school and get basic healthcare, as well as other programs to reduce extreme poverty . Combined with stable economic growth, those in poverty fell from roughly two in five to one in four Latin Americans in just a decade.¶ These and other changes have helped transform the basic nature of Latin American societies. Alongside the many still poor is a growing middle class. Its ranks swelled by 75 million people over the last 10 years, now reaching a third of the total population. The World Bank now classifies the majority of Latin American countries as “upper middle income,” with Chile and Uruguay now considered “high income.” Brazil’s and Mexico’s household consumption levels now outpace other global giants, including China and Russia, as today nearly every Latin American has a cell phone and television, and many families own their cars and houses.¶ The region still has its serious problems. Latin America holds the bloody distinction of being the world’s most violent region. Eight of the ten countries with the world’s highest homicide rates are in Latin America or the Caribbean. And non-lethal crimes, such as assault, extortion, and theft are also high. A 2012 study by the pollster Latino Barometro found that one in every four Latin American citizens reported that they or a family member had been a victim of a crime during the past year. Latin America also remains the most unequal region in the world, despite some recent improvements. Studies show this uneven playing field affects everything from economic growth to teenage pregnancy and crime rates.¶ These countries as a whole need to invest more in education, infrastructure, and basic rule of law to better compete in a globalizing world. Of course, nations also differ—while some countries have leaped ahead others have lagged, buffeted by everything from world markets to internal divisions.¶ Nevertheless, with so much potential, and many countries on a promising path, it is time to recognize and engage with these increasingly global players. And while important for

the world stage, the nations of the hemisphere are doubly so for the United States. Tied by geographic proximity, commerce, communities, and security, the Americas are indelibly linked. As the U nited States looks to increase exports, promote democratic values, and find partners to address major issues, such as climate change, financial stability, nuclear non-proliferation, global security, democracy, and persistent poverty, it could do no better than to look toward its hemispheric neighbors, who have much to impart.

Ensures multiple scenarios for nuclear warFleishmann ‘13 (Luis, Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City, an M.A. degree from the New School as well and a B.A. in Political Science and Labor Studies from Tel Aviv University. Dr. Fleischman has worked for more than two decades for the Jewish Federations of Palm Beach County, Florida and Central New Jersey as executive director for community and political relations. In that capacity, he has worked intensively on issues related to the Middle East and national security serving as a liaison between these organizations and members of Congress, foreign consuls, the media and the local community at large. Dr. Fleischman has also worked as senior advisor for the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy. The focus of Dr. Fleischman’s work at the CSP was on monitoring Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his allies, their connections to radical groups, the expansion of Chavez’s ideas across the continent and the rise of anti-democratic forces in the region. Dr. Fleischman is also an Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College and FAU Lifelong Learning Society, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” http://books.google.com/books?id=N7D6doBly7AC&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s>#SPS, May 31, 2013)

The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in

1999. But the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements throughout Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now

around the globe. Indeed, the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran. His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects— asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders.

These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency , local and international terrorism , rogue states' involvement, and Other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity . The

http://books.google.com/books?id=N7D6doBly7AC&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s%3E#SPS

http://books.google.com/books?id=N7D6doBly7AC&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s%3E#SPS

continent's current economic prosperity, about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, the breakdown Of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se. Instead, it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, the deterioration of democracy to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. As stated in chapter 9, however, the Bolivarian revolution will not die along with Chavez. It will endure and survive because

of the structures and practices he has left in place, not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects Of authoritarianism , the destruction Of the State, and the proliferation Of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin

American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.

Global nuclear warManwaring 05 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today . The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism . These conditions breed massive

humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure.

These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD , genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict .62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive

activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that

must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its

government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real .64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence,

failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states , or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to

provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity .65

Democracy

Colombia democracy critical to democracy in Latin America


Finally, the United States has interests in Colombia due to various value issues, such as democracy. Colombia has had a long history of democracy and represents a bastion of democratic governance in Latin America, which is a region that has experienced many authoritarian rulers. In fact, Colombia is the second oldest democracy in the Western hemisphere and has continued to hold democratic (i.e., fair and free) elections. 51 In addition, Colombia has experienced peaceful democratic transitions throughout its history. The Bush administration wanted to support Colombia and did not want one of the oldest countries in the region to become overrun by narco-terrorists. For all of the aforementioned reasons, the Bush administration recognized that Colombia was in dire need of support in order to preserve U.S. economic interests and avoid potential catastrophes within the country. Uribe understood that he needed help from the United States and sought to extend his hand to Bush, and in return he pledged his support. Bush supported the Colombian government because it fit in with his larger geopolitical objectives. The record between the Bush administration and other countries deteriorated drastically over time. By the end of his presidency, Bush had alienated many Latin American countries and had very low approval ratings. His relationship with Uribe, however, remained strong. 52 Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 1152-1160). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

US Economy

Colombia an important US export market


In addition to the security dynamics, Colombia also represents an important country in terms of economic trade and investments. Some scholars argue that Colombia “is the most important market in the developing world for U.S. exports, and by 2010 total U.S. trade with Latin America will exceed U.S. trade with Europe and Asia combined.” 48 U.S. citizens have significant investments in Colombia and a worsening security situation could result in problems causing Americans to withdraw investments from the country. Joseph Ganitsky states that “if you don’t have security, if the government cannot guarantee security, then you do not do business. This is the reason why millions of people left the country.” 49 Ganitsky argues that companies must take into account the security situation within Colombia before investing in order to maximize their return on investment. He continues, “For companies, they make a very clear assessment of their risk and take insurance for kidnapping and hire people and have policies to cover whatever may happen, so if your employee is kidnaped or killed, there will be compensation for relatives.” Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 1140-1149). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Colombia stability important to the US economy


In addition, Colombia neighbors the Panama Canal, which is a major transit point and crucial geographic location for trade. The United States has an interest in stability in the region and does not want the economic trade interrupted because it could hinder the prosperity and security within the United States. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 709-711). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Global Free TradeColombian instability disrupts global free trade zones


Colombia also is a vital country for security in the region because it borders Venezuela, Brazil, and the Panama Canal. Security in Colombia, therefore, is a major priority in order to ensure stable trading zones. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 194-196). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Peace Deal

Peace Deal Good Disadvantage

Colombia close to rarification of the peace deal that was rejected by voters

Fresh Plaza, November 2, 2016, http://www.freshplaza.com/article/166079/Colombia-Analysis-of-the-conflict-and-impact-of-the-referendum-on-agriculture

Pan A m Post, November 4, 2016, Colombian President suggests there may be another referendum on Revised FARC deal, https://panampost.com/julian-villabona/2016/11/04/colombian-president-suggests-there-may-not-be-another-referendum-on-revised-farc-deal/

Colombia is getting closer to finding a way to ratify a new FARC deal for peace. President Juan Manuel Santos has proposed three possible methods in which revisions to agreement with the guerrilla could be implemented in Colombia: A plan submitted to Congress, a second referendum, or votes by regional governments. The announcement of these three strategies was made by Santos after meeting with United Kingdom Prime Minister Theresa May. The two leaders spoke about the economic situation in Europe and their countries’ own relationship following Brexit. Santos also met with entrepreneurs to discuss what’s ahead for the economy should a new version of the peace agreement go through. In a statement, President Santos said the upcoming challenges for the peace deal involve finding a way to confirm the agreement with FARC, but also first culminating a phase of renegotiation following the people’s vote of No on the referendum to ratify the original agreement.

Five reasons the peace deal is good and the US should support Colombia

Admiral Stavridis was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and is Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, October 27, 2016, 5 reasons the US should do all it can to see the peace accord come to fruition, http://time.com/4547870/colombia-peace-accord-americas/

First, Colombia has a potentially powerful economy that could be an engine of growth in the slumping South American economic sphere. The U.S. and Colombia have a free-trade agreement, and improving the Colombian economy could create a stronger trading partner for the U.S.

https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text

http://panampost.com/tag/juan-manuel-santos

http://panampost.com/tag/farc

https://panampost.com/julian-villabona/2016/11/04/colombian-president-suggests-there-may-not-be-another-referendum-on-revised-farc-deal/

https://panampost.com/julian-villabona/2016/11/04/colombian-president-suggests-there-may-not-be-another-referendum-on-revised-farc-deal/

Second, a peaceful Colombia would have a far better chance of reducingcocaine traffic from the Andean Ridge to the U.S. The agreement would allow the U.S. to continue to enlist Colombia as a partner in interdiction operations.

Third, the agreement could help reduce violence both in Colombia and north into Central America, where many refugees are fleeing instability.

Fourth, from a geopolitical and security perspective, a stable Colombia—which has the best military in the region—could provide an anchor for humanitarian, disaster relief and counter-narcotics operations. Colombia would be able to work even better with other close U.S. partners in the region, including Mexico, Chile, Peru and Brazil.

Fifth, there is a fundamental political value at stake: democracy. Colombia has been an independent democratic nation for nearly as long as the U.S.. We should be cheering as it overcomes a half-century of struggle with a Marxist-based insurgency that has used the most brutal tools of terror, kidnap, torture and murder to try to overthrow the government.

The U.S. must assist the people of Colombia with political, economic and military support as they complete the endgame of defeating the FARC. That means keeping Colombia high on the next U.S. President’s agenda, ensuring that military-to-military contracts remain strong, sharing intelligence and information, providing foreign aid, encouraging the support of the international community (especially the E.U.), and sending our top diplomats to Bogotá. Helping our Colombian friends beyond the metaphoric “great perhaps” of Marquez’s powerful and tragic novel is the right strategic move for the U.S., as well as sound moral judgment that will benefit the entire hemisphere.

Momentum behind peace agreement now

Trevor Williams, October 25, 2016, Ambassador: Despite Failed Accord, Colombia, http://www.globalatlanta.com/ambassador-despite-failed-accord-colombia-still-moving-toward-peace/

Colombia may stay in the “gray zone” between ceasefire and true peace longer than its leaders expected, but the momentum is still going in the right direction despite voters’ recent rejection of a deal to end the country’s 52-year civil war,

http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/4/5703ab396/unhcr-calls-urgent-action-central-america-asylum-claims-soar.html

https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/colombia-s-limbo

Ambassador Juan Carlos Pinzón said in Atlanta. Voters on Oct. 2 shot down on razor-thin margins an accord that would have provided a path to political participation for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, best known by the Spanish acronymFARC. Many citizens believed the deal didn’t go far enough to punish the group for decades of kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking during a grueling conflict that claimed an estimated 220,000 lives and displaced millions. Despite the uncertain future of the accord, Mr. Pinzon was upbeat. He said all parties are still at the negotiating table. A ceasefire is still in force. And even the opponents of the deal, including former President Alvaro Uribe, while strengthened in their positions, are looking at ways to move it forward with changes, rather than vowing to obstruct any progress, Mr. Pinzon said. “Apparently we will be in a longer transition to peace,” Mr. Pinzon said, noting that laying down arms is the “easy” part. It’s reaching a political settlement acceptable to both sides that is harder to achieve, he said. “My opinion is that we are moving toward peace. We will take advantage of this moment with all the the challenges it implies,” Mr. Pinzon said during the inaugural Global Leaders Lecture at Emory Law, put on by the school’s International Humanitarian Law Clinic in partnership with the Carter Center. The ambassador said the rejection vote could drive broader consensus toward the “lasting peace” the government is seeking with its most formidable resistance group, and it has even shown signs of bringing the second-largest armed group, the ELN, to the negotiating table. “Maybe what we have here is a big opportunity for Colombia, an opportunity to have a national peace … with more Colombians included,” he said. But the experience still cautioned leaders to “beware of polls,” some of which had the peace accord winning by a 2-to-1 margin. Many, including President Juan Manuel Santos, who won the Nobel Peace Prize five days after the failed vote, seemed to think its passage was a fait accompli, which some analysts have said impacted the Colombian government’s efforts to promote it. Heavy rain in pro-Santos Caribbean regions also was said to have depressed voter turnout. Mr. Pinzon, however, said the fact that the vote took place at all showed Mr. Santos’ commitment to real and lasting peace. Although not required by law, the president called for the plebiscite to strengthen the democratic underpinnings of the decision, thinking that the Colombian people would back it. His miscalculation won’t preclude an eventual agreement, Mr. Pinzon predicted. “The question will be how long that will take. Nobody knows,” he said. But the question of how to overlook past atrocities in favor of future peace looms large after a struggle in which Colombia has had to reaffirm its commitment to human rights even as it fights to regain territory and re-establish rule of law, said Mr. Pinzon. A former defense minister who said he took out more than 50 of FARC’s leaders during his tenure, the ambassador said that many Colombians have taken issue with

http://law.emory.edu/academics/clinics/international-humanitarian-law-clinic.html

http://www.globalatlanta.com/colombian-ambassador-discuss-failed-peace-deal-emory-law/

http://www.globalatlanta.com/colombian-ambassador-discuss-failed-peace-deal-emory-law/

the “transitional justice” system set up under the deal. Under the proposed pact, criminals would avoid jail time or receive reduced sentences if they confess their crimes and commit to never repeat them. For some Colombians who have lost loved ones, paid ransoms or endured suffering themselves, that’s too tough a pill to swallow. “Of course, it’s debatable,” said Mr. Pinzon, who declined an interview with Global Atlanta after the speech. One key point he drove home, though, is that the FARC rebels wouldn’t be the only ones to have access to the “window” of transitional justice. State actors accused of war crimes will also be able to avail themselves of it, a fact that also stirs up anger among some segments of the populace. Many Colombians, especially in areas like Medellin, still accuse the government of illicit killings of political opponents who they say were wrongly labeled as rebels, now known as “false positives.” Mr. Pinzon acknowledged how that there is no perfect solution, but said demanding that each perpetrator is hunted down and punished through the justice system is also not a realistic solution without devolving into full-scale conflict again. Mr. Santos, the president, even has shifted his rhetoric into discussing peace rather than a “defeat” of the FARC, which has also been softening its public image. “They didn’t have any future in terms of crime and violence as an option to power. That was not going to happen — didn’t have a chance. The reason in Colombia to go to peace was not a desperate move just to end violence,” Mr. Pinzon said. “It was a vision of a strong democracy that recovers its tools for using politics, using diplomacy and using social policy to solve problems. It was peace from strength, but at the same time a clear objective to end violence and to get some kind of shortcut between going after these organizations and giving Colombians the option to have a better future faster.” How these issues are worked out will define how peace moves ahead.

Trevor Williams, October 25, 2016, Ambassador: Despite Failed Accord, Colombia, http://www.globalatlanta.com/ambassador-despite-failed-accord-colombia-still-moving-toward-peace/

Mr. Pinzon stressed that using force, especially on one’s own citizens within a country’s own borders, is rife with humanitarian concerns. But the “brave Colombian people” called on their government to solve the interlinked problems of violence, drugs and overall criminal impunity that saw Medellin and Cali, two of the countries largest cities and strongholds for drug lords, become the murder capitals of the world. The result in the late 1990s was Plan Colombia, a strategy devised by Colombian leaders and “sold” in 2000 in the United States, which had a vested interest in fostering stability of a key democracy in South America both for strategic reasons and as part of its War

on Drugs. To hear Mr. Pinzon tell it, the strength of Colombia’s institutions gave the U.S. the confidence it needed to provide $10 billion in funding for weaponry and training for the Colombian military over the last 15 years — all without taking over the mission. “It was our people fighting for our own future, but what we had was a big, strong friend enabling Colombian institutions,” Mr. Pinzon said. Heavy assets were just part of the equation. The deal aimed to enhance intelligence gathering, train special forces for surgical operations, restore territorial control and — most relevant for the Emory Law gathering of students interested in societal issues — provide human-rights education for soldiers. By changing soldiers’ mindset from “fighting an enemy” to “protecting the people,” the plan laid the groundwork for the essential step that would occur after the military operations: development. “The use of force is never enough. It only creates space, but the real change of reality requires a whole set of policies to change a nation,” Mr. Pinzon said, echoing the prevailing sentiment of many U.S. and Colombian leaders at the time. Economic Resurgence It’s easy to see the fruits of that effort. Once a hotbed of drug violence, Medellin is thriving, and the city is frequently cited as a story of transformation, a model for modern cities on issues like social inclusion. Colombia, a nation of nearly 50 million people with ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, is one of the fastest-growing regional economies, capitalizing on its status as a free-trade partner with the U.S. and a founding member of the Pacific Alliance trade bloc with Mexico, Chile and Peru. Colombia relies heavily on the export of oil and coffee and despite falling commodity prices has been able to sustain positive growth, partly thanks to increased foreign investment that poured in as poverty dropped and the country’s reputation improved. Unemployment has been halved in the last five years, and the GINI coefficient (measuring income inequality) has been significanty reduced. Time will tell whether that growth will provide fertile ground for peace — especially in far-flung communities closer to rebel-held areas, the ambassador said. “There is no way we can claim success. I’m not saying Colombia has done so well we can move to other parts. We have done, probably, some good steps. We have created the right set of trends. We will have to work very hard to keep moving from where we are.”

Peace Accord benefits farmers

Camila Bustos is a lead researcher and Marcela Jaramillo is a policy adviser on climate finance at Nivela, October 24, 2016, The Guardian, What does peace in Colombia have to do with the environment?

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/oct/24/peace-colombia-government-guerrilla-environment

Empowering farmers

The accord creates a land fund to benefit the rural communities most affected by state neglect and conflict. The fund will have 3m hectares of land during its first 10 years of creation. Some of these lands will come from the update, delimitation, and strengthening of the forest reserve and their granting will be conditional on the formulation (with the involvement of local communities) of plans to guarantee social and environmental sustainability. The accord also establishes that those who benefit from these lands will have to protect the environment, remove illicit crops and strengthen food production.The government has a deadline of no more than two years to develop an environmental zoning plan where it delimits the agricultural frontier and expands the inventory of areas that require special environmental management such as forest reserves, highly bio-diverse lands, fragile and strategic ecosystems, watersheds, paramos and wetlands.Narrow window of opportunity for peace

Hannah Mescaros Martin, October 25, 2016, How to make peace with the forest: Development and War in Colombia, https://www.opendemocracy.net/hannah-meszaros-martin/how-to-make-peace-with-forest-development-and-war-in-colombia

Window of opportunity

For movements like these, the Peace Agreement presented a window of opportunity, held narrowly ajar, giving the public the chance to reshape regional policies, such as those concerning economic development.

But now that the agreement has been rejected, that opportunity, however slight, appears to be closing. In the ensuing political uncertainty it is likely that the debate about the environment will take a backseat as everyone turns to the issues of impunity and accountability. High-level, systemic impunity has been an on-going feature of Colombian politics for some time now. Many supporters of the ‘No’ vote were against the degree of legal immunity that would be granted to the officers and foot soldiers of the FARC, while many high level government officials and those involved in paramilitary groups have enjoyed real impunityfor decades. But the referendum results don’t change the fact that the natural environment and those who depend on it for survival are the primary victims of this pervasive and systemic impunity in Colombia.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4201278.stm

Peace Deal BadGreater rich-poor gap and growing environmental problems under the accord


Worrying post-accords scenarios

Of course there were already concerns for a “post-accords” scenario, namely the potential rise of violence in areas previously controlled by the FARC.

In these zones the potential for other armed groups to move in and cause further environmental damage through drug trafficking and illegal mining are incredibly high, not to mention the danger this poses to communities in these areas.

And when legal industries such as mining or oil companies enter, under the legal frame, the environmental destruction will be significantly worse. Thisprocess has already begun with the expansion of the petroleum and hydrocarbon industries in the department of Caquetá after the FARC left certain areas. The president of Ecopetrol, one of the world’s largest petroleum companies stated explicitly that “Peace will allow us to take more oil from areas previously closed by conflict.”

Vélez echoes this concern in relation to the expansion of ZIDRES, or Zones of Interest for Economic and Social Rural Development, a plan that renders all ‘unoccupied’ or ‘uncultivated’ land as national property that can then be sold on to multinationals: “what the government is looking toward is how to bring investors to rural areas, so the land will end up in the hands of foreign investors and then our land is once again in the hands of few. There is going to be a new concentration of land.”

In the wake of the referendum, the question of the environment remains fundamental, even more so considering the new interests and actors that have grabbed a seat at the negotiating table alongside the leaders of the “NO” vote. This has shifted the peace process to what civil society is calling ‘a pact between elites’ seeking to impose certain revisions on the accords.

The proposals coming from the far right (aligned with Uribe) would be devastating to the involvement of social movements in environmental issues.

Peace deal excludes many people


On September 26, the Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP was signed with a pen made from a bullet, while the Air Force “fumigated” the colours of the Colombian flag over a

http://congresodelospueblos.org/comunicados-congreso-de-los-pueblos/item/970-un-gran-dialogo-por-la-paz-para-refrendar-los-acuerdos-de-la-habana-facilitar-los-dialogos-con-el-eln-y-garantizar-la-participacion-decisoria-de-la-sociedad.html

http://congresodelospueblos.org/comunicados-congreso-de-los-pueblos/item/970-un-gran-dialogo-por-la-paz-para-refrendar-los-acuerdos-de-la-habana-facilitar-los-dialogos-con-el-eln-y-garantizar-la-participacion-decisoria-de-la-sociedad.html

http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/paz-nos-va-permitir-sacar-mas-petroleo-de-zonas-vedadas-articulo-627058

http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/paz-nos-va-permitir-sacar-mas-petroleo-de-zonas-vedadas-articulo-627058

http://alaorilladelrio.com/2016/05/23/hidrocarburos-y-zona-de-litigio-entre-meta-y-caqueta/%20http://lasillavacia.com/historia/caqueta-se-le-vuelve-plantar-al-petroleo-56379

crowd all clad in white. These planes are all too similar – if not the same – to the ones that up until very recently sprayed down chemical herbicides over vast areas of the Colombian countryside.

Six days later, in a referendum designed by the Santos administration to be the final form of approval for the agreement, 51.2 per cent out of the Colombians who turned out to vote, a mere 38 per cent, issued a ‘NO’ to the agreement. The difference was 55,651 votes.

The divisions that have separated the ‘no’ from the ‘yes’ are much deeper than the current Uribe vs. Santos model that the media is now spinning. In fact politically, ex-president Alvaro Uribe and the current, Juan Manuel Santos, who was Uribe’s minister of war during his presidency, are not actually that different.

But the fractures in Colombian society are historically entrenched. Since its independence and the formation of the modern state, Colombia has had six civil wars largely caused by divisions along class lines and political ideology. In particular, around land ownership. What the referendum has made increasingly obvious is that these divisions – at the same time geographical, ecological and social – cannot be repaired by a closed Peace Process between the government and a single armed group, a process by definition excluding the participation of wider civil society.

Bullets and toxins

Now, with the country gripped by mass protests, there is a great uncertainty over the fate of the Peace Accords – a 297-page document that has taken four years to draw up. But amidst the confusion, devastation, anger and – for certain individuals – joy, it is worth thinking about something that has not changed, despite the referendum result: the critical role of the environment in the Colombian conflict, in which bullets and toxins are the weapons.

This series of articles will look at the relation between environmental and human rights in order to unpack one of the world’s longest running wars, the Peace Agreement and its seeming collapse.

The Accords, and their proposed reforms, had the potential to open up the debate around the structural issues behind the war, in particular, agrarian reform and economic development. Originally a campesino organisation, the FARC-EP has had agrarian reform as their main pillar since their foundation in 1964: the first chapter of the Peace Accords focuses on this. Paradoxically however, while debating issues directly intertwined with economics, such as rural reform, the negotiations were not allowed to address the current Colombian ‘economic model’. Germán Vélez, director of Grupo Semillas – an agricultural and environmental rights organisation, explains, “Santos made clear from the beginning that anything was up for discussion, except the economic model. So, I believe we have to recognise our starting point as a place where the topic of structural problems in rural areas is not being discussed in depth.”

A major criticism of the accords has been their inability to address the structural problems of the conflict. If Colombia is to ever achieve a real, meaningful peace, economic development and its role in fuelling much of the violence in the countryside needs to be recognised. A very clear, direct example of this has been the contracting of paramilitary groups by multinational companies to “provide security” for their extractive industries. These often involves the intimidation, kidnapping, torture, and in some cases, the assassination of union leaders and environmental rights advocates.

The gap between the economic vision of the government and that of Colombian social movements can be seen as a clash of different visions of the Colombian territory itself, where according to the national development plan, nature poses as an infinite resource that can be dug up, cut down, harvested, shipped off or burnt as fuel without caution or end in sight. Biodiversity in this long-standing model is seen solely as potential capital, yet another mode of investment opportunity. On the other side, indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and campesinogroups insist that this model of development does not include them, their world-vision or their beliefs. Therefore the fight for the environment is seen by these groups as an

http://drclas.harvard.edu/news/bioeconom%C3%ADa-la-pr%C3%B3xima-revoluci%C3%B3n-de-colombia

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/22/colombian-takes-bp-to-court-in-uk-alleged-complicity-kidnap-and-torture

http://semillas.org.co/es/quienes-somos

http://www.dw.com/en/thousands-march-in-support-of-colombia-peace-deal/a-36028584

http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-no-supero-al-si-55651-votos-tras-escrutinios-articulo-661079

existential struggle. Which is why many different social movements, such as the Liberation of Mother Earth in northern Cauca, assert their collective and cultural rights through the preservation of biodiversity and traditional agricultural techniques.

Peace deal is a set-back for Afro Colombians

TeleSurt TV, October 31, 2016, Despite Cease-Fire We Keep Dying: Afro Colombian Activist, http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Despite-Cease-Fire-We-Keep-Dying-Afro-Colombian-Activist-20161031-0017.html

An activist for the progressive political movement Marcha Patriotica, Hector Marino Carabali from the Cauca province, went to Havana as part of a delegation of victims representing Afro-descendant communities that have been heavily affected by forced displacements, evictions, torture and murders related to the armed conflict. We did not expect at all the result of the plebiscite to be 'No',” admitted the activist from the progressive political movement Patriotic March, although he expressed optimism for the future of the country. The result was a "wake-up call" for the people of Colombia, he believed, as many have taken to the streets demanding peace since the vote. He highlighted the role of former President Alvaro Uribe in the "No" win, as the right-wing senator led a “dirty” campaign against peace, sending "messages of confusion in the media," said Carabali, and avoiding as much as possible a concrete explanation of the points of the agreement between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government. However, the peace deal represents a great step back for the rights of Afro-descendant and Indigenous communities, he warned, and for all Colombians. For instance, the peace deal included an agrarian reform allowing the “democratization of rural areas,” but the rebels also committed to respecting the principle of private property, he explained, and the peace agreement signed on Sept. 24 also made huge progress towards addressing inequality in the country. “The peace deal eventually included the reaffirmation that the Colombian state must guarantee the principle of prior consultation before any development project liable to affect the survival or culture of ethnic people,” he added, referring to both the indigenous and Afro-descendent communities. Colombia has already signed the Convention C169 of the International Labor Organization that guarantees that right. However, Carabali pointed out that it was not well applied, hence the need to include that right during the implementation of the peace deal. Extractivist projects, including mining and oil exploitation, have been a major issue all along the Pacific provinces of Colombia. Carabali admitted that despite common demands to protect their lands and cultures, the indigenous and Afro-descendent movements could have been better organized in order to push for reforms together, but different cultures and trajectories did not let both movements unite as much as he would have wished. The agreement negotiated in Cuba also radically changed the way the international community supported peace, instead of war, as Carabali referred particularly to the role of the U.S. in funding Colombia's security forces for decades through the infamous Plan Colombia, which has been responsible for thousands of displacements and assassinations across the country. The international funds would have been directly assigned to mitigate social issues in communities under the agreement. However, some conservative sectors have directly or indirectly benefited from the armed conflict over the decades, and have no interest in signing peace with the rebels, explained Carabali. In his opinion, the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos is also largely responsible for the result of the plebiscite. “The government had committed to start a pedagogic campaign teaching peace in communities but never fulfilled this promise”—a factor that largely explains the high rates of abstention in rural towns, he added. “The government was not required to have the peace deal approved via plebiscite, as the constitution guarantees Colombian people's right to peace.” But in the end, “these are our sons who are sent to fill the ranks of military service, to the FARC-EP, this war has been an absurdity,” said the

http://entrelazando.com/portfolio-item/resistencia-indigena-norte-del-cauca/

http://entrelazando.com/portfolio-item/resistencia-indigena-norte-del-cauca/

Afro-Colombian leader. He also criticized the Colombian state for failing to protect its citizens, as the murders and death threats to campesinos leaders have not stopped since the bilateral cease-fire, “the rebels and the army stopped fighting, and yet our activists keep dying.” He denounced the resurgence of paramilitary groups in the areas where the FARC-EP demobilized and the numerous leaflets and graffiti with death threats that keep emerging in rural towns in the Cauca province. “We will keep struggling for peace, including with the ELN,” he concluded optimistically, referring to the second guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army, which is about to open formal negotiations with the government in the Ecuadorean capital.


“FARC can be expected to hand in a portion of their weapons” said a high level official working on the military advisory team at the Havana negotiations. A FARC defector interviewed by CNN says that the guerrillas plan to turn in 30 per cent of their arsenal. The government has released no official estimate on the quantity of FARC’s weapons. President Santos, instead, agreed to a confusing multi-phased disarmament by which individual guerrilla units were supposed to hand in their weapons at 23 different locations over a period of several months. The UN-supervised process would have been largely staffed by soldiers from Cuba and Venezuela, governments supporting FARC. There is no provision to balance their presence with US or British military personnel who have trained and armed the Colombian army. The SAS provided counter terrorist instruction while MI6 uncovered connections between FARC and the IRA. There was no requirement to register serial numbers of turned-in weapons, making it virtually impossible to cross-reference intelligence records or keep an effective inventory. A former Colombian military intelligence officer and international security consultant believes that “the Cubans and Venezuelans don’t want weapons they sold to FARC being traced back to them”. Lack of controls could also allow many FARC weapons to flow into the international black market, ending up with criminal drugs gangs in Brazil's favelas or budding guerrillas elsewhere in Latin America, such as Mapuche Indian insurgents in southern Chile who were trained by FARC. Colombians also fear the degree of territorial authority which the vaguely worded peace deal allows FARC over millions of acres that would be designated as “peasant reserves”, where guerrilla leaders could hold office and be entitled to “early warnings” of army and police movements. The peace deal would also have integrated FARC into government security agencies through a National Committee of Security Guarantees, allowing the group to access intelligence files, alter or delete existing records and investigate government officials.

Peace deal increases the FARC threat


A former defence minister who flaunts his new zeal for peace by wearing doves on his lapel and featuring portraits of Gandhi at parliamentary debates, Santos has responded to the referendum defeat by doubling down on peace talks. He opened new negotiations with Colombia’s second largest guerrilla group, ELN, a week ago. They collapsed when the group failed to release a kidnapped police official in a goodwill gesture. Intelligence analysts say that the ELN would incorporate FARC fighters rejecting demobilization





under the failed peace accord, thus facilitating access to more sophisticated weaponry and new territory. By pushing peace deals geared to please FARC and its authoritarian backers rather than Colombia's people, Santos risks dragging his country further down the vortex of guerrilla politics, in which drugs and arms dominate any dialogue.

Politics DA

Politics DA Links

Bipartisan support for Plan Colombia


Officials from both countries have lauded Colombia's transformation during events this week, and the words of support in the U.S. have underscored the bipartisan nature of American backing for Plan Colombia, which has cost nearly $10 billion since 2000 but is considered one of America's biggest foreign policy successes.Political support for Plan Colombia in Congress


In the United States, Plan Colombia is seen as part of the "War on Drugs", which was started under President Nixon in 1971. Plan Colombia has numerous supporters in the United States Congress. Congressional supporters assert that over 1,300 square kilometers of mature coca were sprayed and eradicated in Colombia in 2003, which would have prevented the production over 500 metric tons of cocaine, stating that it eliminated upward of $100 million of the illicit income that supports drug dealers and different illegal organizations considered terrorist in Colombia, the U.S. and the European Union.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Nixon

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_Drugs

Security K Answers

Changing language alone will not desecuritize


Additionally, this chapter examines speech acts and analyzes the allocation of resources for Plan Colombia to prove that President Obama sought to desecuritize the drug war in Colombia. Authoritative speech acts enable scholars to track the discourse of key figures with regard to security matters in a country. One can say whatever he or she wants, but this does not mean that the goals are accomplished. Speech acts alone, therefore, do not suffice; politicians can speak about a topic and attempt to change the discourse on the subject, but this does not mean that such efforts will succeed. Therefore, scholars need to determine whether resources have been allocated to support what the politician, or authoritative actor, is attempting to securitize or desecuritize. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Location 2036). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Examining the allocation of resources is the best way to determine if something has been successful because politicians and members of the epistemic community can discuss issues in public, but this does not mean that their goals have been achieved. Many scholars and policy analysts who constitute the epistemic community have talked about the need for Washington to have a serious debate about drug policies and change the course of U.S. foreign policy. People such as Bruce Bagley and Ethan Nadelmann have argued for years that the war on drugs should be desecuritized, and drugs should be treated as a health issue rather than as a security issue. 5 Yet, just because academicians have written about the failed war on drugs and the need for change does not mean that Washington has listened. 6 This can be proven when one examines the finances and allocation of resources to Colombia through programs such as Plan Colombia. The speech acts of authoritative figures are important and provide useful insight into the discourse of the subject, but alone they are insufficient. Politicians and key figures can try to change the discourse and perceptions of the public. Examining the allocation of resources is vitally important, and is what I have termed “the show me the money” phenomenon. 7 To prove that something has been successfully securitized or desecuritized, scholars must follow the money trail to determine whether a security issue successfully been securitized— or even desecuritized. Proving the desecuritization (or partial desecuritization) of the war on drugs in Colombia requires an examination of the allocation of U.S.-provided resources. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2048-2049). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.

Rhetoric alone is not enough –we must end funding to stop the war on drugs in Colombia


Speech acts by authoritative figures are important to analyze, but rhetoric alone cannot prove that something has been successfully desecuritized. The successful desecuritization Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2264-2265). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition. of Plan Colombia and the war on drugs in Colombia, hence, would require the United States to provide the Colombian government with fewer resources and, in essence, defund the war on drugs. A politician can say whatever he or she desires, but this does not mean that such efforts to change the dialogue, securitize, or desecuritize an issue or region will be successful. In order to prove that President Obama successfully desecuritized the war on drugs, one must follow the money trail and track which programs received less funding. 42 An examination of the budgetary allocations and funding for Plan Colombia will help prove empirically whether President Obama has successfully desecuritized the war on drugs. Rosen, Jonathan D.. The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY series, James N. Rosenau series in Global Politics) (Kindle Locations 2265-2271). State University of New York Press. Kindle Edition.