Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II,

Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.14

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single

doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

x x x x

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards

interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;

" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal

action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer."42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50

The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona*, Nachura, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 170122 October 12, 2009

CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 171381

CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief. In the first petition for mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the August 5, 2005 Order,1 as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture case involving the same parties but for different properties.

The Facts

To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic

Act No. (RA) 1379,3 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. This petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.

Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case, docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth Division of the SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.

Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both forfeiture cases.

After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:

(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. Per the Sheriffs Return4 dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly served on respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance which Gen. Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.

Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the OMBs motion, the Garcias interposed an opposition in which they manifested that they have meanwhile repaired to the Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment SB issued in which case the SB should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.

(2) By Resolution5 of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias in default.

Another resolution6 denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer, and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.

A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to the prohibited pleading rule.

(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249.7

On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case of plunder.

(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.

By Order8 of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants having been declared in default which has yet to be lifted.

It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her first special civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the following issues:

I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion x x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and August 26 2005 that merely "Noted without action," hence refused to resolve petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash by virtue of petitioners prior default in that:

A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division could not have acquired jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her childrens] x x x persons, much less make them become the true "parties-litigants, contestants or legal adversaries" in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners [and her childrens] x x x persons, they could not possibly be declared in default, nor can a valid judgment by default be rendered against them.

B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from challenging the [SB] 4th Divisions lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I as the same can be raised anytime, even after final judgment. In the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all proceedings before the [SB] are null and void.

C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the first challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction raised therein had already been passed upon by [the SB 4th Divisions] resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26, 2005 were entirely different, separate and distinct from the

grounds set forth in petitioners manifestation and motion [to consolidate] dated April 15, 2005 that was denied by it per its resolution of May 20, 2005.

D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case against petitioner that mandates the automatic forfeiture of the subject properties in forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any conviction for plunder.

E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.

F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA, any penal conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the Philippines x x x.

G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements, and to avoid possible conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.9 (Emphasis added.)

With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were taken after the petition for Forfeiture II was filed:

(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return of July 13, 2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: "Im receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic)."

(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter thereof which is now covered by the plunder case.

To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for alternative service of summons. The motion for alternative service would be repeated in another motion of August 25, 2005.

(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash and the Republics motion for alternative service of summons.

On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration.10

From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the instant petition for certiorari, docketed as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January 24, 2006 denying petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:

A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the [SB] ought to have dismissed forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioners person x x x.

B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the automatic forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.

C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.

D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements and worse conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.11 (Emphasis added.)

Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were consolidated.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are partly meritorious.

The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the question of jurisdiction and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitionerand her three sons for that matterconsidering that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the plunder caseCrim. Case No. 28107has already been filed and pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of the SB.

Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196

Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against the

Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.

Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan12 involving no less than petitioners husband questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.

Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,13 the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:

Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a "public officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x."14 Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.15 Thus "if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.16 x x x (Citations in the original.)

Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family and business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 317 the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,18 interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on Good Government to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.

Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature while the Latter Is Criminal

It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of

plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is "sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]." On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.19

Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,20 suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.

Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between the plunder case and the subject forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension about the likelihood of conflicting decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said in this regard merits approving citation:

On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division where the plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in conflict with the decision by this division on the forfeiture case. They refer to a situation where this Courts Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the plunder case while the Fourth Division grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or vice versa.

Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to a conflict. After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and circumstances separate and distinct from that in the forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases, there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established and the issues sought to be addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the other.

There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the forfeiture of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption that the information on plunder and the petition for forfeiture cover the same set of properties.21

RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379

Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing Forfeitures I and II with her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.

Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.

It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.

Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children

On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioners contention.1 a vv p h i 1

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:

SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.22

In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,23 we broke down the requirements to be:

(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party."24 Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.

(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.

(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.

The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief.25 In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons since the improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.

Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance

The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.

The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.

Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the courtchallenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus,

imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004

ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21.

The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:

The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun Bombita" with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended Information reads:

That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his death, and as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N.

NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.1

On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.2

The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.

When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3 the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash4 the Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408,5 in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.

Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23, 1993,6 the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994.7 Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9 he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10 denying the motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP.

In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting any evidence in connection with the petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit the offense charged in connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. According to the prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense was committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the

company of civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant."11

For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the aforestated date.12

On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13 the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion14 and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.lawphi1.nt

The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration15 of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.16

The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission when the crime was committed.

On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened.

The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that after preliminary hearing, this Court has found that the offense charged in the Information herein was committed by the accused in his relation to his function and duty as member of the then Philippine Constabulary.

Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:

(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended Information alleging that the offense charged was committed by the Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;

(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of this case, together with the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted immediately to the Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for appropriate proceedings.17

On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975,18 the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial.

Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the RTC.

The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.

The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while in the performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below "27" committed in relation to office are within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the law should be referred to the proper trial court.

The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitioner when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive effect.

The Ruling of the Court

The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.

The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information.19 Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.20

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .21

However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.22 The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge

of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.23

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the

Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. 1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and