ute campaign of 1879

8/13/2019 Ute Campaign of 1879

1/117

THE UTE CAMPAIGN OF 1879:A STUDY I N THE USE OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT

th es is presented t o the Faculty o f th e U.S. ArmyCommand and General S t a f f College i n pa r t i a lfu l f i l lment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART ND SCIENCE

RUSSEL D SANTALA MAJOR USB.A. Un iv er si ty o f Colorado Boulder Colorado 1980

For t Leavenworth Kansas993

Approved fo r p ubl i c release; di st r i bu t i on i s unl imited.


2/117

MASTER OF MILITARY RT ND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name o f candidate: Major Russel D SantalaThes is T i t le : The Ute Campaign o f 879: Study i n the Use of theMi l i tary Ins t rument

Approved by:

Thesis Committee Chairman~ o l o n k lRichard M Swain, Ph.D.

, Member

Accepted t h i s 4 th day o f June 993 by:

, Director, Graduate Degree~ h ? l i p. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those o f the studentauthor and do not nec essari ly represent t he views o f the U.S. ArmyCommand and General S ta f f College or any other governmental agency.(References t o t h i s study should include th e for egoing statement)


3/117

ABSTRACT

THE UTE CAMPAIGN O 1879: A STUDY I N THE USE O THE MILITARY I?ISTRlli4ENTby Major Russel D Santala, USA, 111 pages.Thi s study examines th e r o l e o f th e U.S. Army as an inst rument o fna ti on al power i n th e execution o f U.S. government po li cy . The focuso f t he thesis i s an invest igat ion of the implementat ion of pol icy , i nterms o f th e Ute Indi an tr i b e o f Colorado, and the events preceding andfollowing the Ute uprising of 1879.The U.S. Army found i t s e l f i n a dilerma wi th regard t o i t s support of anational Indian strategy. t was not the primary executive agent forthe implementation o f p ol ic y, but was ca ll ed upon t o both enforcenat ional pol icy and pol ice v io lat ors . This study traces thedevelopment o f t he U S Ind ian Pol icy and the evolu tion o f armystrategy i n the west.The study culminates w i th an anal ysis o f t he events surrounding theoutbreak o f ho s t i l i t i e s i n 1879. This study addresses issues th atfaced the U.S. Army i n an environment o f unclear na ti ona l po li cy andcompeting nati onal and loc al in tere sts. The impl icati ons o f t h i sepisode warrant examination, as th e U.S. Army fi nd s i t s e l f i n anotherperiod with similar problems.


4/117

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

F i r s t must thank Colonel Richard M Swain Combat Stud iesI n st i t u t e USACGSC f o r br in gi ng order out o f chaos and f o r h i sguidance and encouragement. Thanks are due Major Freder ic k J.Chiaventone Department o f Jo i n t and Combined Operations USACGSC f o ra thorough job o f ed it in g and h i s shared i nt er es t o f the Indian

campaigns.The s t a f f o f the Combined Arms Research Li br ar y are due thanks

f o r t h e i r invaluable assistance i n gather ing mater ial and keeping tabson the progress of t he pr oject .

Special thanks are reserved f o r my fami ly. Thei r sharedsa cr i f i ce was an indispensib le par t of t h i s ef fo r t .


5/117

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PPROVALPAGE i iBSTRACTCKNOWLEDGEMENTS i vIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS v i

CHAPTER1. I N T R O D U C T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

. STRATEGIC SETTING 18

. THEOPPONENTS 40MASSACRE AND BATTLE 67

. AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS 9 1IBLIOGRAPHY. I05

N I T I A L D I ST R IB U TI ON L I ST 1 1 1


6/117

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FigureThe Strategy ProcessThe Area o f Opera tionsDiv is ion o f the Missour iUte Ter r i t ory i n 18 6Ute Terr i t or y i n 1868Ute Terr i tor y i n 1873Theater Rai 1 oadsSample News HeadlinesI n i t i a l AdvanceFirst ContactDelay


7/117

CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION

The l a nc e o f t h e m i g h t i e s t P l a i n s I n d i a n n a t i o n was s h a t t e re d ,and t h e r e a f t e r no I n d i a n s r e t a i n e d enough m i l i t a r y power t o r e s i s t t h ew r t o f W ash ington f o r l ong . ' W i th t h i s remark , Russe l l F. Weigleyconc ludes th e American Army's campaigns ag ain st t h e In d ia n; a s e r i e so f campaigns th a t have been v iewed as devo id o f s t r a t e g i c o ro p e r a t i o n a l f oc us , sa ve f o r a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f a w ar o f a n n i h i l a t i o ns t r a teg y he ld s ince the C i v i l War by the s en io r army l eade rs . W i t ht h i s i n m ind, t h i s t h e s i s b e g in s an e xa m in at io n o f t h e A rm y's s t r a t e g i cand operat ional f ramework as t r e l a t e s t o t h e u p r i s i n g o f t h e U teI n d i a n s o f C o lo ra do i n 1879. The c e n t r a l q u e s t io n o f t h i s t h e s i s i s :D i d t h e arm y have an o p e r a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h n a t i o n a lgoa ls , as ev id en t i n th e Ute campa ign?

B e f or e t h i s q u e s t io n i s answ ered, t i s e s s e n t ia l t o a dd re ssth ree secondary ques t ions :

1 D i d a n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y e x i s t and how d i d tr e l a t e t o t h e c o n du ct o f t h e I n d i a n cam paign s?

2. How was th e execu t i on o f t h e na t i o na l m i l i t a r y campa igncons t r a ined?

3. How d id ope r a t i on a l and ta c t i c a l q ues t i ons confor m t on a t io n a l m i l i t a r y s t ra t e g y ?These quest ions w l l shape t h i s s t ud y b y f i r s t e x am in in g t h e I n d i a n


8/117

p o l i c y as an ex p r es s io n o f t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y o f t h e U n it edS t a t e s i n s u p po rt o f t h e n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e o f w e s te rn e xp an sio n.The se con d s u b j e c t t o b e e xam ine d i s t h e n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g yt h a t e v ol ve d t o s u p p or t t h e s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y a t t h e n a t i o n a l o r WarDepartment level .

A f t e r a d dre ss in g t h e n a t i o n a l o r s t r a t e g i c l e v e l , t h e t h e s i sw i l l t u r n t o t h e o p e r a t io n a l o r m i l i t a r y d ep artm en t l e v e l and t h et a c t i c a l o r b a t t l e f i e l d l e v e l s and ev alu ate t h e e xe cu tio n o f m i l i t a r yp o l i c y . T h i s e x a m in a t io n w i l l dem ons t ra te t he l i nkages f r om thes t r a t e g i c o r n a t i o n a l l e v e l , t hr ou g h t h e o p e r a t i o n a l o r d e p ar tm e nta ll e v e l , t o t h e t a c t i c a l o r b a t t l e f i e l d l e v e l . The Arm y's m eans w i l l beexam ined i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o c o n s t r a i n i n g f a c t o r s b o t h i n t e r n a l a nde x te r na l t o i t s o rg a ni za t i on . The paper w i l l e xam ine t h e a p p l i c a t i o no f m i l i t a r y p ower i n s up p o rt o f g overnm ent p o l i c y i n te rm s o f t h e U tecamppign.

The framework f o r t h i s s tudy co rresponds w i t h t he s t ra teg yprocess model (Fig ure 1 and w i l l as p rev ious l y s ta ted , exam ine thel i n k a g e s b etw een t h r e e l e v e l s o f a c t i o n : S t r a t e g i c , O p e r a t i o n a l, a ndT a c t i c a l . T h i s s tu d y i s based on an a n a l y s i s o f h i s t o r i c a l e v en ts a teach o f t h e t h r e e l e v e l s i n accord an ce w i t h t h e s t r a t e g i c p ro ce ssmodel.

Chapter 2 a dd re ss es t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y o f t h eHayes a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and t h e c o rr e s po n d in g n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g yo f t h e War Department. C o n f l i c t i n g v ie ws e x i s t i n t h e c u r r e n t body ol i t e r a t u r e i n te rm s o f t h e im pa ct o f t h e g overnment on t h e u t i l i z a t i o no f m i l i t a r y power i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e I n d ia n p o l i c y . I n ord er t od is cu ss t h i s f u l l y , I n d i a n and m i l i t a r y p o l i c y i n t h e w est fro m 865 t o

2


9/117


10/117

188 w l l be addressed, t o pro v ide th e necessary con tex t . The goa l o ft h i s c ha pte r i s t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e n a t io n a l I n d i a n p o l i c y and t h er e l a t e d n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t r a te g y , o r d o c t r i n e , r e q u ir e d t o im plem entt h e p o l i c y .

Chapter 3 i s an a n a l y s i s o f o p e ra t io n a l s t ra t e g y s e le c te d t oa c h i e v e t h e g o a l s o f p o l i c y . T h i s c h a p t e r f o c us e s on t h e o p e r a t i o n a ll e v e l m i l i t a r y o r g an iz a tio n s r es p on s ib le f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o fm i l i t a r y f o r c e t o a c h ie ve p o l i t i c a l go als , and t h e n o n - m il it a r yg ove rn men t a g en cie s w i t h i n t h e t h e a t e r o f o p e r a t i o n s . T h e m i l i t a r yo rga n i za t i on s exam ined a r e t he D i v i s i o n o f t h e M issou r i , t he D epartm en to f t h e M i s s o u r i a nd t h e D ep artm en t o f t h e P l a t t e . The governmenta ge nc ie s w i t h i n t h e t h e a t e r o f o p e r a t i on s i n c lu d e t h e s t a t e o fC o lo rado, and rep res en ta t i ve s o f t he f ed e ra l government ope ra t i n gw l t h i n t h e s t a t e (i. e., a g e nt s o f t h e I n d i a n B ure au ). Based on ani n i t i a l s ur ve y o f t h e m a t e r ia l , t h e a bsense o f a c l e a r m i l i t a r ys t r a t e g y w o uld a ppe ar t o h ave oc c ur re d a t t h i s l e v e l , l a r g e l y due t ot h e p e r s o n a l i t i e s o f t h e s e n i o r arm y o f f i c e r s i n command. TheCommanders o f t h e D epartmen ts o f t he P la t t e and M isso u r i , B r i ga d ie rG e ne ra ls C ro ok and Pope, r e s p e c t i v e l y , had s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n tv ie ws o f t h e ro le o f t h e a rm y and th e conduc t o f campaigns , t han d i dt h e i r sup er ior s, Generals Sherman and Sher idan. The co nc lus ion o f th i::chap te r w l l be a d i s c u s s io n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y t h a t g u id e dta c t i c a l l e ve l commanders w i t h i n t h e depar tm en ts , and sp e c i f i c gu idancefo r t h e conduct o f t h e U te cam pa ign.

C ha pte r f oc u se s on t h e t a c t i c a l e v e n ts i n v o l v e d i n t h econduct o f th e Ute campaign. These eve nts w l l i n cl u de t h e B a t t l e a tM l 'l k R ive r and th e show o f fo rc e executed by Co lone l Wesley M e r r i t t t

4


11/117

i n t i m i d a t e t h e U te s t o t h e b a r g a i n in g t a b l e . The cons t r a in tsexam ined a r e be t h e l o c a l f a c t o r s t h a t i n fl u e n c ed t h e t a c t i c a l l e v e lcommanders du r in g t h e conduct o t th e campaign. I n a d d i t io n t o t hee x p l a n at i on o f b a t t l e f i e l d e ve nts , t h e go al o f t h i s c hap te r i s t or e l a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e ra t io n s s u rr o un d in g t he s e t a c t i c a levents .

C ha pte r c on clu de s t h i s s t u d y by e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t t h e arm yd i d o r h ave an I n d i a n p o l i c y t h a t was i n t e r n a l i z e d th r ou g h o ut t h ecommand s t r uc tu r e . The p o l i c y shou ld have p r ov ided f o r the ap p l i ca t i o no f m i l i t a r y power w i t h in budgetary and manpower co ns t ra in ts , and was ar e f l e c t i o n o f t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e Hayesa d m i n i s t r a t i o n . f t h e m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y was n o t m u t u a l l y s u p p o rt iv eth r oughou t th e s t r a teg y p r ocess mode l, t h e l i k e l y cause was thed i f f e r i n g v ie w s o f s e n i o r a rm y l e a d e r s be tw een t h e n a t i o n a l anddepa r tmen ta l l eve l s .

B e fo re b e gi nn in g t h e a n a l y si s o f t h e n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c p o l i c yand t h e im p ac t on m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y i n c ha p te r 2, t i s n ecessary t op r ov ide some backg round ma te r i a l pe r ta in in g t o even ts t h a t wereun fo ld ing i n Co lo rado and examine some o f the e lements o f t he U tec r i s i s . T h i s w l l a s s i s t i n fo c u si n g t h e s t ud y a s t l o o k s a t l a r g e rs t r a te g i c and ope r a t i o na l ma t te r s , and w l l a s s i s t i n e x p l a i n i n g whysome ques t i ons loom la r g e r than o the r s i n te rms o f t h e even tss u rr ou n di ng t h i s one, r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l, t r i b e .

I n September o f 1879, t h r e e tr o op s o f t h e 5 t h US Cavalry, underth e command o f Major T.T. Thornburgh, l e f t Fo r t Stee le, Wyoming, f o rth e W hi te R iver Agency i n nor thwes t Co lo rado. Major Thornburgh wasop era t in g under orde rs f rom th e Commander o f t h e Department o f th e


12/117

P la t t e , B r ig ad ie r Genera l George Crook , t o move t o th e agency andas s i s t t he re se r va t i on agen t, N athan C Meeker. Meeker had beenappo in ted agent t o th e Whi te R ive r Agency on 18 March 1878 a f t e ra c t i v e l y p u r su in g th e p o s i t i o n th ro u g h p o i t i c a l a cq ua in ta nce s, b o th i nColorado and i n Washington D.C. M eeker's goa l was t o es ta b l i sh a k i n do f u t o p i a n s t a t e t h a t c om bined h i s r e l i g i o u s v ie w s a nd t h e l es s on s f rc mthe U n ion C olony , a coopera t i ve a g ra r i an exper im en t, i n G reeley ,Colorado.

The appo in tment o f In d i an Bureau Agents had lon g been a pa r t u ft h e p o l i t i c a l s p o i l s system . W i th a change i n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a w ho les e r i e s o f c o v e r t a nd o v e r t a p p oin tm e nt s we re made t o re wa rd p o l i t i c a ls e r v ic e , and t h e im p ac t o f t h i s i n e p t s ystem was f e l t a t t h e . a g en cie sp roduc ing t he p rob lem s th a t had l on g been a so re po in t w i t h t he WarD ep artm en t. S i n ce 1849, t h e D ep artm en t o f t h e I n t e r i o r c o n t r o l l e dI n d i a n a f f a i r s , and, p a r t i c u l a r l y u nd er t h e G ra n t A d m i n i s tr a t io n , t h i sarrangement had come under c r i t i c i s m from b ot h th e re fo rm movement ancls e n i o r o f f i c e r s w i t h i n t h e army, who b e l i e v e d t h e y were b e t t e rq u a l i f i e d a t m anaging I n d i a n p o l i c y f o r t h e n a t i o n t h a n w ere m erep o l i t i c a l a p po in te es . G en era l S h er id a n c m e n t e d , t h a t i t i s n o t t heG overnm en t t h a t i s m anag ing t he I nd ian s , i t i s t h e c o nt ra c ta rs ,t r a d e r s , and s u p p ly i n t e r e s t s . '

S h o r t l y b e f o r e h i s a p p oin tm e nt , Meeker received an encouragingl e t t e r f rom C o lo rado S enator , H enry M T e l l e r , d e s c ri b i n g h i s

.d i scuss ion w i t h t he C om missione r o f I nd ian A f fa i r s , Edward A Hayt, an3 January 1878. It read:

e nt t o t h e C o mm ission er o f I n d i a n A f f a i r s and p o s te d y o urc la im s f o r an agency and designated W hi te R iv er Agency as th ecne anted f o r you. Now h i n k ave a good show. The


13/117

ortLewis

L,,,, Garland

ort nionSam Fe

THE RE OF OPERATIONSAdapted fmm Spnnguo Macwacre)Figup 2


14/117

C om m issio ne r s a i d he was n o t a t a l l s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e a g en ta t W hite R i v e r who k nows n o t h i n g o f i r r i g a t i o n o r f a rm i n g i nth e west. m anx ious you shou ld have i t because e e l yous h o u ld do s o me th in g t h a t w o uld b e o f b e n e f i t t o o u r p e o pl eand t o t he i nd ians . There e l i e ve t h e i nd ian s can be t aug h tt o r a i s e c a t t l e and av e an id e a you a r e t h e man t o do itNow i f you had the p lace i t would pay you $1,500 a year andyou wou ld have a house t o l i v e i n f r ee , a ga rden and so f o r t h .So h i n k you can save something. It i s o n l y 100 m i l e s f ro mt h e r a i l r o a d a nd q u i t e easy. f you accept w i l l commencework. L e t me he ar soon.3The U te s t o o k a n e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t ' v ie w o f t h e i r new a g en t.

L a rg e ly i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e t r e a t y o f 1873 w hic hsecured f o r them 4,000,000 acre s o f Colorado, th ey v iewed themselves asa l l i e s t o t he Un i t ed S ta te s gove rnment. As Ouray, t h e mos t p rom inen to f U t e c h i e f s e xp re ss ed :

The army conquered the Sioux. You can o rd e r them around. Butwe Utes have never d i s t u rb e d you whi tes. So you m us t w a i t u n t i lwe come t o you r ways o f d oin g th ings .4B o th t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e C om missioner o f I n d i a n A f f a i r s

and t he gove rnmen t o f t he s ta te o f Co lo rado had an exp ress l y d i f f e re n tagenda f o r t h e a s s i m i l a t i o n o f t h e U t e t r i b e i n t o m ain str ea m Am erica nc u l tu r e - -o r b e t t e r y e t, i s o l a t i o n fr om it a l t o g e t h e r . B ecause o f t h i s ,t he re l a t i o ns h i p between Meeke r and h i s cha rges , t he Wh it e R i v e rU te s, had d e te r io r a t e d t o t h e p o i n t t h a t Meeker f e l t h i s l i f e was i njeopardy. Meeker was co nf ro nte d by th e Utes, who suspected h im o fd i r e c t i n v ol ve m e n t w i t h t h e a n t i -U t e movement i n t h e s t a t e .

t t h i s ti m e , a r t i c l e s h e a d li n e d The U te s M us t Go w ere b e i n gp repa red by members o f t he s t a f f o f Governo r F rede r i ck W P i t k i n .P i t k i n was a fo rmer miner who used h i s wea l th and i n f l u e n c e , a c q u i r e df rom a g o ld m ine i n t he San Juan Moun ta ins o f Co lorado , t o bo th t or e v i s e t h e U t e T re a t y i n 1 873 and t o become t h e f i r s t G o ve rn or o fCo lorado, upcn s ta tehood i n 1876. H is v iew o f t he Utes was an

8


15/117

expression o f th e statewide view t ha t they were an impediment t o thedevelopment o f t he ri ch es t p ar t o f t he s ta te and should be removed t othe Indian Te rr i to ri es o r elsewhere. Will iam Vickers, an advisor t othe governor wrote i n the Denver Tribune:

The Utes are ac tu al , p ract ica l Communists and the Governmentshould be ashamed t o fo st e r and encourage them i n t h e i ridleness and wanton waste o f property. Li vi ng o f f the bountyo f a paternal bu t i d i o t i c Ind ian Bureau, they act ua ll y becometoo lazy t o draw th e i r rat ions i n the regular way but i ns is t onta ki ng what they want wherever they f i n d it Removed t o Ind ianTer rit ory , th e Utes could be fed and clothed fo r about one ha l fwhat i t now costs the government.Honorable N C Meeker, t he well-known Superintendent o f theWhite River Agency, was former ly a f a s t f r i en d and ardentadmirer o f t he Indians. He went t o t he Agency i n the irmbelief that he could manage the Indians successfully by kindtreatment , pa t ie n t precept and good example. But u t t e rfai lurelmarked h i s ef fo r t s and at l a s t he relu cta nt l y acceptedthe t ru th o f the border t ru ism that the on ly t ru l y goodIndians are dead ones.5

I n t o t h i s s i t uat i on, Major Thornburgh and hi s three troops o fcavalry ar r ived t o mediate a d ispute th at had i t s roots i n the I ndianpol i cy o f the previous 25 years. Thornburgh's orde rs gave him on ly thebroadest ins tr uc ti on s. Meeker had requested-assistance on 10 September1879 by sending a messenger t o te legram Commissioner Hayt. Themessage reached Hayt on 3 September 1879.

The request fo r troops was seen by Secretary o f the I n t e r i o rCarl Schurz, Secre tar y o f War George W McCrary, and u l t ima te ly byGeneral o f t he Army Wi ll iam T Sherman. Sherman approved the requestf o r t roops and i ns tr uc te d the Commander o f t he Di vi si on o f theMissouri, Major General P h i l l i p H Sheridan, t o order the nearestm i l i t a r y commander t o send troops t o White River.% Following someconfusion a t Sheridan's headquarters, the o rder was sent t o F or t Steelenear Rawlins, Wyoming, and then t o Major Thornburgh. While th e troops


16/117

a t F o r t S t e e l e were t h e c l o s e s t t o t h e W h i te R i v e r Agency, t h e y had n o tope rated i n Colorado befo re, as the Colorado-Wyoming bord er delineate:th e boundary between the Department o f th e M iss ou r i and th e Departmento f t h e P l a t t e . ' By t he co nc lus i on o f t h e cam pa ign, t r oop s f r om bo thdepartments were committed aga ins t th e Utes.

The Commander o f th e Depar tment o f th e P la t t e , B r ig ad ie rG en era l George Cro ok, g ave t h e f o l l o w i n g o r d e r t o t h e f o r c e s a t F t .S tee le :

You w i l l move w i t h a s u f f i c i e n t num ber o f t r oo ps t o W h i teR iv er Agency under spe ci a1 instruction^ ^The s p e c i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t Cro ok sp oke o f we re t o c o n t a c t t h eagent on t he scene and " deve lop " t h e s i t ua t i o n . Thornburgh beganh i s march t o t h e W hi te R iv e r Agency on 22 September 1879, w i t h at o t a l o f 1 53 s o l d i e r s and 25 c i v i l i a n s .

By 5 S ep te mb er 1 879, t h e y a r r i v e d w i t h i n 5 3 m i l e s o f t h eagency and camped on th e banks o f F o r t i f i c a t i o n Creek . He dispatched al e t t e r t o t h e Agency, r e p o r t i n g :

I n ob ed ie nc e t o i n s t r u c t i o n s f r o m t h e G e ne ra l o f t h e A rmy,m e n r o u t e t o y o u r a ge ncy, a nd e x p e c t t o a r r i v e t h e r e o nt h e 2 9 th i n s t a n t , f o r t h e p urp os e o f a f f o r d i n g y ou anya s s i s ta n c e i n my power i n r e g u l a t i n g y o ur a f f a i r s , and t omake a r r e s t s a t y o u r s u g g e s ti o n , a nd t o h o l d as p r i s o n e r ss uc h o f yo u r I n d i a n s a s you d e s i re , u n t i l i n v e s t i g a t i o n sare made by your department.a ve h e ar d n o t h i n g d e f i n i t e f ro m y o u r age ncy f o r t e ndays and do no t know what s ta te o f a f f a i r s ex i s t s , w hethe rt h e I n d i a n s w i l l l eave a t my app roach o r show h o s t i l i t i e s .end t h i s l e t t e r by M r Lowry, one o f my guides, and d e s i r eyou t o communicate w i t h me as soon as po ss ib l e, g iv in g mea l l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n y o ur po wer, i n o r d e r t h a t may knowwhat course m t o pursue. f p ra c t i c a l , meet me on theroad a t t he ea r l i es t m om en t .9A f t e r d i s p a t c h i n g t h e l e t t e r , M a jo r T ho rn bu rg h c d n ti n ue d t h e

march toward th e agency and met a de leg at io n o f e lev en U tes f rom th e


17/117

agency, who voiced th e i r concern over th e a r r i v a l o f troo ps anddenounced the agent, Meeker.

The consternation o f th e Utes was understandable, both i n l i g h to f t h e i r percept ion o f th e Army's ro le i n the suppression o f the othet-major Colorado tri be- -th e Cheyenne--and i n t h e i r previous support ofth e Army i n th e campaign aga inst th e Navajo. Utesh ad joined the ropethrower, K i t Carson, dur ing h i s ea r l i e r campaigns against th e Navajoand had taken a r ol e i n support o f the army against th e i r t ra di t i on alenemy, th e Cheyenne. They had not faced an ac t i ve campaignagainst them i n the past, having re l ie d on th e i r remoteness t o pro tec tthem from the expansion o f th e western movement.

The Utes had also benefitted by having a relativelysophist icated leader i n th e i r c hie f Ouray. Af te r being inv i t ed toWashington by the Indi an Bureau t o ne goti ate t he Ute Treaty o f 1868Ouray took h i s cause t o th e eastern press. Ouray remarked:

The agreement an In di an makes t o a United States tr ea ty i sl i k e th e agreement a b uf fa lo makes wit h h i s hunters when piercedwith arrows. A l l he can do i s l i e down and give-in.12

Although on ly a Ch ief o f the Umcompaghre branch o f the Utes, Ouray wasviewed by both st at e and federal o f f i c i a l s as the de facto leader ofthe en t i r e t r i be .

The response from Meeker t o Major Thornburgh's e a r l i e r l e t t e rgave an accurate a ppra isal o f th e In di an mood a t t he agency. The 27September 579 le t te r s ta ted:

Understanding t h a t you are on the way hi t he r w it h UnitedStates troops , end a messenger, M r Eskr idge, and twoIndians, Henry (i nt er pr et er ) and John Ayersly, t o inf orm youth at the I ndians are grea tly excited, and wish you t o stopa t some convenient camping place, and then th a t you andf i v e so ld ie rs o f your command come i n t o the Agency, when at a l k and a be tt er understanding can be had.


18/117


19/117

dump Pre sid en t Hayes from th e 1880 t i c k e t ; and al s o th e army would bep leased t o have a f r e sh d i s as te r t o use as a bas i s f o r new demands t ot r a ns fe r th e Ind ian Bureau t o th e War Depa r tmen t .l 5

The v iew o f wha t con s t r a in ing fa c t o r s were a t work dc r i ngt h i s p e ri o d , and how th e y a f f e c t e d t h e I n d i a n p o l i c y and m i l i t a r ys t r a t e g y , a r e v a r ie d . M ost w r i t e r s on t h e s u b j e c t a gre e t h a tp o l i t i c a l , econom ic, and s o c i a l f a c t o r s p la y ed a l a r g e r o l e i nde te r m in ing the na t i on a l I n d i an po l i c y . They d i sag r ee whethe r t h i s wasan a r t i c u l a t e d p o l i c y o r m e re ly an ad hoc e xp re s si on o f t h e s p i r i t o fma n i fes t des t i ny . Ad d i t i on a l l y , t he r e e x i s t s no consensus on theim pa ct o f e i t h e r t h e s t a t e d o r u n st at ed p o l i c y , on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o fm i l i t a r y p ow er i n su p po rt o f n a t i o n a l g o a ls and o b j e c t i v e s .

Robert Wooster argues i n h i s book , The Un i ted S ta tes and Ind ianP o l i c y : 1865-1903, t h a t p o st -I8 65 p o l i t i c s pl ay e d a c l e a r r o l e i nd e f i n i n g t h e m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y t h a t t h e army f ol lo w e d. He concludest h a t w h i l e a wid e v a r i e t y o f i n f l u e n c e s im p ac te d on t h e r o l e o f t h earmy, l a c k o f c on ce rn by n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y f i g u r e sp re c lu d ed t h e de velopm ent o f a l a s t i n g p o l i c y o r d o c t r i n e .

Russe l l F. Weigley i n The Amer ican Wav o f War a t t r i b u t e s ou rm i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y i n co m ba tt in g t h e I n d ia n s t o t h e e xp erie nc es o f t h earmy sen io r l eade r s h ip du r i ng the C i v i l W ar. As Weig ley s tates:

f t h e conduc t o f t he C i v i l War had p repa red the Un i tedS ta te s Army t o employ a s t r a teg y o f a nn ih i l a t i o n , sometimesw i t h f r i g h t f u l l i t e r a l n e s s , i n i t s wars a ga in st th e I n di an s ,th e s t ra t eg y was much i n harmony w i t h po s t -C iv i l War n a t i on a lp o l i c y . 1 6


20/117

W e ig le y e p i to m i z e s Sherman as t h e c r e a t o r o f a k i n d o f war t h a t f a re c l ip s e d e a r l i e r h i s t o r y , i n te rm s o f t e r r o r and de s tr u ct iv e n es s , andw h ich reached a p i nn ac le du r i n g t he w in t e r cam pa igns aga ins t t h eInd ians .

balanc e between th e two v iews seems a more prudent p o s i t io n .C e r t a i n l y , G en era l o f t h e A n y W i l l ia m T. Sherman ca r r ie d th e baggageo f t h e w ar o f a n n i h i l a t i o n w i t h h im i n t o h i s l e a de r s h ip o f t h e armyi n t h e we st, b u t wh eth er t h i s was t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e a n y c an be h e l di n q u es tio n . Sherman, as a member o f t h e Peace Commission o f 1867made c l e a r h i s v ie w t o Red C lo ud and t h e S io u x t h a t h e had l i t t l eto l e r an ce f o r t h e i r demands. Whatever they s a id , they were doomed.The U n i t e d S ta t es , w i t h i t s e xp an din g p o p u l a t io n , i t s r a i l r o a d s , andi t s arm y, was t h e f a c e o f t h e f u t u re .

One o f tho se opposed t o Sherman's v iew o f a rmy s t ra te gy as afo rm ' o f So c ia l Darw in ism was Br ig a d i er Genera l John Pope who, t oparaphase a m odern p o l i t i c i a n , f avo red a k i n de r and ge n t l e rr e s e r v a t i o n p o l i c y . I n an a d dr es s i n May 1878 P ope d id no t ques t i ont h e d is p la ce m e nt o f t h e I n d i a n f ro m h i s la nd s, o n l y t h a t t shou ld beaccom p l ished w i t h t h e l e a s t su f f e r i ng . He remarked on t he v iew o f t hea r m y o f f i c e r :

To t h e Army o f f i c e r a s t a t e o f p eace w i t h t h e I n d i a n s i s ,o a l l t h i ngs , t he m os t des i rab le , and no man i n a17 th ecou n t r y ea s t o r w est w ou ld do more t o a ve r t an I nd ian w ar.To h im war w i t h In d ia ns means f a r more than t o anyone e ls ee x ce p t t h e a c t u a l v i c t i m . He se es i t s b e g in n i ng i n i n j u s t i c eand wrong t o t he I nd ia n , w h ich he has no t t h e pow er t op reven t ; he sees t h e I n d ia n g ra du a l l y r each a ondition o fs t a r v a t i o n i m p o s s i b l e o f l o n g e r e nd ura nc e an d t h u s f o r c e dt o t a k e w ha t he ca n g e t t o s av e h i m s e l f f ro m d y i n g o fhunger, and cannot h e lp sym pa th i z i ng w i t h h im fo r do ing so;b u t b eca use he do es so t h e o f f i c e r i s o rd e r e d t o u se f o r c eaga ins t h im. W i th what s p i r i t a humane, o r even a decen t l yc i v i l i z e d man, e n t e r s i n t o su ch a war, may be e a s i ly


21/117

u nd ers to od , and y e t i n n e a r l y e ve ry c ase t h i s i s p r e c i s e l yt h e f e e l i n g w i t h w hich Army o f f i c e r s b e gi n h o s t i l i t i e sw i th Ind ians .18t i s w i t h t h i s p ara do xic al v ie w t h a t t h i s s tu dy w l l begin an

a n a l y s i s o f t h e s t r a t e g i c a nd o p e r a ti o n a l framework o f t h e army i n thecon te x t o f t h e U te campaign o f 1879. I s t h er e an a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h eW e ig le y m odel o f t h e w ar o f a n n i h i l a t i o n s t r a t e g y , o r t h e v ie w o fWooster - t h a t a p o l i c y was no t necessa ry , as no emergency ex is te d i nthe campa ign aga ins t the Ind ian .

The conduct o f th e Ute campaign and subsequent In d i a n campaignsmay de no te t h e s h i f t i n U ni te d S t a te s m i l i t a r y p o l i c y t h a t r e t u r n e d t h earmy t o i t s f r o n t i e r r oo ts and away f rom t he conven t iona l army th a t wasc r ea ted as a r e su l t o f t he C i v i l War. The pe r iod a l so marked at r a n s i t i o n i n arm y l e a d e r s h i p t h a t w ou ld p r e p ar e t h e arm y f o r t h e n e x tcen tu ry . The s t ra te gy i n th e west was something more than a se r ie s o ffo r l o r n hopes . I


22/117

ENDNOTES

1. Russell F. Weigley, The American Wav o f War: A Historv o f Uni tedStates Strategv and Pol ic y (Bloomington: Indiana Un iv er si ty Press,19731, 163.2. Paul A. Hutton, Ph i l Sheridan and Hi s Army (Lincol n: Un iv er si tyo f Nebraska Press, 1985), 337.3. Marsha ll Sprague, Massacre: The Traaedr a t White Ri ve r (Boston:L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 19571, 57.4.and5.6.7

Dee Brown, Bury Mv Heart a t Wounded Knee (New York: Henry Ho l tCo., 19701, 367.Ibid., 376.Sprague, Massacre: The Traaedv a t White River , 179.Arthur P Wade, The Mi l i t a r y Command Struct ure: The Great Pla in s,1853-1891, ~ o u r n a i f th e West i 5 ( ~ u l y 976): 16-19.

8. Sprague, Massacre: The Traaedv a t White Rive r, 1809. Elmer R. Burkey, The Thornburgh Ba t t l e With the Utes on M il kRiver, The Colorado Mamzine 13 (May 1936): 92.

10. Ib id ., 92.11. Brown, Burv Mv Hear t a t Wounded Knee, 367.12. Ibid. , 368.13. Burkey, The Thornburgh Ba t t l e With th e Utes on M i l k River, 93.14. un it ed Sta tes Congress. House. The Committee on In d ian A f fa i rs .Testimony i n Rela tion t o th e Ute I ndi an Outbreak. Hearings 46th Cong.,2d Session. House Misc. Doc. 33., 22 March 1880, 203.15. Sprague, Massacre: The Tragedy a t White Ri ve r, 241.16. Weigley, The American Wav o f War, 153.17. John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Sol die r's Passion f o r Order NewYork: The Free Press, 1993), 390.l a John Pope, The In di an Ques tion . Address Before th e Soc ia lScience Association, Ci nc inn at i , Ohio, 24 May 1878.


23/117

19 Thcmss C Leonard, Abcve th e Bat t le : War-Making i n AmericaFrom A~~omattCxo V e r s ai l k s New Ycrk: Oxford L niv ers ity Press1978 , 46.


24/117

CHAPTER 2STRATEGIC SETTING

The r e la t i on sh ip between government p o l i c y and he s t r a t e g y o fi t s m i l i t a r y i s n o t o f t e n c le ar . The p o l i t i c a l o r i g i n s o f s t ra t eg yo f t e n s e rv e t o confound t h e h i s t o r i a n , as w e l l as th e s o l d i e r i n i t se x e c u t i o n ? H i s t o r i a n T. H a r r y W i l l i a m s s t a te s :

Once a government has decided on a pol icy, t t u rn s t o s t ra t eg yt o a c h ie v e i t s o b j e c t i v e . The g ov ern me nt, t o c i t e t h e A me ric ane xp eri en ce , i nf o rm s t h e m i l i t a r y o f t h e o b j e c t i v e and i n d i c a t e sthe human and mater ia l resources t can make a va i l a bl e . Them i l i t a r y t h e n t ak e s o ve r t h e p l a n n in g and e x e cu t io n o f as t r a t e g y t o ac co mp lis h t h e p o l i c y ; i n e f f e c t , t takes overt h e r u n n in g o f t h e w ar. T h is i s t h e co nce pt o f s t ra t e g y t h a tappe ared i n e a r l y m odern w r i t i n g s o n m i l i t a r y t h e o ry and t h a tp r ev a i le d i n America s f i r s t wars . There was a lways, however,a gap between theory and pract ice.From t h e c o n c l u s io n o f t h e C i v i l War t h r o ug h t h e e nd o f t h e

Hayes a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s weret o p romote economic deve lopment and se t t lem en t i n th e wes te rn reg ions .Accomp lishment o f t hese ob je c t i v es r equ i r ed th e fede r a l gove rnment t of o rm u l a te an I n d i a n p o l i c y t h a t w ould d e al w i t h t h e i n e v i t a b l e c o n f l i c t .o f tw o c u l t u r e s . T he re w ere t h r e e p a r t s t o t h e I n d i a n p o l i c y ad op te dt o a c co m p li sh t h es e o b j e c t i v e s : F i r s t , was r emova l o f I nd ians fr om thema jo r east -wes t immig ran t t r a i l s and as an obs tac le t o deve lopment o ft r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l r a i l r o a d ro u t e s ; s eco nd, i n c r e a s i n g t h e r e s e r v a t i o nsys tem t o reduce con tac t between th e races and thereb y reduce co n f l i c t ;


25/117

a n d t h i r d , u s i n g t h e r e s e r v a t io n system t o a s s i m i l a t e t h e I n d i a n i n t omains tream American cu l tu re . The Ind ia n p o l i c y was th e corners tonen a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i s s u e d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d and t h e f o cu s o f armyope r a t i ons .I n r e tr os p e ct t h i s s t ra t e g y i s r e a d i l y ap pare nt, b u t a t t h et ime the se cu r i t y s t r a teg y was n o t found exp ressed i n a documentp ro du ce d a n n u a l ly a s i s t h e c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e . As General W T. Shermanp re p ar ed t o a t t e n d t h e A ug ust 867 Peace Commission, t o open th e p la in sf o r s e t t l e m e n t and t h e r a i l r o a d , h i s co nc er n was on d e f i n i n g t h e a rm y'sr o l e i n r e l a t i o n t o th e p o l i c y o f t h e governm ent. He s t a te d :

ont [ s i c ] c ar e a bo ut i n t e r e s t i n g m y s el f t o o f a r i n t h e f a t eo f t he poo r de v i l s o f I nd ia ns who a r e doomed f r om the causesi nh e re n t i n t h e i r n a tu re o r f r o m ' th e n a t u r a l & p e r s i s t e n th o s t i l i t y o f t h e w hi te race. A l l im t o a cc om p lis h i s o soc l e a r l y d e f in e t he d u t ie s o f t h e C i v i l & M i l i t a r y a ge nts o fG ovt so t h a t we wont [ s i c ] be q u a r r e l l i n g a l l t h e t im e a s t owhose business t i s t o l oo k a f t e r them.2The conc lus ion o f t h e C i v i l War b r ough t the focus o f America

back o n t o n a t i o n a l e xp an sio n beyond t h e w e s te rn f r o n t i e r o r i n t o t h eA merican w e s te rn i n t e r i o r . In de ed , t h e n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e o f t h eU n it ed S t at e s f o r t h e l a s t t h i r t y y ea rs o f t h e 1 9 th ce n tu ry can b echa rac t e r ize d as a f i n a l rush o f American energy upon th e remain ingwi lderness. 3 The fe de ra l government was faced w i t h th e need t odeve lop a se cu r i t y s t r a t eg y th a t wou ld suppo r t t he movement o f i nd us t r yand immig ran ts eas t f rom C a l i f o r n i a and west f r om th e second t i e r o ft ra ns -M iss iss ipp i s t a te s Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and Minnesota.Cha l leng ing th e inexo rab le march o f Amer ica 's ma n i fes t des t iny wast h e I n d i a n . The Ind i an po l i c y was the fede r a l governmen t's s t r a te gy t oanswer t h i s cha l lenge .


26/117

By 1865 the f i r s t pre-war attempt a t a solution t o the theIndian question had been overcome by the continued western expansion

o f the nation. This attempt at physical separation using the westerntrans Mi ssissippi River states f o r Indian t e r r i t or y , had becomeuntenable. As a securi ty stra tegy , the westward tr an sf er of theeastern Indian tr ib es , thus cle ari ng the area east of t he Mississippir i ver for c iv i l i zat i on , no longer f u l f i l l e d the national ob ject ive o fsettlement from sea t o shining sea.

The pre-war na tional po l icy of separation had been created bythe ra ti f i ca ti on o f the Indian Removal B i l l 28 May 1830. Two trendswhich emerged during th i s period would af fe ct fu rt he r re la ti ons betweenthe United States and the Indian. F i rs t , the Indians who had supportedthe U.S. during the War o f 1812 were str ipped o f the lands that hadbeen previously guaranteed them by treaties - as long as the grassshal l grow and the water flow. As Chief John Ross, o f the Cherokeenation, commented:

What a pernicious ef f o r t must such a document...have on thein te re st s and improvements o f the Indians? Who sh al l expectfrom the Cherokees a ra pid progress i n education, rel igi on ,agriculture, and the various art s of c iv i l iz ed l i f e whenresolutions are passed i n a ci vi l i ze d and Christian leg isl atu re(whose da i l y sessions, we are to ld , commence wi th a prayer t oAlmighty God) t o wrest t h e i r country from them, and strange t ot e l l , wit h the point o f the bayonet, i nothing else w l l do?I s t the nature o f things, tha t the Cherokees w l l build goodand comfortable houses and make them great farms, when theyknow not but t h e i r possessions w l l f a l l i n t o the hands o fstrangers and invaders? How i s t possible that they w l lestablish fo r themselves good laws, when an attempt i s madet o crush th e i r f i r s t feeble ef f or t toward i t? '


27/117

The second outcome o f th e i n i t i a l gove rnment Ind ian sepa r a t i onp o l i c y was t h e r e s u l t o f a Supreme C o ur t d e c i s i o n i n f a v o r o f t h eCherokee na t ion . I n 1831, C h ie f Ju s t ic e John Ma rsha l l and th e co ur tr u l ed i n favo r o f t h e Che rokees , wh i l e de c id ing th e case o f Cherokee v.t h e S t a t e o f G eo rg ia . T h i s d e c i s i o n s t a t e d t h e I n d i a n s were n o ts u b j e c t t o s t a t e l aw , b u t a l s o r u l e d t h a t t h e y were n o t an i n de pe nd en tn a t io n . The C o u rt d e f in e d th e I n d i a n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f e d e r a lgovernment by c a l l i n g him a domest ic dependent n a t i on i n a s ta te o fpup i lage . = U l t i m a t e l y , t h e se d e c i s i o n s t o di sp o ss e ss t h e I n d i a n sand cons ider them dependent na t io ns o f th e fe de ra l government wouldr e q u i r e t h e in vo lv em e nt o f t h e r e g u l a r arm y as t h e p r i m a ry m i l i t a r yi ns t ru m e n t ne ce ss ary f o r e n f o r c i n g I n d i a n p o l i c y i n t h e we st. T h i sr o l e w ou ld b re ak w i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h e d A merican t r a d i t i o n e a s t o f t h eM i s s i s s i p p i r i v e r wh ich had r e l i e d on th e presence o f l o c a l m i l i t i a s t oc o n t r o l t h e I n d i a n t r i b e s .

The nex t a t temp t t o co n t r o l t he Ind ians and a l l o w unimpededwes ter n se t t l em en t was th e r ese r v a t i on o r conc en t r a t i on po l i c y . Ase a r l y a s t h e 1 84 0's , e f f o r t s we re b egun t o u se r e s e r v a t i o n s a s a t o o lo f I n d i a n p o l ic y . As t h e u t i l i t y o f s e cu ri ng t h e a re a w est o f t h eM iss i ss ipp i r i v e r was becoming ev iden t , t he government sh i f t e d f rom thep o l i c y o f s e p a r a ti o n t o one o f c o n ce n tr a ti o n. I n 1848, t h e i d ea o fc r e a t i ng Ind ian co lon ie s on the w es te r n p l a in s was d is cussed .

I n February o f 1851, Congress passed th e In d i an App ropr ia t ionAc t, mandat ing the new p o l i c y and p r o v id ing mon ies t o n ego t i a tet r e a t i e s . By 1865, t h e p r i n c i p l e f e a t u r e s o f t h e I n d i a n p o l i c y t h a tthe Un i ted S ta tes would pu rsue were i n p lace . These features wouldre ma in i n v a r i o u s fo rm s u n t i l t h e end o f t h e 1 9 t h c e n tu r y. The p o l i c y

21


28/117

c a l l e d f o r t h e f o rc e d r e l o c a t i o n o f t h e I n d i a n and t h e d r a s t i cr e d u c ti o n o f a re as i n w hich t h e I n d i a n was f r e e t o p r a c t i c e h i sc u l t u r e . Imp lem enta t ion o f t he res erv a t i on sys tem was a t hand andw ou ld p r e c i p i t a t e t h e l o n g e s t and m ost v i o l e n t I n d i a n w ars t h e n a t i o nhad known.

Fo l l ow ing the C i v i l War, t h e r e se r v a t i o n system was theparamoun t means o f imp lemen t ing na t i on a l p o l i c y as the Un i te d S ta test u rn e d a g ai n t o r e s o l v in g t h e c o n t i n u in g c h a ll en g e o f t h e I n d i a n t on a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and w e s te rn e xp an sio n. S e c r e ta r y o f t h e I n t e r i o rJames Har la n d ispatch ed two groups o f comm issioners i n August 1865 t oneg o t i a t e th e new pa rame te rs o f U.S. Ind ian po l i c y w i th the In d ian s o fKansas, t h e I n d i a n T e r r i t o r y , and t h e P l a i n s T r ib e s .

T h i s p o l i c y was a h y b r i d o f t h e s e p a r a ti o n p o l i c y . It soughtt o concent ra te , t h e Ind ians a t seve r a l l a r g e r ese r va t i o ns and removethe m f ro m t h e i m m i g r a ti o n and r a i l r o a d r o ut e s. The I n d i a n T e r r i t o r ywou ld se r ve as one o f t he l a r g e r ese r va t i o ns w i t h a second one l oca tec 'on th e no r t he r n P la ins . From 1865 u n t i l 1876 t h i s s i n g l e p o l i c yc o n s t i t u te d t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y o f t h e U n i te d S t a te s i nre sp on se t o t h e I n d ia n s .

Th is s t ra te gy became known as the Peace P o l ic y dur in g th e G ra r~ ta d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a s it a tt em p te d ( a t l e a s t on t h e s u r fa c e ) t o r e l y ond i p lo m a t i c , r a t h e r t ha n m i l i t a r y means, t o a cc om p lis h i t s o b je c t i v e s .The v iew o f th e In d ia ns as wards o f th e fe de ra l government was ce n t ra lt o t h i s s t r a t e g y a nd u l t i m a t e l y w ou ld u n hin ge it a s b o t h f u t u r e


29/117

p o l i t i c a l and economic fa c t o rs became ev iden t . Even i n 1865, t h ecommiss ioners d ispa tched by Secre ta ry Har lan were ins t ruc ted tha tthe se t r e a t i e s m igh t be amended by t h e Senate and such admendments

wou ld n o t r eq u i r e the concu rr ence o f t h e Ind ians . 7The Peace P o l i c y d i d n o t a d o pt t h e p u re f or m o f t h e o r i g i n a l

p o l i c y o f c o n ce n tr a ti o n. W h il e s t i l l fo cu se d on t h e o v e r a l l n a t i o n a lo b j e c t i v e s , t r e a t i e s w ere n o t ge are d t ow a rd d i s p l a c i n g t h e t r i b e s t ot h e l a r g e c o l o n ie s o r i g i n a l l y e nv is io ne d. I ns te a d, a d e s i r e t o a v e r tp o t e n t i a l h o s t i l i t i e s l e f t n e g o t ia t o rs a w id e band o f o p er at io n .P o l i t i c a l e xp ed ie nc y w ou ld d e te rm i ne w h ic h t r i b e s w ere t o b e l e f t i nt r a d i t i o n a l a r ea s o r w ere t o be rem oved t o t h e I n d i a n T e r r i t o r y . Then e t r e s u l t was a q u i l t - w o r k o f r e s e r v a t i o n s th r ou g h o ut t h e a r ea c r e a t e don an ad hoc basis.

The v ie w o f t h e n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y t ow a rd t h e I n d i a n wasc o n t e n t i o u s t h r o u g h o u t t h i s p e r i o d . The n o t i o n o f d e a l i n g w i t h t h eInd ian by d ip lom a t i c r a t he r than m i l i t a r y means was deba ted i n b othp o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s . S e nio r members o f t h e m i l i t a r ye s ta b li sh m e nt a c t i v e l y cam paigned f o r t h e c o n t r o l o f I n d i a n a f f a i r s t obe t ra ns fe r re d t o th e War Department. Army lea ders be l iev ed th a tmanagement o f I n d i a n a f f a i r s w ou ld be m ore e f f i c i e n t l y s e rv e d by t h eWar Department. The Army saw i t s e l f removed from th e co r r u pt io n andi n c o n s i s t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t io n t h a t p la gu ed t h e B ureau o f I n d i a n A f f a i r s ,a s a d m i ni st e re d by t h e D ep artm en t o f t h e I n t e r i o r . I n 1867, a h i l l t or e t u r n t h e I n t e r i o r D e p art m en t's I n d i a n O f f i c e t o t h e War D ep artm en tpassed th e House, bu t fa i l e d i n th e Senate .8


30/117

P r e si d en t G r an t l e d t h e e le me nt o pposed t o m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l o fIn d ia n s t r a t eg y and favo red t he employment o f o the r means. G ran t sv iew was a gre at d isappo in tm ent t o se n io r a rmy leaders , who be l iev ed hew ould be a s t ron g advoca te o f a rm y co n t ro l o f I n d ia n p o l ic y . OnMarch 1873 a t h i s second i naugura l address he s ta ted :

My e f f o r t s i n th e f u t u r e w i l l be d i re c t e d t o t h e r e s t o r a t io no f good f e e l i n g b etw ee n t h e d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s o f o u r commonc o u n t r y y a human c ou rs e, t o b r i n g t h e a b o r i g i n e s o f t h ec o u n t r y un de r t h e b e n ig n i n f lu e n c e s o f e d u c a ti o n and c i v i l i z a t i o n .t s e i t h e r t h i s o r w ar o f e xte rm in at io n. W ars o f ex te rm ina t i on ,engaged i n b y p e o p le p u r s u i n g commerce and a l l i n d u s t r i a l p u r s u i t s ,are expens ive even aga ins t t h e weakest peop le , and are dem ora l i z ingand w icked . O ur su p e r i o r i t y o f s t r en g th and advan tages o fc i v i l i z a t i o n s h o u ld make us l e n i e n t to w a rd t h e I n d i a n . The w ro ngi n f l i c t e d upon h im s h o u l d be t a ke n i n t o a c c ou n t an d t h e b a l an c e

p l ac e d t o h i s c r e d i t . The m o r al v ie w o f t h e q u e s ti o n sh o u ld b econ sidere d and th e qu es t ion asked, Can no t th e In d ia n be made aus ef u l and pro du ct i ve member o f s oc ie ty by proper tea ch ing andt rea tm en t? f t h e e f f o r t i s made i n good f a i t h , we w i l l s tandb e t t e r b e f o r e t h e c i v i l i z e d n a t i o n s o f t h e e a r t h and i n o ur ownconsciences f o r hav ing made i t 9W hi le sound ing a h i g h m ora l t one , G ran t a l s o add ressed the

e co no mic s o f a n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y o f e x t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t h e saw a s t h ea l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n e xe cu te d un de r t h e a us pic es o ft he I n t e r i o r D epar tm ent. Th i s economic conce rn re f l e c t e d t h e g row ingh o s t i l i t y w i t h i n t h e Congress f o r a p p r o p r i a t i o n s to w ar d a s ta n d in gregu lar a rmy.

The s t r u g g l e t o m a i n t a i n an arm y f o r c e s t r u c t u r e t o meets ec u r i t y o b j ec t i v es was n ot a new phenemonon i n American h i s t o ry .P ro po ne nts o f f i s c a l c o n s e r v a ti s m w i t h i n t h e C on gre ss f ou n d a l l i e samong congressmen and o th er Americans, who quest io ned bo th th e u t i l i t yo f a s tan d ing army and feare d it m i g h t be u se d f o r some d ar k p o l i t i c a lP urpose. The redu c t i on i n f o r c e conduc ted a t t he end o f t h e C i v i l Warwas bo th rap id and deep. As h is t o r i a n Edward M CoPfman describes:


31/117

The C i v i l War was ov er. Some Americans assumed t h a t t h i s meante l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e m i l i t a r y . I n 1885, when a c o l o n e l wasintro duc ed t o a c u l t iv a te d , urban Eas tern woman, she wasaston ished : "What, a co lo ne l o f th e Army? Why, upposed th eArmy was a l l d isbanded a t t he c lose o f t h e wa r " Most o f i t was.W i th in s i x mon ths , 800,000 o f t h e m i l l i o n men i n b lue werec i v i l i a n s a ga in . By 1875 th e permanent s t r en g t h had le ve led o f f a t?5,OOO n compari son w i t h fo r e ig n a rm ies , t h i s p laced the s i z e o ft h e Am erican army i n th e 1 880's a t s l i g h t l y l e s s th a n h a l f t h a t o fBelgium's, a se ve nth t h a t o f B r i t a i n ' s , and a t w e n t i e t h o f t h eFrench army's s ize.10

t was a pe r io d o f te n ca l l e d the "da r k days " o f t he a rmy, and i t wouldshape arm y p l a n n i n g o f n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y a nd o p e r a t i o n a ls t r a t e g y i n t h e w est.

B e g in n in g i n 1869 and 1870, P r es iden t Gran t i n i t i a t e d the mos tw e l l known aspec t o f th e Peace Po l icy , when he abd ica ted , t o a la rged eg re e, f e d e r a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e I n d i a n s t o r e l i g i o u s and r e fo r mgroups. Th is movement was begun i n th e 1850's , p r i m a r i ly by BishopHenry Whipp le o f the E p iscopa l church . Whipp le and o t he r re fo rmersb el ie ve d t h a t t h e r a p i d ad op tio n o f ~ h r i s t i a n i t y nd t h e c u l t u r e o f t h ewh i te man was the on l y means t o p r ec lude ex t i nc t i on o f t h e Ind ian .T h i s v ie w was s i m i l a r t o t h a t h e l d by t h e p r op on en ts o f t h e r e s e r v a t io ns ys te m w i t h i n G r a n t' s a d m i n i s t ra t i o n . The d i f f e r e n c e i n o p i n i o n wasexpressed over t he management o f t he In d i an on the rese rva t io n .

Whipp le and the re fo rmers be l ieved tha t cor rup t ion had reacheds uch p r o p o r t i o n s t h a t n o p r og r es s c o u ld be made i n c i v i l i z i n g t h eInd ian . He p roposed es ta b l i sh in g an hones t ad m in i s t r a t i o n o f I nd ianr ese r va t i ons by emp loy ing the "F r i ends o f t he In d ian " , as the r e fo rmer sl a t e r became known. W h ip ple p r e d i c t e d t h a t i t h e c o r r u p t i o n o f t h eIn d ia n Of f i c e was n ot swept away, "a na t i o n which sowed robbe ry wouldr eap a ha r ves t o f b lood.


32/117

With Gran t ' s approva l; churches began t o nomina te peop le t oserve as In d i an agents . Congress c rea ted a Board o f Ind ianCommissioners t o manage th e In d i an O f f i c e and a c t as a watch dog onc o r r u p t i o n w i t h i n t h e r e s e r v a t i o n s y s t e m . I n i t i a l l y , t h e b oa rd wasc o n t r o l l e d by w e al th y P ro t e s ta n t p h i l a n t h r o p is t s , b u t as d i f f i c u l t i e sr os e o v er s t a f f i n g t h e r e s e r v a t io n s , many ch urc he s l o s t i n t e r e s t andl e f t f o r ' o th e r m iss iona r y adven tu res. .j2 The Peace p o l i c y b r ough tl i t t l e im provem ent a cc o rd in g t o army o f f i c e r s and, i n f a c t , i n v i t e dd i s as te r . I nd ians , be ing enamored w i t h th e w a r r i o r mys ti que , wouldo n l y r e s p e c t o t h e r w a r r i o r s . S ta tements such as Co lone l R ichard I r v in51Dodge's were common:

C h r is ti a n- a pp o in t ed a ge nt s w ere a f i t t i n g c l im a x t o t h ep re p os te ro u s a c t s w h ic h f o r a c e n t u r y have s t u l t i f i e d t h e.governme nta l c o n tr o l and management o f Ind ian s. To appointNathan Meeker, however f a i t h f u l , hones t, and ch r i s t i a n i nb e a r i n g he m i g h t be, t o an a gency i n ch arg e o f a s e t o f w i l db r ig a n d s l i k e t h e U te s, i s s im p l y t o i n v i t e massacre.13W h il e n o t w e l l r e ce i ve d by t h e m i l i t a r y , t h e r ef or m er s

t he m se lv es were p erh ap s a g r e a t e r t h r e a t t o t h e I n d i a n t h a n t h e t h r e a to f d i r e c t m i l i t a r y a c t io n . P r o fe s s in g a s t ro n g b e l i e f i n I n d i a ne q u a l i t y w i t h t h e w h i t e man, r e fo r m e rs f e l t any s ho rt co m in g o f t h eI n d i a n was d ue t o t h e i r a r r e s t e d c u l t u r a l d ev elo pm en t. I n o rd e r t oa s s i m i l a t e th e I n d ia n , t h ey f e l t h i s c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e m ust bec o m p le t el y d e s t ro y e d and t h a t t h e I n d i a n m ust be f o rc e d t o t h i sa l t e r n a t i v e f o r h i s own good. W i t h t h i s r e l i g i o u s b en t, t h e r e fo rm e rswere p o e r fu l a d v e rs a ri e s i n t h e w o rl d o f 1 9 t h c e n t u ry I n d i a n p o l i c yp o l i t i c s .


33/117

The management o f In d ia n t-ese rvat ion s by re form ers , as a meanst o i n s t i t u t e a pro gra m o f s o ci al -D a rw i ni sm , was an a b j e c t f a i l u r e .P o l i t i c a l i n f i g h t i n g b etw een r e l i g i o u s d en om i na ti on s, t h e r e m ai ni ngp o l i t i c a l a pp oin te es , and e l ec t e d o f f i c i a l s f a i l e d t o p roduce anim provem ent t o r e s e r v a t i o n c o n d i ti o n s o r a c e s sa t io n o f h o s t i l i t i e sbe tw een t h e I n d i a n t r i b e s and t h e g ro w in g w h i t e p o p u l a ti o n . Thef a i l u r e o f t h i s p rogram sh i f t e d b lame t o th e r e fo r m movement, away f romt h e G ra n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i l e f u e l i n g c o nt i n u ed demands f o r d i r e c tc o n t r o l o f I n d ia n po l i c y by the a rmy, a view th a t was he ld almostu n i v e r s a l l y b y s e n i o r a r m y o f f i c e r s .

The 1876 i n a u g u ra t io n o f R u t h e r fo r d 0 Hayes brought a sub t lechange t o n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y . I n h i s i n a u g u r a l a dd re ss , Hayesl a i d a p hi lo so ph y o f p a c i f i c a t i o n on t h e n a t i on 's p o l i t i c a l p l a t e ,t h a t s ou gh t t o b r i n g t h e r e c o n s t r u c t io n p e r i o d t o a c lo se .1 4 Then a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e , i n te rm s o f t h e I n d ia n s , was t o be a c o n t i n u a t i o no f t h e G r an t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s e mphasis on a p o l i c y t h a t r e l i e d ondi p l om at ic means. H i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h i f t e d i t s fo c us away f ro m t h er e l o c a t i o n o f I n d i a n t r i b e s t o t h e r e s e rv a t io n s , i n s te a d em p ha siz in ga s s i m i l a t i o n o f t h e I n d i a n i n t o t h e w h it e c u l tu r e .

The s h i f t away f ro m t h e r e s e r v a t i o n p o l i c y d i d n o t o c cu rimmediate ly . The Hayes ad m in is t ra t io n con t inu ed the Peace Po l ic y ,u s i n g r e s e rv a t io n s a nd c i t i n g t h e p e rc e iv e d b e n e f i t o f p r o t e c t i n g andc i v i l i z i n g t he In d ia n. The re se rva t io n sys tem cont inued t o bemod i f i ed , as t had been d u r i n g th e Grant years, away from th ec o n c e n tr a ti o n o f t h e I n d i a n i n l a r g e c e n t r a l i z e d l o c a t i o n s . I n st e ad ,t h e r e s e rv a t io n s w ere s m a l l e r e n t i t i e s i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e I n d i a n a lo n gl o os e t r i b a l l i n e s , and t h i s s m a l l r e s e r v a t i o n a pp ro ac h was t h e


34/117

corners tone o f th e Hayes s t r a te gy . As a re s u l t , when Pres iden t Hayesto o k o f f i c e i n 1877, o ve r s i x t y t r i b e s had been r e s e t t l e d i n th eI n d i a n T e r r i t o r y , w h i l e many more were s h i f t e d f ro m t h e i r ho me la nd t onew locales. ' 5

The r es e rv a t i o n sys tem th a t P res ide n t Hayes i nh e r i t e d wasl a r g e l y c r e a te d on an ad hoc b a s i s t o p r e cl ud e c o n f l i c t a t a l o c a ll ev e l . As d iscuss i?d e a r l i e r , t h e two ce n t ra l them es gu id i ng t hei n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e r e s e r va t io n s ystem were s e p a ra t io n o f t h e I n d ia n sf rom the major imm igra t ion r ou tes and th e i r remova l as an impediment tit h e p ro g r e ss o f t h e tr a n s c o n t i n e n t a l r a i l r o a d sys tem . These a m b i t io n sw ere f u r t h e r amended t o i nc l ude rem ova l o f I n d ia ns f rom a reas t h a t hadg a in e d i m p or ta n ce due t o t h e d i s c o v e r y o f v a r i o u s n a t u r a l r e so u rc e s(e.g., g o l d i n t h e B la c k H i l l s ) . As a r e s u l t o f t h e d is c ov e ry o f g o l da n d s i l v e r , t he t r e a t y betw een th e f ed e ra l government and the U tes o fCo lorado wou ld be rev ise d th re e t imes, accou nt ing f o r each new mine ra ld i scove ry .

The t a s k t h a t f e l l t o H ayes and h i s arm y was t o d e v e lo p as e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y a nd a m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y t h a t w o uld a dd re ss t h ef a i l u r e b y e a r l i e r p o l i c y makers t o c o n t r o l t h e I n d i a n t r i b e s i n t helong te rm . The pu re sep ara t i on po l i c y had been i nv a l i d a te d s i nce t heC i v i l War by t he con t i nued expansion o f t h e coun tr y . The Peace P o l i cyhad n o t m et e x p e c ta t io n s i n te rm s o f a s s i m i l a t i n g t h e I n d i a n s i n t o t h ew h it e cu l tu r e . I n f a c t , t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e Peace P o l ic yco rresponded w i t h t h e beg inn ing o f a t e n yea r p e r i o d du r i n g w h ich someo f t h e m os t d ram at i c c o n f l i c t s betw een the races had occu red . A t t h et im e the arm y v iew ed t h i s as a cause and e f f e c t r e l a t i o ns h ip . Thew atch wo rd became i m p r o v i s ~ t i o n n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f a new nat iona l

28


35/117

s t r a t e g y . As h i s to r i a n R icha rd W h i te desc r i bes :A merican o f f i c i a l s , i n a tt e m p ti ng t o h a l t c o n f l i c t betweenIn di an s and wh i tes, pre ven t expensive wars, and open up lands t ow h i t e s e t t l e m e n t , c r e a t e d r e s e r v a ti o n s t h e way s u r v i v o r s o f as hip w re ck m i g h t f a s h i o n a r a f t f r om t h e d e b r i s o f t h e sun kenvesse l . Res ervat ion s evolved on an ad hoc ba s is as a way t o

p r ev e n t c o n f l i c t a nd e n f o rc e a s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e ra ce s.1 6When Pres id en t Hayes in h er i t ed th e Ind ian ques t ion f rom th e

G ra nt a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a l o n g s e r i e s o f m i l i t a r y c am paigns had j u s t beencomp le ted, cu lm ina t i ng i n the de s t r uc t i o n o f C us te r and h i s command.Many throug hou t th e country , in c l u d i ng th e Commanding General o f th eArmy W il l i a m T. Sherman, saw th e need f o r a com plete r e v i s io n o f t h es e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y o r t h e I n d i a n p o l i c y . The r e l i g i o us andp h i l a n t h r o p i c g ro up s t h a t P r e s id e n t G r an t h ad f o r m a l l y p ro mo te d t o t h ef o re f ro n t , i n t he e f f o r t t o c i v i l i z e t h e I n d ia n on t h e r es erv at io n,were chal lenge d by bo th wes terners and by th e Army. The managemento f t h e I n d i a n , by th es e s o c i e t i e s and t h e I n d i a n O f f i c e o f t h e I n t e r i o rDepartment, was deemed a t o t a l f a i l u r e and c a l l s f o r t he War Departmentt o manage th e In d i an aga in reached Congress i n 1877.

Sec r e ta r y o f t h e I n t e r i o r Ca r l Schur z s ta t ed much th e same v iewas Gen eral Sherman when he assumed o f f i c e . H i s e x po su re t o I n d i a n sp r i o r t o assum ing o f f i c e was l i m i t e d a nd he h e l d a v ie w i n k e ep in g w i t hthe popu la r e thnocen t r ism o f th e t imes . He stated:

The unde r l y i ng su ppo r t o f t h i s p r op os i t i o n [W ar Depa rtmentc o n t r o l ] was t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e I n d i a n c o u l d ne ve r b ec i v i l i z e d a nd t h a t t h e o n l y p o s % ib l e s o l u t i o n o f t h e p ro ble mwhich he em bodied was t o c o n f i n e h im , u nd er s t r i c t m i l i t a r ys u p er v is io n , on r e s e rv a t io n s fro m w hic h a l l u p l i f t i n g c o n t a c tw i t h wh i t e men was b ar red, t ll he should become ext inc t byv i r tu e o f h i s own incu r ab le ba rbar ism.17


36/117

Schurz ' s v iews changed as he ga ined an app rec ia t ion o f th eissues a t hand. W h i l e a j o i n t comm it tee o f C ongress rev iew ed thes t r a t e g y o f t h e Peace P o l i c y , S e c r e t a ry Sc hu rz issued a s ta tement on6 December, 1877 w hic h r e a f f ir m e d t h a t s t r a t e g y , and o u t l i n e da d d i t i o n a l m easures t o be u n d er ta ke n t o speed t h e a s s i m i l a t i o n o f t h e

S ch urz 's s t r a t e g y c a l l e d f o r c o n ti n u ed use o f t h e r e s e r v a t i o ns ys te m a lo n g w i t h a p ro gra m o f g u i d i n g t h e I n d i a n t ow a rd s e l f - s u p p o r t .By t r a i n i n g t h e I n d i a n i n m odern a g r i c u l t u r a l means, S chu rz f e l t t h eI n d ia n w o u l d g ra d u a l ly r ep la c e h i s t r a d i t i o n a l l i f e s t y l e w i t h t h el i f e s t y l e o f t h e dom inant c u l t u r e . I n t h e l o n g t er m he saw t h eA m e r i c a n iz a t io n o f t h e I n d i a n , a s a means t o e l i m i n a t e t h e need f o r

t h e m a in tenance o f f ed e r a l r ese r va t i o n lands.i9 E ve n tua l l y t heres e rv a t i o ns w ould w i t he r away, be ing rep laced by p r i va te l a nd he ld byI nd ia n s p r a c t i c in g a g r i c u l t u r a l p u rs u i t s . S t i l l , i n h i s f i r s t annualre po r t i n November 1877 he exp ressed the v i ew tha t , even w i t h t hea p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e m o d i f i e d re s e r v a t i o n system , t h e r e c u r r i n g c o n f l i c tb e t w e e n t h e a d v a n c i n g f r o n t i e r a n d t h e I n d i a n s c o u l d n o t b e e l i m i n a t e de n t i r e l y b ecause o f th e p r o x i m i t y o f t h e r ace s.2 0 T he Army r o l e i nt h i s s t r a t e g y was t o be l i m i t e d . S ch urz s t a te d :

Such a p o l i c y wou ld be th e most conduc ive t o peace and th emost economical. t ough t t o be re ta i n ed and developed ; bu tt h e army w o uld be no p r o p er ag en cy f o r i t s e x e c u ti o n . M i l i t a r ymen and methods were in dis pe ns ab le f o r emergencies; th e long ,s low p rocess o f r a i s i n g t he red men ou t o f ba rba r ism , how ever,r e q u i r e d q c a l i t i e s i n t h o se who g u id e d i t t ha t t he a rm y cou ldn o t supply.21The r i v a l r y o v e r t h e management o f I n d i a n a f f a i r s had been i n

q u e st io n s i nc e t h e t r a n s f e r o f t h e O f f i c e o f I n d i a n A f f a i r s fro m t h eWar D epartm ent t o I n te r i o r D epartm ent i n 1849 .22 The debate was


37/117

c e n t r a l t o p r o v i d i n g a l i n k a g e between t h e s e c u r i t y and m i l i t a r ys t r a t e g i e s to w a rd t h e I n d i a n , b u t was o f t e n d i v e r t e d b y ch arg es o fc o r r u p t i o n and l a c k o f e x p e r t i s e b y b o t h s id e s.

S churz t ook d i r e c t ac t i o n on one o f t he a rm y 's l ong s tand ingc o m p la i n ts o f t h e I n t e r i o r De pa rtm en t, b y r e o r g a n i z i n g t h e I n d i a nO f f i c e . A l o n g t im e a dv oc ate o f c i v i l s e r v i c e r ef or m , he en te re do f f i c e w i t h a m andate fr om P r e s i d e n t Hayes t o c l ea n u p t h e I n t e r i o rD ep artm en t, a nd i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e I n d i a n B ure au. An i n v e s t i g a t i o ni n i t i a t e d by Schurz i n t o t h e b us in ess p r a c t i ce s o f t h e I n d ia n o f f i c ewas com pleted i n August 1877. The repor t ga ined nat iona l p rominencewhen r ep or te d by the New York Times, and l e d t o th e replacement o f t h eC om missio ne r o f I n d i a n A f f a i r s w i t h i n a m onth. The repor t focused onth e co r r up t io n and abuses t h a t p lagued th e Ind ia n Bureau. Schurzd e s c ri b e d h i s d e a li n g s w i t h t h e Bureau as, a c o n s ta n t f i g h t w i t hsharks. z3

The house c lean ing proved t o be enough t o de fea t army a t temptst o g a in c o n t r o l o f I n d ia n a f f a i r s th ro ug h a j o i n t c on gre ss io na lc om m itte e i n 1878 79. I n a d d i t io n t o m a i nt ai ni ng c o n t r o l o f I n d ia na f f a i r s , t h e r efo rm s a l l e v i a t e d some o f t h e g r ie v an c e s h e l d b y t h eI n d i a n s and se rv e d t o re du ce t h e l e v e l o f open h o s t i l i t y a t some o f t h er e se rv a ti on s . S ch urz 's e f f o r t s i n c le a n in g up c o r r u p t i o n i n t h e I n d i a nB ure au eve n won a d m i r a t io n i n A n y c i r c l e s . The D i v i s i o n o f t h eMis so ur i Commander, General P h i l i p Sher idan commented, h e se rv ic eo f I n d i an a f f a i r s was f i n a l l y l i f t e d o ut o f t h e m i re o f c o r r c p t io n t h a t


38/117

had long made it a d is c r e d i t t o o u r c i ~ i l i z a t i o n . ~ ~hi le as ym b olic s t e p i n th e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , t h e e f f e c t o f t h e Schurz re fo rm ss t i l l had n o t ad dre ss ed c o r r u p t i o n a t t h e g r a s s r o o t s l e v e l o r t h eprob lems o f the management o f re se rva t ion s by competing re l i g io u sgroups.

G iven th e p o l i t i c a l env ironment addressed above, th e army foundi t s e l f i n t h e p o s i t io n o f d ete rm in in g t h e b e s t means t o u t i l i z e t h ei n st ru m e n t o f m i l i t a r y pow er t o s u p p o rt t h e a cc om plis hm en t o f t h eI n d i a n p o l i c y g oa ls and t h e o v e r a l l n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s . I n t h e s p r i n go f 1865, t h e a n y r et ur ne d i t s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e west,r o l e it had a bd ic ate d t o s t a t e and t e r r i t o r i a l m i l i t i a s d u r i ng t h eC i v i l War. That year , t h e Com missioner o f I n d i a n A f f a i r s r e p or te d t h enum ber o f I nd ian s as: c i v i l i z e d , 97,000 ; se m ic i v i l i z ed 125 ,000; w ho l l ybarbarous, 78,000. O f t he s e , 180,000 had t r e a t i e s w i t h t h e U n i t e dS t a t e s and were c on se q ue n tly i n v o l v e d i n r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e a nd m u t u a l l yunders tood re l a t i o ns w i t h t he government; ano the r 40,000 l i v e d onr e s e r v a t i o n s a nd we re m ore o r l e s s u nd er t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e I n d i a nagents; about 55,000 w ere t o t a l l y uncon t ro l l ed . 25

The army faced add i t iona l prob lems that had deve loped dur ingt h e h i a t u s o f t h e r e g u la r s i n t h e e a s t d u r i n g t h e C i v i l War. Ther e l a t i o n s h i p b etween w h i te a nd I n d i a n ( i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e P l a i n s t r i b e s )had de te r i o ra ted , f i r s t b ecause o f t h e c on du ct o f o p e r a t i o n s byt e r r i t o r i a l m i l i t i a s , and second because t h e p ace o f e m i g r a t i o n hadincreased.

The m ost g l a r i ng examp le o f m i l i t i a excesses was t he m assacreo f B lack K e t t le ' s band o f Cheyenne a t Sand Creek by the Co loradot e r r i t o r i a l m i l i t i a i n 1864. I n t h i s case, t h e Cheyennes had g ath ere d

32


39/117

a t a po in t designated by the t e r r i t o r i a l governor and were using aprearranged signa l denoting them as not hos til e. I n sp it e o fcomplying fu l l y wit h the dir ect iv e o f the governor, including f l y i n g anAmerican flag, they here se t upon br ut al l y by the Colorado t e r r i t o r i a lm i l i t i a under the command o f Colonel John M Chiv ington. The episoderesulted i n fur th er rep r isa ls and al ie nat ion on both s ides.

Sand Creek became th e r a l l y i n g cr y f o r humanitarian groupsthroughout the country. An invest igat ion o f i t s events d iscredi ted theeffect iveness of the Colorado m i l i t i a spec if ic al ly and the use ofm i l i t i a troops i n general. Two separate inv est iga tio ns were condcctedone by the U S Senate and one by the Army. Neither adjudged anyrespon s ib i l i ty fo r the inc ident o r prefer red charges, but c lea r l yChivington was a t fa ul t. Ult im atel y, Chivington f l e d the stat e andreturned t o h i s n at ive Ohio. As a re su lt o f t he chronic mishandling ofIndian a f f ai rs by loc al m i l i t i a s and the established precedent f o rt re a t i ng Ind ian s as wards o f th e fed era l government, th e regular armyeventually became th e mi l i t a r y instrument responsible f o r t heenfarcement o f U.S. po li cy i n th e west.

The movement o f peoples t o the western f r o n t i e r s had increasedduring th e C i v i l War years. Migrat ion increased, as many sought t of i n d a new st a r t i n new mining ventures i n the west, o r i n the promiseo f fr ee land created by the Homestead Act o f 1862 The population westo f t he Mi ss is si pp i River grew by one m i l l i o n between 1860 and 1870 andan addi tio nal two and a ha l f m i l l i o n by the end o f th e Hayesadministration.26 This increase i n pop ula tio n compounded the army'sdilemma as t placed greater demands on t f o r secu r it y o f t he


40/117

i m m ig r an ts , b u t a l s o i n cr e a se d t h e n eed f o r m ea su re s t o p r o t e c t t h et r e a t y a rra ng em e nts g u ar an te e d t o t h e I n d i a n s b y t h e f e d e r a lgovernment.

As t h e a rmy e xa mine d t h e s i t u a t i o n w es t o f t h e M i s s i s s i p p iR iv er i n t h e s p r in g o f 1865 t was c o nf i d en t i n i t s a b i l i t i e s t osubdue th e I n d i an as an obs tac le t o na t i on a l ob jec t i - ves . As GeneralSherman announced i n November 1865 as soon as th e In d ia ns see t h a t wehave Regular Cavalry among them they w l l r e a l i z e t h a t we a re i nco nd i t i o n t o pun i sh them f o r any m urde rs o r r obber i es . r 7 Thec o n fi d e nc e was p erh ap s more due t o u n f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e p ro ble m a thand t h a n an a c c u r a t e asse ssm ent o f t h e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n .N e v e rt h e le s s , a s t h e f o r c e s t h a t h ad r e u n i t e d t h e c o u n t r y t o o k t wo d ay st o pa rade be fo re t h e rev i ew ing s tand i n W ash ington, arm y l ead ersh ipp re p ar ed f o r o p e r a t i o n s on t h e f r o n t i e r .

few m i l i t a r y g i a n t s d om in ate d t h e d i r e c t i o n o f n a t i o n a lm i l i t a r y s t ra teg y . The o f f i c e o f t he Commanding G eneral o f t he Armyf i l l e d i n o rde r by G enera ls G ran t, Sherm an, and S heri dan fr om th e endo f t h e C i v i l War t o 1886 d o m i n a t e d t h e s t r a t e g i c a p p l i c a t i o n o fm i l i t a r y power i n t h e w es t. T h i s i s n o t t o i m p l y t h a t t h e CommandingG e ne ra l was i n an a l l p o w e r f u l p o s i t i o n t o e x e r c i s e c o m ple te e x e c u t i v epower fr om h i s o f f i c e . The army had y e t t o i n s t i t u t e t h e r e fo rm s o ft h e g e n e ra l s t a f f system , i n s te a d r e l y i n g on t h e t e n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e andtec hn i ca l bu reaus es ta b l i sh ed by t he Army A c t o f 1866.28 This systemc r e at e d tw o c h a in s o f c o n t r o l w i t h i n t h e army t h e s t a f f and t h e l i n e .

The d i v i s i o n o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s p l i t t h e army. The b ure auc h i e f s r e p o r te d t o t h e S e c r e ta r y o f War a nd d e a l t w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i v eand te ch n ic a l m at te rs. Op era t ion al command was ex erc ised f rom th e

4


41/117

Pres ident through the commanding genera l . The ou tcome o f t h i sa rrangement was l a r g e l y a measu re o f t h e p e r so na l i t i e s o f t hePre s ide nt, Se cre tary o f War, and th e Commanding Genera l a t any g ivent im e . I t s im p ac t o n o p e r a t i o n a l c o n s id e r a ti o n s was f e l t a cro ss t h earmy. As R ob er t M Utley comments:

Al though Sherman he ld th e p os t o f commanding genera l o f t h earmy and p r o found ly i n f l ue nced i t s cha r ac te r , he d id no ta c t u a l l y command it The army s ta f f -m ore ex ac t ly , th e WarDepartment s ta f f - rema ined re so lu te ly o u ts ide Sherman s army.And t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e s t a f f s in de pe nd en ce c re a t e d f o rthe commanding general i n t u r n made h i s a u t h o r i t y o ve r t h e l i n emore nominal than rea1.29The k ey u n if or m ed d e c i s i o n makers o f t h e l i n e a t t h e s t r a t e g i c

and ope r a t i o na l l e ve l s were i n t im a t e l y aware o f each o th e r s s t r eng th sand weaknesses. Past assoc ia t i on s du r in g the conduct o f t he C i v i l Wara s s i st e d t h e f o r m u l a ti o n o f a c e n t r a l iz e d p l a n o f s t r a t e g i c andop era t io na l le v e l commanders f o r th e conduct army opera t ions andcampaigns i n t he wes t.

I n t h e s p r i n g o f 1865, G en era l G r an t was d e te rm in ed t o u t i l i z ethe av a i l a b l e manpower t o conduct o f fe ns i ve ope r a t i o ns on the w es te r np l a in s t o g a in t h e s t r a t e g ic i n i t i a t i v e . H i s d e s i r e t o e x e cu te t h es eo p e r a ti o n s q u i c k l y was t w o f o ld . F i r s t , t h e l a r g e s t p l a i n s t r i b e s , t h eSioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho, were ra id in g imm igrant t r a i n s andh om esteads i n r e a c t i o n t o t h e p r e v i o u s l y d i sc u ss e d m i l i t i a ex ce sse s.Second, a l thou gh Gran t was hopefu l o f m a in ta i n in g a s tand ing f o r cela r g e r than a t p r e - C iv i l War l eve l s , he was a n t i c i p a t i ng cong r ess iona lt r o o p r e d u c ti o n s o v e r a l l , and a requirement f o r increas ed army presencet o su p p o rt t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f o r t i n t h e S ou th . S e c r e ta r y o f WarS tan ton es t ima ted th a t the s tand ing r eg u la r army wou ld be abou t t r i p l e1860 s tr e n g th o r 50,000 men.do Gene ral Pope ad vise d Gra nt, Ih i n k


42/117

the government w l l f i n d t t r u e economy t o f i n i s h t h i s I n d ia n war t h i sseason, so t w l l s ta y f in is he d . We have th e t roo ps enough now on th ep l a i n s t o do t now be t te r t han he rea f te r . a '

An o f f e n s i v e p l an n ed t o i n c l u d e 12 000 t r o o p s b e g in n in g i nA p r i 1 1865 was delay ed u n t i 1 t h e summer. When th e of fe n s iv e begant r o o p s t r e n g t h and q u a l i t y h ad been s o d i s s i p a t e d t h a t t h e o r i g i n a lo b j e c t i v e s were o u t s i d e t h e l m t o f a t ta i nm e n t . Troops employednumbered less than 5 000 and i n st e a d o f r e g u l a r f or m at io n s , t e r r i t o r i a land s t a t e m i l i t i a s c om p ris ed t h e m a j o r i t y o f forces.3i G r a n t' s p l a nt o b r i n g t h e I n d i a n wars t o a d e c i s i v e c o n cl us io n t h ro u gh a s t r a t e g i co f f e n s i v e f a i l e d . The com bined e f f e c t s o f t h e r e d u c t i o n i n t h e armys t r e n g t h and t h e demand f o r t r o o p s i n t h e S o u th and l a t e r on t h eM ex ic an f r o n t i e r w ou ld p r e v e n t f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a g en e ra lo f f e n s i v e .

The s t r a t e g i c d e s ig n f o r t h e c on du ct o f t h e I n d i a n wa rs t h a tw ould cha rac te r i z e t h e reg u la r arm y i n t h e w es t was th e p roduc t o f oneman, General i l l i a m T. Sherman. The demands o f su pp or t in g n a t i o n a lo b j e c t i v e s w i t h s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d r e s o ur ce s fo r c e d t h e army o n to t h es t r a t e g i c d e f en s iv e i n t h e w est. E a r l y on, Sherman saw the p o te n t i a lf o r t h e employment o f t h e r a i l r o a d as a means t o a l l o w t h e o p e r a t i o n a lo f f e ns i ve . Based on h i s C i v i l War expe r ience , Sherm an re a l i z ed t h a tt h e a rm y c o u l d c o n c e n t ra t e t ro o p s r a p i d l y b y u s in g t h e i n h e r e n tm o b i l i t y p r o v id e d by t h e r a i l r o a d , w h i l e r em a in in g on t h e s t r a t e g i cdefe nsive . Sherman wrote t o th e War Department and General Grant , i nt h e f a l l o f 1865 a f t e r v ie w i n g p r og r e s s on tw o s e c t i o n s o f t h er a i l r o a d , on t h e im p or ta n ce o f t h e r a i l r o a d i n t h e w est, I gave both ac lose and c r i t i c a l exam ina ti cn .. .because see th a t each w l l e n t e r

36


43/117

l a r g e l y i n t o o u r m i l i t a r y c a l c u l a t i o n s . 3 J Sherman w ou ld w orkc l o s e l y w i t h t h e m a jo r r a i l r o a d co mp an ie s t o s y n c h r o ni z e t h e p r o g re s son rou tes i n t o t h e op e ra t i on a l a rea w i t h t h e emp loym en t o f a rm yt a c t i c a l f or m a ti on s and t h e p o s i t i o n i n g o f t h e f o r t s ystem i n t h e w es t.

The a rmy s t r a t e g y i n t h e west b e n e f i t t e d fro m t h e d e f i n i t i o n o ft h e n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e . The o b j e c t i v e ( s e c u r i n g t h e fre ed om o fmovement f o r e xp an sio n a lo n g t h e m a jo r t r a i l s and r a i l l i n e s ) l e d t h earmy t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f i t s pr im a r y a re a o f op e ra t i on s . The f a c tt h a t t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y c a l l e d f o r t h e rem oval o f t h eI n d i a n t r i b e s fro m t h i s a re a a llo w ed t h e army t o d e a l w i t h t h e I n d i a n sp ie ce me al: F i r s t f oc u s in g on one t r i b e and t he n u t i l i z i n g t h e r a i lne tw ork t o mass aga ins t subsequent cha l lenges . The s t ra te gy t h a td eve lo ped f ro m t h e s t a t e d p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s was t h e o n l y co u rs e l e f tt o t h e army, based on i t s l i m i t e d re so ur ce s. The s t r a t e g y c a l l e d f o rt h e a rm y t o r e ma in on t h e s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s iv e , w h i l e u s i n g s u p e r i o ro r g a n i z a t i o n a nd te c h no lo g y t o g a i n t h e o p e r a t i o n a l and t a c t i c a li n i t i a t i v e when r e q u ir e d .

The m i l i t a r y p l a n t h a t d e f i n e d t h e U.S. a rm y's s t r a t e g i c r o l ei n t h e we st was l i n k e d t o b o t h t h e n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s and t h e n a t i o n a ls e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y a s d e f i n e d b y t h e f e d e r a l g ov ern me nts p o l i c y to w a rdt h e I n d i a n . Th i s t o a l a r ge p a r t was due t o t h e a rm y's absence f romt h e w es t d u r i n g t h e C i v i l W ar. The o t h e r b ra n ch e s o f t h e f e d e r a lgovernment had es tab l i she d t h e i r agendas i n re ga rd s t o t h e I n d ia n s yt h e t i m e t h e a rmy r e t u r n e d i t s f o c us t o t h e w e st. t f e l l l a r g e l y t ot h e a rm y, t o s a l u t e and c a r r y o u t i t s m is s io n .


44/117


45/117

18. Ib id ., 385.19. Weeks, Farewe ll , MY Nation, 204.20. Hans L. Trefousse, Car l Schurz and th e India ns , The Great Pl ai nsQu ar te rl y (Spring 1984): 114.21. Car l Schurz, The Reminiscences o f Carl Schurz, Vol 3, 385-38622. Weeks, Fa rewel l, MY Nation, 200.23. Leonard D White, The Re ~u b l ican ra. 1869-1901 (New York:MacMil lan Company, i958), 180.24. Robert M Ut le y, F ron ti er Regulars: The Armv and th e India n,1866-1891 (Linco ln: Un iv er s i ty o f Nebraska Press, 19731, 7-8.25. White, The R e~ub l i ca n ra, 1869-1901, 182. The f igu res leave25,000 Indi ans unaccounted f o r i n the Bureau s t a t i s t i c s . Perhaps theyrepresent I ndi ans who were not accounted f o r by formal tr

ute campaign of 1879

Documents