the ute campaign of 1879: a study i n the use of the

THE UTE CAMPAIGN OF 1879: A STUDY I N THE USE OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT

A thes is presented t o the Faculty o f the U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College i n p a r t i a l

f u l f i l l m e n t o f the requirements f o r the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

RUSSEL D. SANTALA, MAJOR, USA B.A., Universi ty o f Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, 1980

For t Leavenworth, Kansas 1993

Approved f o r publ ic release; d i s t r i b u t i o n i s unlimited.

' .

'" '

-

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name o f candidate: Major Russel D. Santala

Thesis T i t l e : The Ute Campaign o f 1879: A Study i n the Use o f the M i l i t a r y Instrument

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chairman ~ o l o n k l Richard M. Swain, Ph.D.

, Member

Accepted t h i s 4 th day o f June 1993 by:

, Director, Graduate Degree ~ h ? l i pJ.' Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those o f the student author and do not necessari ly represent the views o f the U.S. Army Command and General S ta f f College o r any other governmental agency. (References t o t h i s study should include the foregoing statement)

ABSTRACT

THE UTE CAMPAIGN OF 1879: A STUDY I N THE USE OF THE MILITARY I?ISTRlli4ENT by Major Russel D. Santala, USA, 111 pages.

This study examines the r o l e o f the U.S. Army as an instrument o f nat ional power i n the execution o f U.S. government pol icy. The focus o f the thes is i s an invest igat ion o f the implementation o f pol icy, i n terms o f the Ute Indian t r i b e o f Colorado, and the events preceding and fo l lowing the Ute upr is ing o f 1879.

The U.S. Army found i t s e l f i n a dilerma w i th regard t o i t s support o f a nat ional " Indian strategy." It was not the primary executive agent f o r the implementation o f po l icy , but was ca l led upon t o both enforce national po l i cy and po l i ce v io la to rs . This study traces the development o f the U.S. Ind ian Pol icy and the evolut ion o f army strategy i n the west.

The study culminates w i th an analysis o f the events surrounding the outbreak o f h o s t i l i t i e s i n 1879. This study addresses issues t h a t faced the U.S. Army i n an environment o f unclear nat ional po l i cy and competing nat ional and loca l interests. The impl icat ions o f t h i s episode warrant examination, as the U.S. Army f inds i t s e l f i n another period w i th s im i l a r problems.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

F i r s t , I must thank Colonel Richard M. Swain, Combat Studies

I n s t i t u t e , USACGSC, f o r br ing ing order out o f chaos, and f o r h i s

guidance and encouragement. Thanks are due Major Frederick J.

Chiaventone, Department o f Jo in t and Combined Operations, USACGSC, f o r

a thorough job o f ed i t i ng and h i s shared i n te res t o f the Indian

campaigns.

The s t a f f o f the Combined Arms Research Library are due thanks

f o r t h e i r invaluable assistance i n gathering mater ia l and keeping tabs

on the progress o f the project .

Special thanks are reserved f o r my family. Their shared

s a c r i f i c e was an indispensible par t o f t h i s e f f o r t .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVALPAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. i i

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i v

L IST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i

CHAPTER

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 . STRATEGIC SETTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3. THEOPPONENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

4. MASSACRE AND BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

5. AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I05

I N I T I A L DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,111

1

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

The Strategy Process

The Area o f Operations

D iv is ion o f the Missouri

Ute Te r r i t o r y i n 1806

Theater Rai 1 roads

Sample News Headlines

I n i t i a l Advance

F i r s t Contact

Delay



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"The lance o f the might iest Plains Ind ian nat ion was shattered,

and thereaf ter no Indians retained enough m i l i t a r y power t o r e s i s t the

w r i t o f Washington f o r long."' With t h i s remark, Russell F. Weigley

concludes the American Army's campaigns against the Indian; a ser ies

o f campaigns t h a t have been viewed as devoid o f s t ra teg ic o r

operational focus, save for a continuation o f a "war o f annih i la t ion"

strategy held since the C i v i l War by the senior army leaders. With

t h i s i n mind, t h i s thes is begins an examination o f the Army's s t ra teg ic

and operational framework as it re la tes t o the upr is ing o f the Ute

Indians o f Colorado i n 1879. The central question o f t h i s thes is i s :

Did the army have an operational strategy consistent w i t h nat ional

goals, as evident i n the Ute campaign?

Before t h i s question i s answered, it i s essential t o address

three secondary questions:

1. Did a national m i l i t a r y strategy e x i s t and how d id it

re la te t o the conduct o f the Indian campaigns?

2. How was the execution o f the nat ional m i l i t a r y campaign

constrained?

3. How d i d operational and t a c t i c a l questions conform t o

national m i l i t a r y strategy?

These questions w i l l shape t h i s study by f i r s t examining the Indian

po l i cy as an expression o f the nat ional secur i ty strategy o f the United

States i n support o f the nat ional ob ject ive o f western expansion.

The second subject t o be examined i s the nat ional m i l i t a r y strategy

t h a t evolved t o support the secur i ty strategy a t the national o r War

Department level .

A f t e r addressing the nat ional o r s t ra teg ic level , the thes is

w i l l t u r n t o the operational o r m i l i t a r y department leve l and the

t a c t i c a l o r b a t t l e f i e l d leve ls and evaluate the execution o f m i l i t a r y

pol icy. This examination w i l l demonstrate the linkages from the

s t ra teg ic o r nat ional leve l , through the operational o r departmental

leve l , t o the t a c t i c a l o r b a t t l e f i e l d leve l . The Army's means w i l l be

examined i n re la t ionship t o constraining fac to rs both in te rna l and

external t o i t s organization. The paper w i l l examine the appl icat ion

o f m i l i t a r y power i n support o f government po l i cy i n terms o f the Ute

camppign.

The framework f o r t h i s study corresponds w i th the strategy

process model (Figure 1 ) and w i l l , as previously stated, examine the

linkages between three leve ls o f action: Strategic, Operational, and

Tact ical . This study i s based on an analysis o f h i s t o r i c a l events a t

each o f the three leve ls i n accordance w i th the s t ra teg ic process

model.

Chapter 2 addresses the "national secur i ty strategy" o f the

Hayes administrat ion and the corresponding "national m i l i t a r y strategy"

o f the War Department. Conf l i c t ing views e x i s t i n the current body o f

l i t e r a t u r e i n terms o f the impact o f the government on the u t i l i z a t i o n

o f m i l i t a r y power i n re la t i on t o the Indian po l icy . I n order t o

discuss t h i s f u l l y , Indian and m i l i t a r y po l i cy i n the west from 1865 t o

2

IMREALII'Y (CONSTRAINTS) - .......... ................................................. - ............. .......................

1 I IN THEORY ..........................

............................. DOCTllllNE :

DECISION MAKERS

THREAT :--W

TECHNOLOGY :

rweu-n: : OPIUdION :

.............................

1880 w i l l be addressed, t o provide the necessary context. The goal o f

t h i s chapter i s t o a r t i c u l a t e the national Ind ian po l i cy and the

re la ted nat ional m i l i t a r y strategy, o r doctr ine, required t o implement

the pol icy.

Chapter 3 i s an analysis o f "operational strategy" selected t o

achieve the goals o f pol icy. This chapter focuses on the operational

leve l m i l i t a r y organizations responsible f o r the appl icat ion o f

m i l i t a r y force t o achieve p o l i t i c a l goals, and the non-mil i tary

government agencies w i t h in the theater o f operations. The m i l i t a r y

organizations examined are the Div is ion o f the Missouri, the Department

o f the Missouri and the Department o f the Plat te. The government

agencies w i t h in the theater o f operations include the s ta te o f

Colorado, and representatives o f the federal government operating

w l th in the s ta te (i.e., agents o f the Indian Bureau). Based on an

i n i t i a l survey o f the mater ia l , the absense o f a c lear m i l i t a r y

strategy would appear t o have occurred a t t h i s leve l , la rge ly due t o

the personal i t ies o f the senior army o f f i c e r s i n command. The

Commanders o f the Departments o f the P la t t e and Missouri, Br igadier

Generals Crook and Pope, respectively, had s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t

views o f the r o l e o f the army and the conduct o f campaigns, than d id

t h e i r superiors, Generals Sherman and Sheridan. The conclusion o f thi::

chapter w i l l be a discussion o f the operational strategy t h a t guided

t a c t i c a l leve l commanders w i t h in the departments, and spec i f i c guidance

for the conduct o f the Ute campaign.

Chapter 4 focuses on the t a c t i c a l events involved i n the

conduct o f the Ute campaign. These events w i l l include the "Bat t le a t

Ml'lk River" and the show o f force executed by Colonel Wesley M e r r i t t t o

4

in t imidate the Utes t o the bargaining table. The "constraints"

examined are be the loca l factors t ha t influenced the t a c t i c a l leve l

commanders during the conduct o t the campaign. I n addi t ion t o the

explanation o f b a t t l e f i e l d events, the goal o f t h i s chapter i s t o

re la te the operational considerations surrounding these t a c t i c a l

events.

Chapter 5 concludes t h i s study by estab l ish ing t h a t the army

d i d o r have an Indian po l i cy t h a t was in terna l ized throughout the

command structure. The po l i cy should have provided f o r the appl icat ion

o f m i l i t a r y power w i t h in budgetary and manpower constraints, and was a

re f l ec t i on o f the nat ional secur i ty object ives o f the Hayes

administrat ion. I f the m i l i t a r y strategy was not mutually supportive

throughout the strategy process model, the l i k e l y cause was the

d i f f e r i n g views o f senior army leaders between the nat ional and

departmental levels.

Before beginning the analysis o f the nat ional s t ra teg ic po l i cy

and the impact on m i l i t a r y strategy i n chapter 2, i t i s necessary t o

provide some background mater ia l per ta in ing t o events t h a t were

unfolding i n Colorado and examine some o f the elements o f the Ute

c r i s i s . This w i l l ass is t i n focusing the study as it looks a t larger

s t ra teg ic and operational matters, and w i l l ass is t i n explaining why

some questions loom larger than others i n terms o f the events

surrounding t h i s one, r e l a t i v e l y small, t r i b e .

I n September o f 1879, three troops o f the 5th US Cavalry, under

the command o f Major T.T. Thornburgh, l e f t For t Steele, Wyoming, f o r

the White River Agency i n northwest Colorado. Major Thornburgh was

operating under orders from the Commander o f the Department o f the

5

Plat te , Br igadier General George Crook, t o move t o the agency and

ass is t the reservation agent, Nathan C. Meeker. Meeker had been

appointed agent t o the White River Agency on 18 March 1878 a f t e r

ac t i ve l y pursuing the pos i t ion through poi i t i c a l acquaintances, both i n

Colorado and i n Washington D.C. Meeker's goal was t o estab l ish a kind

o f utopian s ta te t h a t combined h i s re l i g i ous views and the lessons frcm

the Union Colony, a cooperative agrarian experiment, i n Greeley,

Colorado.

The appointment o f Indian Bureau Agents had long been a pa r t u f

the p o l i t i c a l spo i l s system. With a change i n administrat ion, a whole

ser ies o f covert and over t appointments were made t o reward p o l i t i c a l

service, and the impact o f t h i s inept system was f e l t a t the . agencies

producing the problems t h a t had long been a sore po in t w i th the War

Department. Since 1849, the Department o f the I n t e r i o r cont ro l led

Indian a f f a i r s , and, p a r t i c u l a r l y under the Grant Administration, t h i s

arrangement had come under c r i t i c i s m from both the reform movement ancl

senior o f f i c e r s w i t h i n the army, who believed they were be t te r

q u a l i f i e d a t managing Ind ian po l i cy f o r the nat ion than were mere

p o l i t i c a l appointees. General Sheridan c m e n t e d , " t ha t it i s not the

Government t h a t i s managing the Indians, it i s the contractars,

traders, and supply in terests . "' Short ly before h i s appointment, Meeker received an encouraging

l e t t e r from Colorado Senator, Henry M. Te l le r , describing h i s

.discussion w i th the Commissioner o f Indian A f fa i r s , Edward A. Hayt, an

3 January 1878. It read:

Iwent t o the Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s and posted your claims f o r an agency and designated White River Agency as the cne Iwanted f o r you. Now Ith ink Ihave a good show. The

6

I I 0Fort Lewis I I

I I 8 I

L,,,, I Garland

0 Fort Union ..I

0S a m Fe I THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

(Adaptedfmm Spnnguo,Macwacre) Figup0 2

Commissioner said he was not a t a l l s a t i s f i e d w i th the agent a t White River who knows nothing o f i r r i g a t i o n o r farming i n the west. Iam anxious you should have it because Ifee l you should do something t h a t would be o f benef i t t o our people and t o the indians. There Ibel ieve the indians can be taught t o ra ise c a t t l e and Ihave an idea you are the man t o do it. Now i f you had the place i t would pay you $1,500 a year and you would have a house t o l i v e i n f ree, a garden and so for th . So It h i n k you can save something. It i s only 100 mi les from the ra i l r oad and qu i te easy. I f you accept I w i l l commence work. Let me hear soon.3

The Utes took an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t ' view o f t h e i r new agent.

Largely i n d i f f e r e n t t o the v io la t i ons o f the t r ea ty o f 1873 which

secured f o r them 4,000,000 acres o f Colorado, they viewed themselves as

a l l i e s t o the United States government. As Ouray, the most prominent

o f Ute ch ie fs expressed:

The army conquered the Sioux. You can order them around. But we Utes have never disturbed you whites. So you must wai t u n t i l we come t o your ways o f doing things.4

Both the representative o f the Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s

and the government o f the s ta te o f Colorado had an expressly d i f fe ren t

agenda f o r the ass imi la t ion o f the Ute t r i b e i n t o mainstream American

culture--or be t te r yet, i s o l a t i o n from it altogether. Because o f t h i s ,

the re la t ionship between Meeker and h i s "charges," the White River

Utes, had deter iorated t o the po in t t h a t Meeker f e l t h i s l i f e was i n

jeopardy. Meeker was confronted by the Utes, who suspected him o f

d i r e c t involvement w i t h the anti-Ute movement i n the state.

A t t h i s time, a r t i c l e s headlined "The Utes Must Go" were being

prepared by members o f the s t a f f o f Governor Frederick W . Pi t k i n .

P i t k i n was a former miner who used h i s wealth and inf luence, acquired

from a gold mine i n the San Juan Mountains o f Colorado, t o both t o

revise the Ute Treaty i n 1873 and t o become the f i r s t Governor o f

Colorado, upcn statehood i n 1876. His view o f the Utes was an

8

expression o f the statewide view tha t they were an impediment t o the

development o f the r i ches t pa r t o f the s ta te and should be removed t o

the Indian T e r r i t o r i e s o r elsewhere. Wil l iam Vickers, an advisor t o

the governor wrote i n the Denver Tribune:

The Utes are actual, p rac t i ca l Communists and the Government should be ashamed t o fos te r and encourage them i n t h e i r idleness and wanton waste o f property. L iv ing o f f the bounty o f a paternal but i d i o t i c Ind ian Bureau, they ac tua l l y become too lazy t o draw t h e i r ra t ions i n the regular way but i n s i s t on tak ing what they want wherever they f i n d it. Removed t o Indian Terr i tory , the Utes could be fed and clothed f o r about one h a l f what it now costs the government.

Honorable N.C. Meeker, the well-known Superintendent o f the White River Agency, was formerly a f a s t f r i end and ardent admirer o f the Indians. He went t o the Agency i n the firm b e l i e f t h a t he could manage the Indians successful ly by kind treatment, pa t ien t precept and good example. But u t t e r fai lurelmarked h i s e f f o r t s and a t l a s t he re luc tan t l y accepted the t r u t h o f the border t ru ism t h a t the only t r u l y good Indians are dead ones.5

I n t o t h i s s i tuat ion, Major Thornburgh and h i s three troops o f

cavalry ar r ived t o mediate a dispute t h a t had i t s roots i n the Ind ian

po l i cy o f the previous 25 years. Thornburgh's orders gave him only the

broadest instruct ions. Meeker had requested-assistance on 10 September

1879, by sending a messenger t o telegram Commissioner Hayt. The

message reached Hayt on 13 September 1879.

The request f o r troops was seen by Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r

Carl Schurz, Secretary o f War George W. McCrary, and u l t imate ly by

General o f the Army Wil l iam T. Sherman. Sherman approved the request

f o r troops and inst ructed the Commander o f the Div is ion o f the

Missouri, Major General P h i l l i p H. Sheridan, t o order " the nearest

m i l i t a r y commander" t o send troops t o White River.% Following some

confusion a t Sheridan's headquarters, the order was sent t o For t Steele

near Rawlins, Wyoming, and then t o Major Thornburgh. While the troops

a t For t Steele were the c losest t o the White River Agency, they had not

operated i n Colorado before, as the Colorado-Wyoming border delineate:!

the boundary between the Department o f the Missouri and the Department

o f the Platte.' By the conclusion o f the campaign, troops from both

departments were committed against the Utes.

The Commander o f the Department o f the Plat te , Br igadier

General George Crook, gave the fo l lowing order t o the forces a t Ft.

Steele:

You w i l l move w i th a s u f f i c i e n t number o f troops t o White River Agency under speci a1 instruction^.^

The special ins t ruc t ions t h a t Crook spoke o f were t o contact the

agent on the scene and "develop" the s i tuat ion. Thornburgh began

h i s march t o the White River Agency on 22 September 1879, w i t h a

t o t a l o f 153 so ld iers and 25 c i v i l i a n s .

By 25 September 1879, they a r r i ved w i t h i n 53 mi les o f the

agency and camped on the banks o f F o r t i f i c a t i o n Creek. He dispatched a

l e t t e r t o the Agency, report ing:

I n obedience t o ins t ruc t ions from the General o f the Army, Iam enroute t o your agency, and expect t o a r r i v e there on the 29th instant, f o r the purpose o f a f fo rd ing you any assistance i n my power i n regulat ing your a f fa i rs , and t o make arrests a t your suggestion, and t o hold as prisoners such o f your Indians as you desire, u n t i l invest igat ions are made by your department. Ihave heard nothing d e f i n i t e from your agency f o r ten

days and do not know what s ta te o f a f f a i r s ex is ts , whether the Indians w i l l leave a t my approach o r show h o s t i l i t i e s . Isend t h i s l e t t e r by Mr . Lowry, one o f my guides, and desire you t o communicate w i t h me as soon as possible, g iv ing me a l l the information i n your power, i n order t h a t I may know what course Iam t o pursue. I f prac t i ca l , meet me on the road a t the e a r l i e s t moment.9

A f te r dispatching the l e t t e r , Major Thornburgh cdntinued the

march toward the agency and met a delegation o f eleven Utes from the

agency, who voiced t h e i r concern over the a r r i v a l o f troops and

denounced the agent, Meeker.

The consternation o f the Utes was understandable, both i n l i g h t

o f t h e i r perception o f the Army's r o l e i n the suppression o f the othet-

major Colorado tr ibe--the Cheyenne--and i n t h e i r previous support o f

the Army i n the campaign against the Navajo. Uteshad joined " the rope

thrower," K i t Carson, dur ing h i s e a r l i e r campaigns against the Navajo

and had taken a r o l e i n support o f the army against t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l

enemy, the Cheyenne." They had not faced an ac t i ve campaign

against them i n the past, having r e l i e d on t h e i r remoteness t o protect

them from the expansion o f the western movement.

The Utes had also benef i t ted by having a r e l a t i v e l y

sophist icated leader i n t h e i r ch ie f Ouray. A f te r being i nv i t ed t o

Washington by the Indian Bureau t o negotiate the Ute Treaty o f 1868,

Ouray took h i s cause t o the eastern press. Ouray remarked:

The agreement an Ind ian makes t o a United States t r ea ty i s l i k e the agreement a bu f fa lo makes w i th h i s hunters when pierced w i th arrows. A l l he can do i s l i e down and give-in.12

Although only a Chief o f the Umcompaghre branch o f the Utes, Ouray was

viewed by both s ta te and federal o f f i c i a l s as the de facto leader o f

the e n t i r e t r i be .

The response from Meeker t o Major Thornburgh's e a r l i e r l e t t e r

gave an accurate appraisal o f the Indian mood a t the agency. The 27

September 1579 l e t t e r stated:

Understanding t h a t you are on the way h i t he r w i t h United States troops, Isend a messenger, M r . Eskridge, and two Indians, Henry ( in te rp re te r ) and John Ayersly, t o inform you tha t the Indians are great ly excited, and wish you t o stop a t some convenient camping place, and then tha t you and f i v e so ld iers o f your command come i n t o the Agency, when a t a l k and a be t te r understanding can be had.

This Iagree to, but Ido not propose t o order your movements, but it seems f o r the best. The Indians seem t o consider the advance o f the troops as a declarat ion o f rea l war. I n t h i s Iam labor ing t o undeceive them, and a t the same time t o convince them they cannot do whatever they please. The f i r s t object i s t o a l l a y apprehension.13

Upon receipt o f t h i s l e t t e r , Major Thornburgh decided t o

continue toward the agency and a t some undetermined point , stop the

main body and proceed alone' w i t h a small escort.14 But Thornburgh

never reached the agency. The Utes attacked h i s command a t M i l k

River. For seven days Thornburgh's command was besieged by the Utes,

u n t i l a re l i ev ing force under Colonel Wesley Mer r i t t , ar r ived on the

scene. For the next month the army played a cat and mouse game w i th

the Utes, attempting t o locate t h e i r camps, whi le the Utes retreated

deeper i n t o the mountains.

The army was walking a t ightrope, attempting t o cow the Utes by

a show o f force w i th troops from both the Departments o f the P la t t e and

the Missouri, whi le a t the same time avoiding a confrontat ion t o

safeguard the l i v e s o f the hostages taken from the agency. While the

army continued t o look f o r the Utes, General Charles Adams, act ing as

a special envoy o f Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r Carl Schurz, was

negot iat ing w i th ch ie f Ouray and the Uncompahgre Utes, t o intercede

w i th the White River band o f the t r i b e t o release the hostages. Adams

was wel l respected by the Utes and t rus ted by the s ta te 's two most

powerful p o l i t i c a l figures--Tel l e r and P i t k i n . He had warned Secretary

Schurz o f the inherent danger o f sending troops t o resolve the Ute

question. Schurz responded tha t a "calamity" on the White River would

de l igh t Te l l e r and other Grant Republicans and provide an excuse t o

dump President Hayes from the 1880 t i c k e t ; and also the army would be

pleased t o have a f resh disaster t o use as a basis f o r new demands t o

t rans fe r the Indian Bureau t o the War Department.l5

The view o f what "constraining" factors were a t work dcr ing

t h i s period, and how they af fected the Indian po l i cy and m i l i t a r y

strategy, are varied. Most w r i t e r s on the subject agree t h a t

p o l i t i c a l , economic, and soc ia l fac tors played a large r o l e i n

determining the nat ional Ind ian pol icy. They disagree whether t h i s was

an a r t i cu la ted po l i cy o r merely an ad hoc expression o f the s p i r i t o f

manifest destiny. Addi t ional ly, there ex i s t s no consensus on the

impact o f e i t he r the stated o r unstated po l icy , on the appl icat ion o f

m i l i t a r y power i n support o f nat ional goals and objectives.

Robert Wooster argues i n h i s book, The United States and Indian

Pol icy: 1865-1903, t h a t post-I865 p o l i t i c s played a c lear r o l e i n

def in ing the m i l i t a r y strategy t h a t the army followed. He concludes

tha t whi le a wide var ie ty o f inf luences impacted on the r o l e o f the

army, lack o f concern by nat ional p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y f igures

precluded the development o f a l as t i ng po l i cy o r doctr ine.

Russell F. Weigley i n The American Wav o f War a t t r i bu tes our

m i l i t a r y strategy i n combatting the Indians t o the experiences o f the

army senior leadership dur ing the C i v i l War. As Weigley states:

I f the conduct o f the C i v i l War had prepared the United States Army t o employ a strategy o f annih i la t ion, sometimes w i th f r i g h t f u l l i te ra lness , i n i t s wars against the Indians, the strategy was much i n harmony w i th post-Civ i l War national policy.16

Weigley epitomizes Sherman as the creator o f a k ind o f war t ha t f a r

ecl ipsed e a r l i e r h is tory , i n terms o f t e r r o r and destructiveness, and

which reached a pinnacle dur ing the winter campaigns against the

Indians.

A balance between the two views seems a more prudent posi t ion.

Certainly, General o f the A n y Wil l iam T. Sherman carr ied the "baggage"

o f the war o f ann ih i la t ion w i t h him i n t o h i s leadership o f the army

i n the west, but whether t h i s was the doctr ine o f the a n y can be held

i n question. Sherman, as a member o f the Peace Commission o f 1867,

made c lear h i s view t o Red Cloud and the Sioux " tha t he had l i t t l e

tolerance f o r t h e i r demands. Whatever they said, they were doomed.

The United States, w i th i t s expanding population, i t s ra i l roads, and

i t s army, was the face o f the future.""

One o f those opposed t o Sherman's view o f army strategy as a

form' o f "Social Darwinism" was Br igadier General John Pope who, t o

paraphase a modern p o l i t i c i a n , favored a "kinder and gent ler"

reservation pol icy. I n an address i n May 1878, Pope d i d not question

the displacement o f the Ind ian from h i s lands, only t h a t i t should be

accomplished w i th the leas t suf fer ing. He remarked on the view o f the

army o f f i c e r :

To the Army o f f i c e r a s ta te o f peace w i th the Indians i s , o f a l l things, the most desirable, and no man i n a17 the country east o r west would do more t o avert an Indian war. To him war w i th Indians means f a r more than t o anyone else except the actual v ict im. He sees i t s beginning i n i n j u s t i c e and wrong t o the Indian, which he has not the power t o prevent; he sees the Indian gradually reach a condition o f s tarvat ion impossible o f longer endurance and thus forced t o take what he can get t o save himself from dying o f hunger, and cannot help sympathizing w i th him f o r doing so; but because he does so the o f f i c e r i s ordered t o use force against him. With what s p i r i t a humane, o r even a decently c i v i l i z e d man, enters i n t o such a war, may be eas i l y

understood, and yet i n nearly every case t h i s i s precisely the f ee l i ng wi th which Army o f f i c e r s begin h o s t i l i t i e s w i th Indians.18

It i s w i t h t h i s paradoxical view t h a t t h i s study w i l l begin an

analysis o f the s t ra teg ic and operational framework o f the army i n the

context o f the Ute campaign o f 1879. I s there an a l te rna t i ve t o the

Weigley model o f the "war o f annih i la t ion" strategy, o r the view o f

Wooster - t h a t a po l i cy was not necessary, as "no emergency existed" i n

the campaign against the Indian.

The conduct o f the Ute campaign and subsequent Indian campaigns

may denote the s h i f t i n United States m i l i t a r y po l i cy t ha t returned the

army t o i t s f r o n t i e r roots and away from the conventional army t h a t was

created as a resu l t o f the C i v i l War. The per iod also marked a

t r a n s i t i o n i n army leadership t h a t would prepare the army f o r the next

century. The strategy i n the west was something more than "a ser ies o f

f o r l o r n hopes. "I

ENDNOTES

1. Russell F. Weigley, The American Wav o f War: A His torv o f United States Strategv and Pol icy (Bloomington: Indiana Univers i ty Press, 19731, 163.

2. Paul A. Hutton, Ph i l Sheridan and His Army (Lincoln: Univers i ty o f Nebraska Press, 1985), 337.

3. Marshall Sprague, Massacre: The Traaedr a t White River (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 19571, 57.

4. Dee Brown, Bury Mv Heart a t Wounded Knee (New York: Henry Ho l t and Co., 19701, 367.

5. Ib id . , 376.

6. Sprague, Massacre: The Traaedv a t White River, 179.

7. Arthur P. Wade, "The M i l i t a r y Command Structure: The Great Plains, 1853-1891," ~ o u r n a i o f the West i 5 ( ~ u l y 1976): 16-19.

8. Sprague, Massacre: The Traaedv a t White River, 180

9. Elmer R. Burkey, "The Thornburgh Ba t t l e With the Utes on Mi lk River," The Colorado Mamzine 13 (May 1936): 92.

10. Ib id. , 92.

11. Brown, Burv Mv Heart a t Wounded Knee, 367.

12. Ib id. , 368.

13. Burkey, "The Thornburgh Ba t t l e With the Utes on M i l k River," 93.

14. un i ted States Congress. House. The Committee on Ind ian A f fa i rs . Testimony i n Relation t o the Ute Indian Outbreak. Hearings 46th Cong., 2d Session. House Misc. Doc. 33., 22 March 1880, 203.

15. Sprague, Massacre: The Tragedy a t White River, 241.

16. Weigley, The American Wav o f War, 153.

17. John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier 's Passion f o r Order (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 390.

l a . John Pope, "The Indian Question." Address Before the Social Science Association, Cincinnat i , Ohio, 24 May 1878.

19. Thcmss C. Leonard, Abcve the Bat t le : War-Making i n America From A~~omat tCx t o V e r s a i l k s (New Ycrk: Oxford L'niversity Press, 1978), 46.

CHAPTER 2

STRATEGIC SETTING

The re la t ionship between government po l i cy and I;he strategy o f

i t s m i l i t a r y i s not o f ten clear. The p o l i t i c a l o r i g i ns o f strategy

of ten serve t o confound the h is tor ian, as wel l as the so ld ie r i n i t s

execution? His tor ian T. Harry Will iams states:

Once a government has decided on a pol icy, it turns t o strategy t o achieve i t s objective. The government, t o c i t e the American experience, informs the m i l i t a r y o f the ob ject ive and indicates the human and mater ia l resources it can make available. The m i l i t a r y then takes over the planning and execution o f a strategy t o accomplish the po l icy ; i n e f fec t , it takes over the running o f the war. This i s the concept o f strategy tha t appeared i n ea r l y modern wr i t i ngs on m i l i t a r y theory and t h a t prevai led i n America's f i r s t wars. There was always, however, a gap between theory and practice. '

From the conclusion o f the C i v i l War through the end o f the

Hayes administrat ion, the nat ional object ives o f the United States were

t o promote economic development and settlement i n the western regions.

Accomplishment o f these object ives required the federal government t o

formulate an Indian po l i cy t h a t would deal w i t h the inev i tab le con f l i c t .

o f two cultures. There were three par ts t o the Ind ian po l i cy adopted

t o accomplish these objectives: F i r s t , was removal o f Indians from the

major east-west immigrant t r a i l s and as an obstacle t o development o f

transcontinental r a i l r oad routes; second, increasing the reservation

system t o reduce contact between the races and thereby reduce c o n f l i c t ;

and t h i r d , using the reservation system t o assimi late the Indian i n t o

mainstream American cul ture. The Indian po l i cy was the cornerstone

nat ional secur i ty i ssuedur ing the period and the focus o f army

operations.

I n retrospect t h i s strategy i s read i l y apparent, but a t the

time the secur i ty strategy was not found expressed i n a document

produced annually as i s the current practice. As General W. T. Sherman

prepared t o attend the August 1867 Peace Commission, t o open the p la ins

f o r settlement and the ra i l road, h i s concern was on def in ing the army's

r o l e i n re la t i on t o the po l i cy o f the government. He stated:

Idont [ s i c ] care about in te res t ing myself too f a r i n the f a t e o f the poor dev i l s o f Indians who are doomed from the causes inherent i n t h e i r nature o r from'the natural & pers is tent h o s t i l i t y o f the white race. A l l Iaim t o accomplish i s t o so c l ea r l y def ine the dut ies o f the C i v i l & M i l i t a r y agents o f Govt so t h a t we wont [ s i c ] be quar re l l i ng a l l the time as t o whose business it i s t o look a f t e r them.2

The conclusion o f the C i v i l War brought the focus o f America

back onto nat ional expansion beyond the western f r o n t i e r o r i n t o the

American western i n te r i o r . Indeed, the "national object ive" o f the

United States f o r the l a s t t h i r t y years o f the 19th century can be

characterized as a " f i n a l rush o f American energy upon the remaining

wilderness."3 The federal government was faced w i th the need t o

develop a secur i ty strategy t h a t would support the movement o f industry

and immigrants east from Ca l i fo rn ia and west from the second t i e r o f

trans-Mississippi states and Minnesota. . . - Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska,

Challenging the inexorable march o f America's "manifest destiny" was

the Indian. The Indian po l i cy was the federal government's strategy t o

answer t h i s challenge.

By 1865, the f i r s t pre-war attempt a t a solution t o the the

"Indian question" had been overcome by the continued western expansion

o f the nation. This attempt a t physical separation using the western

trans Mississippi River states f o r Indian t e r r i t o r y , had become

untenable. As a security strategy, the westward transfer o f the

eastern Indian t r ibes, thus clearing the area east o f the Mississippi

r i ve r f o r " c i v i l i za t ion " , no longer f u l f i l l e d the national objective o f

settlement from "sea t o shining sea."

The pre-war national pol icy o f separation had been created by

the r a t i f i ca t i on o f the Indian Removal B i l l , 28 May 1830. Two trends

which emerged during t h i s period would a f fec t fur ther relat ions between

the United States and the Indian. F i rs t , the Indians who had supported

the U.S. during the War o f 1812 were stripped o f the lands tha t had

been previously guaranteed them by t rea t ies - "as long as the grass .

shal l grow and the water flow." As Chief John Ross, o f the Cherokee

nation, commented:

What a pernicious e f f o r t must such a document...have on the interests and improvements o f the Indians? Who shal l expect from the Cherokees a rapid progress i n education, re l ig ion, agriculture, and the various a r t s o f c i v i l i zed l i f e when resolutions are passed i n a c i v i l i zed and Christian legis lature (whose da i l y sessions, we are to ld, commence wi th a prayer t o Almighty God) t o wrest t h e i r country from them, and strange t o t e l l , wi th the point o f the bayonet, i f nothing else w i l l do? I s it the nature o f things, tha t the Cherokees w i l l bu i ld good and comfortable houses and make them great farms, when they know not but t h e i r possessions w i l l f a l l i n t o the hands o f strangers and invaders? How i s it possible tha t they w i l l establish fo r themselves good laws, when an attempt i s made t o crush t he i r f i r s t feeble e f f o r t toward i t ? '

The second outcome o f the i n i t i a l government Indian separation

po l i cy was the resu l t o f a Supreme Court decision i n favor o f the

Cherokee nation. I n 1831, Chief Just ice John Marshall and the court

ru led i n favor o f the Cherokees, whi le deciding the case o f Cherokee v.

the State o f Georgia. This decision stated the Indians were not

subject t o s ta te law, but also ruled t h a t they were not an independent

nation. The Court defined the Indian re la t i on t o the federal

government by c a l l i n g him a "domestic dependent nat ion i n a s ta te o f

pupilage."= Ult imately, these decisions t o dispossess the Indians

and consider them dependent "nations" o f the federal government would

require the involvement o f the regular army as the primary m i l i t a r y

instrument necessary f o r enforcing Indian po l i cy i n the west. This

r o l e would break w i th the establ ished American t r a d i t i o n east o f the

Mississippi r i v e r which had r e l i e d on the presence o f loca l m i l i t i a s t o

control the Indian t r ibes .

The next attempt t o cont ro l the Indians and al low unimpeded

western settlement was the reservation o r concentration pol icy. As

ear ly as the 1840's, e f f o r t s were begun t o use reservations as a t o o l

o f Indian pol icy. As the u t i l i t y o f securing the area west o f the

Mississippi r i v e r was becoming evident, the government sh i f t ed from the

po l i cy o f separation t o one o f concentration. I n 1848, the idea o f

creat ing Indian colonies on the western p la ins was discussed.

I n February o f 1851, Congress passed the Indian Appropriation

Act, mandating the new po l i cy and providing monies t o negotiate

t reat ies. By 1865, the p r i nc ip le features o f the Ind ian po l i cy t ha t

the United States would pursue were i n place. These features would

remain i n various forms u n t i l the end o f the 19th century. The po l i cy

21

ca l led f o r the forced re locat ion o f the Indian and the d ras t i c

reduction o f areas i n which the Ind ian was f ree t o pract ice h i s

culture. Implementation o f the reservation system was a t hand and

would p rec ip i ta te the longest and most v i o l en t Indian wars the nat ion

had known.

Following the C i v i l War, the reservation system was the

paramount means o f implementing nat ional po l i cy as the United States

turned again t o resolv ing the continuing challenge o f the Indian t o

nat ional secur i ty and western expansion. Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r

James Harlan dispatched two groups o f commissioners i n August 1865, t o

negotiate the new parameters o f U.S. Indian po l i cy w i th the Indians of

Kansas, the Ind ian Ter r i to ry , and the Plains Tribes.

This po l i cy was a hybr id o f the separation pol icy. It sought

t o "concentrate," the Indians a t several large reservations and remove

them from the immigration and ra i l r oad routes. The Indian Te r r i t o r y

would serve as one o f the large reservations w i th a second one locatec'

on the northern Plains. From 1865 u n t i l 1876, t h i s s ing le po l i cy

const i tuted the nat ional secur i ty strategy o f the United States i n

response t o the Indians.

This strategy became known as the Peace Pol icy dur ing the Grar~t

administrat ion, as it attempted ( a t leas t on the surface) t o r e l y on

diplomatic, rather than m i l i t a r y means, t o accomplish i t s objectives.

The view o f the Indians as wards o f the federal government was cent ra l

t o t h i s strategy and u l t imate ly would unhinge it, as both fu tu re

p o l i t i c a l and economic factors became evident. Even i n 1865, the

commissioners dispatched by Secretary Harlan were instructed tha t

"these t rea t i es might be amended by the Senate and such admendments

would not require the concurrence o f the Indians."7

The Peace Pol icy d i d not adopt the pure form o f the o r i g i na l

po l i cy o f concentration. While s t i l l focused on the overa l l national

objectives, t r e a t i e s were not geared toward displacing the t r i b e s t o

the large colonies o r i g i n a l l y envisioned. Instead, a desire t o avert

po ten t ia l h o s t i l i t i e s l e f t negotiators a wide band o f operation.

P o l i t i c a l expediency would determine which t r i b e s were t o be l e f t i n

t r a d i t i o n a l areas o r were t o be removed t o the Indian Terr i tory . The

net resu l t was a qui l t-work o f reservations throughout the area created

on an ad hoc basis.

The view o f the nat ional strategy toward the Indian was

contentious throughout t h i s period. The not ion o f dealing w i th the

Indian by diplomatic rather than m i l i t a r y means was debated i n both

p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y c i rc les . Senior members o f the m i l i t a r y

establishment ac t i ve ly campaigned f o r the cont ro l o f Indian a f f a i r s t o

be transferred t o the War Department. Army leaders believed tha t

management o f Indian a f f a i r s would be more e f f i c i e n t l y served by the

War Department. The Army saw i t s e l f removed from the corrupt ion and

inconsistant administrat ion t h a t plagued the Bureau o f Indian A f fa i rs ,

as administered by the Department o f the I n t e r i o r . I n 1867, a h i l l t o

re turn the I n t e r i o r Department's Indian Of f i ce t o the War Department

passed the House, but f a i l e d i n the Senate.8

President Grant led the element opposed t o m i l i t a r y cont ro l o f

Ind ian strategy and favored the employment o f other means. Grant's

view was a great disappointment t o senior army leaders, who believed he

would be a strong advocate o f army cont ro l o f Indian pol icy. On 4

March 1873, a t h i s second inaugural address he stated:

My e f f o r t s i n the fu tu re w i l l be d i rected t o the restorat ion o f good fee l i ng between the d i f f e r e n t sections o f our common country...by a human course, t o b r ing the aborigines o f the country under the benign inf luences o f education and c i v i l i z a t i o n . It i s e i t he r t h i s o r war o f extermination. Wars o f extermination, engaged i n by people pursuing commerce and a l l i ndus t r i a l pursui ts, are expensive even against the weakest people, and are demoralizing and wicked. Our super io r i t y o f strength and advantages o f c i v i l i z a t i o n should make us len ient toward the Indian. The wrong i n f l i c t e d upon him should be taken i n t o account and the balance placed t o h i s c red i t . The moral view o f the question should be considered and the question asked, Can not the Indian be made a useful and productive member o f society by proper teaching and treatment? I f the e f f o r t i s made i n good fa i t h , we w i l l stand be t te r before the c i v i l i z e d nations o f the ear th and i n our own consciences f o r having made i t . 9

While sounding a h igh moral tone, Grant a lso addressed the

economics o f a nat ional strategy o f extermination t h a t he saw as the

a l te rna t i ve t o the diplomatic so lu t ion executed under the auspices o f

the I n t e r i o r Department. This economic concern re f lec ted the growing

h o s t i l i t y w i t h i n the Congress f o r appropriat ions toward a standing

regular army.

The struggle t o maintain an army force s t ructure t o meet

secur i ty object ives was not a new phenemonon i n American h is tory .

Proponents o f f i s c a l conservatism w i th in the Congress found a l l i e s

among congressmen and other Americans, who questioned both the u t i l i t y

o f a standing army and feared it might be used f o r some dark p o l i t i c a l

Purpose. The reduction i n force conducted a t the end o f the C i v i l War

was both rapid and deep. As h i s to r i an Edward M. CoPfman describes:

The C i v i l War was over. Some Americans assumed tha t t h i s meant e l iminat ion o f the m i l i t a r y . I n 1885, when a colonel was introduced t o a cu l t ivated, urban Eastern woman, she was astonished: "What, a colonel o f the Army? Why, Isupposed the Army was a l l disbanded a t the close o f the war!" Most o f i t was. Within s i x months, 800,000 o f the m i l l i o n men i n blue were c i v i l i a n s again. By 1875 the permanent strength had leveled o f f a t ?5,OOO ...I n comparison w i th foreign armies, t h i s placed the s ize o f the American army i n the 1880's a t s l i g h t l y less than h a l f t h a t o f Belgium's, a seventh t h a t o f Br i ta in 's , and a twent ieth o f the French army's size.10

It was a per iod of ten ca l led the "dark days" o f the army, and it would

shape army planning o f nat ional m i l i t a r y strategy and operational

strategy i n the west.

Beginning i n 1869 and 1870, President Grant i n i t i a t e d the most

wel l known aspect o f the Peace Policy, when he abdicated, t o a large

degree, federal control over the Indians t o re l i g i ous and reform

groups. This movement was begun i n the 1850's, p r imar i l y by Bishop

Henry Whipple o f the Episcopal church. Whipple and other reformers

believed t h a t the rap id adoption o f ~ h r i s t i a n i t y and the cu l tu re o f the

white man was the only means t o preclude ex t inc t ion o f the Indian.

This view was s im i l a r t o t h a t held by the proponents o f the reservation

system w i th in Grant's administration. The d i f ference i n opinion was

expressed over the management o f the Indian on the reservation.

Whipple and the reformers believed t h a t corrupt ion had reached

such proport ions t h a t no progress could be made i n c i v i l i z i n g the

Indian. He proposed estab l ish ing an honest administrat ion o f Indian

reservations by employing the "Friends o f the Indian", as the reformers

l a t e r became known. Whipple predicted tha t i f the corrupt ion o f the

Indian Of f i ce was not swept away, "a nat ion which sowed robbery would

reap a harvest o f blood. ""

With Grant's approval; churches began t o nominate people t o

serve as Indian agents. Congress created a Board o f Indian

Commissioners t o manage the Indian Of f i ce and ac t as a watch dog on

corrupt ion w i th in the reservation system. I n i t i a l l y , the board was

cont ro l led by wealthy Protestant phi lanthropists, but as d i f f i c u l t i e s

rose over s t a f f i n g the reservations, many churches l o s t in te res t and

l e f t fo r 'o ther missionary adventures..j2 The Peace po l i cy brought

l i t t l e improvement according t o army o f f i c e r s and, i n fact , i nv i t ed

disaster. Indians, being enamored w i th the warr ior mystique, would

only respect other warriors. Statements such as Colonel Richard I rv in51

Dodge's were common:

Christian-appointed agents were a f i t t i n g climax t o the preposterous acts which f o r a century have s t u l t i f i e d the

.governmental cont ro l and management o f Indians. To appoint Nathan Meeker, however f a i t h f u l , honest, and ch r i s t i an i n bearing he might be, t o an agency i n charge o f a se t o f w i l d brigands l i k e the Utes, i s simply t o i n v i t e massacre.13

While not wel l received by the m i l i t a r y , the reformers

themselves were perhaps a greater th rea t t o the Indian than the th rea t

o f d i r e c t m i l i t a r y action. Professing a strong b e l i e f i n Indian

equal i ty w i t h the white man, reformers f e l t any shortcoming o f the

Indian was due t o t h e i r arrested cu l t u ra l development. I n order t o

assimi late the Indian, they f e l t h i s cu l t u ra l her i tage must be

completely destroyed and t h a t the Ind ian must be forced t o t h i s

a l te rna t i ve f o r h i s own good. With t h i s re l i g i ous bent, the reformers

were po#erful adversaries i n the world o f 19th century Indian po l i cy

p o l i t i c s .

The management o f Indian t-eservations by reformers, as a means

t o i n s t i t u t e a program o f social-Darwinism, was an abject f a i l u re .

P o l i t i c a l i n f i g h t i n g between re l i g i ous denominations, the remaining

p o l i t i c a l appointees, and elected o f f i c i a l s f a i l e d t o produce an

improvement t o reservation condit ions o r a cessation o f h o s t i l i t i e s

between the Ind ian t r i b e s and the growing white population. The

f a i l u r e o f t h i s program sh i f t ed blame t o the reform movement, away from

the Grant administrat ion, whi le f ue l i ng continued demands f o r d i r e c t

control o f Indian po l i cy by the army, a view t h a t was held almost

un iversa l ly by senior army o f f i ce rs .

The 1876 inauguration o f Rutherford 0 . Hayes brought a subt le

change t o nat ional secur i ty strategy. I n h i s inaugural address, Hayes

l a i d a philosophy o f "pac i f i ca t ion" on the nation's p o l i t i c a l p la te ,

t ha t sought t o b r ing the reconstruction period t o a close.14 The

nat ional object ive, i n terms o f the Indians, was t o be a continuation

o f the Grant administrat ion's emphasis on a po l i cy t h a t r e l i e d on

diplomatic means. His administrat ion sh i f t ed i t s focus away from the

re locat ion o f Indian t r i b e s t o the reservations, instead emphasizing

ass imi la t ion o f the Indian i n t o the "white" culture.

The s h i f t away from the reservation po l i cy d i d not occur

immediately. The Hayes administrat ion continued the Peace Pol icy,

using reservations and c i t i n g the perceived benef i t o f protect ing and

c i v i l i z i n g the Indian. The reservation system continued t o be

modified, as it had been dur ing the Grant years, away from the

concentration o f the Indian i n large central ized locations. Instead,

the reservations were smaller e n t i t i e s incorporat ing the Indian along

loose t r i b a l l ines, and t h i s "small reservation approach" was the

27

cornerstone o f the Hayes strategy. As a resu l t , when President Hayes

took o f f i c e i n 1877, "over s i x t y t r i b e s had been rese t t led i n the

Ind ian Ter r i to ry , whi le many more were sh i f t ed from t h e i r homeland t o

new locales. " ' 5

The reservation system t h a t President Hayes inher i ted was

la rge ly created on an ad hoc basis t o preclude c o n f l i c t a t a loca l

level . As discussi?d ea r l i e r , the two cent ra l themes guiding the

i n s t i t u t i o n o f the reservation system were separation o f the Indians

from the major immigration routes and t h e i r removal as an impediment ti:

the progress o f the transcontinental r a i l r oad system. These ambitions

were fu r the r amended t o include removal o f Indians from areas t h a t had

gained importance due t o the discovery o f various natural resources

(e.g., gold i n the Black H i l l s ) . As a resu l t o f the discovery o f gold

and s i l ve r , the t r ea ty between the federal government and the Utes o f

Colorado would be revised three times, accounting f o r each new mineral

discovery.

The task t h a t f e l l t o Hayes and h i s army was t o develop a

secur i ty strategy and a m i l i t a r y strategy t h a t would address the

f a i l u r e by e a r l i e r po l i cy makers t o cont ro l the Ind ian t r i b e s i n the

long term. The pure separation po l i cy had been inval idated since the

C i v i l War by the continued expansion o f the country. The Peace Pol icy

had not met expectations i n terms o f ass imi la t ing the Indians i n t o the

white cul ture. I n fact , the i n s t i t u t i o n o f the Peace Pol icy

corresponded w i th the beginning o f a ten year period dur ing which some

o f the most dramatic c o n f l i c t s between the races had occured. A t the

time the army viewed t h i s as a cause and e f f e c t re lat ionship. The

watchword became i m p r o v i s ~ t i o n i n the formulation o f a new nat ional

28

strategy. As h i s to r i an Richard White describes:

American o f f i c i a l s , i n attempting t o h a l t c o n f l i c t between Indians and whites, prevent expensive wars, and open up lands t o white settlement, created reservations the way survivors o f a shipwreck might fashion a r a f t from the debr is o f the sunken vessel. Reservations evolved on an ad hoc basis as a way t o prevent c o n f l i c t and enforce a separation o f the races.16

When President Hayes inher i ted the "Indian question" from the

Grant administrat ion, a long ser ies o f m i l i t a r y campaigns had j u s t been

completed, culminating i n the destruct ion o f Custer and h i s command.

Many throughout the country, including the Commanding General o f the

Army Wil l iam T. Sherman, saw the need f o r a complete rev is ion o f the

secur i ty strategy o r the Ind ian pol icy. The re l ig ious and

phi lanthropic groups t h a t President Grant had formal ly promoted t o the

foref ront , i n the e f f o r t t o c i v i l i z e the Indian on the reservation,

were challenged by both "westerners" and by the Army. The management

o f the Indian, by these soc ie t ies and the Indian Of f i ce o f the I n t e r i o r

Department, was deemed a t o t a l f a i l u r e and c a l l s f o r the War Department

t o manage the Indian again reached Congress i n 1877.

Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r Carl Schurz stated much the same view

as General Sherman when he assumed o f f i ce . His exposure t o Indians

p r i o r t o assuming o f f i c e was l im i t ed and he held a view i n keeping w i th

the popular ethnocentrism o f the times. He stated:

The underlying support o f t h i s proposi t ion [War Department cont ro l ] was the convict ion t h a t the Ind ian could never be c i v i l i z e d and tha t the only pos%ible so lu t ion o f the problem which he embodied was t o confine him, under s t r i c t m i l i t a r y supervision, on reservations from which a l l u p l i f t i n g c o n t a c t w i th whi te men was barred, till he should become ex t i nc t by v i r t u e o f h i s own incurable barbarism.17

Schurz's views changed as he gained an appreciat ion o f the

issues a t hand. While a j o i n t committee o f Congress reviewed the

strategy o f the "Peace Pol icy", Secretary Schurz issued a statement on

6 December, 1877, which reaff irmed tha t strategy, and out l ined

addi t ional measures t o be undertaken t o speed the ass imi la t ion o f the

Schurz's strategy ca l l ed f o r continued use o f the reservation

system along w i th a program o f guiding the Ind ian toward self-support.

By t r a i n i n g the Ind ian i n "modern" ag r i cu l t u ra l means, Schurz f e l t the

Indian wouldgradual ly replace h i s t r a d i t i o n a l l i f e s t y l e w i th the

l i f e s t y l e o f the dominant cul ture. I n the long term he saw the

"Americanization" o f the Indian, as a means t o el iminate the need f o r

the maintenance o f federal reservation lands.i9 Eventually the

reservations would wi ther away, being replaced by p r i va te land held by

Indians p rac t i c ing ag r i cu l t u ra l pursui ts. S t i l l , i n h i s f i r s t annual

report i n November 1877, he expressed the view that , even w i th the

appl icat ion o f the modif ied reservation system, the recurr ing c o n f l i c t

between the advancing f r o n t i e r and the Indians could not be el iminated

e n t i r e l y because o f the proximity o f the races.20 The Army r o l e i n

t h i s strategy was t o be l imi ted. Schurz stated:

Such a po l i cy would be the most conducive t o peace and the most economical. I t ought t o be retained and developed; but the army would be no proper agency f o r i t s execution. M i l i t a r y men and methods were indispensable f o r emergencies; the long, slow process o f r a i s i ng the red men out o f barbarism, however, required q c a l i t i e s i n those who guided it tha t the army could not supply.21

The r i v a l r y over the management o f Indian a f f a i r s had been i n

question since the t rans fe r o f the Of f i ce o f Indian A f f a i r s from the

War Department t o I n t e r i o r Department i n 1849.22 The debate was

centra l t o providing a l inkage between the secur i ty and m i l i t a r y

s t ra teg ies toward the Indian, but was of ten diverted by charges o f

corrupt ion and lack o f expert ise by both sides.

Schurz took d i r e c t act ion on one o f the army's long standing

complaints o f the I n t e r i o r Department, by reorganizing the Indian

Off ice. A long time advocate o f c i v i l service reform, he entered

o f f i c e w i th a mandate from President Hayes t o clean up the I n t e r i o r

Department, and i n par t i cu la r , the Ind ian Bureau. An invest igat ion

i n i t i a t e d by Schurz i n t o the business pract ices o f the Indian o f f i c e

was completed i n August 1877. The report gained nat ional prominence

when reported by the New York Times, and led t o the replacement o f the

Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s w i t h i n a month. The report focused on

the corrupt ion and abuses t h a t plagued the Indian Bureau. Schurz

described h i s dealings w i th the Bureau as, "a constant f i g h t w i th

sharks."z3

The house cleaning proved t o be enough t o defeat army attempts

t o gain control o f Indian a f f a i r s through a j o i n t congressional

committee i n 1878-79. I n addi t ion t o maintaining cont ro l o f Indian

a f f a i r s , the reforms a l lev ia ted some o f the grievances held by the

Indians and served t o reduce the leve l o f open h o s t i l i t y a t some o f the

reservations. Schurz's e f f o r t s i n cleaning up corrupt ion i n the Indian

Bureau even won admiration i n A n y c i rc les . The Div is ion o f the

Missouri Commander, General P h i l i p Sheridan commented," ...the service

o f Indian a f f a i r s was f i n a l l y l i f t e d out o f the mire o f corrcpt ion tha t

While a

symbolic step i n the r i g h t d i rect ion, the e f f e c t o f the Schurz reforms

s t i l l had not addressed corrupt ion a t the grassroots leve l o r the

problems o f the management o f reservations by competing re l ig ious

groups.

Given the p o l i t i c a l environment addressed above, the army found

i t s e l f i n the pos i t ion o f determining the best means t o u t i l i z e the

instrument o f m i l i t a r y power t o support the accomplishment o f the

Indian po l i cy goals and the overa l l nat ional objectives. I n the spr ing

o f 1865, the a n y returned i t s a t ten t ion t o the secur i ty o f the west, ::

r o l e it had abdicated t o s ta te and t e r r i t o r i a l m i l i t i a s dur ing the

C i v i l War. That year, the Commissioner o f Ind ian A f f a i r s reported the

number o f Indians as: " c i v i l i zed , 97,000; semic iv i l ized 125,000; wholly

barbarous, 78,000. O f these, 180,000 had t r e a t i e s w i t h the United

States and were consequently involved i n r e l a t i v e l y s tab le and mutually

understood re la t ions w i th the government; another 40,000 l i v e d on

reservations and were more o r less under the cont ro l o f the Indian

agents; about 55,000 were t o t a l l y uncontrolled."25

The army faced addi t ional problems t h a t had developed during

the h ia tus o f the regulars i n the east dur ing the C i v i l War. The

re la t ionship between white and Ind ian ( i n pa r t i cu la r the Plains t r i b e s )

had deteriorated, f i r s t because o f the conduct o f operations by

t e r r i t o r i a l m i l i t i a s , and second because the pace o f em ig ra t i on had

increased.

The most g la r ing example o f m i l i t i a excesses was the massacre

o f Black Ket t le ' s band o f Cheyenne a t Sand Creek by the Colorado

t e r r i t o r i a l m i l i t i a i n 1864. I n t h i s case, the Cheyennes had gathered

had long made it a d i sc red i t t o our c i ~ i l i z a t i o n . " ~ ~

32

a t a po in t designated by the t e r r i t o r i a l governor and were using a

prearranged signal denoting them as "not host i le . " I n sp i t e o f

complying f u l l y w i th the d i rec t i ve o f the governor, including f l y i n g an

American f lag, they here se t upon b r u t a l l y by the Colorado t e r r i t o r i a l

m i l i t i a under the command o f Colonel John M. Chivington. The episode

resul ted i n fu r ther repr isa ls and a l iena t ion on both sides.

Sand Creek became the r a l l y i n g c ry f o r humanitarian groups

throughout the country. An invest igat ion o f i t s events discredi ted the

effectiveness o f the Colorado m i l i t i a spec i f i ca l l y and the use of

m i l i t i a troops i n general. Two separate invest igat ions were condccted

one by the U.S. Senate and one by the Army. Neither adjudged any

respons ib i l i t y f o r the incident o r preferred charges, but c l e a r l y

Chivington was a t f a u l t . Ul t imately, Chivington f l e d the s ta te and

returned t o h i s nat ive Ohio. As a resu l t o f the chronic mishandling o f

Indian a f f a i r s by loca l m i l i t i a s and the established precedent f o r

t r ea t i ng Indians as "wards" o f the federal government, the regular army

eventual ly became the m i l i t a r y instrument responsible f o r the

enfarcement o f U.S. po l i cy i n the west.

The movement o f peoples t o the western f r o n t i e r s had increased

during the C i v i l War years. Migration increased, as many sought t o

f i n d a new s t a r t i n new mining ventures i n the west, o r i n the promise

o f f ree land created by the Homestead Act o f 1862. The population west

o f the Mississippi River grew by one m i l l i o n between 1860 and 1870 and

an addi t ional two and a h a l f m i l l i o n by the end o f the Hayes

administration.26 This increase i n population compounded the army's

dilemma as it placed greater demands on it f o r secur i ty o f the

immigrants, but a lso increased the need f o r measures t o protect the

t r ea ty arrangements guaranteed t o the Indians by the federal

government.

As the army examined the s i t ua t i on west o f the Mississippi

River i n the spr ing o f 1865, it was confident i n i t s a b i l i t i e s t o

subdue the Ind ian as an obstacle t o nat ional objecti-ves. As General

Sherman announced i n November 1865, "as soon as the Indians see t h a t we

have Regular Cavalry among them they w i l l r ea l i ze t h a t we are i n

condi t ion t o punish them f o r any murders o r robberies."r7 The

confidence was perhaps more due t o un fam i l i a r i t y w i th the problem a t

hand than an accurate assessment o f the s t ra teg ic s i tua t ion .

Nevertheless, as the forces t h a t had reuni ted the country took two days

t o parade before the reviewing stand i n Washington, army leadership

prepared f o r operations on the f ron t i e r .

A few m i l i t a r y "giants" dominated the d i rec t i on o f nat ional

m i l i t a r y strategy. The o f f i c e o f the Commanding General o f the Army

f i l l e d i n order by Generals Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan from the end

o f the C i v i l War t o 1886, dominated the s t ra teg ic appl icat ion o f

m i l i t a r y power i n the west. This i s not t o imply t h a t the Commanding

General was i n an a l l powerful pos i t ion t o exercise complete executive

power from h i s o f f i ce . The army had yet t o i n s t i t u t e the reforms o f

the general s t a f f system, instead re l y i ng on the ten administrat ive and

technical bureaus establ ished by the Army Act o f 1866.28 This system

created two chains o f cont ro l w i t h i n the army - the s t a f f and the l i ne .

The d i v i s i on o f respons ib i l i t y s p l i t the army. The bureau

ch ie fs reported t o the Secretary o f War and dea l t w i th administrat ive

and technical matters. Operational command was exercised from the

34

President through the commanding general. The outcome o f t h i s

arrangement was la rge ly a measure o f the personal i t ies o f the

President, Secretary o f War, and the Commanding General a t any given

time. I t s impact o n operational considerations was f e l t across the

army. As Robert M. Ut ley comments:

Although Sherman held the post o f commanding general o f the army and profoundly influenced i t s character, he d id not ac tua l l y command it. The army staff-more exactly, the War Department staff-remained resolute ly outside Sherman's army. And the complications t h a t the s t a f f ' s independence created f o r the commanding general i n t u rn made h i s author i ty over the l i n e more nominal than rea1.29

The key uniformed decision makers o f the l i n e a t the' s t ra teg ic

and operational leve ls were in t imate ly aware o f each others' strengths

and weaknesses. Past associations during the conduct o f the C i v i l War

assisted the formulation o f a central ized plan o f s t ra teg ic and

operational leve l commanders f o r the conduct army operations and

campaigns i n the west.

I n the spr ing o f 1865, General Grant was determined t o u t i l i z e

the avai lab le manpower t o conduct of fensive operations on the western

p la ins t o gain the s t ra teg ic i n i t i a t i v e . His desire t o execute these

operations qu ick ly was twofold. F i r s t , the largest p la ins t r ibes , the

Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho, were ra id ing immigrant t r a i n s and

homesteads i n react ion t o the previously discussed m i l i t i a excesses.

Second, although Grant was hopeful o f maintaining a standing force

larger than a t pre-Civi l War levels, he was an t i c ipa t ing congressional

troop reductions overa l l , and a requirement f o r increased army presence

t o support the reconstruction e f f o r t i n the South. Secretary o f War

Stanton estimated tha t the standing regular army would be about t r i p l e

1860 strength o r 50,000 men.do General Pope advised Grant, "Ith ink

the government w i l l f i n d i t t rue economy t o f i n i s h t h i s Indian war t h i s

season, so i t w i l l stay f in ished. We have the troops enough now on the

p la ins t o do it now be t te r than hereafter."a'

An of fensive planned t o include 12,000 troops beginning i n

Apri 1 1865 was delayed u n t i 1 the summer. When the of fensive began

t roop strength and q u a l i t y had been so dissipated t h a t the o r i g i na l

object ives were outside the l i m i t o f attainment. Troops employed

numbered less than 5,000 and instead o f regular formations, t e r r i t o r i a l

and s ta te m i l i t i a s comprised the ma jo r i t y o f forces.3i Grant's p lan

t o br ing the Ind ian wars t o a decis ive conclusion through a s t ra teg ic

of fensive fa i led . The combined e f f ec t s o f the reduction i n the army

strength and the demand f o r troops i n the South and l a t e r on the

Mexican f r o n t i e r would prevent f u r t he r consideration o f a general

offensive.

The s t ra teg ic design f o r the conduct o f the Indian wars t h a t

would characterize the regular army i n the west was the product o f one

man, General W i l l i a m T. Sherman. The demands o f supporting nat ional

object ives w i th severely l im i t ed resources forced the army onto the

s t ra teg ic defensive i n the west. Ear ly on, Sherman saw the potent ia l

f o r the employment o f the r a i l r o a d as a means t o al low the operational

offensive. Based on h i s C i v i l War experience, Sherman rea l ized tha t

the army could concentrate troops rap id ly by using the inherent

mob i l i t y provided by the ra i l road, whi le remaining on the s t ra teg ic

defensive. Sherman wrote t o the War Department and General Grant, i n

the f a l l o f 1865, a f t e r viewing progress on two sections o f the

ra i l road, on the importance o f the ra i l r oad i n the west, "I gave both a

close and c r i t i c a l examinaticn...because I see tha t each w i l l enter

36

l a rge ly i n t o our m i l i t a r y calculat ions."3J Sherman would work

c lose ly w i th the major ra i l road companies t o synchronize the progress

on routes i n t o the operational area w i th the employment o f army

t a c t i c a l formations and the pos i t ion ing o f the f o r t system i n the west.

The army strategy i n the west benef i t ted from the d e f i n i t i o n o f

the nat ional objective. The ob ject ive (securing the freedom o f

movement f o r expansion along the major t r a i l s and r a i l l i nes) led the

army t o the d e f i n i t i o n o f i t s primary area o f operations. The f a c t

t h a t the nat ional secur i ty strategy ca l led f o r the removal o f the

Indian t r i b e s from t h i s area allowed the army t o deal w i t h the Indians

piecemeal: F i r s t focusing on one t r i b e and then u t i l i z i n g the r a i l

network t o mass against subsequent challenges. The strategy tha t

developed from the stated p o l i t i c a l object ives was the only course l e f t

t o the army, based on i t s l im i t ed resources. The strategy ca l led f o r

the army t o remain on the s t ra teg ic defensive, whi le using superior

organization and technology t o gain the operational and t a c t i c a l

i n i t i a t i v e when required.

The m i l i t a r y plan t h a t defined the U.S. army's s t ra teg ic r o l e

i n the west was l inked t o both the nat ional object ives and the nat ional

secur i ty strategy as defined by the federal governments po l i cy toward

the Indian. This t o a large par t was due t o the army's absence from

the west during the C i v i l War. The other branches o f the federal

government had established t h e i r agendas i n regards t o the Indians by

the time the army returned i t s focus t o the west. It f e l l l a rge ly t o

the army, t o salute and carry out i t s mission.

ENDNOTES

1. T. Harry Williams, The His tory o f American Wars: From 1745 t o 1918 (New York: A l f red A. Knopf, Inc., 19811, x iv .

2. John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier 's Passion f o r Order (New York: The Free Press, 19931, 390.

3. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Front ier i n American His tory (Tucson: The Univers i ty Press o f Arizona, 19921, 312.

5. P h i l i p Weeks, Farewell. My Nation: The American Indian and the United States, 1820-1890 (Ar l ington Heights: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 19901, 27.

6. Ib id. , 29.

7. Wil l iam T. Hagan, "United States Indian Pol ic ies, 1860-1900,"in Handbook o f North American Indians, Val. 4 (Washington D.C.,: Government P r i n t i ng Off ice, 19881, 52.

8. Ib id . , 53.

9. Ulysses S. Grant, Inaugural Addresses o f the United States: From George Washinqton, 1789, t o John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington D.C.,: Government P r i n t i ng Off ice, 19611, 133-134.

10. Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A P o r t r a i t o f the American Army i n Peacetime. 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford Univers i ty Press, 19861, 215.

11. Richard White, I t ' s Your Misfortune and None o f MY Own: A H is tory o f the American West (Norman: Univers i ty o f Oklahoma Press, 19911, 102.

12. Ib id . , 103.

13. Sherry L. Smith, The View from Of f icers ' Row: Army Perce~t ions o f Western Indians (Tucson: Univers i ty o f Arizona Press, 1990), 95.

14. Rutherford B. Hayes, Inaunural Addresses o f the United States: From George Washington, 1789. t o John F. Kennedy. 1961 (Washington D.C.,: Government P r i n t i ng Off ice, 19611, 136.

15. Weeks, Farewell, MY Nation, 205.

16. White, I t s Your Misfortune and None o f My Own, 91.

17. Carl Schurz, The Reminiscences o f Carl Schurz, Vol 3 (New ~ o r k : The McClure Co., 19081, 385.

18. Ib id. , 385.


20. Hans L. Trefousse, "Carl Schurz and the Indians," The Great Plains Quarterly 4 (Spring 1984): 114.

21. Carl Schurz, The Reminiscences o f Carl Schurz, Vol 3, 385-386


23. Leonard D. White, The Re~ub l i can Era. 1869-1901 (New York: MacMillan Company, i958), 180.

24. Robert M. Utley, Front ier Regulars: The Armv and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Lincoln: Univers i ty o f Nebraska Press, 19731, 7-8.

25. White, The Re~ub l i can Era, 1869-1901, 182. The f igures leave 25,000 Indians unaccounted f o r i n the Bureau s t a t i s t i c s . Perhaps they represent Indians who were not accounted f o r by formal t reaty , but were not h o s t i l e t o U.S. in terests .

26. Utley, Front ier Regulars, 2.

27. Robert Wooster, The M i l i t a r y and United States Indian Pol icy, 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale Univers i ty Press, 19881, 114.

28. Utley, Front ier Regulars, 11.

29. Ib id . , 28.

30. Coffman, The Old Army, 216.

31. Wooster, The M i l i t a r y and United States Indian Policy, 112.

32. Ibid., 112-113.

33. Robert G. Athearn, "General Sherman and the Western Railroads", Pac i f i c H i s to r i ca l Review 24 (February 1955):40.

CHAPTER 3

THE OPPONENTS

For the time and the place they weren't bad - not t o compare w i t h Johnny Reb cavalry o r Cardigan's L ights o r Sca r l e t t ' s Heavies o r the Union horse i n the C i v i l War, o r Sikhs o r Punjabis e i ther , but then these were a l l so ld ie rs a t war, most o f the time, and the 7th weren't.'

So stated the f i c t i o n a l Captain Harry Flashman i n assessing the

a b i l i t y o f the 7 th Cavalry i n 1876. What were the capab i l i t i es o f the

Army o f the west and i t s opponents? It i s the purpose o f t h i s Chapter,

as Professor Michael Howard would state, t o provide the context t o the

" c o n f l i c t o f societ ies" between the American and Ute cultures.?

The predominant mission o f the army a f t e r the end o f the C i v i l

War was t o subjugate the Indian. Throughout the per iod t h i s mission

tested the very l i m i t s o f the capab i l i t i es o f the army. I n 1S79, the

year o f the Ute campaign, 20,300 troops garrisoned the west,

representing 66 percent o f the t o t a l army strength.3 The demands o f

the geographic area and the nature o f the mission would la rge ly d i c ta te

the means required by the army.

While the organization o f the Ind ian "forces" t ha t the army

fought was very t rans i to ry , i f they were organized a t a l l , the system

created by the U.S. Army ref lected the need f o r wel l deflned geographic

boundaries and the del ineat ion o f responsib i l i ty . The system o f

geographically defined "d iv is ions" and "departments" was a continuation

o f a method dat ing back t o the reorganization o f 1853.4

On 11 August, 1866, the Army reorganized the command st ructure

i n t o three d iv is ions west o f the Mississippi r i ve r . This s t ructure

would remain i n e f f e c t and carry the army through the Ind ian wars.

This basic organization would del ineate command author i ty , w i th minor

modif ications, f o r the next twenty f i v e years. The M i l i t a r y Div is ion

o f the Missouri was the largest d i v i s i o n o f the three created. It

encompassed the Great Plains area, which would be the focus o f m i l i t a r y

act ion against the Indian.

From 1869 t o 1883 the D iv is ion o f the Missouri was fu r ther

div ided i n t o f i v e M i l i t a r y Departments: Dakota, P la t te , Missouri,

Texas, and Gulf. The Department o f the Gulf remained i n the d i v i s i on

from 1875 t o 1877.5 With headquarters i n i t i a l l y a t F t Leavenworth,

Kansas, and then a t Chicago, I l l i n o i s , it was commanded by the second

highest ranking o f f i c e r i n the army throughout the period. I t s area o f

r espos ib i l i t y was vast. ( f i gu re 3) As General Sherman stated i n h i s

1866 annual report, before incorporation o f areas east o f the

Mississippi River:

I n order t o an understanding o f the great m i l i t a r y problems t o be solved, Imust s ta te i n general terms t h a t t h i s m i l i t a r y d i v i s i on embraces the vast region from the Mississippi River t o the Rocky Mountains, o f an average breadth (east t o west) o f one thousand three hundred and f i f t y mi les and length (north t o south) o f over one thousand miles, v iz : from the south border o f New Mexico t o the B r i t i s h l ine . On the east are the f e r t i l e and rap id ly improving States o f Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, and Arkansas. Immediately on the west are the Te r r i t o r i es and States o f Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and the Indian Te r r i t o r y ...Next i n order are the mountainous Te r r i t o r i es o f Montana, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico. Eetween these mountainous Te r r i t o r i es and those o f the r i v e r border l i e the'great p la ins o f America ...[which] can never be cu l t i va ted l i k e I l l i n o i s , never be f i l l e d w i th inhabi tants capable o f self-government and self-defense as against the Indians and marauders, but a t best can become a vast pasture-f ield, open and f ree t o a l l f o r the rear ing o f herds o f horses, mules, c a t t l e , and sheep.B

DEPARTMENT OF

TEXAS

Div is ion o f the Missouri (Adapted from Wade, The M i l i t a r y Conunand Structure)

Figure 3

The del ineat ion o f the departments w i t h in the M i l i t a r y Div is ion

o f the Missouri was based on several factors. Department boundaries

were drawn t o roughly equate w i th the boundaries o f t e r r i t o r i e s and

s ta tes i n order t o f a c i l i t a t e c i v i l - m i l i t a r y cooperation. I n addi t ion,

the east-west o r ien ta t ion o f the departments corresponded w i th the

routes o f the major l i n e s o f communication (LOC) t o the west.

Throughout the period o f the Ind ian wars, the boundaries o f the

departments and the placement o f the fo r ts , in te rna l t o the

departments, sh i f t ed w i th the changes i n the use o f immigrant t r a i l s

and the ra i l road.

The War Department also believed t h a t the boundaries o f the

departments corresponded w i th the areas cont ro l led by the major t r i b e s

o f h o s t i l e Indians.' By def in ing an area o f respons ib i l i t y t ha t

al ledgedly incorporated the range o f a pa r t i cu la r t r i b e , it was

believed t h a t the problems o f command and cont ro l between departments

would not arise. The actual j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the number and s ize o f

the departments seems t o be the army's force s t ruc tu re a f t e r the C i v i l

War. I n examining the period frm 1866, the geographic command

st ructure was reorganized t o meet the changes i n Congressional

appropriat ions more than i n response t o changes i n the Indian

situation.8

The two departments involved i n the 1879 Ute campaign were the

Departments o f the P la t t e and o f the Missouri. Both re f lec ted an

organization t ha t was focused on protect ing the LOC's through t h e i r

respective area, and the u t i l i z a t i o n o f these l i nes as a means t o

conduct operations t o control the Indian. Headquartered i n Omaha,

Nebraska, the Department o f the P la t te by 1875 contro l led an area

43

inc luding the s ta te o f Iowa, the Te r r i t o r i es of.Nebraska, Wyoming, and

Utah, and a por t ion o f the Te r r i t o r y o f Idaho. I n i t i a l l y , the

department was concerned w i th protect ing immigrant t r a i l s , such as the

Bozeman, but by the completion o f the transcontinental ra i l road i n May,

1869, the ma jo r i t y o f i t s troops were deta i led t o protect t h i s s ingular

national l ink.9

The Department o f the Missouri had a s im i l a r mission. With i t s

headquarters a t Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the Department saw duty i n the

protect ion o f immigrants along port ions o f the Santa Fe and Oregon

t r a i l s . By 1870, the Department had seen the destruct ion o f the major

Indian opposit ion i n i t s area, la rge ly due t o the work o f professional

hunters, who i n the course o f two years, removed the great southern

bu f fa lo herd upon which the Indians based t h e i r subsistence."J The

Department was responsible f o r an area t h a t covered the states o f

I l l i n o i s , Missouri, Kansas, and pa r t o f Arkansas, as wel l as the

T e r r i t o r i e s o f Colorado, New Mexico, and the Indian Ter r i to r ies . The

department was wel l supplied w i th rai l roads, including a l i n e o f the

Kansas Pac i f i c t h a t connected Denver from the east and ran north t o the

Union Pac i f i c l i n e a t Cheyenne, Wyoming.11

The manpower afforded Lieutenant General Sheridan and the

D iv is ion o f the Missouri was hardly s u f f i c i e n t f o r the area. I n 1879,

the aggregate strength o f the d i v i s i o n was 15,517 o f f i c e r s and men,

responsible t o garrison seventy-one permanent posts and Wenty-two

temporary encampments. This s t ructure provided f o r a force r a t i o o f

one so ld ie r f o r every seventy-five square mi les i n the Departments o f

the P la t t e and the Missouri.12

The demands o f safeguarding r a i l and other l i n e s o f

communication, i n addi t ion t o the mission o f con t ro l l i ng Indians and

protect ing them ( a t leas t marginal ly) from white depradations on

reservations and t rea ty land, led the army t o estab l ish the f o r t

system. This system posit ioned small army contingents, usual ly company

o r troop sized, along the paths o f advancing " c i v i l i za t i on . " As

~ener 'a l Sheridan described:

To throughly and e f f e c t i v e l y perform the dut ies devolving upon us compels us many times t o overwork our troops, and not unfrequently obl iges us t o take the f i e l d w i t h small detachments, which have heretofore occasionally been overmatched and great ly outnumbered by our foes. This i s not as it should be; but so long as our companies are l im i t ed t o t h e i r average strength ( f i f t y men t o a bat tery o f a r t i l l e r y , s i x t y men t o a company o f cavalry, and f o r t y men t o a company o f in fan t ry ) , it cannot be avoided...Compelled as i t i s t o keep i n advance o f the wave o f c i v i l i z a t i o n constantly f lowing westward, and t o watch the Northern and Southern borders and guard them from incursions o f savage foes, and also t o be i n readiness t o repress any outbreaks upon the Ind ian reservations, t o say nothing o f having t o make new roads, erect f o r t s , and fu rn ish escorts f o r surveying and explor ing part ies, i t i s , as Ihave said, overworked, on account o f i t s inadequate strength f o r the service required. 13

Because o f both the demands placed on the army o f the west and

i t s small size, the feature which has come t o characterize the Ind ian

f i g h t i n g army arose--the f o r t . For t Fred Steele, Wyoming not only

played a key r o l e i n the Ute campaign, but was charac te r i s t i c o f a l l

western f o r t s . Established i n June, 1868, i n the Wyoming t e r r i t o r y , a t

an in tersect ion o f the North P la t t e River and the Union Pac i f i c l i n e ,

i t served as par t o f a system o f f o r t s f o r the protect ion o f the

ra i l road and the Overland T r a i l and as a replacement t o the abandoned

Bozeman Tra i 1 posts. ' The f o r t system r e l i e d on the advantage i n operational mob i l i t y

t ha t the ra i l road provided, t o overcome any super io r i t y i n numbers the

Indians could achieve loca l l y . By u t i l i z i n g the complementary

development o f the ra i l road and the telegraph, the army could move

troops and equipment t o pursue and punish h o s t i l e bands. General

Sherman was among the e a r l i e s t t o rea l i ze the po ten t ia l o f the ra i l r oad

i n the western campaigns, but he was not alone. The annual reports

from both d i v i s i ona l and departmental commanders included an update on

the s ta tus o f the most recent r a i l l i n e s establ ished i n t h e i r area o f

responsib i l i ty . General Sheridan commented on the close re la t ionship

between the army and the ra i l roads i n h i s 1880 Annual Report: "Amongst

our strongest a l l i e s i n the march o f c i v i l i z a t i o n upon the f r o n t i e r ,

are the various rai lway companies who are now constructing t h e i r new

l i n e s w i th great rapidity."'S

The advantage gained by technological super io r i t y was not

eas i l y brought t o bear i n the Ind ian campaigns. The ra i l r oad and i t s

complementary system, the telegraph, f a c i l i t a t e d m i l i t a r y campaigning,

but "those mi les away from the ra i l r oad were s t i l l horseback

miles. " ' 6 The area t h a t was the predominant region o f operations was

on the f r inges o f " c i v i l i z a t i o n " , not eas i l y inf luenced by the

explosion o f technology dur ing the 19th century. Mob i l i t y o f men and

supplies i n the t a c t i c a l sense s t i l l r e l i e d upon foo t and horse.

Army firepower d i d not enjoy an advantage over the Indian on

the t a c t i c a l b a t t l e f i e l d . While the cavalry had abandoned the

repeating carbine i n the ear ly 1870's i n favor o f a s ing le shot breach

loader, the Indian favored the repeaters when they could be acqcired.

The t a c t i c a l e f f e c t o f t h i s improved weaponry was the same i n the

Indian campaigns as it had been i n the C i v i l War--the r e l a t i v e

advantage o f the t a c t i c a l defense. I n f a c t the Indian, because o f h i s

long standing unconventional s t y l e o f warfare, adapted t o the impact of

the "modern" r i f l e much f as te r than did the army. With s u f f i c i e n t

quan t i t i es o f breachloaders, the Indian had rendered the charge

i ne f f ec t i ve unless t h e element o f suprise was achieved t o a s u f f i c i e n t

degree. As h i s t o r i an , Thomas W . Dunlay describes:

I n t h e 1870s the army increasingly fought against enemies who could not be seen; only the smoke and f l a s h o f the concealed Ind ian 's gun indicated h i s presence. Th i s was a major'reason f o r the surpr ise at tacks on Indian camps; i t was the only way the so ld ie rs could make a dec is ive a t tack a t a11.17

The f o r t system was not the preferred means o f operation by the

army. The predominant view was t h a t the piecemeal a l l oca t i on o f troops

resulted from both the l im i ted s i ze o f t h e army and t h e p o l i t i c a l

demands placed on i t . The system was seen as a detriment t o dec is ive

act ion against the Indian, and because o f i t s p o l i t i c a l and economic

mot ivat ion, i t precluded the army from tak ing a more o f fens ive ro le

against the Indian. General Sheridan remarked:

The f a c t t h a t our army i s so small adds great ly t o i t s expense, f o r whenever i t becomes neccessary t o use a force o f any magnitude whatever against the Indians, we are compelled t o send troops by r a i l o r steamboat from a large number o f small posts, t o enable us t o take the f i e l d w i t h any prospect o f success, and t h e cost o f t ranspor ta t ion incurred by these concentrations becomes a serious item i n our annual expenditures. Our f r o n t i e r i s so extensive t h a t f o r the present we are compelled t o adhere t o a system o f small posts, though i t i s both inconvenient and c o s t l y . ' @

The a l t e rna t i ve being proposed by some w i t h i n the army was the

abandonment o f a large number o f the smaller f o r t s and the

consol idat ion of the bulk of the army's combat troops a t a few !arge

posts. Th is a l t e rna t i ve was not given serious weight u n t i l 1879-1380,

because the ra i l road network i n the west had not been developed

s u f f i c i e n t l y t o support the rapid movements o f these " f l y i n g columns."

Major General John Pope, commander o f the Department o f the Missouri

from 1870 t o 1883, was a supporter o f t h i s proposal. He remarked:

The abandonment o f many o f the small posts, and t h e i r consolidation w i th la rger posts, I have recommended so of ten tha t Icontent myself now w i th saying tha t every year which passes more and more makes apparent the good pol icy , i n every view, o f dispensing w i th the small posts, and concentrating troops i n large garrisons. Economy and e f f i c iency o f the m i l i t a r y forces i n t h i s department would be g rea t l y promoted by such a system, and Iagain respect fu l ly i n v i t e a t ten t ion t o my previous' recommendations on t h i s subject.17

By the outbreak o f the Ute upr is ing i n 1879, the army had a

wel l defined approach t o the doct r ine o f Indian campaigning. The

adoption o f General Pope's proposal was s t i l l forthc$ing, and the

central issues became when t o s t r i k e the hos t i l es and how t o

concentrate s u f f i c i e n t combat power t o defeat them. The employment o f

the bulk o f the army i n the western theater as t r ide ra i l r oad l i nes

became the answer t o the l a t t e r question. The question o f the optimum

t iming o f a campaign was answered through a process C f t r i a l and er ror .

A winter campaign was seen as the best means t o subdue the

Indians. This denoted a change i n the conduct o f campaigning from the

pre-Civi l War era i n the west, and was brought about by the expansion

o f the ra i l r oad i n support operations, and the common experiences o f

the o f f i c e r s who became the senior leaders i n i t s aftermath. O f the

d iv is iona l and departmental commanders i n the west i n 1866, only one

had previous command experience i n the theater--General P h i l i p S t .

George Ccoke--and he was re l ieved fol lowing the Fetterman massacre i n

December o f t ha t year.18

The capab i l i t i es o f a modern f i e l d army developed during the

C i v i l War were i n s tark contrast t o previous army operations on the

f r on t i e r . H is tor ian Paul A. Hutton describes the experiences o f

General Sheridan:

Sheridan's f i r s t campaign against the Indians was a pathet ic a f f a i r . A detachment o f 350 regular troops and a regiment o f Oregon mounted volunteers was dispatched under the command o f Major Gabriel Rains i n October 1855 against the Yakimas. Although the campaign gave Sheridan h i s f i r s t look a t warr iors massed f o r batt le--"a scene o f picturesque barbarism, fasc inat ing but replusiveU-- i t yielded no results...Winter snows ended the campaign, and the o f f i c e r ' s conversations qu ick ly degenerated i n t o recriminations about who was t o blame f o r the fai lure.19

The lessons o f the C i v i l War were not l o s t on the army leaders

i n i t s aftermath. Before the C i v i l War, the focus had been exclusively

on the destruct ion o f the opposing m i l i t a r y forces. Later, a s h i f t

occurred which incorporated a l l war-making po ten t ia l by an enemy i n t o

the process. The expansion o f the scope o f warfare would be evident on

the p la ins o f the west, and the C i v i l War would be used as precedent

f o r a t o t a l war. War became more than a contest between opposing armed

forces - it encompassed the soc ie t ies t h a t found themselves a t

opposition. The nature o f the opposit ion l e f t the Army l i t t l e

a l te rna t i ve i n a struggle between two divergent cul tures.

Army leadership was determined t o f i n d an answer t o the Indian

problem. I t ' s very raison d 'e t re hung i n the balance, and the answer

must not r e l y on the adoption o f Indian methods. Instead, the army

must adopt methods t h a t were i n keeping w i th the u t i l i z a t i o n o f

decis ive m i l i t a r y force as the primary instrument o f national power.

The army had t o f i n d the answer t o the Indian problem as a means t o

j u s t i f y i t ' s own existence. As Thomas W. Dunlay describes:

I n a period when the army believed tha t it was being starved by the Congress and ignored o r scorned by the nation, the suggestion t h a t it could not cope w i th the Indians without Indian a id was especial ly repugnant. Of f i ce rs wanted t o bel ieve tha t they and t h e i r men d id t h e i r best and were the best

sold iers possible under the circumstances. They might dress l i k e cowboys o r mule skinners i n the f i e l d ...,but they took p r ide i n the uniform and i n t h e i r regiments. It was pa in fu l , therefore, t o hear suggestions tha t they could not ccpe w i th savages.?O

It i s an oft-heard remark i n the modern army t h a t the characte:?

o f a u n i t i s a re f l ec t i on o f the personal i ty o f i t s commander. The

Indian f i g h t i n g army may not have re f lected the personal i t ies o f the

senior commanders, but the po l i c i es and t a c t i c s w i t h i n the respective

d iv is ions and departments ce r ta in l y did. By 1879, the major players,

Sheridan, Pope, and Crook were wel l tested by the r i go rs o f Indian

campaigns. Their views on the m i l i t a r y so lu t ion t o the Indian r i d d l e

rested on the spread o f s e t t l e r s and the use o f "modern" technology.

As one commander commented, "as experience o f l a t e years, has most

conclusively shown t h a t o u r cavalry cannot cope w i th the Indian man t o

man."??

The f a i l u r e o f the army t o achieve a decis ive v i c to ry i n the

campaigns against the major Plains t r i b e s had dr iven the senior

leadership i n t o seeking solace i n the f a m i l i a r glow o f technology and

organization. The army found new coif idence i n the modern appliances

o f war and saw i n them a means t o counteract the t a c t i c a l accumen o f

the Indian. A f te r l i s t e n i n g t o a l i t a n y o f the inherent advantages o f

the Ind ian warr ior , General Nelson A. Mi les remarked, "though a l l t ha t

said about t h e i r ski11 and enterpr ise and energy was true, yet w i th our

superior in te l l i gence and modern appliances we ought and would be able

t o counteract, equal, o r surpass a l l the advantages pcssessed by the

savages. "23

Grand Strategy had evolved i n the minds o f the senior

cnmmanders by the i n i t i a t i o n o f the 1879 campaigns. The combination o f

50

the winter campaign and large converging columns as a means t o achieve

the decis ive b a t t l e w i th the Indian had been inval idated by the army's

f a i l u r e i n the Great Sioux War. Ul t imately, success was due t o a

change t h a t brought about re lent less pressure on the Sioux, t h r 7LUSU the-I-

appl icat ion o f harassing tac t i cs .

While, the army had been outmaneuvered i n i t s only attempt a t a

conventional campaign, it retained both the winter campaign and the

converging columns as means t o i n i t i a t e the appl icat ion o f ruthless

unceasing pressure on any offending Indian bands. As Sheridan reported

t o Sherman, "Ihave never looked on any decis ive b a t t l e w i th these

Indians as a settlement o f the trouble...Indians do not f i g h t such

bat t les ; they only f i g h t bo ld ly when they have the advantage, as i n the

Custer case, o r t o cover the movement o f t h e i r women and ch i ldren as i n

the case o f Crook, but Indians have scarcely ever been punished unless

by t h e i r own mode o f warfare o r t a c t i c s and s tea l ing on t h e m w z 4

Success depended on a new operational paradigm consist ing o f the

ccmbination o f the ra i l road, organization, and the appl icat ion o f

steady, d isc ip l ined pursui t .

The nature o f campaigning changed i n the aftermath o f the Sioux

War. The Indian was on the operational defensive, never able t o f i e l d

a force i n s u f f i c i e n t numbers t o challenge the atmy. The advance o f

the western f r o n t i e r meant the army found i t s e l f occupying f o r t s which

ringed the d i f f e r e n t reservations, prepared t o respond t o any

outbreaks. As Sheridan stated i n 1879, "Indian troubles t h a t w i l l

hereafter occur w i l l be those which a r i se upon the d i f f e r e n t Indian

reservations o r from attempts made t o reduce the number and size o f

these reservations, by the concentration o f the Indian tr ibes."Z5

51

Thus, the execution of army strategy in support of national

objectives was often colored by the central army figures on the scene.

The three central commanders involved in the Ute War are interesting

studies, both in their similarities as well as their differences. The

conduct of campaigning and army execution of policy in the west was

perhaps more representative of its leaders' personalities than any

doctrine or official policy.

In March 1869, Phillip H. Sheridan was appointed Lieutenant

General, commanding the Military Division of the Missouri. His views

on the Indian problem were similar to those of General Sherman. At

times, he appeared sympathetic to the plight of the Indian in the face

of expanding civilization, but he, like Sherman, held the view that the

Indian was doomed as an inferior culture. He was a supporter of the

reservation system and a strong advocate for the return of the

management of Indian affairs to the army. As he stated, "I have the

interest of the Indian at heart as much as anyone, and sympathize with

his fading race, but many years of experiences have taught me that to

civilize and Christianize the wild Indian it is not only necessary to

put him on Reservations but it is also necessary to exercise some

strong authority over him."z8

Sheridan's conduct of campaigning was shaped from experiences

in the Civil War and lessons learned in the field against the Indian.

During his tenure as Divisional Commander, he had conducted 'uccessful

campaigns against the Cheyennes (1868-1869) and the Comanches in the

Red River War (1874-1875). He believed earlier failures to subdue the

Indian were due to a preoccupation with humanitarian concerns.

Sheridan made no moral judgements of the policy that, in his opinion,

52

had predetermined cpen war w i th the t r ibes . He reported t o General

Sherman:

I n tak ing the offensive, Ihave t o se lect t h a t season when I can catch the fiends; and i f a v i l l a g e i s attacked and women and ch i ldren k i l l e d , the respons ib i l i t y i s not w i t h the so ld iers but w i t h the people whose crimes necessitated the attack. During the war d i d any one hes i ta te t o attack a v i l l a g e o r town occupied by the enemy because women and ch i ldren were w i th in i t s l i m i t s ? Did we cease t o throw she l l s i n t o Vicksburg o r At lanta because women and ch i ldren were there?"

As previously stated, Sheridan bel ieved t h a t the nature o f the

Indian wars had changed by 1879. The requirement f o r tak ing the f i e l d

i n of fensive operations had ended w i th the destruct ion o f the "great"

Plains t r i bes . Maintenance o f army forces along the ra i l road,

posit ioned t o counter Indian incursions o f f reservations would be

the required remedy.

Sheridan's two p r i nc ip le subordinates, Generals Crook and Pope,

were marked i n t h e i r contrast ing s t y l es o f command. Both were

experienced " Indian f igh te rs " and veteran army p o l i t i c a l animals dho

cu l t i va ted p o l i t i c a l favors and supporters. They possessed d i f f e r e n t

views on the respons ib i l i t y o f a Departmental commander during the

conduct o f a campaign, but t o a large degree Pope and Crook shared

s im i la r perceptions and sought the same goals. Unlike Sherman and

Sheridan, both are remembered as "humanitarian soldiers", moved by the

p l i g h t o f the Indian, but compelled t o deal w i t h the problems they

presented. Whether they were t r u l y compassionate, o r were using t h i s

image t o ~ a i n support among eastern po l i t i c i ans , i s cpen t o

discussion. Certainly, they never of fered a l te rna t i ve po l i c i es and i n

the conduct o f operations ne i ther i n s t i t u t e d t a c t i c a l changes tha t

would r e f l e c t a higher leve l o f s e n s i t i v i t y t o the Indian. Their

opinions captured the imagination o f the eastern press and won both me!:

admirers among philanthrophic groups and humanitarians.

Crook i s o f ten denoted as one o f the most e f f ec t i ve f i e l d

commanders the army had dur ing the period, and as a " re luctant"

warr ior , who was wel l respected by the Indian.28 H is so ld iers tended

t o view Crook as a p u b l i c i t y hungry leader, more concerned w i th h i s

image than f i g h t i n g Indians. A so ld ie rs d i t t y t h a t was popular i n

Crooks command went:

I ' d l i k e t o be a packer, And pack w i th George F. Crook

And dressed up i n my canvas s u i t To be f o r him mistook.

I ' d b ra id my beard i n two long t a i l s , And i d l e a l l the day

I n w h i t t l i n g s t i cks and wondering What the New York papers say.29

General Pope was equal ly concerned o f h i s publ ic image, but d i d

not c u l t i v a t e the image o f an ac t i ve f i e l d commander. Pope preferred

t o remain a t h i s departmental heaquarters o r a t a locat ion t ha t

afforded him the use o f both the ra i l r oad and telegraph. His command

method put him i n the pos i t ion t o monitor operations from a fa r whi le

maintaining contact w i t h superiors and eastern p o l i t i c a l acquaintances.

The three commanders were not working a t cross purposes, but

each conducted operations w i th in the context o f t h e i r own personal

motivations. This s i t ua t i on was charac te r i s t i c o f o f f i c e r s throughout

t h i s period, and the remnants o f it s t i l l can be seen i n the current

American a rm~ .~ " l l three generals pract iced the mechanical

aspects o f Indian warfare i n the manner which characterized army

operations and tac t i cs ; re l iance on technology, use o f converging

columns, w in ter campaigns, a " t o t a l war" devoid of ru les o f engagement

or r es t r i c t i ons on e i t he r s ide.

The o r i g i n s and conduct o f warfare o f the Ute t r i b e , as viewed

by i t s members, are summarized i n the legend 3 f t h e i r c reat ion:

Once there were no people i n any part o f t h e world. Sinawaf, the c rea to r , began t o cut s t i c k s and place them i n a large bag. Th is went on f o r some t ime u n t i l , f i n a l l y , Coyote's [ a f i g u r e representing e v i l o r troublemaker] c u r i o s i t y could stand the suspense no longer. One day wh i l e Sinawaf was away Coyote opened t h e bag. Many people came ou t , a l l o f them speaking d i f e ren t languages, and scat ter ing i n every d i r ec t i on . When Sinawaf returned there were but a few people l e f t . He was angry w i t h Coyote, f o r he had planned t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e people equal ly i n t h e land. The resu l t o f unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n caused by Coyote would be war between the d i f f e r e n t peoples, each t r y i n g t o gain land from h i s neighbor. O f a l l t he people remaining i n the bag, Sinawaf sa id , u t h i s small t r i b e sha l l be Ute but they w i l l be very brave and able t o defeat the res t . "J '

For centur ies the Utes were successful i n defending t h e i r

mountain bast ion, wh i l e ranging t o the east and south on forays f o r

horses and game. The a r r i v a l o f the American army on the Ute range was

not a t f i r s t a cause f o r great concern among the t r i b e . Ey the 19th

century, the Utes had been very successful i n f i g h t i n g European s t y l e

armies. Since t h e expansion o f the Spainish empire i n t o the southwest,

the Utes had proven adept a t mobile warfare i n d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n .

The occupation o f New Mexico by Spain i n 1598, began the

"golden era" i n the Utes' h i s to ry because o f the horse. As w i t h other

Plains t r i b e s , The Utes' cu l t u re experienced a s i g n i f i c a n t change

through the acqu is i t i on of the horse from the Spaniards. The rapid

adaptation o f the horse yreat1.y increased mobi l ty and expanded the

hunting range of the Utes. Hunters could now leave the mountains and

re turn w i t h s u f f i c i e n t bu f fa lo meat and skins t o maintain themselves

throughout the win ter . The creat ion o f an economic surplus through

more e f f i c i e n t hunting made it possible f o r scattered fami ly groups t o

form larger bands under more central ized leadership.3'

From 1838, wi th the establishment o f Bents For t along the banks

o f the South P la t t e River, the Utes had regular contact w i th "American"

cul ture. The general lack o f problems between the Ute t r i b e and the

expanding f r o n t i e r derived from t h e i r unique geographic posi t ion. The

Utes benef i t ted from the f a c t tha t the large immigrant t r a i l s and

e f f o r t s o f the transcontinental ra i l road sk i r t ed t h e i r mountain home.

The one po in t o f f r i c t i o n between white and Ute cu l tures or ig inated

w i th the movement o f s e t t l e r s from New Mexico i n t o the San Luis Yalley

i n south central Colorado. The army was quick t o respond by

estab l ish ing For t Massachusetts i n 1852 ( l a t e r relocated and renamed

For t Garland i n 1858). The s i x fami l ies t h a t founded the pioneer

Colorado town o f San Luis i n 1851 were immigrants from New Mexico, who

had only become American c i t i zens three years e a r l i e r through the

Treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo.

For t Garland remained a c r i t i c a l locat ion i n the re la t ionship

between the Utes and the army u n t i l the u l t imate removal o f the t r i b e

from the area i n 1883. It was garrisoned throughout the per iod by a

combination o f regular army and Colorado m i l i t i a . The post acted as a

"leadership laboratory" f o r fu tu re Ute warr iors as they observed and

served w i th the army i n campaigns against the Navajo, Sioux, and

Cheyenne. As it wasdescribed i n 1870:

Eight thousand fee t above sea-level, a t the foo t o f snow-covered mountains, towering s i x thousand fee t higher, on the western slope o f the Rocky Mountain Range, i n about 106 longitude and 37 l a t i tude , a f avo r i t e range f o r the indomitable Utes, and a f avo r i t e haunt f o r e lk, deer, bear, panther, and beaver, d i f f i c u l t t o access from near ly a l l d i rec t ions - For t Garland, Colorado, though the po in t o f strength and the protect ing

0Denver

:: HUNTING , RANGE

UTE:AREA AT TIME OF 1806 PIKE MP~DIWON (Adabptedfmm Smilh, Ethnography of ihcr Utes)

Flgutls 4

hope o f many a small settlement and iso la ted rancho f l ou r i sh ing on those sweet t r o u t streams, the Trinchero and Sangre de Cristo, has eminent r i g h t s t i l l t o be ca l led a f r o n t i e r post.33

Ear ly i n the re la t ionship between the United States and the

Utes, the Ute t r i b e seemed t o rea l i ze the f u t i l i t y o f act ive

resistance, and instead sought t o adopt a po l i cy o f negotiat ion. TWO

campaigns were conducted against the Utes i n Colorado--the Ute war o f

1854-1855 and the Ute war o f 1879. The f i r s t began on 25 December,

1854, when a small band o f Mouache Utes, under the leadership o f Tierra

Blanca, k i l l e d four trappers. The army gathered a force o f 12

companies o f regulars and m i l i t i a a t For t Garland t o pursue the Utes,

but qu ick ly came t o the conclusion t h a t winter i s not the optimum

season f o r active'campaigning i n the Rockies. The s ize o f the force

'impressed the Utes, who had avoided contact w i t h the troops by melt ing

away i n t o the mountains.

A peace was negotiated i n the f a l l o f 1855, wi th two

consequences t h a t would shape the Ute perception o f the army i n the

future. F i r s t , whi le the army could not penetrate the Ute mountain

range i n the winter, the continual pressure the a n y exerted on the

Utes f o r nine months made a l a s t i n g impression. Second, a young

observer o f the c o n f l i c t was Ouray, who would become ch ie f o f the Utes

and would shape Ute po l i cy u n t i l h i s death i n 1880. Ouray, who was as

p o l i t i c a l l y adept as many o f Colorado's elected leaders, seems ear ly on

t o have recognized the inev i tab le , and sought t o delay the loss o f Ute

lands through a l l i m c e w i th the "whites" and s k i l l f u l negotiat ion.

Ouray i s quoted as saying:

I rea l i ze the u l t jmate destiny o f my people. They w i l l be ext i rpated by the race t h a t overruns, occupies and holds our hunting grounds, whose numbers and force, w i th the

58

government and m i l l i o n s behind it w i l l i n a feu years remove the l a s t t race o f our blood tha t now remains. We sha l l f a l l as the leaves frcm the trees when f r o s t o r winter comes and the lands which we have roamed over f o r countless generations w i l l be given over t o the miner and the plowshare. I n place o f our humble tepees, the "white man's" towns and c i t i e s w i l l appear and we sha l l be buried out o f s igh t beneath the avalanche o f the new c i v i l i z a t i o n . This i s the destiny o f my people. My par t i s t o protect them and yours as f a r as Ican, frcm the violence and bloodshed whi le Il i v e , and t o b r ing both i n t o f r i end l y re la t ions, so t h a t they may be a t peace w i th one an0ther.3~

Relations between the Utes and "whites" p r i o r t o the War o f

1879 were remarkable i n the res t ra in t shown on both sides. I n

reviewing records o f army actions from 1860-1879 i n Colorado, no

incidents invo lv ing the Utes were recorded.35 Indeed, the focus o f

army act ion i n Colorado was against t r a d i t i o n a l enemies o f the Utes.

The Utes proved a steady a l l y f o r the army dur ing t h i s period,

providing men t o serve as scouts and a u x i l i a r i e s against other t r i b e s

on the p la ins and t o the south against the A p a c h e ~ . ~ ~

The Ute warr ior was a valued addi t ion t o any army expedition.

He prided himself on two things: marksmanship and horsemanship. Ute

cul ture, perhaps because o f the h igh ly defensible nature o f t h e i r home

te r ra in , emphasized the a b i l i t y o f the sniper and never developed the

concept Of "counting coup" o r hand-to-hand combat l i k e the Plains

t r ibes. The wealth o f a man was measured by the number and qua l i t y o f

h i s horses, but h i s worth as a warr ior was i n h i s marksmanship.37

The primary armament o f the Ute by 1879, were the Henry o r Winchester

repeater, vhich were e f f ec t i ve f o r hcnting i n the mountains, vhere

volume o f f i r e i s more useful than range i n the broken te r ra in . The

Utes were very pragmatic about the conduct o f warfare. The pract ice by

other t r i b e s o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g war honors (i.e., tak ing scalps) was

not followed. The tak ing o f horses o r prisoners was a matter o f

expediency, but standing f i g h t s were ab jec t l y avoided. Among Indian

enemies the Ute had a reputat ion as a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t adversary

t o k i l l . The army would have t o learn the same lesson on i t s own.

As it served w i th the army, the Ute t r i b e gained an

appreciat ion o f the strengths and weaknesses o f the army and o f

government pol icy. The massacre a t Sand Creek i n 1864 and the winter

campaign o f 1868 against the Cheyenne, would t o a large degree serve as

the framework i n which the Utes would understand the th rea t t o t h e i r

t r i be . The Utes sought t o avoid s im i l a r resu l ts through negot iat ion

and t reaty .

The success o f the Utes' po l i cy o f negot iat ion was determined

by the "boom o r bust" economic cycle t ha t characterized Colorado as a

t e r r i t o r y and i n the ear ly years o f statehood. The rev is ion o f

ex i s t i ng agreements corresponded w i th each newly discovered mineral

bonanza on Ute cont ro l led t e r r i t o r y . The Ute view o f t h i s a c t i v i t y was

an acceptance o f prospectors and miners, w i t h va in attempts t o l i m i t

the development o f permanent communities and farms. They were

unprepared f o r the onslaught t h a t would fo l low the discovery o f

precious minerals.

The discovery o f gold a t Cr ipple Creek and a t Cherry Creek i n

1859, would br ing about the f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n o f Ute lands by the

federal government. The end o f the C i v i l War brought gold seekers and

s e t t l e r s t o Colorado a t an unprecedented rate. The federal government,

u t i l ' i z i n g the special re la t ionship t ha t K i t Carson held w i t h the t r i b e ,

negotiated a t r ea ty i n 1868 t h a t guaranteed the Utes an area o f

approximately 16,000,000 acres and "was binding and f i n a l forever."

60

0 Cheyenne

..............................

UTE TERMTORY . i

0Santa Fe I TREATY OF 1868

(Aclaptd imm Marsh. Paople of the Shining Mountain) Fiiuve 5

The federal government designated Ouray as the primary Ute Chief, which

served t o consolidate h i s pos i t ion w i t h in the t r i be .

"Forever" ar r ived e a r l i e r than ant ic ipated by the Utes. By

1872, the discovery o f s i l v e r i n the San Juan mountains o f southwest.ern

Colorado added new impetus t o revise the 1868 agreement. The Coloradc

delegation t o congress complained t h a t t h i s vast amount o f land was

under u t i l i z e d by the' lazy Ute people. Ourdy, a t a meeting o f the

McCook ~ o i n i s s i o n stated, "We work as hard as you do. Did you ever t r y

skinning a buffalo?"39

I n 1873 the Brunot Treaty was signed, which cut the San Juan

region from the Ute lands. The area t h a t the Utes cont ro l led was s t i l l

impressive - over 11,000,000 acres f o r a t o t a l population estimated a t

between four and s i x thousand. Ouray was disappointed by the continue!!

reduction o f Ute t e r r i t o r y , but h i s t r i b e was f a r i n g be t te r than most

i n t h e i r attempts t o stave o f f complete destruction. The federa!

government had intervened twice on behalf o f the Utes, sending trccps

t o remove miners who weke i n v i o l a t i o n o f the t reaty .

The strategy o f negot iat ion and a l l i ance w i th the army was

working f o r the time being. But by 1879 the destruct ion o f the major

Indian opponents t o the federal government and the continued pressures

o f Coloradc settlement and industry would unhinge the Ute strategy.

The power o f the combined federal and s ta te governments would be soon

brought t o bear on the Utes w i th t e l l i n g e f fec t .

0 Cheyenne

w e - - - - - - - - - - I I I I I 0Denver

U7T I 1

TERRITORY I8 0Colo 8pgs

I I I I

I I I I 0Fort , Garland

0saniol Fe

BRUNOTTREATY OF 1873 (Adapted from Sprague, Me8iiarcre)

Piure 6

ENDNOTES

1. George MacDonald Fraser, Flashman and the Redskins (New York: Plume Books, 19831, 350.

2. Michael Howard, The Causes o f War (Cambridge: Harvard Universi ty Press,1983), 196.

3. Edward M. Coffman, The Old Armv: A P o r t r a i t o f the American Armv i n Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford Univers i ty Press, 19861, 254.

4. Arthur P. Wade, "The M i l i t a r y Command Structure: The Great Plains, 1853-1891," Journal o f the West 15 (Ju ly 1976): 7.

5. Ib id. , 9.

6. Ib id. , 14-15.

7. Paul Andrew Hutton, Ph i l Sheridan and h i s Army (Lincoln: Univers i ty o f Nebraska Press, 19851, 29.

8. Wade, The M i l i t a r y Command Structure, 20.

9. Hutton, P h i l Sheridan and h i s Army, 121.

10. Ib id. , 120.

11. Ib id. , 120-121.

12. War Department, "Report o f Lieutenant-General Sheridan," i n Annual Reoort o f the Secretarv o f War (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Of f ice, 18791, 42.

13. War Department, "Report o f Lieutenant-General Sheridan," i n Annual Reoort o f the Secretary o f War (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Of f ice, 18801, 53.

14. Robert W. Frazer, Forts o f the West: M i l i t a r y Forts and Presidios and Posts Commonly Called Forts West o f the Mississiooi River t o 1898 (Norman: Univers i ty o f Oklahoma Press, 19651, 186.

15. Sheridan, Annual Re~ot-t o f the Secretarv o f War (18801, 53.

15. Thomas W. Dunlay, Wolves f o r the Blue Soldier?.: Indian Scouts and Aux i l i a r i es w i t h the United States Armv, 1860-90 (Lincoln: Univers i ty o f Nebraska Press, 19821, 71.

17. Ib id. , 73.

18. War Department, "Report o f General John Pope," Anncal Report o f the Secretary o f War (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Of f ice,

18801, 92.

19. Wade, The M i l i t a r v Command Structure, 20.

20. Hutton, Ph i l Sheridan and h i s Armv, 8.

21. Dunlay, Wolves f o r the Blue Soldiers, 66.

22. Thomas C. Leonard, "The Relutant Conquerors," American Heritaae 27 (August 1976): 36.

23. Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations o f General Nelson A. Miles, Val. 2 (Lincoln: Univers i ty o f Nebraska Press, 19921, 481.

24. Paul Andrew Hutton, "Ph i l i p H. Sheridan," Soldiers West: B iogra~h ies from the M i l i t a r v Front ier (Lincoln: Univers i ty o f Nebraska Press, 1987), 92.

25. Ib id. , 93.

26. Ib id . , 85.

27. I b i d . , 87.

28. Revis ion is t h is to r ians a t t r i b u t e the favorable view o f Crook t o the adoption o f h i s biography by h i s long-standing adjutant as the d e f i n i t i v e work on the subject. John G. Bourke, On the Border w i th Crook (Lincoln: Univers i ty o f Nebraska Press, 1971).

29. James T. King, "Needed: A Re-evaluation o f General George Crook," Nebraska His tory Magazine 65 (September 1964): 229.

30. The curry ing o f p o l i t i c a l favor was a continuation o f a t r a d i t i o n t ha t reached i t s peak during the C i v i l War. I n 1879, Crook held the u l t imate p o l i t i c a l trump card as President Hayes had served under him i n the C i v i l War. Hayes reputedly had a p o r t r a i t o f Crook hanging i n h i s o f f i c e i n the White House. Coffman i n The Old Army provides an excel lent survey o f t h i s phenomenon.

31. Jan P e t t i t , Utes: The Mountain People (Boulder: Johnson Bcoks, 1990), 5.

32. Carl Abbott, Stephen 2. Leonard, David McComb, color ad:^: A History o f the Centennial State (Boulder: Universi ty Press o f Colorado, 19821, 26.

34. P. David Smith, Ouray: Chief o f the Utes (Sal t Lake City: Wayfinder Press, 1966), 12-13. Although, Ouray was an a r t i c u l a t e spokesman f o r h i s t r i b e these words are probably the work o f an easterii news reporter. T!ie quote captures Ouray's philosophy, but t!?e languags i s too flowery t o be d i r e c t l y a t t r i bu ted t o Ouray. Ouray ras a masterful p o l i t i c i a n and rea l ized t h a t the Indian had a large sympathetic audience i n the east. During h i s three t r i p s t o Washington, D.C., he ac t i ve ly sought t o b r ing the issues a t hand i n t o the pub l i c eye.

35. George W. Webb, Chronoloaical L i s t o f Engagements between the Regular A n v o f the United States and Various Tr ibes o f Hos t i le Indian:$ which Occurred dur ing the Years, 1790-1898, Inc lus ive (St Joseph: Wing P r i n t i ng and Publishing Company, 1939). 21-90.

36. Dunlay, Wolves f o r the Blue Soldiers, 89-90,162.

37. Anne M. Smith, Ethnograehv o f the Northern Utes (Albuqcerque: Museum o f New Mexico Press, 19741, 237.

38. Charles S. Marsh, P e o ~ l eo f the Shining Mountains (Boulder: Pruett Publishing, 1926), 68.

39. V i r g i n i a I r v i n g Armstrong, ed., IHave S~oken: American His tory Through the Voices o f the Indians (Chicago: Swallow Press, 19711, 96.

CHAPTER 4

MASSACRE AND BATTLE

Ei ther they [ the Utes] o r we go, and we are not going. Humanitarianism i s an idea. Western empire i s an inexorable fact . He who gets i n the way o f i t w i l l be crushed.'

Early i n 1879, an e d i t o r i a l i n the Denver Times stated what had

become obvious t o most "white" Colorado residents. Since the 1873

Brunot Treaty, pressure had continued t o mount f o r the removal o f the

Utes from Colorado. Within the state, the publ icat ion o f Hayden's

a t l as o f 1877 demonstrated t h a t a large por t ion o f land was s t i l l

cont ro l led by a "non-producing, semi-barbarous people."? Outside

Colorado, Eastern humanitarians held o f f l eg i s l a t i on introduced by the

Colorado delegation t o Congress i n 1878, which was designed t o f o r c i b l y

remove the Utes from the s ta te t o the Indian Ter r i to ry . The Utes had

not yet provided the grounds f o r m i l i t a r y act ion against them.

The spark t h a t would provoke the war was provided by the Ute

agent, Nathan C. Meeker. I n March 1878, Meeker was appointed as the

agent t o the White River Agency i n northwestern Colorado. Meeker saw

the appointment t o the agency as an opportunity t o continue h i s version

o f soc ia l engineering. A deeply re l ig ious man, Meeker was determined

t o pursue h i s v is ion f o r ass imi la t ion o f the Utes, i n t o White society

through force i f neccessary. As Colorado Governor P i t k i n would l a t e r

state, "A purer and be t te r man than Meeker was never appointed t o an

Indian agency." As an afterthought he added, "He d id not understand

Indians su f f i c i en t l y . "3

Meeker sought t o transform h i s agency overnight. He saw

agr icu l tu re as the means t o Ute sel f -suf f ic iency. He proposed plowing

grassland t o convert t o farmland, although t h i s made no sense t o a

cu l tu re t ha t measured wealth i n horses. Despite strong resistance t o

h i s methods, Meeker remained ever hopeful. He reported i n Ju ly o f 1878:

These Ute Indians are peacable, respecters o f the r i g h t o f property, and w i th few exceptions amiable and prepossessing i n appearance. There are no quarrelsome outbreaks, no robberies, and perhaps not a h a l f dozen who p i l f e r , and these are wel l known...On the whole, t h i s agent i s impressed w i th the idea t h a t i f the proper methods can be h i t upon they can be made t o develop many useful and manly q u a l i t i e s and be elevated t o a s ta te o f absolute independence.4

Despite Meeker's i n i t i a l favorable view, other elements i n the

s ta te were opposed t o mediation w i th the Utes. Beginning i n 1877, the

Department o f the Missouri had been caught up i n t h i s increasing

pressure between the cultures. I n August 1877, c i t i zens pet i t ioned

General Pope t o s ta t i on a company o f cavalry permanently i n the' area o f

Middle Park t o cont ro l the Utes, "bel ieving t roub le w i l l surely be

averted thereby."= Pope d id send troops i n the summer o f 1879-0

Company, 9 th Cavalry-with mixed resul ts.

A t length General John Pope sent a s ing le company o f colored cavalry t o scout i n the Middle Park. Now i f there i s anything on the face o f the ear th t h a t an Indian hates above another it i s a negro, and especia l ly a nigger soldier. Therefore, t h i s movement, instead o f qu ie t ing t h e i r h o s t i l i t y , merely inflamed i t . 6

Pope's e f f o r t s t o defuse the growing c r i s i s went large ly

unappreciated i n the r a c i s t environment o f the times. I n the meantime

he found an un l i ke l y a l l y f o r h i s idea o f consolidating the Utes under

the cont ro l o f the army. P r i o r t o the outbreak o f open h o s t i l i t i e s ,

the army had received support from the Indian Bureau i n t h e i r e f f o r t t o

consolidate the t r i b e s t o f a c i l i t a t e cont ro l by the m i l i t a r y . i n the

case o f the Utes, the Indian Bureau supported moving them t o the Indian

Terr i tory , i n i t s annual report o f 1878. This proposal re f lec ted the

need t o cen t ra l i ze the management o f the d i f f e r e n t t r ibes , i n order t o

be t te r provide a t least the minimum amount o f subsistence t o the

t r ibes . The Utes presented a pa r t i cu la r l y thorny problem because the

mountainous nature o f the t e r r a i n they occupied. The White River

Agency was only accessable two months out o f the year by teamster

wagon. The Indian Bureau presented i t s desire t o relocate the t r i b e as

a matter o f m i l i t a r y expediency. Commissioner Ezra A. Hayt stated:

The reason Ifavored it [ t ransfer o f Utes t o Indian Te r r i t o r y ] i s t h i s : The Indian Te r r i t o r y has enough f e r t i l e land t o enable those Indians t o s e t t l e down comfortably. It has a superabundance o f f e r t i l e land. Again, the country i s not broken, ridged, and labyr in th ine l i k e t h i s region i n Colorado; i t i s a country where the Army could use a r t i l l e r y ; and wherever our troops can use a r t i l l e r y the Indians know very wel l t h a t it i s useless f o r them t o go upon the warpath, so tha t , as a defensive measure, Ith ink i t would be wise t o take them out o f t h e i r for t resses and put them where they w i l l be less formidable...I th ink, then, i f we wish t o avoid expensive wars and t o save the l i v e s o f our soldiers, it i s very desirable t o put these Indians out o f t h e i r for t resses i n Colorado."7

On February 4, 1878, the Colorado delegation introduced the

f i r s t o f three b i l l s designed t o remove the Utes t o the Indian

Ter r i to ry . The b i l l s ca l led f o r the t rans fe r o f the Utes and f o r the

revocation o f any t i t l e t o the Ute lands. House Resolution 351,

introduced by Representative A.M. Scales was t yp i ca l o f the three. It

empowered the Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r t o negotiate w i th the Utes and

"estab l ish by law the extinguishment o f t i t l e t o t h e i r lands, removal

from t h e i r present locat ions and consolidation on cer ta in

reservations. "8

The locat ion o f the White River Agency was a t the end o f the

army's operational reach. While the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad had

pushed a l i n e past For t Garland t o b r ing i n mining supplies t o the San

Juan mountains, the northwestern por t ion o f the s ta te remained

untouched. Troops from For t Steele, Wyoming Ter r i to ry , w i t h i n the

Department o f the Plat te , were approximately 150 mi les from the

agency. The closest troops t o the agency, w i t h i n the s ta te and under

the cont ro l o f the Department o f the Missouri, were a t For t Garland a t

about 176 mi les distance. The army found i t s e l f i n the pos i t ion t h a t

it could both contain the Utes away from the population centers and

l i n e s o f communication w i th in the s ta te and along the Wyoming border,

but was not wel l su i ted t o cont ro l events i n the hinter land o f

Colorado. Superior operational mob i l i t y was not an advantage i f

containment was not the object ive.

The army conmand and cont ro l structure, as delineated by the

departments, may have contr ibuted t o the outbreak o f h o s t i l i t i e s . As

tensions rose and reports o f Ute v io la t ions o f the peace were reported,

c i t i zens o f northwestern and nor th cent ra l Colorado crossed the s ta te

l i n e and demanded act ion from the commander a t For t Steele--Major

Thomas T. Thornburgh. Thornburgh d id not act f o r two reasons. F i r s t ,

he viewed the Ute problem as an issue w i th in the j u r i s d i c t i o n o f the

neighboring department. Second, whi le the Ute range was p r imar i l y i n

Colorado, the Utes d id t r ave l i n Wyoming Ter r i to ry , and he had received

no reports o f problems from Wyoming ranchers. The commander o f For t

Steele s o l i c i t e d reports on Ute conduct from s e t t l e r s w i t h i n 100 miles

o f the post. A l l indicated the Utes were wel l behaved. Thornburgh

0 I I

White Rivor I

Agency I I

O ~ a n t aFa

"MEAlEF?RAILROADS: 1878 (Adaptedfrom Spmgkua, Rllass&~~rta)

Figure7

I

questioned the s tor ies, since the Utes were blamed f o r a myriad o f

problems on one side o f the border and none on the other.9

Coordination between army departments was occuring as tensions

were increasing. Meeker had sen t -a message t o Major Thornburgh on ? 7

Ju ly 1879, concerned t h a t a band o f White River Utes was heading north

on a r a i d t o acquire weapons, and t o possibly meet w i th the Sioux

host i les . . By 26 Ju ly 1879, the report had been relayed t o General Pope

a t For t Leavenworth, Kansas, from the Department o f the P la t t e

Headquarters a t For t Omaha, Mebraska.10 General Crook, Department o f

the P la t t e commander, reported t o General Sheridan on the incident:

...Major Thornburgh's report w i th these statements are forwarded herewith. From these statements it w i l l be seen: 1. That besides k i l l i n g game the Indians committed no depradati ons. 2. That the post commander o f For t Steele, Wyo., d i d not receive t imely information o f the presence of the Indians referred to. Iask a t ten t ion t o the f a c t t h a t it i s impossible f o r the

m i l i t a r y , placed as they are a t such great distances from the agencies, t o prevent Indians from leaving without author i ty , unless warning i n due time by the Ind ian au thor i t ies i s given. Nor can a post commander force them t o re turn without running the r i s k o f br ing ing on a war, f o r which he would be held accountable.

For t h i s reason the post commander i s required t o re fe r the matter t o higher m i l i t a r y author i ty, which also involves delay. Unless troops are stat ioned a t the agencies they cannot know i n time when Indians are absent by author i ty ; nor can they prevent the occurrence o f troubles, for which they are f requent ly and most un jus t l y held responsible.1'

I n addi t ion t o problems along the Colorado-Wyoming border, the

Colorado-Utah border added another fac to r i n t o the equation. The long

standing animosity between the federal government and port ions o f the

Mormon community i n Utah, had the po ten t ia l t o escalate any Ute

outbreak i n t o a more protracted insurgency. As tensions between the

Utes and the government were r i s ing , un iden t i f ied "whites" from Utah

were a r r i v i ng a t Indian camps i n c i t i n g the t r i b e t o take action.

Throughout the summer o f 1879, events and rumors on both sides

were beginning t o take on a l i f e o f t h e i r own. The unsubstantiated

s to r ies o f depradations o f whites and Indians were splashed across the

f r o n t pages o f the Colorado's d a i l y newspapers. ( f i gu re 8) The Utes

were operating under an agreement, the Brunot Treaty, t h a t had been

signed by President Grant only four years ea r l i e r . The trustees o f

t h i s agreement, the Indian Bureau, 'both a t the loca l and nat ional

levels, were openly suggesting the anullment o f the document. The

s ta te government, led by Governor P i t k i n , was c a l l i n g f o r the removal

o f the Utes.

On 5 July, 1879, Governor P i t k i n sent the fo l lowing telegram t o

Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s Ezra A. Hayt:

Reports reach me d a i l y t h a t a band o f White River Utes are o f f the reservation, destroying forests and game near North and Middle Parks. They have already burned m i l l i o n s o f do l l a r s o f timber, and are in t im ida t ing s e t t l e r s and miners. Have wr i t t en Agent Meeker, but fear l e t t e r s have not reached him. Irespect fu l ly request you t o have telegraphic order sent troops a t nearest post t o remove Indians t o t h e i r reservation. I f general government does not act promptly the State must. Immense forests are burning throughout Western Colorado, supposed t o have been f i r e d by the Utes. Iam s a t i s f i e d there i s an organized e f f o r t on the par t o f Indians t o destroy the timber o f Colorado. The loss w i l l be irreplaceable. These savages should be removed t o the Indian Ter r i to ry , where they can no longer destroy the f i n e s t forests i n t h i s state."

P i t k i n ' s action, o r more spec i f i ca l l y h i s lack o f action, t o

defuse the c r i s i s , was adding t o the tension between the Utes and the

c i t i zen ry o f the state. The request f o r troops t o cont ro l the Utes was

based on v io la t ions a t t r i bu ted t o the Utes, based on rumors and the

concerns o f the agent Meeker.j3 On 20 August, i879 , a delegation of

2 January

3 March

5 March

18 A p r i l

23 A p r i l

28 A p r i l

24 May

21 Ju ly

3 August

1 September

12 September

1 January

27 June

9 Ju ly

16 Ju ly

6 August

14 August

10 September

SAMPLE HEADLINES FROM THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (1878-1874)

Indian H o s t i l i t i e s

Utes on Rampage, Whites Fear Uprising

Utes K i l l Ca t t l e on Snake River

Ute Massacre i n Pagosa Sprins

Rumors o f Ute War

Utes' Gold Locations Secret from Whites

Utes Rebellious Through Neglect o f Ind ian Bureau

Movements o f Ute Indians

Utes K i l l Joe McLane, Stockmen Seek Revenge

Ute Upr is ing Feared i n Grand County

Utes i n Trouble over Murder o f Se t t l e r s

Utes Make Trouble i n Middle Park

Utes Threaten Miners i n North Park

Ute Hos t i le A t t i tude Excites State O f f i c i a l s

Shal l We K i l l o r Starve the Indians? [ e d i t o r i a l ] !

The Indians Must Go

Utes Arrested and Charged w i th Arson

Le t te r from Meeker t o ed i t o r complaining o f h i s treatment by the Utes.

Figure 8

Utes frm the White River Agency, led by the ch ie f o f t ha t band,

Douglas, ar r ived i n Denver f o r a meeting w i th the governor. The Utes

assumed t h a t the governor would take act ion against Agent Meeker, once

t h e i r grievances were known. The Utes explained t h a t they no longer

had confidence i n Meeker, and t o avert trouble, a replacement was

needed. A t the time o f the meeting, P i t k i n had been informed t h a t h i s

e a r l i e r request f o r t r o o p s had been approved by the Indian Bureau and -had been turned over t o the War Department.14 The governor took no

action.

Through the summer o f 1879, Meeker was becoming aware o f the

personal animosity the White River Utes held toward him. He found

solace i n the b e l i e f t h a t h i s program would u l t imate ly be successful.'

His notions o f winning the support o f the Indians, would re-emerge

i n more recent civic-act, ion programs i n another theater--"we had t c

destroy the v i l l a g e i n o r d e r t o save it." Meeker had reported t o h i s

Senate sponsor, Senator Tel,ler, " I propose t o cut every Indian down t o

the bare s tarvat ion po in t i f he w i l l not work." Later, he stated,

" the most hopeful t h i ng i s t h a t there are several fami l ies complaining

b i t t e r l y o f cold, and they want houses."l5

The only agency t h a t appeared t o be operating w i th in the

framework o f nat ional po l i cy was the army. While the army was. not a

f r i end t o the Ute, i t was attempting t o maintain i t s e l f above the realm

o f part isan p o l i t i c s and experiments i n soc ia l engineering. General

Pope had one company c f cavalry p a t r o l l i n g the Colorado mountains

t r y i n g t o maintain the peace, and had previously demonstrated tha t the

army would intervene i n the Utes' behalf i n support o f ex is t ing t r ea ty

arrangements. Pope t rave l l ed t o the s ta te on 6 August 1879, t o meet

75

wi th Governor P i t k i n and assess the requests f o r addi t ional troops.

The steady stream of requests from the state, and the reports from both

the Departments o f the P la t t e and the Missouri, l ed him t o the

conclusion t h a t a c r i s i s was unfolding. For t Lewis, Colorado, was

establ ished by the summer o f 1879, near Pagosa Springs, t o contain

f u r t he r v io la t ions o f Ute lands i n the San Juan Mountain area by

whites.16

I n 1879, Major Thornburgh had become aware o f problems a t the

White River Agency. Meeker had wr i t t en him twice, on 7 a 11 June,

regarding problems a t the agency.17 I n addi t ion t o o f f i c i a l message

t r a f f i c , small groups o f Utes had t rave l l ed t o Rawlins, Wyoming, i n an

attempt t o locate long delayed supplies f o r the agency. A t Rawlins,

the rai lhead f o r the White River Agency, supplies had been await ing

t ranspor ta t ion f o r as long as one year. Thornburgh had sent a message

t o Meeker informing him o f t h i s problem, and requested the agent

resolve the matter through Ind ian Bureau channels. Thornburgh d id not

l i v e t o learn o f the answer.

The event t h a t f i n a l l y led t o the c o l l i s i o n o f a l l the

competing in te res ts has been the subject o f popular legend i n the s ta te

o f Colorado. The most widely held b e l i e f i s t h a t Agent Meeker plowed

up the ground t h a t the Utes used as a racetrack. Regardless o f the

reason, on 10 September, 1879, Meeker telegraphed the Indian Bureau

tha t he had been phys ica l ly assaulted by a Ute and was i n feat- o f h i s

l i f e and the safety o f other Agency en~ployees. '~

Meeker's message was received on 14 September 1879, a t the

Ind ian Bureau. By the next day the War Department had ordered troops

t o the scene. On the same day, Commissioner Hayt sent a message t o

76

Meeker t h a t troops had been requested f o r h i s protect ion. Hayt aiso

instructed Meeker t o have "leaders" arrested upon the a r r i v a l o f the

army. Meeker responded on the 22d o f September:

Governor P i t k i n wr i tes, cavalry on the way. Dispatch o f 15th w i l l be obeyed.19

By the 15th, Pope had troops moving t o resolve the reported

problems a t the agency. He had sent orders t o Captain Dodge w i th

Company D, 9 th Cavalry, a t Sulphur Springs, Colorado t o " s e t t l e

matters" a t White River.20 The movement o f these troops was hal ted

as Generals Sheridan, Crook, and Pope discussed the best options t o

deal w i th the problem. Sheridan directed Crook t o send trocps from the

Department o f the P la t t e because o f the r e l a t i v e proximity o f For t

Steele and the Union Pac i f i c railhead. His order t o Pope was tha t the

Department o f Missouri "need not take any act ion i n reference

thereto."21 With orders issued t o Thornburgh's command on 16

September, 1879, Sheridan recommended t o General Pope:

...no act ion i n so f a r as the m i l i t a r y are concerned, except simply t o quel l the ex i s t i ng disturbances and then t o await such f i n a l decision as may seem best by the Indian Bureau.''

On 21 September 1879, Major Thornburgh departed For t Steele

w i th E Company 3d Cavalry, D and F Companies 5th Cavalry, and B Company

from h i s own 4th In fant ry . Included w i th the column as it l e f t

Rawlins, Wyoming were 33 supply wagons and 220 pack mules, a l i n e which

was strung out over several miles. The force carr ied w i th i t rat ions

for t h i r t y days and forage f o r f i f t e e n days, which i n the words o f a

l a t e r report by General Sherman "was considered by everybody as

s u f f i c i e n t f o r the purpose."23 For the next seven days w i th about

200 men, Thornburgh marched toward the agency whi le report ing h i s

progress t o General Crock.

77

Progress t o the agency was slow. Despite being the nearest

m i l i t a r y i ns ta l l a t i on , the t r a i l t o the agency was a d i f f i c u l t one.

Numerous r i v e r s and streams plus the cont inental d iv ide had t o be

negotiated enroute. A f te r crossing the div ide, Thornburgh l e f t the

I n fan t r y company and 25 wagons a t F o r t i f i c a t i o n Creek t o serve as a

supply base f o r h i s command. It had taken u n t i l the 24th t o a r r i v e a t

~ o r t i f i c a t i o nCreek where Thornburgh rested the column and sent a

messenger t o the agency w i th d e t a i l s o f h i s mission.

On the 26th w i t h no news from the agency the column resumed i t s

march. As Thornburgh continued h i s march toward the agency, the Utes

became very agitated. Chief Douglas confronted Meeker about h i s r o l e

i n c a l l i n g f o r troops. Meeker denied any knowledge o f the troops, but

assured Douglas t h a t he would intercede and h a l t the advance short o f

the agency boundary--Milk River.Z4 The message dispatched t o Meeker

from Thornburgh had already arranged t h i s course o f action. On 26

September 1879, Thornburgh reported from the Bear River (now known as

the Yampa River) t o the Department o f the Plat te :

Have met some Ute ch ie fs here. They seem f r i e n d l y and promise t o go w i th me t o agency. Say Utes don't understand why we have come. Have t r i e d t o explain sa t i s fac to r i l y . Do not an t i c ipa te trouble.Z5

The Utes perceived t h a t the march o f the troops meant t ha t war

had been declared on them. Emmissaries met w i t h Major Thornburgh twice

during h i s movement, but i n s p i t e o f h i s best e f f o r t s , the fears and

concerns o f the Utes were not allayed. 3n September 28th, Thoinburmh, 5"

changed the plan t h a t he had previously communicated t o Meeker.

Concerned about the prospect o f being separated from h i s command i f

t rouble ensued, he decided t o push beyond the M i l k River boundary. He

wrote Meeker:

I have, a f t e r due del iberat ion, decided t o modify my plans as communicated i n my l e t t e r o f the 27th ins tan t i n the fo l lowing par t icu lars :

I sha l l move w i th my e n t i r e command t o some convenient camp near, and w i th in s t r i k i n g distance o f your agency, reaching such po in t dur ing the 29th. Isha l l then h a l t and encamp the troops and proceed t o the agency w i th my guide and f i v e soldiers...

Then and there Iw i l l be ready t o have a conference w i th you and the Indians, so t h a t an understanding may be ar r ived a t and my course o f act ion determined. Ihave ca re fu l l y considered whether o r not it would be advisable t o have my command a t a po in t as d is tan t as t h a t desired by the Indians who were i n camp l a s t n ight, and have reached the conclusion t h a t under my orders, which require me t o march t h i s command t o the agency, Iam not a t l i b e r t y t o leave it a t a po in t where it would not be avai lab le i n case o f trouble. You are authorized t o say f o r me t o the Indians t h a t my course o f conduct i s e n t i r e l y dependent on them. Our desire i s t o avoid trouble, and we have not come f o r war.26

As the column resumed i t s march on September 29th, i t soon

descended i n t o a small va l ley t h a t contained the M i l k River. As the

troops moved i n t o the val ley, so ld iers noticed t h a t the grass was

burning along the bottom land. They also noted the presence o f a large

number o f Indian horse tracks." Thornburgh hal ted the column along

the r i v e r long enough t o water the stock. As he was now preparing t o

v i o l a t e the agency boundary, Thornburgh sent a l ieutenant and ten

troopers t o scout ahead as the command resumed i t s movement i n t o Ute

t e r r i t o r y .

The advance guard o f the formation, under the command o f

Lieutenant S.A. Cherry, crossed the Mi lk River and took up pos i t ion

between h a l f t o three quarters o f a mi le i n f r o n t o f the main body.

Instead o f fo l lowing the d i r t t rack t h a t fol lowed the course o f the

r i v e r t o the agency proper, Cherry began cl imbing a low r idge t o the

south o f the track. A t the top o f the ridge, Cherry saw three Indians

disappear over the next r idge l ine . He dropped down i n t o a small g u l l y

and began t o climb the second ridge. His concern o f ambush heightened,

Thornburgh and the main body fol lowed the route o f the advance guard

and bypassed the r i v e r t rack. As Cherry topped the second r idge he

observed:

Idiscovered the Indians on top o f the second ridge, Isaw them l y i n g down w i th t h e i r guns i n t h e i r hands behind the ridge. Iwas w i th in a hundred yards o f the Indians, and I could see them l y i n g down, occupying not more than a yard o f space each; was near enough t o see t h a t they were packed as close as they could be, t h e i r l i n e extending a t leas t 400 yards.28

Upon observing the dismounted force o f between 300 t o 400 Utes,

Cherry turned and rode he l lbent f o r Thornburgh a t the lead o f the main

body. Thornburgh had deployed the two lead companies, D and F o f the

5 th Cavalry, along the f i r s t r idge l i n e as he saw the f r a n t i c r i d e o f

h i s advance guard. The remaining company was s t i l l near the Mi lk River

w i th the wagons. The Utes saw the two lead elements deploy, and based

on t h e i r previous service w i th the army, immediately assumed tha t t h i s

meant a charge was imminent.

The advance guard ar r ived a t Thornburgh's pos i t ion and Cherry

made h i s report. Thornburgh sent Cherry w i t h orders t o the two lead

companies t o "dismount and ho ld f i r e u n t i l he gave the order."Zg

Thornburgh gave Cherry f u r t he r instructions--once the orders were

del ivered t o the companies, Cherry and h i s advance par ty #ere t o

advance and attempt t o par ley w i t h the Utes. Cherry del ivered h i s

orders and proceeded w i th the second h a l f o f h i s mission. Short ly

a f t e r Cherry began h i s r i d e toward the second ridge, he encountered a

small group o f Utes. He waved h i s hat and was met by a h a i l o f b u l l e t s

t ha t cut down a trooper ten f ee t from him.30

80

29 SEPTEMBER 1879: INITIALADVANCE IAdarhd from Dmwson. ThoUteWarl

Cherry's par ty came tumbling back t o the skirmish l i nes formed

by the two companies, as r i f l e f i r e erupted from both sides.

Thornburgh had successful ly avoided the Ute ambush se t f o r h i s command

along the r i v e r track, but was now tak ing a heavy volume,of r i f l e f l r e

i n h i s current posi t ion. He was i n danger o f being cut o f f from h i s

supplies and h i s t h i r d company along the M i l k River as mounted Utes

were attemptirig t o envelop h i s posi t ion. Thornburgh executed a slow

dismounted withdrawal back t o the northside o f the r i ve r , t o the

r e l a t i v e safety o f the wagons. A t one po in t dur ing the withdrawal,

Thornburgh observed the Utes concentrating f o r a mounted at tack and

qu ick ly executed a spo i l ing at tack w i th one o f h i s companies.31 As

the command was f a l l i n g back t o the r i v e r i n a sw i r l i ng b a t t l e o f r i f l e

f i r e , Thornburgh was k i l l e d and command succeeded t o Captain Payne o f

the 5th Cavalry.

Payne assumed command as the three cavalry companies ar r ived a t

the wagons on the nor th s ide o f the r i v e r . The command began using t ! ~

wagons, gra in sacks, dead horses, and d i r t t o estab l ish temporary

breastworks and a cor ra l f o r the surv iv ing animals. Meanwhile, the

Utes occupied the high ground both t o the nor th and south o f the

r i ve r . Using t h i s advantage and the superior range of t h e i r r i f l e s ,

they kept up steady pressure on the troops w i th constant sniping. As

the r o l l was ca l led on the n ight o f September 29, twelve o f the command

were dead. Forty three were wounded, including a l l but One o f the

c f f icers .32

A f f a i r s a t the agency took a marked tu rn f o r the worse w i th the

outbreak o f f igh t ing . Ute messengers rode back w i th news o f the

engagement and the tension tha t had been bu i ld ing f o r months burst

29 SEPTEMBER 1879: CHERFIY MAKES CONTACT (Adapted from Dawson, Tho UteWar)

Figure 10

f o r t h i n a w i l d orgy o f violence t h a t resul ted i n the murders o f e ight

white male employees o f the agency. Included i n t h i s number was

Meeker, who was l a t e r found by troops w i th h i s s k u l l smashed, a logging

ckain around h i s neck, and a barre l stave dr iven through h i s mouth and

sku11.33 The four white female residents o f the agency were taken

captive. These included Meeker's w i fe and daughter.

The besieged troops fought o f f one attempt t o overwhelm t h e i r

defenses the n igh t o f September 29, but t h e i r s i t ua t i on remained

desperate. The Utes, continuing the harassing f i r e , had succeeded i n

k i l l i n g a l l o f the horses and mules. Any movement w i t h i n the

breastworks drew wel l placed f i r e from the i n v i s i b l e snipers. The

problem o f sustaining the defense was compounded by the so ld iers ' lack

o f water. The distance from the defensive pos i t ion t o the r i v e r was

approximately 200 yards. Attempts by the troops t o reach the Mi lk

River dur ing day l ight were impossible. The Utes moved up t o the r i v e r

a t n igh t t o i n t e r d i c t resupply. Compounding the water problems, the

Utes se t f i r e t o the surrounding vegetation, as the troops sought t o

conserve ammunition t o f i g h t o f f more attacks.34

A t approximately midnight on September 29th and 30th, Payne sent

out four volunteers t o go f o r assistance.35 On 1 October, one

cour ier met D Company, 9 th Cavalry, which was enroute t o the agency.

Captain Francis Dodge rode w i th h i s company toward the besieged command

and sent out messages report ing the s i tua t ion . The troops a t M i l k

River continued t o su f fe r from the e f fec ts o f the siege, i n c l u d i n ~

attempts by the Indians t o draw out foolhardy soldiers. The Utes had

29 SEPTEMBER 1879: DE M Y BACK TO WAGONS (Adapted from Dawson, The UteWar)

Figure 11

taken up pos i t ions along the r i v e r bottom and began taunt ing the

so ld ie rs :

Come ou t , you sons-of-bitches, and f i g h t l i k e men---Utes k i l ! ' oo r ' o r se and moo1 and k i l l 0 0 . 3 6

The morning o f the 2d o f October, the s p i r i t s o f Payne's troop:;

were raised by the a r r i v a l o f t h e company o f t h e 9 th Cavalry.

Unfortunately f o r them, the add i t iona l company d id not change the

s i t u a t i o n , except br inging proof t h a t a messenger had suceeded i n

ge t t ing word t o the outs ide wor ld. The company o f the 9 th ar r ived

undetected by the Utes and ran t h e gaunt let o f the l a s t 600 yards under

heavy f i r e . Reaching the breastworks the add i t iona l company se t t led

i n t o t h e defense and awaited f u r t he r reinforcement.

At noon on October 2d, the re l i ev i ng fo rce t h a t Payne's coninian~:!

was wa i t ing f o r swung i n t o act ion. From Fort D.A. Russel l , Colonel

Wesley M e r r i t t , commanding the 5 th Cavalry Regiment, departed f o r t h e

Mi lk River b a t t l e w i t h e igh t add i t iona l companies, or a fo rce c f about

500 men.37 The ra te o f march o f M e r r i t t ' s command stands i n sharp

contrast t o the march o f t h e o r i g i na l expedit ion t o t h e White River

agency. Over a distance o f 170 mi les, M e r r i t t ' s fo rce t r ave l l ed 30

miles on October 2d, 50 mi les on the 3d, and w i t h a nonstop march,

completed the l a s t 70 miles on t h e morning o f 5 October 1879.38

A t 0500 on t h e 5 th , the weary t roops on Mi lk River heard the

s t r a i ns o f a bugle sounding " O f f i c e r ' s Ca l l , " announcing the end o f

t h e i r ordeal. The advance elements o f H e r r i t t ' s force soon reached tile

breastworks. The Utes had detected M e r r i t t ' s column and had retreated

south i n t o the confines o f Ute t e r r i t o r y . M e r r i t t ' s troops were not

the only fo rce r i d i n g t o the sounds o f the guns.

I

General Sheridan had dispatched troops from the Department o f

Texas, as wel l as troops from the Oepartment o f the Missouri i n the

scene. Colonel M e r r i t t soon found himself i n control o f three

??.-.;a?converging columns. Six companies o f the 4th Cavalry, under Ct, ,.,I,-

Ranald S. Mackenzie from For t Clark, Texas, and f i v e addi t ional

companies o f the 9th Cavalry, under Colonel Hatch from Forts Garland

and Union, were rap id ly moving t o White River. M e r r i t t ' s combined

force would number over 1500 men.

The s ize and speed o f the army's response had an e f f e c t on the

Utes akin t o being doused by a bucket o f cold vater. The emotions tha t

had dr iven them t o at tack t h e i r agent were now replaced by fear and

apprehension. The White River Utes retreated deep i n t o the mountains

t o await the expected onslaught o f the army.

ENDNOTES

1. Carl Ubbelohde, Maxine Benson, Duane A. Smith, A Colorado His tory (Boulder: Pruett Pub1 ishing, 1988), 190.

2. Ib id. , 187

3. Forbes Parkh i l l , "The Meeker Massacre," A Colorado Reader (Boulder: Pruett Publishing, 19621, 234.

4. Department o f the In te r i o r , Annual Reoort o f the Commissioner o f In'dlan A f f a i r s t o the Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Off ice, 18781, 19.

5. Congress, House, Committee on Indian Af fa i rs , Testimonv i n Relation t o the Ute Indian Outbreak, 46th Cong., 2d sess., 15 January

1880, 102.

6. Frank Hal l , Historv o f the State o f Colorado, vo l . 2 (Chicago: The Blakelv P r i n t i ng Co.. 1890). 498. While t h i s was wr i t ten 21 year!; a f t & the event, i t - i s worth cbnsidering as a prevalent view among Colorado o f f i c i a l s . A t the time o f the Meeker Massacre, M r . Ha l l was the Adjutant-General o f Colorado.

7. U.S. Congress, House 1880, 60.

8. Congress, House, Extinguishment o f Indian T i t l e , 46th Cong., 1s t sess., Congressional Record, vol. I X , par t 1, 21 Ap r i l 1870, 615.

9 . Department o f the I n t e r i o r , Annual Report o f the Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s t o the Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r (Washington, D.C. : Government P r i n t i ng Off ice, 18791, xx.

10. War Department, "Report o f the General o f t h e Army," i n Annual Reoort o f the Secretary o f War (Washington D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Office, 18801, 8.

11. Department o f the I n t e r i o r , Annual Reoort o f the Commissioner o f 1(Washington D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Off ice, 18791, x x i i - x x i i i .

12. Ib id . , xx i .

13. Parkh i l l , The Meeker Massacre, 239.

14. I n t e r i o r , Annual Reoort o f the Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s (18791, xx i .

15. Parkh i l l , The Meeker Massacre, 235

16. Robert W. Frazer, Forts o f the West: M i l i t a r y For ts and Presidios and Posts Commonly Called Forts West o f the M i s s i s s i ~ o i River t o 1898 (Norman: Universi ty o f Oklahoma Press, 19651, 38.

17. I n t e r i o r , Annual ReDOrt o f the Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s (18791, xx i -xx i i .

18. Ib id. , xxx.

19. Ib id . , xxx.

20. Sherman, Annual ReDOrt o f Secretary o f War (18801, 8.

21. Ib id. , 8.

22. Ibid., 8-9.

23. Ib id . , 9.

24. I n t e r i o r , Annual Report o f the Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s (18791, xxxi.

25. Ib id. , xxxi.

26. Sherman, Annual Report o f Secretary o f War (18801, 10.

27. Fred H. Werner, Meeker: The Storv o f the Meeker Massacre and Thornburgh Batt le. Se~tember 29. 1879 (Greeley: Werner Publications, 19851, 50.

28. Congress, House, Testimonv i n Reiation t o the Ute Indian Outbreak (18801, 64.

29. Ibid., 65.

30. Ibid., 65. The signal o f "waving the hat" i s contentious. The Utes l a t e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t Cherry's act ion was t o s ignal h i s troops t o begin f i r i n g , whi le Cherry i n s i s t s i t was an attempt t o arrange a parley w i t h the Indians.

31. Thomas Fulton Dawson, The Ute War: --A His tory o f the White River Massacre and the Pr ivat ions and Hardshim o f t h e Caotive White Women among the Host i les on Grand River (Denver: Tribune Publishing House, 18791, 23-24.

32. Ib id. , 27-28.

33. George K. Lisk, "Let ters t o the Editor," Winners o f the West 3 (February 1925): 2.

34. Congress, House, Testimony i n Relation t o the Ute Indian Outbreak (18801, 66.

35. I b i d . , 66.

36. Werner, Meeker, 47.

"The Mi lk River Campaign," Winners o f the West 2 (May 1933): 1.37.

38. I b i d . , 4.

CHAPTER 5

AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS

The 5 th Cavalry never got t h e opportuni ty t o d i r e c t l y avenge

t h e i r f a l l e n comrades. The campaign was instead concluded through a

negotiated settlement t h a t would lead t o the removal o f the major i ty of

the Ute t r i b e from the s ta te . The culmination o f the Ute campaign

i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t i n s p i t e o f the misgivings about the national Indian

Pol icy , t h e army had l inked the design andconduct o f i t s operational

st rategy t o t h i s po l icy . P o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y , patterns o f economic

development, l im i ted budget and manpower resources a l l served t o shape

the conduct o f the Ute campaign.

Af ter res t ing h i s fo rce and deal ing w i t h the dead and wounded,

Colonel M e r r i t t pushed on t o the White River Agency. Ar r i v ing a t the

Agency on I 1 October 1879, M e r r i t t buried the bodies o f the v i c t ims of

the "massacre" and made preparations f o r a pursu i t t o the south. While

s t i l l a t White River , reinforcements sent from the Departments o f the

P la t t e and Missouri a r r i ved , br inging h i s strength t o about a thousand

ef fect ives. '

On 14 October, M e r r i t t began h i s pursu i t t o overtake the Utes

and t a rescue the feniale hostages. I n add i t i on t o M e r r i t t , the 4 th

Cavalry under Mackenzie had been reinforced t o about 1500 men and was

preparing t o depart Fort Garland, Colorado.2 Hatch's 9 th Cavalry,

w i t h a complement of 450 men, had been ordered t o Fort Lewis, Colorado,

near the southern Ute Agency.3 The plan was re la t i ve l y simple--the 4th

and 9th Cavalry Regiments would s t r i ke t o the west and north, s p l i t t i n g

the White River Utes from the southern Ute bands. Mer r i t t ' s 5th Cavalry

would push south, trapping the Utes against the other columns.

The campaign would be conducted i n winter, due t o demands f o r

immediate action from the state, and the advantages winter offered army

forces. The demand f o r l og is t i ca l support o f the troops i n the theater

would change l i t t l e whether they remained as current ly deployed, or

took the f i e l d against the Utes. The rugged area o f operations would

cer ta in ly challenge the Army's a b i l i t y t o sustain operations because o f

the l im i ted ra i l road structure, but the Ute's sustainment problem was

dras t ica l ly more d i f f i c u l t i n the winter. The prospect o f the

alternative--namely wait ing f o r the snow t o melt the fol lowing

June--and then having t o chase a highly mobile force through the

mountains was f a r less appealing.

Before Mer r i t t crossed the f i r s t range o f mountains, climbing

out o f the val ley created by the White River, the columns were cal led

t o a halt . Upon ar r iv ing i n Denver, Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r Carl

Schurz intervened, i n an attempt t o save the hostages and defuse the

c r i s i s . He designated Charles Adams as a special envoy because he was

known and trusted by Ute Chief Ouray. Adams was authorized t o negotiate

f o r the release o f the hostages. As early as 2 October, Ouray had sent

messengers north, urging the White River Band t o release the women and t o

cease fighting.4 On 9 October, Ouray and Agent William M. Stanley o f

the southern Ute Agency a t Los Pinos, Colorado, reported t o Schurz tha t

the White River Band " . . .wi l l f i gh t no more unless forced t o do so."=

Schur:, sensing an opportunity t o avert a cos t l y f i g h t , warned

Ouray tha t " the troops are now i n great force, and resistance would

resu l t i n great disaster t o the Indians."= Schurz telegraphed

General Sherman w i th news o f the ongoing e f f o r t s t o mediate the

c o n f l i c t . On 14 October, M e r r i t t received the the fo l lowing dispatch

sent through General Sheridan from General Sherman:

The honorable Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r has, t h i s 10.30 a.m., ca l led w i th a dispatch, given length below, which i s communicated f o r your information, and which should go f o r what i s worth t o Generals Crook and Mer r i t t . The l a t t e r , on the spot, can t e l l i f the hos t i les have ceased f igh t ing . I f so, General M e r r i t t should go i n every event t o the agency t o ascertain the actual condi t ion o f facts. A l l Indians who oppose must be cleared out o f the way i f they res is t . I f they surrender t h e i r arms and ponies, they should be held as prisoners, t o be disposed o f by superior orders.

The Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r w i l l send a special agent a t once t o Ouray, who i s believed t o be honest and our f r iend. He may prevent the southern Utes from being involved, and the I n t e r i o r Department can befr iend him afterward by showing favor t o some o f h i s special fr iends. But the murderers o f the agent and servants must be punished, as also those who fought and k i l l e d Major Thornburgh and men.'

M e r r i t t returned t o the encampment a t White River and along

w i th the other troops i n the state, set about preparing f o r the onset

o f winter, whi le await ing news o f the Adams mission. Emotions w i th in

the s ta te were explosive. Apprehensive a t the prospect o f a f u l l scale

Ind ian War, c i t i zens from areas throughout the s ta te overwhelmed the

Governor's o f f i c e w i th requests f o r arms and troops. Two companies o f

the Colorado m i l i t i a were ca l led up t o pa t ro l the Uncompahgre Valley,

near the Southern ~ t e John C. a member o f the P i t k i n Band. Be l l ,

Guards from Lake Ci ty , Colorado, l a t e r recal led:

The Governor ca l led them i n t o service, and war-order No. 1 was b r ing in, dead or a l i ve , a l l h o s t i l e Indians found o f f the reservation...consider a l l Indians o f f the reservation hos t i le , and b r ing them in., dead o r a l ive, and we w i l l determine t h e i r d o c i l i t y afterward.8

The ultimatum that Adams brought t o the White River Utes

consisted o f two demands: F i r s t , release the hostages unharmed, and

second, surrender the individuals responsible f o r the murders a t the

White River Agency. I f the Utes agreed t o these conditions, m i l i t a r y

action would be forestal led and hearings on Indian grievances would be

held a t a l a t e r date. On 21 October, Adams returned t o Ouray's camp

wi th the unharmed hostages.9 Adams reported tha t the second

condition had not been agreed t o by the Utes, and that hewas returning

f o r fur ther discussions. On 24 October Sherman, growing anxious a t the

delay, sent the fol lowing message t o h i s f i e l d commander:

...Let a l l preparations proceed, and be ready the moment Igive the word t o p i t ch in. Should Agent Adams f a i l i n h i s mission I understand that the c i v i l author i t ies w i l l stand aside and m i l i t a r y

, w i l l take absolute control o f t h i s whole Ute question and se t t l e i t f o r good and a l l . Meantime, humanity t o the captive women and the f r iend ly Utes, even o f White River, j u s t i f i e s t h i s seeming waste o f time.10

Sherman was t i r i n g o f the lack o f progress i n the negotiations.

He saw the s i tua t ion as the d i rec t resul t o f the lack o f army control

i n establishing pol icy. His view that the management o f Indian a f f a i r s

should reside i n the War Department was the source o f h i s f rus t ra t ion

i n handling the Ute problem. As Sherman wrote t o Sheridan:

...as the Govt [s ic ] o f the U.S. and i f the Christian po l icy has fa i l ed it had not been f o r want o f e f f o r t but because the problem i s insoluble--unless the Indian w i l l change h is nature and habits, select h i s spot on earth, and become as a white man he i s domed. It i s not because the white man i s cruel, inhuman and grasping but because it i s the Law o f Natural Change and Development--the wrong began a t Plymouth Rock and w i l l end i n the Rocky Mountains.11

Four days la ter , on the 29 October, Adams reported that the

Indians appeared wilTing t o surrender the g u i l t y parties, i f the

accused would be afforded the same treatment as "whites" under

s im i l a r circumstances. On 10 November 1879, twenty ch ie fs o f the White

River Utes, including Chiefs Douglas and Jack, accepted the government

terms." A commission was immediately created and began a t once t o

so r t out the de ta i l s o f the events leading up t o the uprising.

The commission hearings lasted f o r another year and u l t imate ly

f a i l e d t o address the problems surrounding the events o f 1879 t o the

sa t i s fac t ion o f Colorado c i t i z e n s o r the Utes. The A n y remained i n

force i n Ute country f o r the next two years. By Ju ly 1880, M e r r i t t ' s

cavalry a t white River was replaced by s i x companies o f the 6th

I n fan t r y Regiment, and the 4th and 9th Cavalry Regiments were l ikewise

re i ieved by companies from the 4th, 7th, 9th, and 14th I n fan t r y

Regiments.13 The In fan t r y Regiments established a new ser ies o f

f o r t s which t i e d i n w i t h the expanding r a i l network through the Ute

ter r i tory .14 The development o f t h i s l i n e o f posts, beginning a t

White River and extending south t o Bayard, New Mexico, w i t h the

corresponding development o f the new rai l roads, was the culmination o f

the "small f o r t " system i n the west.. As Department o f the Missouri

Commander, General Pope remarked:

This l i n e o f m i l i t a r y posts begins t o reach the settlements o f Utah and Arizona and the extreme points occupied by the m i l i t a r y forces advancing from the west, so t h a t w i t h the l i n e through Colorado and New Mexico the m i l i t a r y system o f defense south o f the 40th pa ra l l e l would appear t o be c o m ~ l e t e d . ' ~

The resu l ts o f the 1879 campaign were mixed. The Indian po l i cy

changed emphasis i n the years fo l lowing the Ute upr is ing. This change

ref lected the rea l i za t ion t h a t the reservation system and the resu l t ing

segregation o f the Indian was a bankrupt po l icy . While a d i rec t

cor re la t ion o f t h i s s h i f t i n po l i cy t o the events o f the Ute upr is ing

i s not a reasonable deduction, the personal involvement o f Carl Schurz

95

i n the events o f 1879 and h is subsequent ro le i n shaping a new pol icy

cannot be discounted. The events surrounding the Ute c r i s i s , coupled

with the ea r l i e r Nez Perce uprising, added weight t o the arguments o f

Eastern humanitarians who favored a new di rect ion i n policy. The

remaining years o f the Hayes administration saw a new emphasis on the

assimilation o f Indians i n t o mainstream "white" culture. I n h i s 1881

message t o Corigress, President Hayes stated tha t "...the time has come . .

when the pol icy should be t o place the Indians as rapidly as pract ica l

on the same foot ing wi th the other permanent inhabitants o f our

country. " i s

The a t t i tude wi th in the state o f Colorado took a decidedly

d i f f e ren t turn. The events o f 1879 provided, i n the view o f Colorado

ci t izens, tha t the Utes were both dangerous and an impediment t o

progress. With the resul ts o f Schurz's c m i s s i o n s t i l l unresolved,

Governor P i t k in established three m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t s associated wi th

each o f the three Ute agencies. Even with the release o f the hostages,

P i t k in commented t o the press:

It w i l l be impossible f o r the Indians and whites t o l i v e i n peace hereafter...This attack had no provocation and the whites now understand that they are l i ab l e t o be attacked i n any par t o f the state...My idea i s that, unless removed by the government they must necessari1y be exterminated.

The Utes, largely through the e f f o r t s o f Chief Ouray, t r i e d t o

stop the momentum towards removal as best they could. Ouray managed t o

ha l t the proceedings o f the commission by successfully appealing t o

Secretary Schurz tha t the Utes could not receive a f a i r hearing wi th in

the state. A second problem that confronted the i n i t i a l commission was

that Ouray refused t o accept the testimony o f the only survivors o f the

White River massacre because they were women. The hearings received a

change i n venue t o Washington D.C., and concluded w i th the Ju ly 1880

Treaty t h a t forced the removal o f the Utes t o new areas i n Utah. The

demands f o r j us t i ce were soon mit igated, as i t became apparent the Utes

would indeed leave the state. Only one Ute, the veteran o f Crook's

Sioux campaign--Chief Jack, was punished by imprisonment a t For t

Leavenworth f o r a period o f one year. On 7 September 1881, escorted by

the Army, the l a s t band o f Utes crossed the Grand River i n t o Utah

Terr i tory . General Pope wrote o f the occasion:

...the whites who had col lected, i n view o f [ the Utes] removal were so eager and unrestrained by common decency t h a t it was absolutely necessary t o use m i l i t a r y force t o keep them o f f the reservation u n t i l the Indians were f a i r l y gone.. . ' a

With the Ute issue concluded, d i d the campaign serve t o

i l l u s t r a t e an overa l l operational strategy, and was m i l i t a r y act ion

against the Utes the only ava i lab le a l ternat ive? I n the aftermath o f

the Ute campaign, the Army changed l i t t l e . The period o f large scale

Indian wars had ended, even before 1879. The conduct o f the campaign

fol lowed what had become the standard operational pat tern o f the Army.

This pat tern was not developed as pa r t o f a large central ized plan, but

came about instead as the r e s u l t o f changing condit ions and po l ic ies.

While it may be judged an ad hoc strategy t h a t evolved over time, i t

probably represents the only p rac t i ca l a l te rna t i ve t o the times. The

lack o f c l a r i t y and consistency i n the nat ional Ind ian po l i cy l e f t the

Army w i th the d i f f i c u l t task o f formulating s t ra teg ies i n a rap id ly

changing environment.

The network o f f o r t s t ha t were u t i l i z e d t o support Army

operations had been establ ished t o support the expansion o f the

national objective--the economic development o f the west--and t o

control white and Indian transgressions. For t Steele, Wyoming

Terr i tory , represents an example o f the former, whi le For t Lewis,

Colorado, represents the l a t t e r . The employment o f troops by Generals

Pope and Crook from these two i ns ta l l a t i ons suggests t h a t the m i l i t a r y

was serious i n i t s e f f o r t s t o act as an d is in terested mediator i n

disputes between white and Indian, i n support o f the nat ional Ind ian

Policy.

Army leadership pub l i c l y expressed f r u s t r a t i o n w i th the

handling o f Ind ian a f f a i r s by the Department o f the I n t e r i o r , but the

army, nevertheless, continued t o conduct operations i n support o f

nat ional pol icy. This i s not t o suggest t h a t the nat ional po l i cy was a

s ingular coherent document; rather it was vague and d is jo in ted i n i t s

construct and execution. From t h i s amorphous s t ra teg ic set t ing, the

Army attempted t o b r ing un i formi ty and purpose.

I n t h i s e f f o r t , the army benef i t ted from the lengthy terms o f

i t s senior leaders. The lack o f physical documentation o f s t ra teg ic

and operational plans and goals was o f f s e t by the long tenures o f

senior leaders, which maintained a cent ra l purpose t o the conduct o f

operations. The views o f Sherman and Sheridan would determine the

nat ional m i l i t a r y strategy dur ing the period, and the construct o f t h i s

strategy would se t the framework t h a t produced the o ~ e r a t i o n a l design.

The primary goal o f the nat ional strategy was the support o f

economic settlement o f the west, w i th the supplementary goal o f

supporting the nat ional Ind ian pol icy. With these being the cent ra l

themes o f the nat ional strategy, the operational strategy which came

about revolved around the establishment o f a ser ies o f f o r t s t ha t would

qu i te na tu ra l l y correspond w i th the construction o f the ch ie f economic

vehic le o f the period--the r a i 1 road.

Given the p o l i t i c a l demands f o r troops throughout the west and

faced w i th an austere manpower and budget p ic ture, the operational

design qu ick ly evolved toward a large ser ies o f small garrisons t h a t

would be massed f o r f i e l d operations and proximity t o the r a i l system.

The drawback i n t h i s system was the locat ion o f the Indian. As the

reservation system was developed, it became a natural r esu l t t o place

them i n areas t h a t were not desirable t o whites--namely places t h a t

would not l i k e l y a t t r a c t the development o f a ra i l road. Because o f

th is , the army was not i n pos i t ion t o deter outbreaks as they arose,

but instead was forced t o react t o events a f t e r the fact .

The a l te rna t i ve o f pos i t ion ing the army alongside the Indians,

whi le seemingly a t t rac t i ve , f a i l s on two counts. F i r s t , it was not

p rac t i ca l i n terms o f the s ize o f the army a t the time; second, i t

remains un l i ke l y t h a t the army could have successful ly constrained a l l

the bands as the reservation system was arrayed. I n addi t ion, i f the

troops had been located w i th the reservation, they would not have been

i n pos i t ion t o defend the centers o f white population and economic

development.

The other feature o f operational design t h a t was central t o the

conduct o f Indian campaigns i n general, and the Ute campaign

spec i f i ca l l y , was the use o f converging columns. The use o f t h i s

method owes i t s e l f t o the r e l a t i v e pos i t ion ing o f troops and t o the

nature o f the threat. Given the large number o f small garrisons

scattered over a large area, the quickest means t o get them i n t o the

99

f i e l d was t o mass them a t several d i f fe rent points. Also, by doing

t h i s the l imi ted r a i l network was not over-taxed i n supporting

operations from a central point. The advantage held by the Indian, i n

terms o f tac t i ca l mobil i ty, was also central t o the use o f converging

columns. Having succeeded i n using t h i s method on some occasions, it

remained the army's answer t o counter Indian mobility.19

These methods served as the army's primary operational too ls

f o r combatting the Utes and the other Indian t r ibes. The Army d id

receive c r i t i c i sm f o r not formalizing the lessons o f the Indian

campaigns through the m i l i t a r y education system or other means.20 As

h is tor ian Robert Wooster laments:

Those st rategic debates tha t d id occur almost always concerned conventional warfare more applicable t o the ba t t l e f i e lds o f Europe than t o those o f the American West. The absence o f routine meetings, regular correspondence, or open discussion o f m i l i t a r y strategy toward Indians also discouraged individual in i t ia t ive.20

The arguments expressed by Wooster demonstrate more h i s own

lack o f knowledge i n the understanding o f a m i l i t a r y organization, than

i n proving a f a i l u re on the par t o f the American Army. It i s precisely

because o f t h i s lack o f formal discussion o f Indian tac t i cs tha t

i n i t i a t i v e became a survival s k i l l f o r tac t i ca l leaders. Any attempts

by the army t o draw any central ized doctr inal lessons from the Indian

campaigns might have been more damaging, as t h i s assumes that one was

f igh t ing a common enemy. I t i s l i k e l y tha t such e f f o r t s might have

produced an outcome s imi lar t o General Crook's fa te i n h i s f u t i l e

attempt t o transfer lessons from the Red River Campaign t o h i s Rosebud

Campaign. The use o f a few central operational methods provides enough

commonality when f igh t ing a divergent enemy over a wide area.

The focus on f i g h t i n g a European-style war i s la rge ly explained

as a means t o examine the most dangerous po ten t ia l th rea t t o the

nation. The m i l i t a r y view i s always t o prepare f o r the most dangerous

enemy, and a t no time was the nat ion ser iously challenged by any group,

o r groups, o f Indians. The object o f the Indian wars remained l im i t ed

insofar as the nat ional government was concerned. Certainly i n the

view o f many Indians, the pol i c y o f the government and' i t s execution by

the army resembled t o t a l war. The i n i t i a l operations o f the

Spanish-American War v indicates the a t ten t ion t o "conventional war."

The focus o f the army remained on the defense o f the nat ion and d id not

become consumed by what can be categorized as an "economy o f force"

mission.

This argument has probably the most enduring value f o r the

cur ren t l y serving o f f i c e r . As i n the Ind ian- f ight ing army, the

challenge today i s t o so r t out p r i o r i t i e s dur ing a period o f

constrained resources. It would be very easy t o become foccsed on

smaller, more pressing, issues and t o lose s igh t o f the overa l l purpose

o f the army--namely the defense o f the nation. The period between wars

has always been characterized by debate about how best t o prepare f o r

the next c o n f l i c t . While it i s always tempting t o be caught up i n the

t rans i t o r y "po l icy du jour" , it i s essential t h a t the army s t r i v e t o

maintain cent ra l themes which def ine i t s purpose and missions.

It i s doubtful t ha t any change i n the Indian po l icy , o f c f the

army's r o l e i n sbpporting i t s execution, wocld have made any di f ference

i n the u l t imate outcome, when taken i n the context o f the times. The

primary lesson, i n terms o f the army, i s the value o f ear ly involvement

i n the s t ruc tu r ing o f nat ional strategy and a continual assessment o f

101

the government's ccmmittment t o t h a t pol icy. Again, i f t h i s f a i l s t o

mediate the views o f our p o l i t i c a l leaders, it appears t ha t the words

o f Sherman, as he awaited the resu l t o f Agent Adams' mission t o the

Utes w i l l echo again:

...we are l e f t i n the heart o f the mountains w i th our hands t i e d and the danger of being snowed i n s ta r ing us i n the face. Iam not eas i l y discouraged, but it looks as though we had been p r e t t y badly sold out i n t h i s business.21

ENDNOTES

1. War Department, "Report o f the General o f the Army," i n Annual Rewort o f the Secretarv o f War (Washington D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Off ice, 18801, 11.

2. Ib id. , 12.

3. Ib id. , 12.

4. Department o f the I n t e r i o r , Annual Reoort o f the Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s t o the Secretarv o f the I n t e r i o r (Washington D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Off ice, 18791, xxxiv.

5. Ib id. , xxxiv.

6. Ib id. , xxxiv.

7. Sherman, Annual Reoort o f Secretary o f War (18801, 11.

8. John H. Nankivel l , H is torv o f the M i l i t a r y Orqanizations o f the State o f Colorado: 1860-1935 (Denver: W.H. K i s t l e r Co., 19351, 61.

9. I n t e r i o r , Annual Reoort o f the Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s (1879) xxxv. The condi t ion o f the women returning from c a p t i v i t y was not dwelled on by the author i t ies . It was believed t h a t reports o f the v i o l a t i o n o f these womenwould inflame the issue. Concern about the womens reputat ion led i nqu i r i es t o avoid the subject.

10. Sherman, Annual Report o f the Secretary o f War (18801, 12.

11. John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier 's Passion f o r Order (New York: The Free Press, 19931, 399-400.

12. I n t e r i o r , Annual Reoort o f the Commissioner o f Indian A f f a i r s (1879) xxxv.

13. War Department, "Report o f General Pope," Annual ReDort o f the Secretary o f War (Washington D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Off ice, 18801, 84.

14. War Department, "Report o f General Sheridan," Annual Rewort o f the Secretarv o f War (Washington D.C.: Government P r i n t i ng Off ice,

1880), 55.

15. Pope, Annual R e ~ o r t o f the Secretarv o f War (1880), 84.

16. P h i l i p Weeks, Farewell, MY Nation: The American Indian and the United States. 1820-1890 (Ar l ington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 1990), 218.

17. Jan Pettit, Utes: The Mountain People (Boulder: Johnson Books, 19901, 124.

18. P. David Smith, Ourav: Chief of the Utes (Ridgeway: Wayfinder Books, l986), 192.

19. The alternative means to combat the advantages of Indian mobility was the use of Indian scouts or auxillaries. Used with varying degrees of success it was not largely accepted because it implied the Army proper was incapable of dealing with the problem.

20. Robert Wooster, The Militarv and United States Indian Policv: 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19881, 207.

21. Ibid., 180.

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Un~ubl ished mater ia ls

Pope, John. "Address on The Indian Question." Delivered t o the Social Science Association. 24 May i878. Cinc innat t i , Ohio

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