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144 / Towards a Conceptual Model of Consumer Confusion

suggest are positively correlated, irrespective of the antecedents

confusion experienced. Apart from some of the cognitive and

behavioral consequences already mentioned, we propose confused

consumers are likely to experience unpleasant emotions which may

include; frustration, irritation, anxiety, or even anger.

Figure 1 shows the proposed conceptual model which we will

be discussing. Research on consumer confusion has mainly focused

on identifying causes and effects of confusion paying little attention

to its moderators and mediators. In addition to the three antecedents

of confusion, moderators, mediators, confusion reduction strate-gies and consequences are depicted (see Figure 1). Mediator vari-

ables, such as mood, can change while influencing the relationship

between two variables, while moderator variables (e.g., gender) can

affect the relationship, but do not change themselves.

Confusion Moderator Variables

Within any exchange process, it is either the stimulus itself,

created by the marketer, which is inherently confusing or is it some

inability on the consumer ’s part to process marketing stimuli.

Individual characteristics exert a moderating influence because

they are often linked to the consumer ’s ability to rationalize and

process stimuli. Age may reduce confusion through an experience

framework or may increase confusion as processing competence

decreases with the ageing process. Gender differences may also berelated to the experience framework since females tend to have

more experience in different product classes than men. Females are

also reported to perceive more advertisement clutter and

miscomprehension (e.g., Elliott and Speck 1998). Turnbull et al.

(2000) found that more females were ambiguity confused than

males in the mobile phone market, suggesting that product category

interrelates with gender.

In cognitive psychology, tolerance for ambiguity is concerned

with the degree to which people can restrain their need for a perfect,

clear view of the environment (e.g., Goldstein and Blackman 1977;

Feather 1969). Individuals with low tolerance for ambiguity may

prematurely close their information processing activities, and are

rigidly impervious to new information. The way tolerance is

discussed in the literature suggests that consumers go through astage of ambiguity if they intend to clarify the choice environment

and make a more considered purchase. Ambiguity confusion then

occurs when the error band, and uncertainty within the information,

exceeds the error and uncertainty tolerance of the consumer.

Pinson’s (1978) work on cognitive styles distinguished be-

tween sharpeners and levelers, which are similar to Cox’s (1967)

clarifiers and simplifiers. Foxman et al. (1992) found sharpeners

commit fewer errors than levelers when distinguishing between

similar stimuli. Such consumers use more discriminant criteria and

are less likely to be deceived when buying an imitator instead of an

original brand.

Based on Kolb’s (1976) exploratory work, Sproles and Kendall

(1990) examined the relationship between learning style and deci-

sion-making styles and identified three learning styles which couldbe particularly overload confusion inducing; namely, (1) the pas-

sive, accepting learning characteristic, (2) the concrete, fact-orien-

tated characteristic, and (3) the non-adaptive, struggling learning

characteristic. Indeed, in addition to a confused by over-choice

factor, Sproles and Kendall (1986) identified several decision-

making factors which have links with confusion, namely: Perfec-

tionism, Novelty-Fashion Consciousness, and Price-Value Con-

sciousness. We now discuss and explain some of these relation-

ships.

The perfectionistic consumer usually tries to buy products of

superior quality (Sproles 1985). This can involve a great deal of

thorough and systematic search for alternatives and comparisons

because few products meet their demanding criteria. This thorough-

ness is also likely to enhance an individual’s ability to distinguish

between similar stimuli. Hence, we argue that a perfectionistic

approach to shopping might be an effective shield against confusion

caused by similarity and overload antecedents.

Novelty-fashion seekers may be particularly prone to overload

and ambiguity confusion antecedents because: they tend to obtain

more information from the mass media and outside their social

system (Midgley and Dowling 1978); fashion is ever changing andcontradictory (Mead 1993); of the uncertainty surrounding the

longevity of such trends and the ambiguity of defining what is

fashionable; they cannot be certain whether their products or styles

will ever become widely accepted (Winakor et al. 1980).

Economic/price-value conscious consumers want the best

value for money, tend to have clear purchasing criteria and their

approach to shopping is systematic, thorough and efficient (Darden

and Reynolds 1971). This makes them less likely to experience

similarity, overload or ambiguity confusion antecedents.

Field independent individuals impose organization upon vi-

sual stimuli and are able to locate a sought-after component. The

ability to better organize stimuli makes field independent consum-

ers less likely to experience confusions from overload and ambigu-

ity antecedents. Equivalence range refers to the extent to which individuals

generalize about stimuli presented to them (Foxman et al. 1992;

Gardner, Jackson and Messick 1960). An individual with broad

equivalence (or low conceptual differentiation) considers stimuli to

be the same, even when they are only marginally similar. Thus,

broad equivalence consumers are more likely to become confused

from similarity antecedents.

Shopping environment relates to the store layout, variety of

products on offer, arrangement of the merchandise, music, colors,

lighting, etc. It might be expected that constant product moving,

combined with poor signage, will increase ambiguity antecedents

of confusion. Overload antecedents are likely to be exacerbated

when too many products are placed on the shelves. Also, when

look-alike brands are placed side-by-side to the original brand,consumers are more likely to detect that they are different brands

and similarity antecedents of confusion are less likely.

Confusion Mediator Variables

Situational variables, such as shopping under time constraints,

can lead to rushed decision-making, shortened information-pro-

cessing and inference-making time which is expected to increase

confusion caused by similar stimuli (Balabanis and Craven 1997;

Foxman et al. 1990). Time constraints should increase overload

confusion antecedents because of decreased processing time, but it

might also reduce overload confusion in certain circumstances

because, knowing the time constraints, consumers might seek to

acquire and process less information (Walsh 1999). Confusion

from ambiguity antecedents can be expected to be negativelycorrelated with the amount of available shopping time because it

allows more time to clarify what the information actually means.

The social environment refers to the presence of others and

their interactions with the consumer. For example, others’ opinions

could add too much information and create confusion or could be

in conflict with existing beliefs and create confusion. Expectations

of a situation can also influence how much confusion is generated.

For example, if consumers expect a situation to be confusing, they

may be more resistant to confusion causing stimuli or more pre-

pared to deal with it by using coping strategies which might reduce

their incidence of becoming confused.



Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 32) / 145

TABLE

1

DefinitionsofC

onsumerConfusionandtheirClassification

) s ( r o

h t u

A

n o i t i n i f e

D

n o i t i n i f e

D - i s a u

Q

/ e v i t i n g o c

e g

d e l w o n

k

/ e v i t c e f f a

l a n o i t o m e

/ e v

i t a n o c

l a r o

i v a h e

b

s u o i c s n o c

- n o n

s u o i c s n o c

d n a r e l l e p

S ,

y b o c a J

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. p

, 4 7 9 1 ( n

h o

K

d n a

, y u

b t s e

b

e h t d e n i a t b o g n i v a

h t o n

f o

, n o i s u f n o c

f o s g n i l e e f

) . . . ( “

” . r e t t e b s a w

d n a r b r e h t o n a t a

h t g n i l e e f

+

+

d n a s i l u o a i

M

. p

, 8 7 9 1 ( o t a m

A ’ D

) 9 4

s u l u m i t s t c e f f e n i s i

” n o i s u f n o c “ t a

h t e r e

h n o i t i s o p e

h t e

k a t e

W “

” . n o i t a z i l a r e n e g

+

+

. p ,

1 8 9 1 ( d n o m a i

D ) 2 5

a t a

h t g n i n a e m r o

, d n u o s

, e c n a r a e p p a n i

k r a m e

h t s e

l b m e s e r o s

) . . . ( “

” . d e l s i m r o

d e s u f n o c e

b o t y l e

k i l s i r e s a

h c r u p e v i t c e p s o r p

+

l l a d n e K d n a s e l o r p

S

) 4 7 2

. p

, 6 8 9 1 (

e s o o

h c o t

h c i h

w m o r f s e r o t s

d n a s

d n a r

b y n a m e v i e c r e p

] s r e m u s n o c [ “

e c n e i r e p x

e y e h t

, e r o m r e

h t r u

F . s e c i

o h c g n i

k a m y t l u c i f f i

d e v a h

d n a

” . d a o l r e v o n o i t a m r o f n i

+

. p

, 6 8 9 1 (

. l a t e n e

k o

L

) 6 9 1

e h t n i t

l u s e r y a m s t c u

d o r p n e e w t e

b s e i t i r a l i m i s

l a c i s y

h p

) . . . ( “

” . r e m u s n o c e

h t y

b y t i t n e

d i r o n i g i r o

f o e c r u o s

f o n o i t u

b i r t t a s i m

+

n e l l a h r e V d n a z s e i o

P

) 3 3 2

. p

, 9 8 9 1 (

l e v e l

l a u

d i v i d n i e

h t t a s r u c c o t a

h t n o n e m o n e

h p a s i n o i s u f n o c

d n a r

B “

” . e r u t a n n i s u o i c s n o c - n o n y l t n a n i

m o d e r p s i

d n a

) . . . (

+

+

+

, 0 9 9 1 (

. l a t e n a m x o

F

) 2 7 1

. p

” . d e s

u f n o c e r a y l r a e l c

d e l s i m e r a o h w s r e m u s n o c

) … (

“

+

+

, 2 9 9 1 (

. l a t e n a m x o

F

) 5 2 1

. p

d a e l t a

h t g n i s s e c o r p

l a i t n e r e f n i n i s r o r r e e r o m r o e n o

f o s t s i s n o c

) . . . ( “

s e t u

b i r t t a e

h t t u o b a s f e i l e

b e t a r u c c a n i m r o f y l g n i w o n

k n u o t r e m u s n o c a

r a i l i m a f e r o m a n o

d e s a b d n a r

b n w o n k - s s e l a

f o e c n a m r o f r e p r o

” . e c n a m r o f r e p r o s e t u

b i r t t a s ’ d n a r

b

+

+

. p

, 5 9 9 1 ( r e r e f p a

K

) 1 0 1

” . s g n i

k r a m e v i t c n i t s i

d f o n o i t u

b i r t t a t c e r r o c n i n a

m o r f s e s i r a

) … (

“

+

r o

k a h T d n a

i l h o

K

) 3 1 2

. p ,

7 9 9 1 (

r a l i m i s y l

g n i s u f n o c

k c i p y a m s t n e

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h w

, n o i s u f n o c

) . . . ( “

” . s e m a n t e g r a t e

h t f o

d a e t s n i

, s e m a n

+

+

n h a K d n a n a m f f u

H

) 3 9 4 ; 2

9 4

. p ,

8 9 9 1 (

d n a

” g n i s u f n o c e

b y a m

) … (

s n o i t p o

l a i t n e t o p

f o r e

b m u n e g u

h e

h t “

f o t n e m t r o s s a e d i w a

h t i w s e c n e i r e p x e r e m u s n o c a n o i s u f n o c e

h T “

y l i r a s s e c e n t o n , y t i x e l p m o c

d e v i e c r e p e

h t o t e u d s i

, r e v e w o

h , s

n o i t p o

” . y t e i r a v r o y t i x e l p m o c

l a u t c a e

h t o t

+

n i r r o

M d n a y b o c a J

) 7 9

. p ,

8 9 9 1 (

e r e h t

, k r a

m e d a r t a e s u o t e r e w r e n w o e h t n a

h t r e

h t o e n o e m o s

f I “

) r e s u r o i n u j

r o d n o c e s e h t y

b ( e s u

h c u s t a

h t y t i l i b i s s o p e

h t e

b d l u o w

s e k a m y l l a u t c a o

h w g n i

d r a g e r

d e s u f n o c e

b o t s r e m u s n o c e s u a c

d l u o c

” . t c u

d o r p e

h t

+

d n a

l l e h c t i M

, 9 9 9 1 ( u o i l i s s a v a p a

P

) 7 2 3

. p

n o i t a m r o f n i s t c e f f a

h c i h w

d n i m

f o e t a t s a s i

) . . . ( n o i s u f n o

C “

e b e r o f e r e

h t y a m r e m u s n o c e

h T

. g n i

k a m n o i s i c e d

d n a g n i s s e c o r p

” . n o i s u f n o c

f o

e r a w a n u r o e r a w a

+

+

+

) 4 2

. p

, 9 9 9 1 ( h s l a W

n i s e s i r a y l i r a m i r p t a

h t d n i m

f o e t a t s e l

b a t r o f m o c n u n a : s i n o i s u f n o

C “

’ s r e m u s n o c s t c e f f a y l e v i t a g e n

h c i h w

d n a e s a

h

p e s a h c r u p - e r p e

h t

o t d a e l n a c

d n a s e i t i l i

b a g n i

k a m - n o i s i c e

d d n a g n i s s e c o r p n o i t a m r o f n i

” . s n o i s i c e

d l a m i t p o -

b u s

g n i k a m s r e m u s n o c

+

+

, 0 0 0 2 (

. l a t e

l l u

b n r u

T

) 5 4 1

. p

a p o l e v e

d o t e r u l i a f r e m u s n o c s a

d e n i f e d s i n o i s u f n o

c r e m u s n o c

) . . . ( “

e h t g n i r u d

, e c i v r e s / t c u

d o r p a

f o s t e c a f s u o i r a v

f o n o i t a t e r p r e t n i t c e r r o c

” . e r u

d e c o r p g n i s s e c o r p n o i t a m r o f n i

+

+




FIGURE1

ConceptualModelforAntecedents,Mod

erators,Mediators,CopingStrategiesandConsequencesofConfusion




Experiencecan work for or against the consumer with respect

to confusion. Although Foxman et al. (1990) suggest that new triers

and occasional buyers may be especially vulnerable to confusion,

Brengman et al. (2001) found no statistical differences in the

proclivity to similarity antecedents of confusion between light and

heavy product category users. Experienced consumers are less

likely to thoroughly compare the products they buy regularly and

are less likely to be overloaded than inexperienced ones. This is

partly because although they consider a greater number of informa-

tion dimensions, heavy users look at fewer brand alternatives(Jacoby 1977), and partly because the knowledge that stems from

experience facilitates information processing. Also, firmer product

beliefs, accrued from experience, make consumers selectively

perceptive and reduce consumers’ scope of search (Neisser 1976).

As consumers gain brand experience their knowledge base ex-

pands, choice alternatives and evaluative attributes become fewer

and they should become less susceptible to all three types of

confusion.

Foxman et al. (1992) suggest that the task definition can

influence the propensity to become confused because it is related to

the importance of a purchase. For example, consumers can be

scrupulous and attentive when buying a gift and thus be less likely

to be confused from similarity antecedents (Balabanis and Craven

1997).With a low-involvement purchase, confusion from informa-

tion overload is less likely to occur because less information search

and processing takes place. Confusion from ambiguous market

stimuli should be positively correlated with quicker decision mak-

ing because the consumer is less likely to thoroughly examine

ambiguous product information. In high-involvement contexts, the

decision maker will put greater effort into making choices by

adopting decision styles that involve more deliberation and evalu-

ation and this may help to avoid confusion (Foxman et al. 1992).

However, greater effort is only likely to reduce the incidence of

confusion if two conditions hold, namely, 1) that the information is

available and comprehensible, and 2) that the consumer has the

processing ability to analyze the information. If either of these two

conditions is not met, consumers could easily become more con-fused as they increase the purchase evaluation effort.

Consequences of Confusion

We suggest thatattribution theory serves to determine some of

the consequences of confusion. The more consumers attribute their

confusion to external company sources, the greater will be the effect

on company-related consequences. Although no study has system-

atically investigated the outcomes of consumer confusion, it has

been associated with several unfavorable consequences, such as,

negative word-of-mouth (Turnbull et al. 2000), dissatisfaction

(Zaichkowsky 1995; Foxman et al. 1990), cognitive dissonance

(Mitchell and Papavassiliou 1999), decision postponement (e.g.,

Jacoby and Morrin 1998; Huffman and Kahn 1998), shopping

fatigue (Mitchell and Papavassiliou 1997), reactance (Settle andAlreck 1988), decreased loyalty and trust and confusing other

consumers (Foxman et al. 1992; 1990). We propose that there are

two temporally-distinct consequence categories. The first relates to

the immediate effects of confusion. The second relates to actions

aimed to cope with, reduce or eliminate confusion.

Overload-confused consumers are likely to interrupt decision

making in order to take measures that allow them to deal with the

information load by separating important from less important

information, narrowing the choice set or reducing the number of

attributes on which the decision is based (e.g., Iyengar and Lepper

2000). The situations in which no decision postponement takes

place are when a consumer unknowingly acts because of

subconscious confusion, e.g., buying an imitator brand believing it

is the original.

When choice rather than abandonment is the result of confu-

sion, the same possible negative consequences for all three types of

confusion on choice can be: a) a known alteration in brand choice

caused by a lack of understanding, b) the same choice, but made

with undue amounts of uncertainty, misunderstanding, frustration

and dissonance, c) the same choice, but poor or non-maximal

product utilization caused by inadequate understanding, d) thesame choice, but an inability to inform others about the product or

misinform them which may create problems for others, e) the same

or different choice depending on the outcome of a delay designed

to clarify the choice by using confusion reduction strategies.

Finally, there is a tendency in the literature to regard confusion as

akin to (a reverse) ‘hygiene’ factor in the consumer decision-

making; its presence causes dissatisfaction, but its absence does not

motivate consumers to purchase and does not necessarily lead to

satisfaction. This is likely because the experience of confusion can

be rather unpleasant, the eventual outcome or consequences flow-

ing from it can be negative. The ‘hygiene’ analogy gives a negative

view of confusion, which we contend for the most part to be correct.

However, it is conceivable that confusion will have positive conse-

quences. For example, if a consumer employs confusion reductionstrategies and successfully copes with his/her confusion, it could

lead to decreased pre-purchasing dissonance or increased satisfac-

tion. In the following section we offer further specific insights into

the potential impact of confusion from all three types of antecedents

on consumers’ behavior.

Confusion from Similarity Antecedents and Related Outcomes

Stimulus similarity is likely to lead to a delay or abandonment

of decision making because when consumers are aware that there is

at least a possibility that they are about to buy a brand they did not

intend to, they are likely to take more time to find out whether the

(two or more) alternatives are actually the same. Consumers may

also abandon a purchase altogether (‘no-choice option’) because

they want to avoid making difficult trade-offs (e.g., Dhar 1997).

Other studies have reported similar findings that consumers aremore likely to select a no-choice option when both alternatives are

attractive (e.g., Luce 1998). The relevance of confusion from

similarity antecedents to social interaction is because consumers

sometimes feel ashamed of being unable to differentiate between

brands. Consumers who are duped are not always likely to share

their negative experience which they see as their own fault.

We expect consumers’ inability to differentiate between stimuli

(i.e., perceived stimulus similarity) to cause dissatisfaction directed

towards one manufacturer that clearly imitates the other. This is

partly because of the time and effort needed to assess the authentic-

ity of the alternatives and these opportunity costs yield no utility

(Foxman et al. 1990). What is worst still for the original manufac-

turer, is if the consumer does not realize that he/she has bought an

imitator brand and attributes any resultant dissatisfaction to theoriginal brand.

Brand loyalty is also likely to be affected by confusion caused

by similar stimuli (Mitchell and Papavassiliou 1999) because

confused consumers, who perceive stimulus similarity and have

trouble distinguishing products and manufacturers, will find it

difficult to reward a manufacturer with their trust. In this context,

Zaichkowsky and Simpson (1996) argue that perceived brand

similarity can change consumers’ attitudes about the uniqueness of

the national brand. Consumers’ trust is likely to reduce because they

will not know which the ‘right’ alternative is and which manufac-

turer to trust (Lau and Lee 1999).




Confusion from Information Overload and Related Outcomes

Overload-confused consumers are likely to interrupt decision

making in order to take measures that allow them to deal with the

information load by separating important from less important

information, narrowing the choice set or reducing the number of

attributes on which the decision is based. Since stimulus overload

can be attributed to a lack of (processing) time, delaying the

purchase decision can be interpreted as an attempt to gain more

processing time. However, expending a greater effort to arrive at a

decision without gaining a perceivable utility can lead to consumer dissatisfaction (Turnbull et al. 2000). Perceived overload, caused

by too many stimuli, can cause stress on part of the consumer and

dissatisfaction.

As brand loyalty reflects habitual purchasing and requires less

decision making, information seeking and brand evaluation, the

prospect of having to do less information processing and compari-

son is likely to be appreciated by those consumers who are prone to

stimulus overload confusion. Therefore, loyalty can be viewed as a

strategic (conscious or non-conscious) reaction to overload. More-

over, Chernev (2003) found that when consumers select a product

from a large assortment it often leads to weaker preferences.

Irrespective of cognitive abilities, consumers tend to feel

better prepared for purchase decisions with a greater amount of

information (Jacoby, Speller, and Berning 1974; Jacoby, Speller,and Kohn 1974). Since consumers tend to prefer larger stores, with

a greater assortment, to smaller stores with a small assortment

(Hoyer and MacInnis 1997), the over-abundance of products and

information which today’s consumers encounter is unlikely to

decrease trust per se.

Confusion from Ambiguous Stimuli and Related Outcomes

Consumers who are confused by unclear stimuli, or who suffer

from partial miscomprehension (i.e., who extract more than one

logically independent meaning), are likely to try to find information

that will help them clarify their choice environment, e.g., by trying

to establish which information is more credible. This will inevitably

involve suspending the decision-making process. When consumers

compare two or more complex products and experience confusion

from ambiguous information, it could lead to choice deferralbecause the consumer tries to cope with what is seen as a non-

comparable alternative (Dhar 1997). However, ambiguity-con-

fused consumers are unlikely to engage in negative word-of-mouth

if they attribute their inability to fully use and understand a product

to themselves and not the product manufacturer.

Similar to stimulus overload, ambiguity is likely to cause

consumers to seek ways to make satisfactory decisions on a more

permanent basis and becoming brand loyal equates to making fewer

comparisons, which means consumers are confronted with less

ambiguous or unclear stimuli. Trust can help to reduce the per-

ceived complexity in the environment (Hillmann 1994) because

products that have once been positively evaluated do not need to be

assessed again. From an attribution viewpoint, it is also conceivable

that consumers do not blame manufacturers and retailers for their perceived ambiguity, but blame themselves, which is unlikely to

entail a withdrawal of trust.

Confusion Reduction/Coping Strategies

When confusion is experienced by consumers, the same

context may (or will) cause different degrees of confusion depend-

ing on the individual’s prior skill or competence in information

processing and with respect to the confusion ‘strategies’ adopted to

cope. An important prerequisite for the use of confusion reduction

strategies (CRS) is that the consumer is aware of the confusion

involved in the decision. Confusion reduction has not been studied

before and this section identifies some strategies which consumers

might use.

In our view, CRS are, in the main, concerned with clarifying

a choice, reducing ambiguity and increasing understanding relating

to a purchase decision. We propose that the confused consumer

develops strategies which can be categorized into four generic

approaches, namely; (1) clarify the buying goals, (2) seek addi-

tional information, (3) narrow down the set of alternatives, (4)

share/delegate the purchase decision. The ‘seeking additional in-

formation’ category mostly consists of strategies which clarify thechoice environment, but can also involve simplifying strategies.

The reduction of confusion caused by similarity and ambiguity

critically depends on the content of the information received, since

additional information which is conflicting will not reduce similar-

ity antecedents and can exacerbate ambiguity. Confused consumers

can often involve other people (i.e., spouse, family member and

friend) in the purchasing decision by asking a person to accompany

them whilst shopping to help them comprehend the choice environ-

ment. Alternatively, they may delegate the task completely.

CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCHThis paper stimulates a number of research questions driven

by the proposed model. For example, how is confusion affected by

the decision context, e.g., by the degree of involvement and how isit affected by purchaser characteristics such as; age, gender and

cognitive style? The role of atmospherics and the overall physical

store environment and its relationship with consumer confusion

would appear complicated and requires further exploration. Indeed,

basic research parameters of confusion need to be established such

as identifying and measuring; antecedents of confusion; modera-

tors and mediators of confusion; reduction strategies and outcomes

of confusion. One outcome which requires further research might

be shopping fatigue. Consumers who experience confusion regu-

larly across different products categories are likely to become more

frustrated with and tired of shopping. To the extent that much of the

information processing and assessment of error and uncertainty are

done without our conscious awareness, we can agree somewhat

with Foxman et al.’s (1992) assertion that confusion is concernedwith errors of which the consumer is unaware (at least partially),

because sub-conscious processing of information is a basic condi-

tion driven by our mental limitations vis-à-vis a complex environ-

ment. This presents a major challenge for the measurement process.

In order to examine some of these ideas, we need to measure

each type of consumer confusion which depends significantly on

the development of a comprehensive confusion scale (e.g., Foxman

et al. 1992). Thus far, no comprehensive scale exists, although some

existing scales may capture elements of the overload confusion

concept, e.g., Reilly’s (1982) ‘Role Overload of the Wife’, Childers,

Houston and Heckler ’s (1985) ‘Style of Processing Scale’ and

Sproles and Kendall’s (1986) confusion factor in their ‘Consumer

Styles Inventory’. There is therefore a need to devise a completely

new scale to measure the degree of confusion caused by similarityand ambiguity.

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