usaf oral history program interview of maj. frank j. gorski, jr

8/16/2019 USAF Oral History Program Interview of Maj. Frank J. Gorski, Jr.

1/89

USAF

OR L

HISTORY

PROGR M

Interview

650

Major Frank J

Gorski

Jr

Eglin AFB FL

5

Feb

1973

SCANNED BY ISA

«

0

-

~ \ ; -

- : : ~

..........4 \ .1


2/89

t

UNITED STATES

AIR

FORCE

OR L

HISTOHY

PROGR M

Interview

650

of

Major Frank J G o r s k ~

By

LTC V.

H.

Gallacher

Maj

Lyn R.

Officer

Date 5 Februarr 973

Location Eglin

AFB FL

The pen and

ink

changes have been made by the editor

'


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Guide

to

Contents

Major Frank

J.

Gorski,

Jr.

Interview

Subject

Early career

in

the Air Force

Switched from

multi engines to single engine aircraft

Trained in T-28 aircraft

at

Stead AFB

and Hurlburt AFB

Assigned

PCS to

Bien Hoa, South Vietnam

Flew

missions

with

F RM

G TE personnel

Fire fight in IV Corps described

Flew al l models of T-28

South Vietnamese rode in backseat of T-28

Engaged

in

many

night

missions

Command and control

structure

described

Types

of

radios

on T-28

aircraft

Types

of

ordnance

carried

on T-28

aircraft

Size

of napalm cans carried on T-28 aircraft

Weight of ordnance carried on T-28 aircraft

Rules of Engagement in Vietnam

Only worked with

airborne

F C

Did

not

support any particular unit

Tactics employed in

target

area with

close

air

support

Dive angles and

release

altitudes described

i


4/89

Page(s)

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30

32

33

35

37

38

39

40

41

42

42

43

44

45

46

50

51

51

53

55

56

GORSKI

Subject

CE

estimated using

hard bombs

Background experience of T-28 pilots

Training of

South Vietnamese

pilots

Quality

of South Vietnamese

pilots

Rules

of

Engagement and

effectiveness

Departed South Vietnam

in

August

1964

Became

involved

in

B 26K program

Trained

at

Hurlburt

and England

AFB

Worked

out

of

Nakhon

Phanom

with the 603d

during

1966

Primary mission was interdiction

Operated mainly in STEEL

TIGER

east

Flew single

ship

missions

Crew

makeup

on

the

B-26 s

Number

of

B-26 s

operating

Supported infiltration and

exfiltration

teams

in Laos

Teams were under

PRAIRIE FIRE

programs

Ordnance

carried

on

the

B 26

Use

of

star light

scopes

B 26

as a

close

air

support vehicle

Use

of

trucks in truck killing operations

Dive angles employed

in

dropping ordnance

Differences in

Rules of Engagement from one

tour to

the

next


5/89


6/89

Oral

History

Interview 650

Date:

5

February

1973

SECRET

Taped Interview

with

Major Frank

J.

Gorski,

Jr.

Conducted by: Lt Colonel V.

H.

Gallacher and Major Lyn R.

Officer

Ga: Major Gorski,

let 's

begin the interview by reviewing your early

career

in the

Air Force and

leading up

to how you

got

into

Special Operations Forces.

Go:

Yes, well, okay.

We

have

got

to

go

back twenty

years

almost, I

guess. I

came in the Air

Force in

1954

in the

old

Aviation

Cadet program. I

was

one of

the few

people they took at

that

time without a college education. When they opened the doors

for

a while

t

was

in

the

Korean

War

and they wanted

warm

bodies,

and I was one of the warm

bodies.

And I went through the Cadet

program at Lackland. I went

to

Enid, Oklahoma,

Vance

AFB, for

multi-engine training and

then

down to Randolph for advance

training. y first assignment

in

the Air Force was with the Air

Defense Command

out

in

Yuma,

Arizona,

Yuma

County Airport, the

Tow

Target Squadron. I

was

a rag dragger.

Tha

t

's

when I

started

getting

shot

at. Then I spent a tour in

the

United

Kingdom

in

tankers.

I

was

kind of a frustrated fighter pilot

all my

l ife.

I t

was

sort

of a conflict of

interest

when I f irst


7/89

GORSKI

came

in;

one I

figured

on a very short military career, and I

was planning on

getting

out and

flying for

the airlines. That

is one reason I went to basic multi-engines to get a multi-engine

rating and

all

this kind of

stuff.

I fell in love with the Air

Force

more

or less and decided this is what I wanted to do.

So

one of my primary aims was to get back in a

single-engine

or

fighter business.

After my

three

years of tankers over in United

Kingdom

on

my

way back--my next assignment was another

KB-50

outfit,

England

Air

Force Louisiana. I stopped

at

the

Pentagon

and asked

them haw

I could switch over. I had an interview with

one

of their

personnel officers

that

said that the flying game

is

done. Got to start

thinking

missiles. This was back in 1960.

If

I wanted

to

get in on the ground floor of

the

missile program

that would help

me out.

I didn t

really

want

to get in the missile

business.

So

he

recommended

as an

alternate

that

i

I had

got

a

mechanical background

to go

ahead and go to school and

become

an aircraft maintenance officer, which would assure me continuity

with the Flying Program. Apparently at that time they were

seriously considering holding all

the

airplanes up and

just

flying missiles. This was prior to Nam [Vietnam] and a few

other things

that

happened since then.

So

I went to maintenance

school and

wound up at

El Paso Texas in another

KB-50 outfit,

only this time

i t was

as a maintenance officer instead of a

pilot. And I had a kind of unusual circumstance happen. I was

running

short

of

crew chiefs and I was down

to

two and three


8/89

GORSKI

levels

cre-v.ring

these old

birds. I can't remember exactly when

i t

was, about 1961, 1962, they had

this JUNGLE JIM

program. I

had fired an application in on that. And a short mixup--episode

here.

I

was

on

the

phone

to T C

fighting

for

crew chiefs. I

needed something besides three-levels. I had

p e r s o n n e l ~ - t h e

guy

assured me,

as

he

always

did, that there

would be

more

crew

chiefs

c o m i n g ~ - f i v e - l e v e l s

s e v e n - l e v e l s - ~ a n y t h i n g that

I

desired. Just

hang on. While I was talking to--maybe he was a sergeant--I don't

remember now--anyway, he

was

talking about

the

assignment. I l l

never

forget the

guy's name. His name

was

Captain Clutch. He

was at

T C

personnel at

that

time. I asked

him

about

this

JUNGLE

JIM program. He

sort

of

made some funny sounds for a while, and

then he said, Well, where

are

you and what

are

you doing? I

said, Well, I'm

out at

El

Paso--tankering. He said,

Forget

i t .

You've

got

that

-

-you're

s'carce as

hen's

teeth.

We

need

tanker

pilots. I said, Well,

I'm in

maintenance now. And he

just about corne unglued over

the

phone. He says, ''You're what?

I

said, I'm

a maintenance

officer.

I'm just wondering what

happened to my JUNGLE

JIM

application. He said, You can pick

'-26,

T-28 or C-47. I

said,

''Wait a minute.

Slow

down. He

says,

Can I

consider

your

JUNGLE

JIM

application for

worldwide?

And I gave him the

order

in

return.

I says, T-28 and B-26,

C-47. Report down at

Hurlburt pretty quick,

he says, Okay,

I l l

fire

out

a message

on the

machine. The guy gave

me

all of

two

weeks

to

get to Hurlburt. I had a wife and family. This I

3


9/89

GORSKI

thought I could hack,

but

the

next

day I

got

a message

to report

to Stead

[APB

Nevada]

before

I go to

Hurlburt

for training. So

instead of

going

to Hurlburt,

I

got

on an

airplane

heading for

Stead and

told the

wife we d

take care of all this somewhere in

route.

And

I got down to

Hurlburt

and personnel gave me additional

few days to

take care of my family.

Then I completed

my

T-28

checkout. I

was in the

f irst batch of PCS

pilots

to be sent over

to Vietnam. Until

that

time, they had been T Y from Hurlburt.

We were

the

ini t ia l cadre of T-28

pilots

assigned PCS

to

Bien

Boa Airbase.

Ga: You got there in 1962?

Go:

1962. I

stayed for

a

year

and went back

ln

1964.

Ga: Would you

describe the significant

aspects

or

highlights of your

tour

in

1962?

Go: Definitely. There

was

a

lot

of highlights

in

my

tour.

I t s a

subject

we

could talk about for

maybe

a

year

in i tself.

I l l

try

to

be

very

candid and

brief

where

possible.

Initially

we

were assigned

to

Bien Hoa and we were under the old Second Air

Division,

34th Tactical Group.

We

were

the

1st

Commando

Squadron.

We

had, depending

on

losses,

attr i t ion,

and

everything else, we

had a handful of B-26 s, and 7-11, I

guess,

T-28 s--the

Air

Force


10/89

GORSKI

E models.

Primarily

most

of

y flying

was

done out

of

Bien

Hoa

or

Soc Trang

dawn

in

the

Mekong

Delta

down

in IV

Corps. I

started

m y ~ p u l l e d

y

fi rst

combat mission on

the 10th of

September.

Ga: You

were

in

FARM

GATE

Go: No

we

were

with

the [garbled].

That s

where

the thing split .

In fact, the

people

that

gave us

the

dollar

ride

or

area

checkout

every month were

FARM GATE

types. For

instance

y f irst

combat

mission I flew

with

Captain

Bill

Potter, a

FARM GATE

pilot.

And

we went over somewhere west

of

Bien Hoa as I remember and

dropped a bunch of bombs in among some

VC

trees and went

home.

That

was y initiation

into

the

program. [Garbled]

The

second

mission

got

a

l i t t l more

interesting. I took off--oh,

prior to

the

fi rst mission

of

course,

I

was

in

pre-combat

training,

area

mapping checkout program

in

III

Corps

here, flying

around Bien

Hoa

learning

the local

area.

[Garbled]

Don t

go

in areas

and

all this

kind

of

good

stuff. So

as I

say,

the

first

mission

was

kind of

routine. The

second day

was

a mission from alert

with Lt

Shernak--lst Lieutenant..

I was a

captain at

the time.

Of

course,

you

serve

your

apprenticeship

under

the old

hands

pick

up experience on your own. Twenty

or

thirty mission point,

you switch over

to lead. Tom

had been an

old

head

there.

He

had been

there

a couple

or

three

months

already. He was

leading

me

on as I

later on led other

people.

We

took

off

on a


11/89

GORSKI

helicopter escort

mission around the Tay Ninh mountain area

there.

Apparently

some

Viet Cong had shot

up

some government

troops

there

the night before and they wanted to

air

evac some

people from there to Saigon to the hospital. Took off and formed

an

escort

mission. e were carrying napalm and r o k e t s ~ as I

recall.

Tom

checked

in

with PARIS

control at

Saigon there and

asked him i he had anything to spend the ordnance

on

and he

said,

Take off to coordinates

umpty ump,

umpty

ump,

whatever they were,

which

was

way down in IV Corps. e proceeded south and very

shortly I flew off my

map

into IV Corps. Well, I had a good,

competent

leader

so no sweat. e

pressed

on. I casually asked

over the radio where

we

would be recovering. He said, Soc

Trang. Well, I had no idea where

Soc

Trang was. e went on

down

there,

and Tom proceeded

to get

shot down.

So

we had a

regular old

fire

fight

going

there

as I

recall.

He got

hit

by

ground fire and bellied into a rice paddy. No problem.

out all right. Nobody

got

hurt. e lost an

airplane.

He got

But I

remember circling my

downed

leader,

wondering where and what

to

do next. My

init ial

thought was

to

head east because I knew

there was a coast out there someplace and then head north, which

would

get me

back

on

the

map. But

I

called

rather

blindly

over

the radio and said,

Does

anyone

know

where the nearest air

patch

is? Some fellow who I--didn't know

who

he was

at the

time--I turned my head and I saw

him

sitting out on my wing

in

another T-28. A big moustache, connnando

hat--looked like

Terry

6


12/89

ORSKI

and

the Pirates --Bob

Necap(?)1 Cap as they called him.

So

I

said,

Well, you look

like

a

friendly old

cuss so

I l l

just

hang

on. He said,

''We're going

home to Soc

Trang. So I said,

Thanks.

Good.

I l l

finally find out

where

this place is.

That

was

Jim

[garbled].

He

is

now

a

full bull. He

dropped me

off at

Soc Trang.

I t got really

hilarious

at that

point because

I landed and nobody

knew me,

a new guy and I

didn't

know where

anything was.

So after much taxiing

around

in circles

and

whatnot [garbled]

The

crew

chief didn't

even know

who

I

was

and

i f

I needed

fuel or not. ''What do

I

do next? He said, Go

talk to the man in

the

hut. The man in the hut was

a Lieutenant

Kingman who was

equally

surprised at my arrival.

Of

course,

everybody wanted to know where

my leader

was. I

said,

''Well,

last

I

saw

him, he

was

down in

a

rice

paddy and

the rmy

had

picked him up. I t

got

really hilarious because

this

guy wanted

to know where

this

all happened and I had no way of

telling

this

guy where

this all

happened because I

didn't

have a

map. Back

in the early

days you

started

asking

things like, ''What

time

did

this

happen? Well, I

didn't

have

the

presence of mind to look

at my

watch, you

know.

This

all

happened

rather rapidly at that

time, so

i t

was

really

hilarious.

Finally,

somebody

came

in--I

don't remember

who

i t was now

that knew

me--and said, ''What

are

you doing

here? And

I

tried

to

explain

i t

to

him and

all

again.

I t

got funnier

every time I told

i t .

But

that was sort

of my

initiation

into early combat

in

Vietnam. From

there i t

went

7


13/89

GORSKI

pretty much the routine.

We

would

rotate

Bien Hoa to Soc Trang?

Soc Trang Bien Hoa.

We

more

or

less

set

up

three

flights

but

we

rotated the flights. We

had a Bien Hoa

flight>

a

Soc

Trang

flight,

and a

more or less off

and duty

flight. We ran

a

l i t t le

OC

there

at

Bien

Hoa.

So i f you

weren t

flying

either

Bien Hoa

or Soc Trang or rotating between? then you were

either

pulling

duty

in

the

OC or

you were

downtown

Saigon goofing

off.

That s

how pretty

much

the year

went. There

are

times

when

we were

covering pretty

much of

III and IV Corps

with maybe three or

four

airplanes trying

to

keep all

the corners

nailed down which

is

obviously

sort

of not quite

working. But

we

did do

a

good

job,

I

think.

I t was

probably

the

most

interesting flying

I have

done

in

my career.

The

people I worked

with

were probably some of the

most

versatile

people

I ve

worked

with.

There

was

a

esprit

de

corps at that time that was just fantastic. You couldn t believe

i t

What you

see in the Air

Force today looks a

l i t t le bit

shaky

compared

to

what you

saw then. You really saw

people

with

sparks

flying out of their

butts,

just

weird.

We

took our

losses; we

took our lumps;

we did

some

fantastic

flying. A

sidelight, there

was

an

article published in

Life

magazine during

that year

about

this

Lieutenant Shank

who

wrote

his

wife

about

how

bad

things

were

at various times. I turned up in

Life

magazine with a misspelled

name

on

that

one

but

he has been

criticized

by

several

people

ln

the

Air

Force. I know this guy

real

well. He

is not

what his

letters

led him to

be.

But

then, too,

you never know a person

8


14/89

GORSKI

really.

But as

far

as a man

that

was doing his job and

everything,

Jerry

was

right there all

the time.

We

needed equipment.

We

didn t

need sophisticated

airframes, F-4 s,

F-III s. We needed

some more hardware, I believe, similar to what

we

had, only

newer models,

new

equipment.

The stuff we

had

was getting

old.

The wings were

peeling off.

People were

getting killed

for

no

good

reason

at all.

Now

we

have such a

thing

as

the Yankee

extrac

tion

system which

we

have

got

a

lot out of

our people

out of

28 s,

for

instance.

This

is

how I

got out

of my

airplane

last

year, or

a year and a

half

ago.

The

state of the

arts

improved.

We

were

talking

about an X

now

which

is

too

many years late. The

war

is

over. We could have done something earlier. I m

sure we

could

have.

0: Which T-28

did

you

fly?

Did you

fly

the

one

with

the big

engine

or

the

small engine?

Go:

I flew everyone of them. T-28 s I m an

expert

on. I flew every

model

made

I guess.

We

had

the

D

series,

which

was the old

A

model

airframe with

a Navy engine on

t

with

the

Air Force instru

ments. During my tour, I had a chance

to

fly

B models,

some of

the

Vietnamese CIS. We had

the Guppy version,

the

Camera versions.

We

had

the--at that

time,

there

were

D s, B s

and

CIS

over

in

Vietnam.

Later

on

they

came out with the D IO series which is

later--not

the latest one--there is

another one

besides that now.


15/89


16/89

GORSKI

catch

a mission with one of

these

guys. We would take them

out

and

maybe

shoot

ADF s.

Electronic

equipment,

navigation

equipment

at

that

time

was very primitive

and

nonexistent in-country. You

had

PARIS

control, which

is

one

radar site there in

Saigon. At

Bien Hoa at

that

time, I

think

we had an old 25-watt, DF

homer

that was

left

over from

the

French days.

We

flew

in

all

kinds

of

weather.

We didn t

bother

with i t . We just got

on the deck and

went. If you wanted to get someplace, you

just

picked

up

a

canal

and went. That

was

your

navigation

system. Flew time and

dis

tance.

Kept one eye on

the fuel

and one eye

out the window

and

pressed on. Night or day,

i t didn t make

any difference.

We did

a lot

of

night work,

flare support,

a lot

of

hamlet defense,

some

pretty interesting

flying, I must

say, sort of

a

cross at

being

an

old

time mail pilot and sort of a modern day aviator. I t was

a

cross

of

everything.

The

experience

level

that

you

attained

very rapidly was just

a

matter

of survival.

Ga

How

about going into

some

detail on a typical night mission

that

you might

fly?

Go

Okay, a

typical night

mission.

I l l

get

back a

l i t t le

more on

this Vietnamese training

business,

a real interesting story

there.

I guess a

classic

would--I

don t remember when i t

hap

pened,

but

I remember a

night fort

under attack

somewhere

down


17/89

i

I

1

1

ORSKI

at IV

Corps. We responded out

of

Soc Trang. I

was lead.

Right

after

takeoff,

I

lost

my

gyro.

So

I

turned

i t

over

to

number

two, and

we

pressed on to the target area. I t was

a

fairly well--

nice

night.

The moon was out. We just smoked

along. I

remember

we

arrived at

the fort. The fort was

under

attack. You

could

see

a

fire fight

going on,

but

the darn

thing was

shrouded

ln

fog.

the

on.

They had

the old fire

arrow down

there

that they had

inside

fort

where

they

would point to which side

the

bad guys were

We

could

circle

above

this

dude and

pick

up the

fire

arrow,

but

as soon as you

tried

to get

some sort

of angle on

i t

you

lost

i t . Of

course, the flare

ship

was

dropping

flares

and they

would

go down in the

fog and that would

really

play

havoc

with

your

sight.

So we stooged around, and I remember

trying to get

up

the river for a while until I

saw

some palm trees coming at

me

pretty

quick.

So

I

got out

of there,

and

came

back up. I

remember as I looked back, I could see a--looked like a motorboat

t rai l through the fog that I made. I said, That was a dumb

stunt.

But

we

would

try everything

we could because

we

had a

limited

resource,

and

we did

things that maybe

now we

would say

were a

l i t t le bit hairbrained or foolish.

But the guys

that

were

involved

at

that

time all

believed

in

what

they

were doing. I

st i l l believe in what

we did

over there. They were willing to

try

anything. That

was maybe not

a typical mission,

but i t was

a

classic in

a sense

that

we took

off

and you had a good reason

to

abort

but you went on anyway. Even

when

you

got there

and you

2


18/89


19/89

GORSKI

Go; This would

come out of the AOC at

Saigon and would pass

all

the

way

up

through

there

and then back out again.

Even so

our

reaction time once

we

got

the word

was like

twenty

or thirty

minutes

in

anyone of

the

Corps because, you

know

the country

is

long and skinny. If you ve

got

an

airfield

centrally located

you can

get

around

pretty well. t was

broken up

in four

Corps

which

made i t pretty

well--pretty nice

setup.

So

we

would get

i t

by telephone. Like I

say initially i t

would probably

go

out

on an

PM t

would be

authenticated

through

the AOC. AOC

in turn would relegate the resource by phone and then

we

would

respond

accordingly. Once we

took

off

from

Soc

Trang,

we

stood

alert

at Soc

Trang and Bien

Hoa.

~ e '

Operational d i r e c t ~ ; at that

time were to recover at Bien Hoa always, because

of

the length

of the

runway and

the

lighting. Soc

Trang

was the old 3 200-foot

Jap Zero

base

is

what

i t

was, from World

War

II.

We

had no

field

lighting

other than

the Army

had a couple

of

bean bag

lights

out

there. In

an emergency,

we

had one

or

two

guys

pull i t

back

in

but

normally once

we

took

off

launched

out

of

Soc

Trang,

we

were on mission. Then we would recover at Bien Hoa, spent out

the night there

rearm and

refuel. We

worked

sort

of

a

daisy

chain

rotation. You came up

just

by

order. We

just kept going

through the missions

that way.

While you were

on this week of

flying or

two

weeks, wherever you were, at Bien

Hoa

or

Soc

Trang,

you just flew

in rotation

continuously.

We

pulled night

alerts.

14


20/89

ORSKI

Then you

would have

the

next day

off,

of course. Then you

would

be back into

the daisy

chain again the following day

until

your

tum

was

back

up at night

again. I would

s a y ~ ~ l e t

s

see,

I had

250 hours

of

combat time as I

recall.

I would say probably

50

to

75

hours of

that

was

night,

something

like that.

Of course

a lot of

that nighttime

was to-from or

holding, waiting

for a

strike to get off.

Ga:

Did you work

with

FACs at

that

time?

Go: Our

FACs at that

time would be

the flare

ship. t initially was

the

gooney

birds

and

then later on i t was the

C-123s.

They

carried

supposedly a--well, they did--they

carried

a Vietnamese

interpreter and a

liaison who

would authenticate a position

who

was

under

attack,

what

i t

was.

Ga:

Okay

so he

was

talking

to

somebody on

the

ground?

Go: On the

ground.

And then

once he

established the

communication-

very

seldom

did we talk to

anybody on

the

ground.

We

always

talked

through

the

gooney

bird

or

the

123 through

the

FAC

the

flare ship. Same thing

during

the

day.

If

we

were working

we

always worked

with

a

FAC

the

old L ~ 1 9 BIRD DOGs O-l s that

were

FACs. We

had a couple of screwy rules

at that

time.

We

could only work

with Air

Force

FACs.

We

couldn t

work with

15


21/89

GORSKI

Anny FAG;. This

was when the Anny

and the

Air

Force had a

l i t t le

bit of a Who was going to run

the

ground support business going.

In

fact,

I

got my tail

in a crack

one

day because I

did strike

a

target with

an

Anny FAC. One of the

rules

we also

had

was that

you had to have a

qualified

Vietnamese observer aboard. This

guy

assured

me

he had an

observer.

I t was too good of a target to

pass

up

and

we

went ahead and

hit

i t

That

was down near

Pha

Xi

Hoa down

on

the

west

coast

down

in that area,

I remember.

Anyway,

we

were

very

seldom

in

touch

with the man

on

the

ground.

I t

seems

like,

as I

recall,

later on

in

the

year

there was

one

or two

engagements where

they

had

some pretty

good

fire fights

going

on the ground

that we actually talked

to

Army commanders or Army

liaison

types

who

were assigned

with

Vietnamese

units.

Those

calls

were

usually,

Bey,

are

you guys

sure

you know where

the

friendlies

are?

We

assured them

that

we

saw

their

panels and

all this

kind of good stuff because there had been one or

two

occasions along

the line

where, as

in

any war,

somebody

shoots

the

wrong

side.

I guess the guy on

the

ground

is

pretty sensitive

about

that.

I

wouldn't

blame them.

Rightly

so.

0; What

radios did

you have

in the aircraft?

Go: We carried

Air

Force UHF, VH and

then

later on our models had

PM for direct

conummication. But nonnally

we

were working

UH

and

Victor [VHF]

was a backup

VHF.

I don't care what they

do

16


22/89

GORSKI

with the airplanes in

the next couple of years,

but i f there is

going to be any kind

of

cooperation

in

the

services,

this is

almost a must

this UHF VHF M

combination. I have

listened

to

some of

Ritchie s

tapes coming

back from

his

missions

up

north

where he

got

everybody working the

same UH

channel and

oh i t s maddening where here

we

could

just select.

And M

is

so

beautiful.

I have used

i t

over

water.

I have used

i t in

combat and

i t is just the clearest thing. I t

has

got

a

real

tone to

i t

and everything, no static, really tremendous.

0: What

kind

of

ordnance

did

you

carry

along

with

you

on these

missions?

Go: Okay. We

had a

more or less of

a

standard

load. You hear some

funny

things

about ordnance

but

our

standard

load

in

the

daytime

would be 100 pound

white

phosphorous WILLY

PETE

and i t s a

small kind

of size,

gray

things.

Then

we

would

carry

an

iron

bomb

usually anywhere from a 250

GP to

a 250

frag

to a 500

pounder. We

also

had some of the

old--I

forget the designation

now but

120 pound

frag clusters.

We had

these six

World

War II

type frag bombs clustered

together.

I t

was

a very effective

weapon.

Our night

loads

primarily

were

consisted of

napalm and

rockets.

We would use

the

napalm to

give

us a

light,

which is

what

we

wanted and

the

rocket

and machine

gun

from

there

on.

Our T-28 s had the tub modification

at

that time.

It

looked

7


23/89

ORSKI

like

a

big suitcase

hanging

on

the

wing

with

a

gun barrel

sticking

out of

i t .

That was a 75 round pod. Of

course,

the

Vietnamese had some of

the

1 round practice pods,

but we

had

the

big

tubs

that

were developed

dawn here at

Hurlburt to give

us the extra

fire

power.

We

had

some

very old anrnuni

tion. We

would

get

some

of this 5

caliber

once

in

a

while that

would

really light up the

sky. I

don t

know what

i t

does,

but the

API apparently coming

out the barrel

would

ignite in

the barrel

maybe

through

burrs or

something and

i t

would get

flashes

coming

out

of

this

gun,

something

hilarious,

sparks

flying

out

ahead.

You wondered what

was

going toward

the target, if

anything.

We

used

straight

API. I m a

booster

of API, armor-piercing incen

diary. I t

leaves

no tracer,

but

i t

gives you where

you re

hitting.

At night

you can--reca11 one

night we

were

just sort of

working

over a

l i t t le

hamlet the bad

guys

were supposedly

in.

You just

walked

this stuff

around. You could walk

i t up

a door, down

again,

and move

i t a11

over

the

street,

just fantastic, yet you re /U

leaving off

any

tracer.

In

the

daytime, i t s bright enough that

i t

gives you

hits.

Every

hit

you can

see,

so

you

can

adjust

your

fire

beautifully.

Rockets,

unfortunately for

a while

there we

were

getting

armor-piercing

rockets.

These were a

mess

because

down in

IV Corps

in the

Delta

during

the

wet season,

you d fire

one of

these

Joses and

i t

would land say

three feet

from a guy.

This

thing

went so deep

into the mud

that

all i t

would

do is

18


24/89

GORSKI

squirt mud

back

out at the airplane

coming through.

We

used to

come back

with

mud

on the

windshields once

in

a

while.

During

the

dry season

when

the

Delta dries out for instance, i t is

hard

and

i t

would explode

on contact. So

we

finally got

through

to

the

Philippines,

the

~ b i c

[Subic]

Foint

there, and asked

them

w h y ~ ~ s o m e Jose was using

a chart from Korea where he said

we

had

so

many

hard

targets

and so

many

locomotives

to go after.

Our

ammunition

at that

time

was more or less

being

programmed on

what they used

in

Korea, bunkers and

concrete structures

and

all

this

kind of stuff. Well,

we

informed them that we didn t have

any bunkers and no railroads and

no

engines and

no tanks.

This

was very

low profile guerrilla war at that time, and

we

wanted

q u i c k ~ f u s e d

stuff, stuff that would

go

up

in

treetops and put

shrapnel

down

where you wanted

i t , in

the

holes.

This

is one

of

the

beautiful

advantages

of

W LLY

PETE

I t

blows up and

i t

gives you

the vertical arc

and then i t drops down If you ve

got

a guy

in the hole, i t s

going

to go right

down with him.

I t s

pretty nasty stuff. Napalm is

good,

but i t just

covers a

very

limited area. s

a daytime weapon, I don t

know;

I prefer

many things besides

napalm

unless

you have

got

a

specific

target

that

you want

to

burn

out like

a cave or something

like that.

But

at nighttime, i t s

a necessity

actually

because

i t

gives you

lights on the

ground, which

is

what you want

to orientate y o u r ~

self

from.

19


25/89

GORSKI

0; What size

napalm cans

did you

carry?

Go: We

had

the

old 500

pound napalm

tanks. They

had a

later e v e l o p ~

ment where

we

had

some 250's.

Again, I

don't

remember the

designator

for

these things

anymore. But

there

were

some

devel

opments. Initially our napalm

was basically the

old soap-gasoline

mix.

If

you

let i t

set,

i t

would

separate. Then i f

you dropped

i t

you would

get

a

vertical

fireball,

everything

going

straight

up in

the

air. One

of

our guys

was playing

around

with

that

adding charcoal to

i t

and

pieces of

rubber and everything else

and keeping

the

cans rotated for purposes

of

keeping i t burning

longer

and

make

the

fire

burn

on

the

ground

rather

than a

vertical

fireball. He later on

got

involved down here at

Eglin

in the

R D

business--this was Colonel Morris Brooksmore--and

did

fairly well.

He

has

come

up

with

some

real

good

ideas. Later

on

we

had

the

napalm

B the

sticky

stuff that

had a

pretty good shelf l ife

and

everything

else.

But initially

we

had a lot of problems

with

some of that stuff. We are recovering a lot

of

ground that they

had forgotten about since Korea and

World

War

II. Why

did

we

do

things like

this?

Somewhere

along

the line

the

light

bulb would

come on

and

say,

Ha,

that 's why we did

something

like this

back

then.

Let's

face

i t . Prior to

our involvement

in

the Vietnam,

initially, we

were

pretty well strategically

orientated. Every

thing

was

either the missile

or

the

long range bomber, and

we

would never

fight

a conventional war

again.

I can remember those

20


26/89

ORSKI

words

way

back someplace,

that everything

would be nukes from

here on

o ~ t .

The next

thing

you

know

I was going downhill on a

dive

b o m b v ~ i n g

a

T ~ 8 with

an

old World War II

iron

bomb. I t s

;

just

sort

of

strange how i t turned i tself

around.

0: How ITUlch ordnance, weight-wise, could you carry

on the

T-28?

Go: On the

models

we

had

there, we

could carry--well,

we tried

i t -

four

or

five

hundred pounders. But, God those wings would look

awful screwy

out

there. They would

start

bending, and

i t was

5 ~ ' Z i z ; : .

just a bear to

taxi

them, because the shock stress would be

bottomed

out

and everything

else. I t was

putting

hellacious

stresses on

the

wings. So

we

normally,

i f

we

went 500 pounders,

we carried

two, and then

we

would

carry two 50

or

100

pound

Ca£I

WILLY

PETE

on

the

outboard.

So we

had two

points

on each

wing.

Then we

had

the

tub.

Overall,

they

came up with

spar

straps later on

and everything

else, but

I

s t i l l think the air

plane

just

wasn't

designed as a

fighter

bomber.

I t was

designed

as a

trainer.

Although

i t

turned

out to

be a tremendous

l i t t le

weapon--you could

really

thread the

eye

of

the needle

with that

thing--like I say,

this is

where

we goofed--this

is where

we

should have stopped,

right

back

in

1964 and

said,

Hey,

this is

great.

Now

we

need something

like i t .

Only let 's

make i t like

a

fighter

or

a

f i g h t e r ~ b o m b e r not

a

trainer

converted.

We

are

st i l l

living with that

hangover.

We pull the A-l's out

and they

21


27/89

GORSKI

say,

''Well,

here s

the answer. Well,

here

we had another

old

airplane.

We

played with

old airframes

right along.

0:

What

kind

of restrictions

did

you have as

far

as bombing

in i e t ~

nam at this time? What were your rules of engagement?

Go:

Well,

rules of

engagement were

s t r i c t l y ~ ~ w e

could

not

operate

without a

FAC. He

had

all the responsibility

for validating a

target. Once we showed

up on

the

scene,

i f the F C wasn t

there,

we didn t

strike. We

had ordnance

disposal

areas, finally. They

were free bombing areas,

but they

were

very

limited and very well

plotted. I f you were going to drop your junk

off

your wings

before

you

came home

you had to use one

of these spots. We

were

really controlled; there was

no

f r e e ~ l a n c e

work

at all.

0: Did you

ever

work

with the

ground

FAC?

Go: No.

Never.

0;

Always

an

airborne?

Go:

Always

an

airborne FAC.

Again, one

of the

requirements

there was

that

he had

this

Vietnamese

observer who did the authenticating.

I guess that s what you

call

i t authenticate the

target.

22


28/89

GORSKI

Ga: Were you

supporting

any

particular

Vietnamese unit?

Go:

No

just

. . .

Ga: Just on call?

Go;

On

call

and

like

I

say

we

roamed from I Corps through

IV

Corps,

but

primarily my flying was

all

done

in

III and IV with a

l i t t le

bit

in

II Corps. I went up there on one or

two

escort missions.

e

would

support the

popular government

forces the local

militia.

If they were validated and

they

had a

priority

they

got

our

air

power. e might be

out

with--a

classic

happened

right

along

the river here

second

river down in

the

IV

Corps

area the big

one

[Song Hau

Giang]. They had a

Viet Cong

sup

posedly, supply

area

where

we

flew

some

cover

for

a landing

craft that

had

some

small

boats. And they

landed a

party

and

they went

in

burned

down

a bunch

of

hooches. e just orbited.

After i t

was all

done, they

got

back in

their

boats and went

back

out

to

sea

and

that was i t

This

was in the

early days of

river

patrols

also. I remember

this

last

river

way down

south

they had a--Iooked

like

a

destroyer

escort or

something,

some

sort

of a small Vietnamese gunboat

in there

one time.

e

clocked

him

up

the river and back. A lot of our work

was

escort work.

Some

government

unit

would be pulling

out

or

advancing into an

area

and we d

si t

up

there

and

orbit.

A

lot

of

i t was

helicopter

23


29/89

GORSKI

escort. We

worked

primarily at Soc

Trang

with

the l2lst

Army

Aviation Company They

had

the

old

Flying Bananas

at

that

time,

initially. Then they went over to Eueys. But they would go out

and supply

all

the

outposts

and hamlets. Well, we d

drive

along,

and

when

they

would

make their

approach and landing

into

whatever

hamlet

i t

would

be, we

would

si t out there

and

orbit. We

would

also cover some of our gooney birds and our l23 s when they were

out

on

these recent

flying

missions.

Whenever they

got

into

what they called a

hot

area,

we

would be sitt ing out there with

them.

One or two

occasions

when the spray flights

were going

into

highly suspect

areas, we

would

fly escort for

the spray

aircraft.

So

we

ranged from escort

missions. We

would run

the

rai l

line

escort between Bien Hoa and Phan

Thiet

on

the

coast, helicopter

escort, Army and Air Force, of course,

Air

Force 123, gooney bird

escort,

some Navy

escorts

up and

down

the

rivers.

I remember

sitting

capping a

line of

the

troops walking

out

one day. I

don t

remember exactly

where

i t

was.

t was somewhere down there in IV

Corps.

We

would have armed

recce missions,

which

we

would

go

out on and more or less hunt around until

we

found a

F C who

had

a

target.

Then

we

would

go find

the

target.

Ga:

That

was

armed recce?

Go:

That

was

armed

recce,

yes.

This

is

what

we

would

usually pick

up

after we finished an escort mission. We would

declare

minimum

4


30/89

ORSKI

fuel we re going home and we d call

in to

any FACs armmd any

work. They d give us a target and we d go and expend on i t

0: Could you tel l us a l i t t le bit about the

tactics

you actually used

in the target area

and also

the

delivery parameters

that

you used?

Ga: For

close

air

support.

Go: For close

air

support. e l l ~ our

basic

composition over

there

was

a flight

of

two. That s all we could afford. You had a

flight

of two

working Bien Boa; you had a flight of

two

working

out of Soc Trang; you probably had a flight of

two

in maintenance

at Bien Boa. That was the extent of your airframes. Sometimes

we d have

three.

We d keep

them

in reserve. But we d launch

always

in flights

of

two, never minimum never below

that,

no

matter

how hot the mission was, always a

mag

[magneto] check.

You know as

the

old airframes were

that i m p o r t a n t ~

we took

the time to run them up. EVen in a mortar attack we d run them

up. I remember one night

some

mortar rounds

come

whistling

in there

that we

launched on. Anyway

we

would

take

off and

proceed to, in a

flight of

two, to our target

area.

Then i t was

a rutual protection. One guy

in

and one

uy

high, and they d

swap, one guy in and the

other

guy high, trying to cover each

other

as

best

you can. Generally we

delivered

one bomb at a

time for accuracy and a limited amount of ordnance. So I would

25


31/89

•

ORSKI

say on an average target we would probably need four bomb runs,

probably

four

straffe

runs.

Again, i t

was

just continuous

zigzagging around the target, sort

of moving

your

attack

headings

as best as you could trying to cover the

man. When

he

was

in,

you were high, and when you were in, he was

high,

trying to

swap

ends, keep a lookout for ground

fire.

During

the

day, you

couldn't. First light and last

light

strikes were very good

that

way

because everybody that took a

shot

at you, you could

see his muzzle

flash.

You were well orientated because

you

had enough daylight.

You

can be your most effective at

fi rst

light

or

last light. This is beautiful because you have

got

a

horizon. You can do anything you want. You don't have to pay

any attention to

the

instrument panel

at

all, and you can keep

your eyes open

for

every

l i t t le

spark on the ground. t works

out

real

well.

During

the

day,

of

course,

there's

smokeless

powder and muzzle flash pressures and all this. Unless the guy

is using tracer,

you don ,t know you're being

fired at t i l l

you

hear

that

thing that sounds like a marble hitting a garbage can.

Then you say, "Hey, they just put another hole in

me

here.

We

picked

up

our hits every

now

and

then.

0:

What

kind of dive angles

did

you use? What release altitudes?

Go:

We had a rule of thumb over

there

going to and from a target

never

to

go below 1,500 feet unless the weather forced

you

down

6


32/89

;

GORSKI

and then as a second best

you

went right on the d e c ~ I

mean

below

the

trees. Okay once

you

got

to

a target area, we would

be working with a FAC. e normally climbed to 3 500 or 4 000

on a perch while he

was

explaining

the target

and w h a t . h a v e ~ y o u

and we would be orbiting up

there.

Once he marked the

target

with

either

smoke

rocket

or

g r e n a d e ~ - t h a t was another must by

the

way. You had to have the target marked with smoke. Then we

would roll

in.

Oh I guess we were punching them at about I

don't

know

starting say around 4 to 5 around that neighborhood.

e would pick one of them off

at

2 500 to 3. That depended on

the size of the bomb of course, you're carrying big stuff, jack

i t

up a l i t t le

bit. If you're carrying

your

120

pound

frag

clusters, you wanted

real

accuracy you

drive

downhill a l i t t le

bit ,

30 40 45 50 60 90 degree

dives, roll

the

other

way

do

a

roll , come

back

in

on

the

target,

fake

the

guy on

the ground

once in a

while,

roll the opposite

way

from

the

target, just keep

the

roll and come out. t varied. t

really

did.

Napalm

runs,

I 'd dive bomb napalms I 'd

just come

screaming across the trees

and kicked them

off.

t just depends

on

where the

target

and

what

the

defense was.

Some

of our later studies that we

ran

into,

people were

trying to

set

up

too

much

of

a pool

table

environment

in terms of how to

set

up

tactics

and

all

of this. There

are

so

many

factors. There

are

friendly

people.

There

is terrain,

trees, weather sun.

I t

gets back to all

the

basics,

and i f

you

play

them al l ,

there

is no such

thing

as Ita good

attack.

t just

27


33/89


34/89

GORSKI

Wouldn t want

to bet on that

one

again.

Again, as the guy s

experience level

increased, his CE

came

down

and he would

probably use a particular tactic that f i t him well in

conjunction

with

what he

was

faced

with.

As you flew

with these

guys,

after

a while, you more or less knew what they were going to do. This

is

an advantage of having a small

knit

unit where you

've

g o t ~

I

think

our

total force

strength

was 21 pilots at that

time

n

the

28

[T-28] section.

We knew

each other.

You

knew the

guy's

mentality. You knew what he would do, what he wouldn t do.

This

was

another planning

factor in

your mission.

You

had

two

real aggressive

Joses

out t h e r e ~

you had to keep your

fingers

crossed that

nobody

got hurt.

Your

best

combination

is usually

a

l i t t le

bit of a granny and a l i t t le bit of a

tiger

and get

these two

cats

out there

working, and one would temper the

other

one. I remember

the

night

before

a good

friend of

mine

got

killed, I kind of thought he was going

to

get

killed

because he

was just

pulling too

many hairbrained stunts. He was

chasing

some

VC

down a dike

with

a propeller because he

was

out

of a m m u ~

nition.

I gave him a

lecture

at the bar

that

night. I said,

It ain't

worth

i t . I t s not

worth

i t . You

should have

quit,

go

home

Let's get another guy

in there. The next

day he flew

through the side of

a shack

or

a house

or

whatever you want

to

call

i t . Parts

of

him are s t i l l

scattered over there. This

is

something a good

commander

has

to

recognize

in

combat

also.

This

is why I'm a firm believer that commanders must fly. A

commander

9


35/89

O P ~ S K I

is not

a staff officer. He

is

a

leader. He

is a combat

leader

and

this

type

of thing.

0:

What

kind of experience background

did

most

of the

people have

in

your

Go: God, t came

from

everything.

Well, take

classically

mine,

not

classically

but

as an example. Walked

in

a

tanker

pilot

turned

fighter-bomber pilot down

at Hurlburt in three

months, a

lot to

learn.

I was green,

but

I

learned i t --a

lot of--not a

lot of but some of the

guys

came

out

of Air

Training

Command,

pilot

training

background,

instructor

type people,

real

good

heads,

M C types S C types

a couple were

actually T C

fighter

types.

End

Reel 1 Side 1

Go: We

were covering

the

people and

their various

backgrounds, and

I guess how they turned

out

overall. The

key

to

any people

regardless

of what

their

background

is is

adequate training.

Obviously,

in

the

fighter

bomber

business

I guess you could

probably say a certain

mentality or

personality

or attitude is

required.

There

is no

argument

there at all. You

need a person

that is more or less a

self-sufficient

type aggressive person.

3


36/89


37/89

GORSKI

is

important and what

his

background

is, is not

as important,

I

don't feel.

I don't

think

there's such a thing as 1 a fighter

pilot or a

bomber

pilot.

I

like

to

look

at

everybody as

aviators. If they

are

a good aviator,

we

ought to be able to

train them to

do

the job we need them for right now. To attach

some

sort

of stigma to some guy because he happens to be the one

that the Air

Force chose to

fly

the

l4l 's across the Pacific

and

say, 'Well, we'll

never

make

a

fighter

pilot out of you

because

you

are

a multi-engine driver,1 I think

that's

ridiculous. He

may

be

the

world's best, but

he

just

happens to be

in

the job

they

assigned him to

do right now. If he's

a good

troop,

he does

his job and he keeps his mouth

shut.

Then

when

he can, he

gets

into what he wants

to. t

took me seven

years to

get where I

wanted to go,

but

I

got

there.

So,

overall,

they

all

turned

out

fairly

well.

As

I say,

i t

was

just

a

matter of

how fast

they

progress.

Once

they

got

going, they were

really all

good.

0:

Would

you

tel l

us a

l i t t le bit

about your

training of the

South

Vietnamese?

Go:

Oh,

yes.

I mentioned

that

a

l i t t le bit

earlier.

e

would

get

involved with these cats about I 'd sayan average of--usually

when

we

pulled alert tour up at

Bien Hoa--maybe about once every

two weeks

we'd

get

one

or two flights,

and

the

idea

there was to

fly

instruments with them. Well, I went

in

a

real

unusual

32


38/89

GORSKI

situation.

First of l l ~ let me say this about the Vietnamese

pilots at

that

time. They

wouldn't

fly at

night.

I

don't

know

why Orientals

don't

want to fly

at

night for some reason.

They

were very proficient, or they were lousy. There

was no

spectrum.

Either had

really

f irst class

pilots

or you had I

don't know

what.

I had a classic case where we had three

airplanes

available and

we

had

three

South Vietnamese

pilots

to

go out

and

do

some forma-

tion and some instrument and some

l i t t le

tactics. These were

younger kids as I

recall.

I was the third man

in

the flight. So

one and

two

rolled down the runway wing to wing and took

off.

Then we gave i t the needle and pressed on and he was flying

the

airplane, and I

was

sitting back

there

looking

at the

scenery,

I guess, when I

noticed

we were kind

of--extremely

high

rate

of

closure

on this here join up. So I

said,

I've got

i t ,

and sort

of eased ourselves out there a

l i t t le

bit , and settled down

and slid back in. Gave him the airplane again and he started

allover the sky.

So

eased back out. I

figured

well, maybe he

hadn't

been flying for a while. So I asked him. He said, well,

he hadn't flown

for

a l i t t le while. So that 's

why

I

got i t for

a while, and I flew for a l i t t le bit and found a comfortable

position

and

then

gave

i t

to

him. But every ime

I 'd

give him

the darn airplane, he'd just go completely bananas allover the

sky. I finally called

lead,

and I said, I'm going

to

break

off. Our man here needs a l i t t le stick

work--stick

and rudder

33


39/89

GORSKI

work. We'll just go

out

and

do

some instrument work

or

something

and

le t

him

get

used

to flying again.

I

was

under

the

impression

that he hadn't flown

apparently for

a long time

now. We

went

out

and stooged around.

He

was

okay

all

by

himself,

and

we

attempted one

or two DF

approaches, as I

recall,

and then landed.

Got

to

debriefing

this

kid,

and I asked him when he had flown last

and

i t

was like--not

that

bad,

maybe within ninety

days

or

some-

thing

like that. So

I asked him where he took

his training,

and

he

told

me he had flown

in the States,

I

think at

Keesler

or

something. I asked him

how

much time he had. He said he had

about

five

hundred hours.

All

the

while I

was talking to

him,

I had a

real peculiar

feeling. I

just

couldn't

put my finger

on

i t

what i t was. I

finally

said,

'Well,

when was

the

last time you

flew

solo?

He

informed me

i t was way

back

in the States some-

time. I

says. Hm,

and the

light

bulb started going on. I

said, How much

solo

time

do

you have?

He said, I've got

one

hour

solo time. So apparently

the

story

unfolded

that he was

one of

the political

pilot trainees

that they

had

put

through

the program,

wouldn't

wash

him out.

He

had

gotten

back over

there,

and he was

s t i l l

wearing

the

wings and st i l l , because his

uncle

or

somebody

was

somebody

in

the government--and

i t s

a waste

of

money,

waste of time. But

there is part

of

the

old oriental bit

about losing

face. Once

you

start

something, you've

got

to

finish. Of course,

he

was in

a

social structure

where his family

4


40/89

GORSKI

didn't

want

to lose face,

so they carried him through.

As

I

recall,

he

finally

wound

up working on

the

OC

in

Saigon which

is

where he belonged,

some sort of

ground

job.

I

don't

know what

ever

happened beyond

that.

This

is

an extreme, and

of

course

we

did

have

the other

extreme,

the

extremely

well, highly qualified,

talented

pilots

that--heck, some of

these

guys

that

had been

flying

combat

for the last

twenty

years

almost.

We si t

around

and

say, I've got 500

hours

of

combat

in

my

two tours.

Big

deal.

They ve

got

thousands

of

hours

of this stuff, daily, daily

daily routine,

you know. So I guess

the

shaky crop or

the

one

end

of the

extreme is

the new

guy

without the

experience, and

the

other guy is

the

old

master, who survived

and

he's pretty sharp,

that type

thing.

0:

Did

the

rules of

engagement

affect

your

effectiveness?

Go:

Yes. Well, because

we

were

tied

to

this F C

and

tied

to

the

clearing

house supposedly

in

Saigon at

that

time. I remember

specifically one mission

that

happened

right southeast

of Saigon,

this mangrove

swamp

down there. We had an early morning spray

mission

escort

where

they

were

defoliating

some

of

the

trees

down

there. As they finished

their mission--there was

a

flight

of

two of

us--we were

more or less just

climbing.

t was getting

lighter. This

was

a

break-of-day

mission. We were just sort of

circling and climbing.

God

I

spotted

what looked

l ike

a whole

35


41/89

GORSKI

nest

of sampans in there.

Of course, the

friendlies always

generally

put that

old

red and yellow flag out

right away

because

they

didn't

want to get

shot

at. So these cats

didn't

have any

yellow and red

flags

out. They also looked

like

they were trying

to

hide these things

under

the

mangroves.

So

I

figured

I had

stumbled across some sort of supply

activity

or resupply or some-

thing.

They

probably had a base

camp down there

and they probably

had--oh, i t would be

hard

to say what they would

store in there,

but

typically where

the Cong

would store

their

stuff, inaccessible,

hard

to

get

at. When

they needed

i t

they needed

i t

and

go

send

a sampan down and

get i t . So

I

called

for a

F C

because I had to

have a FAC

Now

on

that

123 escort mission, I could have struck

i f

I could

identify

ground

fire.

But because

this

was

a

target

that did not

fire and because I found

i t

I couldn't

do

anything.

So

I

called

PARIS

control

and asked them

to

launch a

FAC

They

said

they would, to

stand

by.

So

I orbited for a

while. Fifteen,

twenty minutes went by. These guys

really

were trying

to

bury

i t .

They

were

bringing

bushes

down

I t was

so obvious.

I t couldn't

have been

friendlies out on

a

picnic.

Well,

finally

I

called

back, and I said,

~ l e r e is

my FAC? I need

this target

validated,

authenticated.

They

said,

We re

trying to get

hold

of

the

province

chief,

because the province chief

was

a captain--always

had

to say,

Yes,

i t was friendly

or

not friendly.

Well,

in

this

case,

i t seemed the province chief

was sleeping,

and nobody

wanted to

wake

him up. So

in disgust,

I led

me

and my

wingman

36


42/89


43/89

ORSKI

So

with that

I got involved

in the B-26K

program, which

is

the

rrl

r?J::

UHfflarkerrrehab

that

they

did

out

at

Van

Nuys,

California,

which

is a tremendous airplane. In

fact, we

had such a new

airplane

a t that time

that we didn t

have a DASH-I. We had one guy

that

went

out

to

the factory,

and he

saw the

airplanes. So he

was

our DASH-I.

We

would

stand

him in the

corner

and ask him ques-

tions. If he didn t know

he would

cal lout there

and

find out.

Ga:

That

thing

had R-2800 s

on it?

Go: Yes. R-2800 s.

Ga:

Reversible props?

Go:

Reverse/ADI. Again,

for corrun

we

had

illIF,

VHF

PM

and

HF.

We

could

talk

to

the

world

out of that turkey. Left side,

you had

all electric instruments. On the right side,

you had

all vacuum

instruments.

That

way

you

didn t

have to sweat

out

electric

failures

and

things

like this. Some

thought had gone into that

machine as far as--what

we

wanted at that time

was

counterinsur-

gency

airplane.

Again,

t

was a

step

in

the

right

direction,

but the Air Force only bought, I believe, 35 of them. This is

why the airplane was

finally

taken

out

of combat later

on in

Southeast Asia . There was just

not

enough airplanes to

make

t

practical

to

use.

If the Air

Force had had

some

smarts

at that

38


44/89

ORSKI

time, I

think

we should have bought 200

of them

at

least.

There

was 200

airplanes

available at

that

time, and Onmark

was

ready

to build them.

I t cost

340,000 a copy.

Ga: What was the name of the company that was

building

them?

Go: Onmark Engineering, Van Nuys, California.

Ga: How do

you

spell

that?

Go:

O-n-m-a-r-k. There is a something in there. Anyway

we

checked

out just as--we were stationed

at Hurlburt with

the 1st

Air

Com-

mando Wing at

that

time. We had

the

6th

Fighter

Squadron equip-

ment, B-26 s. Later on

the

603d.

The

wing moved from Hurlburt

to

England

Air

Force Base

in

1965,

right

around Christmastime.

I t seems to me I

got

to England right after--the day after or

something

like that--Christmas, just before New

Years. I

remember

I

spent

New Years there.

Anyway

we had a

pretty

good bunch of

troops in this program. We developed, based on experience from

people coming back from Southeast

Asia, the things we

had done.

Some

of the old

B-26

people

that

were over

there

assigned

to

flying

out of

Bien Hoa at

the same

time

was flying T-28 s,

formed the nucleus of our

unit.

Again, primarily we developed

tactics, polished

everybody's flying skills and

more or

less

trained continuously, maybe without knowing i t towards

the

39


45/89

GORSKI

night

role.

We did

a lot

of night

flying.

We

used to

fly 200

foot low levels at night, stuff l ike this, real good training.

I run a

l i t t le contrary

to

current thinking in TAe

anyway. I say

if

you want a

man that

will be

able to fly again, teach him how

to use

the

equipment. I say i f you ve

got to

take a loss, le t s

take a loss in training, not in combat. TIlat s the place to take

the

losses.

y

adding

restrictions

and

letting

flying safety

sometimes

override

our operational training, we don t give this

man the opportunity to

develop

his skills. Then we take

a

loss

in

combat, which is

not

the

place to take

a

loss. If

you lose a

guy in combat,

i t

should be through the hostile activity,

not

his flying ability.

Well, anyway,

we finally got

a

contract.

I

guess

we

were all looking for i t . They

told

us

we

would be going

over to Nakhon Phanom. Well, they told us we were going over to

Thailand and we d be working an

interdiction

program on

the

Ho

Chi Minh Trail. Typical military move we had

several force

starts and

then

we finally went, you know.

Ga: Was

that the

606th?

Go:

603d. Again,

ole

Frank

was

one

of

the

original

groups

in,

and

we deployed with what they

called

the BIG E GLE package into

Nakhon

Phanom. I

was with

the

original

group

of that. We did,

after two or three day missions--was for more or less area

checkout--went

to straight night

role.

40


46/89

GORSKI

Ga: Who gave you your checkout over there?

Go:

Initially, we would carry one of the

NAIL

F Cs

that

were working

out of Nakhon Phanom They took us out in the area and gave us

dollar rides and

showed

us landmarks and where they thought the

bad guys were and where they thought the t rai l was. Of

course,

the t rai l was always sort

of

a nebulous thing, you know One

day i t s

here;

one day i t s there; tomorrow i t s under some

bamboo someplace. We flew the average of four missions with

these people. Then we were considered qualified, i f nothing

else,

to

navigate

around

the t rai l . We

were

certified

as

F Cs

at

that time so this gave us the option to

strike

at will

within

the

rules

of engagement on

the

t rai l . Some

of

the rules of engage

ment were you couldn't hit a town. If you caught a

truck

rolling

down

the

road, i f

he

got

into

town he

was

home

free.

You

would

either have

to wait

t i l l he

came

out the other

side

of

town or

leave him alone.

0: Was that your primary mission

then,

hunting

trucks?

Go:

Interdict

the t rai l ,

whatever i t took. If i t

just

took hunting

trucks or i f i t

was

hunting sico10

[bicycle]

drivers

with

bags

of ice, i f i t

was

a

guy

in a sampan anything moving down from

the

north

to the south--invo1ved people, trucks, sampans every

thing.

41


47/89

J

J

1

I

GORSKI

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usaf oral history program interview of maj. frank j. gorski, jr

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