U.S. Policy on Missile Defense

7 APRIL 2005

Presentation for the

National Defense Industrial Forum

Phil JamisonOffice of Missile Defense Policy

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Security Environment

• Risks of unexpected crisis and conflicts involving one or a combination of adversaries– Offense alone inadequate for deterrence

– Need mix of offense and defense

• Range of options required to counter threats

• More diverse, unfamiliar, threats (e.g., regional opponents, proliferation of WMD, terrorism)

- Surprise likely- Deterrence unpredictable

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Missile Defense and US Defense Goals

• Assure allies and friends that US will not be coerced by missile threats

• Dissuade potential adversaries from investing in ballistic missiles

• Deter ballistic missile use by denying benefits of any attack

• Defend against ballistic missiles should deterrence fail

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U.S. Defense Strategy

• Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)– Shifts defense strategy to a capabilities-based approach

– Focus more on how an adversary may fight and the means it might use rather than who adversary might be

• Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)– Major change in our approach to the role nuclear offensive

play in U.S. defense posture

– Established a “New Triad” composed of: • Offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear)

• Missile defenses

• Revitalized defense infrastructure to provide new capabilities in a timely fashion

– Addition of missile defenses means U.S. no longer as heavily dependent on nuclear forces

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Tools for Combating WMD

Counterproliferation

• Interdiction

• Deterrence

• Defense & Mitigation

• Strike

• Missile Defense

• Passive Defense

Nonproliferation

• Diplomacy

• Multilateral Regimes

• Threat Reduction Cooperation

• Nuclear Material Controls

• Export Controls

• Sanctions

Consequence Management

• Respond to effects of WMD use against forces and population

• MD is part of a broad, interlocking WMD Strategy• All pillars multilateral, complimentary – including MD

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Initial Missile Defense Capability Against North

Korea Late 2004

2004

Enhanced Capability: Add Defense Against

Mideast Threat Late 2005

• 10 Ground-Based Interceptors (Alaska and California)

• Upgrade Existing Ground-Based Radar in Alaska

• Integrate Existing Sea-Based Radars

• Add 10 Ground-based Interceptors (Alaska)

• Upgrade Existing Radar in UK

• Add Moveable Sea-Based Radar

• Initial Airborne Laser Available

• Continue Deployment of Ground-Based Interceptors

• Initial 5 Emergency Sea-Based Interceptors

• Add 10-20 Sea-Based Interceptors

Capabilities Against Shorter-Range Missile Threat

2005

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2006-2008

Additional Defensive Layer

• Add 20 Ground-BasedInterceptors (New Site)

• Add Sea, Air or Ground Boost-Phase Interceptors (About 2008)

• Upgrade Existing Radar in

Greenland

• Add New Forward Deployed Radars

• Add More Sea-Based Interceptors• Add More Capable Ground-

Based Interceptors

Initial Missile Defense Plan

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Responding To Guidance

•Evolutionary Missile Defense Plan I: Field an initial increment of missile defense capability (2004-2005)

–Initial protection of entire U.S. from North Korea–Partial protection of the U.S. from Middle East

threat–Protection of deployed forces, allies and friends

•Evolutionary Missile Defense Plan II: Field next increment of missile defense capability (2006-2007)

–Complete protection of U.S. from Middle East–Expand coverage to allies and friends–Increase countermeasure resistance, and increase

capability against shorter-range threats

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Responding To Guidance (cont’d)• Field modest missile defense capabilities in 2004-05

– Up to 20 Ground-based midcourse interceptors

(current 8; planned through 2005 ~ 18 GBIs)

– Up to 20 Sea-based interceptors

(current 4; planned through 2005 ~ 8 SM-3s)

– AEGIS ships upgraded for missile defense

(current 2; planned through 2005 ~ 10 S&T Destroyers; 2 Engagement Cruisers)

– Continued deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units

(current ~200; planned through 2005 ~ 280 PAC-3s)

– Forward-based sensors

(current 2 -- Cobra Dane/Beale; by adding Fylingdales in 2005 – 3)

• Evolutionary; add capability as threat and technology develop

• Continue Research, Development and Testing

• Seek cooperation with allies and friends National Security Presidential Directive 23 (December 17, 2002)

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Implementation Of Evolutionary Missile Defense Block 2004 And 2006 – Approved And Funded

2005 2007

• 16 Ground-Based Interceptors, Alaska• 2 Ground-Based Interceptors, California

• 281 Patriot PAC-3

• Up to 26 Ground-Based Interceptors, Alaska• 2 Ground-Based Interceptors, California

• 512 Patriot PAC-3

• 2 Aegis Engagement Cruisers*

• 8 Standard Missile-3s**

• 3 Aegis Engagement Cruisers*• 8 Aegis Engagement Destroyers*

• 28 Standard Missile-3s**

• Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska• Beale Radar, California• Fylingdales Radar, United Kingdom

• 1 Sea-Based X-Band Radar, Alaska• 1 Forward-Based X-Band Radar, East Asia• 10 Aegis Search & Track Destroyers

• Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska• Beale Radar, California• Fylingdales Radar, United Kingdom• Thule Radar, Greenland

• 1 Sea-Based X-Band Radar, Alaska• 2 Forward-Based X-Band Radars• 6 Aegis Search & Track Destroyers

Initial Protection vs North KoreaPartial Coverage vs Mid-East

Protect Deployed Forces

Full Protection Against Mid-EastExpand Coverage to Allies & Friends Expand Coverage of Deployed Forces

* Engagement ships can perform Search & Track Function** Planned deliveries

Fixed Site Interceptors

Fixed Site Sensors

Mobile Interceptors

Mobile / Transportable

Sensors

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Proposed Missile Defense Plan III Blocks 2008 And 2010

2009 2011

• Up to 36 Ground-Based Interceptors, Alaska

• 2 Ground-Based Interceptors, California

• 36 Ground-Based Interceptors, Alaska• 2 Ground-Based Interceptors, California• 2 Ground-Based Interceptors, Europe

• 3 Aegis Engagement Cruisers• 15 Aegis Engagement

Destroyers• 72 Standard Missile-3s*• 24 Terminal High Altitude Area

Defense Missiles • 712 Patriot PAC-3

• 3 Aegis Engagement Cruisers• 15 Aegis Engagement Destroyers• 101 Standard Missile-3s*• 48 Terminal High Altitude Area

Defense Missiles • 900 Patriot PAC-3

• Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska• Beale Radar, California• Fylingdales Radar, United Kingdom• Thule Radar, Greenland• Otis Radar, Massachusetts• Eglin Radar, Florida

• 1 Sea-Based X-Band Radar, Alaska• 3 Forward-Based X-Band Radars, East Asia (1)

Europe (1), Caucasus (1)• 1 Discrimination X-Band Radar• Initial Space Tracking & Surveil Satellites

• Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska• Beale Radar, California• Fylingdales Radar, United Kingdom• Thule Radar, Greenland• Otis Radar, Massachusetts• Eglin Radar, Florida• Clear Radar, Alaska

• 1 Sea-Based X-Band Radar, Alaska• 3 Forward-Based X-Band Radars, East Asia (1)

Europe (1), Caucasus (1)• 2 Discrimination X-Band Radar• Partial Space Tracking & Surveil Satellites

Keep Pace With ThreatBegin Addressing Asymmetric and

Unconventional AttacksIncrease Capability Against All Threats

Keep Pace With ThreatContinue Addressing Asymmetric and

Unconventional AttacksIncrease Capability Against All Threats

Fixed Site Interceptors

Fixed Site Sensors

Mobile Interceptors

Mobile / Transportable

Sensors

* Planned deliveries

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Military Preparing to Operate Missile Defense

• Missile defense mission assigned to STRATCOM– Plan, integrate and coordinate global missile defense

operations

– Develop a missile defense concept of operations

• Combatant Commanders (CC) developing plans– NORTHCOM preparing for initial Limited Defensive

Operations (LDO) in near future

– Other CCs developing CONOPs for their AORs

• Services have begun to man and train– Army providing staffing for GBI sites

– Navy upgrading selected ships for missile defense mission

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Guidance on Cooperation With Allies/Friends

• Develop and deploy missile defenses capable of protecting allies and friends

• Structure missile defense program to encourage industrial participation by allies and friends

• Cooperation through broad alliances, bilaterally, industry-to-industry, military operations

National Security Presidential Directive 23, December 17, 2002

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Missile Defense Operations in Iraqi Freedom

• Supported coalition in pre-deployment planning

– High demand assets

– Spread throughout the theater to protect US forces & allies

• Successful during initial phase of combat

– Protected sea-ports and staging areas allowing build-up and operational momentum

• Sustained operations

– Moved rapidly forward to protect advancing coalition forces

PAC-2 GEM/PAC-3 = 9 for 9

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Missile Defense Activities with Allies/Friends

• Australia– BMD Framework MOU signed

• Denmark– Upgrade of Thule EWR; Negotiations on BMD Framework MOU

• Germany– PAC-2/MEADS

• Italy– MEADS; Negotiations on BMD Framework MOU

• India– PAC-2 discussions begun; Exercise planning in progress

• Japan– Acquiring layered national missile defense; BMD Framework MOU

• The Netherlands– PAC-2/PAC-3

• United Kingdom– Upgrade of Fylingdales EWR; BMD Framework MOU signed

• Other Friends/Allies– Cooperative efforts underway/being discussed with Canada; Czech Republic;

Hungary; Israel; Poland; Russia; Spain; Taiwan; Turkey.

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Building A Foundation for Missile Defense

• Embedded in US strategic concepts and operations– Supports U.S. Defense Strategy – An important leg of the New Triad

• Supported by military leadership – Global integrator mission assigned to the U.S. Strategic Command – Combatant Commanders preparing for initial operations – Services have begun to train and equip forces

• No longer enmeshed in the ABM Treaty process– Withdrawal from ABM Treaty permits effective defenses– No new restrictions in other treaties

• International Cooperation – Allied support and engagement

• Commitment to continued deployment– Broad support from Congress for deployment– December 2002 announcement by President