Ballistic Missile Defense Overview– 8th Annual Missile Defense Conference –

LTG Patrick J. O’Reilly, USADirector

Missile Defense Agency

22 MAR 10

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Approved for Public Release10-MDA-5341 (11 MAR 10)

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Ballistic Missile Threat – 2010

EgyptScud SS-1

YemenScud SS-21

LibyaScud

IranFateh-110, CSS-8

Shahab 1 & 2Shahab 3

Shahab 3 VariantNew MRBM Pakistan

Ghaznavi,Shaheen 1

Ghauri, Shaheen 2

North KoreaToksa, Scud

ER Scud No Dong

New IRBMTaepo Dong-2

IndiaPrithvi 1 & 2

Dhanush, Agni 1Agni 2, Agni 3

Sagarika

UkraineScud SS-21

SyriaScudSS-21

TurkmenistanScud

KazakhstanScud SS-21

BelarusScud SS-21

VietnamScud

Sources: NASIC, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2009; DIA, Annual Threat Assessment 2008; DIA/MSIC Message 2009281441SS(U)

Rest of World Force Levels

2008

SRBM 5,500

MRBM 350

IR/ICBM <40

Totals 5,900

• Threats are expected to grow quantitatively and qualitatively

• Long-range threats from regional states did not emerge last decade, but the potential threat remains

• Shorter-range threats within key regions are growing rapidly

• The threat is inherently unpredictable and requires that the U.S. be well hedged against future developments

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• The United States will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack

• The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves

• Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions

• The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term

• U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change

• The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Policy Priorities– Guidance From The President, Published February 2010 –

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Layered Ballistic Missile Defense 2010

Beale Air Force Base

Upgraded Early

Warning Radar

Sea-based X-band Radar

Thule,Greenland

Fylingdales, United Kingdom

Early Warning Radar

Shemya, Alaska

THAAD Fire Units (1→2)THAAD Interceptors (0→25)

Patriot Fire Units (44→52)PAC-3 Interceptors (727→791)

Aegis Ships (19→21)

SM-3 Interceptors (35→61)

SM-2 Interceptors (72)

AN/TPY-2

IsraelAN/TPY-2

Shariki, Japan

Ground-based Interceptor

(3→4)

Vandenberg Air Force Base

Thousands of SRBMs

< 1,000 km

Hundreds of IRBMs /MRBMs1,000-5,500 km

ICBMs> 5,500 km

SRBM = Short Range Ballistic MissilesMRBM = Medium Range Ballistic MissilesIRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles ICBM= Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

• THAAD provides rapid worldwide response against SRBMs and MRBMs• Aegis provides mobile and semipermanent response against SRBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs• Ground-based missile defense provides permanent defense of homeland against limited ICBM attack

C2BMC

Ft. Greely

Ground-based Interceptor

(15→26)

Upgraded Early

Warning Radar

Upgraded Early

Warning Radar

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Early Intercept StrategyA

ltitu

de

Time After Lift-Off

Interceptor Launch

20092020

2016

Threat Launch

2020

2009

2016

2020

Boost TrackingLimited TrackingFire-control TrackingInterceptor FlyoutHit AssessmentIntercept

Benefits of Early Intercept1. Large Raid Handling2. Shoot-Look-Shoot3. Hedge Against Maneuvering

Threats4. Constrained Countermeasure

Deployments

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Phased Adaptive Approach In Europe

• Phase 1: Use existing / maturing systems versus SRBM / MRBM threat

- Sea-based missile defenses will be used as necessary to protect parts of southern Europe, combined with other missile defenses (2011 timeframe)

- Deploys forward-based sensor in Europe

• Phase 2: Enhanced missile defense systems versus SRBM / MRBM threat

- Use advanced sensors and improved version of the SM-3 interceptor, the Block IB, to improve the performance once the technology is proven, including a combination of sea- and land-based configurations (2015 timeframe)

• Phase 3: Improved area coverage versus MRBM / IRBM threat

- As threat matures, use the more capable SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, including a combination of sea- and land-based configurations (2018 timeframe)

• Phase 4: Capability versus potential ICBM threat

- If potential ICBM threat emerges, advanced missile defense technologies could eventually provide some capability against a regional ICBM threat

- Once proven and tested, can be made available for deployment to NATO Europe (2020 timeframe)

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Missile Defense Initiatives

Precision TrackingSatellite System

Planning

Airborne InfraredSystem To

Support BMDHigh Performance

InterceptorsDirected Energy

Research

SM-3 1B IIA IIB

Engage on Airborne Infrared(Aegis Ashore)Engage on STSS Demo Satellites Engage on Airborne Infrared

(sea-based SM-3)

Enhanced C2BMC

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Italy: MEADS partner

Japan: Forward-based X-Band radar siting, 21" Missile Development

Denmark: Upgrade Thule Early Warning Radar

Poland: Agreed to host Aegis Ashore

Czech Republic: RDT&E Cooperative Projects

United Arab Emirates: Request for THAAD, PAC-3

Ukraine: Conducting a missile defense project

Russia: Strategic cooperation /transparency dialogue

Netherlands: PAC-3, Maritime BMD Cooperation

Germany: MEADS partner, laser cross-link technology

France: Discussions

Israel: Arrow Deployed, Arrow System Improvement Program; development of short-range BMD, Upper Tier program

UK: Fylingdales Upgraded Early Warning Radar, Joint Project Arrangements for Cooperative Projects

NATO: Missile defense Architecture Analysis. Working with ALTBMD to demonstrate connectivity between NATO and U.S. missile defense systems

International Activity Highlights

R&D Cooperative Efforts

Australia: Advanced technology cooperation

Bahrain: Missile defense discussions

Qatar: Missile defense discussions

ROK: Missile defense discussions

Foreign BMD Projects / Interests

Kuwait: Missile defense discussions

Saudi Arabia: Missile defense discussions

Romania: Agreed to host Aegis Ashore

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