u.s. marines in vietnam - the bitter end - 1973-1975 pcn ......pated the worst. on 22 april, admiral...

military personnel or vessels would be allowed to enterthe country. Thus no Vietnamese vessel, naval or other-wise, would be allowed to enter Subic Bay, leaving theVietnamese with only two choices, abandon ship orsail their vessels to Guam. The edict also meant thatall other transiting refugees would have to minimizetheir stay in the Philippines, and in order to accom-plish that, the processing procedure at "way stations"like Clark and Subic would have to be expedited.5

W"ay Stations

To help meet the demands of the Philippines Gov-ernment by assisting in the task of streamlining refu-gee operations in the Philippines, the 1st Battalion,4th Marines, after standing down as the AmphibiousEvacuation RVN Support Group, reformed as a bat-talion and reentered the evacuation process. Eventuallyits mission would be to assist in the establishment ofa refugee base camp — a way station to aid transitingrefugees.

At approximately the same time Lieutenant ColonelCharles E. Hester's battalion began preparing toreenter evacuee operations, Ambassador Parker Borgnotified the State Department, Ambassador Martin

in Saigon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Gayl-er, CinCPac, of the Philippines Government's displeas-ure with the refugee situation. Borg had become awareof the seriousness of the problem when he receiveda note from the Philippines Department of ForeignAffairs setting forth new guidelines for the Vietnameserefugees. It said: "No more than 200 evacuees shallbe at the base at any one time. The evacuees shalldepart from the base for a mother country within threedays. The evacuees shall not go outside the base, andthe length of time of this evacuation through the baseshall be determined by the Philippines Government,taking into account the prevailing circumstances." TheAmbassador agreed with Marcos' position, believingthat the initial airlift had been organized poorly. Hecontended that "had evacuees been more carefullyscreened for eligibility and staged more quicklythrough the Philippines, the GOP [Government ofthe Philippines] action might have been avoided.However, see no choice now but to comply with GOPinstruction." Ambassador Borg's first recommendedcourse of action to resolve this potential threat to theharmony of Philippine-American relations entailedremoving, as quickly as possible, the backlog of refu-

REFUGEE OPERATIONS 207

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 1163036

Vietnamese refugees board an Air Force C-141 Starlifter at NAS Cubi Point, Phil: jpines,passenger terminal. These evacuees were on their way to Guam and Operation New Life.

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208 THE BlUER END


Refugees are loaded into a C-141 Starlifter at NAS Cubi Point for the trip to Guam. ThePhilippines Government had given the US. only 72 hours to process these refugees.

Members of the AESF provide assistance as crewmen and dependents disembark from aVietnamese Navy minesweeper at Subic Bay. Processing took place in the warehouse to theleft and later the refugees were placed on board the USNS Sergeant Truman Kimbro.


ft

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gees from Clark Air Base. He stipulated, "No morethird country evacuees permitted to stage through U.S.bases in the Philippines until backlog cleared. Back-log of evacuees at Clark must be removed im-mediately."6

Fortunately, this diplomatic impasse occurred priorto 29 April and before Operation Frequent Wind andthe mass exodus from South Vietnam. By that date,Air Force transport aircraft had moved the entire back-log from Clark to Guam where Marines from MarineBarracks, Guam (manning the Operation New Lifereceiving centers), welcomed them. Removal of thebacklog addressed only the immediate problem andnot the one troubling Ambassador Borg: how tominimize the stay of evacuees on Philippines soil soas not to exceed the 72-hour restriction. Since themajority of the next wave of refugees would arrive byship, Borg decided to shift his focus from Clark to Su-bic Bay.

The ships carrying the evacuees to Guam wouldhave to dock in Subic Bay for replenishment, andtherefore it seemed logical to relocate the refugeecenter there. Ambassador Borg believed that this ac-tion would also reduce the delay involved in processingthe evacuees. Considering the constraints set forth bythe Philippines Government with regard to securityand length of stay, the site for the center had to benear the water, highly secure, and limited in access.Nothing fit that description better than land sur-rounded by water, an island in Subic Bay. Two milesoff the approach end of Runway 7 at Naval Air Sta-

tion Cubi Point sits Grande Island. Normally used forrecreational activities, it suddenly became the refugeehousing and processing center. Temporary and func-tional by design, this initial check-in point would serveas a way station enroute to Guam, but first it had tobe constructed, then stocked with stores and mannedby personnel, and finally secured by forces. Startingfrom ground zero, all of this had to be accomplished

South Vietnamese Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky strollsthe deck of the USS Midway. He flew his personalhelicopter to the ship shortly after noon on 29 April.

Marine Corps Historical Collection



Grande Island sits just west of Cubi Point and was identified as an ideal location fora refugee camp. The island was the first way station for Vietnamese seeking a new life.

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210 THE BITFER END

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A801612

Marines keep order among Vietnamese pilots on board the attack aircraft carrier USSHancock (CVA 19). Many brought their entire crews as they fled from Sa:on area bases.

VNAF helicopters approach the Midway from all directions. They are observing no specifictraffic pattern and are creating a hazard to both the shij and other aircraft in flight.

Photo courtesy of BGen William A. Bloomer, USMC (Ret)

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in less than 48 hours. Already, thousands of refugeeswere on board ships headed for Subic at near flankspeed.

Although the numbers of evacuees on these shipsfar exceeded initial estimates, the total did not sur-prise the Navy and Marine Corps. They had antici-pated the worst. On 22 April, Admiral Maurice F.Weisner, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, sent amessage to Admiral Gayler requesting guidance onhow to handle what he expected to be an onslaughtof refugees attempting to board Navy ships from everytype of craft imaginable. Additionally, he addressedthe aspect of safe havens. He said: "Consider it likelythat a substantial number of Vietnamese may attemptto flee the coast of South Vietnam in small craft andassorted boats . . . a number of them will approachUSN and MSC ships and request refuge. . These

personnel must also be considered in planning for safehaven, designation of which remains an urgent re-quirement. Request policy guidance in this matter."

The Navy's Pacific headquarters then queried JCSas to what they should tell Admiral Weisner. Unfor-tunately, the response came in the form of a messageon 27 April, and was of little help. It did not evenmention the possibility of Vietnamese heliborne refu-

gees. It only said, "Suggest such persons be deliveredto Phu Quoc."8

The designation of Grande Island as the first stopto safe haven and the simultaneous establishment ofGuam as another "way station" and a refugee receivingcenter went a long way toward addressing AdmiralWeisner's concerns. The answer to his question of whoshould be granted permission to board Americanships never came and eventually events made aresponse unnecessary. On 29 April, when the first Viet-namese helicopters (Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky flewhis helicopter to Midway shortly after noon on 29April) began landing on any floating platform theycould find, authorized access became a mute issue.Unknowingly and certainly unintentionally, theseVietnamese helicopter refugees helped the Americans.They alerted and thereby prepared the crews for theimminent crisis that Admiral Weisner had anticipat-ed, literally thousands of small craft overflowing withfrantic Vietnamese seeking refuge. They tried to boardthe ships in any manner possible, but received an un-expected reception. Before any ship would permit en-try, each refugee had to submit to a screening. Marineschecked each one for weapons and once cleared, thenpermitted them to board. In this way, the Americansattempted to insure safe passage for all.


Photo courtesy of BGen William A. Bloomer, USMC (Ret)

A Cessna 0-1 Bird Dog lands on the USS Midway without benefit of a tailhook or barn-cade. The pilot, a Vietnamese major, brought with him his wife and five children.

212 THE BlUER END

The helicopter problem reached crisis proportionswhen Vietnamese pilots started to cut in front of Ma-rine helicopters on final approach to their respectiveships while other Vietnamese pilots tried to land onbarges filled with refugees. Although the numbersthese helicopters carried were incidental, the hazardsand difficulties they created were totally unanticipatedand nearly impossible to handle. More than 30 emptyHueys went to intentional ocean graves at the hands ofNavy crewmen attempting to keep the flight decks oftheir ships clear.

Although many unexpected events such as this oc-curred, it can be argued that the large number ofevacuees was anticipated and predicted by AmbassadorGraham Martin. On 23 April, in a message to theSecretary of State and Admiral Gayler, he estimatedthat the total number of evacuees for the entire oper-ation could be as high as 200,000. Likewise, Rear Ad-miral Hugh G. Benton expected some problems as aresult of the size of the potential evacuee population.Placed (on 5 April) in overall charge of the ongoingevacuation from South Vietnam as CinCPac's represen-tative in Saigon, Admiral Benton predicted someproblems with shipboard evacuation in the final days.He alerted Admiral Gayler in Hawaii by wiring on 23April: "It is proposed that operational control of MSCshipping be passed to Commander Seventh Fleet earlyenough to permit an orderly turnover and provide con-tinuity of operations. It is recommended that addi-tional MSC personnel be assigned to CommanderSeventh Fleet when MSC ships are chopped."(Chopped means the transfer of tactical control fromone commander to another.)9 According to theSeventh Fleet commander, this transfer of control nevertook place. Admiral Steele stated, "Operational con-trol of Military Sealift Command was never passed toCommander Seventh Fleet as recommended by RearAdmiral Benton. In my opinion, this was a serious er-ror. It was another instance of violation of the cardi-nal military principle, unity of command."°

The release of the message authorizing the refugeereceiving center on Guam, the reorganization of theAmphibious Evacuation Security Force into 14 MSCshipboard detachments, and the use of 1st Battalion,4th Marines to construct and outfit the Grande Islandrefugee camp indicated that the events of 29 Aprilwere not unanticipated, possibly just underestimated,especially in terms of magnitude and speed of occur-ence. The fact that these actions happened immedi-ately after the release of the Weisner and Benton

messages signalled a gathering consensus that addi-tional preparations had to be made. The PhilippinesGovernment's diplomatic note provided the stimulus.These decisions, made none too soon, would have afar-reaching impact on the Marine Corps.

Marines would be affected in four different areas.It would touch first and foremost the 1st Battalion,4th Marines. Additionally, the AESF would feel theimpact as the group most directly involved in the han-dling of refugees. The third area affected would beGuam and its Marines, and the 3d Marines on Hawaii.Additionally, a contingent of Marines drawn fromCamp Pendleton and Marine Corps Air Station El Torowould also become involved in the process. The linksin the chain to freedom were forming and the MarineCorps would continue to play a major role in forgingit.

Preparations: 1st Battalion, 4th Marinesand the Task Force

When Admiral Donald B. Whitmire's Task Force 76,Major Quinlan, and the AESF sailed out of Subic Bayon 18 April leaving the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines be-hind, Lieutenant Colonel Hester felt certain his bat-talion had completed its contribution to theevacuation effort. Little did he know that before themonth ended, he and his Marines would be key playersin relieving what stood as a potential diplomatic road-block to continued refugee operations. LieutenantColonel Hester reported: "1st Battalion, 4th Marinesplayed a large role in the orderly processing of thou-sands of refugees through Grande Island, by providingmanpower for movement of equipment, setting up ofover 140 refugee tents and assisting in the overall con-trol of the evacuees."1' Just as importantly, the Ma-rines assisted in the unloading of barges and shippingand provided security for all of these activities. PettyOfficer First Class Paul Long recalled that, ". . . be-

fore the evacuees arrived, the Marines and Seabeesworked around the clock, erecting hundreds of tents,building a chain-link fence, installing security lightsand setting up nearly 200 toilets on the island."12 TheHeadquarters and Service Company commander, Cap-tain James P. Rigoulot, stated, "We averaged about300 Marines a day working, pitching 140 tents, andsetting up."'3

As the numbers of South Vietnamese attempting toflee the country multiplied, other means of transportexceeded the use of the helicopter. Approximately30,000 escaped on a Vietnamese Navy flotilla of gun-boats, patrol boats, and other small craft.' The firstrefugees to reach Grande Island arrived well before the


Photo courtesy of Capt James D. Tregurtha, USN (Ret)Tents to house refugees are erected on the soft ball field and golf course of Grande IslandThe camp commander was Subic Bay executive officer Capt U B. Moore, Jr., USN.

Vietnamese Navy's evacuees even left South Vietnam.These early visitors "called it 'Project New Life,' andduring the height of the massive airlift, nearly 5,000evacuees arrived on Grande Island at the mouth of Su-bic Bay . . . . Fifteen minutes after a tent was up itwas occupied." Until 28 April the South Vietnamesecame by C-141 and C-130, but on that day AdmiralGayler in a message to the Air Force suspended all butC-130 flights which themselves were ended the follow-ing day when a Hercules incurred damage from ar-tillery fire directed at Tan Son Nhut Airport. Theadmiral also addressed how he expected the refugeesto get to their next destination: "MAC [Military AirliftCommand] will arrange onward movement toGuam/Wake and other designated locations."b6 Thiswould change significantly within the next 24 hours.The suspension of the fixed-wing airlift would meanthe start of Frequent Wind and the helicopter evacu-ation of South Vietnam, followed by the RVN Navy'sevacuees.

As soon as Tan Son Nhut Airport came under siege,

first from a bombing attack by Communist-flownA-37s late on the afternoon of 28 April and then froma rocket barrage 10 hours later, South Vietnamese AirForce pilots started manning their planes and helicop-ters and flying them, along with their dependents, toU.S. Navy ships off the coast or to bases in Thailand.The Blue Ridge reported the landing of one of thesecraft, a VNAF CH-47, on its deck shortly after the aer-ial bombardment of Tan Son Nhut. It quoted the pilotand copilot, each of whom had brought along his wifeand children, "Our crew was refueling at Tan Son Nhutwhen six A-37s commenced attack . . . . The only wayout for South Vietnamese helo pilots was to head tosea and U.S. shipping." In the process of landing, theVietnamese Chinook cut off the approach of an AirAmerica helo attempting to land on the Blue Ridge.'This type of incident would become commonplace inthe next 48 hours. These refugees, arriving by Viet-namese helicopter, and subsequent groups, arrivingby small craft or carried by Marine helicopters,represented the gravest challenge to the evacuation

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214 THE BITtER END

Photo courtesy of Capt James D. Tregurtha, USN (Ret)

A flotilla of Vietnamese Navy ships sits at anchor in Subic Bay. There was no more roomon Grande Island for these refugees so they had to be loaded directly to MSC ships.

security force and the Navy. All of them had to bemoved and as quickly as possible to ships preparedto house them. Once on board, they would then betransported as soon as possible to Grande Island forprocessing.

The Military Sealift Command's ships had been out-fitted, manned, and equipped to handle large num-bers of evacuees. Where to transfer them and howquickly became the key questions. Congress had justannounced that day, 28 April, the refugees' final des-tination. House Democratic WhipJohnJ. McFall stat-ed that refugees located in four different areas of Asiawould be brought to Camp Pendleton, California;Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; and Fort Chaffee, Ar-kansas. Also that day, Admiral Gayler notified theJCSand Seventh Fleet that it was time to begin the refu-gee air evacuation to Guam and the United States andthat within 24-36 hours he expected a rate of 3,000per day. With a destination finally in hand, the onlything that stood between the refugees and freedomwas the Pacific Ocean. With the means available to

navigate at least to the island of Guam, the next stepfor the refugees would be to find a way from the grayNavy ships to the blue MSC ships.'°

Admiral Whitmire, the task force commander, hadordered that all of the amphibious ships with welldecks (decks that can be opened to the sea and filledwith water) be placed in a line landward of the helicop-ter platforms.* This meant the LSDs and LPDs wouldmove their evacuees down to the well decks where theywould board LCMs (Mike Boats) for a ride to one ofthe four MSC ships anchored eastward, seaward of theamphibs. Once a sealift ship was full, it would weighanchor and make room for an empty one. In order tofacilitate the transfer of refugees, the tank landingships (LSTs) would float their causeway sections. With

*Captain James D. Tregurtha, USN, commander of Task Group76.5, Surface Evacuation Forces, remembered: "We had to move theholding area farther out from the coast because of the possibilityof attack by North Vietnamese PT boats and also to discourage theexodus of fishing boats and other craft to the Navy ships:' Tregur-tha Comments.

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these sections lashed to the belly of the ship next tothe accommodation ladder, the Mike boats then wouldhave a relatively safe place to dock and unload. Thisdistribution of refugees to their temporary sea quartersensured a minimum amount of passenger traffic onthe decks of the helicopter platforms and achieved itsprimary goal of getting the Vietnamese to the availablefood, water, and medical supplies. This evolution wasso important that a special situation report announcedits start. Special Frequent Wind Execution SituationReport 018 issued at 1700 on 29 April stated, "Trans-fer of evacuees from USN to MSC shipping has com-menced and proceeding smoothly."9 Vice AdmiralSteele, on board the Oklahoma City (CLG 5), havingreceived this message from the Blue Ridge (Rear Ad-miral Whitmire's command ship), knew that thingswere proceeding as planned. To the casual observer,this did not seem to be the case because as far as thenaked eye could see there was nothing but boats com-ing from the coastline, headed directly for the fleet.Each of these small Vietnamese vessels carried morepassengers than it could safely hold and this represent-ed only the first wave of those fleeing their homeland.

This picture of a Vietnamese pilot ditching his helicopter is testimony to the desperationthat prevailed As a result of the unexpected arrival of dozens of South Vietnamese helicop-ters on 29 April, many of the helicopter-capable ships had decks covered with aircraft.



South Vietnamese pilot and his family walk with Ma-rine across the USS Hancock's flight deck. Entire fa-milies escaped by air and many flew to Thailand

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216 THE BITFER END

As a result of this incredibly large armada of smallcraft, the efficient movement of refugees between shipsbecame even more critical and meant the differencebetween control and chaos and even life and death.Indications of the onset of confusion were everywhere,but no where more so than in the skies overhead. Onthe Dubuque alone, five Vietnamese helicopters hadmade unauthorized landings.

To prevent the Vietnamese pilots' flagrant disregardof basic flight safety from endangering his ship andits crew and thereby impeding the evacuation process,Navy Captain Roy W. McLain, Jr., the Dubuque 's cap-tain, established fire-fighting teams augmented byMarines from the AESF's detachments Quebec,Romeo, and Uniform. This mini-crash crew stood byready to assist should one of these many, wildly gy-rating helicopters crash on the Dubuque. The impor-tant contributions of these AESF Marines would bematched by their peers in detachments who now foundthemselves fully committed to assisting and controll-ing the arriving refugees.

Evacuation and Passage.Frequent Wind and the AESF's Final Chapter

For First LieutenantJosephJ. Rogish, Operation Fre-quent Wind began 29 April with a wake-up call andended approximately 24 hours later with a nighthelicopter landing on the Hancock. After four frus-trating days of arising at 0130 and waiting hours tolearn of another postponement, the word to beginOperation Frequent Wind came as a most rewardingand welcome surprise. Yet even this event occurred ina convoluted manner, with first a cancellation thenan immediate recall.

The unusual events surrounding this operation ac-tually began two weeks earlier when Lieutenant Rog-ish's ship, the Hancock, left the formation as the taskforce prepared to depart Vietnamese coastal waters.The Hancock, with a different destination, quickly putmany miles between it and the Subic-bound task force.The next day, the Hancock and its complement wereenjoying a port call in Singapore.* Then just as quicklyas liberty had begun, it was over. Admiral Steele hadordered the ship and its pilots back to the South ChinaSea.

*During the time the Hancock was in Singapore, the Vice Presi-dent of the United States was attending Chiang-Kai Shek's funeralin Taipei, 15-17 April. The Ford administration took this opportu-nity to schedule a secret meeting between Vice President NelsonRockefeller and the leader of the Vietnamese Senate, Tran Van Lan.No available records reveal whether the meeting was actually heldor its contents.


AESF Marines enforce a sanitization check for weaponsamong Vietnamese refugees on board the Green Port.

As Rogish said, "this did not make sense becausejust a few short days ago they had sent us to Singa-pore, telling us they would not need us because theSouth Vietnam government looked like it would beable to hold on."2°

Back on station in the South China Sea, the Han-cock received word on 29 April that the extraction forceshould be over the zone at 1200 local (time of receiptapproximately 1130). Six hours later, Lieutenant Rog-ish received his next shock. Suddenly, without warn-ing, the flight section in which he was flying wasdiverted to the American Embassy instead of thebriefed pick-up point, the Defense Attache OfficeCompound. The next surprise followed immediatelyupon its heels. As the four "Lady Ace" CH-46s clearedthe area, they radioed the Embassy that they had justdeparted with 100 evacuees on board. The staff"rogered" the Lady Ace call and replied that they stillhad 200 refugees awaiting extraction. Having listenedto virtually the same transmission on their inboundleg, the HMM-165 pilots experienced first shock thenanger. Lieutenant Rogish said, "We knew right thenthat in effect what they were doing was lying aboutthe number of people they had to go which left usin the dark during most of the operation as to whatwe really had to move. Consequently, despite pilots

I

taking back load after load, we never really knew whatwe had left to do."21

This meant that not only would 9th MAB helicopterpilots not know how many people still awaited rescue,but also neither would the receiving ships and theirMarine security guards. With 257 Marines spreadamong eight MSC ships and the Barbour County, theAESF believed it was as ready as it could be, but neverdid it suspect the arrival of 30,000 refugees in 30 hours(the majority would arrive by sea). Certainly, no one,save possibly the Ambassador, expected more than 100from the Embassy. U.S. Army Major General John R.D. Cleland's post-action investigation of FrequentWind stated: "The evacuation at the U.S. Embassy wasnot a coordinated action. This resulted from the con-fusion as to the total number of evacuees to be trans-ported which was never made clear, and the lack ofthe necessary command and control to properly ac-complish evacuation requirements. The GSF had onlyscheduled a single helicopter lift from the Embassy,hence no plan existed for the large volume of evacueesassembled there. Inasmuch as the Embassy plan wasfor a minimum evacuation from that location, the ex-ecution of the unplanned lift became essentially a 'seatof the pants' operation."22

As a result of this "seat of the pants" operation,Lieutenant Rogish and every available CH-46 pilotcontinued making trips to the Embassy rooftop, whilethe AESF Marines screened and loaded the seeminglyunlimited supply of refugees. As soon as they arrivedon the MSC ships, the Marines processed the SouthVietnamese and placed them in predesignated areas.In the case of the Pioneer Commander, India Detach-ment loaded 4,020 evacuees in little over 12 hours.23

The problems the Pioneer Commander and its Ma-rines overcame during this phase of Frequent Windtypify the MSC and AESF's efforts. Captain Cyril V.Moyher, the detachment's commander, assisted by hisNCO-in-charge, Gunnery Sergeant Robert Wicker,oversaw this difficult evolution. Captain Moyher relat-ed how it began: "At 1330 on 29 April 1975, the codeword 'Deckhouse' was received over the MSC BroadcastNet. Deckhouse was the code word for us to departour waiting position and head for the refugee pick-up point off the coast of Vietnam."24 Shortly after this,the ship attached a causeway to its side and at about1815 the evacuees started arriving in Mike boats.Despite the presence of numerous small fishing craftwhich appeared soon after the first Mike boat, the ord-erly processing of refugees from the Navy ships con-



Vietnamese barges and sampans approach SS Sergeant Andrew Miller off Vung Tau. Ma-,-ines from A.ESF Detachment Sierra, rzght foreground guard the boarding platform.

218

tinued until about 2200. The commander of TaskGroup 76.5, Surface Evacuation Forces, Captain]amesD. Tregurtha, USN, credited predeployment preparations for the ease with which refugees were movedbetween ships.* He recently recalled, "One of the reasons refugee processing was handled fairly smoothlywas that during predeployment workup and a MAUsize practice landing at Camp Pendleton, we had maleand female volunteers from the amphibious base atCoronado act as refugees. They were bussed up to thelanding zone where they were interrogated, identified,and accommodated on the ships."25

While Mike boats continued to deliver Vietnameserefugees to the Pioneer Commander well into the predawn morning of the next day (Wednesday, 30 April),the last Mike boat in the first wave unloaded its passengers at 2200 and departed. This gap in traffic left,for the first time that day, the loading ramp/causeway unguarded and accessible. With its sides unprotected, the platform offered an opportunity whichthe circling Vietnamese vessels did not decline. Gunnery Sergeant Robert Wicker recalled what happenednext:

The departure of the Mike boats left the platform openon three sides, and the population on the platform increasedfrom 8 Marines in a matter of minutes to 200, 500, 1,000refugees and they were jumping on and off boats, passingkids and household effects until the platform was packed.With the mad scramble by the refugees driving the Marinesback until they were pressed around the base of the accommodation ladder, it became impossible to process the airevacuees to which the Navy had given priority. The platform was slowly cleared after Marines were placed on theouter edges of the platform to keep the fishing boats away.Utilizing the InterrogatorJranslator people and a Vietnamesepriest we were able to get the crowd settled down.2 •

The work of loading the passengers from Mike boatscontinued until 0400 when the last of the refugeesfrom the Navy ships boarded. At this point, the rushto occupy the platform began again, and this time order could not be restored. As a consequence, the shiphoisted its accommodation ladder with the Marinesstill on it, and this act finally made a impression. Gunnery Sergeant Wicker recalled, "The refugees were informed that we would leave them if they did not

*Captain TIegurtha also credited the logistic planning when headded: "Success of the evacuation was also due to the setting ofa goal prior to deployment that all ships would deploy with no 'CasReps' (disabled or non-functioning equipment). This was accomplished and the squadron transited to Vietnam and operated forover a month before the first 'CasRep' occurred. By then our jobhad been completed." Tregurtha Comments.

THE BITTER END

become orderly, quiet, and with as little confusion aspossible start to board the ship."27

By sunrise, all of the refugees on the platform hadbeen loaded and the Pioneer Commander then directed seven newly arrived vessels to nearby MSC ships.Still, the scene that Wednesday morning (30 April)was one of utter chaos with the sea crowded with abandoned fishing boats; some burning, some dead in thewater, and some circling with their helms tied downand their motors running. Avoiding these dangerousshipping hazards, the Pioneer Commander weighedanchor and proceeded to the holding area. Once there,it waited for other ships to join it for the express purpose of forming a convoy for the voyage to Subic. ThePioneer Commander spent the next 20 hours embarking an additional 650 people, 200 of them from theGreenville Victory. After a health and sanitizationcheck, Navy medical personnel gave the Pioneer Commander, the Pioneer Contender and the AmencanChallenger medical clearance for a trip not to exceedfive days. The first two ships in the convoy, PioneerCommander and Pioneer Contender, pulled up theiranchors at 0230 on 2 May and headed for Subic Bayat 21 knots.

Shortly before their deparrure the deluge of refugees peaked and then began to subside. During thisperiod, the third ship in the convoy, the Amen'canChallenger, remained in the holding area and assistedthe overcrowded Greenville Victory by relieving it of3,000 Vietnamese refugees. Once loaded, the Amen'can Challenger set off in pursuit of the Pioneer Commander and Pioneer Contender.

Thirty-eight hours later, while approaching SubicBay, the Pioneer Commander received word of a newdestination, Guam. Less than two hours after that,while undergoing a night medical resupply by helicopter, the Pioneer Commander steamed out of Subic Bayand headed for Apra Harbor, Guam, leaving the Pioneer Contender behind. Meanwhile, the third shipto leave the holding area, the Amen'can Challenger,received its updated orders: proceed directly to Guam.

While Amen'can Challenger, Pioneer Commander,and Pioneer Contender headed for Subic, the MSCships and their Marine security detachments wrestledwith the most serious challenge still confronting them,disarming the remaining refugees. The combinationof overcrowding, fatigue, and a never-ending streamof refugees, driven by a sense of finality or "no tomorrow," had created an extremely volatile simation. Stripping them of their weapons during the loading process



Marine LCpI M. R. Bishop of the AESF operates awater point for refugees on board the SS AmericanRacer enroute to Guam. This shill, and the 55 Trans-colorado departedSubic Bay for the island of Guam on5 May with more than 10,000 refugees between them.

quickly became tedious and eventually dangerous, oc-casionally leading to physical confrontations.

In one instance, Captain Richard L. "Rick" Reuter,the Echo Detachment commander, barely averted adisastrous and catastrophic panic on board the Ser-geant Kimbro when some Vietnamese physically resist-ed sanitization. Captain Reuter responded to this crisisby calling in a reaction force from the 3d Battalion,9th Marines. The mere presence of these additionalMarines, who had arrived by helicopter from the near-by task force, calmed the people enough to enable Re-uter's men to reestablish control. In the case of manyrefugees, the overwhelming fear of being left behindto the mercy of the Commmunist invaders was inten-sified by the absence of food or water. Many of therefugees had seen neither of these necessities for morethan four days.

Yet by 2300, 1 May, every evacuee, save a fewhundred, had access to at least water, and by mid-morning, 2 May, almost every evacuee had receivedsome form of sustenance. By late morning that Friday

(2 May), every MSC ship had reached capacity exceptthe Sergeant Kimbro which continued to load refu-gees until the afternoon of the next day. By nightfallon 2 May, MSC ships had embarked nearly 40,000refugees while a newly arrived Navy ship, the BarbourCounty, with a recently assigned detachment of Ma-rines led by First Lieutenant David A. Kratchovil, hadloaded an additional 958 evacuees. With all but a fewof the AESF Marine detachments on MSC ships andthe loading of Vietnamese refugees virtually complete,CinCPac transferred control of the AESF from GeneralCarey to Rear Admiral Whitmire and his task forceon 3 May. The admiral's mission would be to ensurethe refugees' safe arrival in Guam?8

That night, as the Pioneer Commander and theAmerican Challenger set course for Guam, the PioneerContender, which they had left behind, pulled along-side the pier at Grande Island and beganunloading a third of its passengers. The transfer ofthese 2,000 Vietnamese coincided with the transfer ofcommand of the AESF to Admiral Whitmire, and be-gan its final phase of the evacuation. Six hours later,the Pioneer Contender and its AESF Detachment Vic-tor departed for Guam, fully resupplied and carryingthe remaining 4,000 refugees. Less than 36 hours later,on 5 May, the Transcolorado with Hotel Detachmentembarked and the American Racer with Mike Detach-ment on board left the Philippines for Apra Harbor.Nearly exceeding capacity, the two ships counted morethan 10,000 refugees. The Greenville Victory, SergeantAndrew Miller, and Green Forest, because of over-crowding and unsanitary conditions, had to unloadtheir passegers at Subic, as did the Green Port.

A Tango detachment squad leader, then-SergeantJ. C. Owens, recalled the unhealthy state of affairs onthe Green Forest in 1975, "The most ridiculous andunsanitary condition was created when they hung theportable toilets over the ship's railing and the Viet-namese after using them threw the toilet paperthrough the holes. Before you knew it there was usedtoilet paper streaming from every part of the ship notto mention those pieces of paper that landed on oursleeping bags, laying on the ship's after deck. A moreunhealthy situation could not have existed." These un-satisfactory living conditions caused the medicalauthorities to declare these four ships unfit for habi-tation until thoroughly cleaned. Once sanitary con-ditions were restored then and only then couldrefugees reboard these MSC ships (Greenville Victory,Sergeant Andrew Miller, Green Forest, and GreenPort)?9

220 THE BlUER END


Men of Detachment Tango, AESF help Vietnamese sailors and dependents up the gang-way of SS Green Fbrest at Subic. Overcrowding caused sanitation problems on MSC ships.

Having sailed from Vung Tau to Subic Bay on board their own shzps, members of theSouth Vietnamese Navy prepare to embark on board SS Green Forest at Subic. The Philip-pines government would not let any refugees remain at Subic Bay more than 72 hours.


1' -4

i.;... I

As these events were unfolding, the Pioneer Com-mander and the American Challenger were racingtoward Guam. The Pioneer Commander probablywould have been the first MSC ship to deposit sea-borne Vietnamese refugees on American soil exceptfor an old naval tradition endowing the senior skipperin a convoy with the privilege of entering port first.The Commander of Marine Detachment Novemberon board the American Challenger, Captain MichaelT. Mallick, recently recalled that part of the journey:"Enroute to Guam, the Pioneer Commander was or-dered to reduce speed so as to allow the AmericanChallenger to reach Guam first, the reason being theskipper of the Challenger (Captain Bouchie) wassenior. We arrived at 0115 on 7 May, deposited 5200refugees on Guam and departed before dawn."30

The Pioneer Commander arrived in Guam at 0800on 7 May and it too began unloading almost immedi-ately. By noon every one of the refugees had left theship, beginning the first of their many days on theisland of Guam. For three of those days, the Marinecontingent from the Pioneer Commander, IndiaDetachment, would also remain on the island, at theMarine Barracks, Guam. At 0630, 10 May, these AESF

Marines boarded a bus and rode to Andersen Air ForceBase where a C-141 waited to fly them to Okinawa.Captain Moyher, the detachment commander, sum-med up the experience: "On the morning of 7 May weentered the harbor at Guam and discharged 4,678evacuees. Prior to disembarking, the refugees present-ed the detachment with a set of lacquered 4 seasonsplaques and a letter of thanks."3'

By 7 May, the American Racer, accompanied byMike Detachment and carrying most of the remainingFrequent Wind refugees (including those that theGreen Port had unloaded on 5 May), was less than24 hours from completing the mission Admiral Gaylerhad tasked Rear Admiral Whitmire with five days earli-er: safe passage to Guam for all of the Frequent Windevacuees. At approximately the same time that Wed-nesday afternoon, the AESF control group, detach-ments Quebec, Papa, and Romeo, 17th ITT, and MPpersonnel began screening, unloading, and processingthe refugees on board 29 Vietnamese Navy ships whichhad escaped from South Vietnam. They attempted toensure that these refugees spent as little time as pos-sible in Subic in order to honor the wishes of thePhilippines Government that no refugee remain in



Pioneer Commander unloads its refugees at the pier in Apra Harbor, Guam, on 7 May1975. Once all of the evacuees were clear of the ship, Capt Cyril V Moyher led his Detach-ment India to their temporary quarters on Guam before returning to Okinawa on 10 May.

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222 THE BI1TER END

that country more than 72 hours. Major Quinlanreported, "This pierside operation involved processingthe refugees, many of whom had to be disarmed, fromships ranging in size from gunboat to destroyer escort,then immediately embarking them on board waitingevacuation ships. In less than 24 hours over 20,000 peo-pie were unloaded, processed, and reembarkedwithout incident. This herculean effort was directedby First Lieutenant Johnnie Johnson and Chief War-rant Officer Al Kent."32

On 8 May, the final phase started when the GreenPort (carrying a new detachment, Kilo, which hadreplaced Papa on 5 May), and Green W"ave (Detach-ment Uniform) left Subic Bay. These two ships, with7,522 evacuees on board, preceded by one day the Ser-geant Andrew Miller's (Detachment Sierra) departurewith 3,200 refugees. Tango Detachment and the GreenForest joined these ships the next day when it board-ed the last of the large groups of refugees (more than4,000) and took them to Guam. Between the time theAmerican Challenger deposited its load of evacueesat Guam and returned to Subic (7-10 May), the refugeecamps on Guam had reached their capacity. No longercould Guam handle large groups, and consequentlythe American Challenger and its security detachment(November) were released from evacuation opera-tions.* Eleven days later, after the remainder of hisdetachments, save one, had also been released, MajorQuinlan and his command group departed Subic.They left behind one detachment (Foxtrot) on theGreenville Victory. Remaining for the exclusive pur-pose of assisting in any future refugee operations, theyreturned to Okinawa after six days of waiting withoutaction. With Detachment Foxtrot's arrival on 27 May,the AESF's function, in effect, ceased. Two days priorto this, Admiral Whitmire had returned control of theAESFto III MAE On 31 May 1975, Maj General Hoff-man made the termination official by deactivating theunit.

A Vietnamese City in Guam

On Guam the American Command prepared toreceive the expected flood of refugees. On 23 April amessage from Admiral Gayler to his representative onGuam read: "JCS has directed immediate implemen-tation Vietnamese refugee support at Guam."34 This,by no coincidence, came at the same time the Philip-

*Captain Mallick related: 'The American Challenger with 27

members of November Detachment and myself proceeded to Su-bic where we were assigned to provide security for 27 Cambodian/Vietnamese ships." Mallick Comments.

pines Government notified the American Embassy inManila that the refugees could not remain in the coun-try. Guam, only three hours flight time by C-130 fromCubi, offered an excellent solution to the diplomaticdilemma.

Earlier notification and more preparation mighthave eliminated a series of problems on Guam, butthe alarmingly large number of evacuees seemed tosurprise Washington. Despite the short notice, MarineBarracks Guam jumped into Operation New Life withenthusiasm and energy. That alone would not beenough to overcome the absence of time to plan andprepare, forcing in many instances the barrack's 11officers and 333 men simply to react. "Having receivedword that we could anticipate involvement in the refu-gee program on the morning of 23 April 1975, thefirst refugees arrived Camp Asan at 1820 hours on 24April. Planning therefore was brief and simple."

Colonel Gene M. "Jinx" McCain's first act, once hav-ing received notification of the operation, was to calla staff meeting. Just prior to it, he learned that Ad-miral Gayler had directed that the old Asan HospitalAnnex, deserted since 1973, would be used as the siteof the Vietnamese refugee center. Besides discussingthis topic during the meeting, Colonel McCain detail-ed the initial responsibilities of his staff. He told themthat he would serve as the commanding officer, CampAsan, and that Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Gobatwould be his deputy. In addition, Captain Eugene R.Hardman and Captain Charles R. Provini became theCamp Asan executive and operations officers, respec-tively. First Lieutenant Ronald E. Spratt learned thathe would fill the billet of camp supply officer.

That same day, immediately after the morningmeeting, Captains Hardman and Provini, accompa-nied by Lieutenant Spratt, visited the site of the newrefugee center. They found two years of rubble andhundreds of seabees furiously attempting to put theplace in habitable condition. Immediately, they setto work devising a scheme that would enable themto accept their first arrivals in less than 24 hours.Categorizing their anticipated concerns into generalmanagement areas, they formed three working groups,each with three subsections. The first, administration,contained population control and accounting, locatorsystem, and billeting assignments. The second, oper-ations, oversaw processing (both in and out), an in-terpreter pool, and coordination/liaison. The thirdgroup, logistics, involved food services, supply, andsanitation.

For every organization and participant, the foremost

concern was meeting the incoming buses and obtain-ing a valid manifest. With this in hand, they thencould assign billeting, plan meals, and organize linen!bedding issue. The task of refurbishing the old hospi-tal annex in less than 24 hours presented a nearly im-possible undertaking. Formidable as the job appeared,no other choices existed and the Marines and Seabeeson Guam turned all their attention to meeting thisdeadline. When the first busloads of refugees arrivedthe next day, the Navy-Marine Corps team had fourof the 15 barracks ready. The new occupants also foundblankets, sleeping gear, and food awaiting them.

The initial buses took their passengers to Building502 for processing and orientation. Next, the Marinesshowed the refugees their new living spaces with itsdimensions and assignment based on the size of thefamily. From here, the new occupants moved toblanket issue after which the Marine hosts gave themthe choice of either going to bed or to the messhall.At Building 548, hot rice and tea awaited their arrival.This process would be repeated thousands of times be-fore Operation New Life ended and Camp Asan closedits doors. By the following day, 25 April, Camp Asanhad a population of 5,000 people. On that Friday, thefirst departing group left Camp Asan for AndersenAir Force Base, and a flight from Guam to the UnitedStates. After that, a continuous flow of arrivals anddepartures became the routine.36

Colonel McCain later related that by the time thefirst refugees arrived at 1800 on 24 April, he had es-tablished a complete camp organization to provide fullsupport including administration, billeting, baggagehandling, messing, medical, transportation, clothing,and location of relatives. By 1130 on 26 April, the or-ganization administratively processed 6,420 arrivals,adding them to the camp rolls. This effort involvednot only the Marines on Guam but also their familiesas well. Marine wives assisted with the initial recep-tion and processing of evacuees, including the collec-tion and distribution of clothing and baby supplies.3

The first evacuees came to Guam via Air ForceC-141s and C-130s. Landing at Andersen Air Forcebase, they soon found themselves at an increasinglymore crowded Camp Asan. Despite the fact that eachaircraft could only transport a hundred or so Viet-namese per sortie, Camp Asan quickly reached its ca-pacity. Within less than 48 hours of the first arrival,Colonel McCain requested a 48-hour moratorium inorder to give his Marines a chance to stabilize the sit-uation in the camp and continue to upgrade the fa-cilities. During the moratorium, only 17 new refugeesentered the camp and more importantly at this junc-ture, Admiral Gayler decided to increase the numberof camps and make Colonel McCain the overall com-mander of Naval Refugee Camps, Guam.

In his initial message establishing a refugee support


Department of Defense Photo (USN) 2777Camp Asan awaits the arrival of its first refugees under Operation New Life. South Viet-namese and evacuees of other nationalities startedarriving in Guam at 1820 on 24 April.

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224 THE BITTER END

center, Admiral Gayler told Colonel McCain to expectan initial input of 10,000-13,000 with a rapid buildupto 50,000. He said, "The center's operation is expectedto last a minimum of 90 days."38 With these require-ments in mind and after having surveyed the initialsituation at Asan during the moratorium, ColonelMcCain reported to the Commandant of the MarineCorps that he would need eight officers and 225 staffnoncommissioned officers and enlisted men to accom-plish this task. Little did he know then the volumeand rate at which refugees would arrive, and that theoperation would last double the forecasted minimum.Besides Marine Barracks, Guam's involvement, ColonelMcCain enlisted the assistance of 10 men from Ma-rine Detachment, USS Proteus (AS 19) (a submarinetender), as a working party to assist in establishing arefugee camp at Orote Point, Guam. He also obtainedpermission to assign one officer and 60 Marines fromhis Company C as a force to participate in the conver-sion of a local hotel into an evacuee billeting site.

As Operation New Life unfolded, the Marines' in-volvement significantly expanded. Besides assisting inthe opening of new camps, the Marines worked on thedocks meeting the Military Sealift Command ships asthey arrived; their efforts made the refugees' initialtransition easier. From the unloading of the ships tothe processing of the refugees, the Marines had onephilosophy: as much as possible, make the evacueesfeel at home. Captain Provini, who had witnessed refu-gee resettlement efforts in Vietnam in 1972, offeredhis advice based on the South Vietnamese Govern-ment's handling of the former Quang Tn residents.His experiences and ideas were instrumental in de-veloping this "Welcome Home" philosophy. He point-ed out that the refugees coming south after the fallof northern I Corps in 1972 received a very regimentedwelcome. The South Vietnamese Government officialsplaced them into holding areas for subsequent relo-cation and readmittance into society. The conse-quences of this were tragic; the refugees experiencedconfusion and fear. Eventually, they rebelled and thisact provoked their countrymen into using force againstthem. As a result, these South Vietnamese felt likeprisoners in their own country.4°

Avoiding such aggressive behavior became the focusand intent of the Marines on Guam. The camp guardsand staff made every effort to let the Vietnamese knowthat they could expect the best treatment possible.Upon arrival at Camp Asan, the Vietnamese departedtheir buses for their first event, a "welcome aboard"

brief. At this initial meeting, and throughout theirstay, chaplains always made their presence known byannouncing that they, too, were available to assist andcounsel anyone in need. Besides their well-timed hu-man relations training, the Marines acted with onepurpose, "to show compassion and consideration tothe refugees." To further enhance their image andpresent a sharp appearance, the Marines at the refu-gee operation center always wore the uniformprescribed for the occasion. Those working at CampAsan wore their modified blue uniform instead ofcombat gear, for two reasons. They hoped to providea favorable first impression to the Vietnamese toreduce their anxieties, and they wanted to make themfeel welcome in their new home. The Marines thoughtcombat gear would remind the refugees too much ofthe war and the pain they had left behind.41

By presenting the appearance of a city with a friend-ly living environment, the Camp Asan Marines gainedthe confidence and trust of the new arrivals. Using thistrust, they induced the refugees to form their owncommunity structure and govern themselves. Once therefugees elected a mayor for their new "city," the Ma-rines assumed advisory roles and became even less con-spicuous. The elected official, "Tony" Lam, assumedthe title of Vietnamese camp manager, and retainedthis function until transfer to the states on 23 July.Lam's departure signalled the end of the camp's out-standing internal command network. For three months(April 25-July 23), Lam and his organization virtual-ly ran the Asan camp.42

Satisfied with the progress and developments atCamp Asan, Colonel McCain redeployed some of hisAsan Marines to the satellite camps: Tokyu Hotel,Camp Socio, and J&G Construction Camp. Despitethe move, their mission remained the same, "to or-ganize, supervise, assist and take care of the refugeepopulations within these camps."43

Throughout this endeavor, Colonel McCain receivedhis guidance for the conduct and running of the campfrom Admiral Gayler's representative on Guam, RearAdmiral George E Morrisori. Admiral Morrison active-ly participated in the refugee operation and after aninitial briefing of Colonel McCain and his staff on 23April, he personally visited Camp Asan at least twomore times. One of those times, on 9 May, Rear Ad-miral Morrison escorted the overall commander, Ad-miral Gayler (CinCPac), through Camp Asan.

Apparently satisfied with Colonel McCain's han-dling of the operation, Admiral Morrison changedColonel McCain's title from Camp Coordinator of all

camps under Navy jurisdiction to Military SupportOfficer, New Life Guam, effective 1 August. His newmission responsibilities entailed coordinating with theSenior Civil Coordinator to provide necessary adminis-trative, logistical, and operational support for the in-ternal camp functioning. He also provided guidanceto the Marines who were carrying out these functions.Colonel McCain insured above all else that they avoid-ed law enforcement activities in the camps, maintain-ing as minimal a military presence as possible.

Just prior to Colonel McCain's redesignation, RearAdmiral Kent J. Carroll replaced Admiral Morrisonas Commander, Naval Forces, Marianas (ComNavMar)and overall military coordinator for refugee operations.At about the same time, the newly designated SeniorCivil Coordinator arrived. Julia Taft, the Director ofthe Interagency Task Force (IATF) for Indochina Refu-gees, had appointed retired Army Brigadier GeneralJames A. Herbert to head a team of representativesresponsible for coordinating the processing and prepa-ration of refugees for shipment to the United States.The Senior Civil Coordinator and the Military SupportOfficer soon would work closely together in solvingthe "repatriate" problem and bringing to a close therefugee operation on Guam.44

Colonel McCain's redesignation reflected the chang-ing complexion of the camps' population. As each newgroup of refugees boarded a flight for the continentalUnited States, the percentage of those remaining whodesired to return to Vietnam increased. Known as

"repatriates," the potential danger they represented,and their alarming threats, grew as they approacheda majority.* As this problem intensified, the Marineshad to take overt action to stem the growing threatof violence. Captain Howard P. Shores III, the com-mander of Camp Socio, before taking control of whatlater became the Socio repatriate camp, received onlyone instruction, "insure that the camp functions."

To accomplish this security mission, Captain Shoreshad no choice but to deal directly with the leader ofthe repatriates, Colonel Quay (political leader) andhis assistants, Captain Tam (political second in com-mand) and Major Hai (administrative leader). Upontheir initial meeting, Colonel Quay stated his posi-tion: "The only thing we want is to be able to repatri-ate to Vietnam and we will do anything including

*Recently General Herbert explained the origin of the repatri-ates and the extent of the problem: "VNN ships were evacuatedwith crews. The crews never contacted their families, who remainedin Vietnam. The same was true of some VNAF aircraft (C-130s whichwere flown to Thailand) crews whose families were in SVN. Therewere families sent out in the refugee stream whose (husbands) didnot make it and were in SVN. Most of the repatriation group wishedfor family reunification, regardless of the cost. All of those who ex-pressed a desire to leave were moved to Camp Asan, as other campswere closed out." General Herbert's task upon arriving in early Au-gust as the newly designated Senior Civil Coordinator 'was to resettleabout 6,000 refugees remaining on Guam, to assemble repatriatesfrom Eglin, Indiantown, Chaffee, and Pendleton on Guam and carefor them there until the 'repatriate problem' was solved." HerbertComments.


Photo courtesy of BGen James A. Herbert, USA (Ret)

Orote Point, a former airjIeld was the most isolated and most secure of the camps. Whenrepatriates threatened violence, Capt HowardE Shores III remindedthem of Orote Point.

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226 THE BIITER END


Repatriates, protesting the delay in their return toVietnam, burned this barracks at Camp Asan. Mostof the repatriates were peaceful and only sought re-union with the families they had left behind

violence in order to accomplish this goal."° CaptainShores explained to Quay that he did not have theauthority to repatriate them and, while he did havethe responsibility of making their stay comfortable,his first priority was the safety and welfare of his Ma-rines. He asked Quay not to interpret compassion asa sign of weakness and reminded him that the firstperson to break the rules would be sent to the isolatedand more primitive Orote Point where tighter securityrestrictions could be imposed. Thanks in large partto the establishment of these ground rules, Camp So-cio did not have one dangerous incident. The onlyovert activity took place on 30 July 1975, when eightrepatriates shaved their heads in protest. They objectedto Captain Tam's confinement at Orote Point for hispart in the burning of a Camp Asan barracks.*4?

Eventually, by the end of August, all of the Sociooccupants had been moved to Camp Asan. The mar-ginal sewage pumps at Socio inspired that decisionwhen they malfunctioned two times in three days,spilling more than 8,000 gallons of raw sewage. Thesenew occupants of Asan, 240 Vietnamese, stilladamantly wanted to return to Vietnam despite a

*General Herbert recently described that incident: "There weresome hot heads' among the group of repatriates. They burned downa barracks and the group was told by me that we really did not tarehow many buildings were torched because the entire group wouldremain at Camp Asan until repatriation, with or without the com-fort of a roof over their heads. There was no more violence." Her-bert Comments.

meeting with Brigadier General Herbert, who ex-plained in detail the ramifications and dangers ofrepatriation.** Still, they insisted on returning to theirhomeland. Consequently, on 15 October, they and theother repatriates of Camp Asan boarded a Vietnamesevessel, the Thuong Tin I. At 1230 the next day theship with its 1,546 repatriates departed for Viet-nam.*** Two weeks later, Camp Asan closed. Withits closure, Operation New Life ended, having lastednearly four months longer than its original forecast of90 days.48

The repatriates by far had represented the gravestchallenge to the overall refugee operation. Their con-tentious behavior and threatening demands promptedcommand changes at other satellite camps in additionto Socio's. On 5 July because of repatriate problems,Colonel McCain assigned First Lieutenant Roger D.Gabelman as the commander of Camp J&G. Hewould remain there until two days after the transferof that camp's repatriates to Camp Asan on 20 August.First Lieutenant Keith L. Johnson received word theday Gabelman transferred his camp occupants that ef-fective 22 August he would become the commanderof Tokyu Hotel. Although Tokyu Hotel did not houseany repatriates, it had its own problems. It containedhundreds of third-country nationals who awaited animmigration judge's ruling on whether they qualifiedfor American citizenship and benefits. On 10 Septem-ber, he decided that they did not and ordered themdeported. He ruled that the special law passed by Con-gress allowing the entry of Vietnamese refugees intothe U.S. did not apply to them. Within two weeks ofthe order, all of the third-country nationals were

**General Herbert mentioned his attempts to change the repatri-ates' decision: 'As the Senior Civil Coordinator, I had numeroussessions with the repatriate leadership and explained the probableactions to be taken by the Hanoi folks if they returned. They werefor the large part committed to their family members remainingin Vietnam, regardless of the warnings." Herbert Comments.

***The Senior Civil Coordinator explained his participation inthis undertaking: "We developed the plan to fix up the ThuongTin I ship, convert the freighter to passenger use, and send therepatriates back. I obtained authority to seize the Thuong Tin Iand ComNavMar was instructed by CNO via CinCPacFlt to repairit as necessary and fit it out to carry the repatriates. This job wasdone rapidly and well, at a cost of $800,000, as I recall, On 16 Oc-tober, with outstanding support from Rear Admiral Kent Carrolland the combined efforts of the Naval Ship Repair Facility, MarineBarracks Guam, Naval Logistics Center, and the IATF team, theThuong Tin I set sail with 1,546 repatriates on board from Aganafor Saigon." He added that he still had the text of a lawsuit in whichhe was sued for $3,000,000 for his part in the seizure of the ship.Herbert Comments.

returned to their native countries, leaving only a fewhundred Vietnamese refugees. On 23 October, afterhaving found sponsors for these last few evacuees, in-cluding the 123 who had elected to live on Guam,the Tokyu Hotel closed its doors.

Having successfully accomplished its refugee mis-sion on Guam, the Marine Barracks Guam justly gavecredit to the additional forces whose assistance ColonelMcCain had needed as early as April when he em-ployed Marines from the Proteus. Other units externalto his battalion which Colonel McCain used duringthe course of the operation included Company E, 2dBattalion, 3d Marines, 1st Marine Brigade, who arrivedon Guam for temporary duty on 5 July 1975, andCompany F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, 1st MarineBrigade, who joined them on 24 July. These elementsdeparted Guam for Hawaii on 23 September 1975.

The Marines from 1st Brigade and the Marine Bar-racks Guam combined forces in the final months toinsure that no repatriate or disconsolate refugeeharmed or endangered life or property. Consideringthe fact that the only reported casualties during theentire operation involved two auto-related deaths (aretired Army sergeant and a Marine off the Proteus),one would have to conclude that their efforts to pro-tect life and property were extremely successful.

A South Vietnamese child enjoys an Americanfavorite. Within days this child would be on her wayto America anda new beginning at Camp Pendleton.

Photo courtesy of Capt James D. Tregurtha, USN (Ret)



Thuong Tin I gets underway for Vietnam on 16 October with 1,546 repatriates on board

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IC

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228 THE BlUER END

Processing more than 100,000 refugees, including aone-day camp population high of 7,221 in Asan on10 June, they expended thousands of hours and helpedmove the refugees one step closer to the final link intheir chain to freedom.

The Final Link. Camp Pendleton

When the base duty officer at Camp Pendleton an-swered the phone on Saturday, 26 April 1975, he wasintrigued to hear the voice at the other end identifyhimself as the Headquarters Marine Corps CommandDuty Officer. Even more intriguing was what he saidnext, could Camp Pendleton house and administerVietnamese refugees? The Pendleton duty officer im-mediately passed the call to the chief of staff, ColonelTullisJ. Woodham,Jr., who, in turn, notified the basecommander, Brigadier General Paul G. Graham.*The duty officer added that headquarters had said itwould be very unlikely for Pendleton to be selectedbecause it was a fully operational base, but just thesame they still needed the answer to the feasibilityquestion by midnight that day. This unexpected eventwould serve as General Graham's only advance warningthat his base would be used as a refugee processingfacility. Despite assurances to the contrary, the inter-agency task force created as a result of President Ford'sappeal to Congress on 10 April to help the Vietnameserefugees, eventually chose Camp Pendleron as one ofits three receiving and processing sites in the continen-tal United States.

General Graham later recalled: "The first inklingI had of the possibility of establishing a refugee campwas about 1730 on Saturday afternoon on the 26thof April."° He related that after Colonel Tullis Wood-ham told him of the Headquarters Marine Corps in-quiry. Graham told Woodham "we had better gettogether and talk it over with all the assistant chiefsof staff." He then "set up a meeting for seven o'clockthat evening."5' At that meeting, General Graham andthe assistant chiefs of staff discussed whether CampPendleton could handle such a facility even thoughHeadquarters had said it ". . . really did not have toworry about being selected as a refugee facility becauseof the size of the base and the amount of training wedo here 52 After exploring the various facets of

*Colonel Woodham first contacted the staff. He stated: 'GeneralGraham was not notified immediately. I received the informationin the early afternoon. I went directly to my office and attemptedto make calls to key staff officers who could answer the basic ques-tion 'what if and then told them to prepare for a meeting withthe CG Woodham Comments.

such a possibility and viewing engineer studies andmaps of the base, they decided that the northern sec-tion of the base at Camp Talega could handle a refu-gee center. General Graham stated, "after looking atall the aspects of Talega, we came to the conclusionthat we probably could put a facility up there, butit would have to be a tent facility, under field condi-tions." That evening General Graham informedHeadquarters Marine Corps that Camp Pendletoncould build a facility to handle 18,000 refugees, butunder austere living conditions.

At 0720, shortly after arriving at work Monday, 28April, General Graham received a call from his chiefof staff. Colonel Woodham informed him that ".Pendleton had been selected as the reception centerfor the refugees." From this point, the news onlyseemed to get worse as the chief of staff told his basecommander that refugees were scheduled to start ar-riving anytime, and in fact some were already airborne.Indeed, the very refugees Colonel McCain's Marineshad processed so quickly through Camp Asan wereinbound to Marine Corps Air Station El Toro with afinal destination of Camp Pendleton, California.

General Graham quickly moved to action, liningup support and translating his plans into productiveresults.** He first sought assistance from the 1st Ma-rine Division, whose commander, Brigadier GeneralWilliam L. McCulloch, readily provided two engineerbattalions. According to Graham, "We had 1,500 to1,700 people here about ten o'clock that morning (28April). We brought about 10 bulldozers in. We justlined them up track-to-track, went right down in anarea, leveled it off, brought the graders in and turnedto the 1st Force Service Regiment to get the tents."55After some frantic telephoning that morning, the basecommander felt a little more comfortable knowingthat either the Marine Corps Supply Depot, Barstow,or the General Services Administration in Ogden,Utah, would provide additional tents and supplies assoon as they were needed. General Graham said, "Weknew that if we were receiving refugees as fast as thisfirst group, that we would be one step ahead of dis-aster unless we got some outside assistance very quick-

**Colonel Woodham related: "Initially, the major load restedon the shoulders of Colonel George A. Red' Merrill (assistant chiefof staff for facilities) and Colonel Robert W. Calvert (assistant chiefof staff for logistics and supply). At the JCS level the operationreceived support from Colonel Kenneth L. Robinson, Jr., and atthe Headquarters level from Colonel Neil A. Nelson of the Instal-lations and Logistics Division, HQMC." Woodham Comments.


Marine Corps Historical CollectionBulldozers prepare ground for the erection of hundreds of tents. Five hours before theofficial notification to establish a refugee camp at Pendleton, the first evacuees arrived

iy."56 They did receive this support and with it somewell-timed local assistance. The combination made thecenter a success.

At the beginning, a favorable ending did not seemlikely, especially after 800 bone-weary refugees arrivedat El Toro at 0200 on 29 April, well before anyone ex-pected them.* Confused, tired, scared, and disorientedafter having flown for 14 hours, these refugees arrivedin their new country in the middle of a pitch blacknight. Many responded to the unfamiliar surround-ings by simply crying. Marines at El Toro helped themboard Marine Corps buses for the relatively short rideto Camp Talega (less than 45 minutes). General Gra-ham immediately placed them in the Camp Talegaquonset huts, which had been constructed years earlieras additional housing for Marine Corps units assignedto Camp Pendleton. His decision to postpone themandatory processing procedure until morning savedthe refugees from further suffering and allowed themsome much-needed sleep.

The irony of this eleventh-hour arrival and the ex-treme crush it placed on General Graham's forces wasthat the official authorization to perform resettlementduties did not arrive until after the first refugees hadfallen asleep in their new home, the Camp Talega

*Colone! Nicholas M. Trapnell,Jr., Chief of Staff, Marine CorpsAir Station El Toro, had anticipated the refugees' arrival. He relat-ed that the reason the processing went so smoothly at 0200, 29 April,was because of his prior knowledge of the evacuation plans. Hegained that understanding while serving in Vietnam on the DAOstaff from 1973 to 1974. He stated, "1 initiated preparations for therefugees more than a week before receiving word from HQMC andby then the planning and rehearsal were complete." TrapnellComments.

"hotel." At 0736 on 29 April, Headquarters MarineCorps sent a message to the commanding general ofCamp Pendleton. It said, 'Establish New HorizonCoordination Center and be prepared to providebilleting, messing, essential medical treatment, trans-portation, security, and camp administration for upto 18,000 evacuees."57 The next day the final authorityarrived: "This message confirms previous oral arrange-ments that you take action required to establish andoperate the Camp Pendleton Refugee ProcessingCenter."58

From this inauspicious beginning, Camp Pendleronmore than sufficiently met the Joint Chiefs' originalobjective: "The Marine Corps will be tasked to receive,process, billet, and support 18,000 (eighteen thou-sand) RVN evacuees for a period of 90 days or morecommencing about 29 April 1975." To accomplishthis, General Graham had to organize his forces, cre-ate a staff, and plan while still receiving more refu-gees each day.** Complicating this matter was thepresence of a dual system of command that functionedunder the auspices of the State Department, whichhad overall responsibility for the South Vietnamese

**COlOflel Woodham related General Graham's daily routine:"General Graham's schedule entailed arriving at Base headquart-ers at 0715, taking care of pressing base matters, then boarding thestandby UH-1E and flying to the refugee camp headquarters wherehe would stay until 1700, and finally returning to Base to makedecisions on matters that had arisen during the day. In inclementweather, he would ride in his sedan and usually arrive back around2000. Oftentimes his staff would remain at work until 2300 or later."Colonel Woodham also described the inordinate importance thedimension of public relations assumed at staff headquarters whenhe said, "Refugee matters were constantly in the national news andas a consequence a TV was installed in my office to monitor dayand night the media reports." Woodham Comments.

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230 THE BITTER END


Marines prepare to build a new city at Camp Pendleton, California. Marines particij'at-ing in Operation New Arrival erected nearly 1,100 tents to house Vietnamese refugees.

This is an aerial view ofBGen Graham's Vietnamese city. Each tent, weghing 360 pounds,required a minimum of 35 minutes for 10 men to erect it in this instant "urban area."

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8607508- - —a----.— — — — — — W a• SW

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u.s. marines in vietnam - the bitter end - 1973-1975 pcn ......pated the worst. on 22 april, admiral...

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