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Policy Brief

Policy Brief :14 1

U.S. LEADERSHIP IN A POST 9/11 WORLD Comparing World Views and Foreign Policy Decisions of George W.

Bush and Barack Obama

Brandon C. Prins Professor & Global Security Fellow, Baker Center for Public Policy

University of Tennessee

Allan Wilford PhD candidate in Political Science


Fall 2013

Policy Brief :14 1







Fall 2013

Policy Brief :14 1







Fall 2013

Baker Center Board

Cynthia BakerMedia ConsultantWashington, DC The Honorable Howard H. Baker Jr.Former Ambassador to JapanFormer United States Senator The Honorable Phil BredesenFormer Governor of Tennessee

Sam M. BrowderRetired, Harriman Oil Sarah Keeton CampbellAttorney, Williams & Connolly, LLPWashington, DC

Jimmy G. CheekChancellor, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville AB Culvahouse Jr.Attorney, O’Melveny & Myers, LLPWashington, DC

The Honorable Albert Gore Jr.Former Vice President of the United StatesFormer United States Senator Thomas GriscomCommunications ConsultantFormer Editor, Chattanooga Times Free Press

James Haslam IIChairman and Founder, Pilot CorporationThe University of Tennessee Board of Trustees Joseph E. JohnsonFormer President, University of Tennessee Fred MarcumSenior Adviser to Senator Baker The Honorable George Cranwell MontgomeryFormer Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman Regina MurrayKnoxville, Tennessee Lee RiedingerVice Cancellor, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

John SeigenthalerFounder, First Amendment Center, Vanderbilt University Don C. Stansberry Jr.The University of Tennessee Board of Trustees The Honorable Don SundquistFormer Governor of Tennessee William H. SwainThe University of Tennessee Development Council The Honorable Fred ThompsonFormer United States Senator Robert WallerFormer President and CEO, Mayo Clinic

Baker Center Staff

Matt MurrayDirector

Nissa Dahlin-BrownAssociate Director

Michelle Castro Development Director

Patti RebholzBusiness Manager

Elizabeth WoodyOffice Manager

Carl PierceDirector Emeritus & Senior Fellow for Baker Studies

About the Baker CenterThe Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy is an education and research center that serves the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and the public. The Baker Center is a nonpartisan institute devoted to education and public policy schol-arship focused onh energy and the environment, global security, and leadership and governance.

Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy1640 Cumberland AvenueKnoxville, TN 37996-3340

[email protected]

The contents of this report were developed under a grant from the US Department of Education. How-ever, these contents do not necessarily represent the policy of the US Department of Education, and you should not assume endorsement by the federal government. Findings and opinions conveyed herein are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent an official position of the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy or the University of Tennessee.

The Howard H. Baker Center for Public Policy The Howard H. Baker Center for Public Policy I

Baker Center Board

Cynthia BakerMedia ConsultantWashington, DC The Honorable Howard H. Baker Jr.Former Ambassador to JapanFormer United States Senator The Honorable Phil BredesenFormer Governor of Tennessee

Sam M. BrowderRetired, Harriman Oil Sarah Keeton CampbellAttorney, Williams & Connolly, LLPWashington, DC

Jimmy G. CheekChancellor, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville AB Culvahouse Jr.Attorney, O’Melveny & Myers, LLPWashington, DC

The Honorable Albert Gore Jr.Former Vice President of the United StatesFormer United States Senator Thomas GriscomCommunications ConsultantFormer Editor, Chattanooga Times Free Press

James Haslam IIChairman and Founder, Pilot CorporationThe University of Tennessee Board of Trustees Joseph E. JohnsonFormer President, University of Tennessee Fred MarcumSenior Adviser to Senator Baker The Honorable George Cranwell MontgomeryFormer Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman Regina MurrayKnoxville, Tennessee Lee RiedingerVice Cancellor, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

John SeigenthalerFounder, First Amendment Center, Vanderbilt University Don C. Stansberry Jr.The University of Tennessee Board of Trustees The Honorable Don SundquistFormer Governor of Tennessee William H. SwainThe University of Tennessee Development Council The Honorable Fred ThompsonFormer United States Senator Robert WallerFormer President and CEO, Mayo Clinic

Baker Center Staff

Matt MurrayDirector

Nissa Dahlin-BrownAssociate Director

Michelle Castro Development Director

Patti RebholzBusiness Manager

Elizabeth WoodyOffice Manager

Carl PierceDirector Emeritus & Senior Fellow for Baker Studies

About the Baker CenterThe Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy is an education and research center that serves the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and the public. The Baker Center is a nonpartisan institute devoted to education and public policy schol-arship focused onh energy and the environment, global security, and leadership and governance.

Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy1640 Cumberland AvenueKnoxville, TN 37996-3340

[email protected]

The contents of this report were developed under a grant from the US Department of Education. How-ever, these contents do not necessarily represent the policy of the US Department of Education, and you should not assume endorsement by the federal government. Findings and opinions conveyed herein are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent an official position of the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy or the University of Tennessee.

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the new Policy Brief series of the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy. An informed electorate is essential to active

engagement in the political process and the effective operation of our system of democracy. It is often difficult for the public to identify objective, timely and

bipartisan resources to inform healthy political debate and discourse. It is the purpose of the Policy Brief series to help fill this void. Researchers and policymakers who are

affiliated with the Baker Center will present essays on a range of subject matter that is at the center of public debate. These essays will seek balance while at the same time

presenting contrasting views of public policy problems and their potential solutions. It is my hope that you will find these Policy Briefs to be both provocative and

informative.

Howard H. Baker, Jr.

The Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy is a non-‐partisan institute at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, dedicated to education, research and civil

discussion of policy issues. This Policy Brief series is intended to disseminate and communicate research findings to diverse audience – to review and assess current

literature and to stimulate discussions and reflection on these issues so critical to our nation.

This Policy Brief series will include short papers or essays written by Baker Center Fellows and others affiliated with the Baker Center, The Briefs are intended to be

short, policy relevant, timely and accessible to a large US and international audience. The Briefs will supply hypertext links to source materials, reference lists and

suggestions for further readings. Readers will be invited to comment on the Briefs, and comments will be moderated in an effort to encourage spirited, informed, and

respectful dialogue, following the ideals espoused by Senator Baker.

Matthew N. Murray, PhD Director

The Howard H. Baker Center for Public PolicyII

Baker Center for Public Policy Policy Brief | 3

U.S. Leadership in a Post 9/11 World

Brandon C. Prins &

Allan Wilford

Executive Summary Barack Obama frequently distinguishes his policies from those of his predecessor. But critics note how many of George W. Bush’s programs persist deep into Obama’s presidency. This Brief is divided into several sections that all compare and contrast the presidential administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama on matters of foreign policy. We begin by noting Obama’s campaign rhetoric of eliminating many of his predecessor’s foreign policy programs. We then discuss the worldviews of each President and the foreign policy objectives they pursued during their respective terms. The next section of this Brief examines specific policies of the two administrations to identify any substantive differences. The areas examined include overall military spending, foreign aid allocations, international commitments, and voting alignments in the United Nations General Assembly. We then briefly elaborate on the partisan composition of Congress during both Presidents’ terms. This section identifies some of the domestic challenges each President faced, as political opposition at home presents unique challenges for a President’s foreign policy initiatives abroad. Our concluding section evaluates what the future may hold for President Obama as he progresses more fully into his second term. Should we

expect Obama’s differing worldviews to Bush to produce substantively different foreign policy, or will there be more of the same over the next few years?

The Baker Center Policy Briefs are issued by the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. These Policy Briefs are designed to provide public officials, policymakers, scholars, and citizens with commentary and research on matters of public policy. Copyright 2014 by THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

The Howard H. Baker Center for Public Policy The Howard H. Baker Center for Public Policy 1


U.S. Leadership in a Post 9/11 World

Brandon C. Prins &

Allan Wilford

Executive Summary Barack Obama frequently distinguishes his policies from those of his predecessor. But critics note how many of George W. Bush’s programs persist deep into Obama’s presidency. This Brief is divided into several sections that all compare and contrast the presidential administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama on matters of foreign policy. We begin by noting Obama’s campaign rhetoric of eliminating many of his predecessor’s foreign policy programs. We then discuss the worldviews of each President and the foreign policy objectives they pursued during their respective terms. The next section of this Brief examines specific policies of the two administrations to identify any substantive differences. The areas examined include overall military spending, foreign aid allocations, international commitments, and voting alignments in the United Nations General Assembly. We then briefly elaborate on the partisan composition of Congress during both Presidents’ terms. This section identifies some of the domestic challenges each President faced, as political opposition at home presents unique challenges for a President’s foreign policy initiatives abroad. Our concluding section evaluates what the future may hold for President Obama as he progresses more fully into his second term. Should we

expect Obama’s differing worldviews to Bush to produce substantively different foreign policy, or will there be more of the same over the next few years?

The Howard H. Baker Center for Public Policy2


During the 2008 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Barack Obama used every opportunity to deride the policies of the George W. Bush administration (hereafter referred to as Bush 43). In fact, the campaign was as much about George W. Bush as it was about Obama’s actual opponent for office Senator John McCain of Arizona. Especially in foreign policy, candidate Obama successfully portrayed his own policies and worldviews as the antithesis of President Bush. Obama capitalized on the electorate’s frustration with the Iraq campaign to stress his own vote in opposition to the war and serendipitously cover his thin foreign policy resume. Candidate Obama also tied John McCain to the unpopular military interventions of the Bush 43 administration, which served to undermine McCain’s claim of superior expertise and judgment in international affairs. Given that approval of the Bush presidency hovered in the low 30s to high 20s during most of 2008 and support for Bush’s foreign policies plummeted from a high of 83% in January of 2002 to 32% by February of 2008, McCain found his campaign dragged down by his support for Bush and the Iraq War. Moreover, by January of 2008 a majority of Americans considered the Bush administration to have deliberately misled the American people about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (www.gallup.com), further damaging McCain’s foreign policy credibility. The American electorate’s disapproval of the Iraq intervention, coupled with Bush’s own personal unpopularity around the world (large majorities in 19 of 24 countries expressed little or no confidence in President

Bush), led the Obama team to shrewdly develop a campaign platform centered on “renewing American leadership” at home and abroad. Invited by Foreign Affairs in the summer of 2007 to describe his foreign policy, Obama used the opportunity to condemn the unilateral and militaristic policies of the Bush administration. “I intend to rebuild the alliances, partnerships, and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security,” he wrote. “Needed reform of these alliances and institutions will not come by bullying other countries to ratify changes we hatch in isolation.” Obama went on to criticize the Bush administration for its single-minded focus on military solutions to global problems as well as a misunderstanding of America’s core values.

Notwithstanding the campaign rhetoric, though, even supporters of the current president see strong similarities in the foreign policies of presidents Bush and Obama. Drone attacks (directed at times against U.S. citizens) have continued and markedly increased in number, NSA surveillance programs remain in place, military force was used without congressional authorization in Libya, and post-9/11 increases in defense spending persist. Such policy actions have led many on the left to accuse President Obama of hypocrisy. To be fair, though, Obama was transparent about his foreign policy vision during the 2008 campaign. In Pennsylvania he said, “the truth is that my foreign policy is actually a return to the traditional realistic policy of George Bush’s father, of John F. Kennedy, of in some ways, Ronald Reagan.” And he went on to say many times that he



did not oppose all wars, he just opposed ‘stupid ones.’ President Obama has also clearly distinguished himself in foreign policy from his predecessor in his commitment to nuclear arms control, efforts at multilateralism, recognition of the importance of soft power, and he has shown greater skepticism in the efficacy of using military force.

In this policy brief, we compare and contrast the worldviews of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. We then assess how these two leaders acted in foreign policy while president. We base our assessment on defense and foreign aid spending, international commitments, and voting alignments in the United Nations General Assembly. We also look at the political environment confronted by both presidents. Both leaders experienced unified and divided government as president and each has served as a political lightning rod for the American electorate. Importantly, there is a relationship between domestic political support and presidential attention to foreign affairs. U.S. leaders frequently turn to foreign policy when their domestic policy agenda remains blocked by partisan opposition in Congress. Finally, we examine Bush’s second term to anticipate what President Obama may expect in his final three years in office.

World Views Worlds Apart?

Like most presidents before him, George W. Bush came to office in 2001 with a focus on domestic issues such as tax and education reform, entitlements, and energy production. One recalls that on September 11, 2001 Bush was in Florida speaking at Booker

Elementary School about his education initiatives. His foreign policy platform during the 2000 presidential election campaign centered largely on free-trade and the U.S. relationship with Latin America. Bush was also skeptical of U.S. efforts to nation-build. In fact, during the second presidential debate candidate Bush argued that the Somalia mission “went wrong” when it transitioned from providing humanitarian aid to rebuilding its political and economic institutions.

Of course, the terrorist attacks against New York City and Washington, DC dramatically changed the foreign policy focus of the Bush administration. No longer was trade central in the administration’s priorities. Now terrorism and its state-sponsors, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, directed the efforts of Bush and his team. In a speech given to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001 President Bush announced that the U.S. would go on the offensive against terrorist groups. “Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there” he argued. “It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) may define the Bush 43 administration’s foreign policy after 9/11, but Bush came to office with a view of American exceptionalism and power that accorded with the beliefs of the neo-conservative leaders he brought to office with him. Indeed, George W. Bush gravitated towards unilateralism, dismissed global governing bodies, such as the UN, and considered American hegemony essentially benevolent and largely



supported, if tacitly, by the international community. In his 2001 State of the Union address Bush notes “a distinctly American internationalism” and affirms the distinctly neo-conservative view that “a strong America is the world’s best hope for peace and freedom.” While previous administrations (democrat and republican) also considered U.S. preponderance crucial in promoting international security, the Bush 43 administration more actively sought to prevent the emergence of rivals. In his first National Security Strategy (NSS) document (2002), President Bush notes the importance of “building good relations among the great powers”, but later in the same document goes on to stress that U.S. “forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”1

Since conventional deterrence and containment will arguably not work with terrorists and non-rational state leaders, regime change served to simultaneously eliminate the world’s most dangerous regimes and liquidate terrorist safe-havens.

Neo-conservative unilateralism was also

reflected in the 2002 NSS. In the cover letter to the strategy document President Bush states “America will act against…emerging threats before they are fully formed” and the appointment of John Bolton as UN

1 With its attention to U.S. primacy, democratization, and the offensive use of military force, the 2002 NSS is considered by many to be a clear statement of neo-conservative views (see Boot 2004).

Ambassador reflected the belief that global institutions and international law only served to constrain, and sometimes undermine, U.S. actions abroad. Indeed, as UN Ambassador, Bolton was deeply suspicious and critical of bodies, such as the Human Rights Council (previously the Human Rights Commission), that frequently condemned U.S. actions and focused disproportionately on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To be sure, even a perfunctory inspection of the UNHRC membership notices countries such as Burma, China, Syria, Sri Lanka and Iran; countries with appalling human rights records that likely use seats on the council to distract attention from their own repressive policies. Still, it was noted by many critics of the Bush administration that the GWOT requires sustained cooperation from allies and IGOs alike and admonishment by the U.S. government only frustrates such support.

The most controversial aspects of the neo-conservative worldview became two critical elements in the so-called Bush Doctrine: preventive war and democratization. However, the anticipatory actions the Bush administration considered were not directed only at the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, but also included rogue states considered to pose a threat to U.S. security and/or interests regardless of whether those states could be linked to terrorist organizations. President Bush insisted that the “intersection of radicalism and technology” mandated that the U.S. act before such dangers gather. And since conventional deterrence and containment policies will arguably not work with terrorists and non-rational state leaders,



regime change served to simultaneously eliminate the world’s most dangerous regimes and liquidate terrorist safe-havens.

Neo-conservatives, such as Charles Krauthammer, also equated the GWOT with Reagan’s confrontation with Soviet authoritarianism. It was anticipated that vigorous U.S. action against militant Islam would produce the same dramatic victories as was witnessed in 1989 and 1991. Targeting authoritarian regimes in the Middle East would lead to a political transformation in the very region where Islamic fundamentalism seemed to thrive.

The insurgency in Iraq exposed the inadequacies of the Bush Doctrine and led President Bush to change course during his second term. The 2006 NSS calls for more active public diplomacy, minimizes the importance of democracy, and eliminates the overt moralism found in the 2002 NSS. Further, the failures of the Iraq intervention pushed President Bush toward a less hawkish and more multilateral foreign policy.

Barack Obama came to office in part because of the perceived and real foreign policy failures of the Bush administration. By 2008 the American public had grown weary of U.S. wars abroad and sought a new leader that would concentrate more attention on conditions at home while simultaneously improving America’s reputation overseas. Candidate Obama’s belief that the U.S. needed to reduce its footprint abroad, turn attention towards Asia, work closely with allies, and share responsibility in global governance, resonated with many Americans because it seemed so un-Bush like. When asked what an Obama foreign

policy would be like, Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said “if you were to boil it all down to a bumper sticker, its ‘wind down the [Iraq and Afghanistan] wars, reestablish American standing and leadership in the world, and focus on a broader set of priorities from Asia and the global economy to a nuclear nonproliferation regime.”

Obama’s liberal internationalist worldviews clashed with conservative political opposition, budgetary resources, and the legacy of President Bush’s Freedom Agenda in the Middle East. Indeed, neo-conservative efforts to restructure the Middle East as well as approval by Bush administration officials of harsh interrogation procedures soured Obama on the promotion of democracy and human rights. High-level posts in Obama’s cabinet went to noted realists, such as Robert Gates, Hillary Clinton, and Tom Donilon, rather than Susan Rice and Samantha Powers both known for their interest in alleviating poverty, protecting minorities, and assisting development in the global south.

Unlike his predecessor, Obama also saw climate change and environmental degradation as critical security issues that required high-level attention. President Obama’s cover letter to the 2010 NSS notes violent extremism as a challenge of our time, but goes on to identify climate change, poverty, and conflict resolution as essential concerns of U.S. foreign policy as well. In fact, the security implications of eco-system destruction are emphasized in Obama’s first NSS. “Dependence upon fossil fuels constrains our options and pollutes our environment. Climate change and pandemic



disease threaten the security of regions and the health and safety of the American people.” Such language reveals President Obama’s interest in expanding the security portfolio to include environmental conservation and energy independence.

President Obama also used the cover letter of the 2010 NSS to rebuke the Bush administration for its contempt of international law and recklessly abandoning America’s clear commitment to universal values. “And we reject the notion that lasting security and prosperity can be found by turning away from universal rights,” he wrote. “Democracy does not represent our better angels, it stands in opposition to aggression and injustice, and our support for universal rights is both fundamental to American leadership and a source of our strength in the world.” Some of the first actions Obama took upon entering office were to prohibit waterboarding and shutter the CIA black sites overseas. Obama also tried to close the detention facility at Guantanamo, but was blocked by Republicans (and some Democrats) in Congress.

While Obama’s START Treaty reduced U.S. strategic warheads to 1,550 (by February of 2018) and renewed the verification regime, tactical nuclear warheads were not addressed and the U.S. strategic arsenal remains on high alert.

Liberal internationalism recognizes that

countries have common interests, but identifying those shared interests, preventing bargaining breakdowns, and agreeing on a specific course of action, remains difficult.

Institutional structures like IGOs and international law help identify mutually beneficial strategies and thus remain essential in promoting cooperation and building trust among governments and leaders. Obama’s clear preference for acting multilaterally with allies and through IGOs is based on a liberal belief that shared governance helps support U.S. interests. Joseph Nye (2002, 159) agrees and writes, “the multilateralism of American preeminence is a key to its longevity, because it reduces the incentives for constructing alliances against us.” President Obama’s actions in Libya tend to support this principle even if the policy slogan “lead from behind” was universally ridiculed by political elites. However, Obama understood that hyper-activism by the United States discouraged collective governance of the international system. Only by allowing others to lead and receive credit for such leadership would the burdens and costs of governance become shared.

Obama has also shown a greater commitment to nuclear non-proliferation than his predecessor. The Bush 43 administration’s arms control efforts largely revolved around the GWOT. In a speech given at West Point shortly after 9/11 President Bush connected the threats of terrorism and CBRN2 proliferation. “When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations.” However, policies championed by the Bush administration, such as the Proliferation 2 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.



Security Initiative and UN Security Council Resolution 1540, both of which sought to impede trade in WMD technologies and materials, while undoubtedly useful, were met with indifference by the international community. In part this reflected opposition to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but the Bush administration was also perceived as duplicitous in its commitment to arms control. Not only was the U.S. researching new types of nuclear weapons, but Bush unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty and only half-heartedly negotiated a strategic nuclear arms pact with Russia. It was not that the Bush team opposed arms control. It was simply irrelevant to the security challenges they viewed as important.

Obama has been clearer in his commitment to nuclear arms reductions and he has elevated the importance of non-proliferation in his administration. If Bush saw U.S. nuclear weapons as unrelated to proliferation challenges, Obama noticeably links U.S. actions with efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and delegitimize the production and use of such weapons. In one of the first speeches after his inauguration in 2009, President Obama called for a nuclear-weapons free world and committed the U.S. to a no-first use policy, albeit a conditional one (2010 Nuclear Posture Review). Still, the Obama administration has not pushed for advice and consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (a commitment he made during his campaign) and billions have been promised to upgrade the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Further, while Obama’s START Treaty reduced U.S. strategic

warheads to 1,550 (by February of 2018) and renewed the verification regime, tactical nuclear warheads were not addressed and the U.S. strategic arsenal remains on high alert.

Candidate Obama’s belief that the U.S. needed to reduce its footprint abroad, turn attention towards Asia, work closely with allies, and share responsibility in global governance, resonated with many Americans because it seemed so un-Bush like.

To be clear, George W. Bush and Barack Obama have fundamentally different worldviews. Neo-conservatism and liberal internationalism begin with very different assumptions about how the world works and the forces that drive leader behavior. Still, some of the specific policy actions taken by the Bush 43 administration remain in place today despite Obama’s seeming disapproval during the 2008 presidential campaign. Further, many of these policies stand in opposition to the very tenets of liberal internationalism. In the next section we compare and contrast several foreign policy actions of the Bush and Obama presidencies. The specific policies include overall military spending and foreign aid allocations, international commitments, voting alignments in the United Nations General Assembly. We also briefly examine the partisan composition of Congress that each president confronted inasmuch as political opposition influences leader decision-making.

U.S. Defense and Foreign Aid Spending



We begin with defense and foreign aid spending by the Bush 43 and Obama administrations. Table 1 shows U.S. defense spending from 1940 to 2014 (forecast). The 8 years of the Bush 43 administration are highlighted in bolded red and the 5 years of Obama (with forecast for FY 2014) are identified in blue. Clearly defense expenditures have increased dramatically over the past decade, particularly in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks. From 2001 to 2008 the Pentagon’s budget jumped by nearly 70% reaching levels not seen since World War II. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq actually push military spending even higher as the figures reported in Table 1 reflect only the Pentagon’s base budget and not the additional funds allocated for those two interventions.

Figure 1: U.S. Defense Spending Identifying Bush and Obama Budgets, 1940-2014

Source: USgovernmentspending.com

Obama, while pledging a smarter and less hawkish foreign policy, has not fundamentally changed overall military spending. In fact, defense allocations increased in each of Obama’s first 2 years in office before declining slightly in 2011, a bit more in 2012, and then significantly in 2013. The 2014 budget brings the Pentagon’s base budget down to

approximately $520 billion and while that is 17% below the high reached in 2010, it remains higher than spending in each and every year since 1945 inflation-adjusted dollars.

Foreign aid spending during the two presidencies looks more similar than different as well. And, both Bush and Obama’s rhetoric on foreign aid have been consistent with long held U.S. ideals of promoting good governance and representative democracy. President Bush introduced the Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC), which was aimed at linking levels of foreign aid to responsible government. The criteria that the MCC required were economic freedom, investments in people, and good governance. The expected returns of development projects are examined by the MCC and foreign aid is allocated in this fashion (MCC, 2011). Obama, for his part, sought to reframe and change how foreign aid was to be allocated under his administration. In September 2010, he initiated U.S. Global development policy that attempted to link continued foreign aid and development to measures of broad-based economic growth (OxfamAmerica). Poverty and aid were to be linked to responsible government and many U.S. government agencies were co-opted into this effort. Although Obama attempted to differentiate how aid was to be allocated, the rhetoric was certainly familiar:

"It has become clear over the past decade that all the elements of American power must be developed to protect our people, interests and values," the proposed budget stated.

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"That is why the administration is committed to placing the nation on a path to double foreign assistance to $50 billion.”

--Obama campaign pledge quoted in Jacobson, 2013

Obama’s campaign promise was translated in part in the levels of foreign aid allocated during his first term. Table 2 illustrates total aid (both military and economic) from 2001 to 2012. The total aid budget has nearly doubled from Bush 43’s first year in office to 2012, but much of the increase came during Bush’s second term. Indeed, aid has fallen somewhat during Obama’s first term in office, although he admittedly has increased the base budget by about 18% on average from Bush’s final year in office.

More dramatic than the increase in total aid allocation has been the breakdown by program area (Table 2). Obama doubled the aid going to global health and substantially increased aid for counter-terrorism and combating WMD. Humanitarian aid in 2012 remained at about the same level as Bush left it in 2008. Table 1: Traditional U.S. Foreign Aid (constant 2012 dollars appropriated)

Year

Total Foreign Aid ($billions)

2001 20.68 2002 22.46 2003 31.81

2004* 49.39 2005 27.99 2006 28.45 2007 30.99 2008 32.08 2009 39.34 2010 41.63 2011 35.66 2012 37.68

Source: Congressional Research Service; * increase due to Iraq War appropriation Table 2: U.S. Foreign Aid by Program Area (Millions of current U.S. dollars)

Year

Counter-Terrorism

Combating

WMD

Health

Humanitarian

2006 157.0 229.9 4,594.7 2,451.7 2007 242.1 228.0 5,705.1 3,097.4 2008 188.2 253.7 7,243.0 4,071.8 2009 225.0 410.9 8,224.3 4,883.9 2010 432.2 320.5 8,996.3 4,969.4 2011 520.8 343.3 8,630.2 3,803.9 2012 517.9 328.1 9,072.8 4,091.4

Source: Congressional Research Service

If we examine the countries that received a greater share of foreign aid since 2008, we do notice some illuminating trends. Obama has also altered somewhat the mix of countries receiving U.S. aid (Table 3). Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan and Pakistan receive large aid packages in both administrations illustrating how critical such countries are to U.S. regional security interests. But where Bush allocated monies to Turkey, Peru, India, and Yugoslavia, Obama has sent more aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa was the big winner in the last five years in foreign aid. Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia have received substantial increases in U.S. aid going from Bush’s first term to Obama’s. In fact, not one country in Sub-Saharan Africa was in the top 15 countries receiving U.S. aid. In 2012, 4 of the top ten and 8 of the top 15 countries receiving U.S. aid are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Obama has clearly increased Africa’s relative share of the U.S. foreign aid budget compared to Bush 43. Where Obama has cut foreign aid, has been in Europe and Eurasia as well as Latin America and the Caribbean.



Table 3: Top Recipients of U.S. Foreign Aid 2002 & 2012 (Millions of current U.S. dollars)

FY 2002 FY 2012

Israel 2,788 Israel 3,075 Egypt 1,960 Afghanistan 2,327 Pakistan 1,050 Pakistan 2,102 Afghanistan 686 Iraq 1,683 Colombia 406 Egypt 1,557 Jordan 355 Tanzania 752 Turkey 253 Jordan 701 Peru 234 Kenya 652 India 173 Nigeria 625 Yugoslavia 167 Ethiopia 580 Source: Congressional Research Service

Many countries saw their foreign aid cut completely during the Obama administration. Most notably North Korea, Israel, and the Central African Republic saw foreign aid commitments removed entirely. If we examine absolute changes in aid, we find that Iraq predictably had their aid slashed over this period, reduced by $1,983 million from 2008 to 2013. Similarly, many wealthier and more developed African nations saw their foreign aid reduced substantially, with half of the biggest absolute losers seeing their aid reduced considerably (Gibler and Miller, 2012). Projected figures for 2014 also throw-up some notable winners and losers. Myanmar is projected to receive $170 million in foreign aid, a notable increase for a country that has seemingly made substantive political reform over recent years. Similarly, El Salvador is slated to increase its share of foreign aid by 51 percent over 2012 levels (Piccio, 2013).

As the above analysis illustrate, there are substantive differences between the administrations. A recent study by Gibler

and Miller (2012) highlights some interesting factors that differentiate the two administrations. Firstly, many wealthier and more developed states that previously received aid under Bush were suddenly cut-off during Obama’s first term. That many of these countries were supporters of the war in Iraq may be no accident, perhaps highlighting a closing of the chapter on this period in U.S. history. There is also a distinct lack of any regard to the human rights practices of these countries when deciding which countries receive aid, with, for example, low-scoring countries like Egypt and Tunisia both receiving generous aid packages during the Obama administration. It seems that neither administration seems overly concerned about the human rights record of these countries when it comes to the allocation of foreign aid. There does however seem to be a noticeable positive relationship between the democracy scores of the recipient states and foreign aid. Countries that have made steps to improve democratic governance often see an increase in aid levels, and this is consistent in both administrations.

In many respects, foreign aid has continued to be allocated in a familiar fashion after Obama took over the Oval Office in 2009. The rhetoric continues to stay similar, with both administrations highlighting how nations that continue to make strides to measured democratic governance will be rewarded. We can also identify how both administrations continue to reward friendly regional powers, with large levels of aid allocated, regardless of how mixed the human rights records of these countries might be. Differences



between the administrations do however exist. The Obama administration not only slashed much of the foreign aid going to former loyalist allies of the War in Iraq, Obama also redirected much of the aid across Africa to more democratic nations. However, these differences aside, both administrations’ allocation of foreign aid have generally been characterized with an appreciation of realpolitik concerns, alongside a more general promotion of democratic governance.

International Commitments

International law does not distinguish the myriad agreements negotiated among and between countries. In fact, the form of the arrangement (be it a treaty, convention, or agreement) matters less than the substance. Any non-trivial agreement designed to be binding on the parties, which clearly specifies obligations, represents a treaty under international law. In the United States, however, only international agreements that go to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification are formally defined as treaties (Klarevas, 2003). U.S. presidents can, though, negotiate compacts with other countries without needing Senate approval. This authority, seemingly established in Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution, has enabled presidents since Washington to negotiate international agreements without Senate consent. For each presidential administration it is interesting to examine the mix of treaties and international agreements negotiated as well as the issues addressed in these compacts.

International treaties were certainly utilized by both Presidents especially in their

first terms of office, with both Presidents seeing a decline in international treaties approved by the Senate during their second terms. The Bush administration used international treaties to great effect during both the 107th and 108th Congress. Bush's first term saw only two treaties held up in the Senate (Table 4). The only un-ratified treaties were the United Nations Convention on the Safety of UN Personnel and the environmental treaty from the Stockholm Convention on Organic Pollutants; neither made it through the Senate. Bush also pushed through many commerce and tax treaties, alongside a dozen extradition and terrorism treaties highlighting the concerns of the times. Whilst Bush did see a reduction in international treaties during his second term, the administration was not blocked wholesale by the Senate (Thomas: The Library of Congress).

For Obama, there was a marked difference between the first and second halves of his first term as President. Obama signed just 16 treaties during this first term (around a third as many as Bush), however, only five were ratified and these five successful treaties were all sent to the Senate during the first half of 2010. The shift in the composition of the Senate seemed to hinder any further progress for Obama during his first term, and this pattern is seemingly continuing into Obama’s second term (U.S. Department of State). Interestingly, it seems that the type of treaty had little bearing on this. Of the five treaties the Senate ratified early in Obama's term, these included an arms control treaty with Russia and tax agreements with on again-off-again ally France. Conversely, seemingly fairly



benign and uncontroversial treaties, such as fisheries and investment treaties stayed firmly sidelined after 2010. For Obama’s second term in office, and perhaps sensing the changing mood in the Senate, we see a complete standstill in any progress on international treaties so far.

When it comes to matters of defense and security, we see both Presidents using international treaties to achieve strategic concerns. Whilst extradition and terrorist concerns were a high priority for Bush during his first term, we see little appetite for these treaties from Obama. Whilst the number of arms control treaties are virtually identical, these treaties make up only a small proportion of Bush's first term, with Obama spending more time and energy on these matters proportionally than the Bush administration (Table 4). Interestingly, one of Obama's few treaty victories was with the strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia early in his Presidency, again indicating a fairly high priority for arms control matters for Obama, a priority that is echoed when we examine executive agreements.

Table 4: International Treaties during the First Terms of Bush 43 & Obama Bush First Term Obama First Term Signed Ratified Signed Ratified

Taxation, etc. 16 16 9 3 Extra & Terr 12 12 0 0 IGOs 5 5 0 0 Arms Control 2 2 3 1 Other 14 12 4 1

Total 49 47 16 5

The use of executive agreements has of course been much more widespread for both Presidents, with this trend accelerating since the end of the Second World War (Klarevas, 2003). If we examine executive agreements

for the two presidents’ first terms we see many differences in the numbers and types of treaties that were passed. Most starkly, we see the huge disparity in the number of executive agreements to treaties proper. President Bush signed over 13 times more executive agreements than treaties, whilst President Obama signed a staggering 37 times more executive agreements than treaties (Table 5). Interestingly and perhaps unexpectedly, Obama signed more defense cooperation executive agreements than Bush in the two Presidents’ respective first terms. This is illustrated not only in the percentage of defense cooperation agreements signed, but also in the raw numbers of these types of agreements. Obama is only eclipsed in Bush's second term, when defense cooperation agreements shoot up to 242, making them a full quarter of all executive agreements signed by Bush. Arms control agreements show a familiar pattern to international treaties, with Obama once again devoting more time and energy than his predecessor in pursuing international agreements on arms control. Obama’s focus on arms control agreements echoes a similar focus in the few international treaties passed by the Senate under Obama.

Finally, the amount of international law and organization agreements signed by the Bush administration largely reflects the administration's push to restrict the orbit of the International Criminal Court from impinging upon U.S. military personnel. Also, foreign aid agreements, a topic discussed earlier, show a marked difference between Bush and Obama, perhaps reflecting the changes implemented by Obama we discussed earlier.



Table 5: International Executive Agreements during the First Terms of Bush 43 & Obama Bush First Term Obama First Term Number of

Agreements % of Total

Number of Agreements

% of Total

Defense Coop 118 17.9 145 23.9 Law & IGOs 89 13.5 4 0.7 Foreign Aid 25 3.8 63 10.4 Arms Control 29 4.4 36 5.9

Total 661 100.0 607 100.0

The use of international treaties for the President has continued to decline over the years. Their practicality eclipsed by the far more numerous and effective executive agreement (Caruson and Farrar-Myers, 2007). The ease of passing international treaties in divided government is highlighted by the paucity of treaties successfully passed by Obama in his first term. That Obama would look to executive agreements seems hardly surprising, and there is therefore little else to identify in the types and numbers of treaties under Obama due to the limited number of treaties passing the Senate.

Executive agreements do however allow for some better comparisons between Obama and Bush. What is perhaps a little surprising is the similarity in both the raw numbers of executive agreements and types of agreements passed by these administrations. Both Presidents saw similar numbers of arms control and defense cooperation agreements, with Obama shading Bush in both categories (Table 5). Whilst Obama has wound-down wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, defense cooperation agreements continued to proliferate unabated. It seems that as far as matters of defense and security there seems very little difference between the administrations, at

least in numbers of agreements both of these administrations entered into.

Voting in the UN

Candidate Obama campaigned on rebuilding America’s reputation in the world and his speeches in Berlin, Prague, and Cairo were all designed to illustrate clearly the change in leadership in the United States. If President Bush alienated much of the international community through his unilateralist and hawkish foreign policies, Obama would seek assistance and input from foreign leaders and their governments. One wonders, however, whether any of Obama’s actions and rhetoric have improved perceptions of the U.S. abroad. One measure of reputation is the frequency with which foreign countries vote with the United States in the UN General Assembly.

Figure 2 illustrates this measure. It shows the average percentage of countries on all votes in each year voting with the U.S. position. For example, in 1946 countries in the international community on average voted with the United States on approximately 67% of the votes taken in the UN General Assembly. This percentage increases to 77% in 1958 (the 2nd year of Eisenhower’s second term) but drops to its lowest level (24%) during 2007.

Visually it appears that UN voting with the United States drops during Republican presidential administrations, and this is confirmed by examining the average voting score during both Democrat and Republic presidents. During Democratic presidencies countries vote with the U.S. 53% of the time (averaged over the five democratic administrations), but the same countries vote



with the U.S. only 45% of the time during Republican presidencies. Eight percentage points may not seem like much, but it does reflect a real (statistically significant) difference.

Figure 2: Voting Alignment with U.S. in UN General Assembly, noting Republican Presidents (in shaded blue)

Source: Eric Voeten

One also sees a dramatic drop in voting alignment during the second half of the Carter administration. In fact, using 1979 as a cut-point, average support for the U.S. position on votes in the UN General Assembly is above 63% (1945-1978). After 1978 the level of support drops to under 35%. But support remains markedly higher during the presidencies of Clinton and Obama compared with Reagan, Bush 41, and Bush 43. Average support during the Clinton administration is about 42%. This support drops to 28% during Bush 43 and rebounds somewhat during the first term of Obama to 35%. Admittedly, support for the U.S. in the UN General Assembly during Obama’s first term is lower than for any other post-World War II Democratic president. But there is a statistically significant increase from Bush 43 to Obama, even with only 12 combined observations.

Obama came to office hoping to improve the U.S. reputation abroad. To a certain

extent he has done just that. But it also is clear that there remains deep distrust with and opposition to U.S. foreign policy. And, while the change from Bush 43 to Obama clearly increased support for U.S. positions in the UN General Assembly, it will take more than just a change in presidents to rebuild America’s relationship with much of the global community. It will take a more fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy.

Confronting Congress

Finally, the political environment confronted by both Bush 43 and Obama is worth noting. The actions a president takes remain influenced by the support and or opposition coming from Capitol Hill. To be sure, there existed a broad strategic consensus among policy makers on most issues relating to U.S. international affairs up until the Vietnam War. The institutionalized dominance of the presidency was legitimized through constitutional prerogative and a general agreement that executive control over foreign policy was essential for maintaining U.S. security in the face of a dangerous and highly fluid international environment. Consequently, a remarkable level of bipartisan Congressional support existed for the president’s foreign policy priorities.

Figure 3: Partisan Support for the President in the House of Representatives, 1953-2012

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policy consensus was to some extent due to Vietnam and other increasingly salient issues confronting policy makers. The issues synonymous with national security concerns that had compelled agreement among lawmakers and the executive were changing. Indeed, no longer were the foreign policy issues confronting the United States entirely separate from domestic and more partisan issues. In particular, economic and trade issues have helped to politicize foreign policy because districts and states are not immune or isolated from the effects of economic and trade policies.

Figure 4: Partisan Support for the President in the Senate, 1953-2012

A changing electoral landscape coupled

with a changing issue agenda has tended to mean much greater congressional activism

in foreign policy. This activism has mostly broken down along partisan lines. One can clearly see this partisan opposition to presidential foreign policy in Figures 3 and 4. Both figures show Republican and Democratic support for presidential positions in both houses of Congress. Presidential support has become intensely partisan over the past 30 years. Republican support for Republican presidents increases from Reagan, to Bush 41 to Bush 43. At the same time, Democratic support for the same Republican presidents decreases. A similar trend can be seen in the Senate as well (Figure 4). Congress (both chambers) is more ideological, partisan, and polarized than at any time in the post-World War II period.

Conclusion

We have seen that Obama’s attempt to realign American foreign policy has had somewhat mixed results. By some measures such as voting alignment with the U.S. at the UN, a realignment of foreign aid priorities that stress good democratic governance, and a heavier focus on arms control and reduction, we find that Obama has managed to move away from the policies of the Bush years with some success. Obama’s more liberal internationalist worldview has, as expected, refocused U.S. foreign policy in many ways. Yet in other foreign policy areas President Obama has been met with an intensely partisan Congress that has prevented policy change or Obama has simply continued without significant revision the foreign policies of his predecessor. Consider the historically high levels of defense spending and unfortunate

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antagonization of allies with recent NSA spying disclosures. Both of these policies remain at odds with Obama’s stated objectives at the beginning of his presidency.

Looking forward, we have already seen domestically how Congress has frustrated the President’s international treaties and indirectly his commitment to a promised increase in foreign aid. That this pattern will change anytime soon seems unlikely. Indeed, in response to Congressional opposition the Obama administration now moves arms control and defense cooperation agreements unilaterally rather than through a formal treaty, a pragmatic and somewhat predictable response to domestic obstructionism. There seems little reason to expect this tactic to change going forward.

It seems that any prospect for dramatic change in foreign policy during President Obama’s second term has been tempered domestically. Conservatives oppose President Obama’s liberal internationalist policies and liberals have been incensed that Obama has not broken more dramatically from his predecessor’s programs. Many scholars and pundits also note how historically U.S. presidents have found foreign policy change difficult to enact when they enter office. Bush 43 certainly saw his priorities and policies change early in his first and later after the 2006 congressional elections. Obama will surely find continued obstacles in the final three years of his presidency.



References

Caruson, Kiki, and Farrar-Myers, Victoria A., 2007. “Promoting the President’s Foreign Policy Agenda: Presidential Use of Executive Agreements as Policy Vehicles.” Political Research Quarterly 60 (4): 613-644.

Gibler, Douglas M., and Miller, Steven V. 2012. “Comparing the Foreign Aid Policies of Presidents Bush and Obama.” Social Sciences Quarterly 93 (5):1203-1217.

Klarevas, Lois, 2003. “The Law: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements.” Political Studies Quarterly 33 (2): 394-406.

Websites

Jacobson, Louis. 2013. Available at (http://politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/170/double-us-spending-on-foreign-aid-to-50-billion).

MCC, “Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2012” (February 2011). Available at (http://mcc.gov).

Oxfam America Foreign Aid 101. Available at (http://oxfamamerica.org/files/foreign-aid-101-revised-edition.pdf).

Piccio, Lorenzo. 2013. Available at (http://devex.com/en/news/which-countries-are-winners-and-losers-in-obama-s/80713).

Thomas (The Library of Congress). Available at (http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php) U.S. Department of State. ). Available at (http://state.gov/s/l/treaty/index.htm) The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: US Global Development Policy”.

Available at (http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy).

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