u.s. foreign policy in the gulf after 9/11
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The effect on US-GCC relations Saudi Arabia in the focusTRANSCRIPT
Hichem Karoui
US Foreign Policy in the Gulf After 9/11
The effect on US-GCC relations (Saudi Arabia in the focus)
2
HICHEM KAROUI
U.S. Foreign Policy In The Gulf
After September 11
The effect on US-GCC relations
Saudi Arabia in the focus
3
Thanks
I would like to thank a lot of people, whose help has been
essential for the completion of this research. I mention from the
Sorbonne University (Paris III), Department of English and American
studies: Mrs. Malie Montagutelli, along with .P.Schnapper, C.Bonafou-
Murat, and Jean Pierre Bourcier. I mention also the staff of the American
Library in Paris, with at its head M. Charles Trueheart. And of course, I
am much indebted to professor Burhan Ghalioun (Sorbonne-Nouvelle:
Department of Oriental studies), who has always advised and encouraged
me.
4
Books by Hichem Karoui
In French :
- Où va l'Arabie saoudite? L‘Harmattan . Paris . 2006.
- L‘après-Saddam en Irak : les plans, les hommes et les problèmes.
L‘Harmattan. Paris.2005.
In Arabic :
- Al nisr wal houdoud (prolegomenon For a Critique of the Arab
Policies ). مقدمت لىقد الواقع السياسي العربي: الىسر والحدود
Dar al Nawras. 1988.
- Al tawazun al duwali (International Balance, From The Cold War
To The Detente.) وفراجالب الباردة الى االتوازن الدولي مه الحر
Addar al Arabiyya lil Kitab. 1985.
- Amidatu al Junun al sabaa (7 Pillars Of Madness – A Novel) أعمدة
.Addar al Arabiyya lil Kitab. 1984الجىون السبعت
- Noun : وون A Novel. Déméter. Tunis. 1983.
In Progress:
- Bush America And the Middle East.
5
Contents
Introduction : Questions of Methodology………. 9
Chapter One : Political Ramifications……………… 23
- US and Western Critiques of Saudi Policy………… 26
- Islamism, Internationalism, Nationalism………… 33
- Identity Problematic and Nationalistic Irrationality 36
- Neo Fundamentalists…………………………….. 40
- Media War……………………………………….. 44
- PAX AMERICANA……………………………… 50
- Madrasas , problems of education………………... 52
- Living in the denial, adopting conspiratory theories or
losing identity…………………………………….. 54
- Another Pearl Harbour?………………………….. 58
- The Saudis react………………………………... 60
Chapter II : Economic Ramifications……………………. 69
- Complexity of a relationship……………………... 70
- Oil and Security…………………………………... 71
- Data rates and performances……………………... 73
- Trade relationship………………………………… 76
- Oil production……………………………………. 77
- The challenges of the Muslim nations……………. 79
- There is ally and ally……………………………... 81
- US Energy supply and demand – Base case……... 83
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- Special Partnership……………………………….. 85
- Terror Funds……………………………………… 87
- Americo-American controversy………………….. 91
- Occult international financial network…………… 93
- The file against Saudi Arabia…………………….. 95
- Is bin Laden as wealthy as he is said to be?……… 98
- Arabs and Muslims charge Saudi Arabia………… 100
- Is Saudi Arabia worse than other Arab states?…… 102
- More questions to answer………………………… 105
Chapter III : Strategic Ramifications………………………
111
- The Gulf or the Peninsula?……………………… 116
- Democracy and interests………………………... 119
- Threats and concerns……………………………. 122
- Defense and Security……………………………. 126
- Elite change theories and American strategists…. 130
- Saudi elite positions…………………………….. 133
- Saudi Arabia, a piece in the ―machine‖…………. 141
- New concerns, self-criticism……………………. 144
Chapter IV : Impact on US Policy and the GCC Bilateral
Relations………………………………………………… . 147
- Of vital interests………………………………… 148
- Is it a turning point?…………………………….. 150
- US military and the Gulf………………………... 152
- Democracy for sail……………………………… 161
- Societies under stress…………………………… 164
- Handling the unrest……………………………... 166
- Power paradox and Empire nostalgia…………… 169
- Withdrawing troops……………………………... 173
Chapter V : Futuristic Assessment……………………… 179
- Anti-americanism………………………………. 181
- New time, new thought…………………………. 182
- Politics of identity………………………………. 185
- Islam and the West……………………………… 189
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- The failure of romantic nationalism……………. 191
- Reason and individuality……………………….. 194
- Pioneers of Arab secularism…………………….. 195
- Muslim secularisers………………………………197
- Towards liberty………………………………… 201
Bibliography……………………………………………. .213
8
For: Nana and Mamia
The Essence Of Responsibility
“Anyone can hold the helm when the sea is calm…But in stormy waters it takes strength, commitment and
responsibility to stay the course. We cannot adjust the winds, but we can always adjust our sails, and when it comes our turn to hold the helm…we must be strong.”
9
Introduction
Questions of methodology
In a book published in Paris in 2003, two important French
scholars have undertaken to discuss the issue of 9/11 in its varied
dimensions and connections. Joseph Maila contested the idea that 9/11
responded to a thought event, which means ultimately that nothing or
almost nothing could change in the concepts and the notions of
international and national policies. Maila contended that since it cannot
be compared to the Soviet revolution, nor to the rise of fascism, nor to
the violence of decolonization, nor even to the downfall of the Berlin
wall, 9/11 has nothing of an event of thought (un évènement de pensée).
Maïla concedes however that it introduced some kind of interruption, but
he wouldn‘t go to the extension of considering it a major upsetting
phenomenon. For him, the event allowed ―the construction of a
phantasmagoric notion of conflict unduly generalized in a global
violence‖ 1. That‘s why the conflict between cultures (civilizations
shock) imposed itself as the core and the asset of the event. As to the
islamologist M. Arkoun, he argued that ―the occidental culture is prone to
build up the enemy in order to legitimate a frontal war‖. Thus, ―the
concomitant construction of two cursed characters‖, he says, ―Bin Laden
and Arafat, reached since 9/11 a perfection of the kind‖ 2. In Arkoun‘s
eyes, since 1945, and ―more conflictingly after the revolution so-called
Islamic of Khomeini, the words Islam and West polarized an intensive
work of imaginary construction of the Other: to the Islamic and arabo-
islamic demonization of the West (Al Gharb, with its intellectual/cultural
aggression, ghazw fikri) responds, in a controversial dialectic, the
1 Mohamed Arkoun et Joseph Malia, De Manhattan à Bagdad : au delà du bien
et du mal, ed. Desclée de Brower, Paris 2003, pp.12-13. 2 Op.Cit. P.15.
10
fanciful construction of the enemy Islam.‖ 3 M. Arkoun points out also
that the word West itself has two distinguished sides: ―There is on the
one hand, the inescapable West, ubiquitous, but ideologically built up to
nourish the Muslim imagination altogether, notably since the Iranian
revolution, and particularly the arabo-islamic imagination, because of the
numerous recurrent conflicts that tear up the geopolitical sphere called
Middle East in the American political science and scholarly lexicon. And
there is on the other hand the West dialectically built up by the Euro-
Americans themselves as soon as the matter is about making a unified
front against the enemy Islam. This latter West is that of the
―Civilizations shock‖ thesis, opposing a world of values summarized in
the war slogan ―unlimited freedom‖ to the non-values, or archaic values
dangerously reactivated by the Islamist militants staying outside the
unique and universal vocation incarnated by the historical itinerary of the
USA‖. 4
We retain two key-notions of this much interesting intellectual
debate: first, 9/11 as an ―interruption», and second, the ―build up of the
enemy‖. Two preliminary remarks must be noted here:
1 - Concerning the first notion, one must concede that although
9/11 is not a paradigmatic shift in the sense described by Thomas S.
Kuhn, as ―scientific revolution‖ 5, the re-conceptualization of
international and regional issues, it has introduced, sounds as a new
vision concerning these issues. It has not only upset the old conceptions
of international order, particularly those that have been used since the
end of the Cold War, but it has also brought up some new ―fields6 of
thinking‖ to the social sciences. Therefore, it would be much difficult not
to report to this event as a line of interruption, not only between two
times or eras (before 9/11 and after it) while studying the international,
the regional, or any local scene, but also between two worlds: Maybe
these worlds are the West and the arabo-islamic 7, and maybe the division
line concerns two notions of Mankind future: a democratic, modern,
humanistic one, open up on huge, rational, reasonable changes and
3 Op. Cit.P.23.
4 Idem.
5 Thomas S. Kuhn , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of
Chicago Press, third edition 1996. He says for example : 6 We use the term ―field‖ with the connotation given to it by Bourdieu.
7 ―The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and
ideological boudaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed‖,
according to S.Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.
11
reforms, and an archaic, autistic, self-centered one, dominated on one
side by hegemonic policies and on the other side by authoritative
regimes and totalitarian thought.
There is perhaps not a revolution in the knowledge since 9/11, but
indeed there is a shift in the patterns of thought, 8 either in the USA or
outside it. And if we just ask what is a paradigm, the answer Kuhn
provides is: « in its established usage, a paradigm is an accepted model of
pattern‖9. It does not even require broad acknowledgment at its start.
―We must recognize how very limited in both scope and precision a
paradigm can be at the time of its first appearance‖, says Kuhn. Then
what happens? ― Paradigms gain their status because they are more
successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the
group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute‖ 10
. That‘s why we
may be more able to understand what‘s going on if we take in
consideration - even as a hypothesis - the ―paradigmatic shift‖ in the
American strategy, endeavour and conceptualization of the international
scene, than if we reject it out of hand.
2- As to the second notion, there are some works that have been
achieved by scholars on this topic, so that they deserve to be taken in
consideration while treating subjects related to war, conflicts and
confrontation. We cannot attain a meaningful progress while trying to
8 As early as September 30, 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report
issued by the DOD (Department of Defense) talks of ―the paradigm shift in force
planning‖ , and of ―transforming America‘s defense for the 21st century. The report
stresses that ― this Quadrennial Defense Review was the product of the senior civilian
and military leadership of the Department of Defense. It benefited from extensive
consultation with the President of the United States. It was truly "top down" in that the
decisions taken on strategy, forces, capabilities, and risks resulted from months of
deliberations and consultation among the most senior Defense Department leadership.
This report outlines the key changes needed to preserve America's safety and security in
the years to come‖. In the chapter entitled Paradigm Shift, the report says :
―The new force-sizing construct specifically shapes forces to:
- Defend the United States;
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for
the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts - including
the possibility of regime change or occupation; and
- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations‖. Let‘s
observe that this is the first time an official document acknowledges the possibility of
changing foreign regimes by force. 9 T.Kuhn, op.Cit.P23.
10 Idem.
12
understand what is at stake, if we ignore such data. Social and political
research is different from diplomatic processes. The main object of any
scientific approach is the truth, not the embellished truth, but the truth as
the empirical knowledge can provide it. Concerning scholars like Samuel
Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and others while it would not be right to say
that they focused on ―the construction of the enemy‖ as an object of their
work, we have to recognize that we would not be able to understand
much of their theories without this notion in mind, though. The same
thing may be said concerning the intelligentsia in the arabo-islamic
world. That‘s why it is not accurate either to pretend that only
islamologists like M. Arkoun or political and social scientists with
particular focus on Islamists may be interested in such a notion. In fact,
even without ever mentioning the notion (construction of the enemy),
Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington may well be the most important
theoreticians in the West who made full use of its political, cultural,
social, and historic meaning while analyzing the relations between the
West and the Muslim world.
However, if this is to introduce us to the debate in social sciences
about new conceptions emanating from 9/11, we will have to recognize
that in all that concerns the Gulf region, the strains and the tensions are
much more felt than in any other region of the world. And this is so
because of varied reasons, among which – and this not the least – the fact
that the majority of the 9/11 terrorists were coming from that region.
As the problem of Islamic radicalism – especially its terrorist
brand – raises the questions of the relations to power and authority,
legitimacy, opposition, etc…in these societies culturally different from
those called Western democracies, we will have, first, to recognize that in
most cultures human relationships are greatly determined by irrational
authority. Paraphrasing Erich Fromm, we will say that people function in
the Western society as in most societies, ―on the record of history, by
becoming adjusted to their social role at the price of giving up part of
their own will, their originality and spontaneity‖. Fromm explains that
―while every human being represents the whole of mankind with all its
potentialities, any functioning society is and has to be primarily
interested in its self-preservation. The particular ways in which a society
functions are determined by a number of objective economic and
political factors, which are given at any point of historical development.
Societies have to operate within the possibilities and limitations of their
particular historical situation. In order that any society may function well,
13
its members must acquire the kind of character, which makes them want
to act in the way they have to act as members of the society or of a
special class within it. They have to desire what objectively is necessary
for them to do. Outer force is to be replaced by inner compulsion, and by
the particular kind of human energy which is channeled into character
traits‖11
. If we acknowledge these varied and vital particularities of
societies, civilizations and cultures, we would hold already a key to
understanding much of collective and individual behavior.
One of the consequences of such a statement is that the part of
individualities in the social processes is much more important than
people are prone to believe. This is indeed a part of the modernization
history in the West. The question about whether the same processes of
individualization and rationalization have also marked the history of
Arab and Muslim societies, albeit it is quite interesting, remains beyond
the scope of this study. However, we would need to digress a bit in some
theoretical works12
to understand the remark of Fromm that ―as long as
mankind has not attained a state of organization in which the interest of
the individual and that of society are identical, the aims of society have to
be attained at a greater or lesser expense of the freedom and spontaneity
of the individual. This aim is performed by the process of child training
and education‖13
. We will have to question the validity of this claim
(Habermas) in the course of this study, with a special focus on Saudi
educative system.
Both, George Herbert Mead and Norbert Elias pondered
extensively the individual-group dilemma currently faced by social
movement scholars. Elias states: ―An attentive reader of the classical
sociological literature will everywhere find traces of this awkward
problem of the relationship between individual and society. Max Weber
saw individuals as separate, disorderly, self-reliant and independent.
Society was viewed as orderly, structured etc. He would not reconcile the
two. Durkheim struggled with this as well viewing society as constitutive
of individuals, but viewing individuals as having an ―inner
consciousness‖ that may not be objective‖14
. Elias concluded that both
11
Erich Fromm, Individual and Social origins of neurosis, article, first published
in American Sociological Review (Vol. IX, No. 4, August 1944). 12
The works of Alain Touraine, Charles Taylor, G.H.Mead , Norbert Elias and
many others would be of much help for a good understanding of this topic. 13
E. Fromm, op.Cit. 14
Norbert Elias, What is Sociology? Columbia University Press, New York,
1978, p.117.
14
scholars could not reconcile the dilemma because they viewed the
relationship between the individual and society as static. He noted that
this is also the case in analyses of social change, which is often
conceptualized as a fixed state. Elias argued that sociologists must
―capture the processual nature of societies in all their diverse aspects‖15
.
His conception of the individual is that of a dynamic person, ―constantly
in movement; he not only goes through a process, he is a process. In this
regard, Elias viewed the individual as a part of a broad array of ―webs of
relationships‖ as is elaborated in his concept of ―figuration‖16
. Elias
develops this concept to correct a major shortcoming of sociological
theories that ―present a clear conception of people as societies, [but] …
fail to do the same for people as individuals‖17
.
Individuals, as he sees it, are interwoven into a network of people.
In clarifying his conception of figurations he writes: ―One‘s conceptions
of such figurations is a basic condition of one‘s self-conception as a
separate person. The figurations can change over the course of a lifetime.
One‘s view of ―we‖ and ―they‖ may shift‖18
.
Mead 19
, too, developed a concept of the individual as constitutive
of society, but acknowledged individuality. He states: ―Every individual
self within a given society or social community reflects in its organized
structure the whole relational pattern of organized social behavior which
that society or community exhibits or is carrying on, and its organized
structure is constituted by this pattern; but since each of these individual
selves reflects a uniquely different aspect or perspective of this pattern in
its structure, from its own particular and unique place or standpoint
within the whole process of organized social behavior which exhibits this
pattern since, that is, each is differently or uniquely related to that whole
process, and occupies its own essentially unique focus of relations
therein-- the structure of each is differently constituted by this pattern
from the way in which the structure of any other is so constituted‖20
.
Mead further distinguishes between the ―I‖ and the ―me‖ arguing
that the latter is mediated through the former. The ―me‖ ―is the organized
set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the
others constitute the organized ―me‖ and then one reacts toward that as
15
Elias. Op.Cit.P115. 16
Elias. Op.Cit. Pp124-128. 17
Elias, op.Cit, p128. 18
Idem. 19
G.H.Mead, Mind, Self and Society, University of Chicago Press, 1934. 20
G.H.Mead, op.Cit, p 202.
15
an ―I‖‖21
. The ―I‖ is the place where novelty and values reside, though
the ―I‖ is dynamic and changes as it processes a variety of social
situations.
Social movement scholars‘ treatment of collective identity
processes has tended to preface the ―me‖ as opposed to the ―I‖. The ―I‖ is
where values and novelty reside. It constitutes individuality and is where
reflection takes place. To be certain, recent social movement theory has
dealt with values as in frame analysis, where frames are targeted to
resonate with existing group values. Here, too, ―me‖ aspects of collective
identity are prefaced and provide a barrier to understanding the processes
through which individuals interpret frames. Group values necessarily
reflect individual values, but they are not sufficient explanations of
collective identity processes. Thus, in social movement theory, there is
often the presumption that the potential recruit or social movement
activist is only a political/cultural heritage individual divorced from any
other identity of self. This perspective ignores the complexity of identity
construction that rests on multiple figurations that transcend time 22
. This
is just to underline how much difficult it is to understand the complex
relations between Islamist activists, either taken individually or as a
group, and the social and cultural environment wherein they grow up and
work. This is also to point out to the rapid, and in our eyes, unwise
summarizing of modern Islamic political trends in the West, and their
unreasonable linkage to terrorist activities.
We will rely mainly on what social scientists call ―Documentary
Observation‖, meaning that we will have to analyze in depth and
comment a varied array of documents issued by different institutions,
either in the USA or in Saudi Arabia and the GCC States, along with all
the parties concerned by the current developments: many of these
documents come from the public domain, archives, official statistics and
data, media and intelligence reports, US Congress publications, and
personal information.
In this context, the amount of documents issued in the wake of
September 11 and related to it directly or indirectly is merely astronomic.
We have no pretension of reading or examining much of it. Since the task
21
G.H.Mead, op.Cit, p 175. 22
Individuals constantly engage in self-verification, ―or seeing the self [―I‖] in
terms of the role [―me‖] as embodied in the identity standard.
16
is ostensibly out of proportion for a single person – and even for a large
group – we opted for a microanalysis circumscribed to the strict
minimum of ―pics‖ selected throughout our observatory sticking-up with
the event, day in and day out, for the purpose of informing. Even with all
the self-restriction and necessary caution, in choosing such or such
document rather than another, we should add that something personal and
even randomly would also enter in consideration, although unconsciously
most of the time. How can one justify, in effect, the option for analyzing
or commenting such a ―piece‖ emanating from such an institution rather
than another? There is indeed a rational and voluntary choice, aiming at
the verification of some allegations and hypothesis; yet, as in all work of
this kind, there is also a part of intuition and predilection. To cite
Habermas, ―one can gain clarity about the meaning of value judgments
by examining the dual, descriptive-prescriptive content of these
evaluative, need-interpreting expressions. They serve to make
predilection understandable. This component of justification is the bridge
between the subjectivity of experience and that intersubjective
transparency that experience gains in being truthfully expressed and, on
this basis, attributed to an actor by onlookers‖23
. Thus, insofar as my
personal experience – in the media - is involved, I will be able to gain
insight with respect to my object as far as I make of it (i.e. the
subjectivity of my experience) an integrative part of this scientific
project.
Events unfolded since September 11 in such a rapid development
that even the most experienced observer would find some difficulties to
follow up everything anywhere. Let us begin by some of the last
developments:
In early 2004, the Presidential study group, - a bipartisan
commission of statesmen, diplomats, legislators, scholars, and experts—
was conveyed to examine the state of the Middle East and the
effectiveness of U.S. policy in advancing U.S. interests in that region.
According to the report it has published 24
, ―the United States is facing an
extraordinary moment of challenge in the Middle East, one that demands
an integrated U.S. strategy built on a set of three pillars: security, reform,
and peace. The security agenda is the most pressing, but it alone is not
23
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One,
Beacon Press, 1984, p.92. 24
2005 Presidential Study Group Report, Security, Reform and Peace : The
Three Pillars of U.S. Strategy in the Middle East, The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy.
17
sufficient. If the United States wants not just to combat the threats it
faces in the region but also to change the regional dynamic which
produces such threats, the administration should also pursue political,
social, and economic reform in Middle East countries and the promotion
of a secure Arab-Israeli peace‖.25
We can recognize the great lines of concern of the Bush
administration in the linkage between these ―three pillars‖, which has
never reached in previous administrations such systematization in the
thought. Indeed there is a particular focus on Iraq in the paper, but this is
only a result of a process that started just after 9/11, in which Iraq – like
Afghanistan- were seemingly the first experiences of change that have
involved a huge effort from the USA. Some topics are thus maintained
together in a kind of ―package‖ for the ―Greater Middle East‖, to use the
new expression:
* speeding the training and fielding of new Iraqi security forces
while building the structure of a free and representative Iraqi
government,
* coordinating strategy on Iran‘s nuclear program with key
European and Security Council powers,
* developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to fight
the ideological war against Islamist extremism,
* injecting presidential leadership into calls for political reform,
and
* investing in Palestinian political and security change and a
peaceful and orderly Israeli disengagement from Gaza…
Such are the ―Bush administration most pressing Middle East
priorities for 2005‖, as described by the report.
Prior to the U.S.-led war on Iraq, the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks in the United States had expanded the security challenges facing
the United States in the Gulf region, which has seen three Major wars in
the past two decades: the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), the Gulf war (1991),
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).
Moreover, it was almost established over a relatively long period
of time that The Gulf states face internal threats not attributable only to
Iran or Iraq. All six Gulf26
States — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the
25
Idem. 26
The reference simply to the Gulf is a convenience to avoid controversy over
the usage of the term "persian gulf" versus "arabian gulf". Thus we will use only the
term : the Gulf henceforth, except in the quotations of other writers.
18
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Qatar—are hereditary
monarchies. Like all the Arab states, they allow limited formal
opportunity for popular participation in national decision-making,
although several, particularly Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, are opening up
their political processes and earning U.S. official praise for doing so.
Kuwait has had a vibrant, elected parliament for over four decades,
although the parliament has periodically been suspended and female
suffrage was banned there27
. Some of the Gulf states, including Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, are undergoing leadership
transitions; Bahrain‘s leadership passed to a new generation in March
1999 when the long serving prince died suddenly 28
. Recently, Saudi
Arabia‘s first held municipal elections proved at least how much progress
the idea of democratization has gained the Saudi mind, although it is
deemed to be the most conservative in the Arab world.
The Gulf has since the first part of the XXth century struck the
imagination of the Westerners as one of the most extraordinary regions of
the world with its cozy much intimate ambiance, both hospitable and
wild, its mysteries and legends, and its detachment from the historical
processes, which sounded to be resulting from the conservatism of its
population and so many long centuries of what the Arabs describe as
decadence under the Ottoman rule.
―The hazards of history and geography‖, says Peter Mansfield
―have combined to decide that Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Union of
Arab Emirates (formerly the Trucial Coast) instead of entering the
modern world as impoverished outlying provinces of one of the bigger
States in the area – Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Iran – have become independent
members of the United Nations with living standards which are among
the highest in the world. Two of them – Kuwait and the UAE – are major
financial powers‖ 29
.
The total land area of the GCC countries is approximately
2,475,190 square kilometers (approximately 28 percent of the United
States). In terms of size, Saudi Arabia is the largest GCC state (over 2.1
million square kilometers) and occupies nearly 87 percent of the total
area. The second largest GCC state is Oman (9 percent of total area),
27
Until 2005, when for the first time a lady is appointed member of the
Parliament, then Minister. 28
Kenneth Katzman, the Persian Gulf States, Post-war issues for US policy ,
2003, July 14, 2003, CRS report for Congress. 29
Peter Mansfield, The Arabs, Penguin Books, 1985, p.331.
19
followed by the UAE (3.4 percent) and Kuwait (0.72 percent). Bahrain,
with a land area of only 620 square kilometers, is the smallest.
The weather and soil patterns together with the lack of surface
water have meant great difficulties and high costs for economically
productive activities. One way to overcome these tremendous natural
odds is to learn to control the environment, to build infrastructure, and to
modernize with the help of physical capital and technology brought in
from outside. This is the background against which foreign economic
relations of he Gulf States must be understood.
“ The effect of great and sudden wealth on the tiny desert states
of the (…) Gulf has been remarkable‖, says P. Mansfield. ―In the
kingdom of Saudi Arabia it has produced one of the most extraordinary
phenomena of the twentieth century. It is not only that a state which was
one of poorest on the globe when it was created half a century ago is well
on its way to becoming one of the richest by any standards, with control
over a major part of the world‘s financial reserves, but that it should have
happened to a Bedouin tribal monarchy ruled on the most fundamentalist
and puritanical principles of Islam. The inescapable problem of how to
serve both Allah and Mammon has yet to be resolved‖30
.
Maybe never as since 9/11 this problem has been raised in more
an urgency, both to Americans and Saudis, because – particularly- of all
the connections between funds and fundamentalist terror, of all the
ambiguities and misunderstandings, of the stereotypes, the pre-
conceptions, and the false dialogue, the hypocrisy internationally
established.
For the historical background, albeit many people still think that
the GCC was a reaction against the Iranian revolution, some observers
have a different approach. Lenore G. Martin for instance, says that the
GCC " was not an automatic reaction to the revolutionary Iranian State.
Various collective security arrangements had been discussed among the
Gulf States after the Iranian revolution. For example, after the new
Iranian regime engaged in naval exercises in 1979, Oman reacted by
proposing an international Western force to operate sophisticated
surveillance equipment to counter superior Iranian naval forces, as well
as a coordinated Gulf states ground force to respond to potential Iranian
threats. Both Iraq and Saudi Arabia rejected the Omani proposal. Iraq
proposed instead a collective security force with a joint military
command composed of Gulf States (excluding Iran). The Saudis also
30
Op.Cit.P.348.
20
responded by pressuring Oman to avoid inviting American and British
forces into the Gulf and by conducting talks with South Yemen, Oman's
enemy. Saudi Arabia also offered Oman financial assistance for weapons
purchases" 31
.
In this view, it was after Iraq became embroiled in the war with
Iran, that Saudi Arabia proposed the formation of the GCC in the January
1981 meetings of the Third Islamic Conference. The GCC was
announced at a Gulf foreign ministers' meeting in February and its
inaugural session took place in May 1981. It is not clear what subjects
and priorities were privately discussed among the GCC states at these
initial sessions. It has been reported that ―their topics included
coordinating security efforts for oil fields and installations, as well as
collective efforts against subversion"32
.
Since 1991, the United States has developed an extensive network
of Gulf military bases (although Washington eschews that term, in favor
of ―access agreements‖ and ―facilities‖ and other such euphemisms,
everyone in the region calls these installations in their country ―the
American base‖) 33
. These cover much of the G.C.C.:
- Kuwait has hosted American troops on a regular basis since
1991, at a permanent facility north of Kuwait City (Camp Doha). The
U.S. has also prepositioned equipment for an armored brigade. With the
build-up of U.S. and allied forces in Kuwait for an attack on Iraq, nearly
one-third of the territory of the country has been declared a closed
military zone.
- The headquarters of the vastly expanded American naval
presence in the Gulf, the Fifth Fleet, is in Manama, Bahrain‘s capital.
There is normally at least one carrier battle group in the Gulf area at all
times. Approximately 4,000 U.S. military personnel are attached
regularly to the headquarters in Bahrain.
- Qatar signed an agreement in December 2002 to upgrade
American facilities in the country, which include a major airfield at Al
Udaid, a command and control center (duplicating facilities in Saudi
Arabia, in case the U.S. is denied access to them), and prepositioning
depots for the equipment of two armored brigades.
31
Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf, Threats from within, Lexington Books,
1984, P.26. 32
Idem. 33
F. Gregory Gause III, The Approaching Turning Point : The Future of U.S.
Relations with the Gulf States, Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic
World, Analysis Paper Number Two, May 2003.
21
- Oman provides access to American forces and prepositioned
material at airbases at Al Seeb and Thamarit and on Masirah Island in the
Arabian Sea.
- The port and airport facilities in the UAE provide vital logistical
support for American Forces, and that country hosts more recreational
visits by American troops than any other Foreign country.
Gregory Gause thinks that the United States policy toward the
Gulf Cooperation Council States has reached the point of an important
change. His thesis is that Saudi Arabia has served as the linchpin of
American military and political influence in the Gulf since Desert Storm.
It can no longer play that role. After the attacks of September 11, 2001,
an American military presence in the kingdom is no longer sustainable in
the political system of either the United States or Saudi Arabia.
Washington therefore has to rely on the smaller Gulf monarchies to
provide the infrastructure for its military presence in the region. The
build-up toward war with Iraq has accelerated that change, with the
Saudis unwilling to cooperate openly with Washington on this issue. No
matter the outcome of war with Iraq, the political and strategic logic of
basing American military power in these smaller Gulf States is
compelling. Therefore, he adds: ―In turn, Saudi-American relations need
to be reconstituted on a basis that serves the shared interests of both
states, and can be sustained in both countries‘ political systems. That
requires an end to the basing of American forces in the kingdom‖ 34
.
This is indeed an interesting view shared particularly by some
Saudi observers. Yet, we must note that it would remain a mere
hypothesis as far as it has not been validated by facts, most of all because
it seems to counter the orientation of successive American
administrations as regards settlement in the Gulf. Anyway, the crucial
question here is about the ability of the other states of the region not only
to cope with the changes, but also to form a viable, credible alternative to
Saudi Arabia in the long term. We are aware that some of these changes
have occurred recently on the occasion of the war against Saddam. But is
it not too soon to pretend that the relations between Saudi Arabia and the
USA have taken a new irreversible turn? Before advancing such a
suggestion, we should first answer questions like: how much of theses
changes should the region expect and how much welcome are they in the
smaller Gulf States? If some of these changes would ultimately find
alternative allies to USA among the States of GCC (others than Saudi
34
Idem.
22
Arabia) isn‘t this tide going to disturb the balance of powers and the
interrelations inside the GCC itself? What if the allies of Saudi Arabia
inside the GCC are not concerned to play the part of the alternative
option? Then, would it be better to understand first to which extent the
Saudi-US relations have been seriously disturbed by 9/11, and whether
the disturbance is fixable in the short term? How can we evaluate the
future prospects in regard of what happened, on the political, economic,
social, and strategic levels? What are the expected impacts of such
changes on the internal development of the Gulf societies?
These are some of the great questions people inside the GCC and
outside it are raising. The answers are neither obvious nor easy to find,
because of the complexity of the patterns of thought, the diversity of
reactions, and the double-edged problem: the fact that the attitudes are
neither only political, nor economical, nor strategic, but also cultural; that
religion, traditions, and political and economical interests mix up in an
explosive assortment; that some pending questions from outside the
region (like the Palestinian Israeli conflict, the relations with Iran, the
situation in Iraq, etc) further complicate the picture …All those little
details have , at one time or another, something to do with the Gulf,
Saudi Arabia, the USA, or all of them.
However, the main question stays : what is the real change
introduced by September 11 on both American thinking and projects and
the attitudes and responses of the elite and the ordinary people in the
Gulf- especially in Saudi Arabia?
23
Chapter One
_______________
Political ramifications
According to a poll by Zogby International, in January 2001, 56%
of Americans polled viewed Saudi Arabia favorably, 28% unfavorably.
In December 2001, those numbers had basically reversed, with only 24%
viewing Saudi Arabia favorably and 58% unfavorably35
. Similarly, much
of the American political and media elite, which had generally accepted
the US-Saudi relationship, now began to question the value for the
United States of a close relationship with Riyadh. For example, the New
York Times and the Washington Post both urged a new and more critical
American stance toward the kingdom. They even used the same title in
their editorials: "Reconsidering Saudi Arabia." The Times said those
relations are in an "untenable and unreliable state" because of "Saudi
Arabia's tolerance for terrorism." The Post said that Saudi Arabia's
"autocratic system…is itself one of the root causes of Islamic
extremism"36
.
35
Poll cited in Dr. James J. Zogby, ―New Poll Shows Damage Done,‖
December 24, 2001. Accessed via ―GulfWire‖ e-newsletter, www.arabialink.com. 36
The editorials can be found in New York Times, October 14, 2001 and
Washington Post, November 11, 2001.
24
What has changed most dramatically since the attacks of 9/11,
has been the attitude in the American right wing toward Saudi Arabia.
Both neoconservatives and the religious right had previously accepted the
close American relationship with Riyadh on strategic grounds, even
while opposing many aspects of Saudi politics and society. They have
since 9/11 become vocal critics of the relationship. Given the importance
of both of these groups in the Republican party, the American policy
toward Saudi Arabia can hardly avoid being marked by their ―updated‖
views.
A parallel shift in public opinion has occurred in Saudi Arabia.
The close relationship with the United States has always been a
controversial issue in the kingdom. For committed fundamentalists, any
dealings with non-Muslim powers are suspect. For most in that category,
the American presence in the kingdom is, at best, something to be
tolerated as a political necessity ordered by the government. For some,
though, it is a focus of violent opposition. ‗Usama bin Laden made the
American military presence in Saudi Arabia the centerpiece of his
indictment of the ruling family. Attacks on an American training mission
attached to the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh in 1995 and on an
apartment building in the eastern province housing American air force
personnel in 1996 took the lives of 24 Americans. The latter attack led to
the transfer of the American air wing from Dhahran, in the populated
Eastern province, to the Prince Sultan Airbase south of Riyadh, in the
desert.
Unprecedented polling in Saudi Arabia since the September 11th
attacks confirms the anti-American trend in public opinion. A Gallup
poll, conducted in late January-early February 2002, reported that 64% of
Saudi respondents viewed the U.S. either very unfavorably or most
unfavorably. Majorities in the poll associated America with the
adjectives ―conceited, ruthless and arrogant.‖ Fewer than 10% saw the
U.S. as either friendly or trustworthy.37
A Zogby International poll,
conducted in March 2002, reported similar results. Only 30% of the
Saudis polled supported American-led efforts to fight terrorism, while
57% opposed it. Moreover, only 43% had a favorable opinion of the
American people, and 51% an unfavorable opinion – the highest
unfavorable rating of the eight Muslim countries in which the poll was
conducted (the others were Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, the UAE,
37
Richard Burkholder, ―The U.S. and the West – Through Saudi Eyes,‖ Gallup
Tuesday Briefing, August 6, 2002, www.gallup.com/poll/tb/goverpubli/20020806.asp.
25
Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan). More recent polls, also confirmed this
trend on the eve of war with Iraq, conducted in Saudi Arabia in February-
March 2003. They found that 95% of those polled had either a very or
somewhat unfavorable attitude toward the United States, compared with
only 4% favorable 38
.
The polling also focused on specific sources of Saudi public
antipathy toward Washington. Majorities looked favorably upon
American science and technology (71%), American freedom and
democracy (52%), American movies and television (54%), and American
education (58%). However, fewer than 10% viewed US policy in the
Arab world or on the Palestinian issue in a favorably light. 64% of those
polled said the Palestinian issue was either the most important or a very
important political issue to them, and 79% said they would have a more
favorable view toward the U.S. if it ―would apply pressure to ensure the
creation of an independent Palestinian state.‖39
However, we need only to relativize such results, so that nobody
takes them for granted, invariable truths. On the one hand, because we
are talking here of a certain perception of the reality, which may be
formulated by Erving Goffman‘s concept of ―frames‖. A frame is the
shared definition of a situation that organizes and governs social events
and our involvement in them. It is the public surface of collective
schemas. ―A frame comes into being when its participants activate shared
schemas for it; if someone does not share the going schema, the results
can be embarrassing‖40
. The idea is close of William James‘s ―perception
of reality‖41
. While there are multiple realities, ―there is one that presents
itself as the reality par excellence‖, say Berger and Luckmann42
.
38
Shibley Telhami, ―A View from the Arab World: A Survey in Five
Countries,‖ March 13, 2002. Available at :
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/survey20030313.htm 39
―The 10 Nation ‗Impressions of America‘ Poll Report,‖ Zogby International,
August 7, 2002, www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=610. 40
Daniel Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths, Bloomsbury, London, 1998,
p.197. 41
James asks : ―under what circumstances do we think things are real?‖ In his
answer , W. James pointed to the crucial role of selective attention in creating
subworlds of reality, each with ―its own special and separate style of existence‖.
William James, The Principles of Psychology, New York, Dover, 1950. 42
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality,
Doubleday, NewYork, 1966, p22.
26
On the other hand, Bourdieu draws our attention to the fact that
―public opinion does not exist‖43
in itself, and that the polling is actually
―a tool of political action. Its most important function is to impose the
illusion that there is a public opinion as a sum purely additive of
individual opinions‖44
. However, the real impact of Bourdieu‘s remark
may be felt on the political level, since in his eyes, polling helps to
suggesting the idea that a certain public opinion is favorable or
unfavorable to such or such course of events…
U.S. and Western critiques of Saudi policy
It is now clear that the main critiques kindled in the USA about
Saudi Arabia in the wake of 9/11 concern two kinds of issues:
1 - The security one, that aroused questions about funding, and
assumed involvement from within Saudi connections.
2 - The political one, that aroused questions about the internal
(local) and external (international, or regional) process that permitted the
"making of" the networks that are in the background of 9/11, whether in
Europe and the USA, or in the Middle East.
There was much talk about " alleged Saudi involvement in
terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist groups.
Commentators have pointed to the high percentage of Saudi nationals
among the hijackers (15 on 19). Others maintain that Saudi domestic and
foreign policies have created a climate that may have contributed to
terrorist acts by Islamist radicals. Critics of Saudi policies have cited in
particular a multiplicity of reports that the Saudi Government has
permitted or encouraged fund raising in Saudi Arabia by charitable
Islamic groups and foundations linked to Osama bin Laden‘s Al Qaeda
organization, which the U.S. Government has identified as clearly
responsible for the hijackings. An independent task force sponsored by
the Council on Foreign Relations, in a report published in October 2002,
asserted that individuals and charities in Saudi Arabia have been the most
important source of funds for Al Qaeda for some years, and that ―Saudi
officials have turned a blind eye to the problem‖45
.
43
Such is the title of one of his lectures in 1972, published in : Pierre Bourdieu,
Questions de sociologie, les éditions de Minuit, Paris, 1984, p. 222. 44
Bourdieu, op.Cit. P.224. 45
Alfred B. Prados, Saudi Arabia, Current Issues and U.S. Relations.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress, April 3, 2003.
27
As Kenneth Katzman points out46
, over the past two decades, U.S.
attempts to contain the threats from Iran and Iraq have depended on
cooperation with the elites in power in the GCC. Those threats made the
Gulf States highly dependent on a military presence in the region. Yet,
the question is : are the Gulf States concerned - as Katzman put it - that
the United States might turn its attention away from the Gulf now that
Saddam Hussein has been removed?
Actually, the Gulf States are not alone struggling with such a
dilemma. We should not forget that the entire Arab world is facing the
problem of how much dependence a Sovereign State is expected to allow
in order to maintain some homogeneity and stability inside the country.
This is as well the problem of all the newly emerged States, since the
fifties of the XXth century, in Africa and Asia. Yet if it has grown to be
so sharp and even violent (considering some reactions) in the Gulf, it is
likely because of the energy resources, which have shaped the new
culture of the region. Here, unlike the subsaharean Africa, or the Asian
steppes, the religion (islam) is still playing the main role in the society. It
has created a habitus, which is still underlying the behaviors and shaping
the attitudes. In his writings, Bourdieu proposes that practice is neither
the mechanical precipitate of structural dictates nor the result of the
intentional pursuit of goals by individuals but rather ―the product of a
dialectical relationship between a situation and a habitus, understood as a
system of durable and transposable dispositions which, integrating all
past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions,
appreciations, and actions, and makes it possible to accomplish infinitely
differentiated tasks, thanks to the analogical transfer of schemata‖
acquired in prior practice.47
More to the point, the islamic puritanism - either sunnite, from
the Wahhabi school of thought or the Ikhwan, or shiite , from the
khomeynist doctrine - adds more a complicated feature to the situation,
because of the officially acknowledged influence it is exerting on both
societies and States. Yet, it is likely that the United States will remain
highly engaged in the Gulf, as Katzman observes,because the September
11 attacks added a new dimension to U.S. relations with the Gulf States
46
Kenneth Katzman, the Persian Gulf States: Post-war issues for US policy ,
2003. July 14, 2003, CRS report for Congress. 47
See Bourdieu : Esquisse d‘une théorie de la pratique, le Seuil 2000, and
Questions de sociologie, op.Cit.
28
beyond the need to contain longstanding threats from Iran or Iraq. He
notes also that after the September 11 attacks, the United States began
pressing the Gulf states for their cooperation against Al Qaeda activists
and financial channels located in the Gulf states themselves. The need for
the United States to deal with all the security threats emanating from the
Gulf gives the United States a stake in the political stability of the Gulf
regimes. It is noticeable that despite the threats they face, the GCC States
have proved more durable politically than some experts had predicted,
surviving attempts to subvert them by Iraq (1970s) and Iran (1980s and
1990s), the eight year Iran-Iraq war (September 1980-August 1988), the
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait (August 1990-February 1991),
and post-Gulf war unrest and uncertain leadership transitions in a few of
the GCC States.
Since September 11, Katzman observes, the United States has
heightened its attention to public attitudes in the Gulf in light of surveys
and reports that many Gulf citizens are sympathetic to at least some of
the goals of radical Islamic movements such as Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda
leader Usama bin Laden is viewed by many Gulf citizens as a
revolutionary Islamic figure who is fighting to overcome U.S. influence
over the Islamic world, but bin Laden supporters and other Islamic
activists do not appear to pose a major challenge to the Gulf regimes at
this time, although they have started disturbing the civil peace with
recurrent terrorist operations in Saudi Arabia. Some U.S. officials are
concerned that Al Qaeda, defeated in Afghanistan, might turn its
attention to destabilizing pro-U.S. Arab governments in the Gulf or
elsewhere and to attacking U.S. forces based in the Gulf, from secret
basis in Iraq.
This is why the political issues in Saudi Arabia – and broadly in
the Gulf- seem in tight connection with the special focus on international
terrorism. This feature has probably appeared as a result of the failure of
American authorities – and their allies in Europe and the Gulf – to
prevent the tragedy of 9/11. The ultimate meaning of this feature is that
some of the social and political changes inside the latter countries will
bear the mark of the security necessities. On the short term, it is perhaps
not very affecting, but on the middle and the long terms, some options
dictated by security necessities would have to be dealt with to tune up
with requirements emanating from the civil society itself. A critical view
may assume that if under the pressure of the Americans, the Arab
regimes are hurrying up to show that they are moving towards some kind
of political reform, on the long-term, a change handled in such conditions
29
of fear and pressure would be very limited in its scope, as it is meant to
show to the exterior world that the state finally found a compromise with
its society . The consequence may be that in some years, the situation
would revert to the point Zero, because it has never been meant to go
further. Such a regression may be then equal in its results – or worse-
than any longstanding authoritative regime could lead to. This follows
from the general principle that social change cannot be forced over any
society from the exterior. If it does not emanate from it, then maybe it is
not necessary at all.
Nevertheless, if the political issues have always in these
surroundings a security side, we should not omit that the phenomenon
that has released this indigestible salmagundi, -i.e. 9/11- is related to
religion, not as dogma or ritual, but rather as political practice. No
wonder that one of the first reactions of the Americans – and the
Westerners – after 9/11 was to seek to understand who are ―they‖
(i.e.The terrorists). And it is in the answers they give to that question that
rely one of the aspects of the politics of post 9/11.
Let us however recall the historical background of such a
question in order to better understand who is actually the sponsor and the
leader of the hijackers :
Branded by the FBI as an "international terrorist" for his role in
the American US embassy bombings, well before he became prime
suspect in the New York and Washington terrorist attacks, Saudi born
Osama bin Laden was recruited during the Soviet-Afghan war ironically
under the auspices of the CIA, to fight Soviet invaders.
In 1979, the largest covert operation in the history of the CIA was
launched in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in support of
the pro-communist government of Babrak Kamal. With the active
encouragement of the CIA and Pakistan's ISI (Inter Services
Intelligence), who wanted to turn the Afghan jihad into a global war
waged by all Muslim states against the Soviet Union, some 35.000
Muslim radicals from 40 islamic countries joined Afghanistan's fight
between 1982 and 1992. Tens of thousands more came to study in
Pakistani madrasahs (schools) . Eventually more than 100.000 foreign
muslim radicals were directly influenced by the Afghan jihad. The
Islamic jihad was supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia with a
significant part of the funding generated from the Golden Crescent drug
trade : In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security
Decision Directive 166, which authorized stepped up covert military aid
to the mujahideen, and it made clear that the secret Afghan war had a
30
new goal : to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action
and encourage a Soviet withdrawal. The new covert US assistance began
with a dramatic increase in arms supplies…a steady rise to 65,000 tons
annually by 1987,…as well as a "ceaseless stream" of CIA and Pentagon
specialists who traveled to the secret headquarters of Pakistan's ISI on the
main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan. There, the CIA specialists met with
Pakistani intelligence officers to help plan operations for the Afghan
rebels.
The CIA using Pakistan's military Inter Services Intelligence
played a key role in training the mujahideens . In turn, the CIA sponsored
guerilla training was integrated with the teachings of islam : Predominant
themes were that Islam was a complete socio-political ideology, that holy
Islam was being violated by the atheistic Soviet troops, and that the
islamic people of Afghanistan should reassert their independence by
overthrowing the leftist Afghan regime propped up by Moscow.48
Now the question « who are they » aroused in the mainstream
media after 9/11 was as much about Islam than about Wahhabism49
. Few
observers were concerned with linking it to the historical background
where the CIA appears to have the main part. People in America and
Europe, sought to know whether it was logical for Muslims to kill others
just because they are not Muslims. The fact that Usama bin Laden had
published a Fatwa legitimating such a behavior, was in itself
significant50
. A branch of Islam seems to be therefore bloodthirsty and
48
See : Michel Chossudovsky, Who Is Osama Bin Laden? 12 September,
2001,Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), Montréal. 49
The serious French newspaper Le Monde, on its October 4 issue, did not
hesitate to run a story full of suggestions and questions about a generation of Saudis that
even if it did not take part to the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan, feels an
admiration towards bin Laden. According to Le Monde, we must find the causes of
what happened on September 11 not in Afghanistan, but rather in the Saudi Kingdom
itself. (: L'hypothèse de la piste Saoudienne). Another example : For Mr. Stephen
Schwartz, it is the whole Wahhabism that must be singled out as the very cause of what
happened on Sept.11. " One major question is never asked in American discussions of
Arab terrorism", he writes; and this question is: " What is the role of Saudi Arabia?"
Then the answer he gives is quite amazing. In his view the question is not asked because
" American companies depend too much on the continued flow of Saudi oil, while
American politicians have become too cozy with the Saudi rulers"! (The Spectator -
U.K. September 22.) For more about this topic, see : Hichem Karoui, Pressure on the
House of Saud, October 13, 2001, Media Monitors Network.
http://mediamonitors.net/karoui26.html 50
The ―Jihad against Jews and Crusaders‖ was issued by the World Islamic
Front on February 23, 1998. It was signed up by the following : Shaykh Usamah Bin-
31
seeking war and destruction. People made a quick rapprochement with
what they thought knowing, which revealed to be rather the ignored part
of Islam. Yet the ignored could not be easily known. Thus, when the
French researcher Pascal Ménoret wonders what is meant by
Wahhabism , he finds that the term is being used to mean at least six
different phenomenons that wisdom as well as methodological caution
should advise us to distinguish. He mentions :
1- The traditional doctrine elaborated by theologians claiming to
defend the reform of Muhammad Abdelwahhab.
2- The official islam of the Saudi religious establishment.
3- The religious practices of the Saudis.
4- The influence of Saudi Arabia in the islamic world.
5- Some religious opinions preached by islamist groups.
6- Theological reference of a range of behaviour considered in Europe
deviant (such as the long beard, non-consumption of alcohol or porc,
segregation between women and men, etc) and even illegal (like the
head scarf for girls in the french schools) 51
.
Adherence to religion, though, carries with it the impetus to look
beyond the self in favor of that, which transcends the self. One of the best
descriptions of that side of religion rational has been pointed out by
Christian Smith52
. He explains how religion can encourage political
action by providing transcendent motivation. Religion provides ―sets of
beliefs and practices grounded not in the ordinary, mundane world, but in
the divine, the transcendent, the eternal, the holy, the spiritual. Religious
meaning-systems operate with reference to supernatural beings, timeless
truths, celestial realities. This is what sets religion apart from non-
religious cultural meaning systems‖ 53
. In this way, religious life is not
about satisfying personal preferences, but it is about living a life in
accordance with transcendent ideals.
Muhammad Bin-Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt , Abu-
Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group, Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of
the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Jihad Movement in
Bangladesh. See the text of the fatwa here :
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm 51
Pascal Ménoret , Le Wahhabisme , arme fatale du néo-orientalisme, Revue:
Mouvements, décembre 2004, n° 36. 52
Smith, Christian, Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement
Activism. New York: Routledge. 1996. 53
Idem.
32
. * Figure 1 presents a diagram of the transcendent motivation
approach. An oval represents the transcendent, while two rectangles
represent the actor, and the goal of religious behavior. The arrow from
the transcendent to the actor represents the source of the individual‘s
goal, the arrow from the actor to the goal represents the religious action
itself, and the arrow from the goal to the transcendent represents
completion of the religious behavior. While the rational choice
conception involves an actor producing ―religious satisfaction‖ to gratify
personal needs, the transcendent motivation perspective allows for the
end result of the action to be directed toward the completion of a
transcendent directive. In the pure form of the transcendent motivation
approach, the self is only a minor player in the act, and certainly not the
center of activity it is in the rational choice conception54
.
54
For more development of this topic, see: Matthew T.Loveland and Erik
K.Sartain, Bringing Sociology Back to the Sociology of Religion, University of Notre
Dame, Working Paper and Technical Report Series, n°2003-06.
33
Islamism, internationalism, nationalism
In the wake of 9/11 there was also a question related to Islam and
nationalism. If the American reaction emphasized the fact that this was a
―war against America‖, who could declare wars but nationals of other
countries, even if they were pariahs and mercenaries?
The point is that al Qaeda leaders never hid the pretention that
they are fighting to get the American troops out of Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf. However, as they found refuge in varied countries outside their
own birthplaces, and as they masterminded operations that crossed
borders and continents from African to Asian and American or European
shores, the observers were struck by the international aspect of this
activity which they labeled "international islamism", ―international
jihad‖, and ―international terrorism‖, while the regional and local aspects
became secondary. Such views have been issued for example, by – but
by no means exclusively- Israeli analysts, who, while confronted with
violent operations executed by Hamas and al Jihad al Islami activists,
have been interested in picturing a scene where local palestinian fighters
would be part of ― an Islamist Internationale‖. Nevertheless, this view
does not stand to the analysis, at least because the Palestinian islamist
activists have never executed any operation outside what they deem to be
a field of conflict : Israel itself and the palestinian territories.55
For R. Paz, the term Global Jihad marks and reflects the
solidarity of variety of movements, groups, and sometimes ad hoc
groupings or cells, which act under a kind of ideological umbrella of
radical interpretations of Islam. The Islamists saw the fall of the Soviet
Union as a direct result of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan at the hands
of Islamic warriors.The masses of Arab volunteers recruited to fight the
Soviets in the Afghan conflict led to the opening of Islamic fronts in
various local and national disputes with religious overtones: Bosnia,
55
See for example, Reuven Paz, Is there an Islamist Internationale? July 9,2000.
Institute for Counter-Terrororism (ICT), Herzliya, Israel, and Global Jihad and the
European Arena, by the same author (International Conference on Intelligence and
Terrorism, Priverno, Italy, 15-18 May 2002. Let us recall that from the Palestinian
radicalist point of view, all the territories claimed by the Israelis as theirs, since 1948
and even before, are Palestinian. Thus, when they operate inside Israël, they act inside
disputed territories.
34
Albania, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan and Kashmir. ―This involvement
has led many observers to view the phenomenon of ―Afghan Arabs‖ as a
kind of Islamist Internationale, similar to the International Brigades of
Socialist and Communist volunteers in the civil war in Spain in the
1930s‖56
.
Nevertheless, Paz fails to see the national – or even the nationalist
– dimension of the phenomenon, maybe because he was unable – like
many israelis – to view the activists of islamist organizations in Palestine
and the rest of the Arabo-Islamic world as mainly contesting the regimes
they are directly confronted with. That‘s why , there is a pre-Afghanistan
in their struggle and an after-Afghanistan. In the two periods ,we can
observe that the phenomenon fall back to its local (national) dimension.
And everything happens as if Afghanistan and all those wars of religious
overtones, were just a ―passage‖ paving the way to the main struggle
wich aims not at toppling the government of the USA – they know they
cannot do that – but rather at erecting ―islamist‖ regimes in Muslim
countries. This is actually the real challenge, and any confrontation with
Western powers, means in this context, a violent opposition to the
support given by the West to the concerned Muslim states. This is
actually an internal political struggle with an international interface.
This nationalistic dimension of the Islamist struggle, some
analysts have been unable to understand. Paz, for example, mixes up the
Wahhabism , the international terrorism, and the Jihad. He writes :
―Under the influence of the Arab Afghan phenomenon there has also
been an ideological consolidation of Wahhabi-Takfiri Jihadi ideology
and rhetoric that resulted in two main developments :
- A shift in the struggle , mainly through massive
terrorism, from the heart of the Arab world into the
‗Wild West‘ of Central Asia and to Western countries or
Western interests in the region.
- Better cooperation between various groups and
organizations. In the Middle East examples are Hamas,
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and to some extent
Hizbollah. On the international scene, one can see this in
the case of the Egyptian , Pakistani, Kashmiri, Algerian,
Jordanian , Yemeni, and Sunni Lebanese groups‖57
.
56
Idem. 57
Idem.
35
Seemingly, there is some confusion in Paz‘s perception of the
Islamist phenomenon.
First point, one would ask : what is the link between
Wahhabism and Takfir? Were the Wahhabists – who are still a majority
in Saudi Arabia – takfiris, they would never have been able to maintain
any relationship with other Sunnite Muslims who do not share their
principles and who are also the majority in their respective countries.
After all, who launched the idea and founded a quite acknowledged
International Islamic Organisation acting on behalf of islamic states, but
the Wahhabist Saudis ? Takfir is a notion that asserts that the ―others‖ are
not believers, and as such they deserve to be considered as foes of God.
The most clear example of such an endeavour is that of the Egyptian
extremist group, labeled al takfir wal hijra, which ―executed‖ President
Sadate on these same grounds.
Second point, what Paz figured out to be a ―shift in the struggle‖,
was rather a parenthesis, imposed by two factors : a) the violence of the
repression against the Islamists – notwithsatnding their moderation or
their extremism- in some Muslim countries and their forced exile ; b) the
calling for islamic solidarity at the time of the soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Many Mujahideens thought that an experience in an armed
struggle would be useful on the day they return home to deliver the
ultimate fight. That is exactly what happened.
Third point, if we take a close look at the groups Paz mentions,
we would see that each one of them is related to a determined country
and a localized struggle inside that country. If there is some kind of
solidarity between them, what‘s more normal? All political organisations
from the right wing to the left have some connections. Yet, it is too much
exceeding the real facts to deduce that because they are islamists they are
necessarily similar in their programs and aims, and as such they are also
– necessarily- involved with terrorism. Nothing is more wrong, for a
simple reason : terrorism is a thing, islamist political organisations are
another. There is not necessarily a connection between the two.
Moreover, terrorism is not always islamist. It is not even always
religious. We should not forget that the first ―terrorists‖ of the XXth
century were anarchists, marxists, and nihilists, well before the
nationalists of the liberation movements – often secularists – used these
same methods against the European colonialism.
However 9/11 set the clock on the islamist bundle, not without
some good reasons, though.
36
It was the first time since the wars of decolonization that notions
like ―jihad‖ and ―holy war‖ were broadly used to featuring some of the
most elapsing characters of our time. And the idea that some of these
islamist trends were marked by nationalism started getting some ground.
For indeed, before joining hands in Afghanistan, all those small
movements scattered over different Arab and Muslim countries have had
a national ambition : al Zawahiri was sentenced to death by an Egyptian
court because he was incriminated for his activity in Egypt ; and Bin
Laden has been spoiled from his saudi nationality because of his activity
against the Saudi government. These examples show that the people who
actually form al Qaeda networks are initially nationals with national
ambitions. If they changed tactics in course of their activity and aimed at
international targets, nothing proves that they rejected their initial
strategic goal : to overthrow the local elites from power and take over. In
the Arab world, the label "Arab Afghans" is synonymous of rebels. They
have been identified as key-elements in underground and/or terrorist
activities in many arab countries. They have had for instance a heavy
hand in the algerian civil war after the failed elections of 1992, in the
same measure that they have been active in Iraq since the collapse of the
Baath regime, and in Saudi Arabia as well.
Identity problematic and Nationalistic irrrationality
Obviously, it is the identity element, which we find missing in
some analysis, albeit this is an important key to understandig the
phenomenon. ―From the perspective of cultural criticism‖, notes Nilüfer
Gole, ―Islamism shares similarities with other contemporary social
movements that have introduced new categories of identity into politics,
such as sex, race, nature, and religion‖58
. Gole pointed to the question of
identity definition as one of the most important features of the Islamist
movement. ― The religiosity that Islamists recover‖, she says, ―is not
something that was there, a social reservoir waiting to be used ; Islam is
no longer transmitted by their social, family, and local settings that they
re-appropriate and revisit in order to elaborate a new religious self in
modern contexts. Islamism is the work of those Muslims who exist under
conditions of social mobility and uprootedness ; those actors who have
left their families and small towns to come to cities or to cross national
58
Nilüfer Gole, The Voluntary Adoption of Islamic Stigma Symbols, in : Social
Research, Vol.70, n° 3 , Fall 2003.
37
boundaries, becoming migrants in Western countries in search of work,
education, and better living conditions‖59
. Thus, Islam becomes in such
conditions of uprootedness and alienation the bond between them and the
expression of individuality. ―Muslim identity is transformed from a
‗natural‘ category into which one is born – a tradition handed down from
generation to generation – into a ‗social‘ category. Islamism is the name
given to this radical procedure, to this shift from Muslim to Islamist‖60
.
As a result, Muslim identity is revised and reconstructed to fit in with
that transformation.
Now, the question is about whether this has anything to do with
nationalism ? Is it new? Is it a reproduction of a past experience? When
and how?And at last, when and how does America enters into the
account?
Before going any further, let's look at an aspect of the 9/11 course
of events that has been seldom talked about. It is precisely because it is in
connection with that question of nationalism. Many people in America
wondered : Why they (the Arabs, or the Muslims) hate us? And when
they did not find an answer enough sound to stand critics, they began to
convince themselves that the real evil came from wahhabism, although
they have lived and coped with it for more than half a century.
But the amazing thing is that without these clues, 9/11, would
have appeared as perfectly detached from any relation to Wahhabism.
How that ? The reason is simple : Take a look at the messages issued by
al Qaeda . At no moment, there is any hint to Wahhabism , neither as an
adopted doctrine, nor as an ideological rival. Better : 9/11 as explained
by Bin Laden himself, has nothing to do with interpreting islam. The
point was not about Islam, but about the unbalanced relations between
America and the Arabo-islamic world in political and economical
matters. Otherwise, in matters that are not religious but political : Bin
Laden hinted several times to the Palestinian problem, and to the 12
years' long plight of the Iraqi people under the embargo. The message
was clear : He held America responsible for the death of thousands of
people in the Arab countries , in Palestine, in Iraq, in Lebanon, etc…
Because he thinks America's policy is egoistic, immoral and
unconditionally siding with the oppressors of the Palestinians. For him,
9/11 was a right response to a wrong policy. The matter was not about
hate or love, but about pride and respect. The USA as a superpower, in
59
Idem. 60
Idem.
38
his view, does not act out of the moral principles of a world conscience :
America does not even suspect the amount of pain its policy has caused
to the Arabs and Muslims. In this regard, it is labeled in the major
discourses of the islamic movements (and they are not all members of al
Qaeda or radicalists or jihadists) as " al istikbar al alami " , which means
: the world arrogance. Thus, 9/11 was intended to be a blow at the face of
that distasteful"world arrogance", precisely in order to make its people
feel pain and wonder : why ?
Is that a rational behavior ? To convince America that such or
such policy harmed some people, should it be better to slaughter 5000
innocents or to make speeches in the UN or a media campaign on CNN ?
Here, we should come back to our first hypothesis. If the brand of
islamism that Bin Laden has embraced is a nationalistic one, his
behaviour would be as much irrational as his argumentation to justify it
would try utmost rationality. About this latter particularity of the man,
there is little disagreement between observers. Bin Laden revealed to be,
in effect, very keen on media communications, since al Jazeerah channel
became his favorite instrument in this context. On the other hand, he
would not be able to escape the epidemic nationalist violence, since his
return to Saudi Arabia from Afghanistan. As we know, with the
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to
Saudi Arabia to combat what he saw as an « infidel government ».
Further angered by the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia accompanying the
Gulf War, bin Laden became even more outspoken in his anti-regime
rhetoric.
There is nothing odd about that. In a study about nationalism and
rationality, Michael Hechter notes for instance that in 1994 "eighteen of
the twenty-three wars being fought were based on nationalist or ethnic
challenges to states. About three quarters of the world‘s refugees were
fleeing from, or were displaced by, ethnic or nationalist conflicts. And
eight of the thirteen United Nations peacekeeping operations were
designed to separate the protagonists in ethnopolitical conflicts".61
Yet, one may object that 9/11 is just a terrorist operation not a
war; but this is not true. The president of the United States himself, made
the remark that it was war declared against his country. A war that
necessitated a retaliatory action not only in waging a war against the
Taliban regime , followed by another against the Saddam regime, but all
61
See Nationalism and Rationality in : Festschrift for Immanuel Wallerstein,
Part One, Journal of World Systems Research, volume VI, n° 2, Summer-Fall 2000.
39
this was also a piece in a huge war strategy declared against international
terrorism. As to the other side, - al Qaeda that is - we should only
remember the fatwa of 1998 , which says : "The ruling to kill the
Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an individual
duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is
possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy
mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move
out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.
This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God...We — with
God‘s help — call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to
be rewarded to comply with God‘s order to kill the Americans and
plunder their money wherever and whenever they find It".
No wonder. ―The uglier side of modern nationalism‖, says
Charles Taylor ―frequently combines a chauvinistic appeal to the national
personality or will with a drive to power which justifies recourse to the
most effective industrial and military means‖62
. Taylor holds nationalism
as a fruit of Romanticism in modern politics. In his view , the ―extreme
case of this repulsive phenomenon was Nazi Germany. Here was a
regime brought to power partly by appeals to expressive integrity against
instrumental reason.‖63
There is indeed an important level of irrationality in nationalism :
The accidental birth of a person in a certain country gives him the wrong
baseless idea that he may scorn others and consider them as enemies.
Born in Europe and having a white skin for example, he gives himself the
right to plunder the black Africans and refuses to employ towards others
the criteria he uses towards his own compatriots. Even a genius like
Einstein is disliked by a Nazi German because he is a Jew. Can anything
be more inhuman and unreasonable than to prefer a wicked, corrupt and
incompetent compatriot of the same race or language to an honest,
benevolent and competent person who is born beyond one's frontiers?
Nationalism of that kind inevitably ends in racism and racial prejudice. It
has been the cause of clashes, aggressions, and constant rivalry between
nations, causing much riot and bloodshed all over the world. When a
country thinks only in terms of its own interests and gives itself the right
to dominate others, the result will obviously be conflicts, aggressions and
hegemony.
62
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self : the making of the modern identity,
Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 415. 63
Idem.
40
Neo fundamentalists
An interesting point of view that deserves to be compared with
what we have previously mentioned concerning Islamism, is held by the
French scholar Olivier Roy. For him, there is no such a thing as what
some observers call An "islamist internationale". A survey of the
mainstream Islamist movements in the 1990s showed that they have
failed in producing anything resembling an ―Islamist Internationale,‖
even if their ideological references remain similar. 64
Many people are convinced of the contrary , though. There has
been a wide debate about the internationalisation of the islamist
networks, which permitted to the cells of al Qaeda to be transplanted in
Iraq after losing their base in Afghanistan. Besides, whereas O. Roy
forward a new concept to help understanding the islamist phenomenon,
the important questions are therefore : why neo? Who is meant by this
word ? And in what is he different from other fundamentalists? Is the
difference lying in the means used, or in the content of the program, or
something else?
Through the reading he achieves of the islamist map, we can
hardly find a complete answer to these questions. Yet, Roy gives us a
shrewd description of the islamist networks. Thus, he talks about their
"nationalisation". For example, he says that ―this ―nationalization‖ of
Islamism is apparent in most countries of the Middle East. Hamas
challenged Arafat‘s (and today Abu Mazen) PLO not on points relating
to Islam, but for ―betraying‖ the national interests of the Palestinian
people. Hassan Turabi used Islam as a tool for unifying Sudan, by
Islamizing the Southern Christians and pagans. The Yemenite ―Islah‖
movement has been active in the re-unification of Yemen. The Lebanese
Hezbullah has always stressed the defense of the ―Lebanese people‖ and
has even established a working relationship with many Christian circles.
It has, apparently, given up the idea of an Islamic State in Lebanon, due
to consideration of the role of the Christians in defining the state. The
Turkish islamist Party (today in power), by stressing its Ottoman
heritage, was trying to affirm a kind of neo-Ottoman Turkish model in
the Middle East. By the same token, the Shiite radical parties of Iraq,
such as Da‘wa, stressed the need for national unity and appeared closely
64
Olivier Roy, Neo-Fundamentalism, Social Science Research Council. Essays.
41
working with non-Islamic national parties. The Algerian FIS – front
islamique du salut - claimed to be the heir of the National Liberation
Front of the anti-French war. The Tunisian Nahdha party wants to be
considered as the heir of the first destourian party founded in 1920 by
nationalists and Zeitounians65
like sheikh Abdelaziz Thaalibi. During the
Gulf War of 1991, each branch of the Muslim Brothers‘ organization
took a stand in accordance with the perceived national interests of its
own country (e.g., the Kuwait branch approved U.S. military
intervention, while the Jordanian branch vehemently opposed it)‖66
.
Roy notices in the same context another feature : the pacifism of
some of these movements : ―These movements are not necessarily
violent, even if, by definition, they are not democratic: the Pakistani
Jama‘at Islami and the Turkish Refah Party as well as most of the
Muslim Brothers groups have remained inside a legal framework, except
where they were prevented from taking political action, as was the case
in Syria, for instance‖. 67
There is even more an interesting feature observed by Roy. It
concerns the possible evolution towards democracy thanks to these
movements' activism : ―On the domestic scene, these parties brought
previously excluded social strata into the political process: the mostazafin
in Iran (the marginalized segments of the urban population); the Shi‘as in
Lebanon; recent city-dwellers and Kurds for the Refah; urban youth in
Algeria, shocked by the bloody repression of October 1988; Northern
tribes in Yemen, etc. In doing so they have helped to root nation-states
and to create a domestic political scene, which is the only real basis for a
future process of democratization. In this sense, the Islamist parties,
while they are not democratic, foster the necessary conditions for an
endogenous democracy, as is clearly the case in Iran. Khatami‘s election
expressed a call for democracy which is possible only because the whole
population has been brought into a common political scene by a popular
and deep-rooted revolution‖68
.
65
The Zeitounians are those who graduated from the Zeitouna university
(traditional education). The claim is disputed by the party in power (RCD) which
pretends also to be the heir of that first party. 66
Idem. 67
Idem. The same may be said about the Tunisian Nahdha party which, despite
it has been forbidden and despite it still have many militants in jail, never indulged into
violent struggle. Something very similar to the islamist Turkish party happened to the
Tunisian : under pressure it changed of name, but it did not change of strategy. 68
Idem.
42
The question is : how many people among the Western elite
would agree to Roy‘s views ? The point is there has always been an
inclination to consider the islamist movements as generally hostile and
agressive, if not irredeemably violent and as such unable to indulge in
political compromises. Yet, while not setting clearly the limits between
neo and conservative fundamentalists, Roy formulates the hypothesis that
the process of conservative islamization has been promoted by the
muslim states themselves as a reaction against islamist opposition in the
eighties . What is the result ? His answer is : " The first part of the
program was quite a success, but state control has never been effective".
This observation is not unaccurate, for it is known that many arab states
were forced to play the Islamist card (an official islamism, that is) in
order to prevent dangerous uncontrolled trends coming up from the
bottom of their societies. However, if in North Africa, the governments
played the card of The islamists to counter the left since the seventies
(like in Egypt under Sadate, Tunisia under Bourguiba, and Morocco
under Hassan II, or in Sudan under Numeyri,etc), in the Gulf region, the
stakes were quite different. In these conservative societies, the left has
never pressed of any real weight on the struggle for power as to
jeopardise or upset the other players. The game was then since the outset
between elites that took islam as an asset and used it in the race for
political power. However, some islamist movements before growing to
participate to a wider international network, have been first national
political organisations in their own countries. If they shifted to become
supranational, it was at least for two reasons : 1- They have been
forbidden or have undergone opression and were thus forced to exile, and
in exile, they had to survive through networking as an international
islamist movement. 2 - Some international events, have helped to make
of the local Movements a worldwide network, such as : the iranian
revolution, the occupation of Afghanistan, the Chechen problem, the
Balkans war, etc.
The neofundamentalists of O. Roy are anti-imperialists,
supranational, and may be even the product of contemporary
globalization than the islamic past. Undubitably, this is true. Yet, we
cannot deny to the Conservative islamists to be also anti-imperialists,
supranational, and reacting against globalization. So, What is the
difference?
May be it is lying in the details . For example : " The Islamists
(the conservative, that is) were not anti-Christians as such". The neo are
definitely anti christians and anti jewish. And he is right to notice that
43
―in Iran during the revolution there has never been any attack on
churches. The Egyptian Muslim Brothers never cracked down on the
Copts. The idea was that there is some common ground between true
believers. Now, however, the term ―religious war‖ really makes sense.‖
Indeed, we never heared more talk about New crusades than since 9/11,
which is according to this view a neo fundamentalist "achievement".
We may think that the second feature mentioned by Roy -
supranationality, that is - is also applicable to the conservative
fundamentalists, in fact to all the islamists, since Islam itself is
considered a universal religion that does not recognize boundaries. But
for Roy , the point is more about background than about ideologic
orientation and doctrine : "The second point is that these movements are
supranational. A quick look at the bulk of bin Laden‘s militants killed or
arrested between 1993 and 2001 show that they are mainly uprooted,
western educated, having broken with their family as well as the country
of origin. They live in a global world." More specifically he adds :
" While Islamists do adapt to the nation-state, neo-
fundamentalists embody the crisis of the nation-state, squeezed between
infrastate solidarities and globalization. The state level is bypassed and
ignored. The Taliban do not care about the state—they even downgraded
Afghanistan by changing the official denomination from an ―Islamic
State‖ to an ―Emirate.‖ And last but not least, " Using two international
languages (English and Arabic), traveling easily by air, studying, training
and working in many different countries, communicating through the
Internet and cellular phones, they think of themselves as ―Muslims‖ and
not as citizens of a specific country. "69
Here is the point where we join O. Roy in the analysis, for since
9/11, the observers are more concerned about a global network than
about activist movements that can be easily located and isolated. Bin
laden , al Zawahiri, or al Zarqawi were indeed citizens of arab countries
with specific goals and roots inside Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Jordan.
Nonetheless, by their activities they are no longer the concern of these
only countries. If the terrorist operations they masterminded could reach
America, Europe, or other countries and continents, they would be
considered thus as the negative side of the globalization. They represent a
phenomenon that goes beyond the question of religions, modernity,
West-East or North-South relations, etc, because they are part of that
unacknowledged quantity of risk that the game of Nations engender in
69
Idem.
44
times of particular tension and rapid transition. And it is now with that
risk that the leaders of the world have to play, to struggle, and to cope.
How much calculation , how much chance are left to them ? That is the
question.
Media war
« Each culture establishes in its language a relation to reality »70
,
says Jürgen Habermas. Yet, in a single culture we may also find several
varied relations to reality. May be this is so because ―whatever language
system we choose , we always start intuitively from the presupposition
that truth is a universal validity claim‖71
But this ―cognitive adequacy‖ in
Habermas‘s terminology is as he acknowledges himself sometimes
bypassed.
Critics of some media behaviour in the USA in the wake of 9/11
were not all Arabs or Muslims. We can also find among the American
writers and journalists many people who held similar positions. Susan
Sontag is one of them. In a series of essays conceived as responses to
9/11 and published in The New Yorker, she says for example :
"The disconnect between last Tuesday's monstrous dose of reality
and the self-righteous drivel and outright deceptions being
peddled by public figures and TV commentators is startling,
depressing. The voices licenced to follow the event seem to have
joined together in a campaign to infantilize the public. Where is
the acknowledgement that this was not a "cowardly" attack on
"civilization" or "liberty" or "humanity" or "the free world" but
an attack on the World's self proclaimed super-power, undertaken
as a consequence of specific American alliances and actions?
How many Americans are aware of the ongoing bombing of
Iraq?"
Better : in her eyes, if the word "cowardly" is to be used , "it
might be more aptly applied to those who kill from beyond the range of
retaliation , high in the sky, than those willing to die themselves in order
70
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One,
Beacon Press, Boston, 1984,p.57. And he adds : ―to this extent, ‗real‘ and ‗unreal‘,
‗true‘ and ‗untrue‘ are indeed concepts that are inherent in all languages and not ones
that can, say, be present in this language and absent in that. But each culture draws this
categorial distinction within its own language system‖. 71
―If a statement is true‖, he says, ―it merits universal assent, no matter in which
language it is formulated‖.Op.Cit.P.58.
45
to kill others. In the matter of courage (a morally neutral virtue) :
whatever may be said of the perpetrators of Tuesday's slaughter, they
were not cowards" 72
.
There was indeed an intense debate between the American writers
and observers. Sontag's view represents a trend of the opinion inside the
country (and outside it, particularly in Europe). Similar positions may be
found for instance in the liberal and the left-wing media throughout the
USA (from the Nation, to Media Monitors Network , Z magazine, Anti-
war.Com, the Independent Institute, Palestine Chronicle, the progressive,
the Monthly Review, The Nation, Mother Jones, What Really
Happened,… etc). For the Monthly Review, ―the world changed on
September 11. That‘s not just media hype‖(…) ―The way some historians
refer to 1914–1991 as the ―short twentieth century,‖ many are now
calling September 11, 2001, the real beginning of the twenty-first
century. It‘s too early to know whether that assessment will be borne out,
but it cannot simply be dismissed.‖73
Among the ―myths‖ this magazine
tried to unveil, we may mention : ―The attack was like Pearl Harbor, and
therefore, as in the Second World War, we had to declare war or risk
destruction ; This was an attack on freedom ; You‘re with us or you‘re
with the terrorists ; The war on Afghanistan was self-defense ; The Bush
administration turned away from its emerging unilateralism (pulling out
of the Kyoto protocols, sabotaging the ABM treaty with Russia, etc.) to a
new multilateralism…etc‖.
Concerning the second point (freedom), the magazine notes :
―Whatever considerations exist in the mind of Osama bin Laden or
members of his network, his recently broadcast statements contain no
mention of any resentment of American democracy, freedom, or the role
of women. They mention specific grievances regarding U.S. policy in the
Middle East: the sanctions on Iraq, maintained largely by the United
States, which have killed over one million civilians; material and political
support for Israel‘s military occupation of Palestine and its frequent
military attacks, carried out with American weapons, on practically
unarmed Palestinians; and U.S. military occupation of the Gulf and
72
Susan Sontag, Reflections On September 11th, The New Yorker, September
24, 2001. 73
See New Crusade : The US War on Terrorism, the Monthly Review, February
2002. We cannot pretend that this magazine is pro-Bush, albeit as we see, it stresses the
existence of what we may call a ―paradigmatic shift‖, without claiming it. The point is
that such a statement has nothing to do with the political sensibility. It is rather a matter
of objective observation.
46
support for corrupt regimes that serve the interests of U.S. corporations
before those of the people.‖ 74
As to the third point, the magazine says
―This polarization, (you‘re with us or against us) foisted on the world to
frighten possible dissenters from America‘s course of action, is the logic
of tyranny, even of extermination. Anti-war protesters who condemn the
terrorist attacks of September 11 along with the criminal acts of the
United States in Afghanistan, and countries that do the same, don‘t fit
into this scheme, and certainly don‘t deserve to be tarred with the same
brush as the terrorists.‖75
Noam Chomsky‘s analysis of the media is also noteworthy . For
him, ―there are two categories of information that are particularly useful
because there are two distinct, though related, sources for the attack.
Let‘s assume that the attack was rooted somehow in the bin Laden
network. That sounds plausible, at least, so let‘s say it‘s right. If that‘s
right, there are two categories of information and of populations that we
should be concerned with, linked but not identical. One is the bin Laden
network. That‘s a category by itself. Another is the population of the
region. They‘re not the same thing, although there are links. What ought
to be in the forefront is discussion of both of those. The bin Laden
network, I doubt if anybody knows it better than the CIA, since they were
instrumental in helping construct it. This is a network whose
development started in 1979, if you can believe President Carter‘s
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. He claimed, maybe he
was just bragging, that in mid–1979 he had instigated secret support for
Mujahedin fighting against the government of Afghanistan in an effort to
draw the Russians into what he called an ―Afghan trap,‖ a phrase worth
remembering. He‘s very proud of the fact that they did fall into the
Afghan trap by sending military forces to support the government six
months later, with consequences that we know. The U.S., along with
Egypt, Pakistan, French intelligence, Saudi Arabian funding, and Israeli
involvement, assembled a major army, a huge mercenary army, maybe
100,000 or more, and they drew from the most militant sectors they could
find, which happened to be radical Islamists, what are called here Islamic
fundamentalists, from all over, most of them not from Afghanistan.
They‘re called Afghanis, but like bin Laden, they come from
elsewhere‖76
. The second part , according to Chomsky, is the people of
74
Idem. 75
Idem. 76
The United States is a leading terrorist state, interview with Noam Chomsky
by David Barsamian, Monthly Review, November 2001.
47
the region. He says : ―They‘re connected, of course. The bin Laden
network and others like them draw a lot of their support from the
desperation and anger and resentment of the people of the region, which
ranges from rich to poor, secular to radical Islamist. The Wall Street
Journal, to its credit, has run a couple of articles on attitudes of wealthy
Muslims, the people who most interest them: businessmen, bankers,
professionals, and others through the Middle East region who are very
frank about their grievances. They put it more politely than the poor
people in the slums and the streets, but it‘s clear. Everybody knows what
they are. For one thing, they‘re very angry about U.S. support for
undemocratic, repressive regimes in the region and U.S. insistence on
blocking any efforts towards democratic openings‖77
.
On the other side of the picture, there is also the opposite trend of
opinion, actually the one that took shape with the victory of M. George
W. Bush –twice- in the elections and dominated the media and political
scene thereafter. However, the writers of both trends may cross the
"lines" of the media making of them an open forum for controversial
exchanges insofar that those "lines" are fictive and not expressing a
doctrinary creed. We may thus, read samples of both opinion trends in a
single paper or online magazine, such as the Washington Post, the New
York Times, or -say - MMN. An example representative of the camp
opposing Sontag's opinion is expressed by Charles Krauthammer, who
writes commenting her essay as follows :
" What Sontag is implying, but does not quite have the courage to
say, is that because of these 'alliances and actions', such as the bombing
of Iraq, we had it coming. The implication is as disgusting as Jerry
Falwell's blaming the attack on sexual deviance and abortion, except that
Falwell's excrescences appear on loony TV, Sontag's in The New
Yorker"78
.
77
Idem. 78
Washington Post, September 21, 2001, Voices of Moral Obtuseness. Let‘s
note by the way, that C. Krauthammer is member of the Project for New American
Century established in the spring of 1997 as a nonprofit educational organization
"whose goal is to promote American global leadership". Its chairman is William Kristol,
who is the editor of The Weekly Standard. About PNAC we can say that On September
20, 2001, members of the PNAC, issued a document entitled : " Open Letter to
President Bush : Lead The World To Victory ". It is clear from the headline of this letter
that the PNAC identifies "The World" to the "USA", maybe even to the Bush
administration or merely to the New Conservative falcons supporting it. Anyway, in
their view, it seems there is not a shade of doubt that what is good for the USA is good
48
The American agressive strategy in the Middle East, which did
not start with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power and seems
unlikely to stop there, is not really a reaction to 9/11 ; the latter event has
only accelerated a process that was already in the making. A simple
glance at the 2000 Report of the PNAC, would persuade us . From the
first sentences, the Empire is present with its broad ambitions : ―As the
20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world‘s
most preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War,
America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States
have the vision to build upon the achievement of past decades? Does the
United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to
American principles and interests?‖79
These are the questions of the
beginning. It seems effectively that what C.Wright Mills defined as the
―industrial-military complex‖ has prevailed over the PNAC to make of
the American ambition in the XXIst century if not a military one, then at
least one quite supported by a strong military establishment. ―The
American peace has proven itself peaceful, stable and durable. It has,
over the past decade, provided the geopolitical framework for widespread
economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and
democracy. Yet no moment in international politics can be frozen in
time; even a global Pax Americana will not preserve itself », states the
report with these tones reminding us of the way historic textbooks talk of
PAX ROMANA. Then what? After that statement inducing that nothing is
durable, the report points out to an amazing ―paradox‖ of our time : Even
for the rest of the world, a view that has been widely opposed inside the USA, and to be
sure in Europe, as well as in the Arab world. In this open letter, the signatories address
M. Bush on five issues, encouraging him to adopt radical policies in order to fight
radical and hostile activities. 1- They support the "necessary military action in
Afghanistan" ; 2- they encourage him to undertake action to remove Saddam Hussein
from power ; 3- they support a war against terrrorism including Hezbollah as a target,
and "appropriate measures of retaliation" against Syria and Iran ; 4 - They consider the
Palestinian Authority responsible as to "the terrorism emanating from territories under
its control", no further assistance should be provided to the PA until these activities are
stopped ; 5 - They support an important increase in defense spending to meet the
requests of " a serious and victorious war on terrorism". See the full text of the open
letter in : The Iraq War Reader, History, Documents, Opinions, Edited by Micah L.Sifry
and Christopher Cerf, Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, 2003. 79
Rebuilding America‘s Defenses : strategy, forces and resources for a new
century, A report of the PNAC, September 2000.
49
if left alone as an unequaled Superpower on the international scene after
the demise of the former USSR, America would not stand the road if ,
like some sportive competitors of high level, it does not indulge in testing
some ―testosterone ‖ on its muscles. In other words, ―paradoxically, as
American power and influence are at their apogee,‖ says the report, ―
American military forces limp toward exhaustion, unable to meet the
demands of their many and varied missions, including preparing for
tomorrow‘s battlefield. Today‘s force, reduced by a third or more over
the past decade, suffers from degraded combat readiness; from
difficulties in recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of soldiers,
sailors, airmen and Marines; from the effects of an extended
―procurement holiday‖ that has resulted in the premature aging of most
weapons systems; from an increasingly obsolescent and inadequate
military infrastructure; from a shrinking industrial base poorly structured
to be the ―arsenal of democracy‖ for the 21st century; from a lack of
innovation that threatens the technological and operational advantages
enjoyed by U.S. forces for a generation and upon which American
strategy depends. Finally, and most dangerously, the social fabric of the
military is frayed and worn. U.S. armed forces suffer from a degraded
quality of life divorced from middle-class expectations, upon which an
all-volunteer force depends. Enlisted men and women and junior officers
increasingly lack confidence in their senior leaders, whom they believe
will not tell unpleasant truths to their civilian leaders. In sum, as the
American peace reaches across the globe, the force that preserves that
peace is increasingly overwhelmed by its tasks‖80
.
Oddly enough, the author sounds convinced – and ready to
convince us – that the deployment of thousands of US military and
dozens of US bases around the world is normal. The question that this
very deployment may be contested in Europe , in Asia, in the Middle
East, etc, does not even dawn on him, as he takes it for granted that all
the peoples of the world are as persuaded as he is that all that military
―hula-hula‖ is for the sake of peace.
Why not, after all? This is also a matter of ―logic‖.
80
Idem.
50
PAX AMERICANA
When Jay Bookman - deputy editorial page editor of the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution - wonders for instance "why the administration
dismissed the option of containing and deterring Iraq, as we had the
Soviet Union for 45 years?", the answer he gives is : "Because even if it
worked, containment and deterrence would not allow the expansion of
American power. Besides, they are beneath us as an empire. Rome did
not stoop to containment ; it conquered. And so should we"81
.
Then, trying to find out who was really supporting these views or
working them out behind the scene, Bookman adds : " among the
architects of this would-be American Empire are a group of brilliant and
powerful people who now hold key positions in the Bush administration.
They envision the creation and enforcement of what they call a
worldwide 'PAX AMERICANA', or American peace. But so far, the
American people have not appreciated the true extent of that ambition".
Thus, if there is a homogeneous vision leading the American
strategy after 9/11, it has to be found in this report issued just a year prior
to that event (in September 2000) by the Project For the New American
Century (PNAC), a group of conservative interventionnists "outraged by
the thought that the United States might be forfeiting its chance at a
global empire", to use Bookman's expression. Behind the report, we find
people holding key positions in the first Bush administration, such as :
Paul Wolfowitz, deputy defense secretary ; John Bolton, undersecretary
of State ; Stephen Cambone , head of the Pentagon's Office of Program,
Analysis and Evaluation ; Eliot Cohen and Devon Cross, members of the
Defense Policy Board, which advises Rumsfeld ; I. Lewis Libby, chief
of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney ; Dov Zakheim, comptroller for
the Defense Department.
"Because they were still just private citizens in 2000, the authors
of the project report could be more frank and less diplomatic than they
were in drafting the National Security Strategy", says Bookman.
Thus, well before President Bush tagged Iraq, Iran and North
Korea as the Axis of Evil, the authors of the report identified these States
as primary short-term targets. To preserve the Pax Americana, the report
says US forces will be required to perform "constabulary duties" - the
United States acting as policeman of the world- and says that such
81
J. Bookman, The President's Real Goal In Iraq, the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, September 29, 2002.
51
actions "demand American political leadership rather than that of the
United Nations".
To meet those responsibilities , and to ensure that no country
dares to challenge the United States , the report advocates a much larger
military presence spread over more of the globe, in addition to the
roughly 130 nations in which US troops are already deployed. In this
context, one may assume that in the Gulf for instance, the matter is more
about a global strategy dictated by the American necessities throughout
the world, than a policy targeting the region exclusively on the basis that
"it is good for invasion or colonisation", because of its oil wealth,
although it would be naive to discard the oil production from the
« American necessities ». Actually, American military deployment
concerns varied places of the world, some of which are considered
strategic even without oil or natural gas. Such is the case of Europe for
example, where the American troops have been stationed since the end of
the second world war. That is also the case for Japan, Korea, etc…82
Yet,
this is not meaning that all the regions of the world are similar, or equal
as regards the interests they represent. The Gulf, for example, is certainly
more a priority to the US global strategy than , say, the African horn.
More specifically, the authors of the report argue the USA needs
permanent military bases in the Middle East, in Southeast Europe, in
Latin America and in Southeast Asia, where no such bases exist. That
helps to explain another of the mysteries of American post-September 11
reaction, in which the Bush administration rushed to install U.S. troops in
Georgia and the Philippines, as well as American eagerness to send
military advisers to assist in the civil war in Colombia. Concerning the
82
Either in Europe or in Asia, there are movements contesting the American
military presence. We can mention for example the CAAB (campaign for the
accountability of the American bases) in the United Kingdom, whose web site is :
http://www.caab.org.uk . We counted in the sole UK no less than 23 groups contesting
the American bases. An American living in Japan writes in his blog what follows :
―Something that Americans do not often think about is what it would be like to have
foreign military bases in your country. Even living in Japan, knowing the bases are here,
it doesn't come to mind much, and though there are many who protest the bases in
Okinawa and sometimes elsewhere in Japan, the truth is, you don't hear about it often.
But then, most Japanese people will not complain about the obnoxious politicians
during campaign season with their all-day loudspeaker truck battles, so it doesn't mean
that nobody minds. I certainly know that Americans would mind if, say, England had
bases across the country‖. See ,The blog from another dimension : American Bases in
Japan, March 16,2004… http://www.blogd.com/archives/000512.html
52
Gulf itself, the PNAC report asserts that the presence of American forces,
along with British and French units, has become ―a semipermanent fact
of life‖. These forces represent the ―long-term commitment of the United
States and its major allies‖ to a region of vital importance. More
precisely, ― the need for a substantial American force presence in the
Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein‖.
The 2000 report acknowledges its debt to a still earlier document,
drafted in 1992 by the Cheney Defense Department in the waning days of
the Bush administration : the Defense Policy Guidance. That document
had also envisioned the United States as a colossus astride the world,
imposing its will and keeping world peace through military and
economic power. When leaked in final draft form, however, the proposal
drew so much criticism that it was hastily withdrawn and repudiated by
the first President Bush.
Madrasas, problems of education
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Islamic
schools known as madrasas have been of increasing interest to analysts
and to officials involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy toward the
Middle East, Central, and Southeast Asia.
Madrasas drew added attention when it became known that
several Taliban leaders and Al Qaeda members have developed radical
political views at madrasas in Pakistan, some of which allegedly were
built and partially financed through Saudi Arabian sources.
These revelations have led to accusations that madrasas promote
Islamic extremism and militancy, and are a recruiting ground for
terrorism. Others maintain that most of these religious schools have been
blamed unfairly for fostering anti-U.S. sentiments and argue that
madrasas play an important role in countries where millions of Muslims
live in poverty and the educational infrastructure is in decay83
.
83
Febe Armanios, islamic religious schools , madrasas : background. October
29, 2003, CRS report for Congress. On the global front, concern has been expressed
over the spread of radical Islam through Saudi-funded schools, universities, and
mosques, which exist in many countries including Bangladesh, Bosnia, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and even in the United States. Some view the teaching of Saudi
Wahhabism as threatening the existence of more moderate beliefs and practices in other
parts of the Muslim world. However, there are those who argue that a differentiation
should be made between funding to support charitable projects, such as madrasa-
building, and funding which has been channeled, overtly or implicitly, to support
53
In recent years, the dissemination of Saudi Arabian donations to
Islamic charities and the export of a Saudi educational curriculum have
received worldwide attention. Although in Saudi Arabia itself, schools
teach subjects beyond religious studies, conservative Islamic teachings
permeate the Saudi educational system structure. Viewing Saudi Arabia
with greater scrutiny following the events of September 11, experts have
maintained that Saudi school curricula foster anti-Western and anti-
Semitic sentiments. Saudi official textbooks also reportedly used to
―denounce Shi‘a Islam as well as any popular Islamic practices that do
not agree with Wahhabi beliefs‖84
.
In response to such allegations and following a review of
schoolbooks in 2002, the Saudi foreign minister stated that, in light of a
Saudi government survey, 5% of the material was considered ―horrible‖
and 10% questionable, while 85% called for understanding with other
religious faiths. Shortly thereafter, the government vowed to remove
objectionable parts and to train teachers in promoting tolerance, but
skeptics questioned the extent to which the government was willing or
able to instill reforms in its schools85
.
The second Forum for National Dialogue, held in Saudi Arabia in
late December 2003 under the patronage of Saudi Crown Prince
Abdallah Ibn Abdelaziz, brought more answers to these questions.
Attended by 60 intellectuals, researchers, clerics and public figures,
among them 10 women, the Forum, which focused on religious
extremism and moderation, ended with recommendations for :
accelerating political reform and expanding popular political
participation ; renewing the religious discourse in compliance with
modernity ; establishing a culture of dialogue in Saudi society ; allowing
responsible freedom of expression ; strengthening women‘s status in all
areas ; setting out a strategy to help keep Saudi youth away from
extremist teachings in these madrasas. Critics of Saudi policies allege that the Saudi
government has permitted or encouraged fund raising by charitable Islamic groups and
foundations linked to Al Qaeda, which the U.S. government has identified as
responsible for the September 11 hijackings. In 2003, the Saudi government announced
that it was banning private charities and relief groups from donating money overseas,
until new regulations are instituted to ensure that the money is not being channeled to
terrorist organizations. The extent to which these government regulations will be
effective remains to be seen . 84
Idem. 85
Idem.
54
religious extremism ; and improving the saudi school curricula so that
they spread a spirit of tolerance and moderation.86
Living in the Denial, adopting conspiratory theories
or losing identity?
Among the Arab reactions to 9/11 that may seem to the Westerner
amazingly irrational is the denial that Muslims were ever involved in the
tragedy. Dr. Nawwal Nur and her son Hazem Saleh Abu Isma'il, who
preach and teach Islam in the U.S., were interviewed by the Saudi-based
channel Iqra TV about September 11 on July 15, 2004. The host of the
program asked if the attacks impacted the image of Islam by Americans.
Nur explained : "Not at all, it has not even been proven that Muslims
committed it. There hasn't even been an investigation… They are
confused about what happened… That is why more people converted to
Islam."
Her son added: "I am one of those who believe these events were
fabricated from the outset as part of the global groundwork for the
distortion of Islam's image… Even before these events took place there
was preparation for them.
Maybe this is a kind of protection against what is deemed to be an
―aggressive world‖, pushing the Muslims in the West to the limits of
losing their identities . 9/11 indeed reinforced the stigmatisation against
Muslims in the West. In the USA, the Patriot Act, signed into law by
President Bush on October 26, 2001, stipulates among other provisions
that ―immigrants can be detained indefinitely, even if they are found to
not have any links to terrorism. They can be detained indefinitely for
immigration violations or if the attorney general decides their activities
86
Al Sharq al Awsat, London, January 4, 2004. One of the major studies
presented at the Forum concerned the religious curricula in boy‘s schools in the Saudi
state school system. The study conducted by former Saudi Judge Sheikh Abd al Aziz al
Qassem and Saudi author and journalist Ibrahim al Sakran, was based on an
examination and critical analysis of three curricula for Saudi middle and high schools : -
Al Hadith, a general curriculum on islamic traditions ; - al Fiqh, a curriculum on matters
of religious law and ritual ; and – al Tawhid, a curriculum on matters of belief. The
researchers found extremely grave defects in the curricula, particularly with regard to
attitude toward the ―Other‖- that is toward anyone whose views are not in line with the
Wahhabi islam that is dominant in the Kingdom. They stated also that the curricula
denigrate and show hatred toward and incitement against non-Muslims. The study may
be viewed on this site : http://www.alwihdah.com/print.asp?cat=1&id=711
55
pose a danger to national security. They never need to be given a trial or
even a hearing on their status‖ 87
.
The reactions towards such circumstances are varied.
Kay Deaux, professor of psychology in New York, mentions the
case of Anika Rahman , who says : ―I became a United States citizen four
years ago because of my long love affair with New York....I am a
Bangladeshi woman and my last name is Rahman, a Muslim
name...Before last week, I had thought of myself as a lawyer, a feminist,
a wife, a sister, a friend, a woman on the street. Now I begin to see
myself as a brown woman who bears a vague resemblance to the images
of terrorists we see on television....As I become identified as someone
outside the New York community, I feel myself losing the power to
define myself‖88
.
According to Deaux, ― the events of September 11 have without
question altered the context of identification for thousands of U.S.
citizens and for those immigrants, legal and illegal, whose citizenship is
still in flux‖.89
Deaux thinks that prior to September 11, the prevailing
stereotype of Arab Americans was somewhat negative but not
particularly well articulated and, indeed, that many Americans had given
little thought to the subject. On such a background, 9/11 had had an
overwhelming, indeed, terrific impact on Arab and Muslim immigrants :
―It is in this newly-defined context that the Arab American immigrant
must consider questions of identification of the kind that Anika Rahman
raised: What do I call myself? What does it mean to be that kind of
person? And how is that ethnicity valued, by me and by others?‖90
These
questions are central to the understanding of the ―processes by which
identity is negotiated‖.
To find a strong basis for the denial that Muslims perpetrated
9/11 crimes, a conspiracy theory was helping. Saudi Cleric Dr. Sa'd bin
'Abdallah Al-Breik spoke about Al-Qa'ida's role on Saudi Arabia's
87
San Francisco Chronicle, 9/8/02 88
Kay Deaux, Negotiating Identity and Community after September 11, Social
Science Research Council, Essays on Terrorism and Democratic Virtues. 89
Idem. The current estimate of first generation Arab-American immigrants in
the U.S. is 2,315,392. Current estimates of the number of Muslims in the U.S. are far
less certain, varying from 2 to 6 million. (It should be noted that Arab-Americans and
Muslims are far from overlapping sets. Many Arab-Americans are Christians; Muslims
in turn come from a variety of ethnic groups in the U.S., including African American,
Latino, and, as the highly-publicized case of John Walker Lindh illustrates, from Euro
American backgrounds as well.) 90
Idem.
56
Channel 1 on August 16, 2004 : " We must not inflate [the importance]
of Al-Qa'ida, to the point of claiming that it is the main and only
perpetrator of this large operation [September 11]. I'm not here to defend
[Al-Qa'ida], but we must not overstate this matter… It is a mistake to
ignore the possibility that the Zionist hands used some people who were
planted into one of the stages of this plan, from this issue. I have read
some books that were translated from English into Arabic in which the
Americans themselves call 9/11 'The Great Deception' or 'The Great
Game,' so why do we use all sort of names to avoid this subject? No, we
must be clear and not censor ourselves. These false accusations and the
rush to accuse Saudi Arabia, the judging of others according to the
guidance of the Zionists via the media which is owned by the Zionist‖.91
Al Breik was neither the first nor the last to hold such a conspiratory
theory. It was not even a Muslim-created myth, since we will find many
Westerners propagating it.
In the front page of its November 3, 2003 edition, Al-Watan
published an Arabic translation of an article from Glasgow's Sunday
Herald about the Mossad's involvement in the September 11 attacks:
"Israeli intelligence has been showing the Al-Qa'ida hijackers as they
move from the Middle East through Europe and into American, where
they trained as pilots and prepared to suicide-bomb the symbolic heart of
the United States. And the motive? To bind America in blood and mutual
suffering to the Israeli cause… If Israel's closest ally felt the collective
91
Such a picture would not be complete if we omit that on the other side, the
Israelis were reacting in the same manner. A typical reaction identifying Saudi Arabia
as the main support behind 9/11 hijakers is that of AIPAC , the powerful israeli lobby
in Washington. It is Dore Gold himself who wrote it. (Dore Gold is special adviser to
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon . He was also President of the Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs and former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations. He testified before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs of July 31, 2003, saying for
example : ―Saudi Arabia‘s past involvement in international terrorism is indisputable.
While the Bush administration decided to retract 28 sensitive pages of the Joint
Intelligence Report of the U.S. Congress, nonetheless, Saudi involvement in terrorist
financing can be documented through materials captured by Israel in Palestinian
headquarters in 2002-3. In light of this evidence, Saudi denials about terrorist funding
don‘t hold water‖. But like other Israelis, he makes of the confusion between Palestinian
islamist activists and international terrorism (al Qaeda) the sense of his position,
although he was unable to prove that there is any connection between them. Yet, in his
eyes, since Saudi Arabia allocated $ 280. 000 to 14 Hamas charities, according to the
Mossad, it is enough to prove that the Saudiens are deeply involved with international
terrorism.
57
pain of mass civilian deaths at the hands of terrorists, then Israel would
have an unbreakable bond with the world's only hyperpower and an
effective free hand in dealing with the Palestinian terrorist, who had been
murdering its innocent civilians as the second Intifada dragged on
throughout 2001… There is more than a little circumstantial evidence to
show that Mossad – whose motto is 'By way of deception, thou shalt do
war' – was spying on Arab extremists in the U.S.A. and may have known
that September 11 was in the offing, yet decided to withhold vital
information from their American counterparts which could have
prevented the terror attacks… Mossad agents were spying on Muhammad
Atta and Marwan Al-Shehi, two leaders of the 9/11 hijack teams. The
pair had settled in Hollywood, Florida, along with three other hijackers,
after leaving Hamburg – where another Mossad team was operating close
by… Certainly, it seems, Israel was spying within the borders of the
United States and it is equally certain that the targets were Islamic
extremists probably linked to September 11. But did Israel know in
advance that the Twin Towers would be hit and the world plunged into a
war without end; a war which would give Israel the power to strike its
enemies almost without limit?"
The Mossad plot finds its roots in what is called the ―israeli spy
ring‖. The issue of Israeli foreknowledge of 9/11 is highly controversial.
The story is too complicated to go into detail here, but a number of
respected publications 92
have written about an Israeli ―art student‖ spy
ring operating in the US for several years before 9/11. The name ―art
student‖ is used because most of these scores of spies were posing as
college art students. There have been suggestions that some of these
Israeli spies lived close to some of the 9/11 hijackers. For instance, a US
Drug Enforcement Administration report from before 9/11 noted that
Israeli spies were living in the retirement community of Hollywood,
Florida at 4220 Sheridan Street, which turned out to be only a few
hundred feet from lead hijacker Mohamed Atta's residence at 3389
Sheridan Street93
. Israeli spies appear to have been close to at least ten of
the nineteen 9/11 hijackers. In fact, Forward, the most widely circulated
publication in the US targeting the Jewish audience, has admitted the spy
92
For instance, Fox News, 12/12/01, Forward, 3/15/02, ABC News, 6/21/02,
Salon, 5/7/02, Ha'aretz, 5/14/02, Le Monde, 3/5/02, Reuters, 3/5/02, AP, 3/5/02, AP,
3/9/02, Cox News, 3/5/02, Guardian, 3/6/02, Independent, 3/6/02, New York Post,
3/6/02, Jane's Intelligence Digest, 3/15/02 . 93
see the DEA report, 6/01
58
ring existed, and that its purpose was to track Muslim terrorists operating
in the US.94
Some have claimed that the existence of this spy ring shows that
Israel was behind the 9/11 attacks, an argument that is beyond the scope
of this essay. Nevertheless, if the mainstream media are to be trusted,
Israel gave the US several specific warnings of the 9/11 attacks. In the
second week of August 2001, two high-ranking agents from the Mossad,
the Israeli intelligence agency, came to Washington and warned the CIA
and FBI that 50 to 200 al-Qaeda terrorists had slipped into the US and
were planning an imminent ―major assault on the US‖ aimed at a ―large
scale target‖95
. Near the end of August, France, Russia and Germany
also gave similar warnings.96
Another Pearl Harbour?
The question that many observers raised in the wake of 9/11 is
about whether Saudi Arabia may be going through a dilemma much
similar to that of Iran , where reformists are facing the resistance of a
conservative clergy. This hypothesis, still requiring a validity
verification, actually concerns the role played by the religious elite in the
aftermath of 9/11. The term elite does not designate only those currently
in power (representative of the official Islam through institutions like the
Council of Ulamas theologists), but also those who are outside power and
struggling for it (in the opposition, that is) either inside the Kingdom or
in exile. For this is , as it seems, the political panorama that has emerged
from both the Gulf war in 1991 and, ten years later, the events of
September 11. We think that there is some kind of connection between
the two cases, if the latter is not merely an upshot of the former, although
not in the sense that it has been produced directly as a reaction against
the war and the presence of western troops in the country. It is not
plausible today that the 9/11 hijackers were instrumentalised by Saddam
Hussein, albeit they might have been acting on the behalf of the Iraqis
and the Palestinians as several messages of al Qaeda claimed. Yet, we
must keep in mind that neither the Iraqi nor the palestinian peoples asked
94
Forward, 3/15/02 95
Telegraph, 9/16/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, Ottawa Citizen, 9/17/01 Fox
News, 5/17/02 96
Fox News, 5/17/02
59
them to strike America, as far as we know. The Palestinians in their
majority - even the Islamists like Hamas - have condemned 9/11, and the
Iraqi elite (ex-opposition in exile) has even profited from the American
anger to make the ultimate rapprochement with the Bush administration ,
which ended up in a full scale war against Saddam regime and his
overthrow from power.
Yet, despite this background, the relations between the Gulf
States and the USA suffered a lot and were put under a tremendous strain
after 9/11: The alliance was thus for the first time put in question, not by
those in the local opposition who, for some time, have been critical of it,
but rather by the officials themselves either in the USA or in the Gulf
States. The situation has no precedent, because of the amount of horror
and fear engendered in the USA by the terrorist operation that has been -
rightly or wrongly - compared to Pearl Harbour.
This is, for example, how the 9/11 Commission report describes
the event :
"The 9/11 attack was an event of surpassing disproportion.
America had suffered surprise attacks before—Pearl Harbor is one well-
known case, the 1950 Chinese attack in Korea another. But these were
attacks by major powers. While by no means as threatening as Japan‘s
act of war, the 9/11 attack was in some ways more devastating. It was
carried out by a tiny group of people, not enough to man a full platoon.
Measured on a governmental scale, the resources behind it were
trivial.The group itself was dispatched by an organization based in one of
the poorest, most remote, and least industrialized countries on earth. This
organization recruited a mixture of young fanatics and highly educated
zealots who could not find suitable places in their home societies or were
driven from them."
In other words, if Washington knew after Pearl Harbour exactly
who was the enemy and where to strike back at it, the picture is quite
different in 2001. Indeed Afghanistan's Taleban have been indicted as the
sponsors of this new kind of war performed by al Qaeda on the behalf of
the Muslims (who never asked for it) , and the second victim of the
American anger will be Saddam Hussein , who even without his weapons
of mass destruction, was considered enough harmful and dangerous to
deserve – after all – a just punishment. But everything since, happened
as if nothing would allay the wounded America .
60
The Saudis react
There is a belief in the USA that public sentiments of anti-
americanism in Saudi Arabia ― have both constrained, but also have been
encouraged, by the Saudi government‖, as writes Gregory Gause III, who
adds : ―The focus on Saudi Arabia in the American media immediately
after 9/11 led a number of Saudi officials, including Crown Prince
Abdullah, to complain publicly that the Kingdom was being targeted in a
―campaign‖ against it. The Saudi government very publicly denied
American forces the right to use Saudi bases for the air campaign in
Afghanistan, even while quietly allowing the U.S. to use the command
and control center at Prince Sultan Airbase, south of Riyadh, to
coordinate that campaign. In a public meeting with Saudis in November
2001, the Crown Prince revealed that in August 2001 he had sent a letter
to President Bush complaining of the American stand on the Arab-Israeli
issue. In that letter, he said that differences between the two countries on
that issue had grown so great that ―from now on, you have your interests
and the Kingdom has its interests, and you have your road and we have
our road.‖97
For the American analyst, ― Abdullah‘s revelation was part
of a defense of the value of the U.S.-Saudi relationship for the
Palestinians, because it gave Riyadh leverage with Washington on Arab-
Israeli issues. He went on to say that, because of his letter, the Bush
Administration shortly thereafter announced public support for the idea
of a Palestinian state. However, the fact that a Saudi leader publicly
acknowledged such a dispute with the United States was undoubtedly
meant to demonstrate that the government was reflecting the views of its
citizens on this issue.‖
The Saudi reactions to critics since 9/11 may be considered
mainly with regards to the inside front and to the exterior pressures. In
other words, in the same measure that the critics were not exclusively
exterior – Americans-, but also emanating from internal social forces ,
the reactions have had to deal with both sides.
Saudi Arabia has some features that distinguishes it from other
Gulf States. It was one of the few countries in the Middle East never to
be colonised or to have its borders defined by the imperial powers, either
because at the time it was not considered strategically important, or
97
Gregory Gause III, The Approaching Turning Point : the future of US
relations with the Gulf States, Brookings Project on US policy towards the Islamic
World, Analysis paper n° 2, May 2003.
61
because it hosts the holy places of Islam. We can hardly pretend that such
a privilege in an arab world that has been at a moment or another
completely invested by colonial powers, could not have any influence in
shaping the Saudi mind. We think on the contrary that it may cause a lot
of disturbance, insofar as it is not really reckoned as an important
element in the construction of regional strategies and other political
arrangements.
"The idea of the world's great powers landing half a million
soldiers on the peninsula in 1991/92 to defend this desert and secure the
freedom of the little neighbouring emirate of Kuwait would have
sounded like a very tall story in the first half of this century" 98
, says A.
Jerichow. And despite this author is not favorable to the Saudi regime
and does not hide it, he could not apparently occult some aspects of the
Saudi evolution. He does not deny for example that after all, elections are
not entirely new to the Saudis. Thus , he says : ―Between 1926 and 1963
regular elections were held to elect the town councils in Hejaz, in the
western part of the country. Royal power, however ended this custom.
But in 1977, the King issued a new law that looked like it would allow
for half of the members of the town councils to be freely elected. The
royal powers never passed this law. The idea behind it was, however,
difficult to eradicate. In december 1990, the demand for local elections
was again heard in a dramatic proclamation from Saudi Arabia
intellectuals"99
.
So, even if the Saudi reactions to increasing pressure and critic
take time to materialize , we should indeed distinguish between at least
two kinds of attitudes : the first emanate from the elite in power (the
royal family itself), and the second from the population or the civil
society.
In the first set of reactions and attitudes we would mention for
example, some royal initiatives like the advisory council, and the
municipal elections, and later the reform of the educative system, etc.
Whereas on the second set of reactions we would mention all the changes
that occurred in the civil society and the increasing demands that
followed up.
98
Anders Jerichow , Saudi Arabia, Outside Global Law and Order, Curzon
Press, 1997, P.18. In our analysis‘ context, we have also to find the articulations where
the present events join the past, or at least may be better explained under its light. This
is provided by two kinds of approach : the historic and the sociologic. When associated
in a homogeneous view, we have then a tool for more an accurate analysis 99
Op.Cit.P.7.
62
In the same context, , we should perhaps consider the municipal
elections , which have been recently organised and which, in spite of
their shortcomings and the exclusion of women, have been greeted as a
first step toward more a consistent reform. The advisory Council was
also the result of these demands: " King Fahad" says Jerichow " must
have realized that the time was ripe for a compromise with the modern
world in the shape of a move that could be interpreted as a move towards
democracy"100
. He emphasizes however that the Advisory Council could
appear similar to the affairs of State in all other parts of the world, "but
no one insists on changing anything or on carrying through any new
proposals"101
. The fact is the decisions of the Council have to be
presented to the head of the Council of Ministers - also the King - who
then presents them to the Council. If it happens that the Council of
Ministers and the Advisory Council do not agree, then, as it says in the
Royal Decree, Article 17, 'the King decides as he deems fit'.
There are indeed more limits of a reform coming from the top,
than when it is emanating from the civil society and imposed by it and
followed up by some mechanism of control. Yet, we must remember that
we are talking about a society deeply influenced by the traditional views
of the religious elite. What if the obstacles against liberal reforms come
from that elite? It would not be the first time 102
, and besides, resistance
to political and social reforms might be as powerful as the clergy deems
that its interests are threatened, in a conjoncture that is charcterized by a
deep suspicion about the kind of influence exerted by some top-religious
leaders over the framework that permitted not only 9/11 but also the
terrorism wave coming over in its wake and striking the kingdom itself.
If the real dilemma for the middle class is about material changes
and welfare, in a social and economical conjuncture more and more open
to the fluctuations of the free market and the neo-liberalism , for the
religious elite, the dilemma is different : it is not about power , but more
100
Op.Cit.P.6. 101
Idem. 102
During the the rule of King Abdelaziz : "The clergy found no sympathy for
cars, telephones, television or the computers of the modern age. All of it was conceived
as inroads by a faithless world outside into the islamism of the Saud family. But -
allegiance with the Wahhabi sect or no - the ruling Saud family was in no mind to miss
out on the possibilities the new world had to offer, neither in the form of weaponry to
defend borders the Saud family had set, nor in the form of the social development,
which the family was now able to buy with its oil money. The result was a compromise,
which turned out to be the dilemma of the Saud Wahhabi alliance ".
Jerichow.Op.Cit.P.19.
63
precisely about the degree of power allowed to the clergy in the affairs of
the society and the State . The fact is that in spite of all the past and
current amount of authority recognised to the religious elite, it sounds as
if there are more and more doubts about the usefulness of allowing such
an authority to a body that is much less necessary for the survival of the
state than in the first days of the Saudi kingdom.
As this is actually the core of the problem since 9/11 , - i.e. the
incontournable connection between religion and politics – it will never
appear as urgent and capital as in the educative matters, because
education is directly related to the elite, and thus opening the prospects of
the future of the society as a whole.
Reacting against the western biased media, Khaled al Maeena –
Arab News Editor-in-Chief- says " There was no critical thinking. There
was lazy journalism. Sometimes, they would hear something, some
rumors, that turned into myths and then into facts, and this was very
painful103
".
Al Maeena was particularly pained by "the demonization of the
Saudis" after 9/11. "We all became criminals" said he, and he noticed
that even those in America who tried defend the Saudis "found their
voices or their words drowned". What he noticed was a kind of
discrimination against writers and journalists talking from Saudi Arabia
or on its behalf that seemed to shape the media scene in the USA in the
wake of 9/11 : " I have seen lies in the print media and on TV here. I am
a liberal. I support criticism. I want the free press. I want the press to be
really free, but sometimes, you wonder if the press here is free enough to
tell the truth about other countries, other religions, especially about
countries that for years were allies of the United States."104
What upset al Maeena is also some media jargon, such as "islamic
terror". For him, "terrorism has no religion", and the use of such
expressions contribute only to more confusion about the Muslim world
creating an atmosphere of islamophobia.
There are also what we may call ―collateral damages‖, which
would go unnoticed on a broad scale, but not so on the local scene. On
May 27, 2003 , approximately two weeks after the suicide bombings in
Riyadh , the editor-in-chief of the Saudi daily Al-Watan, Jamal
103
Media, Terrorism, and Reality, Remarks by Khaled al-Maeena, 13th Arab-
U.S. Policymakers Conference, Washington DC, September 13, 2004. 104
He was talking in Washington.
64
Khashoggi, was fired, as it seems, by order of the Saudi Information
Ministry. At the time, no official reason was given for his dismissal.
Jamal Khashoggi served as the paper's editor-in-chief for only a
few weeks; his previous position was as editor of the Saudi English-
language weekly Arab News. Despite his brief tenure, he managed to
arouse the ire of Saudi hardliners, both establishment and opposition,
because of a series of articles condemning the Saudi government's
Authority for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (i.e. the
religious police). Following the publication of these articles, attacks were
launched against Al-Watan by several Islamist websites which support
bin Laden and oppose the Saudi regime. These websites also support the
Saudi religious police, even though it is a government body. The
websites featured a parody of the Al-Watan ("The Homeland") logo, that
read instead Al-Wathan – "The Pagan Idol."
The newspaper angered Islamists for other reasons as well. For
example, it discussed women's issues such as identity cards and the right
of women to drive cars. The result was a frequent turnover of editors-in-
chief – Khashoggi was the third, though the paper has been in existence
for less than three years. He was replaced by Tarek Ibrahim105
.
The last straw that led to Khashoggi's termination was reportedly
an op-ed on the Riyadh bombings that appeared in the May 22 edition;
the op-ed criticized Ibn Taymiya (1268-1328), the spiritual father of
Wahhabism, which is the Saudi kingdom's official stream of Islam, but
Khashoggi was not the author. Beyond the controversy and the scourge it
had led to, we think that it deserves to be cited, because it testifies of the
new frame of mind that terrorism paradoxically helped to shape in Saudi
Arabia. The Individual and the Homeland Are More Important than Ibn
Taymiya, is the title of the story, written by Khaled Al-Ghanami. The
author asks : ―Why did they wave the banner of Jihad?‖ -―The answer is
this: Ibn Taymiya... said… that if the ruler does not observe the
commandment of promoting virtue and preventing vice, this obligation is
105
We have to notice that Jamal Khashaggi was appointed recently advisor to the
Saudi ambassador to London. Al-Watan was founded in 2000, in the city of Abha in the
southern Saudi district of Asir, a district which is a major basis of support for Saudi
Islamists. The cornerstone of the paper's building was laid by Crown Prince Abdallah,
and its board of directors is headed by Prince Bandar bin Khaled Al-Faisal. The paper
takes an independent line and demonstrates a stance considered liberal by Saudi
standards. The newspaper's op-ed page reflects pluralism, and features articles
expressing diverse opinions.
65
incumbent upon the clerics… It is these words [of Ibn Taymiya] that are
the real problem. We must stop cajoling and say: These words are a
mistake, and a true disaster, that lead to anarchy, and to a threat to
national unity, and the return of the Jahiliya, because anyone who thinks
himself a cleric will try to remove everything he considers vice. Anyone
who thinks music is forbidden will blow up stores that sell tapes; anyone
who thinks smoking a Narghile is forbidden will blow up shops offering
them for sale, and so on. This is no exaggeration; the day is not far off
when they open fire on satellite dishes." Then he asks again : ―How did
they permit the blood of the non-Muslims? -―The answer is: Because
they attribute no value to human life if it is not Muslim, and because they
ignore the words of Allah: 'There is no coercion in Islam.' Another reason
is that they think that non-Muslims' presence in the Arabian Peninsula is
sufficient reason to kill them. They forget that the Jews were in the
Arabian Peninsula during the life of the Prophet and also after his death.
Proof of this is that his shield was left in the hands of a Jew from whom
he bought food. They ignored the words of Jabber bin Abdallah: '...None
must come near the Al-Haram mosque unless he be a slave or of the
Dhimmis [i.e. Jew or Christian].' Examine this tradition and you will see
that it permitted those with whom there was a protection agreement to
enter even the Al-Haram mosque." Then the author put another question :
―What is the reason for [their] hatred of humanity?‖ – ―The reason is that
they misunderstand the rule of 'loyalty and renunciation.' This rule is a
fundamental Islamic rule, but the meaning of 'renunciation' is to renounce
the attacking, fighting infidels, and to refrain from helping them [act]
against the Islamic state. Their claim that you must hate anyone who is a
non-Muslim cannot be true. The Prophet loved Abu Taleb, who died
while still clinging to idol worship… Proof that Islam came to spread
love among people is that Islam permitted a Muslim to marry a Jewish or
Christian woman‖. And again another question : ―How did these
murderers permit the blood of Muslims and children?‖ -―Answer : They
did this based on a Fatwa of Ibn Taymiya in his book 'The Jihad, 'that
says that if the infidels take shelter behind Muslims, that is, if these
Muslims become a shield for the infidels, it is permitted to kill the
Muslims in order to reach the infidels. Ibn Taymiya did not base this
Fatwa on an actual text from the words of Allah or from the words of His
Prophet. I do not think that this Fatwa leads to realization of the supreme
intentions of Islamic religious law; on the contrary, it is a mistaken Fatwa
that contradicts the way of the Prophet Muhammad, who is proven to
66
have recommended to the Jihad warriors: 'Do not kill a woman, a child or
an old man.'‖
There are indeed many other examples of the reactions and
attitudes of what we may call the reformist elite in Saudi Arabia, which
deserves to be better defined and kown. Another example we will take
here consists in an an article titled "Where Do We Start With Reform?"
His author is Rashed Al-Fowzan, columnist for the Saudi newspaper Al
Jazirah, He merely calls for a program of economic and social reforms.
He says :
―There is a desire by the government for economic reform and in
truth, some such reform is urgently needed. In talking about economic
reform, I am aware that so broad a subject cannot be dealt with in only
one article. What I will try to do then is to mention some things that need
reform because they cause problems for many of us.‖
• "Limited resources and our total dependence on oil. Our revenues are
80 percent derived from oil."
• "Hundreds of billions of riyals have been spent on education and yet
our students are still not up to international standards. Far too few of our
students concentrate on technical or scientific subjects."
• "Unemployment. A problem for both graduates and non-graduates, both
of whom suffer from a lack of job opportunities as well as opportunities
for training…"
• "There are plenty of local factories but we hear nothing about exporting
locally-made goods. We ought to expand local production because it
would produce substantial revenues…"
• "Our national debt is estimated at more than SR700 billion and there is
no plan in the near future for eliminating it or dealing with even a part of
it. Both our population and government spending are on the increase. Our
population is growing faster than our economy and it should be the other
way round…"
• "Many barriers to foreign investment. Attracting foreign investment is
important because it could provide technology, money, jobs and
experience. We all know Dubai has attracted enormous foreign
investment because of its willingness to scrap meaningless barriers and
pointless regulations…"
• "The importance of women in society and the economy. Women have
limited job opportunities in the Kingdom. Despite the fact that hundreds
of millions of riyals have been spent on women's education, there has
been no corresponding economic return. The nursing sector, for example,
67
needs more than 50,000 nurses and there are other specialties where
women's participation is needed."
"These are a few of the points that the government is addressing.
The solutions may be both unpopular and expensive with many Saudis
since increasing the price of some services and imposing higher prices on
others are likely to be among them. We need to be clear and honest if we
want to come up with solutions." 106
On the broader scale of Muslim nations, it is clear that 9/11
fostered a new political thinking with a particular focus on democracy.
The debate went on and is still continuing about the compatibility
between islamic culture and democratic values. A topic that the Algerian
thinker Malik Bennabi (1905-1973) was discussing half a century ago,
and he was not alone, - far from it. So, before going any further, let us
recall what Bennabi was saying about this subject : ―democracy ought to
be considered from three aspects: democracy as an attitude toward the
ego, democracy as an attitude toward the other, and democracy as the
combination of the socio-political conditions necessary for the formation
and development of such attitudes in the individual. These three aspects,
he explained, encompass the subjective and objective requirements of
democracy, which are the psychological propensities upon which the
democratic attitude is established and the assets upon which the
democratic system in any society depends. For democracy can never be
accomplished as a political reality unless its conditions are fulfilled in the
character building of the individual and in the norms and traditions of the
country‖.107
This is to raise the question about the individual dimension of
democracy and its relevancy to the current efforts of democratization in
the Arabo-Islamic world. Is it possible to achieve democracy without
lifting the tutelage tying the individual to traditional concepts about
106
This article was originally translated into English by Arab News on
Wednesday 13 August, 2003. 107
Algerian Malik Bennabi was born in 1905. Highly regarded as the most
eminent scholar, and thinker, of Post World War II Algeria, and one of the foremost
intellectuals of the modern Muslim world. Educated in Paris and Algiers in
Engineering, he later based himself in Cairo, where he spent much of his time toiling
through fields of History, Philosophy and Sociology. Among his works, let‘s mention :
Les Conditions de la Renaissance (1948) ; The Question of Culture (1954) ; Islam in
History and Society (1954)…
68
family, party, religion, State, and other social groups or institutions or
creeds relaying them?
69
Chapter II ___________
Economic ramifications
―The Bush administration‘s ties to the oil and gas industry are
beyond extensive; they are pervasive‖, says an essay by Michael Renner.
―They flow, so to speak, from the top, with a chief executive who grew
up steeped in the culture of Texas oil exploration and tried his hand at it
himself; and a second-in-command who came to office with a multi-
million dollar retirement package in hand from his post of CEO of
Halliburton Oil. Once in office, the vice president developed an energy
policy under the primary guidance of a cast of oil company executives
whose identities he has gone to great lengths to withhold from public
view‖108
. Renner notes that since taking office, the president and vice
president have assembled a government peopled heavily with
representatives from the oil culture they came from. These include
Secretary of the Army Thomas White, a former vice president of Enron,
and Secretary of Commerce Don Evans, former president of the oil
exploration company Tom Brown, Inc., whose major stake in the
company was worth $13 million by the time he took office. What is
worthy noticing too is the fact that as soon as May 2001, a report of the
National Energy Policy Development Group, led by Vice President
Cheney, acknowledged that U.S. oil production will fall 12% over the
next 20 years. As a result, U.S. dependence on imported oil which has
risen from one-third in 1985 to more than half in 2003 is set to climb to
two-thirds by 2020.
108
Michael Renner, The New Oil Order : Washington‘s war on Iraq is the
lynchpin to controlling Persian Gulf oil, Foreign Policy In Focus, February 14, 2003.
70
Complexity of a relationship
Oil is indeed the core of the Saudi-US relationship, even if both
parties pretend that the matter is more complicated ; and to be sure, it is
so. Nevertheless, the complication is also related to issues connected –
directly or indirectly - to oil and energy. There is no doubt about it.
Throughout the history of oil, sorting out who gets access to this highly
prized resource and on what terms, has often gone hand in hand with
violence. At first, it was Britain, the imperial power in much of the
Middle East, that called the shots. But for half a century, the US seeking
a preponderant share of the earth‘s resources has made steady progress in
bringing the Gulf region into its geopolitical orbit. In Washington
calculus, securing oil supplies has consistently trumped the pursuit of
human rights and democracy. That is to explain why the US policy
toward the Middle East has long relied on building up proxy forces in the
region and generously supplying them with arms.
In the wake of 9/11, the US-Saudi relationship has come under
considerable scrutiny , with some analysts questioning its centrality in
US foreign policy. Some analyzers have thus challenged the assumption
that Gulf oil remains vitally important to the United States.
Yet, the US-Saudi relationship is too much important, too much
intertwined, too much rich, and too much complicated to let itself being
summarized and reduced to some bad reactions about terrorism, though.
The interests at stake are huge compared to those prevailing between the
USA and other states of the Arab region. Yet, an objective evaluation of
the current situation cannot afford to ignore the ambiguous side of the
relationship and the attitudes and reactions trying to demonize this side or
the other of the relationship, in what we have called the construction of
the enemy’s frame of mind. The point here, as in any relationship
between two different entities, is that we should always consider its
unseen part. To borrow the lexicon of psychoanalysis, in any relationship
between two people – let‘s say a man and a woman, for instance- there is
not only these two persons, but also , their father and mother, their grand-
fathers and grand-mothers, their sisters and brothers, their children, etc.
So that when we see two people having a relationship, we should
consider what lay behind in any evaluation, according to the
psychoanalysts. This is also the case for States, for the latter do not
represent themselves , but all the diversity of peoples behind them. In our
case, we will not have only the USA and the Saudi Kingdom, but also all
71
those who – for a reason or another – identify theirs interests to one of
them and claim to have the right to advise and pressure as they claim the
right to support and side with or against. Hence, beyond the economic
ramifications of 9/11, which –as we see – cannot be summarized in
reactions and counter-reactions over the issue of terror funding, there are
the cultural background, with its variety of religious, ethnic, social, and
political hues. However, it is true that the US-Saudi relationship has
experienced its worst crisis in history. Americans and Saudis alike have
started to wonder about the meaning and the cost of such a cozy
relationship and whether their own governments have served them well.
Oil and Security
Oil and national security concerns have combined to produce a
close and cooperative relationship between the United States and Saudi
Arabia for much of the past century. Since the award of the first Saudi oil
concession to a U.S. company in 1933, both states have had an increasing
interest, respectively, in the marketing and acquisition of Saudi
petroleum supplies. As regional threats multiplied in the latter half of the
century, mutual concerns over the stability of Saudi Arabia and other
moderate regimes in the Arabian Peninsula engendered a significant
degree of defense cooperation.
US strategic priorities made of Saudi Arabia a key-piece for
American primary security interests. As shown by declassified
government documents, Washington has focused for half a century on
preventing hostile forces from seizing and establishing control of Gulf
petroleum. That is why Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 could not
be allowed : in the eyes of the American strategists, an ambitious and
ruthless dictator, hated in his own country, would be much more
emboldened if he was left in control of so much of the world‘s oil wealth.
The lesson from the Nazi adventure was being recalled in the media,
along with a hypothesis assuming that Saddam would not stop at Kuwait
anyway. No wonder that even the Arab states entered the international
coalition that gathered not only to liberate Kuwait, but also to warn other
candidates to military expansionism – under whatever slogans- in the
Gulf or elsewhere : for the first time, the Arab states have been unified in
a coalition that far from fighting against Israel, would oppose a ―brother-
72
regime‖. The arab solidarity would be the first victim of such a situation
created by Saddam‘s agression.
The fear that a powerful state – then the Soviet Union- could
control the dominant share of the world‘s oil supply has since 1949
pushed American policymakers to plan the destruction of regional oil
facilities. ―In coordination with the British government and U.S. and
British oil companies, but without the knowledge of local Arab
governments, President Harry Truman approved a detailed plan --
described in a National Security Council directive known as NSC 26/2
and later supplemented by a series of additional NSC orders -- to store
explosives near Persian Gulf oil fields. As a last resort in the event of an
imminent Soviet invasion, oil installations and refineries would be blown
up and the reserves plugged to keep the oil out of Moscow's hands‖109
.
Telhami reminds us that in 1957 too, ―in response to increased
instability in the wake of the Suez crisis, the Eisenhower administration
reinforced and expanded the logic of this strategy. With many friends of
the West threatened by the rise of pan-Arabism, championed by Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the United States grew concerned that
unfriendly governments would emerge in the region. This fear led
Eisenhower to expand the denial policy to include not only threatening
external powers, but also hostile regional regimes‖110
.
Although the US military presence is not solely about oil, oil is a
key reason. In 1999, General Anthony C. Zinni, then the head of the US
Central Command, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee
that the Gulf region is of vital interest to the US and that the country
(America, that is) must have free access to the regions resources. Bush
administration officials have, however, categorically denied oil is one of
the reasons why they pushed for regime change in Iraq.111
109
Shibley Telhami, Does Saudi Arabia still matter? Differing perspectives on
the kingdom and its oil, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002. 110
Idem. 111
―Nonsense‖ Defense Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld told 60 minutes Steve Kroft
in mid-December 2002. ―It has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil‖ !
73
Data rates and performances
With oil export revenues 112
making up around 90-95% of total
Saudi export earnings, 70%-80% of state revenues, and around 40% of
the country's gross domestic product (GDP), Saudi Arabia's economy
remains, despite attempts at diversification, heavily dependent on oil
(although investments in petrochemicals have increased the relative
importance of the downstream petroleum sector in recent years).
Saudi Arabia ranks as the first largest crude oil producer in the
world, and is a leader in OPEC's production quota decisions. As such,
Saudi Arabia was a critically important player behind the oil price
collapse of late 1997 through early 1999, and also in actions taken by
world oil producers which have led to a tripling in oil prices by the fall of
2000. During 2004, Saudi Arabia produced an estimated 10.4 million
bbl/d of oil (32% of total OPEC oil production), with net export of
around 8.7 million bbl/d (the comparable figures for 2003 as a whole
were 9.9 million bbl/d and 8.3 million bbl/d, respectively). 113
Oil prices were strong during 2003, and even stronger in 2004.
Combined with the highest Saudi oil output ever, the country's oil export
revenues were up sharply in 2004, to more than $100 billion, compared
to $77 billion in 2003 (and more than triple the $34 billion earned in
1998, when Saudi oil prices fell below $12 per barrel). For 2005 and
2006, oil export revenues are expected to remain very strong once again.
Partly as a result of these strong oil export revenue increases, Saudi
Arabia's real GDP growth was an estimated 6.1% in 2004, up from 1.7%
average growth between 1995 and 2002. For 2005, Saudi real GDP
growth is expected to remain strong, at 6.2%.
112
Opec Revenues Fact Sheet, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/opecrev.html
113
Opec Revenues : Country Details,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/orevcoun.html
74
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW of Saudi Arabia
Currency: Riyal
Market Exchange Rate (12/21/04): US$1 = 3.75 riyals
Gross Domestic Product (GDP - market exchange
rate) (2004E): $247.2 billion
Real GDP Growth Rate (1995-2002 average): 1.7%
(2003E): 7.2% (2004E): 6.1% (2005F): 6.2%
Inflation Rate (consumer prices) (2003E): 0.6%
(2004E): 0.4% (2005F): 1.5%
Unemployment Rate (2004E): 14% (unofficial
estimates are higher)
Current Account Balance (2003E): $29.7 billion
(2004E): $11.6 billion (2005F): $13.1 billion
Major Trading Partners (2004): Japan, United States,
European Union
Merchandise Exports (2004E): $112.3 billion (mainly
crude oil and petroleum products)
Merchandise Imports (2004E): $36.6 billion (mainly
industrial goods, metals, food)
Merchandise Trade Balance (2004E): $75.7 billion
Oil Export Revenues (2003E): $77 billion (2004E):
around $100 billion
Oil Export Revenues/Total Export Revenues (2004E):
90%-95%
Public Debt (2004E): $176 billion (note: external debt
is estimated at $39 billion)
Reserves of Foreign Exchange and Gold (2004E): $23
billion (note the country has significantly more in
total "foreign assets")
* Source: DOE, USA. Country Analysis Briefs.
75
During fiscal year 2004, Saudi Arabia originally had been
expecting a budget deficit. However, this was based on an extremely
conservative price assumption of $19 per barrel for Saudi oil -- and
assumed production of 7.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d). Both of these
estimates turned out to be far below actual levels. As a result, as of mid-
December 2004, the Saudi Finance Ministry was expecting a huge budget
surplus of $26.2 billion, on budget revenues of $104.8 billion (nearly
double the country's original estimate) and expenditures of $78.6 billion
(28% above the approved budget levels). This surplus is being used for
several purposes, including : paying down the Kingdom's public debt (to
$164 billion from $176 billion at the start of 2004); extra spending on
education and development projects; increased security costs (possibly an
additional $2.5 billion dollars in 2004; see below) due to threats from
terrorists; and higher payments to Saudi citizens through subsidies and
other means. For 2005, Saudi Arabia is assuming a balanced budget, with
revenues and expenditures of $74.6 billion each.114
In spite of the recent surge in its oil income, Saudi Arabia
continues to face serious long-term economic challenges,
including high rates of unemployment (around 15%-20%), one of the
world's fastest population growth rates, and the consequent need for
increased government spending. All of these place pressures on Saudi oil
revenues. The Kingdom also is facing serious security threats, including
a number of terrorist attacks (on foreign workers, primarily). In response,
the Saudis reportedly have ramped up spending in the security area
(reportedly by 50% in 2004, from $5.5 billion in 2003).
Saudi Arabia's per capita oil export revenues remain far below
high levels reached during the 1970s and early 1980s. In 2004, Saudi
Arabia earned around $4,462 per person, versus $22,174 in 1980. This
80% decline in real per capita oil export revenues since 1980 is in large
part due to the fact that Saudi Arabia's young population has nearly
tripled since 1980, while oil export revenues in real terms have fallen by
over 40% (despite recent increases). Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has faced
nearly two decades of heavy budget and trade deficits, the expensive
1990/1991 war with Iraq, and total public debt of around $175 billion.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia does have extensive -- around $110
billion -- foreign assets, which provide a substantial fiscal "cushion."
114
Country analysis Briefs, Saudi Arabia, January 2005, Energy Information
Administration, Department Of Energy. US Government.
76
Trade relationship
Saudi Arabia was the second largest U.S. trading partner in the
Middle East in 2002. For that year, Saudi exports to the United States
were estimated at $12.2 billion and imports from the United States at
$4.3 billion. Comparable figures for Israel, the largest U.S. trading
partner in the Middle East, were $12.4 billion in exports and $5.3 billion
in imports. To a considerable extent, this high volume of trade is a result
of U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia and U.S. arms exports to that
country. The Saudis buy significant amounts of U.S. commercial
equipment, such as machinery and vehicles, as well. Also, a Washington
Post article of February 11, 2002, estimates that Saudi nationals have
invested between $500 and $700 billion in the U.S. economy 115
.
Saudi Arabia has applied to join the 128-memberWorld Trade
Organization (WTO) as a developing country, an arrangement that would
give it a special transition period to bring its commercial procedures in
line with WTO rules. The U.S. State Department notes that accession
will require the Saudi government to initiate substantial reforms,
including tariff reduction, opening up financial services (insurance and
banking), allowing competition in telecommunications and other
services, and better protection of intellectual property rights.
In recognition of its progress in protection of intellectual property
rights, Saudi Arabia was removed from the U.S. Trade Representative‘s
Priority Watch List in 1996, but remains on the basic Watch list pending
further progress. The U.S. Trade Representative reportedly has also cited
Saudi observance of the secondary boycott against Israel as an obstacle to
admission to the WTO. In March 2001, WTO officials reportedly
expressed disappointment over a recent list issued by the Saudi
government of activities off limits to foreign investment and predicted
that these restrictions could delay Saudi accession to the WTO. During
Crown Prince Abdullah‘s April 2002 visit, however, President Bush
expressed support for Saudi accession and said the United States is
making technical assistance available to Saudi Arabia to support the
Saudi application.
115
Alfred B. Prados, Saudi Arabia, Current Issues and US Relations, August 4,
2003, CRS Issue Brief for Congress.
77
Oil Production
With the world‘s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 261.7
billion barrels in January 2001), Saudi Arabia produced an average of
9.145 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil during 2000.
Approximately 14% of U.S. oil imports and 8.46% of total U.S. oil
consumption came from Saudi Arabia during 2001. Formerly the largest
foreign supplier of oil to the United States, Saudi Arabia has been
exceeded in this role by Venezuela and/or Canada during recent years .
U.S.Oil consumption and imports
Category 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total US consumption
Total U.S. Imports
Imports from Saudi Arabia
Imports from Venezuela
Imports from Canada
18.917
10.708
1.491
1.719
1.598
19.519
10.852
1.478
1.493
1.539
19.701
11.459
1.572
1.546
1.807
19.649
11.871
1.662
1.553
1.828
* Source : U.S. Department Of Energy.
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has alternately supported cuts and
increases in production as oil prices on the international market have
fluctuated. Under a ―gentlemen‘s agreement‖ reached in June 2000,
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
established a mechanism to adjust the supply of oil by 500,000 bpd if the
20-day average price of oil moved outside a $22 to $28 price band.
Members disagree, however, as to whether this mechanism is automatic
or requires separate action by OPEC to implement it, and Saudi Arabia
has spoken of a target price of $25 rather than a price band. Congress has
approved legislation to discourage price fixing by oil producing
countries116
.
116
Idem.
78
ENERGY OVERVIEW : Saudi Arabia
Proven Oil Reserves (1/1/05E): 261.9 billion barrels (includes half
of Divided/"Neutral" Zone)
Total Oil Production (2004E; includes NZ): 10.4 million barrels per
day (bbl/d), of which 9.1 million bbl/d was crude oil, 1.2 million
bbl/d was natural gas liquids (NGLs), and 80,000 bbl/d was "other
liquids" (including MTBE)
Total Oil Production (2003E; includes NZ): 9.9 million barrels per
day (bbl/d), of which 8.8 million bbl/d was crude oil, 1.0 million
bbl/d was natural gas liquids (NGLs), and 80,000 bbl/d was "other
liquids" (including MTBE)
OPEC Crude Oil Production Quota (effective 11/1/04): 8.775
million bbl/d
Crude Oil Production Capacity (12/04E): 10.5-11.0 million bbl/d
Total Oil Consumption (2004E): 1.67 million bbl/d
Net Oil Exports (2002E): 7.0 million bbl/d (2003E): 8.3 million
bbl/d (2004E): 8.7 million bbl/d
Major Oil Customers (8/04E; approximate exports): United States
(1.9 million bbl/d); OECD Europe (1.4 million bbl/d); Japan (1.2
million bbl/d); South Korea (838,000 bbl/d); India (345,000 bbl/d);
China (310,000 bbl/d); Taiwan (210,000 bbl/d)
Crude Oil Refining Capacity (1/1/05E): 1.745 million bbl/d
Natural Gas Reserves (1/1/05E): 235.0 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)
(includes half of NZ)
Natural Gas Production/Consumption (2002E): 2.0 Tcf
Electric Generating Capacity (2003E): 26.6 gigawatts (all thermal)
Net Electricity Generation (2002E): 138.2 billion kilowatt-hours
* Source: DOE, USA. Country Analysis Briefs
79
The challenges of the Muslim nations
If one of the most important consequences of 9/11 is the
accentuated demand on democratization and reform in the Arab world as
a way to preventing more Islamic radicalization in these societies, it is
noticeable that anyway even without those tragic events, the West was
still adamant on introducing some political reforms. The fact is that the
GCC being involved in international trade, its connections with the
western political notions have to be updated from inside. There is a
reason for that. Nowadays, the terms "democracy" and "market
economy" are often used interchangeably. Some kind of opening has thus
to be performed. In the former East-European states, the process has
conduced to joining the European Union, which was - and still remains-
an economic market before it became a political project. In Russia, we
see almost the same scheme, and even in China, there is an orientation
towards some sort of liberalization.
However, in America some priorities that were already working
in the background of the political scene well before 9/11 have hardly
changed after these events, whereas others occurred in the aftermath and
have renewed - or rather accentuated- the interest in the region .
In 1999, an article of the magazine "Brain Food" announces that
"America will soon lose the stability the framers worked so hard to create
because it is becoming wholly dependent upon inherently unstable
(authoritarian) oil-producing Muslim nations "117
. Indeed, the idea is
neither new nor genuinely original. Besides, it is not quite logical, either.
The question that such an idea raises is : can a Superpower like America
lose control over its own destiny just because it is relying for some of its
energy importations on ―unstable countries‖? Why should the instability
in some Muslim countries lead necessarily to a similar instability in the
USA? For Jay Hanson, it happened over twenty five years ago that
OPEC quadrupled world oil prices and plunged America into
"stagflation". Yet, maybe it would be more advisable to speak of unrest
instead of instability. To be sure, 9/11 caused unrest in America which
has become anxious about international terrorism and radical Islamism.
Either some like it or not, Islam is since then an asset in this game, and it
117
Jay Hanson, The Best-Kept Secret In Washington, Brain Food, Third Quarter,
1999.
80
happens that those who detain the main resources in energy are Muslim
nations.
" Muslim nations " writes J. Hanson " will soon control virtually
all of the world's oil exports. Since neither capital nor labor can create
energy, the next round of energy-shortage-induced stagflation will leave
central bankers helpless and they will seek military solutions to their
economic problems. It's the best-kept secret in Washington, Whitehall,
Brussels, and Jerusalem, but it's just a matter of time until word hits the
street"118
.
The market economy receives almost 80 percent of its energy
subsidies from nonrenewable fossil sources : oil, gas, and coal 119
. That
makes the struggle for energy a vital issue, not only for the consumers
(especially the Westerners) but also for the producers, for who the matter
is most of all of political survival. That's where the strategies of the
Western states intermingle with the local struggles for power between the
elites of the concerned regions, until it becomes hard to distinguish
between what is a local necessity and what is a priority dictated by the
foreign interests.
Oil is the highest quality energy today used throughout the world,
making up about 38% of the world energy supply, according to some
estimations120
. In 1977, Richard Duncan developed a new model to
forecast oil production called the "Numerate Empiric Model". In the
course of his research, it seems that Duncan discovered what J. Hanson
holds as the "best-kept secret", which is that Muslim nations would be
able to control market economies because they will control virtually all
of the oil export market. Writing to President Clinton and Senator Jessie
Helms in the same year, Duncan warned them that if an "alliance of
Muslim petroleum exporting nations" could see the day , this alone
―could cause World stock markets to fall 50 % in one day, and crucially
it could ignite both (1) a World Petroleum War, and (2) a World Holy
War (called Jihad by Muslims)‖.
Though these sentences are tainted with a highly emotional
dramatic tone, it seems that by an irony of the hazard the events gave this
118
Idem. 119
They are called nonrenewable because , for all practical purposes, they're not
being made any more. The reason they are called fossil is because they were produced
by nature from dead plants and animals over several hundred million years. 120
Studies show that nothing can replace oil : a recent review of the future
prospects of all alternatives has been published. The summary conclusion reached is
that there is no known complete substitute for petroleum in its many and varied uses.
81
apocalyptic vision some weight. Indeed, the Muslim nations did not
make any alliance with the clear purpose of striking at the heart of the
world economy, as Duncan imagined. Yet, what was the Desert Storm if
not a little World Petroleum War caused by the failed attempt of Saddam
Hussein to lay his hands on the Kuwaiti oil fields? And if one of the
consequences of that war consisted in implanting and broadening the
American military presence in the Gulf, what was the reaction of the
local opposition (or/and dissidence gathered in the radical jihadist cells)
if not starting the World Holy War (jihad) against the Westerners, as Bin
Laden put it? But in 1999, when he published his article, J. Hanson could
very well draw his own conclusions from the course of the Gulf War that
changed a lot in the political vista of the region. Never before that time,
the Saudi opposition could catch the ears and the eyes of the grand
public, and we can probably say the same of all those small groups of
militant jihadists which spread loosely all over the Arab region. It will
be 9/11 that brings to the limelight the connection between those who
are inside and those who are outside. Nothing will ever be similar after
that date.
There is ally and ally
Why 9/11 changed all the conceptions prevailing about the
relations between the USA and the GCC , and particularly Saudi Arabia ?
Because, it raised the question not only about the credibility of the
American allies in the Arab world, but also about America's own
credibility in regard of what justifies some of those alliances.
The Americans pride themselves for what they deem to be their
power and influence in the modern world. Some of that power and
influence is supposed to be reposing on a strong independence will. But
what the Americans discovered in the wake of 9/11 is that they are not as
independent as they have always figured to be. Not to be completely
independent means in this dramatic context not to be able to tackle
efficiently the calamity that hit America in the heart : the Islamist
terrorism. The problem is grave, or at least that's how it sounded the day
after 9/11, when America discovered to its horror that 15 on 19 hijackers
were Saudi citizens. Why Saudis? Why the Gulf States, which
Washington has always thought to be allies and friends in the same
measure that it considered itself as their protector ?
82
Nonetheless, behind the official message and the main stream
media discourse there are the truths that are neither new nor secret, if
only one could make sense of some signs that preceded those tragic
events of New York and Washington.
First, when Senator Helms replied to Duncan, he did not hesitate
to acknowledge that "the Commerce Department recently released a
report which found that US dependence on foreign oil has become a
threat to national security. The government should not have allowed its
national security to be placed in such a vulnerable position" said he. That
makes J. Hanson - and many others - shudder for "what if?" "The United
States", writes the latter, "is physically unable to produce enough oil
domestically to keep its economy alive and is forced to rely on its
imports. In 1998, the United States imported 53 percent of its oil needs.
This deficit is growing... and will continue to grow until the economy
collapses exactly like it did twenty five years ago" 121
.
However, maybe the core of the problem is not that America is
relying on imports for its needs of energy : would that have been really a
thorny problem if those imports of oil were coming from - say - Europe,
for instance ? The Europeans , in spite of their complicated controversies
with the USA are allies. And so are the oil producing Muslim states .
Then where is the problem? It is exactly in the cultural differences122
,
those « lines » of division and meeting assumed to be the « front » of
civilization shock in the thesis of professor Huntington. Islam is a peace
religion, though. Yet, what people could make of it , is another question,
particularly when there is on one part and another of the globe(i.e. in the
West and in the arabo-islamic world) a systematic, thorough construction
of the enemy. This is not just an intellectual polemic, as passionate as it
may sound to Western and Muslim scholars. This is now, and since 9/11
a matter of global challenge facing the American administration, as it is
facing - but with a different tone and on a different scale - the Muslim
states, either in the GCC or in the rest of the world 123
.
121
Idem. This was written in 1999. 122
See about this topic, Dispassionating the Debate about Modernization and
Westernization, Hichem Karoui, 11/15/03: http://www.hichemkaroui.com/archives.htm 123
We can talk of construction of the enemy each time we notice that the
discourse is based on a series of elementary dichotomies , such as : good/evil,
just/unjust, guilty/innocent, rational/irrational, civilized/uncivilized, which can be
defined as floating (or empty signifiers). These floating signifiers have no fixed
meaning, but they are (re)articulated before, during and after the conflict and placed in a
chain of equivalence. Both sides claim to be rational and civilized, and to fight a good
and just war, attributing responsibility for the conflict to the enemy. The construction of
83
Well before 9/11 , and even before the two Gulf wars ignited by
Saddam Hussein in 1980 and 1990, the couple "Islam and oil" has
already revealed to be quite explosive : the Iranian revolution of 1979
proved it. In those not so remote days, it was not only 63 Americans
taken as hostages at the embassy in Tehran, but America itself. The
whole regional system set up in the Gulf since the fifties was being
paralyzed. And here too, the issue was not just about oil interests, but
about the social project and the cultural shock. After all, the new regime
of the Mullahs did not stop pumping oil towards the West, and the West
did not stop buying it. The problem was elsewhere. It was in the
attitudes, the behaviors, the symbols, and to put it briefly, in the signs
released by the new regime in Tehran and in their interpretation in the
West.
So, does it really matter if we notice for example, following
Hanson's steps, that the Middle East alone has 64 % of the world's
proved oil reserves? Yes of course, it does. And this is not just because it
is the Middle East. Nobody would care if it were the Caribbean, the
northern pole, the Black Sea, or Southern America. The point is that the
contemporary Middle East is mainly a region deeply influenced by two
trends: religion (Islam) and nationalism. And that makes the difference.
Add to that 9 % (i.e., the FSU Muslim republics, 1.7 % ; Muslim African
nations, 6.7 % ; Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, 1%) and the Muslim
states would have roughly 73% of the total world's proved oil reserves.
Conclusion of Hanson : " By 2010, Muslim nations could control 60
percent of the world's oil production and, more importantly, 95 percent of
the world's oil exports. In short, the Muslim exporting nations have
Western economies by the throat"124
.
U.S. Energy Supply and Demand - Base Case
Energy Information Administration\Short-Term Energy Outlook
February 2005 :
the enemy is accompanied by the construction of the identity of the self, clearly in an
antagonistic relationship to the enemy's identity. In this process not only the radical
otherness of the enemy is emphasized, but the enemy is also considered to be a threat to
'our own' identity. In this fashion the enemy's identity becomes a constitutive outside,
supporting the identity construction of the self. 124
Idem.
84
Year Annual Percentage Change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (billion chained 2000 dollars) 10381 10843 11228 11581 4.4 3.6 3.1 Imported Crude Oil Price
a
(nominal dollars per barrel) 27.74 36.12 39.13 37.19 30.2 8.3 -5.0 Petroleum Supply (million barrels per day) Crude Oil Production
b 5.68 5.43 5.62 5.89 -4.4 3.6 4.8
Total Petroleum Net Imports( million barrels per day) (including SPR) 11.24 11.84 11.94 11.98 5.4 0.8 0.3 Energy Demand World Petroleum (million barrels per day) 79.8 82.5 84.5 86.5 3.4 2.4 2.4 Petroleum (million barrels per day) 20.03 20.51 20.83 21.22 2.4 1.6 1.9 Natural Gas (trillion cubic feet) 22.36 22.20 22.86 23.46 -0.7 3.0 2.6 Coal
c
(million short tons) 1095 1102 1143 1170 0.6 3.7 2.3 Electricity (billion kilowatthours) Retail Sales
d 3488 3544 3664 3743 1.6 3.4 2.2
Other Use/Sales e 179 177 185 188 -1.0 4.4 1.4
Total 3667 3721 3848 3930 1.5 3.4 2.1 Total Energy Demand
f
(quadrillion Btu) 98.2 99.1 101.8 103.9 1.0 2.6 2.1 Total Energy Demand per Dollar of GDP (thousand Btu per 2000 Dollar) 9.46 9.14 9.06 8.97 -3.3 -0.9 -1.1
Renwable Energy as Percent of Total g
6.4% 6.5% 6.6% 6.6%
Sources: Historical data: Latest data available from Bureau of Economic Analysis and Energy Information Administration; latest data available from EIA databases supporting the following reports: Petroleum Supply Monthly, DOE/EIA-0109; Petroleum Supply Annual, DOE/EIA-0340/2; Natural Gas Monthly, DOE/EIA-0130; Electric Power Monthly, DOE/EIA-0226; and Quarterly Coal Report, DOE/EIA-0121; International Petroleum Monthly DOE/EIA-0520; Weekly Petroleum Status Report, DOE/EIA-0208. Macroeconomic projections are based on Global Insight Model of the US Economy, January 2005.
85
Special partnership
Yet, one is prone to say , the situation has not always appeared so
grayish. In fact, it could even have appeared the other way round. Thus,
in studying US-Gulf states relationship, one cannot help noticing the
moderating influence of Saudi Arabia - the most conservative state in the
Gulf. The underlying motivation behind Saudi Arabia's friendly policy
toward the United States has been ―the realization that its security and
government stability are inextricably tied to (1) moral and material
support of the United States and her industrial allies and, (2) economic
prosperity and stability of the industrial world , including the United
States. The fact that the Kingdom has and will depend very heavily on
US military supports for its external security cannot be
overemphasized‖.125
According to Vo Xuan Han, Saudi Arabia's economic dependence
on the outside world is no less obvious. Oil exports being her most
important source of revenue, Saudi Arabia's economic interests depend
heavily on the economic conditions in the most advanced and largest
industrial economies. ―Also as most of the Saudis' financial assets are
held in the currencies of these industrial countries, especially the US
dollar, her wealth would be adversely affected by economic recession
and depreciation of these 'hard' currencies. Last but not least, another
factor that may explain Saudi Arabia's cautious and generally pro-
Western stance has been her dependence on Western goods and
technology, which she sorely needs for her industrialization and
modernization efforts.126
‖
Saudi Arabia's perception of national interest would seldom
collide with the need to preserve solidarity with her exporting allies. At
the height of the oil shocks in the 1970s, it was Saudi Arabia that
counseled a moderation in price increases. "This kingdom had repeatedly
wanted to keep the oil price down out of a sincere concern for recessions
125
Vo Xuan Han (associate professor of Economics at Winthrop University,
Rock Hill, South Carolina) , Oil, the Persian Gulf States, and the United States, Praeger
Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, London, 1994. P. 113. 126
Idem.
86
in the global economy, particularly the advanced market economies",
writes Vo Xuan Han127
. During the OPEC price negotiations in 1976-77
and 1979, ―it was Saudi Arabia that had fought the other powerful
militant members, such as Iran, to keep the crude price from rising as fast
as they had wished. At this time, the kingdom's position was strong and
secure enough to force compromises. There was also evidence that Saudi
Arabia had acted out of political consideration to please President Carter
during 1976-77 when she resisted the pressure to increase oil prices from
other OPEC members. In 1981 , near the peak of OPEC crude price
hikes, by maintaining a high rate of production, Saudi Arabia was able to
put a halt - albeit a short- lived one- to the price escalation that had
started in 1979. Once again , in 1988 when the oil glut drove the price
down and oil exporters wanted to control production to keep the price
around $ 18 per barrel, the Saudis were accused of secretly trying to
undercut the producers' efforts and keep the price around $ 15 per barrel
by such scheme as giving discount to buyers. Differences between Saudi
Arabia and the OPEC members led to the most bitter confrontation at the
April conference‖.128
The same author notes that Saudi Arabia's foreign
policy toward the United States ―reflects a strong desire to push her own
interests as far as she can without having to break away from her historic,
mutually beneficial relations with the United States and other industrial
powers‖129
. Saudi's special ties to the United States , historically based on
investment security (for the oil firms), has evolved through times to
deeper levels ranging from oil to military security on the one hand and
economic and technical cooperation, on the other. On balance, ―Saudi
Arabia's oil policy has made her an invaluable ally of the industrial
powers. The kingdom's moderating influence has prevented the global oil
industry from becoming an oligopoly dominated by one firm."130
Yet, when 9/11 broke out, it was as if years and years of this
partnership vanished off the records and were almost erased from men‘s
memory, letting the way open to paranoid suspicion and mutual
accusations.
127
Vo Xuan Han. Op. Cit. P. 114. 128
Idem. 129
Idem. 130
Idem.
87
Terror Funds
According to press reports in mid-August 2002, families of more
than 600 victims of the September 11 attacks have filed a suit in the U.S.
District Court of Alexandria,Virginia against three members of the Saudi
royal family, seven banks, and eight charitable organizations. The
lawsuit, which also named Osama bin Laden, members of his family, and
the government of the Sudan, sought approximately $1 trillion in
damages from these individuals or organizations for allegedly helping
finance the Al Qaeda network.
According to excerpts reported in the press, the lawsuit states that
―the financial resources and support network of these defendants —
charities, banks and individual financiers—are what allowed the attacks
of September 11, 2001 to occur.‖ Saudi media and business spokesmen
have described the suit as an attempt to extort Saudi money deposited in
the United States and exert political pressures on Saudi Arabia; some
have called for withdrawing Saudi investments in the United States,
estimated by one media source at $750 billion and another at between
$400 and $600 billion. A London Financial Times article on August 21,
2002, quoted estimates that Saudi investors have withdrawn between
$100 billion and $200 billion from the United States in recent months,
but other sources quoted in the article expressed skepticism that a mass
exodus of Saudi money is under way 131
.
Since the outset, the question about the funds that helped opening
the way to the terrorists has been raised, and it was not so much because
the American intelligence ignored that al Qaeda has built a little financial
empire, but because assumably the CIA and other intelligence agencies
could not ignore it. Unfortunately, the reality did not match the
assumption : 9/11 has not been feasible only because of a severe gap in
the security measures and a grave failure in intelligence gathering and
analysis, but it was also a great lack of curiosity in all what concerns the
financial data of the terrorists. The fact that Usama bin Laden is a
millionaire is well known and almost pointless. Yet, the questions that
should have mattered since a long time for the intelligence and security
apparatus in any concerned country were about : what did he do of his
131
Alfred B. Prados, Saudi Arabia, Current Issues and U.S.Relations, August 4,
2003, CRS Issue Brief For Congress.
88
money? Where did he invest it? How did a man retaining and training
and entertaining thousands of militia-men and jihadists could do that
without the existence of a financial system and some accounts and
records? Even an ordinary family cannot afford to ignore budget and
accounts , so what about an organization like al Qaeda? Where did
money come from and where does it go? It is amazing that these
questions become crucial only after 9/11, although the previous
operations of Al Qaeda should have raised them.
In this context, we point out to the unconvincing opinion of the
Saudi dissident Saad al Fagih about the nature of al Qaeda and its
finances. In an interview with PBS Front Line132
, Al Fagih tried to reduce
the size and the importance of both Al Qaeda organizational structure and
finances, suggesting that it does not require a lot of money to planify and
execute terrorist operations. This is quite unlikely in our view, at least
because of all the international financial and human network necessarily
mobilized to sustain al Qaeda‘s activities. One must be very simple-
minded to believe that all those people (thousands) would survive only
thanks to prayers and fresh water. However, for Al Fagih, the reports on
Bin Laden assets are not serious. He told PBS : ―I read a few reports on
the American press about bin Laden's financial assets and the way
Americans are trying to ... trace them ... using satellites and Internet. It
made me laugh a lot. Because I know there is none of that. Bin Laden
does not use banks I was told. But bin Laden, in his personal capacity, is
supposed to be bankrupt now. He had three massive setbacks in his
financial story. ... First there was the freezing of all his assets ... around
250, 300 million dollars. It's inside Saudi Arabia and it is part of his share
in the company. It is under the microscope of the Saudi regime. It can't
go here or there. ... And then he had a big loss in Sudan. Because he
volunteered to do one of two projects [for] the Sudanese. The big road--
they call it the challenge road. And he spent something like 250 or 300
million dollars on that project. Assuming that the Sudanese would pay
him at one time, but they ... paid him hardly 10 or 20 million. So in
132
Interview with Dr. Saad al Fagih, Front Line , PBS, 2001. This question of
funding terror has been analyzed by numerous and varied observers. See for example :
Roland Jacquard, Au nom d‘Oussama Ben Laden, Editions Jean Picollec, Paris, 2001.
This author thinks that the Islamists have since the beginning relied on several sources
of funds instead of only one. Thus, even if we assume with Al Fagih that Bin Laden is
broke, this is not by any means the proof that the funds reserved for terror activities
have completely dried out. See particularly the chapter XIII, les milliards des réseaux
Ben Laden, in Jacquard‘s book.
89
practicality, he lost all this money. And then came the last, the set back.
When this man [Sidi Tayyib] defected to the Saudi regime. And he knew
quite a bit about his remaining small companies here and there. And he
told the Saudis about them. Now he knew that his man would defect. So
he prepared himself by selling those companies with significant loss
before the defection of [Sidi Tayyib] ...‖ And most interestingly, when
asked ―why does he survive now?‖, Al Fagih says ―Well, he survives for
two reasons. Number one, there is some other source, other than his own
money, ... his indirect family support and rich Muslims supporting him to
back up jihad. And the other reason that he survives is that neither he nor
his followers need money. They are living a very, very simple life. And
for their operations, they don't need a lot of money. You can buy a
[rocket propelled grenade] in Yemen for cheaper than foreign audio tape
recorders. You can buy TNT in Somalia cheaper than sugar. So
explosives are not that expensive and the [people] have already been
trained. And the logistics needed are very little. And people are
volunteers. They are not paid. They are not mercenaries. So the cost of a
big operation like bombing Riyadh or bombing Khobar could come to a
few thousand dollars. Very easily.‖133
So, they are volunteers and are not paid! Then, how do they live?
We are talking about thousands of people, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
other regions. They have weapons because they are cheap! How do they
eat? Where do they live? What about their families? If there were no
funds backing them, would they really carry on fighting for so many
years? Even with the best good will in the world, with the deepest belief,
a man still behaves as a man: he needs to eat, to shelter himself and to
grant his own safety and survival (not to talk of his family if he is
married). How does bin Laden and al Fagih or anyone else propose to
make those thousands of jihadists survive if they have no money? What
about the Palestinian fighters who have preceded them on this field?
Does anybody think that those fierce patriots are not paid? This is indeed
easier to check out today with the Palestinian Authority. Yet, we do
know that the Fidayeens have always been paid by the PLO. This is a
fact. Therefore, to pretend that al Qaeda jihadists are not paid, is either a
naïve pretension or a misinformation.
Already in 1998, some American observers were speculating
about whether Bin Laden‘s personal fortune were funding his network
and comparing it to other sources of funds, but without detailed data,
133
Idem.
90
though. Katzman writes in this context : ―Bin Ladin's personal wealth
gives him options that other terrorist organizations lack. Not only can he
buy protection from state hosts but he can maintain a thriving network
without need of state assistance. In contrast, such groups as the Abu
Nidal Organization, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine became inactive when state sponsors cut
their funding in the second half of the 1980s. Hezbollah maintains its
operations against Israeli forces in south Lebanon because it gets Iranian
aid, estimated at $80 million to $100 million per year; without this,
Hezbollah would likely not be able to raise enough money to sustain
those operations‖134
.
The same Katzman adds : ―Bin Ladin's wealth, in contrast,
appears sufficient to sustain his approximately three thousand fighters
spread out in east and north Africa, the Middle East, former Yugoslavia,
and parts of east and central Asia. His wealth also enables him to become
patron of Egypt's Islamist organizations, Islamic Group and Al-Jihad.
These groups had looked to Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman for leadership
but with him in jail in a medical facility in Missouri for plotting to
destroy New York landmarks, his residual network has had to turn
elsewhere for support, and bin Laden has filled the gap‖.
If such was the case, how come that neither the US government
nor its allies took measures in order to cut the terrorists from their source
of funds until the aftermath of 9/11?
Maybe the first answer of which one can think is that the
Americans were then focusing on several groups believed to have ties
with terrorism, and we should not omit also the fact that state-funded
terrorism was linked – directly – to the ―Rogue States‖ in the political
and strategic paradigm prevailing prior to 9/11. At that time, « Middle
Eastern terrorism »135
was divided into three categories : ―(1) State
terrorism, in which a government relies on its own agents or national
apparatus to conduct acts of terrorism; no organized terrorist groups are
involved, though foreign nationals might be subcontracted under certain
circumstances. (2) State-assisted terrorism, in which organized terrorist
groups receiving material assistance and possibly direction from
134
Kenneth Katzman, counter-terrorism policy, American successes, The Middle
East Quarterly, December 1998, Vol: V, n° 4. 135
Let us notice by the way that there is no agreement on a strict definition of
terrorism between the USA and the Arab and Muslim States. Despite the international
anti-terrorist campaign led by President Bush, with the declared support of the Arab
States, such an agreement about who is meant by the term « terrorist » is still lacking.
91
governments, carry out the acts of violence. (3) Independent terrorism, in
which the terrorist groups receive minimal or no assistance and virtually
no direction from national governments‖136
.
There was also a lot of attention focusing on Libya, Syria, Iraq, -
which were considered to be the ―traditional patrons‖ of terrorism- and
particularly on Iran as a supporter and a fund backer for islamist
activism, either in Lebanon – through Hezbollah – or outside it, for
example in Sudan. Although this latter country is mainly Sunnite, some
reports viewed it as possibly slipping toward the Iranian sphere of
influence since the beginning of the nineties137
. Nobody ever wondered,
as far as we know, for instance whether this has anything to do with Bin
Laden‘s choice of Sudan as a refuge for his close people, his funds and
himself, as a manner to counterbalance the increasing Iranian influence.
The West was then focusing on the Iranian connections and almost
forgetting that the greatest part of the radicalism islamist is Sunnite and
since centuries in rivalry with Shiism. The Economist for example wrote:
―From Iran, Mr. Turabi will admit only to getting oil and army vehicles,
though diplomats testify to three guerrilla training camps run by Iran in
the east of Sudan.‖138
Americo-American controversy
This situation has apparently raised an argument inside the USA.
In a memo published on the site of the PNAC, Gary Schmitt wrote :
―This past Sunday, pundit Fareed Zakaria alleged that the Project for the
New American Century (PNAC), which he characterized as "Bill
Kristol's advocacy group," paid no attention to Al Qaeda in the 1990s.
136
Katzman. Counter-terrrorism…Op.Cit. 137
The most common claim has been that Iran enabled Sudan to make massive
arms purchases, either directly from Tehran or through China, by giving Sudan
economic assistance. Interestingly, while Sudanese opposition groups and Southern
Sudanese looked at this support as funds to escalate the war in the South – a domestic
issue – international media have focused on Sudan as a fertile soil for terrorism and a
new ―beachhead for Islamic radicalism‖ – an international issue. A second serious claim
was that Iran sent Revolutionary Guards to Sudan. The Pro-Israeli Anti-Defamation
League (ADL) wrote in 1998 that ―hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards are sent
to terrorist training camps in Sudan to train in the subversion of moderate Arab
regimes.‖ Even more radical claims came from Sudanese opposition groups and
Egyptian disinformation, which asserted that 18,000 Iranian fighters have been based in
Sudan, fighting against the SPLA in the south. 138
The Economist, ―Sudan: An Evangelist at Home,‖ London. Apr. 18, 1992.
92
Similarly, Zakaria wrote last month in the New York Times, "One
searches vainly through the archives of the Project for the New American
Century, the main neoconservative advocacy group, for a single report on
Al Qaeda or a letter urging action against it before 9/11."
Then Schmitt started answering Zakaria : ―In fact, the directors
and fellows of the Project published several articles on the subject of the
war on terrorism and Al Qaeda prior to September 11. In September
1998, after the embassy bombings, William Kristol and Robert Kagan
wrote an editorial in the Weekly Standard in which they expressed
concern that the Clinton administration's cruise missile strikes in
Afghanistan and Sudan had not "made a dent in the terrorist networks"
and questioned whether the Clinton administration "really has the
stomach for such a war."
In an essay in the book Present Dangers, edited by Kristol and
Kagan and published in September 2000-a month before the bombing of
the U.S.S. Cole, Project Senior Fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht discussed the
necessity of taking action to "check the lethality, if not the growth, of
Taliban/bin Laden-style Islamic radicalism."139
Yet, even if there was some analysis of Al Qaeda activities in the
pre-September 11 period, it has not acquired the depth and the abundance
of details that characterized the papers following the event. Anyway, for
what concerned the financial part of the analysis , it would not be
inaccurate to say it was void, and on this level Zakaria was probably
right. We have thus to acknowledge that there was a ―diffused attention‖:
the Clinton administration for example was still hoping until its last days
to make a deal in the Middle East between Palestinians and Israelis. The
Iraqi situation – on the humanitarian level – was disastrous. And with
that, there were the ―traditional‖ – say – challenges (or Bêtes noires) of
the USA : the ―rogue states‖, and the loose network of terrorist groups
not necessarily thought to be a part of Al Qaeda, about which there was
much talk in the media (Abu Sayyaf for example, or the Algerian GIA).
The result of that ―diffused‖ attention is that Al Qaeda was not yet
occupying the first position in the terrorist ranking140
. The second result
is that its sources of funds were still let in the ―darkness‖.
139
Gary Schmitt, Memorandum To: Opinion Leaders, Addressing Terrorism
before 9/11, March 25, 2004, http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense-
20040325.htm 140
The U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations as of October 8, 1999: Abu
Nidal Organization (ANO), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Armed Islamic Group (GIA),
Aum Shinriykyo, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), HAMAS (Islamic Resistance
93
Occult international financial network
What we know today is that al Qaeda reportedly has been
exploiting for years the free market and the freedoms of the democratic
countries and the right to the banking secrecy and even the good will of
charitable people unaware of what would become of their donations, and
nobody seemed really to care about this occult self-financing system until
9/11.
To operate effectively though, transnational terrorists and
criminals need ready access to money and the ability to maneuver it
quickly and secretly across borders. On a large scale, such money
maneuvers can ripple across entire regions, embroiling global markets
and threatening vital American economic interests as well as
destabilizing other countries politically. The ability to move vast
quantities of wealth rapidly and anonymously across the globe—
sometimes combining modern-day wire transfers, faxes, and Internet
connections with centuries old practices, such as the hawala, of personal
connections and a handshake—gives terrorist and criminal networks a
strategic advantage over many states. Yet it also might be their
vulnerability.
In September 2001, President George W. Bush listed 27 terrorist
organizations and individuals whose assets were to be blocked in
American financial institutions. Since then, more than 202 entities and
individuals have been identified for punitive financial action worldwide.
The principals behind the Al Qaeda financing network reportedly are Al
Barakaat and Al Taqwa/Nada Management Group. Al Barakaat is a
Somali-based international financial conglomerate with operations in
over 40 countries, including the United States. The organization‘s
Movement), Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), Hezbollah (Party of God), Gama'a al-
Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG), Japanese Red Army (JRA), al-Jihad, Kach, Kahane
Chai, Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE),
Mujahedine Khalq Organization (MEK, MKO, NCR, and many others), National
Liberation Army (ELN), Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ), Palestine
Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
(PFLP-GC), al-Qa'ida, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November), Revolutionary People's
Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C), Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), Shining
Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL), Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).
94
founder, Sheikh Ahmed Nur Jimale, reportedly is closely linked to
Usama bin Laden and has used Al Taqwa/Nada Group to facilitate the
financing and operations of Al Qaeda and other Islamist organizations.
Before its U.S. operations were closed down, Al Barakaat reportedly
wired at least $500 million in annual worldwide profits to the company‘s
central money-exchange office in the United Arab Emirates. Al Qaeda
allegedly received a flat 5 percent cut of that money, amounting to
approximately $25 million a year.
The events of September 11 pushed money laundering and the
financing of terrorism to the forefront of domestic and foreign policy
concerns in the USA. As a paper of the Strategic Forum reports 141
,
« since September 11, $34 million in terrorist assets, including $27
million belonging to Al Qaeda and bin Laden, have been frozen in the
United States. A total of 161 nations have blocked the assets of known
terrorist organizations, amounting to another $70 million. Action also is
being taken to disrupt severely the misuse of the hawala system and
other underground remittance systems used by bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and
other terrorist organizations » 142
.
Not surprisingly, Usama bin Laden excels at amassing and
distributing large sums of money to support his terrorist schemes. His
main sources for financial support include his personal wealth, estimated
between $280 million and $300 million, funds siphoned from overt
Muslim charities, and wealthy well-wishers, especially in the Gulf States.
Allegedly, a wide variety of international banks in the Gulf are used to
manipulate and move funds using business front organizations owned by
bin Laden. Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden‘s brother-in-law, was
reportedly responsible for managing parts of the financial network that
deal with major investments in Malaysia, Mauritius, the Philippines, and
Singapore. Bin Laden has- according to some reports- funded a number
of network cell operating expenses, including accommodations, safe
houses, cars, and payments to operatives for the recruitment of new
141
Kimberley L.Thachuk, Terrorism‘s Financial Lifeline : can it be severed?
Strategic Forum, n° 191, May 2002. 142
Idem. Once again, we must remind the reader of the important controversy
between the Arab and Muslim States and the USA and Europe about the definition of
terrorism, as many of the former states hold some organisations as ―national resistance‖
against occupying forces, which is not the position of the USA. Moreover, some Arab
regimes consider their own Islamist opposition as ―terrorist‖ even if it is a moderate
movement, whereas they may consider goups fighting in Iraq against the new system as
―resistance‖.
95
members. His contributions have further purchased explosives and key
components for explosive devices.
At least $5,000 is known to have been transferred from bin Laden
holdings to operatives in Yemen to fund the attack against the U.S.S.
Cole in 2000. The investment for bin Laden to mount the September 11
attacks is estimated to have been approximately $500,000, while the total
costs to the United States for cleanup, property losses, and Federal
Government bailouts will exceed $135 billion.143
The file against Saudi Arabia
In the summer of 2002, there were rumors in the American media
about a briefing given by an analyst from the Rand Corporation on June
10, 2002, to the Defense Policy Board, a high-level advisory group that
advises the U.S. Defense Department on defense policy. According to the
rumor, the briefer asserted among other things that ―Saudi Arabia
supports our enemies and attacks our allies‖ and that ―the Saudis are
active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers.‖
Commenting the rumor, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told
reporters on August 6 that the briefing represented the analyst‘s own
opinion and went on to say: ―It did not represent the views of the
government, it didn‘t represent the views of the Defense Policy Board.‖
State Department spokesman Phil Reeker told reporters that these
opinions ―do not reflect the views of the President of the United States or
of the U.S. Government.‖ He added that Secretary of State Powell made
that clear in a telephone call to Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal.
In November 2002, newsmedia reported that Princess Haifa, the
wife of Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar bin Sultan,
had provided funds— approximately $100,000 according to one article—
over a four-year period to a Jordanian woman (married to a Saudi citizen)
who was in need of medical treatment. The recipient, in September 11
hijackers. On November 23 and 24, a senior policy advisor to Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah (the country‘s de facto ruler) said there is no
evidence that Saudi Arabia provided money to the hijackers and that his
government is determined to uncover all the facts; a Saudi Embassy
officials said the Saudi investigation will probably be widened to
scrutinize all gifts provided by the Embassy. Ambassador Bander told the
143
Idem.
96
New York Times on November 26 that Saudi Arabia is a partner with the
United States in its anti-terrorism campaign, while his wife expressed
outrage that donations to the needy were being linked to terrorism.
There is actually much to say about these reports alleging links
between the Saudi authorities and the terrorists, for they emanated from
several and varied people inside the USA and outside it. The Israelis
were not in the rear for that kind of work. On the contrary, they
contributed to the effort of ―unveiling‖ the so-called Saudi conspiracy at
a degree unequaled. It goes without saying that they have never been
satisfied with the ―special partnership‖ between the USA and the Saudi
Kingdom, out of jealousy. Moreover, if that is not because the words of
King Abdelaziz during the famous meeting with Roosevelt about the
Israelis are still ringing at their ears as the proof of the ―Arab hate‖, then
it is because they are convinced that behind ―Hamas‖ there is Saudi
Arabia and nobody else.144
Thus the long series of Saudi funding terrorism went on, with
however a noticeable ―shift‖ in the visions and the alliances : it was no
longer the American left-wing and liberal writers who attacked Saudi
Arabia for everything, from its intolerance toward other religions on its
soil to its puritanical conservatism and its victimization of the women, as
they used to do prior to 9/11. The new thing was that neo-conservative
Americans have been since that date leading the ―orchestra‖, which was
labeled in Saudi Arabia ―campaign against Islam‖.
As the official 9/11 Commission report acknowledges, though
"origins of the funds remains unknown". So there is a lot of speculation
about the matter. The report says that in fact , "Bin laden and his aides
did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America.
The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and
$500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Consistent with the
importance of the project, al Qaeda funded the plotters. Khaled al Sheikh
144
See about this topic : The testimony of Matthew A. Levitt, before the US
subcommittee on international trade and finance , committee on banking, housing and
urban affairs, August 1, 2002, which we can read on the Washington Institute site :
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/levitt/levitt080102.htm ; and the testimony of
Dore Gold before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on July 31, 2003,
which also we can read on this URL :
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/saudi/saudi_dgb.htm .
97
Mohammad provided his operatives with nearly all the money they
needed to travel to the United States, train, and live. The plotters‘
tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They
moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating
the detection mechanisms in place at the time.145
"
According to the same report, it does not appear that any
government other than the Taliban financially supported al Qaeda before
9/11, although some governments may have contained al Qaeda
sympathizers who turned a blind eye to al Qaeda‘s fund-raising activities.
Moreover, the report adds that ―Saudi Arabia has long been considered
the primary source of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence
that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials
individually funded the organization.‖ This conclusion does not exclude
the likelihood that charities with significant Saudi government
sponsorship diverted funds to people linked to al Qaeda, without being
aware of those ties. Still, al Qaeda reportedly found fertile fund-raising
ground in Saudi Arabia, where extreme religious views are common and
charitable giving was both essential to the culture and subject to very
limited oversight, as it sought money from wealthy donors in other Gulf
states, which, in our eyes, does not imply that all those donors were
always aware that they were actually funding international terrorism.
Actually, the money of Zakat is not accounted for in any Arab or
Muslim state. If religious authorities are allowed to charge the sum
people have to give as Zakat at each Eid, they do not interfere with who
would acquire it ; neither do the government. Thus, people are free to
give money to whoever they deem deserving it. The Westerners who do
not know a lot about the system of Zakat are thus induced to think that
the fund-backers and all those who support charities and individuals
always know how the money would be dealt with. Nothing is more
inaccurate.
However, the report adds : "to date, the U.S. government has not
been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks.
Ultimately the question is of little practical significance. Al Qaeda had
many avenues of funding. If a particular funding source had dried up, al
Qaeda could have easily tapped a different source or diverted funds from
145
See 9/11 Commission Report.
http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
98
another project to fund an operation that cost $400,000–$500,000 over
nearly two years."
Is bin Laden as wealthy as he is said to be?
The authors of 9/11 Commission report think that Bin Laden did
not fund al Qaeda from his personal fortune . It seems that the
organization relied primarily on a fund-raising network developed over
time. Thus, the CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million
per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was
raised almost entirely through donations. For many years, the United
States thought Bin Laden financed al Qaeda‘s expenses through a vast
personal inheritance. Bin Laden purportedly inherited approximately
$300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access
to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to
secure his leadership position in al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S.
government discovered a different reality: roughly from 1970 through
1994, Bin Laden received about $1 million per year—a significant sum,
to be sure, but not a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund
jihad. Then, as part of a Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s,
the Bin Laden family was forced to find a buyer for Usama‘s share of the
family company in 1994.The Saudi government subsequently froze the
proceeds of the sale. This action had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of
what otherwise might indeed have been a large fortune. Nor were Bin
Ladin‘s assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda. When Bin
Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of
businesses and other assets. These could not have provided significant
income, as most were small or not economically viable. When Bin Laden
left in 1996, it appears that the Sudanese government expropriated all his
assets: he left Sudan with practically nothing. When Bin Laden arrived in
Afghanistan, he relied on the Taliban until he was able to reinvigorate his
fund-raising efforts by drawing on ties to wealthy Saudi individuals that
he had established during the Afghan war in the 1980s. Al Qaeda appears
to have relied on a core group of financial facilitators who raised money
from a variety of donors and other fund-raisers, primarily in the Gulf
countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia. Some individual donors surely
knew, and others did not, the ultimate destination of their donations. Al
Qaeda and its friends took advantage of Islam‘s strong calls for charitable
giving, zakat. These financial facilitators also appeared to rely heavily on
certain imams who were willing to divert zakat donations to al Qaeda‘s
99
cause. Al Qaeda also collected money from employees of corrupt
charities. It took two approaches to using charities for fund-raising. One
was to rely on al Qaeda sympathizers in specific foreign branch offices of
large, international charities—particularly those with lax external
oversight and ineffective internal controls, such as the Saudi-based al
Haramain Islamic Foundation. Smaller charities in various parts of the
globe were funded by these large Gulf charities and had employees who
would siphon the money to al Qaeda. In addition, entire charities, such as
the al Wafa organization, may have reportedly participated in funneling
money to al Qaeda. In those cases, al Qaeda operatives controlled the
entire organization, including access to bank accounts. Charities were a
source of money and also provided significant cover, which enabled
operatives to travel undetected under the guise of working for a
humanitarian organization.146
While we emphasize that these official views about Muslim
charities have at last prevailed, forbidding some of them sometimes
without sound evidence, we should recall that if infiltrating some big
intelligence institutions was not that hard for many spies and double
agents, with all the « professionally granted » security they are endowed
with, then what about Charities and little associations ? It is obvious that
146
The 9-11 Commission Report : Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Edition. We have to
remind the reader also of the controversy over that report. On July 29, 2003, Saudi
Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal called on the Bush Administration to release a
classified section of the joint congressional report covering intelligence community
actions before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The classified
section reportedly described alleged Saudi links with persons involved in the attacks
and indicated that senior Saudi officials channeled charitable gifts to individuals that
may have helped fund the attacks. Prince Saud and other Saudi officials denied the
allegations and asked that the classified section be released to enable the Saudi
government to rebut the allegations. The Bush Administration refused on the grounds
that disclosure could reveal U.S. intelligence sources and methods and might
compromise the ongoing investigation of the 9/11 attacks. Members of Congress also
requested release of the classified section, some of them expressing concern that the
Bush Administration was trying to avoid publication of information that might
embarrass Saudi Arabia. One Member called for replacement of the Saudi Minister of
the Interior for failing to stop the flow of money to terrorist groups. At a hearing on July
31, two other Members asked the U.S. Treasury Department to provide a list of Saudi
organizations investigated by the Treasury Department but not publicly named as
terrorist entities.
100
the latter are an easy target for any party willing to divert them from their
initial course.
Arabs and Muslims charge Saudi Arabia
Reaching this point, let us honestly acknowledge that the Western
observers are not alone in charging Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States of
the responsibility of funding the islamist nebulae. We are certainly not
hinting to the Israelis,- it is a different matter, - but merely to Arab and
Muslim observers , whereas some of them enjoy a certain renown in the
Arab media. Let us take for example, the journalist Riad Najib El-Rayyes
(founder of Al Rayyes Books). He writes : ― The oil regimes in the Arab
peninsula, thought that in order to protect their wealth and stability, it
would be well advised to declare the allegiance of oil to Islam. Thus, they
began since the seventies to fund all the islamist, salafist-fundamentalist
movements, no matter their own commitments and loyalties in any
country where such groups require their assistance‖147
. Another writer –
a Saudi – did not hesitate after the murder of Saudi prince Talal Bin
Abdulaziz Al Rasheed, by islamists in Algeria, to say : ―Those who
killed him are those who want the word silenced (…)We have bred
monsters. We alone are responsible for it. I have written as much before
my personal tragedy and will continue to do so for as long as it takes. We
are the problem and not America or the penguins of the North Pole or
those who live in caves in Afghanistan. We are it, and those who cannot
see this are the ones to blame. Castrated as we are, we look to America.
Why? Because they went into Iraq and made a difference.‖148
However, while this study is not exactly about the Arab reactions
as to the issue linking terrorism and Saudi Arabia, we may still add other
significative examples, to show that not all of those who blamed the
policy of Saudi Arabia are Westerners or Israelis, but possibly people
angry with Saudi Arabia, if not Saudi citizens. The following is a citation
from a story published on the Egyptian magazine Ruz al Youssef , by
the deputy-editor. W. Al Abrashi says : ―I can state with certainty that
after a very careful reading of all the documents and texts of the official
147
Riad Najib El-Rayyes, Assailant and Victim , Islam and Arabism, (in Arabic)
published in July 2000, by Riad El-Rayyes Books, Beirut, Lebanon. P. 66. 148
Dr. Muhammad Talal Al-Rasheed, Senseless Violence, Senseless Death, The
Saudi Gazette, November 30, 2003.
101
investigations linked to all acts of terror that have taken place in Egypt,
from the assassination of the late president Anwar Sadate in October
1981, up to the Luxor massacre in 1997, Saudi Arabia was the main
station through which most of the Egyptian extremists passed, and
emerged bearing with them terrorist thought regarding Takfir – thought
that they drew from the sheikhs of Wahhabism. They also bore with them
funds they received from the Saudi charities. Apparently, we had to wait
all these years and the September 11 explosions had to happen, and many
other explosions that harmed Saudi Arabia's stability, for the Saudi
authorities to understand the two dangers: 'The danger of Wahhabi Takfir
Fatwas [and] the danger of charities, most of whose money ultimately
flows to the treasuries of extremists‖. 149
Now on the one hand, it is true that if all what has been said about
that issue cannot be entirely inaccurate, some of it goes beyond real
objectivity and turns out to be over-exploitation of a tragedy for political
interests.150
Speaking honestly, we did not see these documents upon
which M. Al Abrashi was building his argument, nor did he care to show
them to his readers. Secondly, we have to say that there is no such a
Takfir fatwa issued by the Wahhabi establisment, as far as we know,
although we must acknowledge that some fatwas have been issued by
Wahhabi opponents and dissidents or those called ―Sahwa Sheikhs‖.
On the other hand, as we have already hinted, this issue cannot
summarize the economic relationship between the two countries , despite
the extreme gravity of 9/11. It would be fair to recognize that both
parties share responsibility for failing to foresee and interpret accurately
the consequences of such common politics , like funding the jihadists and
many Islamism groups since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
We think that the responsibilty has to be shared, because as
several scholars and observers noticed, « The Islamic jihad was
supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia with a significant part
149
Wael Al-Abrashi, Roz Al-Yousef (Egypt), May 31, 2003. 150
Particularly aggressive on this side was Daniel Pipes with stories like ―Make
the Saudis pay for terror‖ (New York Post, April 15, 2002), wherein he holds ― the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia‘s massive implication in the death of 3000 Americans on
9/11‖ deserving judiciary suing : some kind of Lockerby affair, where King Fahd would
have ordered the massacre ! Which is not serious coming from a scholar. Anyway,
Pipes seems almost unable to control his anger against the Saudis. This is quite obvious
in other stories he published on the same subject. To read more about this case, see The
Middle East Forum. http://www.meforum.org
102
of the funding generated from the Golden Crescent drug trade »151
. Thus,
in March 1985, President Reagan signed « National Security Decision
Directive 166 », which authorized stepped-up covert military aid to the
Mujahideen, and it made clear that the secret Afghan war had a new goal:
« to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action and
encourage a soviet withdrawal. The new covert US assistance began with
a dramatic increase in arms supplies – a steady rise to 65,000 tons
annually by 1987, as well as a ―ceaseless stream‖ of CIA and Pentagon
specialists who traveled to the secret headquarters of Pakistan‘s ISI on
the main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan. There, the CIA specialists met
with Pakistani intelligence officers to help plan operations for the Afghan
rebels »152
. After a quite interesting analysis, Chossudovsky states :
« Jane Defense Weekly confirms (…) that half of Taliban manpower and
equipment originated in Pakistan under the ISI (…) In other words,
backed by Pakistan‘s military intelligence (ISI) which in turn was
controlled by the CIA, the Taliban Islamic State was largely serving
American geopolitical interests (…) No doubt, this explains why
Washington has closed its eyes on the reign of terror imposed by the
Taliban including the blatant derogation of women‘s rights, the closing
down of schools for girls, the dismissal of women employees from
government offices and the enforcement of the {Shari‘a laws of
punishment} »153
.
Is Saudi Arabia worse than other Arab States?
―The Saudi ruling elite is also paying for its repression and links
to Washington, especially when contrasted with its formalistic Muslim
piety‖, says Doug Bandow 154
. Explaining what was happening in these
151
See for example: Michel Chossudovsky, Who is Osama Bin Laden, Centre for
Research on Globalization (CRG), Montréal. 12 September, 2001.
152
Idem. 153
Idem. For more about this same topic, see the excellent book of Ahmed
Rashid, Taliban : Islam, oil and the new great game in Central Asia, I.B. Tauris &Co
LTD, London, 2000. According to this author, even the Israelis tried to have some
contacts with the Taliban. The Mossad started a dialogue with them through their
liaison offices in the USA. And even if Pakistan did not recognize Israel, ISI was
favorable to such contacts, says Rashid. But when the USA changed its position vis à
vis the Taliban, Israel followed up. 154
Befriending Saudi Princes, A high price for a dubious alliance, Policy
Analysis n° 428, March 20, 2002. CATO Institute.
103
last years, he says : ―with 70 percent of government revenues (and 40
percent of gross domestic product) derived from oil sales, the drop in
energy prices since the early 1980s has caused economic pain in Saudi
Arabia ; per capita GDP has dropped from $28,600 in 1981 to less than
$7,000 in 2002. Unemployment is estimated at 15 percent overall and
20 percent for those under 30‖. That has helped generate deep undertones
of unrest, but the discontented feel helpless to promote political change.
Criticism tends to be expressed through religious leaders. Before his
death, Saudi novelist Abdurrahman Munif warned that the ―situation
produces a desperate citizenry, without a sense of dignity or belonging.‖
Neil MacFarquhar of the New York Times notes : ―In another country
Mr. bin Laden might have become an opposition politician rather than a
holy warrior. But Saudi Arabia brooks no dissent.‖
Yet, while focusing on this negative side in Saudi Arabia, some
observers fail to see that it is just a detail in a worse picture. If held
together – with all its details – the picture of the Arab world does not
offer to the observer much hope about freedom and democracy. Maybe
this is going to change, but so far the Arab regimes were not front-
runners for democracy. To be sure, Bin Laden‘s recruits (the army of al
Qaeda, that is) come from all the Arab and Muslim countries, assuming :
1) that none of them could join the democratic opposition, because there
is simply no such a thing as what we call democratic opposition ; 2) that
even if such an opposition exists , the radical islamists being as they are -
prone to violent action – would not join it.
―Senior clerics live well on the government payroll and therefore
lack credibility‖, says Doug Bandow. Yet, he omits to say that such is
still the case in the rest of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia does not hold the
exclusivity of that demeanor155
. Better : Maybe those clerics are allowed
more freedom in Saudi Arabia than their colleagues in other Arab
countries, wherein the sermons of Friday and the Eid prayers are written
down by a bureaucrat in the Ministry of religious affairs and circulated
all over the country for the imams‘ usage. The reason for that is simple :
the ruler must be granted that people in the mosques hear but praises for
his own rule156
.
155
It goes without saying that our argument must not be taken for a justification,
but as it is intended to be : analysis, that is. 156
Oddly enough, in one of the most democratic country (France) the Imams of
the mosques are more and more controlled by the Ministry of Interior. M.Sarkozy
declared recently (July 2005) that the Republic cannot allow Imams to say anything.
104
The Americans do know anyway that the ability of some Muslim
governments to helping the United States win greater understanding for
its policies and objectives ―is limited by their own lack of credibility‖ as
a Blueprint for action asserts 157
. Decades of controlled press reporting,
government-owned broadcasting—which did little beyond televising
footage from government meetings—and extravagant lies have undercut
public trust, the report says.
A « related barrier to trust has been erected by Usama bin Laden
and his spokesmen, who have argued that impious Muslims and infidels
have constructed a vast edifice of lies intended to conceal the true nature
of reality from honest Muslims », says the Blueprint158
. The implicit
claim is that any assertion by the United States or its « Muslim puppets »
is necessarily false. The truth can be inferred as the opposite of whatever
the United States says. As an example, when the United States elected to
support the road map for Israeli-Palestinian peace, bin Laden denounced
it as a sly maneuver that was actually intended to enslave Palestinians.
Similarly, Western intervention on behalf of Muslims in the Balkans has
been dismissed as a ruse to further the denigration of Muslims. Another
impediment to a U.S. partnership with local governments in an effort to
foster dialogue and improve America‘s image lies within these
governments themselves. The Blueprint gives the example of the
Egyptian and Saudi governments, which « do not only permit but
deliberately echo and reinforce anti-American themes in a bid to buttress
their popular legitimacy. This policy, generally defended in a
disingenuous way as respect for free expression, is a key element of their
strategy for clinging to power while avoiding serious reforms »159
. The
conclusion the authors deduce is : ―We therefore need to bear in mind, as
we contemplate ways to enlist these governments in a campaign to
improve Muslim understanding of the United States, that we will in
effect be asking them to undercut their own perceived interests‖160
.
Some French media talked about « Zero Tolerance » as regards « Islamism », which
they hold for an efficient policy if compared with the British « laxity». 157
Defeating the Jihadists, a Blueprint for Action, Century Foundation Press,
11/16/2004, The report's authors are Richard A. Clarke, Glenn P. Aga, Roger W.
Cressey, Stephen E. Flynn, Blake W. Mobley, Eric Rosenbach, Steven Simon, William
F. Wechsler, and Lee S. Wolosky—all experts on various aspects of national security,
intelligence, counterterrorism, military operations. 158
Idem. 159
Idem. 160
Blueprint For Action , op.Cit. The report underlines that whereas state-
sanctioned anti-Americanism thrives in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the state-sponsored
105
Actually, such a behaviour has to be understood within its
context : American policy in the Middle East is not very popular, as
Washington is today aware. Yet, what the blueprint called « disingenious
way » may be the recourse of the weak not the powerful in what concerns
international relations. The Arab regimes – Saudi Arabia and Egypt are
by no means the only cases – represent the weak party, indeed, in front of
a Superpower having its own interests and goals. Understandably, their
governments do not wish to be taken for « puppets ». Anyway, this is
also the case of other nations. Even among Western allies, there is more
and more distancing following criticism and opposition to the American
schemes. Either in France or in Germany, such positions kept the
governments away from the war against Saddam Hussein. In Great
Britain, M.Tony Blair‘s position has been threatened by opponents in his
own party, because of his « unconditional » alliance with M. Bush.
More questions to answer
Rightly, Rachel Bronson observes that ―during the Cold War,
Saudi Arabia‘s religiosity was considered an asset in the struggle against
godless communism. Today, its religious activism poses a significant
threat. Saudi money has supported some of the most anti-American
mosques and schools across the globe‖161
.
There is, however, much more to say about this subject. Let us
mention for example the report of Freedom House in 2005, Saudi
Publications On Hate Ideology Fill American Mosques, with a foreword
by James Woolsey, former Director of CIA(1993-95), and thereafter
Chairman of Freedom House. In his introduction adapted from a
testimony before the House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Woolsey says : ―Until
less than thirty years ago, our relations with the Saudis were generally
smooth. We were on the same side in the cold war, and the Saudis valued
our support (and we theirs) against Soviet influence in the Mideast. Of
course the oil embargo of 1973 created major stress, but the watershed
anti-Americanism of Iran is detached from a population that is effectively pro-
American. One common thread uniting anti-Americanism across the region is that it is
propagated by various powerful interest groups within the countries.
161
Rachel Bronson, Issue Brief, August 2004, Council on Foreign Relations.
106
year was 1979, when Khomeini came to power in Iran and extremists
took over the holiest of Islam‘s shrines, the Mosque in Mecca, which was
under the protection of the Saudi King; it was reclaimed by the Saudis
only after substantial loss of both life and face.‖ That is the year Woolsey
defined as that of the beginning shift in Saudi endeavor. He says : ―The
Saudis chose after the twin shocks of that year to strike a Faustian
bargain with the Wahhabi sect and not only to accommodate their views
about propriety, pious behavior, and Islamic law, but effectively to turn
over education in the Kingdom to them and later to fund the expansion
into Pakistan and elsewhere of their extreme, hostile, anti-modern, and
anti-infidel form of Islam. The other side of the bargain was that if the
Wahhabis would concentrate their attacks on, essentially, the U.S. and
Israel, the Saudi elite would get a more-or-less free ride from the
Wahhabis and the corruption within the Kingdom would be overlooked.‖
This is quite a strange talk coming from a man who was in charge of the
most important intelligence Agency in the USA (CIA), for the inevitable
questions are then : Where was America in that ―Faustian‖ Bargain? Was
Washington being marginalized by this queer shift in Saudi policy? If
such was the case, then how would we explain the tight cooperation that
went on and on years during between the Saudi authorities, the Pakistani
ISI and the CIA over topics of mobilization of the international islamist
network and assistance to the Mujahideens?
Following the consequences implied by Woolsey‘s argument, we
are undubitably confronted to a dilemma of logic : Either Washington
was aware of the shift in Saudi policy and despite this decided to carry on
its tight cooperation with Ryadh. Therefore, there is no excuse for the
American behaviour and no reproach at the Saudi. Or, Washington was
unaware of the Saudi shift , which has been discovered recently (!!!), and
this is even worse. May a Superpower afford to be so naïve? What would
we say if such were really the case with the ex-Soviet Union during the
Cold War, although there is definitely no possible comparison with Saudi
Arabia that has never been perceived as an enemy in the USA?
Yet, aware of the extreme importance of the relationship and the
difficulty of reducing it to the dark dimensions created by a disaster that
nobody could really control, R. Bronson put the focus on the greatest
challenges facing the two countries, such as the growing number of
young, poorly educated, unemployed Saudis. ―According to the United
Nations, 39 % of the population is under the age of 15. In 1980, Saudi
gross domestic product was 15,500 per capita, $ 2,500 more than the
107
comparable US figure. Now it‘s closer to $ 7,500, almost $ 25,000 less
than the US amount. Job creation has not kept pace with the growing
population, and Saudi Arabia‘s education system – which emphasizes
memorization and religious training – is producing graduates ill-equipped
to work in a modern, globalized economy. Debate had begun in Saudi
Arabia before September 11 about how to handle these challenges. Since
then these problems have appeared on Washington‘s radar screen –
because unemployed and disaffected youth seem to provide recruitment
pool for al Qaeda and other extremist groups.‖162
Thereupon, the author
of the paper163
suggested that the following issues were likely to be raised
during the presidential campaign:
« - Should the United States actively promote democracy in Saudi
Arabia and, if so, how?
- Is Saudi Arabia doing enough to clamp down on terrorist
financing?
- Is there anything the United States can do about the large
number of undereducated Saudi youth?
- Would a more rigorous energy conservation policy make
Americans more secure? »164
The questions upon which the 2004 presidential campaign
focused were however more concerned with the Iraqi problem than with
Saudi Arabia. Yet, Bronson‘s questions sound however still attracting the
attention of both American and Saudi leaders and thinkers, beyond the
simple event of the presidential elections in the USA. Their pertinence to
the US-Saudi current state of relations make them of a particular interest
to Republicans and Democrats.
In November 1999, for example, King Fahd himself stated that
"the world is heading for...globalization" and that "it is no longer possible
for [Saudi Arabia] to make slow progress." In the context of successfully
becoming integrated into the global economy, Fahd also emphasized the
importance of regional unity among Gulf states , economically,
politically, and militarily. Along these lines, a customs union among
GCC countries was agreed upon at the December 1999 GCC summit,
which would take effect only in March 2005. Currently, goods from
GCC countries are exempt from all Saudi import duties, as long as 40%
of their value has been added within the GCC and the producing
162
R. Bronson. Op. Cit. 163
Who happens to be a senior fellow and the director of Middle East and Gulf
studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 164
Idem.
108
company is owned at least 51% by GCC citizens. The GCC has also
agreed to impose a common set of Value Added Taxes (VATs) beginning
in 2005.
Yet , the security and economic matters being quite close , some
additional questions remain seeking an answer. According to the
Petroleum Economist, ―The consequences of a disruption to Saudi oil
supplies amid already tight supply and demand conditions would be
devastating for the global economy.‖165
Saudi Arabia takes the security
of its oil very seriously. Although details of the kingdom‘s security
budget are classified, analysts estimate the Saudis spent around $5.5
billion in 2003 and increased security expenditures by 50 percent in
2004. According to a recent assessment in Jane’s Intelligence Review, in
the past two years the Saudi government has allocated an extra $750
million to enhance security at all its facilities.
In the spring of 2004, however, the growing band of jihadists in
Saudi Arabia succeeded in sending shock waves through the global
energy industry without even firing a single shot at any physical oil
infrastructure. A twenty-five-hour rampage of attacks on foreign oil-
workers in Al-Khobar, the heart of Saudi refining operations, topped a
month of increasingly bloody attacks that seemed to mark an
intensification of the militants‘ campaign against Western interests in the
kingdom.
To summarize briefly the current challenges , it is believed that
socioeconomic and political malaise in Saudi Arabia raises concerns over
the internal stability of the regime in the medium term. Some American
observers think that it would be imprudent to place much weight on the
Saudi pillar as long as serious structural and political internal reform
remains off the agenda. Saudi Arabia is said to be the case of a
conservative regime blocking any avenue of domestic dissent except that
which it most fears—radical Islam—and therefore tries to manage. It is
also believed that to build a more stable regional system that will pose
less of a burden to external powers and reverse the growth of extremism,
reform of the region‘s political, economic, social, and—as just noted—
defense structures is essential. Reform also at last seems feasible, now
that some of the Gulf Arab regimes admit that they must permit pluralism
and provide better administration. But precipitate and externally forced
165
Security of Oil Supply; Saudi Oil Comes Under Threat, Petroleum Economist,
July 13, 2004.
109
democratization may lead to short-term destabilization without any
assurance of long-term gains.
―The key-question‖, writes The Middle East Report 166
―is not
whether democracy is compatible with Islam but whether democracy is
compatible with oil‖.
This view is however flawed with a clear prejudice. To the
contrary, we think that under the pressure of the events, the Gulf is
already changing, and that the change may even be more rapid and more
structured than in other Arab countries , particularly in North Africa 167
.
The oil rich countries of the Gulf have not invented Arab
authoritarianism. There are other Arab and Muslim states much more
rude to their own people, which are also deprived of the Gulf sources of
wealth. We do not think that to be deprived of such a wealth gives any
state the privilege of being more democratic or more able to operate the
shift toward democracy. On the contrary, this is a serious handicap : as
we know, none of the Western democratic countries is poor. Is
democracy then the luxury of the rich ? This is a question that deserves to
be further investigated.
The Gulf has an advantage, though : it owns the means to
achieving its own reform, to master its own destiny. Neither Saudi
Arabia nor the other GCC states rely on the foreign assistance for their
own subsistence and survival, as do other Arab countries. Thus, the
change will be embedded within the specific social and political regional
framework , and it may even go beyond any expectation, once started.168
Yet, it has to come from inside.
166
The Democracy Agenda in the Arab World, Middle East Report, n°174,
January-February 1992. 167
Each regime that has instituted elections and similar reforms among those
latter, has been compelled to do so by mass insurrections : Egypt in 1977 and 1986,
Tunisia and Morocco in 1984, Algeria in 1988 , and Jordan in 1989. 168
Just look at the little revolution Qatar achieved in the media vista of the whole
Arab world when it launched Al Jazeerah TV. It is indubitable that Al Jazeerah
changed completely and rapidly the way people in the Arab world look at their own
media.
110
111
Chapter III ________________
Strategic ramifications
Apparently, the US government has decided to bring the changes
it views as « necessary » in the whole Middle East, just after 9/11. The
first objection to this plan is related to its legitimacy: on which grounds
the Americans may claim a right to make changes in foreign countries?
Legitimacy claims are related to power. Two contrasting types of
power are of special interest to us here: power derived from a
constellation of interests that develops on a formally free market, and
power derived from established authority that allocates the right to
command and the duty to obey. The latter is obviously not the case of the
USA in the Arab world, then, what about the former?
That case is exactly what Max Weber proposed to call
―domination‖ (Herrschaft): he used the example of a large central bank
that dominates potential debtors by virtue of its monopolistic position in
the credit market. Though such a bank can impose conditions for the
granting of credit, it does not exercise authority and the debtors submit to
it in their own interest. If the bank controls credit institutions by virtue of
its central position, however, it may attempt currency management or the
control of the business cycle through regulations and special agencies
that approximate the formal authority of government. This example
illustrates that the constellation of interests between a central bank and its
debtors may shade off into an authority relationship between that bank
and the ―member banks‖ of a national banking system. This kind of
domination – to use Weber‘s term – is similar to the system whereby the
USA has been trying to hook its potential clients – among the Arab and
Muslim states – into its own strategy.
Ostensibly, the globalization played the largest part in catching
the candidates to such a game, especially in the aftermath of the Berlin
wall collapse.
112
If domination involves a reciprocal relationship between rulers
and ruled inside a determined country, the same may be said on a broader
scale. On the international scene, - between states, that is - there are no
rulers and ruled, though, but sovereign states. Theoretically, all the UN
members are associates in the same system. However, just a look at the
structure of the International Security Council is enough to persuade us
that there is no equality between the States. Hence, it is right to deduce
that what underlies the relations between the States is more related to the
power balance than to any formal equality. These are precisely
domination bonds.
―Domination‖, notes Reinhard Bendix ―requires an administrative
staff to execute commands, and, conversely, all administration requires
domination in that the power of command over the staff must be vested
in an individual or a group of individuals‖169
. Yet, we are still far from
answering the question about the legitimacy of change.
To make it happen, there must be some kind of identification in
purposes between the local elite to which the political change assumedly
incur, and the eventual international ―advisers‖,- in this case the US
government. The local elite would thus act as if it were carrying out a
project that is profitable for both parties: the foreign adviser and the
natives.
The local elite cannot perform such a task, though, without
legitimating its own domination. A government that has no credibility
inside its own country cannot achieve a profitable reform for its citizens,
and much less for the foreign supporter.
―In Weber‘s view beliefs in the legitimacy of a system of
domination are not merely philosophical matters. They can contribute to
the stability of an authority relationship‖170
. Weber saw only three
principles of legitimation – each related to a corresponding type of
―apparatus‖- that have been used to justify the power of command:
-1- ―Legal domination exists where a system of rules that is
applied judicially and administratively in accordance with ascertainable
principles is valid for all members of the corporate group (…)
-2- Traditional domination is based on the belief in the legitimacy
of an authority that ‗has always existed‘. The persons exercising the
169
Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber, an intellectuel portrait, a Doubleday Anchor
Book, 1962, p 292. 170
R.Bendix, op.Cit, p 294 .
113
power of command generally are masters who enjoy personal authority
by virtue of their inherited status (…)
-3- Charismatic domination (…) the power of command may be
exercised by a leader – whether he is a prophet, hero, or demagogue –
who can prove that he possesses charisma by virtue of magical powers,
revelations, heroism, or other extraordinary gifts‖171
.
At first glance, the message about the necessity of change has
reached its destination at least in two countries, where the local elite
identified its own interests with those of the American government:
Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, we have to remark that in both countries
change did not happen from inside, but was rather imposed after a war.
The Palestinian case is the third corner in the US triangular strategy that
adopted change in the Middle East as one of its goals, as it has been
advocated by some American analysts, in a document titled Wiser Peace,
- issued by the CSIS172
.
However, in the case of Saudi Arabia precisely, there is probably
a problem, and not a little one. First, despite the « discovery » that not
everybody is kindly disposed towards the Americans and the Westerners
in the Saudi kingdom – as everywhere -, since 9/11 and because of it, the
Saudi Royal family is still considered a precious ally and friend of the
USA. Indeed, some people may evoke the case of the Pahlavi and other
―friends and allies» of the USA who, when confronted to the ire of their
own people, were just unable to get any assistance from the USA. That is
why the Saudi Royal family has also an obvious interest in introducing
the necessary reform and allowing more public and individual freedom to
the citizens. Secondly, the Saudi opposition is not all honey and milk:
some of its components are radical Islamists even more puritanical, more
conservative, and more hardliner than any Wahhabi sheikh entrusted with
the official power of the State . This opposition is active inside the
kingdom (in the underground) and outside it. Indeed, it is asking also for
change, but what kind of change? To be sure, it is not the kind that would
get the admiration of the West. The case of Iran since the revolution is
clear enough. Therefore, if the West is well disposed toward social and
171
Idem. 172
See for an analysis of this document our book ―L‘après-Saddam en Irak‖,
l‘Harmattan, Paris, 2005. There are also other documents drawing on the same topics,
like Forging a Durable Post War Settlement in Iraq – Heritage Foundation -, and the
Washington Institute‘s Winning Peace in The Middle East, which we also analyze in the
first chapter of this book (in French).
114
political changes in the arabo-islamic world, it is unlikely that a slip
toward the far-right ultra-conservative Islamism is welcome. What to do
with that opposition? That is the question! Thirdly, When some assume
that the opposition elite may be considered as a key element in any
change intended in the arabo-islamic world, and could be trusted as such,
is this implying only the liberal opposition, or all the sensibilities from
the left-wing to the Islamists, the Panarabists and the rest? The question
is important, because of what we notice concerning some prejudgements,
pre-held positions and ―parti-pris‖ in the West toward such or such
political group or organization. Anyway, it is understood that this is not
an American or a Western problem; the internal struggle would select
those who will lead the change. Hezbollah or Hamas may be considered
terrorist organizations in the USA or Israel. However, in Lebanon, the
former is already represented in the parliament, and the latter will soon
find its way to it in the Palestinian territories173
. The foreign powers can
hardly impose their choice on these issues. If the Americans have had to
choose really who will rule Iraq, would they have chosen the Da‘wa
party or the SCIRI 174
? This is unlikely.
In fact, it seems that the USA policy in the Middle East is
confronted to paradoxical options: on the one hand, as a report of Rand
Corporation confirms 175
, after the devastating September 11, 2001,
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, « the suppression of
terrorism rose to the fore of U.S. concerns in the Middle East. Al Qaeda
and other radical Islamist groups draw heavily on the Arab and Muslim
world for recruits and funding. In addition, much of their violence and
propaganda is directed at destabilizing Middle Eastern regimes that are
friendly to the United States. Thus, the United States must confront risks
on a governmental level, helping its regional partners secure themselves
against terrorist-generated instability, and at a popular level to ensure that
nationals in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, or other states in the
region do not join terrorist groups or provide them with financial or other
assistance »176
. In other terms, in order to fight international terrorism,
173
On Saturday March 12, 2005, Hamas announced that it will participate to the
next legislative elections expected for the summer, although it is still a controversial
issue among its militants. 174
Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq. 175
The Future Security Environment in the Middle East, Rand Corp. 2004. 176
Idem.
115
the US government has to continue the policy M. Bush himself and his
top-officials condemned, acknowledging that sacrificing democracy
while supporting and strengthening authoritative and dicatorial regimes
for the sake of stability, neither brought stability nor peace . On the other
hand, the US government knows that in supporting some Arab or Muslim
authoritarian regimes, the opposition – included the moderate and the
liberal movements – would be swept away, as none of its elements has
hitherto acquired enough strength to stand to the local government and
safely survive.
So, what is exactly the US strategy? How would it cope with the
local demands? Is there necessarily a common ground between US
interests and those of the populations in the countries concerned? These
questions are important insofar as we believe that a democratic country –
and the USA is one - cannot impose on another a non-democratic regime
without losing its own soul in this deal. Such a bargain is like that of
Mephistopheles in Faust. If the USA or any Western democracy has to
make a choice regarding a possible involvement in a local political
conflict in a foreign land, should that involvement be helpful to the side
of democracy or to that of perdurable autocracy? The history of the XXth
century shows that sovereignty is not a guarantee against undemocratic
processes ; nor has the USA always supported democratic rules.
Yet, one cannot deny that the insight of the foreign observer may
be profitable if it is fair and objective. There is a paragraph about the
sociologist Georg Simmel‘s description of the stranger, or outsider, to the
group, we cannot resist quoting: ―The stranger‘s position, said Simmel,
is defined by the fact that he has not belonged to the group from the start,
and that he brings a point of view to it that is foreign. He is both inside
and outside. Therein lies his particular value: his strangeness brings with
it a special objectivity about the group itself. The stranger as
characterized by Simmel (…) is not committed to the unique vision the
group shares (…) thus, while he may understand the gloss of reality that
the shared lens imparts, he is not bound by it. His objectivity is not
simple detachment, but a combination of indifference and involvement,
intimacy and distance. In his objectivity the stranger has a certain
freedom: he has no obligations to the group that might skew his
perception or prejudice his understanding (…) While he may have blind
spots, they are not likely to be those of the group, and so he can see what
the group vision misses‖177
.
177
Daniel Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths, op.Cit.P239.
116
The Gulf or the Peninsula?
In her essay Arabia Incognita, Sheila Carapico178
points out to the
American research agendas so shaped by realpolitik that instead of
thinking in terms of the whole Peninsula, they are more inclined to using
the term Gulf. Carapico holds the view that it is time now to think about
the Arabian Peninsula as a sub-region similar to the Nile valley, the
Maghreb, etc. She describes the region as bounded by the Indian Ocean
and the Red Sea as well as the Gulf, a place that is part island and part
crossroads. Her purpose is to invite scholars to recognize the Peninsula as
a sub-region of the Arab world. But we must notice that this is a part of
her project to go "beyond the oil wells and shopping malls of the Gulf
and the mythic figures of the desert tribesmen to see the whole
Peninsula" and especially, to bridge the gap between "Gulf studies and
Yemeni studies", which may be as legitimate as useful. Yet, it is a
research domain quite different from ours here, as we are just focusing on
the study of a political case, more than that of a region or a sub-region.
Anyway, even if we consider Saudi Arabia as a key-element in the GCC,
we should not omit that the latter is more a politico-economical structure
than a geopolitical entity. Sheila Carapico has a different approach.
However, when she tries to describe the Gulf region in "classical terms",
- so to say, she is of a particular interest to this study. She says for
example "the Gulf is where American interests are", which is quite an
"original" definition of the region. Indeed there is a reason- and a good
one- for that. As she explains, "the Gulf" for the Persian-Arab Gulf can
refer to the larger region including Iran and Iraq, but also often is
shorthand for the Gulf Cooperation States (GCC), a pro-American
military alliance comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain,
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates "The Gulf also refers to what Gause
called the oil monarchies, any logical extension, to the citizen-subjects of
those kingdoms". Within the territory run by the GCC governments, the
Gulf refers specifically to al-Hasa in eastern Arabia, the strip of Persian
Gulf coast where most of the oil is pumped and shipped. Carapico
emphasizes the international characteristic of the new cities, as well as
178
Sheila Carapico, Arabia Incognita: an invitation to Arabia Peninsula Studies.
Robert Schuman Center For Advanced Studies. European University Institute, Working
papers, RSC/2002/12. Mediterranean Program Series.
117
the fact that the Gulf is the center of the CENTCOM, the US central
command: "the zone whose stability the Gulf war of 1991 was fought to
protect and will be preserved presumably at all costs". It is noteworthy
that "in addition to forming a military alliance, the monarchies on the
western edge of the Persian Gulf define themselves as a unique cultural
sub-region within the larger Arab and Islamic context‖179
.
In the Western analysis prevailing about this region, we have to
notice that instability is a recurrent topic. The point is that such views
have nothing to do with the situation that has evolved out of the 9/11
chaos. In fact, it may even appear that the notion of instability itself has
been a key-concept in different approaches trying to understand what are
the prospects of the region. However, we should observe that this is by
no means an exclusivity of this region. Many researchers in social
sciences and international policies do use this concept while analyzing
quite a different range of countries. For example, in South-Eastern Asia
or in Southern America, if not in Africa or the Balkans. Better: One of
the best specialists on these questions, M. Stanley Hoffmann, believes
that instability is actually a characteristic feature of the international
arena, which he sees as part order and part disorder180
. Instability in the
international politics of the Gulf has two aspects: domestic political
instability, which has international political implications, and
international political instability itself. Domestic political instability with
179
Idem. 180
Stanley Hoffmann: World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War
Era, November 1998, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. We live, Hoffmann notes,
"in a world of great originality, complexity, and uncertainty." It remains a world of
sovereign states, but these states are buffeted by forces often beyond their control. The
increasing globalization and privatization of economics both creates international
interdependence and further polarizes the "have" and "have not" nations. Ethnic and
religious conflicts tear at national cohesions, as does the rise of intense nationalist and
separatist aspirations. Older tools of understanding the world no longer suffice. The
"realist" approach that sees only competing, absolutely self-interested states captures
neither the current reality of cooperation, at times, among states nor the weakness of the
state in many instances. The "liberal" approach, which assumed a more peaceful world
would evolve through, among other things, the spread of markets, has ignored the harm
the world market has done. Hoffmann's own approach to international relations is itself
liberal yet - embracing Kant, Rawls, and others - focused on ethical and normative
considerations. Individuals have the right to autonomy and integrity, and states have the
duty to insure this right. While this might seem merely a simplistic adage, Hoffmann
deliberates carefully on what such an ethos means and how it might be applied to
understanding and judging myriad world situations and problems, from immigration to
armed intervention in the affairs of another state.
118
international political implications in turn has two meanings. The first
entails a change of regimes. What is meant is not only change of
government or change of controlling party or leadership. What is meant
is a change in basic form of government, a change in legitimating
principles, such as from democracy to dictatorship, monarchy to republic.
Such domestic political instability has international political implications
because regime changes often herald changes in the foreign policy and
reorientation of international alignments. If the regime change is a radical
one, it often carries a revolutionary fervor and interest in foreign
adventure. That was undoubtedly the case of the Iranian revolution,
which introduced an element of ideological competition in the
international politics of the Gulf that has given rise to the protracted Iraq-
Iran war and the creation of the GCC as a collective security pact. Both
of these activities are unexpected in a normal or "stable" dynamic
balance of power. In addition a number of territorial disputes between
Gulf States have been identified as well as cleavages within the political
communities of the Gulf States and potentially radical regime changes
that have destabilizing implications for the current system.
Lenore G. Martin notes that " a transformation of the Gulf
international system would occur in the event of radical changes to its
structure, which is composed of a number of major actors and a
distribution of their capabilities. These changes would be systemic in the
sense that a radical change in one element, such as a radical redistribution
of capabilities, would also incur a radical change in the other element, the
number of major actors. So, for example, the most likely transformations
from a dynamic balance of power would be to an imperial system, in
which a single major actor possessed predominant capabilities, or to a
bipolar system, in which two major actors possessed superior
capabilities."181
"Such transformations may result from the interactions of the
actors within the system", he emphasizes. "They may also result from
interactions with actors from outside of the system"182
. "One other
serious possibility that should be mentioned is the development or
introduction of nuclear weaponry into the Gulf"183
.
181
Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from within, Lexington
Books, 1984. P.156. 182
Idem. 183
Idem.
119
Democracy and Interests
In the Rand report previously mentioned, it is stated that ―the
United States has a broad, worldwide interest in democracy and human
rights that has implications for U.S. actions in the Middle East. However,
this interest is honored more in the breach than in reality because Israel is
the only democratic state in the region‖. In other terms, the USA stays
more committed to promoting Israeli interests than those of the Arab
regimes. What is not taken in consideration here is the fact that Israel is
still considered as an aggressor, since its government does not abide by
the UN resolutions asking for Israeli withdrawal from the 1967
conquered territories. For the Arabs, the point is: does the Israeli refusal
to enforce the international law make it a Rogue State or not? If it does,
how could such a state be a pillar in the American strategy in the Middle
East? And if it does not, then what is the definition of a Rogue State? In
the political discourse prevailing in the Arab and Muslim countries, it is
repeatedly stated that the American unconditional commitment to Israel
would have negative implications for future and current US actions in
the region.
In fact, for a part of the Arab elite, the point is not about arguing
whether Israel is a democracy or not, but about whether democracy itself
is held by US policymakers as a condition for full access to the same
favors and privileges acquired by Israel: if such is the case, then the USA
deceived the Arab and Muslim governments, which it has supported sixty
years along , for Washington acknowledges none of them as democratic.
Therefore, what the USA is supporting them for, asks this elite?
The argument seems sound, particularly when it is compared
with the Rand report‘s findings : « Saudi Arabia, for example, says the
report , has no free press or free elections, and Saudi women face a
variety of restrictions on their travel, employment, and daily lives. Even
Egypt, which has had a parliament for decades, has bans on organized
political activity and on free speech, and has other basic impediments to
democracy »184
. If these restrictions elicit at most mild criticism from
Washington, the linkage between the most conservative of the Arab
countries (Saudi Arabia) and the most liberal (Egypt) is an interesting
feature., which implies that repression is not an exclusivity of the
184
Rand report. Op.Cit.
120
conservatives. As Jon Alterman notes, ―American officials have tended
to accede to official requests to downplay calls for democratization and
to shun extensive contacts with those working against the ruling
governments.‖185
As a result, even liberal Middle Easterners question
U.S. support for democracy. Murphy and Gause contend that ―there is a
pervasive sense in the Middle East that the United States does not
support democracy in the region, but rather supports what is in its
strategic interest and calls it democratic‖186
.
The latter sentence retains the attention, because if such is the
acknowledgement of an American report issued by an institution like
Rand, then what should be the attitude of the Arab elite? The ―settled
way of thinking‖ the Middle East issues may find it hard to admitting,
but policy making is not just creating illusions and playing with them, as
Charles de Gaule said once. That may be rewarding for a while, until the
growing dissent sweeps away the illusions and their makers, as the great
general himself experienced it in May 1968, and as the USA also learned
in 1979 when the Shah run away from Iran, giving up to the popular
pressure.
This is anyway more and more recognized by American analysts
and commentators. There is even an evolution less expected, because it
concerns ordinary folk in America and elsewhere. ― In the wake of
September 11, the U.S. public may be less tolerant of government
support for authoritarian states in the region‖, says the Rand report187
;
and it goes on adding that a survey conducted in November 2001 found
57 percent of the polled saying that it was ―very important‖ for the
United States to press for more democracy in Saudi Arabia, which is an
enormous increase over the 10 percent who responded similarly in a June
1999 poll.
The report recognizes by the way that concerns over
democratization and human rights often limit U.S. actions and could
affect the type of support it would provide in a crisis. For example, if
unrest in a Gulf state led to mass demonstrations and the government
responded by killing large numbers of unarmed protesters, the United
States would have to reconsider arms sales to that country and might
otherwise limit ties at least temporarily. Even if unrest arose threatening
the flow of oil or the stability of a friendly regime, the United States
185
Idem. 186
Future Security Environment, Op.Cit. 187
Idem.
121
would be not very likely to use its own forces, according to the report, to
directly assist a regime that used torture, arbitrary arrests, and other
forms of repression that would be widely condemned in the United States
and the West in general. Furthermore, the U.S. public may grow more
cautious about cooperating with autocratic Middle Eastern regimes in the
wake of September 11, particularly those that are not seen as cooperating
in the war on terrorism, further limiting the U.S. scope of action. And the
conclusion the Rand report draws from these statements is that ―although
human rights and democratization are not interests that the United States
actively seeks to advance or protect in the Middle East, they are broad
concerns that may inhibit U.S. attempts to defend its other interests‖188
.
However, the question that seems hitherto unavoidable for the
Arab elite, objecting to the special US-Israeli relationship over the
pretension that it is the only democracy in the region, is: if human rights
and democratization are not interests that the US actively seeks to
advance, then just what is the ground of its unconditional commitment to
Israel? In other words, if we do not consider all the assistance the Israeli
state receives from the USA as some sort of reward for its democracy –
―the only in the Middle East‖- then what is the object of the assistance?
If we insist on the Israeli-Arab conflict as an aspect of the
strategic ramifications in the aftermath of 9/11, it is well because it is
almost never absent of any American study even if it is concerned with
the Gulf – theoretically far away from Israel – or the sole Saudi Arabia.
Actually, Israel is also present in the background of the picture, each time
we have to analyze the local policies in the region. The discourse about
the Israeli-Arab conflict is an integrative part of the political discourse in
the Arab world without exception since long years. It has even a double
social and political function, for on the one hand, it is instrumented by
rulers and officials to demonstrate their commitment to the great cause of
the Palestinian struggle for justice and freedom, which gathers popular
consent and sympathy all over the Arab and Muslim world ; and on the
other hand, it plays a part in legitimating and illegitimating rulers and
policies by the media and the civil society. Let us put it more simply: an
Arab ruler who is losing credibility and legitimacy will doom himself if
going away from the collective consent of his society, he makes of an
Israeli government a friend at the expenses of the Palestinians, as far as
the struggle is not resolved. In blunt words, this is highly unpopular, as
everybody knows from President Sadate experience. People in the Arab
188
Idem.
122
world may forgive authoritarianism, but they do not forgive what they
believe to be treason coming from their own ruler. As Burhan Ghalioun
observed, some Arab rulers have not only inherited the colonization
legacy, but also its role. In their own countries, they are considered
foreign occupiers, and they behave as such, to the extent that they are
perceived as the enemies of the people. Whence the idea that the State in
such countries stands against the nation189
.
Threats and concerns
This leads us to question the American view about the interests
and the concerns in the region. We think there is some kind of confusion
– or a mismanaged ambiguity - in the report, when it comes to talking
about the Arab-Israeli conflict.
« In recent decades, says the Rand report 190
, several different
types of threats have emerged to the U.S. interests: One of the more
recurrent themes is the identification of Israel as a pro-western state,
whereas the Arabs, which enter in conflict with it, are ‗aggressors‘ ».
We do not see how such a situation may represent any direct
threat to the US interests. First : who identifies Israel as a pro-Western
country while the Arabs are perceived as ‗agressors‘, but the Israelis
themselves ? Second, we observe that the Arabs hold exactly the reverse
of that discourse : some of them -included Saudi Arabia and the rest of
the GCC- think that they are, indeed, pro-western states and that Israel is
an agressor maintaining by violence the Palestinians under occupation.
The Rand report failed to see the double side of the picture.
Moreover, when it talks of the challenges to the US interests, it
says that ―the greatest danger to regional security in the past was outright
aggression by a hostile state. Israel fought wars with its neighbors in
1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. In addition, for much of this period it
regularly skirmished with Egyptian and Syrian troops as well as
Palestinian guerrillas‖191
.
189
See Burhan Ghalioun, Le Malaise Arabe, L‘État contre la Nation, La
Découverte, Paris, 1991. 190
Future Security Environment. Op.Cit. 191
Idem.
123
This is quite an explosive ―mixture‖, for at least in two of these
above-mentioned wars, Israel was certainly the aggressor, not the Arabs:
precisely in 1956(along with France and G.Britain) and in 1982, when it
invaded Lebanon and besieged its capital Beirut. Besides, in 1967, it was
well the Israeli air forces that undertook to destroy the Egyptian aviation
on the ground, even before any war plane could take off, and
subsequently, after invading the Sinai, and much of the West Bank and
the Golan, Israel refused to come back to the pre-war boundaries, as it
has been ordered by the U.N. resolutions. So, the question remains: What
is the meaning of ―hostile state‖ and « agressor » in the Rand report?
The case of Iran and Iraq is different. Here we are directly
confronted with the problems of the Gulf security. In the 1970s, Iran and
Iraq engaged in a proxy war over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and then
fought a brutal eight-year war with each other in the 1980s, which led to
disruptions in the flow of oil and destabilized the region. In 1971, Iran
occupied several islands claimed by the UAE. Iraq invaded Kuwait in
1990 and was only expelled by the U.S.-led coalition‘s massive military
effort.
There is also what the Rand report called ―internal instability‖:
« Internal instability also poses a threat to U.S. interests. Palestinian
groups have long used terrorism to weaken Israel. In 1987, Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza began a series of riots and demonstrations
against Israeli occupation, the first intifada. Violence continued
sporadically in the 1990s, surged after the collapse of peace talks in
2000, and remains intense »192
. The Arab reading of this sentence may be
as follows: unless the USA identifies its own interests to those of the
Israeli state, one cannot see how local uprising against the Israeli iron
hand in the West Bank and Gaza – which have never been acknowledged
as Israeli territories by the international community - can pose a threat to
US interests!
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that when talking of the unrest in
the Gulf States, the report identifies clearly the American interests to
those of these governments. Whence, the question : is it easier to unveil
the American anxiety about a region of vital importance for the world
economy than to recognize that in fact the US administration
sympathizes more with the Israelis than with the Palestinians? Anyway,
we are reminded that in 1979, Saudi and other Arab religious extremists
seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, holding off Saudi security forces for
192
Idem.
124
two weeks. Under the influence of the Iranian revolution, Shi‘a in
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia rioted against their governments in
the early 1980s. In 1995, radical Islamists destroyed the Office of
Program Management/Saudi Arabian National Guard office in Riyadh
killing seven, including five Americans. It also appears that Saudi,
Egyptian, Yemen, and Algerian nationals are a major component of al
Qaeda, and many Gulf state citizens provided financial support to a range
of anti-U.S. Islamist causes. In general, many states in the Middle East
face economic problems and demographic pressures and have few
institutions for incorporating public sentiment into decision-making, a
combination that suggests that the potential for unrest remains acute.
We will add another element to this picture, of which everybody
should be aware since it triggered wars and revolts in the region. It is
what Fred Halliday calls the ―Gulf misperceptions‖193
. His analysis is
based on the hypothesis that the geopolitics of the contemporary Gulf are
dominated by a triangular conflict between the three most powerful states
of the region – Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. His thesis is that the causes of
instability in the Gulf, of past conflicts and probable future ones, ―lie
much less in a continuous history or in the geopolitics itself, in past
external intervention or relations between local states, and more in the
contemporary domestic politics of these three countries‖194
. More to the
point, if we ask what it is that has constituted the current divisions within
the Gulf, including misperceptions, the answer, according to Halliday, ―is
to be found in the forms of state produced in the region in the modern
period, and in the way which two groups of people, previously almost
completely separated from each other, came to be brought into contact by
modern political forces, in particular by two such forces, first external,
imperial intervention, and then internal, the rise of nationalism‖195
.
However, we think that Halliday writing under the latterly effects
of the 8 years long Iraqi- Iranian war, has a little exaggerated the hostility
between Iranians and Arabs. Is it true that the two groups of people have
been ―completely separated from each other‖ before the modern period?
Nothing is more doubtful, though. Halliday reminds us that ―Saddam was
quick to invoke Qadisiyya as a mobilisatory symbol in his war with the
Islamic Republic‖, which is true. Yet, neither Saddam nor his regime is
193
Fred Halliday , Arabs and Persians Beyond the Geopolitics of the Gulf, in :
Cahiers d‘études sur la Méditrranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, n°22, juillet-
décembre 1966. 194
Idem. 195
Idem.
125
supposed to be a reference in matter of historical thought or
historiography196
. Both have largely contributed to the miserable
falsification of Arabo-islamic history inasmuch as that history cannot be
reduced to the phenomenon of Shu‘ubiyya197
, without amputating it from
the most significant contribution to sciences, arts, philosophy etc, in the
classical and medieval times, provided by the Iranians.
If we cannot brush away the conflicting relations between Arabs
and Iranians, is it that not because all political and social relations are by
definition conflicting? What has been always uneasy to admitting in the
region is precisely the racialist view of the relations, especially when it
borrows the nationalistic discourse, either on the Arab side (the Iraqi
Baath conceptions for example) or on the Iranian (during the Shah
Muhammad Ridha rule). Here, we join Halliday on a point: When Great
Britain lost its influence 198
and the USA started increasing gradually its
naval presence and becoming the main arms supplier to pro-Western
regional states, the result was that Iran came increasingly to present itself
as the dominant power in the Gulf : ―it developed its navy, and,
especially after 1971, insisted that the Gulf be known by the name
‗Persian Gulf‘. During the 1970s this assertion of Iran‘s hegemony was
reinforced by the Shah‘s desire to make Iran a great economic power, a
‗second Japan‘: this imperial project was conceived of as a counterweight
to the Arab world as a whole‖199
. Yet, if Iran sought to develop its
military and economic ties with a bloc of non-Arab states – Turkey,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India- ―as a counter-weight to the Arabs‖, let
us not forget that the common bond between these countries and Iran is
well Islam.200
196
In 1981, a year after the start of the Iran-Iraq war, Dar al Hurriya, the
government publishing house, issued Three Whom God Should Not Have Created:
Persians, Jews and Flies. The author, Khairallah Talfah, was the foster-father and
father-in-law of Saddam Hussein. It was the Iraqi Baathist too who, claiming to be the
defenders of Arabism on the ―eastern frontiers‖, brought to the fore the chauvinist myth
of Persian migrants and communities in the Gulf being comparable to the Zionist
settlers in Palestine. 197
It means a racial distinction between Arabs and Persians. 198
Withdrawal from Kuwait in 1961, from South Yemen in 1967, from Bahrain,
Qatar and the Emirates in 1971, from Oman in 1977. 199
Halliday. Op.Cit. 200
In India also there is a large Islamic community.
126
Defense and Security
Ever since the oil shocks of the 1970s, the United States has
steadily been accumulating military muscle in the Gulf by building bases,
selling weaponry, and forging military partnerships. James Aikin, who
served as a US envoy in Kuwait and Iraq, and ultimately as ambassador
to Saudi Arabia at the time, recalls that in 1975 an article headlined
‗Seizing Arab Oil‘ appeared in Harper‘s. The author, who used the
pseudonym Miles Ignotus, was identified as a ‗Washington-based
professor and defense consultant with intimate links to high-level US
policymakers‘. The article outlined, as Akins put it, ―how we could solve
all our economic and political problems by taking over the Arab oil fields
and bringing in Texans and Oklahomans to operate them‖201
.
Simultaneously, a rash of similar stories appeared in other magazines and
newspapers. ―I knew that it had to have been the result of a deep
background briefing‖, Akins says. ―Then I made a fatal mistake. I said on
television that anyone who would propose that is either a madman, a
criminal, or an agent of the Soviet Union‖. Soon afterward, he says, he
learned that the background briefing had been conducted by his boss,
then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Akins was fired later that year.
If the anecdote says a lot about Kissinger‘s manners, it says even
more about some American officials and policymakers‘ look at the Gulf,
maybe at the Arab world as a whole. In the 1970s, ―America‘s military
presence in the Gulf was virtually nil, so the idea of seizing control of its
oil was a pipe dream‖, notes Dreyfuss202
. How about the situation since
―Desert Storm‖? Indubitably, when he invaded Kuwait, Saddam Hussein
triggered a mechanism he will never be able to control. In very simple
words: he brought to reality Kissinger‘s old ―pipe dream‖.
Until 1991, the United States was unable to persuade the Arab
Gulf states to allow a permanent American presence on their soil.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, while maintaining its close relationship with
201
Reported by Robert Dreyfuss, The Thirty-Year Itch, March 1, 2003, Mother
Jones. 202
Idem.
127
the United States, began to diversify its commercial and military ties; by
the time US ambassador Chas Freeman arrived there in the late eighties,
the USA had fallen to the fourth place among arms suppliers to the
kingdom. ―The United States was being supplanted even in commercial
terms by the British, the French, even the Chinese,» Freeman notes203
.
All that changed with the Gulf war.
―After the second Gulf war‖, says Jerichow, ―in 1991 it was
difficult to pretend that the Saud family was not being protected by and
dependent on the USA‖204
. In all, ―6000 US soldiers, training facilities
and planes were stationed on a permanent basis in Saudi Arabia, the vast
majority of them in the eastern province which was already used to a lot
of foreigners in the oil industry. More than 30.000 US civilians were
working in the country in 1996‖.205
The United States and Saudi Arabia are not linked by a formal
defense treaty; however, a series of informal agreements, statements by
successive U.S. Administrations, and military deployments have
demonstrated a strong U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia206
.
Saudi forces acquired experience during the Gulf war and further
upgrading through a large-scale program of arms procurement. Together
Saudi Arabia and its five smaller Gulf neighbors remain vulnerable to
future external aggression, according to the American prevailing
analysis. On one hand, both the Iranian and Iraqi armed forces suffered
major personnel and equipment losses during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq
war and Operation Desert Storm, respectively, and neither is in a position
to offer an immediate threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On
the other hand, the combined forces of Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies
have been outnumbered in important categories by those of Iraq and Iran,
even after the losses sustained by both countries in recent wars (with the
exclusion of operation Iraqi Freedom).207
In the decade after the second Gulf war, the USA sold more than
$43 billion worth of weapons, equipment, and military construction
203
Idem. 204
Anders Jerichow, Saudi Arabia, Outside Global Law and Order, Curzon Press,
1997, p. 97. 205
Idem. 206
For statements by previous administrations, see CRS Report 94-78, Saudi
Arabia: U.S. Defense and Security Commitments, February 3, 1994. 207
Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, August 4, 2003, Alfred B.
Prados, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division /CRS Issue Brief for Congress.
128
projects to Saudi Arabia, and $16 billion more to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain,
and the United Arab Emirates. Before operation Desert Storm, the US
military enjoyed the right to stockpile, or ―pre-position‖, military
supplies only in the comparatively remote Gulf state of Oman on the
Indian Ocean. After the war, nearly every country in the region began
conducting joint military exercises, hosting US naval units and Air Force
squadrons, and granting the United States pre-positioning rights.
Obviously, Saddam‘s catastrophic invasion of Kuwait, created a new
situation, where the old precepts of arab and islamic solidarity sounded
without real meaning.
In an analysis that has preceded the war against Saddam, the
authors208
have assumed -rightly - that this regime will be defeated, and –
less accurately - « that Iraq will not implode into civil war, and that a
U.S.-led coalition will oversee the emergence of a new Iraqi government
that will have a modicum of internal legitimacy and external
acceptance ». Its pertinence to our subject is that if the war against
Saddam was indirectly a consequence of 9/11 and the Bush anti-terrorist
campaign, - since it has been waged upon the assumption that if
Saddam's WMD were not found and destroyed they might very well end
up in the hands of some terrorists – then post-Saddam Iraq is likely to be
a part of the regional system set up by the USA in the Gulf209
. That is
why the authors of the report think that a « fundamentally new Iraqi
regime is necessary but, » they argue, « insufficient for lasting Gulf
security ».
In effect, with a probability of the Iranian neighbor acquiring
nuclear capability, what would be the reactions of Saudi Arabia or even
of the UAE, which a controversy over three islands already oppose to
Iran?210
208
Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik, and David Gompert, A New Persian
Gulf Security System, Issue Paper, Rand Corporation. 209
For an analysis in depth of this case, see: Hichem Karoui, l‘après-Saddam en
Irak, les plans, les hommes, et les problèmes. Op.Cit. 210
If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, then, from an American strategic
standpoint, a "best case" scenario for U.S. interests would be an Iran that retains a
defensive stance and does not seek to expand its influence in the region. That being
said, even defensive tactics can be affected in a world where states possess variable and
often wildly differing notions of national security interests. Because of this, Washington
is working to take preventive measures to slow Iran's quest for power. For instance, one
preventive measure taken by the United States to slow Iran's growth -- and a measure
that has been in place for years -- is U.S. economic sanctions. But it has been observed
that Washington's sanctions policy has not been entirely effective. Iran's economic
129
―It would be unlikely that Saudi Arabia would nuclearize in the
face of a nuclear armed Iran‖, says a recent report 211
; and in explanation
of this hypothesis, it assumes that « because Saudi Arabia would likely
not seek to build or establish nuclear technologies, alternate means could
be considered to secure a similar strategic end. More specifically, in
regards to weapons of mass destruction, the monarchy could seek to
increase clandestinely its chemical weapons as a parallel deterrent »212
.
Yet, we find the assumptions about the possible nuclearization of Saudi
Arabia as groundless as stupidly steeped in a heinous attitude toward
Islam. Whatever the criticism we may express vis-a-vis Saudi policy, we
have to acknowledge that it has never been characterized by such
ambitions of grandeur. Of course, there is Pakistan. But there is also
India, and the old rivalry between both countries. In the recent history of
the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, does not stand as a rival for any country.
Without expansionist ambition – such as the israeli or the iraqi during
Saddam‘s rule - , and without rivalry – such as the one prevailing
between all the nations that sought and got nuclear weapons - , why
should the Saudi state buy nuclearization ? The problem of Iran is
different , as this country has since the revolution – and much more so
since the American invasion of Iraq - felt threatened, either by Saddam,
or by Israel, or by the USA.
At present, the Saudi regime still has much to prove to its
citizenry about how it can reform without breaking the perceived
interpretations of Islamic law. A nuclear Iran ten or fifteen years ago
would have been a significant threat to Saudi Arabia; today, however, it
would likely cause only a moderate change to the power equation.
Nonetheless, such change would greatly benefit the Iranians with an
advantage in current bargaining issues, regardless of U.S. sanctions or
rhetoric.
sectors remain heavily reliant upon its energy resources. While its energy industry is
ineffectually managed due to haphazard state control, questionable oversight
procedures, as well as murky forms of regulation, these inadequacies and potential
liabilities make little difference to thirsty states such as China and India that have a
growing demand for energy resources. Because of this, some observers think that
Tehran is able to compensate for U.S. economic sanctions through its growing relations
with China and India. Yet, one is inclined to ask: Why Libya was not able then to stand
more to the sanctions imposed for its refusal to collaborate over Lockerby affair, despite
the Jamahiriya could also seek help in India and China and Russia and other nations? 211
Jonathan Feiser, Nuclear Iran: Repercussions for Turkey and Saudi Arabia,
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR), January 28, 2005. 212
Idem.
130
Elite change theories and American strategists
As we have previously pointed, to be efficient and legitimate any
change has to be performed by the local elite. There is no strategy that
can change this rule, and any strategy that does not take it in account
would be doomed. It is also important to note that besides approaches in
general theory of elite, the impact of the social theories of Michel
Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu proved to be decisive in shaping
conceptualizations of elite change. Foucault made clear that power does
not exclusively belong to a class or even to a group of people, rather it is
a general phenomenon in all aspects of social life. Bourdieu‘s theory on
different ―forms of capital‖ was also crucial because it opened the way
for thinking about the convertibility of different social assets.
Elite approach gained strength by the end 1980s, partly because
elite theory seemed to be more appropriate to capture the social changes
unleashed by the collapse of communism in East-Europe and the former
Soviet Union, than the classic Marxist approach. In the last two decades,
there were many studies in elite theory inspired by the classic
contributions of Weber, Pareto, Mosca and Mills. Burton and Higley
emphasized, for example, the importance of elite groups in political
change. They claimed that elite settlements represent one route to stable
democracy. Their definition is the following :
―Elite settlements are relatively rare events in which warring
national elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations
by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements. Elite
settlements have two major consequences: they create patterns of open
but peaceful competition, based on the norm of ‗restrained partisanship‘
among all major elite factions, and they transform unstable regimes (…)
into stable regimes in which irregular seizures no longer occur and are
not widely expected‖213
.
Elite settlements were presented as alternatives to social
revolutions. They are defined as the elite side of peaceful transitions to
democracy and acknowledged as the more important part of it. According
to the authors, elite settlements have five major characteristics: 1- speed
(it must be done quickly or not at all); 2- Negotiations (face-to-face,
213
Michael G. Burton and John Higley , Elite Settlements, American
Sociological Review, Vol 52, June 1987, 295-307.
131
partially secret); 3- written agreements; 4 – conciliatory behavior; 5 –
Experienced leaders.
The idea of such elite driven-change was formulated in the
intellectual atmosphere of the1980s which emphasized the importance of
the more formal, minimalist, « modest» meaning of democracy where
elite choices are not so much disturbed by the masses. Huntington‘s own
approach was also elite-centered when he said that ―democratic
institutions come into existence through negotiations and compromises
among political elites calculating their own interests and desires‖214
. The
elite settlement approach was then followed by some important
contributions in ―transitology‖, which described the process of regime
change largely as ―elite games‖.
With this view in the mind, we can now have a different approach
of the changes that have recently occurred (Iraq and Afghanistan, for
instance) and those still expected.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2003 war
against Iraq, as we know, profoundly affected the Middle East in general
and U.S. policy in the region in particular. Although the ramifications of
these events are still being felt, several changes are already evident. The
way the American strategists look at the changes provides us with a
strategic insight regarding the options in the ―elite games‖. From the
American point of view, the ―elite settlements‖ would have to be
negotiated over topics of first priority for the Bush administration.
Nothing is said about the priorities of the other side (the countries
concerned), which are likely considered as identical to US priorities.
Thus, the Rand report about Future Security environment in the Middle
East, builds the American strategy upon the following points :
1- « A reprioritization of U.S. interests. Terrorism and WMD
proliferation have long been a concern of the U.S. government. However,
the scale of the September 11 tragedy has elevated terrorism‘s relative
importance, and the subsequent war with Iraq increased awareness of the
dangers posed by WMD proliferation. Other U.S. interests, such as the
Arab-Israeli conflict and relations with Saudi Arabia, may be reassessed
within this new context »215
. Let us notice by the way that the linkage
between terrorism and WMD proliferation was already in the background
214
Samuel P.Huntington, Will more countries be democratic? Political Science
Quarterly, Vol 99, 1984, 193-218. 215
The Future Security Environment in the Middle East, conflict, stability and
political change, Edited by Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, Rand Project Air
Force.
132
of the picture, prior to the war against Saddam. To put it simply, it was
the main justification of the war, although it revealed afterwards to be a
fake excuse. It goes without saying that such a « priority » means to put
countries like Iran and Syria under close scrutiny.
2- « Reduced tolerance for state sponsorship of terrorism. In the
1980s and 1990s, Iran, Iraq, and « other sponsors of terrorism »
conducted limited strikes without suffering massive retaliation. Such
tolerance, however, has now eroded. The toppling of the Taliban in
Afghanistan vividly illustrated the U.S. willingness and capacity to
overthrow regimes that support anti-U.S. terrorist groups. That point was
further emphasized in the spring of 2003, when the Bush administration
used Saddam Hussein‘s pretended connections with al Qaeda as one of
the justifications for war »216
. This « priority » is understandable,
although it is also intended to be used as a deterrent. The case of Libya is
here enough expressive : the 180 degree about-face in the Libyan policy
was perceived by observers as much more related to the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq than to the resolution of the Lockerby affair. The
message the wars delivered was sanctions against Libya over Lockerby
were not the last step but the first in the scale.
3- « A focus on internal stability. Although all regimes in the
Middle East were well aware of the threat that Islamic radicals posed
(several regimes had long been fighting Islamic insurgencies and many
others monitored and arrested radicals), the attention of the United States
was not focused on regional domestic politics. The attacks suggest,
however, that the domestic policies of regimes, particularly their
willingness to allow citizens to support or join radical causes abroad,
directly affect U.S. security »217
. Yet, we do not need to say that the US
focus on internal local affairs in the region is not welcome, whatever the
justification. It is actually felt as an hegemony will. So, as long as this
feeling is prevailing in the Arab and Muslim societies, Washington
would find great difficulties to have its « elites game » locally adopted
and tuning up.
4- « A decline in conventional military threats. With the toppling
of Saddam‘s regime, the danger of a conventional military conflict has
diminished considerably. Although Syria, Iran, and other ―potential
aggressors‖ maintain large forces, in general they do not field modern
equipment, are poorly trained, and otherwise pose only a limited threat.
216
Idem. 217
Idem.
133
In contrast, the region‘s two greatest military powers, Israel and Turkey,
are staunch U.S. allies »218
. However, the stated decline of conventional
military threat would be transformed from a statement into a priority at
the condition that it is maintained as a status quo, which is hardly the
case. The first party expected to breach the « status quo » is the US
government itself, as it is apparently carrying on the same policy as
concerns arms sails.
Saudi Elite positions
Some of the American research material related to Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf region, issued in the period preceding the operation Iraqi
Freedom, has stirred a lot of concern among the Saudi elite. For example,
the Saudi scholar Turki al Hamad wrote an op-ed reacting about the
release of what he deemed to be ― an indirect message to the Saudi
government pressuring it to be obedient to the demands of the American
administration, because the alternative might be the collapse of the whole
regime‖219
. In al Hamad‘s analysis, since 9/11, Saudi Arabia is no longer
the same country for the Americans, who discovered that ―America is
hated on a broad scale inside the Saudi society, as is the case of any other
Arab society, precisely because of the Palestinian problem. America used
to believe that the Saudis were not similar in their attitudes to other Arab
people, and suddenly they appear all the same. And the Saudis might
even have more extremist positions in so far as they stood on
fundamentalist principles‖220
. The result of a quick U.S. evolution,
according to al Hamad, is that Saudi Arabia appeared to the Americans
as « the cultural matrix, the social environment, and the financial source
of the terrorism that struck the twin towers in September‖221
. For al
Hamad, the danger was not in the review of the relations, but it was in
doing it into a state of ―vertigo‖ that made the American reactions much
similar to those of its enemies: ― if those who masterminded the 9/11
operation are known to divide the world into black and white, absolute
right and absolute wrong, belief and unbelief, axis of goodness and axis
of evil, and no middle point between these extremities‖, then what is the
218
Idem. 219
Turki al Hamad, America wal Saudiyya , kay la nafqid al dalil, Al Sharq al
Awsat, 18/8 /2002. 220
Idem. 221
Idem.
134
difference?222
Moreover, Saudi Arabia, in al Hamad‘s view, cannot
subscribe to the logic likely to emanate from ousting Saddam from
power, which would divide the region into indefectible allies and
absolute enemies. He thinks that some states like Qatar, Bahrain, and
Kuwait ―have nothing to lose in allowing the Americans to use their
territories for attacking Iraq. That may even be practically the best
political option for these states, in so far as they are relying on that kind
of cooperation for their survival. But a state like Saudi Arabia has quite a
different reasoning. For if it agreed on changing the Iraqi regime from the
outside, thus opening its own territories for the operation, that would
mean to issue its own death sentence‖223
. In Hamad‘s view, agreeing on
the American logic is ultimately agreeing that it might be used against
Saudi Arabia itself, if the Americans are dissatisfied with its policy. This
is far from being a stranded voice among the Saudi intelligentsia. Many
people are likely to share al Hamad opinions.
After the New York Times published on October 14, 2001, a story
about the necessity of reexamining Saudi Arabia, M. Khaled Abdallah,
wrote in response to this article, which symbolizes in his view the new
trend in American strategic thought: ―the story defined the essence of the
relationship in the era preceding the end of the cold war, as follows: it
was a realistic deal, whereof the USA got the oil its economy needed and
Saudi Arabia got the military protection when its security was threatened
by its violent neighbors, included Iran and Iraq.‖ 224
Yet, it was not all what the Americans obtained from Saudi
Arabia, says the story, but also other services such as large investments
and a lot of expensive weapons, along with Saudi help in other spheres of
fight against rebels and ex-Soviet Union weakening, like what happened
in Nicaragua, Iran, and Afghanistan. There was a partnership; but that did
not hinder the American administration, according to the Saudi writer,
from leaking to the media some reports charging Saudi Arabia of ―being
active at all the levels of the terrorist connection, from the planners to the
funds backers, and from the master minders to the executors, and from
the theorists to the supporters‖225
. And he adds: ―if we take the previous
sentence and just replace the word (terrorist) by (militant) in the context
of the eighties, it would be considered as a merit that Saudi Arabia
222
Idem. 223
Idem. 224
Khaled Abdallah, attariq al masdud fi al ‗alaqat assaudiya al amirikiyya,
12/8/2002, Al Quds al Arabi, London. 225
Idem.
135
deserved, not as a demerit‖226
. These considerations would lead the
writer to stating that what happened between the USA and Saudi Arabia
is not just a temporary problem, but it is ―a political event with a deep
and broad signification. The Saudi political structure in its essence is no
longer of any usefulness to the American strategy, and its negative
symptoms have grown embarrassing for the American decision-
maker‖227
. Then, Khaled Abdallah makes another step in explaining what
he deems to be the new American strategic thought. According to this
writer, there are two trends in the USA advocating change in Saudi
Arabia. The first tries to pressure the Saudi government to monitor the
reforms so that when the changes come the USA would not be ―ejected‖
or marginalized in the process, as it happened in other countries (Iran, for
example). But while some of the American elite is concerned by true
reforms, some others are pressuring for changes just for the sake of
empire hegemony. However, the ―doves‖ and the ―falcons‖ agree,
according to K. Abdallah, on the necessity of substantial change, which
means for instance, that the religious establishment becomes just a
Ministry for religious affairs (Awqaf) as in other Arab countries, instead
of being a partner in decision making as it has been so far.
K. Abdallah underlines in the context of pressures, the role of the
new conservatives. He thinks that in full agreement with the Zionist
lobby, the New Conservatives want to ―separate religion in Saudi Arabia
from finances, so that the former plays less an important part abroad.
Besides, they imagine the possibility of dividing the country in two or
three states, with the smaller controlling oil, the second controlling the
pilgrimage rent – what they call religious tourism- and the third – Nejed-
which is deemed to be the hub of fanaticism, would live from subsidies
provided by the two others‖228
.
The idea of dividing Saudi Arabia cannot be considered as
serious, even if it stems out of Einstein‘s mind, which is not the case.
Apparently, the situation in Iraq , the former Lebanese civil war and the
fragile geo-political configuration of the Middle East region, additionally
to the ethnico-religious tensions, and some precedents in the Balkans,
inspire the imagination of some observers. Yet, we have to recall that
there is no ethnical divisions in the Saudi Kingdom. The country is
unified. The Arabs are its main component since the pre-islamic period,
226
Idem. 227
Idem. 228
Idem.
136
and even on the religious level, Saudi Arabia is sunnite – its Shiite
population is but a minority, which is not representative of any threat
toward the system. This is neither the case in Iraq, nor in Lebanon or
Syria. Thus, the idea of partitioning Saudi Arabia may be but a pipe
dream.
There is no doubt that it is also exploited by the opposition and
used as an additional pressure against the government. As it happens
often in all opposition literature in the Arab world, some of these debates
are more likely to range into wishful thinking than into serious objective
analysis.
According to Muhammad Ali al Fayez, the first time the Saudi
government acknowledged that the Kingdom‘s union is threatened was
when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. It was rumored then that what
Saddam was aiming at concerned the division of Saudi Arabia into three
political entities: ―the eastern region (Alahsa and Qatif) to be annexed by
Iraq, and the Western region (Hijaz) to be annexed to the Hashemite
Jordan, and the southern region (Jazan, Asir, Najran) to be annexed to
Yemen.‖229
Such an idea is preposterous, in our eyes, because Saddam
had not the means of invading Saudi Arabia. The country is merely above
his resources, - and he could not ignore it – although he might have
thought of protecting his back while invading Kuwait.
Now, while acknowledging that in the past there has been a great
deal of animosity between the Saudi Royals and the Hashemite family-
which ruled Iraq, and is today ruling Jordan- we wonder how much
credibility should we accord to the thesis that suggests the following:
―the Hashemite threat has been an element of terrible pressure exerted on
the Saudis in matters related to Hijaz‖230
? The question concerns actually
the ability or inability of the Hashemites to gain back Hijaz from which
they have been expelled even before the proclamation of the Saudi
kingdom. If there are still ambitions on this side, Iraq is much more easy
to deal with than Saudi Arabia, in the wake of Saddam‘s ousting from
power. But, as far as we know, the Hashemite monarchical party revealed
to be unable to attract iraqi people or to obtain any real weight inside the
country. How would such a party dream of obtaining Hijaz ?
229
Muhammad Ali al Fayez, al ‗alaqat al saudiyya al amirikiyya tadkhulu
marhalat kasr al ‗azm, 5/8/2002, Gulf Issues. 230
Fayez. Op. Cit.
137
The ―Hashemite threat‖ is indubitably a myth231
. Moreover, M. al
Fayez himself must not be very convinced of his own thesis, for he
moved the threat, from the « Hashemite +Saddam » side to the American
and the Arab neighborhood. In his view, the Americans have taken over
the question of dividing Saudi Arabia into several states. Thus, against all
what international observers agree upon, he ―decided‖ that ―the USA is
not the protector of the regime anymore, but its main threat‖232
. How and
why? His answer is : ―Just after Desert Storm, the Saudis began to feel
the menace of the dangerous protector. In their private spheres, the
Saudis officials started hinting that there are serious conspiracies plotting
to tear up the kingdom, and that the Americans have up three or four
political entities‖.233
Furthermore, the Saudis have localized the real
threats in their regional neighborhood, according to this writer. He
suggests that even the other GCC states, ―are hoping that some day the
kingdom would split up, so that the states emerging from its
fragmentation would be as small as them‖234
. The conspiracy involves
along with the Americans, ―Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, and some of the
Gulf States‖.235
When one looks closely to these countries, it is inevitable to state
that with each of them Saudi Arabia entertains a normal – if not an
excellent – relationship. So, what is the point of trying to implicate them
in such a paranoiac thesis?
It seems as if the writer wants absolutely to find any ground
whereupon he would set up his argument.These are, perhaps, the limits of
an opinion that takes in consideration only one part of the problem, in
231
The struggle between Sherifiens and Saudis go back to the XVIIIth century.
Saint-John Philby writes about it: ―The first serious encounter between Wahhabis and
the Sharif of Mecca, who had deliberately provoked it, had served only to emphasize
the strength of the new fanatics. The puritan creed, for all its lack of appeal to the easy-
going materialism of the Badawin Arab, had aroused in the more settled communities
something of a national sense, which, without entirely eliminating the traditional
passion of the populace for internecine strife, could be brought into play under the stress
of a common danger to their independence. And the success which had so triumphantly
vindicated this feeling of a common interest in defense would before long engender
ambitions of a more aggressive character, whose pursuit would more readily evoke the
enthusiasm of the Badawin, though the tribes would ever prove an element of weakness
in the hour of trial‖. See: Arabia, H.St.J. Philby, London, Ernest Benn Limited,
1930.Pp. 53-54. 232
Idem. 233
Idem. 234
Idem. 235
Idem.
138
focusing on what may be called the ―imaginary country‖, in contrast with
the ―real country‖. As it happens, this is a feature we can easily localize
in the Arab political discourse, whether it emanates from the government
or from the opposition. In the absence of a real democracy, where
opinions could be contested on a rational basis, the debate would evolve
into an environment characterized by paranoia, wishful thinking, and
political phantasms. The matter does not concern the sole Saudi Arabia,
but it is -as any observer can state – an Arab phenomenon.
However, the analysis of al Fayez, becomes less fantasizing
when, backing away from conspiracy theories, and paranoid allusions, he
focalizes on the changes occurring in the ―real world‖. In this context, he
mentions new occurrences in the American policies, which may be
summarised as follows:
1- The prevalence of a vision considering Islam as a threat to the
West and its civilization. Thus, since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the West has started the construction of a new enemy, which is Islam.
2 – The decrease of the Saudi role on the economic level, because
of the existence of alternatives to the Saudi oil, in Russia and the Caspian
Sea.
3 – The apparition of alternative military facilities, other than
Israel, in the heart of the Gulf and on the edge of the Arab peninsula, in
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and very likely in Iraq and Afghanistan
and other central Asian states.
The first tip is clearly biased. For it is not accurate to pretend that
the West is making Islam his enemy : there are millions of Muslims
living in the West, and they do not have this feeling. The West is neither
a unified bloc with a standardised ideology (as was the communist bloc)
nor even a homogenous society with a unique identity and a unique
objective. The West is actually a World , with an incalculable number of
differences, potentialities and perspectives. Indeed , there is a trend,
which has made of Islam an enemy. But such is the case in the Arab
world, as 9/11 and other terrorist operations against Westerners proved it.
May we accurately say that the Arab world has made of the West his
enemy ? It is an unacceptable – because biased - logic.
The third tip in this argument is about strategic options depending
on American vision and interests. As such, it is pointless to discuss it.
As to the second tip, it raises the question of whether the Caspian
Sea oil represents a real alternative to the Middle East or a mere myth.
This must be clear: Oil currently accounts for 40 percent of global energy
consumption and is not anticipated to fall much below this share in the
139
next 20 years. Saudi Arabia alone sits on fully 25 percent of global
reserves, with Iraq following at 11 percent, and Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates, and Iran at 9 percent each. Only Saudi Arabia has the ability to
weigh on oil pricing. Russia certainly cannot play this role. The euphoria
on the Caspian Sea as alternative suppliers to the Gulf is quite misplaced.
Russia‘s proven oil reserves constitute just five percent of the world total.
« The Russian do anticipate finding major new reserves on Sakhalin
Island off their eastern coast, in the ―northern seas‖ of the Arctic Circle,
and in certain fields in the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea. As for the
other post-Soviet states, substantial new reserves certainly lie in the
Caspian basin, already equivalent in size to those under the North Sea.
And more finds are expected in Kazakhstan, where the new Kashagan
offshore field is now estimated to contain around 22 billion barrels of
oil…more than twice the size of the Prudhoe Bay reserves in Alaska. But
even after adding a field of this size to the existing reserves and projected
Russian findings, Russia and the Caspian basin together will still never
have enough oil to displace Saudi Arabia‘s 264.2 billion barrels of
proven reserves »236
.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has a trump card that Russia has not: It
is, in effect, acknowledged that the kingdom‘s extra reserves, to be used
only as a last resort during a crisis in the oil market, make ―policymakers
elsewhere beholden to Riyadh for energy security‖ and form ―the
centerpiece of the US-Saudi relationship‖. Russia actually produces and
exports at maximum capacity and is likely to continue to do so: ―to make
matters worse, a recent Russian energy report indicates that if current oil-
extraction levels continue and new technologies do not bring additional
reserves into production, Russia can expect to have depleted its current
reserves by 2040‖.237
Some other conclusions may be drawn out of that literature that
grows popular on the internet and on some Arab media, much more
because of the lack of democracy inside the Arab world and the need for
free expression and free thought, than because of the accuracy of its
thesis. The most important feature is perhaps the amalgam entertained
between fighting terrorism and fighting Islam. Thus, some writers do not
236
Shibley Telhami, Does Saudi Arabia still matter? Foreign Affairs, November-
December 2002. 237
Idem.
140
hesitate to say that what America is after since 9/11 is actually Islam:
that‘s the enemy.
Starting from the statements elaborated by some Western
theorists, as they are interpreted in the Arab world, some among the
Saudi elite – much like many among the Arab intelligentsia- think that
what is at stake does not concern terrorism but Islam itself.
―It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a
movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the
governments that pursue them‖, writes Bernard Lewis238
. ―This is no less
than a clash of civilizations…the perhaps irrational but surely historic
reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our
secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both‖. Such a statement
in professor Lewis‘s text was accompanied by a call: ―It is crucially
important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally
historic but also equally irrational reaction against that rival‖.
Apparently, the call as wise as it may be has been dismissed and
forgotten. What struck the Arab mind was precisely the statement about
the clash of civilizations. It would be broadly circulated and commented.
And it would be Samuel P. Huntington the real champion of the theory
that gave the Muslims their ―enemy‖ inasmuch as it gave the West its
own. The paradox passed almost unnoticeable, for everybody observed
that Huntington was talking about ―the new fundamental source of
conflict‖ as if it were concerning the sole West, since he was speaking on
its behalf. But the point is: can such a hypothesis create an enemy for the
West, - and let‘s call it the Other - without creating in the same time the
Other‘s enemy, which would be the West? This is the mirror effect of the
Clash of civilizations’ theory. But here too, people read only what they
want to read, and not necessarily what is written black on white. What
the Arabs retained from Huntington for example, are little striking
sentences, such as: ―the principal conflicts of global politics will occur
between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future‖239
. But other sentences
would not even be considered as part of the analysis. For example, who
cares when Huntington says: ―In the politics of civilizations, the people
and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the
objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as
238
Bernard Lewis, What went wrong? The Atlantic Monthly, January 2002. 239
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, summer
1993.
141
movers and shapers of history‖240
? And we can indeed multiply the
examples of that ―selective» reading of some important texts, so that it
becomes obvious that with 9/11 in the background or without it, 241
when
people do not want to understand each other, or when understanding each
other they do not want to reach an agreement, for any reason, there is
nothing to do about it.
Saudi Arabia a piece in the “machine”?
Now, how can we evaluate the American approach in this
connection?
To begin with, the Americans seem to consider Saudi Arabia as a
part of a whole, which may be called the Gulf, the GCC States, or the
Greater Middle East, according to the case. On the global scale of the
region, there is a notion that the United States should anticipate potential
changes and shape and hedge accordingly. The Rand Corporation report,
previously mentioned, recommends in this context, the following:
« - Anticipating changing assumptions: Planning for regime
change requires recognizing when assumptions about how a regime will
behave are vulnerable. Obviously, analysts should continue to follow the
changing fortunes of individual leaders to best determine who may take
power should a current leader die or become incapacitated.
« - Anticipating more fundamental shifts is far more difficult.
Predicting a coup, revolution, or other forms of rapid and radical regime
change is exceptionally difficult »242
.
This acknowledgement of the difficulty of anticipation draws the
attention to the importance accorded to certain indicators when they
suggest a country is likely to face regime instability. These indicators are
featured as :
« A) the presence of partial democracy. In general, mature
democracies and established autocracies are fairly stable. Regimes that
are in transition, however, often face unrest and instability and are more
likely to go to war. If Egypt, Syria, or other regional states liberalize,
they may be vulnerable to sudden changes. B) A crisis among the elite.
Many revolutions began after a split in the existing elite. As a result,
240
Idem. 241
Both texts cited here, of B. Lewis and S. Huntington have been published and
commented before 9/11. 242
The Future Security Environment in The Middle East. Op.Cit.
142
regimes may find it difficult to repress or co-opt dissent, providing
opportunities for revolutionaries. C) The spread of populism. Even if
democracy does not spread, elites may rely more on populism to
mobilize support for their rule. For many years, politics in the Middle
East was the purview of elites such as military leaders, security officials,
wealthy landowners, and businessmen. If leaders appeal more and more
to the people for support, popular views, which are often at odds with
those of current regimes, will matter more ». 243
Obviously, the above features are not concerned with a particular
country, but sound as guidelines for the policy of the USA in the entire
Middle East. Yet, we cannot understand them in their full scope without
the recommendations intended to be ―shaping and hedging‖, which we
summarize hereafter :
1- « The United States should consider actions to shape the
environment to make any regime change more favorable and, should that
not be practical, hedge against unfavorable changes »244
. However,
intervention is not synonymous of success and it has little influence over
succession in most countries, acknolwledges the report, which notices
that « pressure may backfire, leading to the rise of anti-U.S. leaders ».
2 – « Washington should also consider increasing contacts with
leaders who are out of favor and factions that are out of power but enjoy
considerable support . Focusing exclusively on the current power set
risks being blindsided should dramatic change occur, as it did in Iran.
Islamist groups deserve particular attention. Many of these groups are
hostile to the United States, but dialogue is possible with some members,
and indeed necessary if many of the stereotypes and conspiracy theories
are to be dispelled. Establishing contacts with non-regime figures, of
course, will anger the regime, a tricky balance to negotiate »245
.
3 – « The United States should also focus more on cultivating
public opinion. The current U.S. focus on elites will be less fruitful in the
coming years. The possibility that publics may play a greater role in
decision-making than in the past is currently a danger for the United
States because of the hostile perceptions many Arab publics hold toward
U.S. policy. Washington should attempt a media strategy that explains
U.S. positions, going beyond the standard Western outlets and focusing
on Arab satellite television stations and newspapers »246
.
243
The Future Security Environment in The Middle East, Op. Cit. 244
Idem. 245
Idem. 246
Idem.
143
4 – « The United States should also consider increased student
and military exchanges (..). The U.S. military should consider a diverse
and redundant basing structure and access arrangements as a hedge
against instability or change in one country. Given that many countries
are vulnerable to sudden change, and almost all may at some point
hesitate to provide access to placate domestic opinion, having many
options is necessary »247
.
We do not need to comment over all these topics, as some of them
are normal ties between states on the international scene. However, the
sole concern is about systematic intervention elevated to the level of
doctrine. We wonder how much of these concerns are real necessities for
the American foreign policy and how much stem out of imperialist
views. We think that building the American strategy upon such concepts
as « shaping and hedging », and « favorable and unfavorable changes »,
etc…plays only in favour of a military view of the future.
Ostensibly, States like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where domestic
and opposition opinion appears firmly against ties to the U.S. military,
are of particular concern. In the Gulf, leading producers also face strong
social and political challenges, and have relied on energy revenues to
subsidize internal stability, as well as high levels of defense spending.
There is no clear and definite linkage between oil revenues and internal
stability, just as the Middle East offers few absolutely predictable links
between economic reform and stability at least in the short term.
Nonetheless, analysts of regional affairs tend to agree that energy
revenues allow otherwise dysfunctional states to ―cover a multitude of
sins‖ in terms of governance and public policy. Lower revenues, against
a background of social unrest and political turmoil across the region,
could press some regimes past the breaking point. Regime change itself
might not affect oil exports over the longer term, but internal instability
might well interrupt production on a temporary basis, pushing up prices
and discouraging foreign investment. One consequence of the events of
September 2001 has been to increase Western scrutiny of the internal
situation in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies. The potential for
internal instability in Saudi Arabia, the key ―swing producer,‖ may well
be the leading source of energy security risk over the next few years.
Iran is also not immune to the challenges posed by volatility in oil
prices. As with Saudi Arabia, oil revenues may be a factor in its stability
247
Idem.
144
over the next decade, and it may affect Iranian procurement priorities and
its ability to pursue WMD-related programs.
New concerns, self-criticism
Some American analysts248
think that the fall of Saddam Hussein
and the Baath regime in Iraq removed a critical set of military threats
from the Gulf. At the same time, the end of Saddam‘s regime has
scarcely transformed the Middle East. No one knows how stable Iraq will
be in the future, what its governments will be like, what its strategic
goals will be, or how it will eventually rebuild its military forces and
rearm. Furthermore, there are other types of threats that affect the region
and Saudi Arabia‘s planning for defense and counterterrorism: Local
threats from conventional military forces and proliferation; Regional
threats from terrorism and Islamic extremism; Self-inflicted threats
created by poor military planning and inadequate attention to economic
reform of the part of the Southern Gulf states; and Threats imposed by
policy failures on the part of the USA.
Let us begin by the latest of these threats, as it concerns the
acknowledgement of American shortcomings. In some Saudi reports we
have already analyzed, there is a belief that the US role as regards Saudi
Arabia, has shifted from the status of friend and protector to that of
potential threat, which means eventually a ―potential enemy‖ of the Saudi
regime. However, few – if any – self-criticism has emanated from the
Americans about the crisis in the relations with Saudi Arabia. A lot of
pressure has been put on the latter as if it were the unique responsible for
what happened in 9/11. Nothing is further from the truth, though. This is
first a matter of logic: in each relationship there is at least two parties. If
it breaks up, would it be fair to charge only one party of the failure?
248
See for example : Saudi National Security, Military and Security Services,
Challenges and Developments, Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, Center For
Strategic and International Studies, September 30, 2004
145
In their report about Saudi National Security249
, Cordesman and
Obaid acknowledge some of the American shortcomings.
One key problem, says the report, has been the failure to find
viable ways to support reform, and US political efforts that have been
more counterproductive than useful : « If the US is to maintain the
political support it needs to sustain its current security role in the Gulf, it
must accept the fact that change must be evolutionary and must be driven
largely on the basis of local values and reform efforts. The US also needs
to show its Arab allies and friends the respect they deserve. The US
cannot afford to deal with Islam or the Arab world in terms of ideological
prejudice. The US does not need either neo-conservatism or neo-
liberalism. It needs pragmatism, neo-realism, and a return to the
―internationalism‖ that has shaped its most successful national security
policy efforts ever since World War II. The US cannot afford to engage
every terrorist movement by itself, and its intervention in Iraq has shown
that it risks alienating and radicalizing peoples and movements in nations
throughout the Islamic world if it does so. It needs to create local
partnerships with key nations like Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. It needs to
focus systematically on just how different the various Sufi, Salafi, neo-
Wahhabi, and Shiites movements are, and then deal with each separately
on the terms best tailored to defeating violence and extremism in each
separate case. A far more visible US effort is needed to make it clear that
the US understands these realities, and understands that it is fighting
against a relatively small minority of extremists, and not the Arab world
and Islam. In the process, the US must also make it clear that while
trying to persuade other countries of adopting ―universal values‖ this will
not mean imposing Western values »250
.
The last point is quite problematic, for as we know, the Western
values, which are those of the modernity and the post-modernity are
identified completely as universal values. Let us take an example : the
idea of separation between religion and politics. About this topic,
Bernard Lewis notes that « if the idea that religion and politics should be
separated is relatively new, dating back a mere three hundred years, the
idea that they are distinct dates back almost to the beginnings of
Christianity. Christians are enjoined in their Scriptures to ‗render…unto
Caesar the things which are Caesar‘s and unto God the things which are
249
Idem. 250
Saudi National Security, Anthony H.Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid. Op.Cit.
146
God‘s »251
. Thereupon, Lewis acknowledges that « this formulation of
the problems posed by the relations between religion and politics, and the
possible solutions to those problems, arise from Christian, not universal,
principles and experience. There are other religious traditions in which
religion and politics are differently perceived »252
.
The debate concerning this topic in Islam has been going on since
the XIXth century. To be sure, it is an internal debate, which means that
any attempt to hasten and pressure its issue in a way favorable to such or
such Western power, will be perceived as an intrusion if not a new-
imperialist manipulation.
251
Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, Why so many Muslims deeply
resent the West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified, September 1990,
The Atlantic Monthly. 252
Idem.
147
Chapter IV ______________
Impact on U.S. policy and the GCC bilateral
relations
―If something happens in Saudi Arabia, if the ruling family is
ousted, if they decide to shut off the oil supply, we have to go in‖, says
Robert E. Ebel, director of the energy program at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank whose
advisers include Kissinger, former Defense Secretary and CIA director
James Schlesinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter‘s national security
adviser. The commitment to grant the stability and security of the Saudi
Royal family is clear enough for policymakers in Washington. That is
why when a man like Laurent Murawiec – former Rand strategist –
pretended to give lessons in wise foreign policy by describing Saudi
Arabia as the ―kernel of evil‖ and suggesting that the Royal family
should be replaced or overthrown 253
, he just get fired and lose the job,
not because he was ―too controversial‖, as R. Dreyfuss thought, but
rather because it is not advised when one has the job of adviser to lose
the sense of realities.
Some years ago, the same R.E.Ebel oversaw a CSIS task force
that included several members of Congress as well as representatives
from industry including Exxon Mobil, Arco, BP, Shell, Texaco, and the
American Petroleum Institute. Its report, ―The Geopolitics of Energy Into
253
See Robert Dreyfuss, The Thirty-Year Itch, March 1, 2003, Mother Jones.
Op.Cit.
148
the 21st Century‖, concluded that the world will find itself dependent for
many years on unstable oil-producing nations, around which conflicts
and wars are bound to swirl. "Oil is high-profile stuff," Ebel says. "Oil
fuels military power, national treasuries, and international politics. It is
no longer a commodity to be bought and sold within the confines of
traditional energy supply and demand balances. Rather, it has been
transformed into a determinant of well-being, of national security, and of
international power "254
.
As vital as the Persian Gulf is now, its strategic importance is
likely to grow exponentially in the next 20 years. By 2020, the Gulf will
expectedly supply between 54 and 67 percent of the world's crude,
making the region "vital to U.S. interests. This is no longer a matter of
controversy, anyway. The US policy in the region is not born in the
aftermath of 9/11 to be that much reactive even to an event of that size.
What we see today has been steadily built up step by step, and any
encroachment beyond the limits of the acceptable may be harmful to US
interests as well. If we look forward, we will have also to look backward
in order to understand how things are linked to each other.
Of vital interests
Back to 1980, we recall that in his State of the Union address of
January 23, while Soviet troops were attempting to pacify Afghanistan
and while Iranian revolutionaries were holding US diplomats hostage,
President Carter warned that "an attempt by any outside force to gain
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the
vital interests of the United States…[and] will be repelled by use of any
means necessary, including armed force". The response crafted by US
policy makers to potential Soviet military threats to the Gulf region was
the development of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDF). Eight
months after the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine military forces were
invading Iran. They were not the Soviet forces contemplated by the
Carter Doctrine. They were Iraqi forces from within the Gulf.
President Reagan gave official recognition to such "threats from
within" in his corollary to the Carter doctrine. In October 1981 he stated,
"Saudi Arabia we will not permit to be an Iran", and was understood to
imply that the United States would be prepared to counter internal
threats. One year later it was announced that the RDF was to be
254
Idem.
149
reorganized, its forces almost doubled and its mission expanded. As of
January 1, 1983 the RDF was renamed the US Central Command
(CENTCOM). Its expanded mission was to respond to a broad range of
threats to oil supplies in the Gulf, from exterior (then Soviet) invasion to
internal revolt. 255
What is important here is the fact that the American military
presence in the Gulf, as a protecting system, has been started even before
the mobilization of mujahideens throughout the Muslim world to fight in
Afghanistan against the red army. At that time, Usama bin Laden did not
care a lot about CENTCOM‘s objectives, since he preferred to orient his
energy, his resources, and the men he led toward a fight outside his
country and region, foreknowing that he will be joining forces and
cooperating with the CIA and the Pentagon, and that did not seem to be
much repelling to him.
So, at this point, a nationalistic Islam does not sound to be a
notion that we can easily apply to this situation. If the fight against the
red army was nationalistic for the Afghans themselves, the case was quite
different for those who came from varied Arab countries to help, Bin
Laden included. How come that the latter did not talk then about
American troops ―humiliating‖ the Arabs by their invading presence ?
Why did he not choose from the outset to fight against them instead of
rushing toward the Soviet troops, thousands of miles away from his
country? 256
The point is that at the time Bin Laden engaged himself and so
many people with him in Afghanistan, the USA was not unhappy for that
involvement. It has even encouraged it not out of fantasy, but because it
was a strategic choice. « The Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary
together outline US policy on the Gulf. It is a policy that seeks to protect
255
Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from within, Lexington
Books, 1984, P.1. 256
On August 17, 2002, an editorial of the Saudi newspaper Al Watan,
headlined « is that the way America rewards its allies? » underlines the close connection
between Usama bin Laden and the CIA. According to Al Watan, the CIA has succeeded
in recruiting Muslim youth to fight in Afghanistan for purposes quite different from
what was declared. Moreover, ―many of those who are now hunted down by America as
terrorists have been trained in American camps‖, says the editorial. America has also
rejected a proposition from the Sudanese government in 1996, about delivering Bin
Laden, according to Al Watan. In the same time, Washington has pressured Ryadh for
receiving Bin Laden from Sudan, but the Saudi authorities refused on the grounds that
they had not yet a strong evidence for his crimes allowing the law-court to sentence
him. See: ahakaza tukafi‘u America hulafa‘aha?
150
Western supplies of Gulf oil by committing the United States to the
defense of the region from external and internal threats. These are threats
from outside of the region by the Soviet Union and threats to Saudi
Arabia and probably other Gulf sheikhdoms from within the region. The
principal instrument to support these commitments is CENTCOM »257
.
At the time, the strategy of dependence upon CENTCOM,
subjected US Gulf policy to criticism from two opposite sources. « On
the one hand, are the critics who view the Gulf as highly instable and
CENTCOM's present posture as likely to be ineffective. On the other
hand are the critics who view the Gulf as stable and CENTCOM as likely
to be unnecessary »258
.
Is it a turning point?
Today, American policy toward the Gulf Cooperation Council
states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates,
and Oman) may be in the midst of a change, according to some
analysis.259
That change might be affected at the margins by the outcome
of the war with Iraq, but its direction is set.
If this hypothesis is right, the change began before the attacks of
September 11, 2001, but its pace has accelerated since that fateful day.
For reasons of domestic politics in both Saudi Arabia and the United
States, it is assumed that Washington can no longer look to Riyadh as the
military centerpiece of its Gulf strategy. Because of the « growing
distance » in the Saudi-American relationship, the smaller Gulf states
would thus assume an even more central role in the maintenance of
American military power in the region, during the war against Iraq, and
most probably thereafter.
In G. Gause III‘s analysis there are three turning points in the US-
Gulf relations260
. The United States would be facing now the third crucial
turning point in its Gulf policy over the past thirty years, since Great
Britain gave up its role as a protecting power over the smaller states of
the lower Gulf. To summarize this point of view, we would say :
257
L.G. Martin. Op. Cit. P.1. 258
L.G. Martin. Op. Cit. P.2. 259
F. Gregory Gause III, The Approaching Turning Point: the future of US
relations with the Gulf States, Brookings Project on US policy towards the Islamic
World, Analysis paper n° 2, May 2003. 260
F.G.Gause ,op.Cit.
151
The first turning point in U.S.-G.C.C. relations was the British
withdrawal of 1971, and the response was the Nixon Doctrine policy of
the ―twin pillars.‖ Unwilling to assume direct military responsibilities in
the region in the midst of the Vietnam War, Washington built up the
Shah‘s Iran and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia with huge arms sales and
military training missions. The aim was that they would act as ―regional
policemen.‖ That policy fell apart with the Iranian Revolution of 1979,
but the military stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war permitted the United States
to remain relatively distant from the region for most of the 1980‘s.
The second turning point, according to the same thesis, began in
1987, with the massive American naval deployment in the Gulf at the end
of the Iran-Iraq war, and culminated in the Gulf war of 1990-91. This
was driven by the fear that a hostile local power, first revolutionary Iran,
then Saddam‘s Iraq, would dominate the region. The regional proxy
policy was replaced by one of direct and sustained American military
presence. The US military relationship with the Arab monarchies of the
GCC, close before that period, became more open, as all six states came
to host what looks to everyone in the region as a permanent American
military presence. For the first time since the closing of the American
military airbase in eastern Saudi Arabia in 1961, there was a continuous
American air force presence in Saudi Arabia from 1991 – not training
missions or American advisors to Saudi units, but an American air wing
stationed in the kingdom. American bases were also built in Kuwait and
Qatar. The American naval force in the Gulf, a paltry three ships in 1971,
was given fleet status and its headquarters in Bahrain was expanded.
American access to facilities in Oman and the UAE increased as well.
This current, third turning point would consolidate the American
military role in the smaller Gulf states, while bringing to an end more
open military cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Whether consciously or
not, the United States is falling into the historic position of Great Britain
in the Gulf, and seems set to replicate the general outlines of British Gulf
strategy: a strong presence on the coast, with a general aversion to
become too involved in inland Arabia. If combined with a new role in
Iraq, the American strategic position would mirror that of Britain
between 1920 and 1958. However, the regional circumstances are much
different from that of the first half of the twentieth century. The
populations of the smaller Gulf States are larger, more educated, and
more politically mobilized now. Their immediate prospects for regime
stability are very good. Yet, a close military association with the United
152
States might become more difficult to sustain domestically in the future –
as it already has in Saudi Arabia.
For the time being, as the American-Saudi relationship is deemed
to be contracting, particularly on the military level, American reliance on
the other Gulf States would be evolving. Since 1991, the United States
has developed an extensive network of Gulf military bases, covering
much of the G.C.C.:
- Kuwait has hosted American troops on a regular basis since
1991, at a permanent facility north of Kuwait City (Camp Doha). The
U.S. has also prepositioned equipment for an armored brigade. With the
build-up of U.S. and allied forces in Kuwait for an attack on Iraq, nearly
one-third of the territory of the country has been declared a closed
military zone.
- The headquarters of the vastly expanded American naval
presence in the Gulf, the Fifth Fleet, is in Manama, Bahrain‘s capital.
There is normally at least one carrier battle group in the Gulf area at all
times. Approximately 4,000 U.S. military personnel are attached
regularly to the headquarters in Bahrain.
- Qatar signed an agreement in December 2002 to upgrade
American facilities in the country, which include a major airfield at Al
Udaid, a command and control center (duplicating facilities in Saudi, in
case the U.S. is denied access to them), and prepositioning depots for the
equipment for two armored brigades.
- Oman provides access to American forces and prepositioned
material at airbases at Al Seeb and Thamarit and on Masirah Island in the
Arabian Sea.
- The port and airport facilities in the UAE provide vital logistical
support for American forces, and the country reportedly hosts more
recreational visits by American troops than any other foreign country.
U.S. military and the Gulf
« America's military strategy in the Persian Gulf has always been
as much about denying control of oil to enemies as assuring the flow of
oil to the West. And the significance of the relationship with Saudi
Arabia has always been more political than military »261
, says S.Telhami.
However, such an agressive policy has been tied up to the Cold War
261
Shibley Telhami, A Need for prudence in the Persian Gulf, The New York
Times, January 29, 2002.
153
time. As Telhami explains it, ―during the cold war, the policy of the
United States was intended to guard against the possibility of Soviet
control of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf region in addition to defending
against disruption of America's own oil supply. As declassified
government documents reveal, an oil-denial strategy was put in place by
the Truman administration in 1949, when it embarked on a policy—
without the knowledge of local governments—to blow up oil
installations and plug oil fields in the gulf states, with cooperation from
Britain and American and British oil companies, if a Soviet invasion
seemed imminent. The deployment of "radiological" weapons to make
the oil fields unusable was also considered. Despite concerns by State
Department officials that such a policy would be opposed by the host
countries if it ever leaked, this policy was implemented in the 1950's and
remained in place at least through the early 1960's, so great was the
worry that the Soviet Union would come to control a substantial share of
the world's oil‖262
.
But today, as the Cold War is over along with the Soviet threat, is
there any justification for an agressive policy ?
Despite there are problems between Americans and Saudis about
US military presence, as it seems, some reports do not exaggerate the
degree of the dissensions. There is even a tendency to inflate the reality
of threats to the security of the GCC States, in order to bind them with
complicated commitments to the US military strategy, and sell out tons
and tons of weapons and military material, which will never be used.
When we read some official reports, like the Congressional Budget
justification, for example, we see how much the American military
establishment is winning from controlling the oil region. In fact, nothing
is clearer than the ties binding the oil industry to the military complex, as
it has been insightfully analyzed by C.Wright Mills in his classic Power
Elite. We can hardly understand in this context, for example, why Saudi
Arabia – or any of the wealthy countries of the Gulf – should ever need
funds allowed by the US government, like IMET, in order to purchase
military training, and why is it a ―privilege‖ for Saudi Arabia to have
such a deal?
The very official Congressional Budget Justification reported263
« that Saudi Arabia remains a strong ally of the United States. The
262
Idem. 263
Congressional Budget Justification for Fiscal Year 04 Foreign Operations,
February 2003, Near East. It can be reached also on this URL:
http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm
154
kingdom has lived up to its pledge to provide the U.S. with whatever
cooperation or support is needed in the global war against terrorism; it
has also provided crucial logistical support for U.S. requests related to
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Saudi Arabia has long provided
political and logistical support for Operation Southern Watch and related
programs. Continued military to military contacts will encourage the
development of a professional military command and armed forces,
which will allow the Kingdom to assume a greater role in self-defense
and will assist the U.S. in achieving its policy goals in the region »264
.
The relatively modest amount of International Military Education
and Training (IMET) fund requested in Federal Year (FY) 2004
($25,000) « will permit the Saudi government to purchase military
training in the U.S. at considerably lower cost than is charged countries
that are not eligible for IMET »265
. While Saudi Arabia controls the
world‘s largest oil reserves, it faces increasing budget pressure. « The
Saudi military consequently enjoys diminished funding, and, as a result,
has sought less expensive -- and less effective -- training from other
countries. These steps have lead to diminished experience with U.S.
equipment and techniques, which in turn risks a decrease in the
interoperability of Saudi armed forces with those of the United
States »266
.
Providing IMET to Saudi Arabia, it is said, « ensures a continued
high level of Saudi attendance at U.S. military training institutions. Such
attendance provides the skills necessary for Saudi officers to maintain a
sophisticated level of military expertise geared towards interoperability
with U.S. forces; it also permits continuing maintenance of the extensive
inventory of sophisticated military systems that U.S. corporations sell to
the Kingdom. Greater exposure to training in the U.S. would apparently
help Saudi military personnel understand U.S. values, ideas, and
policies »267
. The program also « increases awareness of international
norms of human rights and fosters greater respect for the principle of
civilian control of the military, and the rule of law »268
.
Finally, as part of its efforts to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, related technologies
and other weapons, the United States planned to provide NADR Export
264
Idem. 265
Idem. 266
Idem. 267
Idem. 268
Idem.
155
Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) funds for a
cooperative program to help establish fully effective export controls in
Saudi Arabia. FY04 NADR funding focused on strengthening export
laws and regulations as well as establishing effective enforcement
procedures and capabilities.
Concerning the other Gulf States, the report stipulates the
following:
* Bahrain: In 2001, the US President designated Bahrain a
« Major Non-NATO Ally » (MNNA) in recognition of the close
cooperation and facilities support that Bahrain has provided the U.S.
Navy for the past 50 years. Bahrain currently hosts NAVCENT, the U.S.
Navy Fifth Fleet Headquarters, and important air assets. The United
States has « an enduring national security interest in retaining access to
these military facilities in order to maintain stability in the Gulf and to
facilitate the on-going war on terrorism »269
. The relatively open access
to facilities, land and airspace that Bahrain provides is « critical to: U.S.
Operations in Afghanistan, Multinational Interception Force (MIF)
activities that prevent illicit smuggling of Iraqi oil and other goods, and
any contingency operations and/or force projection in the Gulf and
Southwest Asian areas »270
. According to the report, the Government of
Bahrain has been a steadfast supporter of the US foreign policy
objectives. A member of the coalition against Iraq since 1990, « it has
remained a strong supporter of U.S. policies toward Iraq. During its
recent tenure on the UN Security Council (2000-02), Bahrain supported
U.S. objectives throughout the region »271
. Since the attacks on the
Pentagon and World Trade Center, Bahrain has also been a key supporter
of the US war on terrorism. Bahrain responded positively to all U.S.
requests connected to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and donated
its sole frigate to provide humanitarian support for Afghan relief. U.S.
political and military support and cooperation helps encourage the
political and economic reforms fostered by the King and Crown Prince.
In October 2002, Bahrainis elected the lower house of the National
Assembly by universal suffrage. Women candidates ran for national
269
See for Bahrain the same report on Congressional Budget Justification.
Op.Cit. 270
Idem. 271
Idem.
156
office in those elections -- a first for any Gulf Cooperation Council
member state.
U.S. security assistance programs – Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and International Military and Education Training (IMET) –
support « the United States‘ national interest in maintaining stability in
the Gulf, promote interoperability and understanding with U.S. forces,
and buttress Bahrain‘s defensive capabilities »272
, says the report.
Bahrain received FMF for the first time in FY 2002 as part of the
supplemental appropriations request. While the FY 2002 allocation
funded the purchase of a critical air defense radar system, FY 2004 FMF
funding of $25 million would make important related weapons upgrades
and the further development of a truly integrated air defense network
possible. « Increased air defense coverage results in increased security
not only for Bahrain but also for U.S. and coalition forces »273
. The FY
2004 IMET increase from $450 to $600 thousand would allow more
Bahrainis to attend Professional Military Education (PME) courses in the
U.S.
Bahrainis regularly attend U.S. service war colleges, command
and staff colleges, and other key PME courses. Bahraini attendance at
key PME courses has fostered « important one-to-one relationships that
are paying invaluable rewards in the form of interoperability,
coordination and mutual understanding. Moreover, the IMET program is
said to increase awareness of international norms of human rights and to
foster greater respect for the principle of civilian control of the military,
the rule of law, and to help encourage the political reform already
underway in Bahrain »274
. Bahrain is also eligible to receive U.S. Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
* Oman: the country occupies a strategic location on the
underbelly of the Arabian Peninsula and on the southern shore of the
Strait of Hormuz. As the Strait forms a key naval chokepoint for a very
large percentage of the world‘s oil and gas shipments, the Oman-U.S.
relationship is viewed as « critical to U.S. defense interests, not only in
the Persian Gulf region, but also globally »275
. Since concluding a
272
Idem. 273
Idem. 274
Idem. 275
Congressional Budget Justification. Op.Cit.Oman.
157
bilateral agreement with Oman in 1980, the United States has had access
to Omani military bases. This has proven « invaluable for U.S. combat
support and readiness » in the Gulf. Oman has been a « stalwart
supporter » of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
providing critical support in a wide variety of areas. Oman has also been
an « active, long-time supporter of U.S. political and military initiatives
vis-à-vis Iraq ». The United States has « a critical interest in ensuring that
Oman continues to participate in efforts to promote regional stability, as
well as in retaining access to key Omani military facilities. Continued
access and assistance will be vital »276
to the success of any future
operations in Southwest Asia.
Continuing FMF support in the amount of $25 million was
requested in FY 2004. These funds would « help Oman address its
critical defense needs and focus on helping Oman increase its ability to
secure and monitor its considerable land and maritime borders »,
including the vital Strait of Hormuz. Oman‘s ability to monitor its
maritime borders, especially the Straits, « directly supports the war on
terrorism, complements expanding Coalition maritime interdiction
operations »277
, and helps ensure that the deployment route to the Gulf
remains unobstructed. FY 2004 FMF would help fund the acquisition of
a coastal surveillance system, mine countermeasure equipment and
coastal patrol boats. US improved defense sales relationship with Oman
would also be well served by this modest FMF program.
Increased IMET funding of $1 million requested in FY 2004
would also help « buttress the bilateral military relationship » with
Oman. Omani attendance at Professional Military Education (PME)
courses helps foster « one-to-one relationships that pay invaluable
rewards later in the form of interoperability, access, coordination and
mutual understanding. Maintenance, logistics and specialist training
would enhance the Omani military‘s value as a training and coalition
partner »278
. In addition, Oman was eligible in FY 2004 to receive Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis under Section 516 of the
Foreign Assistance Act. Omani access to EDA would complement U.S.
assistance under the FMF and IMET programs.
Finally, as part of its efforts to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, related technologies
276
Idem. 277
Idem. 278
Idem.
158
and other weapons, the United States planned to provide NADR Export
Control and Related Border Security assistance funds to a cooperative
program « to help establish fully effective export controls in Oman ». FY
2004 NADR funding is focused primarily on establishing effective
enforcement procedures and capabilities, including through the provision
of equipment.
* United Arab Emirates: Thanks to careful management of its
oil wealth and the free trade and open market policies promulgated by its
leadership, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an important regional
actor in the Gulf. U.S. relations with the UAE have developed
significantly since the 1991 Gulf War, and have become especially close
and mutually supportive since the beginning of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF). The UAE is the tourism, financial, transportation, trans-
shipment, and trade center of the Gulf region, and 20,000 American
citizens live and work there as a result. The UAE is said to be « open to
continued strong relations with the United States and considers its
fundamental interests and values as compatible with U.S. goals »279
.
Relatively modest U.S. technical assistance to the UAE would be critical
in helping its federal and emirate authorities to focus their « tracking of
possible shipments of components of weapons of mass destruction and
related materials through UAE ports and airports »280
.
As part of efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, their delivery systems, related technologies, and other
weapons, the United States planned to provide NADR Export Control
and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program funds for a
cooperative program in the United Arab Emirates. FY 2004 NADR
funding was provided to strengthen export control laws and regulations
as well as improve export control enforcement through training and
equipment.
In the Fiscal Year 2005 US Budget request, we can read the
following:
« For there to be security in the long run—both in the Greater
Middle East and here at home—we must marshal the energy and ideals
upon which our Nation was founded and work to promote democracy in
the region. The President‘s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)
279
Congressional Budget Justification. Op.Cit.UAE. 280
Idem.
159
promotes political, economic, and educational reform efforts in the
Middle East, especially focused on opportunities for women and youth.
MEPI funds grants, partnerships, training, and technical assistance. The
President proposes to increase funding for this important initiative in
2005 to $150 million. The President also proposes to double funding to
$80 million in 2005 for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
for a Greater Middle East Leadership and Democracy initiative. The
Endowment is a grant-making foundation that distributes funds to private
organizations for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad. NED
focuses on democracy-building through civic education, developing
political parties, encouraging a free press, and promoting human
rights. »281
The same report contains a document entitled ―summary of
accomplishments and future challenges‖, which we reproduce as such
hereafter :
281
FY2005 Budget Request, which can be found at:
http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm
160
A Record of Accomplishment
(2004 vs. 2001 levels except as
noted)
A Commitment to the Future
(2005 proposals vs. 2004 levels
except as noted)
*Responded to the September 11th
terrorist attacks with the War on Terror—
led a coalition to defeat the terrorist-
supporting regimes in Afghanistan and
Iraq, liberated 50 million people, and
began rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq.
*Began transformation of DOD to face
threats of the 21st Century and increased
the defense budget 26 percent, the largest
increase since the Reagan
Administration.
*To defend against long range missile
threats, doubled investments in missile
defense systems and will deploy the first
ever land and sea-based system.
*Increased military pay by more than 21
percent over three years, expanded use of
targeted pay and bonuses, and improved
housing.
*Secured enactment of the largest
Government reorganization in a half-
century, merging 22 entities into the
Department of Homeland Security.
*Protected America by nearly tripling
homeland security discretionary funding.
*Provided $4.5 billion to State and local
governments and hospitals for
Bioterrorism preparedness, and secured
$5.6 billion for the BioShield Initiative.
*Provided a total of $8.8 billion for
terrorism-preparedness training and
equipment for State and local first
responders.
*Improved border and transportation
security by increased funding of nearly
$9 billion.
*Transformed the FBI into an agency
whose primary mission is to prevent
terrorist attacks and increased its budget
by over 40 percent.
*Blocked over $136.8 million in terrorist
assets.
*Advances ongoing efforts in the War on
Terror by providing $1.2 billion for
rebuilding Afghanistan and continues to
build a broad coalition to defeat terrorism
and spread freedom and democracy
worldwide.
*Targets over $5.7 billion in military and
economic assistance to front-line states
supporting the United States in the War
on Terror.
*Continues strengthening and
transformation of defense capabilities by
providing $402 billion for DOD, a seven-
percent increase.
*Provides a 3.5-percent pay raise for
military personnel and improves housing
by privatizing 90,000 units by the end of
2005.
*Improves America's security with a 10-
percent increase in homeland security
discretionary spending.
*Provides $5.3 billion for the
Transportation Security Administration (a
20-percent increase) and $6.2 billion for
the Coast Guard (a nine-percent
increase).
*Doubles the level of first responder
preparedness grants targeted to high-
threat areas that face greater risk and
vulnerability.
*Protects our food supply by providing
$553 million (a 180-percent increase) in
funds for a new agriculture and food
defense initiative and $274 million for a
new biosurveillance initiative.
*Provides $5.1 billion (an 11-percent
increase) for the FBI, including a $357
million increase for counterterrorism
activities.
161
Actually, these are a lot of services offered to the Gulf customers,
and the question is about whether these are ―privileged services‖ for
wealthy states, or programs for all the US allies. Is it a free option for
any State of the Gulf to join or reject, or a ―highly recommended‖ one?
What if neither Saudi Arabia nor its partners in the GCC want more
military training and weaponry? Besides, one cannot but point out to the
assumption that there is a link between maintaining the American
military build up in the region and keeping alive and propagating the idea
that any of the GCC States is about to ―implode‖ because of the internal
pressure or ―explode‖ because of the external, as if the sole presence of
the American military is the life-lifebuoy. We have to underline though,
that while the civilian cooperation may be appreciated, the American
militay presence is a subject of controversy, if not of dissension in the
region ; and that while it may be considered as a deterrent to potential
rivals (like Iran), it has also served as the main reason for accumulated
anger and protest, thus increasing the difficulties of the concerned
governments.
Democracy for sail
Should the Arabs democratise to alleviate American pains or
theirs? How can democracy fit in with the American military
surveillance? Should we consider the call for democratization emanating
from the Bush administration as a favorable response sympathyzing with
the social forces movement in the Arab countries or just an attempt to
control it?
It is today widely believed that the call for democratization and
reform for the Middle Eastern societies has emerged out of the mess of
September 11.
In his State of the Union address on 28 January 2004, US
President George W. Bush urged the rapid democratization of the Middle
East. Substantive details of Bush‘s plan were leaked to a London-based
Arab newspaper two weeks later, as a document branded ‗the Greater
Middle East Initiative‘ (GMEI). They amounted to a reform package
intentionally recalling the 1975 Helsinki Accords (which challenged the
Soviet bloc to respect individual freedoms and human rights) and
particularly focused on replacing autocracy with participatory
democracy. The initiative seemed to fit into Bush‘s larger vision, dubbed
the ‗forward strategy of freedom‘, which has been advanced as the core
162
of the administration‘s Middle East foreign policy. Superficially, the
initiative is targeting three ‗deficits‘ identified in the UN Arab Human
Development Report – freedom, knowledge and female empowerment –
as the bases for its own proposals, and couching outside involvement in
the no threatening language of development assistance. A more nuanced
reading of the document, however, illuminates a bottom-up approach that
would largely bypass states in favor of local stakeholders. For this
reason, regional powers, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were
indignant. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak complained that ‗we hear
about these initiatives as if the region and its states do not exist, as if they
had no sovereignty over their land‘.
The US stood a chance of diplomatically salvaging the GMEI by
recasting it as a prescription for support rather than an outside
imposition. In any case, there were some authoritarian regimes that the
US would not want to alienate in the near future. These included the
secular, anti-Islamist governments of Egypt and Jordan – both of which
have made peace with Israel – and the relatively cooperative Yemeni
regime. Another would be the government of Algerian President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who is credited with taming an Islamic insurgency
unleashed in 1992 when an Islamist victory in democratic elections was
invalidated, has been a strong US counter-terrorism partner, and on 8
April was re-elected with 83% of the vote in an election deemed
generally fair by international observers.
The values embodied in the initiative, however, are not likely to
change. It enshrines the idea that US security concerns are best served
not by cultivating relationships with autocrats but by directly addressing
the root causes of terrorism. Moreover, the GMEI implicitly rejected the
idea that the resolution of the Palestinian issue is a prerequisite for
progress elsewhere. But the conventional wisdom, espoused by the
authoritarian leaders themselves, is that until the Palestinians have
attained a just settlement, illiberal states will continue to be justified as
necessary to maintaining order and insulating policy from the passions of
the ‗Arab street‘. Several prominent European leaders sympathize with
this view and oppose the GMEI. Until the death of Yasir Arafat,
Washington‘s decision to downplay conflict resolution between the
Israelis and Palestinians was consistent with the Bush administration‘s
general aversion to strategic micromanagement, but squared less easily
with the administration‘s express advocacy of a two-state solution.
However, it did seem to reflect realistically low expectations for
the ‗road map‘ for peace that was rolled out in May 2003 and has since
163
met with frustration due to persistent continuation of violence on both
sides and the inflexibility of both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships.
Marginalizing the conflict implied recognition that Palestinian fighting
and Israel‘s determination to diminish its citizens‘ vulnerability – by
building a security barrier and withdrawing from Gaza and parts of the
West Bank – had conclusively interred the Oslo process. Yet there was a
danger that the subordination of the Israeli–Palestinian problem could
lead to missed opportunities and increasing discomfort among allies.
As of April 2004, however, the US had its hands full in Iraq.
Against hopes of improving security to ease the scheduled handover of
sovereignty to the Iraqis on 30 June 2004, US retaliation for the ambush
and brutal killing of four American security contractors in the
conservative town of Falluja, west of Baghdad, on 30 March triggered a
Shiite, then a Sunnite uprising against the US-led occupation. Thus, if in
April 2003, a US military victory in Iraq was imminent, by April 2004, it
had come and gone, and an American political triumph in Iraq and major
peace dividends in the region seemed neither close nor assured.
A similarity between the cases of Iraq and Palestine, consisting in
the American emphasis on democratization, has not been enough
underlined by observers, although it is in the heart – as we assume- of the
GMEI deal. The link with the security and stability of the Gulf is likely
an issue still open for the debate.
As many American analysts point out, the future of Iraq also has
important regional implications. Since Saddam Hussein‘s rise to power in
the late 1970s, the country has been a source of regional instability. If the
domestic situation does not stabilize, violence and political unrest could
spread over Iraq‘s long and porous borders. But if US plans succeed,
Iraq, as a westward-leaning beacon of democracy and free markets, is
likely to inspire a measure of political and economic reform that could
both ameliorate the region‘s endemic problems and improve the chances
of a better accommodation between the Arab world and the West.
The Iraq war proved to be a mixed blessing for Tehran. The US-
led coalition‘s ouster of Saddam Hussein removed a deep and painful
thorn from Iran‘s side, and liberated Iranian Shiites‘ religious brethren –
the 65% Shiite majority that Saddam had brutally repressed. Tehran was
nonetheless uncomfortable with the United States installed as a powerful
occupying force in both Afghanistan and Iraq, on its eastern and western
flanks. Moreover, the liberation of the Iraqi Shiites stood to further
deepen the political and doctrinal cleavages in Iran‘s Islamic political
system, which hinges on the Velayat-al Faqih, or absolute clerical rule. In
164
that system, political influence and power are derived from the clerical
establishment in Iran. Any law or governing standard must be ‗Islamic‘,
and that determination falls to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In Iraq, there is an assumption that a new and powerful source of Shiite
religious authority beyond Tehran‘s control could arise and test the
already vulnerable doctrinal basis of a regime founded on a fairly narrow
interpretation of Shia thought. In particular, Iraqi Shiites‘ traditional
opposition to the mixing of religion and politics was by February 2004
providing considerable intellectual support for those in Iranian politics
who questioned the prudence of paramount religiously based political
authority in Iran. More broadly, the rise of the Iraqi Shiites may
challenge Iran‘s international primacy, and give the non-Iranian Shiites –
from Lebanon and Yemen, to Azerbaijan and India – a greater say in
Shia affairs.
Societies under stress
In the charged diplomatic atmosphere following the failure of UN
debates on Iraq, both Iran and the EU had much to gain from
demonstrating that the EU‘s ‗constructive engagement‘ of Tehran could
produce tangible results. Tehran was motivated to deflect overly
aggressive American attention, while the EU could claim to be taking
direct and effective action to bring Iran into line without resort to the
threat or use of force. The focus of European diplomacy was Iran‘s
nuclear program, which both Washington and European capitals saw as
an Iranian bid to obtain a nuclear weapons breakout option. The EU
troika (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) was able in October
2003 to convince Iran to give a full account of its nuclear program before
the 31 October deadline set by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) board to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing
activities, and to bring all of its nuclear activities under stronger IAEA
inspections. Both Brussels and Tehran portrayed this development as a
victory for dialogue over coercion.
But the onus was on Tehran and the EU to convince a skeptical
United States that the agreement reached in Tehran on 21 October
between the troika‘s foreign ministers and the Iranian government,
through the office of its National Security Council, was comprehensive
and robust enough not to require referral to the UN Security Council for
further actions, including potential economic and political sanctions. The
165
latter option had been the United States‘ preferred mode of dealing with
Iran since 2002, when revelations about Iran‘s clandestine nuclear
activities began to surface. Questions about the Iranian–European deal
rose immediately before the March 2004 IAEA Board of Governors‘
meeting, when the IAEA reported that Iran had failed to fully report its
past enrichment program and was continuing to build centrifuge
machines, despite its October 2003 commitments. Faced with the
prospect that the US and Europe might join forces to report Iranian non-
compliance to the Security Council, Tehran again made tactical
concessions, agreeing to expand the suspension to include construction of
additional centrifuge machines, while the IAEA Board responded to
Washington‘s unhappiness by giving Iran another ‗last chance‘. As of
March 2004, many observers believed that additional revelations of
Iran‘s nuclear activities could still emerge, making it undeniable that
Iran‘s nuclear program was intended to give Iran a nuclear weapons
option. A recent study282
states that in an era in which U.S. interests are
being examined more critically, the greater Middle East continues to
present high stakes for American policymakers. Taking a longer-term
(through 2025) perspective, U.S. key national interests include according
to this document:
* the survival of Israel and completion of the Middle East peace
process,
* access to oil,
* forestalling the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon,
* preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
* promoting political and economic reform and through it internal
stability, and
* holding terrorism in check.
Some of these interests are specific to the region, but most are
closely linked to broader, systemic interests in stability, non-
proliferation, energy security, and evolutionary versus revolutionary
change.
The notion of the « Greater Middle East » -GME- has been
adopted to capture one of the key macro trends in the current strategic
environment, and one that is assumed will be even more significant in the
future — that is, the steady erosion of traditional distinctions between
282
Sources of Conflict in the Greater Middle East, by Ian O. Lesser, Bruce R.
Nardulli, and Lory A. Arghavan, in: Rand Project Air Force/ The Muslim World after
9/11.
166
―Middle Eastern‖ security and ―European‖ and ―Eurasian‖ security. This
erosion is the result of the growing reach of military systems and the
growing economic and political interdependence of regions. Spillovers of
different sorts, from transregional terrorism and smuggling to refugee
flows and migration, are further contributing to the breakdown of old
regional definitions.
For the authors of the afore-mentioned study there are at least
four trends to be closely watched. They are peculiar to what they call
"societies under stress"283
. In their analysis, States across the region are
facing threats to stability as a result of internal trends. The most
consequential trends in this context include:
« - demographic change and relentless urbanization ;
- problems of economic growth and reform ;
- dysfunctional societies and the erosion of state control, and
crises of political legitimacy and the challenges of Islam and
nationalism »284
.
Taken together, these trends have encouraged and would
assumedly continue to support a pervasive sense of insecurity within
Middle Eastern societies. When officials and observers within the region
itself talk about future security, they would be concerned first and
foremost with internal security. The key ―drivers‖ identified here would
all « have consequences for the types of conflict and nonconflict
demands and constraints the U.S. military is likely to confront across the
region through 2025. The drivers represent deep systemic factors that
will be at the forefront of challenges to stability in the region for the next
several decades ».285
Handling the unrest
On May 5–6, 2003, Rand‘s Center for Middle East Public Policy
(CMEPP) and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) held a two-
day conference in Geneva on ―The Middle East in the Shadow of
Afghanistan and Iraq.‖ The conference was the fourth in a series of
283
Idem. 284
Idem. 285
Idem.
167
collaborative efforts by GCSP and RAND‘s CMEPP in the area of
security policy 286
.
The discussion of the impact of the Iraq war on the Arabian
Peninsula centered around two broad issues. The first was the impact on
the regional balance of power, particularly Saudi Arabia‘s role. While it
was difficult to say exactly what the impact of the Iraq war would be on
the Arabian peninsula, several participants suggested that it could lead to
« shifts in the regional balance of power ». In particular, the balance of
power in the GCC could « shift away from Saudi Arabia ». Qatar, they
noted, was emerging as « a major player » in the Gulf. It wanted « to get
out from under Saudi domination » and had clearly thrown in its lot with
the United States. Qatar‘s policy and regional ambitions were of concern
to Saudi Arabia, but its ambitions were « not congruent with Qatar‘s size
and real possibilities ». Qatar, some participants suggested, seemed to be
« punching above its weight »287
.
Iraq‘s evolution, several participants stressed, could have an
important impact on the Gulf States. If Iraq becomes a pro-U.S.
democracy, this could have a liberalizing impact on the Gulf monarchies.
The U.S. victory would end an era in which Gulf States lived under an
Iraqi threat. At the same time, there was a possibility that Iraq might be
integrated into a Gulf security system. In such a case, « a new Iraqi-led
bloc could emerge as a counterbalance to Iran, but also to Saudi Arabia‘s
detriment »288
.
Accordingly , Saudi Arabia was « likely to be affected » as well.
A reassessment of U.S.-Saudi relations was already visible before the
outbreak of the war with Iraq. But it was likely to gain greater
momentum as a result of the war. The Saudis, one participant pointed
out, had actually been more helpful in the Iraq war than many observers
had expected. Publicly, they had been rather critical of the war, but
« behind the scenes they had rendered considerable support to the United
States ». In any event, the war was likely to result in a lower U.S.
military profile in Saudi Arabia, which in turn could help reduce tensions
in U.S.-Saudi relations.
Saudi Arabia would remain sensitive to continued turmoil in Iraq,
it was noted. Iraq oil, participants agreed, could have an important
impact. Once Iraq‘s oil came back on line, this could reduce Western
286
The Middle East in the Shadow of Afghanistan and Iraq, National Security
Research Division, F.Stephen Larrabee, Rand. 2003. 287
Idem. 288
Idem.
168
dependence on Saudi oil. But it was stressed that it would take time for
Iraq to increase its oil production and that with the best will in the world,
Iraq could not replace Saudi Arabia‘s vital role as ―swing producer‖ in
the event of crises and shortfalls; for that, it would need the unused spare
capacity of two million barrels a day that was a uniquely Saudi asset.
Nonetheless, « either a strong pro-American and reformist Iraq or a
weak, unstable Iraq could lead to greater social unrest in Saudi Arabia »,
several participants warned. One important consideration will be the
nature of the regime that emerges in post-Saddam Iraq. If a Shia-
dominated republic should emerge in Iraq, « Saudi Arabia would feel
threatened »289
. In such a case, Riyadh could move to intensify relations
with Pakistan and might look to Islamabad for nuclear reassurance.
We have to notice, by the way, that this hypothesis needs
validation. First, Saudi Arabia is not a country with an important number
of Shiites. Historically, Shiisme has had very little impact on the
population, which is not the case of other arab countries. Iraq has been
certainly a hub for shiite activity, as well as Egypt and Tunisia in the
medieval times. The mainland of the contemporary Saudi Arabia has
never been under Shiite spell ; and there is no reason that it will be in the
future. Second, the only time wherein the Saudi kingdom felt threatened
by a shiite phenomenon was when the Islamic revolution of Iran burst
out. However, Saudi Arabia was not then the only country which felt the
threat. It was all the Arab countries – Iraq in the forefront – that felt the
destabilizing wave of the Iranian radical islamism…until the remote
Morocco , which explains why all sided with Saddam during the 8 years
long war with Iran.
Iranian nuclear ambitions are another important factor supposed
to affect the regional balance. If Iran develops nuclear weapons, the
United States, one participant suggested, « might be prompted to provide
a nuclear umbrella to the Gulf States ». However, this would only work,
another noted, as long as Iran did not have nuclear weapons that could
reach the United States. Once Iran achieved the capability to deliver
nuclear weapons that could hit the United States, the calculation would
change.
A second dominant theme during discussions was the prospects
for internal reform in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia. Several
participants noted that there was pressure for reform both from the top
and from the bottom. Both Bahrain and Qatar had recently taken steps
289
Idem.
169
toward greater political liberalization. An amorphous movement for
reform had also gained strength in Saudi Arabia since the 9/11 attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
However, the parameters of reform are not clear. Most of the
leaders in the region were interested in some form of ―decompression‖—
that is, a relaxation of some restrictions—not genuine liberalization. This
was designed to buy time and postpone major reform. However, the
Iranian experience called into question whether slow, selective reform
could work.
Power paradox and Empire nostalgia
The reconstruction of Iraq intersects with two other, more subtle
developments which, when combined with Saddam‘s removal, amount to
a watershed that permits a new and better security system to be built. One
is the growing acceptance by elites in Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states of the need for domestic reform. The
other development, obscured by rhetoric on both sides, is the growing
possibility that America and Iran can do business with each other. This
seems to be also the point of view of Kenneth M. Pollack, who served as
―Director for Persian Gulf Affairs‖ on the staff of the National Security
Council (from 1995 to 1990 and 1999 to 2001). He thinks that the three
main problems likely to bedevil the Gulf security over the next several
years « will be Iraq‘s security dilemma, Iran‘s nuclear weapons program,
and potential internal unrest in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council »290
.
To summarize his thesis, let us say that ―the paradox of Iraqi
power can be put simply : any Iraq that is strong enough to balance and
contain Iran will inevitably be capable of overrunning Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia‖291
. This hypothesis is apparently suggested by a precedent :
Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait. Yet, Besides the fact that Saddam‘s
intentions concerning Saudi Arabia are not known, and much less known
as yet was his capacity of achieving such a scheme, it is not necessary
that history repeats itself. To suggest such a hypothesis is to subsequently
imply that Iraq itself is condemned to be ruled by dictators and
expansionist leaders, whereas all the efforts are today focusing on
290
Kenneth M.Pollack, Securing the Gulf, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003. 291
Idem.
170
orienting the whole region – not only Iraq – toward democracy and
peace.
As for Iran, Pollack is convinced that ―its nuclear program has
gone into overdrive and unless stopped – from inside or outside – is
likely to produce one or more nuclear weapons within five years‖292
.
Concerning the unrest, he thinks that ―terrorism and internal instability in
the Persian Gulf are ultimately fueled by the political, economic, and
social stagnation of the local Arab states‖293
.
Now, where does all this become problematic for the United
States?
We should first remember that the US troops are already in Iraq,
and nobody knows until what time they will remain there, which means
also – to borrow an ironical expression widespread in the Arab media -
that the USA is, since April 2003, ―Iran‘s neighbor‖. Thus, the first two
questions – Iraq and Iran – are being tackled straightforward by the USA.
Yet, this is not the end of the troubles, but perhaps their beginning, for it
is – as everybody can state – an ambiguous tackling in an abnormal
situation.
Ambiguous, because of the unsaid, which lies in the intentions of
the concerned parties, or which is imagined as being a part of their varied
– and often- adverse projects. As to the abnormality of the situation, we
do not need to say more about what is believed to be as explosive as
harmful, not only to the region, but possibly to the world, included the
USA. Pollack emphasises in the same article that ―the United States is
not simply concerned with keeping oil flowing out of the Persian Gulf; it
also has an interest in preventing any potentially hostile state from
gaining control over the region and its resources and using such control
to amass vast power or blackmail the world‖294
, which sounds to be the
author‘s conclusion of the brief and violent Iraqi adventure with Kuwait.
But as we have already hinted, this is not the only reason for the
American presence. Just observe what happened since the Gulf War
(Desert Storm): a controversy over American military presence in the
Gulf (not only in Saudi Arabia); a controversy over the American
intervention in Iraq ; a controversy over American military presence in
Iraq ; and now a controversy over Iranian nuclear program.
292
Idem. 293
Idem. 294
Idem.
171
In this context and regarding the increasing critics, President Bush
for his first tour in Europe after his reelection, chose to allay the
Europeans : he depicted the allegations that the USA prepare an invasion
of Iran as ―ridiculous‖. Yet, he did not rule out any option in handling the
Iranian problem, which cast much more ambiguity even on the term
―ridiculous‖. Some people in Europe wondered: do we have the same
understanding of the language and the terms used in Europe and the
USA?
The unrest in the Gulf may even open the door to more ambiguity
and more controversial issues. In the American vision still marked by the
9/11 event, the unrest is linked directly to radical Islamism, governmental
despotism, and other social and economic failures, which breeds
terrorism. Moreover,― if the United States were denied access to the
Persian Gulf, its ability to influence events in many other key regions of
the world would be greatly diminished‖295
, notes Pollack, which is not
inaccurate. So, the issue is not only about local unrest, but also about
wider strategic concerns of the USA. This is precisely another source of
problems, inasmuch as the populations of the region feel that the US
military presence, instead of reassuring them, makes them uneasy. Such a
feeling may find its source even in the US theories about Empire and
hegemony that seem to have flourished after 9/11.
―In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New
York and Washington‖, notes Ivan Eland, ―several foreign policy
observers have concluded that America should look to the vanished
empires of the past for foreign policy guidance, not because the strategy
of empire should be scrupulously avoided, but because the strategy of
empire should be unabashedly embraced‖296
. Several examples may be
mentioned in this context. The first is provided by Max Boot of the
Council of Foreign Relations and former Wall Street Journal editorial
features editor. The September 11 attacks, says Boot, were ―the result of
insufficient American involvement and ambition ; the solution is to be
more expansive in our goals and more assertive in our implementation
(…) Afghanistan and other troubled lands today cry out for the sort of
295
Idem. 296
Ivan Eland, The Empire Strikes Out, the new imperialism and its fatal flaws,
Policy analysis n° 459, November 26, 2002, Cato Institute. See also: Hichem Karoui,
What has changed in the imperial views, 11/6/03:
http://www.hichemkaroui.com/archives.htm
172
enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident
Englishmen in Jodhpurs and pit helmets‖297
.
Sebastian Mallaby, Washington Post columnist, is also quoted as
an advocate of empire. He says that ―the logic of neo-imperialism is too
compelling … to resist. The chaos of the world is too threatening to
ignore, and existing methods for dealing with that chaos have been tried
and found wanting‖. He therefore calls for an ―imperialist revival‖
wherein orderly societies, led by the United States, can and should take a
page from the past and ―impose their own institutions on disorderly
ones‖298
.
Robert Kaplan, Atlantic Monthly correspondent, goes a little
further. The advise for American foreign policy should be sought in the
chronicles of the Greek, Roman, and British empires, in his view. ―Our
future leaders could do worse than be praised for their…ability to bring
prosperity to distant parts of the world under America‘s soft imperial
influence‖, says Kaplan, and ―Rome in particular, is a model for
hegemonic power, using various means to encourage a modicum of order
in a disorderly world‖299
.
In the result, this kind of speculations is not very reassuring,
either to the Arab populations or to their elites. The problem is that
beyond the obvious hegemonic views such theories convey, they leave no
place anymore to trust and confidence. How much of this talk about neo-
imperialism and empire nostalgia has reached the ears of the policy
makers in the Bush administration, and what is its impact ? Such is the
question the Arabs would raise, particularly when such views are linked
to neo-cons having an important part in the current foreign policy of the
USA.
―We always looked upon the media in the West, if I may use both
Britain and others, as a model of truth, as people who call a spade a
spade, and that would not try to cover up‖, says Khaled al Maeena, Arab
News editor-in-chief. ― But (…) we all became criminals (…) It‘s
297
Max Boot, The Case for American Empire, Weekly Standard, October 15,
2001.
27 Also see the same author: The Savage Wars of Peace: small wars and the
rise of American power (New York, Basic Books, 2002). Cited in: I. Eland. Op. Cit. 298
Sebastian Mallaby, The Reluctant Imperialist: terrorism, failed states, and the
case for American Empire, Foreign Policy 81, n° 2, March-April 2002. Cited in: I.
Eland. Op.Cit. 299
Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: why leadership demands a pagan ethos,
New York, Random House, 2002, p.153. Cited in: I. Eland.Op.Cit.
173
unfortunate because America has never been a colonizing power‖.300
However, with such imperial views in sight, and with a thorough reading
of American history – such as the one made for example by Howard
Zinn301
– would we still find that America « has never been a colonizing
power » ?
Withdrawing troops
Actually, what cannot be occulted is the existence of a debate
inside the USA. All those issues are discussed publicly, and because of
the transparency of a democratic society we can find their track, and
follow up with analysis and commentaries. Whereas in the Arab world
itself, such a task is much harder to performing.
Another aspect of the problem, as it seems to us, consists in that
the ambiguity of the US policy may also emanate from the nature of the
situation in the Gulf region, in addition to the nature of the political
debate in the American society.
―Many of those who called for an end to the American presence
in Saudi Arabia argue that the United States military must remain in the
region indefinitely for one reason : oil‖, says Christopher Preble, from
the Cato Institute 302
. ― To those who are focused on the Gulf‘s energy
resources and who argue that U.S. troops must remain in the region, the
euphemism most frequently used is ―engagement,‖ as if, the presence of
U.S. troops ensures that the United States is ―engaged.‖ By this logic,
engagement comes only at the barrel of a gun. But why can we not
assume that individual initiative, private enterprise, and cultural
exchange are also forms of engagement? Do people only travel to places
where U.S. troops are stationed? Can commerce only take place in the
presence of American troops? Of course not.‖ 303
These remarks might as well have been issued by an Arab writer.
Put under such a pen nobody would notice any difference. This means
also that people‘s minds are more connected to each other than the
differences of the races, the countries or the religions, may suggest. The
300
Media, Terrorism, and Reality, Remarks by Khaled al-Maeena, 13th Arab-
US Policymakers Conference, Washington DC, September 13, 2004. 301
Howard Zinn, A people‘s History Of The United States ; Harper Colophon
Books ; 1980. 302
Christopher Preble, After Victory, toward a new military posture in the
Persian Gulf, Policy analysis n° 477, June 10, 2003. Cato Institute. 303
Idem.
174
reason for that has been explained by a great genius of the XVth century:
Descartes, who said in his famous Discourse of the Method, that common
sense is the most shared thing in the world. We don‘t need to go further,
in order to find what makes us so different and so similar at once. Yet, if
common sense is the most shared thing in the world, stupidity is no less.
In this context, human history is as much the story of the success of
Reason than that of unreason and stupidity.
To continue with Preble‘s analysis, he thinks that ―The United
States needs not have troops stationed in the Persian Gulf in order to
remain engaged in the region. The Gulf‘s energy resources are important
to the global economy, but goods and services flow on the world market
where explicit ―protection‖ by military forces‖304
is absent. Furthermore,
if these troops have stabilized the Gulf, they remain also a source of
tension and instability, as the terrorist attacks against the Americans, in
Saudi Arabia demonstrated.
Preble rightly remarks that the American military presence in the
Middle East has engendered widespread animosity throughout the
Muslim world. He reminds us that in 1996, former U.S. Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia Richard Murphy called the ―great probability of terrorism
to be ‗an inescapable consequence‘ of our decision to keep troops in the
region.‖ But Murphy‘s statement presumed that the United States had no
choice but to leave American forces in the region.
―In fact‖, says Preble, ― given the threat from terrorism and the
limited utility of the forces in the region, a change in our military
deployment policy was warranted long before September 11, 2001.‖305
So, what‘s happened? Why instead of withdrawing forces, the
USA increased them?
For Preble, ―despite the known risks (…) three successive
presidential administrations, both Republican and Democratic, chose to
keep American troops in the region.‖ Furthermore, he says ―The
president of the United States should never submit American foreign
policy goals to the vagaries of international public opinion. But when the
troops serve no useful purpose, their presence is known to contribute to
anti-American sentiment, and those who wish us ill capitalize on anti-
Americanism to encourage disgruntled psychopaths to fly airplanes into
304
Idem. 305
Idem.
175
buildings, it is clear that our forces in the Persian Gulf make America
less, not more, secure.‖306
Like many observers, Arabs and Westerners, Preble advises that
the United States should follow up its military victory and the
establishment of a new Iraqi government with swift troop withdrawal
from Iraq. Besides, the Bush administration‘s decision to shift U.S.
forces out of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia should be only the first of
several steps to substantially reduce the U.S. presence throughout the
region. The Bush administration should clearly articulate its plans for
removing troops from the region. As he put it, ― Americans rightly
marvel at the proficiency of our armed forces, and American taxpayers
have funded the military‘s transformation. The Pentagon should reorient
policy in a way that takes advantage of our technological superiority and
capitalizes on our ability to project power from a distance, by eliminating
our expensive and unnecessary policy of forward deployment throughout
the region. The troops are unnecessary. They are costly. And they do
little to make the United States safer and more secure.‖307
Similarly to the above-mentioned features, an Issue paper of Rand
Corporation308
emphasizes the same needs. The USA, it says, entered the
21 century preserving stability in the Gulf via an extensive forward
military presence. Long before September 11, Washington‘s strategic
dilemma was clear. Starting in the seventies, with Britain‘s withdrawal,
the United States took over the role of security manager of the Gulf.
From the outset, the United States sought to avoid a costly and
unwelcome forward presence in the region, instead relying on regional
allies to police the security system and on its own ability to project force
to the region if they could not. In the 1970s, the United States used the
twin pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia to ensure stability and to contain
threats to the status quo. Iran was effective in the 1970s in helping to
crush Dhofari rebels in Oman and in marginalizing Soviet-backed
Baathist Iraq.
The United States « supported Iranian and Saudi authoritarian
regimes out of strategic expedience and fear of radical alternatives.
Political reform was not on the American agenda neither in the Gulf nor
in the rest of the Arab world ; American diplomats and intelligence
306
Idem. 307
Idem. 308
Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik, and David Gompert, A New Persian
Gulf Security System, Issue Paper, Rand 2003.
176
operatives had virtually no contact with reformist and other opposition
elements »309
.
Until 1990, the United States stuck to the British approach of
maintaining a low-cost security system by relying on regional allies and a
naval presence. After the Gulf War, this approach was replaced by one
involving extensive forward basing and regular military engagements,
sometimes escalating into large-scale deployments (e.g., in 1990, 1992,
1994, 1998, 2002, and 2003).
The Issue paper acknowledges that « in addition to the direct
costs, U.S. presence has become a lightning rod for political discontent.
The United States has contributed to that discontent through its support
for Israel (the pros and cons of that support aside) and for autocratic Arab
regimes. In most countries, the deeper cause of political discontent is the
socioeconomic malaise that grips the region. At a more philosophical
level, discontent reflects the Arab and Islamic world‘s struggle to adapt
to modernity and a divisive debate within Islam about its response to the
modern world. Al Qaeda is the most extreme expression of this
discontent, encompassing a minority of Muslims. This generalized
discontent, which is focused on existing regimes and the United States,
threatens remaining U.S. allies, especially Saudi Arabia, in ways that the
U.S. strategy of military presence plus reinforcement cannot address—a
reminder that balance of power alone cannot suffice »310
.
Yet, even with all these disadvantages and others we did not
mention, the paradoxal conclusion the Issue paper reaches is that ―the
United States does not have the option of withdrawing from the Gulf as
the British did 30 years ago (knowing the United States would take over).
Therefore, it is an important U.S. interest to support a more favorable,
affordable, and durable Gulf security system—one that takes advantage
of and promotes political change rather than resists it‖ 311
.
Thus, political reform in the region has grown to be a necessity both local
and international. The Issue paper emphasizes also that the democratizing
vision goes further than Iraq to remake the Middle East.
Democratization, it is argued, « will enable countries across the region to
defuse domestic dissent and become productive members of the
international community rather than remain in a developmental and
political ghetto ». In this argument, democratic transformation cannot and
309
Idem. 310
Idem. 311
Idem.
177
need not stop at Iraq. Its advocates call for exploiting the « domino
effect », using Iraq as a lever to bring about change in other Arab states.
Yet, we have to observe that on the one hand, the condition to
such transformation is the success of democracy in Iraq, which is still far
from being achieved. On the other hand, if democracy is the goal and the
reward, we do not need to frame it – even if it were only on a theoretical
or a hypothetical level – into Cold War concepts, such as « domino »
theory.
We are often reminded in this context that the need to create a
regional security environment conducive to the consolidation of
democracy was a central consideration in U.S. and Western strategy
toward Europe after World War II. NATO was created not only to deter a
Soviet threat, but also to establish the security umbrella under which
fragile post-war West European democracies could establish themselves.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE created a
framework that both encouraged democratic change and helped ensure a
soft and largely non-violent landing when communism eventually
collapsed. At the end of the Cold War, the need to consolidate fragile
democracies was also a key factor leading NATO and the European
Union to extend a security umbrella to Central and Eastern Europe.
The situation in the Gulf – and broadly in the arab world – today
can hardly be compared with Europe, at least because the Arabs have
never been considered as an integrative part of the NATO, nor did they
ask for it. Consequently, if the West wants to help promote democratic
change in the region, it must step up its efforts, together with other
countries, to resolve the core geopolitical conflict afflicting the region,
between the Arabs and Israël.
The cause of democracy and human development in the region
will be enhanced immeasurably by a final resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian issue and the broader Israeli-Arab conflict based on United
Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the vision of two
states — Israel and Palestine — living side-by-side in peace and security.
Many in the Arab world today see a Western — and especially American
— commitment to a renewal of the role of honest broker in Israeli-
Palestinian peace negotiations as a litmus test of Western intentions in
the Arab world more broadly, including democracy.
The way forward in the Middle East must be to work in parallel
on resolving the Israel-Arab conflict and on promoting democracy across
the region. The West cannot credibly make the case for democracy across
the region if it is, or appears to be, unwilling to support the Palestinians‘
178
right to political self-determination and a resolution of this conflict in all
of its aspects. On the other hand, autocratic Arab governments could no
longer hide behind or use this conflict to deflect domestic pressures for
domestic change. Terrorists across the region could no longer exploit this
conflict to recruit men and women into their ranks.
179
Chapter V ____________
Futuristic assessment
How can we live together if we do not try to understand each
other as to be able to accept, more easily, our differences? Such a
question seems today inevitable, as the future will depend on the answer
we will provide.
The dramatic global resurgence of religious, often fundamentalist,
movements over the last decades has caught many people by surprise,
notes Martin Riesebrodt : ―To most of us, such a resurgence of religion
came as a surprise since according to our modernization myth, religion
was supposed to be headed towards a continuous path of secularization
and privatization. Indeed, this myth presented us with several options for
the fate of religion in the modern world, but neither a return of religion as
a public force nor its ability to shape people according to its own ethos
and instill into them a new habitus was among them‖312
. However, the
point that seemed to him more enticing is that the social scientists in their
attempts to cope with their own cognitive dissonance have been as
―interesting as this surprising return of religion‖. Digressing about this
point, he notes that the most typical reactions were ―denial and instant
conversion‖. In his view, ―some authors have simply insisted that their
expectations of modernization and secularization are basically sound.
Focusing on the resurgence of religion outside the modern West allowed
them to pretend that these revivals of religion are still part of a
modernizing process. And, not surprisingly, many have taken pains to
312
Martin Riesebrodt, Secularization and the Global resurgence of Religion,
University of Chicago, paper presented at the comparative social analysis workshop,
university of California , Los Angeles, March 9, 2000.
180
detect a ―Puritan spirit‖ or an ―inner-worldly asceticism‖ in such
movements, revealing their problematic reading of Max Weber‘s
―Protestant Ethic‖ as a general theory of modernization‖.313
Nonetheless, we do not see why social scientists should refrain
from trying such comparative analysis, as the temptation is actually great
and the rewards promising on the theoretical level. If there is nothing to
find out from such an endeavour, only the result would reveal it. Yet, if
comparative analysis may add something – as modest as it could be – to
our knowledge of the studied Phenomena, then why not to give it a shot ?
Other authors have chosen the opposite route of instant
conversion , says Riesebrodt, by ―denying the existence of any general
trend towards secularization in the West and elsewhere. In particular,
rational choice theorists have explained secularization as an effect of
religious monopolies‖314
. He pointed particularly to the sociologist
Steven Warner who emphasized ―American exceptionalism in contrast
to the European trend towards secularization‖. Warner maintains that
there is a ―new paradigm‖ in the making for the study of religion in
America which rejects an older paradigm based on the European
experience of secularization.
Apparently, this is not the only difference in European and
American notions about religion and secularization. The ―American
exceptionalism‖ in this context reminds us of Charles Taylor‘s ―moral
exceptionalism‖, which may also serve as a paradigmatic shift in the
history of the West. In the introduction to this study, we have already
hinted to the possibility that since 9/11 the world is no longer what it was
before, and that at least concerning the American view, there is certainly
a new paradigm in the making, as regards world policy. The Europeans
are not obliged to have the same analysis, and there is a reason for that:
either in the Middle East or elsewhere, the USA is the leading power
not Europe. If success there is in tackling hard and complicated issues of
world policy, everybody would profit from it ; and if not, the USA would
be alone to bear whatever results, because it is her policy, not the
Western alliance‘s.
Our analysis, all along the four previous chapters, aimed
altogether at demonstrating the need for handling regional and
international issues differently. A new pattern of thought is already acting
313
Idem. 314
Idem.
181
behind the scene and pulling the strings. To deny it would change
nothing to the facts.
A point has however to be cleared. It concerns the reaction
against such an overwhelming American influence. Many people used to
say that this is an Arab-American problem ; but in our view, it is not …at
least, not to the degree imagined.
Anti-Americanism
« Among the components in the mood of anti-Westernism, and
more especially of anti-Americanism, were certain intellectual influences
coming from Europe ». The remark was made by Bernard Lewis 315
, who
goes on pointing out to Germany as one source of these influences. ―A
negative view of America formed part of school of thought by no means
limited to the Nazis but including writers as diverse as Rainer Maria
Rilke, Ernest Junger, and Martin Heidegger‖, he says 316
. If we mention
this question, it is well because a non negligible part of Arab modern
culture has been influenced by European intellectuals, to the point that it
is just impossible to make – say – a critic of a modern literary work in
Arabic, without any reference to the Western works in the same domain.
Indeed this is not only the case of comparative literary studies‘ focus but
also that of social sciences. Bernard Lewis acknowledges it when he says
―German philosophy, and particularly the philosophy of education,
enjoyed a considerable vogue among Arab and some other Muslim
intellectuals in the thirties and early forties, and this philosophic anti-
Americanism was part of the message‖317
. Social scientists and Arabists
who study for example the Baath ideology or the Panarabism cannot omit
to look for the European influences on these trends of thought. We do not
even need to underline the extensive influence that the Marxist literature
enjoyed in the Arab world: to some degree, the Arab anti-Americanism
came from this source, but it was not the sole. As European powers were
much more present in the Arab world, before the Second World War, it
315
Bernard Lewis, The roots of Muslim Rage, op. Cit. 316
―In this perception, America was the ultimate example of civilization without
culture: rich and comfortable, materially advanced but soulless and artificial; assembled
or at best constructed, not grown; mechanical, not organic; technologically complex but
lacking the spirituality and vitality of the rooted, human, national cultures of the
Germans and other ‗authentic‘ peoples‖. Idem. 317
Idem.
182
was merely unimaginable that the European culture does not mould the
Arab elite. When Europe began losing influence and the USA gaining it
in the same region, the trend of anti-Americanism was first unleashed by
angry Europeans. The Arab elite was at the time hoping that the USA –
which had no colonial experience with Arabs-, relieved them from their
pains while representing a counterweight to the colonialist powers.
Nothing was perhaps more alien to the Arab mind than the idea that the
USA could threaten the Arab people: in 1956, when Israel along with
Great Britain and France attacked Egypt as a reaction against the
nationalization of the Suez Canal, the USA stood against such an
aggression. It has never been forgotten, and indeed the US position
against France‘s colonialist plans in North Africa in the same period,
helped those who were fighting for independence. Therefore, one should
look for the seeds of anti-Americanism in the European cultural
production of that time more than in the Arab‘s. For one thing: apart
from the communist propaganda, nothing in the Arab culture of the time
was anti-American. Better : some of the best literature about the new
Arab awakening came from the United States, on the hands of people like
George Antonius, Nagib al Raihani, or Gibran Khalil Gibran. Yet, things
began to change and to worsen with the Arab Israeli conflict getting on,
unresolved, and with the USA siding irremediably with Israel, until the
picture completely metamorphosed. Today, Arab anti-Americanism has
reached peaks even the overzealous European anti-Americans have not
attained.
Why? That is the question.
New time , new thought
There was an opportunity that neither Americans nor Arabs
seized to stop the escalation in the love-hate relationship. This is when
the Berlin wall collapsed on November 9, 1989, and that the world
shaped by the post-second world war politics began to fall apart. It was a
good opportunity because the fall of the Berlin wall (1989), followed by
the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and finally the
fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, generated an optimistic mood
regarding the future of international relations, especially in the West.
This optimistic perspective was best captured in Francis
Fukuyama‘s article ―The End of History.‖ According to this view, the
Soviet Union‘s collapse had validated the superiority of the Western
liberal model of economics and politics and confirmed its universal
183
application. It was, therefore, expected that those countries that had not
yet embraced this model would embark on market-oriented economic
reform and democratization. It was also believed that, with the end of the
Cold War, military expenditures could be reduced and more funds both at
national and international levels would be spent on economic and social
development—the so-called peace dividend. This optimism was further
strengthened by the victory of the international coalition created in 1990
under U.S. leadership to reverse Iraq‘s aggression against Kuwait and
later buttressed by the Oslo process resulting in the 1993 Palestinian-
Israeli peace agreement. Indeed, it was hoped that the end of the Gulf
War (March 1991) would usher in a new period of peace and prosperity
in the Middle East. But, unfortunately, not only that did not happen, but
the situation even worsened with the failure of the Oslo process, the rise
of the second intifada, and the return of the Israeli falcon, General Ariel
Sharon, to power in Israel.
Was the new paradigm that would explain the international scene
in the aftermath of Berlin wall‘s fall, Huntington‘s ‗Clash of
Civilizations‘ as suggest some people?
It is true that the attacks by terrorists belonging to the extremist
Muslim organization Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, appeared to validate the clash of
civilizations thesis. But if such is all what we can account for, to
summarize 1500 years of Western-Muslim relationship, it is rather a very
sad conclusion for the whole mankind.
Bernard Lewis rightly notes that ―the Muslim world is far from
unanimous in its rejection of the West, nor have the Muslim regions of
the Third World been the most passionate and the most extreme in their
hostility‖318
. It is also true that many Muslims share with the West
―certain basic cultural and moral, social and political, beliefs and
aspirations‖319
. Considering the fact that the greater part of the world is
still outside Islam, it would be a madness to make of all those people an
enemy, just because they happen to be in ―the house of war‖, according
to the Islamic medieval interpretation of the mankind division320
. Yet,
this is exactly what some fanatics pretend to do.
A Wilton Park Conference on rebuilding trust between the
Muslim world and the West after 9/11 identified the symptoms of the
318
B. Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, op. Cit. 319
Idem. 320
Mankind is thus divided into: house of Islam and house of war (unbelief).
184
current crisis between the Muslim world and the West as involving : « a -
the attack of September 11, 2001 on the USA and the symbols of
Western financial, political and military power; b - the ongoing
Palestinian-Israeli crisis; c - the wars of ‗regime change‘ in Afghanistan
and Iraq ». 321
In this context, it was stated that « 9/11 has been a watershed in
US Arab relations. For the Saudi political elite, the radical questioning of
their favored status with the USA has been a severe blow. Whilst both
sides have made serious efforts to disavow the stereotypes of ―Crusade‖
or ―Islamic terrorism‖, some of the characterization has stuck. The Saudi
political elite has paid a heavy price for the climate of xenophobia and
religious extremism, which was tolerated or even encouraged in that
country. The US reaction to 9/11 was unprecedented. This attack on the
US mainland has yielded a ―zero-tolerance response‖. In spite of the
widespread hatred of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the US has by
no means been universally successful in projecting the war as one of
liberation and reconstruction ».322
The conference was particularly concerned about violence and
terrorism : The prevalence of use of armed force, whether by state or
non-state actors, whether through war, occupation, resistance or
terrorism, is indicative of a volatile and dangerous set of relationships
between the Muslim world and the West. From TV news, place names
such as Afghanistan, Baghdad, Ramallah, Bali, New York, Washington,
Rabat, Riyadh, Istanbul and Madrid are familiar. The globalization and
unpredictability of violence is a feature of our times. The political use of
armed force has again become an acute area of debate since 9/11. The
Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States brought almost universal
condemnation. The US-led coalition‘s wars of ‗regime change‘ deposed
dictatorial regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Particularly the action
against Iraq, however, led to deep divisions in the world community.
Even within western societies, the justification for, and legitimacy of the
war has been vigorously contested. Under the heading ‗war against
terrorism‘ many states have introduced legislation, which is also used
against political opposition, as well as against possible terrorists.
Particularly, but not only, in the Arab world, Israel‘s definition of
Palestinian resistance to occupation as terrorism (in contravention of the
321
Report on Wilton Park Conference 745: Monday 3 – Friday 7 May 2004 on
―Rebuilding trust between the Muslim world and the West‖, organized in co-operation
with the Swedish Institute in Alexandria. 322
Idem.
185
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 181, 242 and 337) is widely
contested. It is almost universally rejected in the Arab world. Unless
international legitimacy and respect for international law is secured, it is
difficult to see how « the just war principle of use of armed force », if
only as a last resort , can be consistently upheld. Important principles
such as the protection of human rights, the state‘s monopoly of armed
force, and diplomacy rather than war as the key to international relations
have all been weakened in recent years. Representations of ―the West‖
for Arab youth, the material standards of living of the West, and the
media reach of globalized communication presents Arab youth with an
ambivalent picture. On the one hand, the West is seen as the dominant
society holding back development (the hostile Other), on the other hand,
it is seen as highly attractive and an Eldorado. In a number of western
countries, however, right wing, anti-immigrant political parties have
arisen. For the West, this presents the dilemma of whether to deny such
parties the ―oxygen of publicity‖ or whether censorship and restrictive
legislation would add the glamour of martyrdom to such political views.
Second- and third-generation youth from Muslim countries face difficult
tasks of ―social navigation‖ in seeking to find their own identity or juggle
their multiple identities. They also face the difficult and possibly
excessive expectations of being able to act as a ―bridge‖ to the societies
from which they, their parents or grandparents emigrated. At the same
time, they face difficulties of full acceptance within the community
where they live. The existence of such transnational communities
presents a wide range of challenges.
Politics of identity
Often, the politics of identity operates through a community
defining itself in relation to ‗the Other‘. In European history, such sharp,
binary definitions have usually been at the expense of Jewish and
Muslim minorities. It is more healthy for European identity to be
established in terms of ideals such as: the rule of law, adherence to
standards of human rights, the legitimacy of democratic politics and the
separation of powers. If, however, the identity of the European Union is
defined negatively as different from the Muslim world, the impact could
have negative consequences both for the sizable minorities of Christians
in the Middle East and Muslims within the European Union. « Within
European history, there have been strong tendencies for nation states to
regard uniformity as a threat. Such anxiety about diversity can easily feed
186
the roots of intolerance and even culminate in ethnic cleansing »323
.
Tolerance of ‗the Other‘ as an individual is not enough. What is required
is the safeguarding of communal rights of those of different ethnic and
religious backgrounds. Minorities must have rights both in the private
and the public sphere. Fundamentalism, whether of a religious or
antireligious sort, cannot adequately respond to other communities. The
destruction of Bosnia serves as a warning of what can occur when
nationalist ideologies cannot accept ‗the Other‘. « In the war, which
destroyed Bosnia, huge numbers of Muslims were killed or expelled.
Over 1000 mosques were destroyed. Europe failed to protect a
longstanding Muslim community within its midst and failed to protect
the diversity of a European country »324
.
When Mohammed Arkoun talks of enemy construction in the
West, focalizing on Islam325
, we should recall that at the same time, the
Muslim culture – and some call it modern – uses the same tools for the
same purpose: in the Arab countries, little children go to the koranic
schools since they are 2 or 3 years old. The koranic schools (called al
kuttab in the Maghreb) are the second environment of the child directly
after the family. In these schools or ―madrasas‖ (kuttab), Koranic verses
are learned by heart. Even before he could understand the historical
conditions that caused their apparition , the child grows up learning by
heart some verses of the Koran pointing out to Christians and Jews
sometimes as « people of the Book » - ahl al kitab -, with whom Muslims
have to debate, and sometimes as the enemies against whom they have to
fight. When we know that there are hundreds and hundreds of books
written only for the purpose of interpreting these verses, one may wonder
about the wisdom of teaching the Koran to little children, without
bothering to explain it to them. Yet, how about teaching the Bible to the
children in the Christian countries? Has anybody doubted of the
importance of religious teaching in the West? In fact, it is almost the
same problem anywhere, and we can add the same observation for the
Judaism and other religions. It is always at an early age – when the brain
of the child is like a sponge, taking everything in and incapable of
reflexion – that religious precepts are taught. Thus, religion is inherited,
along with the family legacy, the race, and the country of birth ; it is
seldom a matter of free choice.
323
Wilton Park…Op.Cit. 324
Idem. 325
See our introduction.
187
If the majority of the terrorists of 9/11 happened to be Saudis, the
ideology that shaped their minds in not homogenous, and it is not
necessarily Wahhabite. Let us not omit that al Qaeda, as an international
network is compounded of elements ideologically diversified, although
they share a common ground. Actually, those people were not the first to
perform such terrorist operations in the world, and it is unlikely that they
will be the last. Radical Islamism leads logically to terrorism. Radical
Islamism is not necessarily Wahhabite ; it is not even necessarily
Sunnite. It may proceed out of an peculiar interpretation of the Koran and
the Hadith (tradition of the Prophet). Those who prepare psychologically
and physically young men (and girls) to blow up themselves along with
people they never saw before, would use any thought, any idea, any text
convenient for their purposes. They act as gurus do with mesmerised
followers of their sects. Their secret weapon is brainwashing. Their
precedent was the programmer of the Manchurian candidate, if not
Ravachol.
If they use the Koran as the manual of the little terrorist, it is not
the fault of the Koran, though, but their own reading of the verses.
Reading the Koran is not complicated. Anybody with some notions in
Arabic can do it. But interpreting the meaning of the text , that is the
problem. A problem from which have emerged in the 9th century the
schools of Islamic thought, which asked the Greeks for help to
understand the divine word revealed to the Muslims. In order to
understand the Koran, scholars started translating Aristotle and the other
philosophers, and comparing what the latter said with what they
understood of their own revelation. That is how philosophy was born in
those remote centuries in the Arabo-islamic world.
―In the first century of the Abbasid Caliphate most of the great
works of Greek philosophy and science – Plato, Aristotle, Euclid and
Hippocrates – were translated into Arabic. There were few original
thinkers; one notable exception was Al Kindi, the first outstanding
Islamic philosopher, who was called the philosopher of the Arabs. He
was highly appreciated by the Caliph Mamun and died about 870. Al
Kindi was of noble Arab descent in the male line; but most of the famous
later Islamic philosophers such as Avicenna (980-1037) were Persian.‖326
326
Peter Mansfield, The Arabs, op. cit. p50.
188
From al Kindi, to Avicenna and Averroes, very learned Muslim
scholars tried to understand what was the link between Reason and
Revelation. The debate was intense. It represents actually the whole
history of the classic islamic mind. Yet, despite this rich history, in the
XX and XXI centuries, some people assumed that the Koran is to be
understood only one single way and it must be theirs, and for that
purpose they started their ―jihad‖ to kill anybody who does not agree
with them, either in order to make Islam pure or to reach an idealistic
purity by the blood.
The pressure the Americans put on Saudi Arabia after 9/11 for
reforming its educative system was actually ―one-eyed‖: the other eye
remained blind and thus unable to see the facts: it is not just the system in
Saudi Arabia that produced radical Islamism, it is also different systems
in the whole world, for one thing is true: the first wave of radical
Islamism was meant to be an opposition to the states some of which were
supported by the West. The second was born and grown up in the West.
It is thus, as much an arabo-islamic problem as a Western.
When the opponents failed to change anything to the local
regimes, they thought of striking at the heart of those who support those
regimes. They found help and support in Europe and America, among
marginalised angry Muslims. The Jihad against the « enemis of Islam »
was the rallying slogan. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya ,
Somalia, Sudan, etc, gave them the possibility for perfoming training and
fighting.
So, the kind of terrorism, which struck the USA, was of the same
brand that struck the Westerners in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, etc… It is
also of the same brand that put the bombs in the Parisian metro, in the
Madrid trains station and in the London subway.
The game was not initially about ―American arrogance»: how
would the Islamists have accepted to be trained in Pakistan and
Afghanistan under American supervision, if America was initially
considered as their enemy? Would anyone explain this puzzle?
Indeed, there is in the Islamist literature – from Sayyid Qutb and
Abu al A‘la al Mawdudi to Sheikh Ali Khudhayr and Ayman al Zawahiri
– a construction of the West as the historic enemy of Islam, that is. But
for any observer who endeavours to read thoroughly some of these texts,
it is clear that this discourse aims at opposing the secular and modernist
one from an ideologically preconceived basis more than arguing against
the Western social scientists and thinkers on a scientific ground. None of
the fundamentalist thinkers considers important for example to discuss
189
the theories of Michel Foucault about knowledge and oppression, or
those of Derrida about language and deconstruction, or those of Alain
Touraine or Taylor about the subject and modernity, or those of the
Frankfurt school, etc…although this should have been the logical way to
make the demonstration of the soundness of their own arguments as
regards the relations between Islam and the West. And one would hardly
find any real reference to Bernard Lewis or Francis Fukuyama or Samuel
Huntington in their works, at least as a counter-argument or to give
substance to their own views. How can any thinker find his own way, if
he does not read other thinkers or criticize them? Genuine thought does
not stem out of nothing : Nietszche was Plato‘s reader, before reversing
him. Marx was Hegel‘s disciple. Sartre was Kierkegard‘s reader.
Habermas owes a lot to Weber. Avicenna invented a formula, which was
repeated by Averroes and Albertus Magnus: ―Thought brings about the
generality in forms‖. Better: ―Averroes is more important in Christian
than in Mohammedan philosophy‖, says Bertrand Russel.327
And the
history of thought is nothing but such an addition. Where do the
contemporary Islamist thinkers belong?
Islam and the West
The ―neofundamentalists‖ reject the West out of a
misunderstanding, since they never tried seriously to know about the
West more than the ―clichés‖ over-used in their dissertations. For them
the West is summed up in a few stereotypes : it is the land of the
crusaders and the colonialists. They would build up the West they
imagine upon this basis ; and they would not lack arguments on this
level, since it is true that the largest part of the historical relationships
between the West and Islam is concerned by wars and political struggle
more than by dialogue : first, the crusades ; then the colonisation ; and in
the second decade of the twentieth century, the dislocation of the
Ottoman empire, the Sykes and Picot conspirative agreement about the
partition of the Middle East between France and Great Britain , then the
aggression of Suez in 1956, the war of Algeria, and so on.
These are, indubitably, real events of real history. Few people
even in the West could reject the idea that imperialism is lurking behind
such or such war. Yet, we know that imperialism is not the whole West;
327
Bertrand Russel, A history of Western Philosophy, A Clarion Book, Simon
and Schuster, 1967, p 427.
190
we know that the West that colonized countries and triggered wars was
also the West that bred the Human Rights Declaration and invented all
the modern welfare we are today enjoying. But how history is re-
appropriated and instrumented to serve the purposes of such or such
party, is another problem.
One may contend that this re-appropriation of history is also
performed by governments, which is indeed a cogent argument ; that is
why educative programs are important. The question is not only about
how Christians and Jews and Westerners are represented in school
textbooks in the Arab and Muslim countries ; it is also about how
Muslims and Arabs are represented in Western textbooks and in the
media. How many manuals of history or books of philosophy in the West
talk objectively about Muslim contributions to civilization ? How come
that a whole historic period -when Muslims were leading universal
sciences and thought - is completely omitted, so that young pupils grow
convinced that the Western civilization owes everything to the Greeks
and the Romans and nothing to the Arabs and Muslims ?
The Saudis are criticized because they have made of proselytizing
and propagating Islam a state doctrine, though carried out with respect to
the law in non-Muslim countries, it can represent no public harm, as
conversions are always an individual choice. Yet, what have been
Christian missionaries doing in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, since many
years ?
Although the recently voiced opinions about the clash of
civilizations posit that Islam falls outside the Judeo-Christian and
Hellenic cultural continuum, the reverse is actually true : Classical
Islamic civilization, as we have already hinted, was constructed out of
Arab, Biblicist, and Hellenic cultures, additionally to the fact that it cast a
wider net by integrating Persian, Central Asian, and Indian components
within its cultural synthesis. Historically, Islam is the true bridge between
East and West. We should not omit that Islam‘s Hellenism was mediated
primarily through Eastern Christian intellectual circles, and important
streams of Muslim philosophical and scientific thought still remain an
understudied field linking late Antiquity with the Renaissance. Thus,
there are strong grounds of asserting that Islam as a civilization force and
religious tradition should be perceived as an integral part of the Western
tradition in as much as this tradition tends toward universal ecumenism.
As we know, the first peoples to be conquered by Islam were
those of the east Mediterranean or Hellenic world, whose minds have
been formed by Greek thought. The first Islamic theologians did not
191
reject Greek philosophy out of hand. On the contrary, with the
encouragement of the early Caliphs (such as Mamun: 813-833), they
studied deeply all the sciences of the classical world ; and it can be said
that the Christian West ultimately recovered much of the knowledge of
Greek philosophy that it had lost in the dark ages through the Arabs and
especially the great universities of Moorish Spain. The Arabs introduced
Aristotle to the West centuries before the revival of Greek scholarship,
which directly preceded the Renaissance and was one of the causes of the
Reformation.328
The Arabic Aristotle of Spain was one of the principle
sources for medieval Christian scholars in the thirteenth century.
―During the twelfth century‖ writes Bertrand Russel, ―translators
gradually increased the number of Greek books available to Western
students. There were three main sources of such translations:
Constantinople, Palermo, and Toledo. Of these Toledo was the most
important, but the translations coming from there were often from
Arabic, not direct from the Greek.‖329
It has been noticed that what is often viewed, as a clash of
civilizations is actually a clash of symbols. The symbols on the one side
are headscarves, turbans, and other signs of Islamic religious expression
that Westerners find sometimes repellant, just as fundamentalist Muslims
view much of Western culture as anti-Islamic. Moreover, cultural contact
between Islam and the West has been marred by historically unequal
power relations, ―leaving the West arrogant and insensitive and the
Muslim world defensive and insecure‖330
.
The failure of romantic nationalism
Muqtedar Khan observes that « the American support for
authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world breeds radical opposition in
these countries and stimulates anti-American sentiment ».331
And he is
surely right, for just observe how the opposition in the Arab world – all
trends confounded- reacted to the American intervention to oust Saddam.
328
T.Arnold and A. Guillaume (eds), The Legacy of Islam, London, 1931,p.29. 329
About arabo-islamic contribution to the Western thought, see: Bertrand
Russel, A History of Western Philosophy, a Clarion Book, Simon & Schuster, USA,
1967, Chapter X, Mohammedan Culture and philosophy. 330
See the contribution of Abdul Aziz Said, Director of the Center for Global
Peace, to the workshop organized by the United States Institute of Peace on November
2001. 331
See the contribution of Muqtedar Khan to the same workshop. Op.cit.
192
Our first remark is that instead of siding with the Iraqi opposition –
which should have been the logical course – they sided with Saddam!
Even if they did not say so, but rather covered it with anti-imperialist or
antiwar slogans, they have de facto supported the dictator at least for
labeling the Iraqi opposition as ―agents of the CIA‖, not as people who
are fed up with oppression.
In the same paper, M. Khan remarks also that the lack of peaceful
channels for protest and dissent in the Arab world has slowly radicalized
most moderate Islamic opposition groups. The West legitimized the
military coup that prevented Islamists from coming to power after
winning an election in Algeria in 1992. The United States gave tacit
support to Turkey when it forced Islamists out of power in the 1990s,
even after they had won popular mandates. ―It is not the hatred of
democracy and freedom but the desire for democracy that has made
many Muslims hate the United States, which they blame for the
perpetuation of undemocratic polities in their world‖332
. Other sources of
hostility include American troops stationed in the Gulf, and uncritical
American support for Israel.
There are three dangers, noted Khan, against which all peace-
loving people must be on guard : « (1) the conflict emerging from 9/11
must not be allowed to become a clash of civilizations between Islam and
the West; (2) hawks and extremists must not be allowed to hijack and
dominate the discourses in the West and in the Muslim world; and (3) the
search for security and revenge should not be allowed to undermine the
moral fabric of our societies ».333
All societies, including those of Europe and North America, carry
within them the seeds of intolerance and authoritarianism. What makes
the Arab world stand out then is simply its recent record of extreme
illiberalism. Nazih Ayubi334
observes in this context that there is a
difference between a ―hard state‖ and a ―strong state‖: one punishes and
coerces, whereas the other achieves its goals. By these definitions all
Arab states are hard states, and a few, such as Syria or Iraq (under
Saddam), are ultra-hard or ―fierce‖ states that employ vast bureaucracies,
large armies, harsh prisons, and sometimes firing squads to preserve
themselves by force. Yet, these hard states are also weak states that lack
the capacity to enforce laws, break traditional patterns, and adapt to
332
Idem. 333
Idem. 334
Nazih Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle
East, London, I.B. Tauris, 1995.
193
changing conditions.335
Ayubi argues that, regardless of the status of
Arab civil society, « three interconnected factors drastically limit the
Arab state‘s capacity for social control. The first pertains to vested
interests against political or economic liberalization. The second consists
of cultural dispositions favorable to authoritarianism. And the third
involves inhibitions against reforms liable to fuel uncontrollable and self-
augmenting demands for redistribution »336
.
The analysis identifies systematic repression as an obstacle to
change. But it is misleading to ascribe the observed repression only to the
abuses of state officials. Responsibility lies also, if not mainly, with
ordinary citizens who keep quiet or even actively support the political
status quo in the face of tyranny and inefficiency. To one degree or
another, every Arab country exhibits an expressive equilibrium in which
individuals refrain from speaking honestly for fear that the vast majority
of their fellow citizens will stay loyal to the status quo, leaving dissidents
isolated. And every potential dissident who exhibits such reticence
discourages other malcontents from publicizing their complaints.
Ayubi argues that pan-Arabism, « far from being an innovative
force for growth and liberation, has been a source of illiberal
conservatism ».337
Born as a defensive response to Turkish nationalism,
European colonialism and Zionism, « pan-Arabism emphasizes
communal solidarity and considers individualism an alien trait to be
suppressed ». Thus, it uses modern nationalism as a vehicle for
preserving the « anti-individualist strands of the Arab cultural heritage ».
But it has been manifestly unsuccessful in achieving its political goals.
Capable of galvanizing crowds and instilling communal pride, it has
taught successive generations that the individual Arab can prosper only
as a servant of the global Arab community. Yet, not only it has not
unified Arabs, but also by granting legitimacy to the most illiberal
regimes of the Arab world (like the Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq), it
has delayed both economic and political liberalization and hindered
335
A long line of distinguished thinkers, most notably Karl Wittfogel, author of
Oriental Despotism (1957), have held that in the Middle East the state has always been
strong and civil society always weak. Wittfogel‘s argument, which draws on both Marx
and Weber, hinges on the state‘s control of most land and irrigation systems. Although
the specifics of Wittfogel‘s thesis are generally treated with skepticism, its essential
message enjoys wide acceptance. 336
Ayubi. Idem. 337
Ayubi. Op.Cit.Pp. 136-51.
194
viable unification while indulging in romantic self-praise and
sentimentalist nostalgia.
The failure of romantic pan-Arabism may only be understood in
the light of the failure of local state-nationalism. Concerning Pan-
Islamism, Ayubi thinks that it has been also a romantic and highly
ritualistic doctrine, ignoring many practical issues of modern life, which
is true. However, it is not only romantic pan-Arabism that banned
individualism from expression, but also romantic local state-nationalism,
which in identifying the state to the party in power or to the autocratic
leader made of any opposition a ―high treason‖ to the people, and ended
up wrapping up the individual and any private life, any private freedoms
into the mythological flag, as a way to cover the absence of freedom by a
miserable nationalism. In this context, people become the anonymous
mass forced to follow the steps of the head of the state. No private life is
allowed to the individual in such a situation. In some countries, romantic
local state-nationalism has been historically marked by the fascist
discourses of the thirties (Xxth century), for an understandable reason : it
was hostile to the occupying powers (France and Great Britain, that is).
It is exactly in that period that many nationalist leaders and parties
struggling for independence have emerged.
Reason and individuality
We hardly need to stress the importance of individualism in the
modernization process in the West. From literary studies to rational
choice theory, issues broadly construed as ‗cultural‘ have inspired
academic debates, fostered interdisciplinary exchanges, and prompted
battles over the methods, evidence, and objectives of scholarly research.
Derived from Max Weber, classic analysis of the ‗effective affinity‘
between the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism in the West, these
studies attempted to demonstrate how cultural attitudes and beliefs either
constrained or promoted progress.
In a book published in Arabic under the title ―Assassination of the
Reason‖, Burhan Ghalioun starts from the remark that the main
dimension of the current crisis in the Arab society is related to culture.
But the Arab writers were much more concerned, in his view, by its role
in the Nahdha- Renaissance- than by its social function: ―the cultural
question has become particularly attractive for the research only after the
irruption of the question of identity. The link of the culture to the nahdha
has thus become the specificity of those who were preaching change and
195
revolution, whereas the same link to the identity has been claimed by
those who preached conservatism, authenticity and independence‖338
.
Such a division has been enacted and reflected by the controversy
over modernity (hadatha) and traditionalism (taqlid). The Arab
contemporary thought in its entirety fell under the effect of such a
dispute. ―The history of the modern Arab culture has become that of the
development of this conflict, of its metamorphosis, and of its different
resurrections‖339
. The conflict has not only divided the Arab
intelligentsia, but also the Arab society, Ghalioun observes. Thus, two
opposite camps appeared, each one with its own vision of the past, of the
present, of history, of the Reason, of the Rationality, and with its own
purposes, its own political and social mottos‖340
. More specifically,
Ghalioun notes that ―while the call to the authenticity is to be defined by
embracing religion, the call to the modernity would rather identify itself
with science‖341
. We may also paraphrase Ghalioun and say that this
debate has crossed several stages and taken varied forms, but since the
XIXth century, it has nearly concentrated into the conflicting and –
sometimes violent – controversy between Islamic salafism and social
evolutionist secularism.
The decline of Islamic civilization prompted a number of Arab
intellectuals, including some already exposed to European culture and
impressed by the accomplishments of Europe, to call for radical reform.
As a consequence of the intellectual debate aroused within the Arab
world by European advancement, an opposition was drawn between din
(religion) and ‘aql (reason), asalah (nobility) and mu’asarah
(modernity), din and dawlah (state) and din and ‘ilm (science or
knowledge).
Pioneers of Arab secularism
The early secularizing elite was dominated by a group of
Christian Arabs who had received their education at the Syrian Protestant
College and then settled in Egypt. Important figures included Shibli
Shumayyil (1850-1917), Farah Antun (1874-1922), Georgie Zaidan
(1861-1914), Ya‘qub Suruf (1852-1917), Salama Musa (1887-1958) and
338
Burhan Ghalioun, Ightiyal al ‗aql, ed. Madbouli, Cairo, 1990, 3d print, p 22. 339
Idem. 340
Ghalioun, op. Cit, p 23. 341
Idem.
196
Nicola Haddad (1878-1954). Al-Muqtataf and Al-Hilal publications,
founded respectively in 1876 and 1892, were used by writers and
thinkers belonging to this group. They strove to propagate the
transcendence of ideas like love of country and fellow countrymen over
all other social ties, even those of religion.
Through their copious writings, these thinkers succeeded in
consolidating the foundations of secularism in the Arab world. Praising
the liberal thought of France and England during the eighteenth and
nineteenth century and condemning the hegemony of tradition over the
human mind, they stressed that reason should set the standard for human
conduct. For modernization to take place, they demanded that only
traditions, which were compatible with this objective, should remain.
The main aim of these intellectuals was to lay the basis of a secular state
in which Muslims and Christians could participate on a footing of
complete equality.
Shibli Shumayyil, who after graduation from the Syrian
Protestant College went to Paris to study medicine, is reputed to have
first introduced the theories of Darwin to the Arab world through his
writings in Al-Muqtataf. He belonged to the late nineteenth century
movement, which saw science as the key to unlock the secret of the
universe, even as a form of worship. He believed that the religion of
science necessitated a declaration of war on older religions. To him
social unity, which was essential for a general will to exist, involved the
separation of religion from political life since religion was a cause of
division. He insisted that nations grew stronger as religion grew weaker,
and pointed out that this was true of Europe, which had only become
powerful and truly civilized once the Reformation and the French
Revolution had broken the hold of religious leaders on society. He
condemned both shuyukh (Islamic scholars) and priests of resisting
progress and development.
Farah Antun (1874-1922) who migrated from Tripoli to Cairo in
1897 chose to propagate his views through a study of the life and
philosophy of Ibn Rushd (Averroes). He was influenced by the works of
Ernest Renan to such an extent that Hourani calls him Antun‘s master.
Antun believed that the conflict between science and religion would be
solved, but only by assigning each to its proper sphere. He dedicated his
book to what he called ―the new shoots of the East those men of sense in
every community and every religion of the East who have seen the
danger of mingling the world with religion in an age like ours, and have
come to demand that their religion should be placed on one side in a
197
sacred and honored place, so that they will be able really to unite, and to
flow with the tide of the new European civilization, in order to be able to
compete with those who belong to it, for otherwise it will sweep them all
away and make them the subjects of others.‖
Like Shumayyil and other Lebanese writers of the time, Antun‘s
aim was to lay the intellectual foundations of a secular state in which
Muslims and Christians could participate on a footing of complete
equality. His emphasis was on proving the invalidity of what he termed
‗the inessential part of religion‘: the body of laws. His second condition
for secularism was the separation of temporal and spiritual authorities,
suggesting that the separation of the two powers in Christianity made it
easier for Christians to be tolerant than for Muslims. He added that if
European countries were now more tolerant, that was not because they
were Christian but because science and philosophy had driven out
religious fanaticism, and the separation of powers had taken place.
Salama Musa (1887-1958) called for separating the sphere of
science and the sphere of religion insisting that religion, due to the
influence of religious institutions and clergymen had lost its progressive
nature and become a heavy burden. He tried to emphasize that Islam and
Christianity have identical stands with regard to the freedom of thought
and emancipation of the mind. He strongly believed that ‗society cannot
advance or progress unless the role of religion in the human conscience is
restricted ; progress is the new religion of humanity.‘
Muslim secularizers
The next generation of Arab secularist thinkers was mostly
followers of Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). While pressing for
reforms, Abduh believed that a modern legal system should develop out
of shari’ah and not in independence and favored an equal partnership,
rather than separation, between those who governed and the guardians of
the law. He stressed above all that no conflict existed between Islam on
the one hand and logic or science on the other. Shocked by the magnitude
of backwardness in the Arab world, he scorned those who blindly
imitated the old and resisted the new. He believed that Islam‘s
relationship with the modern age was the most crucial issue confronting
Islamic communities. In an attempt to reconcile Islamic ideas with
Western ones, he suggested that maslaha (interest) in Islamic thought
corresponded to manfa’ah (utility) in Western thought. Similarly, he
equated shura with democracy and ijma’ with consensus. Addressing the
198
question of authority, Abduh denied the existence of a theocracy in Islam
and insisted that the authority of the hakim (governor), qadi (judge) or
mufti, was civil. He strongly believed that ijtihad should be revived
because ‗emerging priorities and problems, which are new to Islamic
thought, need to be addressed.‘ He was a proponent of the parliamentary
system; he defended pluralism and refuted the claims that it would
undermine the unity of the ummah, arguing that the European nations
were not divided by it. ‗The reason,‘ he concluded, ‗is that their objective
is the same. What varies is only the method they pursue toward
accomplishing it.‘
However, some of Abduh‘s disciples, such as Qasim Amin and
Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid, were not entirely and exclusively influenced by
his thought. They had been influenced by the Christian pioneers of the
secularist school of thought and began to work out the principles of a
secular society in which Islam was honored but was no longer the
arbitrator of law and policy. Seeking to reconcile secularist ideas with
Islam, they went so far as to develop Abduh‘s emphasis on the
legitimacy of social change into a de facto division between the two
realms of religion and society, each with its own norms.
Qasim Amin (1865-1908), known as the emancipator of women,
suggested that the problem with the Muslims was a lack of science. He
stressed that it was useless to hope to adopt the sciences of Europe
without coming within the radius of its moral principles. The two, he
believed, were indissolubly connected, and ‗we must therefore be
prepared for change in every aspect of our life.‘ He believed that
perfection is not to be found in the past, even the Islamic past, but can
only be found, if at all, in the distant future. To him, the path to
perfection was science. Since Europe was the most advanced in the
sciences, was ahead of the Muslims in every way, he insisted that it was
not true that the Europeans were only materially better but not morally.
Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid (1872-1963) was a leading member of
this group. Although he was a close associate of Abduh, Islam played an
insignificant part in his thought. He was not concerned, like Al-Afghani,
to defend it, nor like Abduh, to restore to Islamic law its position as the
moral basis of society. Religion, whether it be Islamic or not, was
relevant to his thought only as one of the constituent factors of society.
The official abolishment of the Khilafah (Caliphate) in 1924
aroused a debate among thinkers of the time over the importance of the
Khilafah and the response of Muslims to its abolishment. Ali Abdel
Raziq (1888-1966), a graduate of Al-Azhar and Oxford, contributed to
199
the debate with a book published in 1925 that turned to be one of the
most controversial works in modern Islamic history: Al-Islam wa Usul
al-Hukm: Bahth fil-Khilafah wal-Hukumah fil-Islam (Islam and the
Fundamentals of Governance: A Thesis on Caliphate and Government in
Islam). Abdel Raziq claimed there was no such thing as Islamic political
principles, a theory believed to have been drawn mainly from the
opinions of non-Muslim writers on Islam. He denied the existence of a
political order in Islam and claimed that the Prophet had never
established one and that it had not been part of his mission to found a
state. His work has been a main source of ammunition in the vigorous
campaign launched by ‗secularists‘ in later times against the validity of
Islamic law or shari’ah. The book pioneered the idea of rejecting
conventional interpretations and replacing them with innovations based
mostly on orientalists‘ opinions and writings on Islam.
In this connection, what has been remarked about the failure of
modernization in the Arab world342
should be explained also in the light
of the oppression undergone by individuals and individualistic thought in
the Arab world. I would go further and say: the self is in the arabo-
islamic world what has been wiped off as a neglected thing, and without
the rediscovery and the reconstruction of that self, it is useless to hope for
any real progress.
According to Esposito, contemporary Islamic reformers or
neomodernists stress the need to renew Islam both at the individual and
the community levels. They advocate a process of Islamization or re-
Islamization that begins with the sacred sources of Islam, the Koran and
Sunna of the Prophet, but that also embraces the best in other cultures.
They see themselves as engaging in a dynamic process that is as old as
Islam itself. Much as early Muslims interpreted and applied Islamic
principles and values to their times and adopted and adapted political,
legal, and economic practices from the cultures they had conquered, the
neomodernist reformers wish to bring about a new Islamic renaissance
(nahda) pursuing a similar selective, self-critical path. They distinguish
between God's revelation and human interpretations, between that part of
Islamic law which is eternal and that which is contingent and relative,
between immutable principles and regulations that were human
constructs conditioned by time and place. In contrast to neorevivalists,
neomodernists are more creative and wide-ranging in their
reinterpretation of Islam and less tied to traditional interpretations of the
342
See for example the works of Burhan Ghalioun on this topic.
200
ulama. For this reason, they are often accused of "deviationism" by the
ulama, who charge that neomodernists lack the necessary training and
credentials to interpret Islam.343
Or, to paraphrase Charles Taylor, the question ―who am I‖ is
often spontaneously phrased by people to describe the problem of
identity. But ―this can‘t necessarily be answered by giving name and
genealogy. What does answer this question for us is an understanding of
what is of crucial importance to us. To know who I am is a species of
knowing where I stand.‖344
What is important to underline here is the link
between identity and a kind of orientation, which Taylor calls
―framework‖, and he stresses that ―a person without a framework
altogether would be outside our space of interlocution ; he wouldn‘t have
a stand in the space where the rest of us are‖.345
In other words, ―what I
am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have
significance for me. And (…) these things have significance for me, and
the issue of my identity is worked out, only through a language of
interpretation which I have come to accept as a valid articulation of these
issues.‖346
Outside this framework, it is useless to try to answer the
question ―who this individual is‖, for the self is partly made by its self-
interpretations. That is exactly where the construction of the ―Other‖ – as
enemy or as ally – fits in.
― What we call identity crisis‖ observes B.Ghalioun in ―State and
Religion‖, ―represents only one aspect of the renewal of the national
personality in a time of deep civilizational crisis such as what is
undergone by altogether underdeveloped societies‖347
. In his view, within
the world struggle for the construction of the national self and the
achievement of independence and distinction 348
, the Islamic revival –
notwithstanding the existence or inexistence of faith – is a fundamental
element in the construction of the communal belonging, ― as a source of
common values determining the behaviors and the great historical and
human orientations‖.349
343
See : John L.Esposito, Contemporary Islam ; reformation or revolution? From
Oxford History of Islam, 2000 Oxford University Press. 344
C. Taylor. Op. Cit. P 27. 345
Taylor, p 31. 346
Taylor, op.cit, P 34. 347
Burhan Ghalioun, naqd assyasa addawlatu waddine, Ed. al mu'assasa al
arabiyya liddirasat wannachr Beirut, 1993. P. 255. 348
With the signification given to this term by Bourdieu. 349
B. Ghalioun, naqd assyasa. Op. Cit. P256.
201
Let us note, by the way, that the debate about identity,
authenticity, modernity, etc, is accompanied in the Arab world by a
feeling of distrust and even hostility towards the West. And although we
can hardly put 9/11 on the account of the reconstruction or the reconquest
of the identity, we state only that such a violent expression of the hard
feelings toward the West – and particularly the USA – may be a response
to that ―construction of the enemy‖, which M. Arkoun has identified as a
part of the Western culture, omitting to say that it is also a part of the
Arabo-islamic culture. However, despite the relative success of Islamists
in providing adversarial idioms and resonant political critiques, the
struggle among nominally Muslim citizens and Islamist activists is as
pronounced as the solidarities an Islamist adversarial politics has
fostered. Being ―Muslim» might signify a set of religious beliefs, an
ascriptive attachment, a ―cultural‖ identification, a state classification, a
set of recognizable activities, or none of the above. There are those who
see a separation of mosque and state as fundamental, and those who
advocate their conjuncture. There are those who think the shari‘a should
be the source of legislation, those who view it as a source, and those who
wish it were irrelevant to contemporary law. There are countries where
the ‗Ulamas,- or religious elite - are independent of the state, places
where mosque sermons are controlled by the state, and places where the
‗Ulamas are coterminous with the state. There are in short vigorous
communities of argument and plural varieties of social and political
practice. This plurality makes any invocation of a single political doctrine
of Islam empirically untenable and theoretically meaningless.
Towards Liberty
There is a tradition of thought in the West, distinguishing three
types of liberty: the political, the civil and the economic. As defined by
Hayek 350
, liberty or freedom is ―that condition of men in which coercion
of some by others is reduced as much as is possible in society‖. This
conception of individual liberty is closely related to the notion of
individualism, ―a distinctly Western concept to which most other
civilizations have not subscribed‖, according to Deepak Lal351
. If this is
350
Hayek F.A. The constitution of Liberty, London, Routledge, 1960. Cited in:
Deepak Lal, Does modernization require westernization? The Independent Review, v.
V, n° 1, Summer 2000. 351
D. Lal. Op. Cit.
202
really the case, assuming that modernization has not resulted in self-
sufficient democratic regimes in the Arab world, then something was
wrong since the start. In other words, if individualistic values were not
allowed to evolve as integrative part of what Joseph Needam called ―a
packet of change‖ – responsible in his view of the ―European miracle‖ of
modern economic growth- then it becomes clear that this is a good reason
explaining the current failure of the Arab societies on the level of
freedom and democracy.
Two remarks are worth noticing here : first, economic
performance requires economic and civil liberty, because they underwrite
the sanctity of private property. The second is that hereditary monarchy,
not democracy, indeed delivered the industrial Revolution.
As nobody needs to reinvent the warm water, the Arabs do not
need to start the change process out of the zero level. However, this does
not mean that they are dispensed from democracy, since the first
condition – i.e. civil and economic freedom- is still necessary for them to
perform an economic genuine progress.
For Deepak Lal, ―although individualism was an essential aspect
of the West‘s subsequent trajectory, it is not essential – or inevitable, as
Hayek‘s cultural evolutionary view would suggest – for the ―rest‖ to
adopt this particular Western value in order to reproduce the West‘s
economic success‖352
.
However, we need first to establish as a fact that individualistic
values do not exist in any form whatsoever in the Arab and arabo-islamic
thought, if not since the Nahdha, then mainly in the classic ages. This is
actually far from being proven. If communalism has prevailed over
individualism in the modern Arab and arabo-islamic culture, this is not in
itself the evidence that the values of individualism have never been of
any importance in the Arabo-islamic civilization, not to speak of the pre-
Islamic culture. We need certainly to make a new reading of that heritage
with the purpose of seeking these values. Some researches have already
tried to question the classic heritage, but with the exception of the
psychoanalyst approach achieved by Ali Zay‘ur who studies the
individual Arab more than the individualistic values, there are little
works that even when escaping the dogmatic ―rape‖ focus on localizing
and analyzing these values.
D. Lal raised a question also very discussed by the Arab thinkers
since the XIX th century: to promote in the rest of the world the material
352
Idem.
203
prosperity that the ―European miracle» has brought to the West, does the
unique Western value system need to be transferred, and if so, how? The
answer he gave opposed Hayek‘s view. The latter has answered
positively to the question ―does modernization require westernization?‖
He maintained that the market economy requires cultural underpinnings
in the form of a set of ‗modern‘ values based on individualism. He even
argued that a form of cultural evolution had, in an unplanned way, led
from a Stone Age culture with its sense of communal bonds to a modern
culture with respect for abstract rules, such as the rule of law, and a
―detachment from communal, co-operative ends‖. In his view, it would
seem that, even though the culture of liberty arose in the West, because
of its success it should naturally spread across the world. A similar
implicit belief underlies the current Western moral crusade around the
world, wherein a combination of the market and good governance
(euphemism for democracy) is increasingly offered as a panacea for
poverty and war.353
Maxime Rodinson,354
the well-known French orientalist and
social scientist, maintains that there is nothing in Islam – either in the
Koran and Sunna or the sacred Law that was developed from them- that
is especially hostile to capitalist enterprise. However, as P. Mansfield
notes, ―it cannot be proved that Muslim societies would have developed a
capitalist formation of the European-American type. It is equally
impossible to prove that they were incapable of doing so‖355
. If the
private accumulation of capital never attained the European level, despite
a self-confident and enterprising Islamic bourgeoisie existed in the
Middle Ages, the result of its failure to reach political power – as this
was in the hands of the Mamluks and other Turkish and Caucasian
military- in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as happened in
Europe, was that when the European powers invaded and occupied many
of the Arab lands in the nineteenth century these were all at a pre-
industrial stage. Did colonialism prevent the Arabs from industrializing?
That‘s the question! Anyway, we ought to notice that the heart of the
Arab Peninsula – the current Saudi Arabia – has never been occupied by
the Europeans. Industry failed to progress out there, though.
―It is a paradox of Islam that as social system it is at once the
most democratic and the most authoritarian of religions‖, notes
353
Idem. 354
In : Islam et Capitalisme. 355
The Arabs, op. Cit. P. 85.
204
Mansfield356
, who adds: ―it is democratic because it has no established
church hierarchy to intercede between God and the faithful (…) But
because in religious matters the humblest Muslim stands on a level with
the caliph or his chief qadi a third root of faith had to be added (to the
Koran and the Tradition)- the voice of the people or ‗consensus‘ of the
faithful (ijma in Arabic)‖.
Even if Ijma does not mean the democratic counting of votes of
the Muslim community to reach decisions on points of law or ethics at
any given time but the slowly accumulating pressure of opinion over a
long period, nevertheless, it is a democratic principle in Mansfield‘s
view, ―in the sense that it means the acceptance of the will of the
majority‖357
.
He notes also that Heretics in Islam have been condemned by the
orthodox, but they have rarely been persecuted and still more rarely have
they been burned at the stake. It is worth noticing in this context, that
those who suffered martyrdom like Al Hallaj and Averroes, were not
atheists: the first was a great sufi (mystic) and the second was the latest
great philosopher of the classical age, the one who tried his life during to
find the connection between philosophy and prophecy (Reason and
Revelation). That is why the remarkable tolerance of classical and
medieval Islam towards variations in belief and practice did not diminish
the tendency towards political absolutism. Thus, whereas there was a
natural tolerance enjoined by Islam of the Christians and Jews – the
dhimmis – who were organized in their own millets or religious
communities with internal autonomy and considerable individual and
communal freedom, the attitudes toward the Shia Muslim subjects of the
Ottoman empire, who existed in large numbers in what are now Iraq,
Lebanon and Yemen, was more severe. ―There was no requirement for
Sunni Muslims to treat the Shias kindly and there was a long history of
hatred and warfare between them which especially affected the Shias of
Iraq, who were close to the rival and Shia Empire of Persia‖358
.
It is clear that much of that ambivalence that marked the classical
and medieval Islam remained and is still affecting today‘s attitudes.
On the other side – that of the West – there is ―the moral
exceptionalism‖ to paraphrase Charles Taylor, who says: ―there is no
doubt lots of pride and illusion in our self-image. But it is still true that
356
Op.Cit.P.69. 357
Idem. 358
The Arabs.Op.Cit.p88.
205
the civilization which grew out of western Europe in modern times
(certain aspects of which now extend well beyond Europe) has given an
exceptional value to equality, rights, freedom, and the relief of
suffering.‖359
As he explains in an end note, moral exceptionalism is just one
facet in the complex idea of civilization, which has been an essential
notion in the collective self-narration of the Western culture over the last
two centuries. ―As it develops in the Enlightenment ‗civilization‘
designates the condition we have evolved to, mainly through the
development of the arts and sciences‖. But, the concept was not confined
to the scientific- technological-economic domain. « The notion was
current that progress in the arts, sciences, and commerce, brought with it
a softening of morals : ‗le doux commerce‘ civilizes us ». By the
nineteenth century, ‗civilization‘ comes to englobe the new moral
sensitivity to suffering and concern for general well-being. In addition,
there is a third facet: ―civilization is thought to involve a sense of
ourselves as individuals in the triple sense I described earlier‖, says
Taylor. Thus, ―civilized people are capable of taking an objectifying
distance from their society, culture, and history‖.
Why is this possible for the West and much more problematic for
the arabo-islamic world? It is true that this did not happen in a few years,
but through an accumulation of experiences and knowledge that shaped
the Western societies as well as the individual, but this must not be an
excuse to condone laxity, apathy, and tolerance of despotism in the
Arabo-islamic world. As M. Khan put it, ―Many Muslims have become
hypocritical in our advocacy of human rights in our struggles for justice.
We protest against the discriminatory practices of Israel, India, and other
Non-Muslim nations, but are mostly silent against the discriminatory
practices in Muslim states. We rightly condemn Israeli treatment of
Palestinians at all international forums. But our silence at the way many
Muslim nations have treated the same Palestinians really questions our
commitment and concern for them. While we loudly and consistently
condemn Israel‘s ill treatment of Palestinians, Russian excesses in
Chechnya, or Serbian atrocities in Bosnia, we remain silent when Muslim
regimes abuse the rights of Muslims and slaughter thousands of them.‖360
359
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the making of modern identity,
Cambridge University Press, 1989, P397. 360
M. Khan. Islamic perspectives on Peace and Violence. Special Report.
United States Institute of Peace. Op.Cit.
206
Since the objectification of the self is part of what Taylor called
―moral exceptionalism‖, it is true that the focus on threats to the Western
freedom led the Westerners, as noted Robert W. Hefner, ―to overlook the
fact that the violence (of 9/11) was directed, not merely against the
United States, but against moderate and democratic-minded Muslims
around the world. The attack was but the latest chapter in a long struggle
between moderate Muslims and Islamists hardliners for the hearts and
minds of Muslim believers‖361
. Thus, for this writer, ―there is no clash of
civilizations between Islam and the West. The really decisive battle is
taking place within Muslim civilization, where ultraconservatives
compete against moderates and democrats for the soul of the Muslim
public.‖ 362
Moreover, Hefner thinks that the globalization so widespread
in our age will never bring about a world-wide homogenization of culture
and identity: ―What the process has done is make the interests we share
with the great majority of Muslims all the clearer. One hopes that we
Americans will not forget this fact as we move beyond the events of
September 11. The lesson to keep in mind is that our suffering and
outrage were shared by millions of Muslims. They look to us now to
remember just how deeply we share political challenges and a common
humanity‖363
.
This line of reasoning is consistent with the ―moral
exceptionalism‖, which if well understood, should be universal inasmuch
as the modernity itself is a common ground for all of us. This emphasis
on feelings‘ sharing between people of different religions and
communities should be understood as a direct coping with the future.
Here too, much of the endeavor with respect to future relations between
the West and the arabo-islamic world should stress the individualistic
dimension of any change. In fact, we know, nothing can be done outside
the ―framework‖ of the individual mind, on both sides. That‘s why any
reform should first focus on the education: it is in the years of learning
that a mind is being shaped for the rest of the time life. Let‘s put it
otherwise. In the terms of Alvin Toffler, ―we can begin our battle to
prevent future shock at the most personal level. It is clear, whether we
know it or not, that much of our daily behavior is, in fact, an attempt to
ward off future shock.‖364
361
Robert W. Hefner, September 11 and the struggle for Islam, Department of
sociology, Boston University. Social Science Research Council. 362
Idem. 363
Idem. 364
Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, Pan Books, London, 1980, p 338.
207
For Toffler, since we use varied tactics unconsciously ―to lower
the level of stimulation when they threaten to drive us above our adaptive
range‖, why not ―increase their effectiveness by raising them to
consciousness‖?365
Whether we are concerned by tactics of control of cognitive
simulation or by tactics of control of the body, as those that have been
described by Michel Foucault366
, we are dealing with a level of
consciousness, which means a degree of moral thinking. To generate the
result we hope for, we have to adopt the right method with an order of
priorities. As Descartes put it: ―the true function of reason, then, in the
conduct of life is to examine and consider without passion the value of all
perfections of body and soul that can be acquired by our conduct, so that
since we are commonly obliged to deprive ourselves of some goods in
order to acquire others, we shall always choose the better‖367
. This
definition of the mastery of reason brings about an internalization of
moral sources. ―The Cartesian proof is no longer a search for an
encounter with God within‖, says Taylor, ―it is no longer the way to an
experience of everything in God. Rather what I now meet is myself: I
achieve a clarity and a fullness of self-presence that was lacking
before‖368
.
How much close to this feeling are we today? The question does
not concern some people in particular, excluding the others. Americans,
Arabs, Europeans, Muslims, Christians, Jews… Everybody should try to
answer it, honestly, because it is urgent to know how wide is the gap
between us. The Americans think, not without reason, that they are the
epicenter of the Western world. They pretend to lead the West and
possibly all those who identify to their values and purposes. This is much
better formulated by Wallerstein: ―I think that Americans tend to believe
that others have less of many things than we have, and the fact that we
have more is a sign of grace (…) Americans consider that life in the U.S.
is more comfortable, that our production competes more successfully in
the world market, and that therefore we are certain to win the wars into
which others may drag us. Americans also consider their society to be
more efficient. Things run more smoothly – at the work place, in the
public arena, in social relations, in our dealings with bureaucracies (…)
But of course most Americans would deny that the less-ness of others is
365
Idem. 366
In : les mots et les choses, surveiller et punir ,etc.… 367
Letter to Elizabeth, Descartes‘ letters. Cit. In Taylor, p151. 368
Taylor. Op. Cit. P157.
208
merely material. It is spiritual as well. Or if the term spiritual seems to
exclude the secular humanists, it is cultural as well (…) to all those
"huddled masses yearning to breathe free." Our density of freedom is
visualized in so many ways. Which other country has the Bill of Rights?
Where else is freedom of the press, of religion, of speech so honored?
Where else are immigrants so integrated into the political system? Can
one name another country in which someone arriving here as a teenager,
and still speaking English to this day with a thick German accent, could
become the Secretary of State, the chief representative of Americans to
the rest of the world? Is there any other country where social mobility,
for those with merit, is so rapid?‖369
On the other side, there is a similar feeling that Saudi Arabia has a
responsibility vis à vis the Muslims of the world. ―We are the epicenter
of the Muslim world‖, says Haifa R. Jamal al-Lail. ―The historic
relationship between our government and Islam is crucial. Our role as
Custodian of Mecca and Medina is central to all that transpires in the
Kingdom. We focus tremendous resources on the annual pilgrimage, or
hajj (…) Over two million Muslims perform the hajj pilgrimage each
year‖.370
It is true that this only event makes of Saudi Arabia the center of
the Islamic world, and it cannot be of any good to underestimate the fact.
On the contrary, taking it in consideration may avoid a lot of trouble to
those who are pressuring the Saudis for reforms as well as to those who
among the Saudi elite claim these changes. The whole affair is to know
what kind of change is reasonably acceptable in such a country and what
is not?
We are not talking about democracy, as we consider that Islam, as
a religion, cannot be opposed to democratic regimes. We are rather
talking about moral prospects of change. And on this level, the West
should accept the fact that it is not going to change the individual Saudi
to the extent that nothing would distinguish him (or her) from a
Westerner.
We have to make these two spheres of human and social endeavor
quite distinct, because any ambiguity would lead to more
misunderstanding and more conflicting behavior, on both sides. On the
one hand, Political reform is a matter of collective options. It involves the
369
Immanuel Wallerstein, America and the World, the Twin Towers as
Metaphor, Social Science Research Council, Essays, New York. 370
Haifa R. Jamal al-Lail, Saudi Society, Reform and Terrorism, paper
presented to the Norfolk World Affairs Council on May 31,2004.
209
elite, the state, and the civil society. Like any other country of the world,
Saudi Arabia is influenced by the regional and international atmosphere.
Thus, reform preaches its own cause from inside the society, as we can
state. On the other hand, we should understand that the cultural
conceptions are different from a country to another. Those latter include
the moral values, which in the case of a ―traditional legitimacy‖ – Max
Weber – are much closer to religious faith, and as such, claim a kind of
immunity against change forced from the outside.
Let‘s take an example: is the notion of freedom the same in the
Saudi society and the American? Indeed, we are not talking about
political freedom, but moral and religious freedom. On this level, there is
much to say, and not much to agree on, I am afraid.
In a landmark speech on May 9, 2003, at the University of South
Carolina, President Bush announced America‘s firm commitment to
democracy and freedom in the Middle East as the key goal for America‘s
war on terror:
―We support the advance of freedom in the Middle East, because
it is our founding principle, and because it is in our national interest. The
hateful ideology of terrorism is shaped and nurtured and protected
by oppressive regimes. (I am stressing) Free nations, in contrast,
encourage creativity and tolerance and enterprise. And in those free
nations, the appeal of extremism withers away. Free governments do not
build weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of mass terror. Over
time, the expression of liberty throughout the world is the best guarantee
of security throughout the world. Freedom is the way to peace.‖
Some widely propagated ideas about change in the arabo-islamic
world need to be reviewed, at least because what is thought to be
―obvious‖ in the West is not so elsewhere. Such a work has already
begun in the USA, although it needs likely more systematization. We
take as an example on this way the article ―Middle East Democracy‖
published on Foreign Policy371
. Among the myths that need to be thought
over ―promoting women‘s rights is crucial for democratic change‖. ―This
myth, a favorite of women‘s organizations and Western governments,
reflects the combination of correct observation and false logic. No
country can be considered fully democratic if a part of its population (in
some cases, the majority) is discriminated against and denied equal
371
Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, Middle East Democracy, Foreign
Policy, November-December 2004
210
rights‖, say the authors. But ―the main problem at present is that Arab
presidents and kings have too much power, which they refuse to share
with citizens and outside institutions. This stranglehold on power must be
broken to make progress toward democracy. Greater equality for women
does nothing to diminish the power of overly strong, authoritarian
governments‖. Worse: ―Arab leaders know this truth too well. Many
autocrats implement policies to improve women‘s rights precisely to give
themselves reformist credentials and score points with Western
governments, media outlets, and nongovernmental organizations. These
efforts, however, often amount to a trick of smoke and mirrors designed
to disguise the governments‘ refusal to cede any real power‖372
.
Another myth, ―Arab Democrats are the key to reform»: No, say
Ottaway and Carothers, because if all Arab countries ―boast a small
number of Westernized liberals who advocate respect for human rights,
freedom of thought and speech, and democratic change‖, we know that
―democratic transformation requires more than the ideological
commitment of a few individuals‖. Moreover, Arab democrats in some
countries ―are not a persecuted group. Rather they tend to be
professionals comfortably ensconced in the upper-middle class.
Therefore, they are hesitant to demand genuine reforms that might lead to
a hard-line takeover and content to advocate democratization from the
top‖. According to the authors of the article, it would be ―a serious
mistake‖ under such conditions, ―for US and European democracy
advocates to focus on Arab democrats as the key to political change‖.373
A third myth assumes that ―Islamists are the main obstacle to
Arab democracy‖, hence they must be forbidden from accessing it. The
article is more nuanced; the authors point out to the fact that the chance
of an overwhelming electoral victory that would allow Islamists to
abrogate all freedoms at once is remote in the Arab world. ―During the
last decade‖, they say, ―Islamist parties and candidates have participated
in elections in eight Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen), always with modest results‖
(…) and ―Turkey, a country where an Islamist party took power with a
large majority, is becoming an encouraging example of democratic
success‖. However, what is noteworthy is the fact that ―Islamist parties
are also integral to democratization because they are the only
372
Idem. 373
Idem.
211
nongovernmental parties with large constituencies. Without their
participation, democracy is impossible in the Middle East‖374
.
Hence the question: building upon such myths without regard to
the real situation, is it helpful or justified?
In another paper, Marina Ottaway, notes that despite the fact that
calls for democracy in the Arab world are increasing, there are also clear
signs that this newfound interest in democracy has not translated so far
into an attempt to build popular constituencies for democratic change.
―Political parties embracing democracy remain weak, their leaders
isolated in downtown offices while Islamist organizations set up
headquarters in lower-class sections of town. Prodemocracy intellectuals
in general shun political parties and prefer to set up nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), often with foreign funding. These organizations
can generate quickly visible activities such as conferences that receive
attention abroad. But these groups are not necessarily able to speak to the
general public in their own countries. As a result, the acceptance of
democratic ideas by Arab publics revealed by opinion polls has not
become the foundation for the rise of a new political force. Ideologically,
the Arab street belongs much more to Islamist preachers than to
democracy activists‖375
.
Taken together, all these features mean that Arab democracy is
not underway, and if ever some kind of pluralistic rule is achieved in any
of these countries, it might fall under one of the categories created by
political and social scientists to designate such an evolvement, which is
not necessarily westernized: semi-democracy, formal democracy,
electoral democracy, façade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak
democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy, and virtual
democracy… characterize the ―gray zone‖ that is situated between
outright dictatorship and liberal democracy. Some of these terms, such as
façade democracy, and pseudo-democracy, apply only to a fairly specific
subset of gray-zone cases. Other terms, such as weak democracy and
partial democracy, are intended to have much broader applicability.
Actually, to talk about democratic change in the Arab world when
the Western governments themselves have been supporting such or such
dictatorship, is an euphemism. The Western democracies are precisely
those that so far sustained with money and weapons the most dictatorial
374
Idem. 375
Marina Ottaway, Democracy and Constituencies in the Arab World, Carnegie
Papers, n°48, July 2004.
212
regimes of the Middle East. For that reason, people in the concerned
region are much skeptic about so many plans of so-called
democratization emanating from the Western governments and supported
by them.
Therefore:
- A sustained effort has to be consented aiming at boosting
democratization and modernization together with a serious movement
towards resolving the Middle-East conflict in its multiple sides and
aspects. Yet, who would lead such efforts, when suspicion is floating
about everything and distrust is master?
- Modernization should not be pursued at the expense of
democracy, because without freedom, the welfare state is just a golden
cage. Yet, even modernization revealed to be a false one, as it has been
reduced to importing high-tech products and other gadgets, whereas
genuine modernization should be creative as well.
- Demilitarizing the oil rich region of the Gulf may sound, in the
present time, almost a pipe dream, albeit the military build up is not
absolutely necessary for the stability of these countries. It may even be a
cause of tension.
- To call for democratization and to support military expansion or
autocratic regimes at once is equal to sending a schizophrenic message to
someone who is already in a state of advanced paranoia.
- The backbone of any democratic change is the civil society and
the social movements. If there is a way to strengthen both of them
without triggering a war, generating a revolution, or causing a
coup…maybe there is a hope. If not, the society will reproduce itself and
―History‖ will go on, indifferent to all those who have neither the means
nor the will to master ―her‖.
Paris, August 1, 2005.
Hichem Karoui.
213
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221
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222
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Operations, February 2003, Near East. It can be reached on this
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Laundering (FATF).
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Affairs on July 31, 2003, which also we can read on this URL :
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on international trade and finance , committee on banking,
housing and urban affairs, August 1, 2002:
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