u.s. foreign policy in indonesia from 1945-1966 and its role in indonesian massacre in 1965-1966
TRANSCRIPT
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WARTBURG COLLEGE
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN INDONESIA FROM 1945-1966 AND ITS ROLE IN INDONESIAN
MASSACRE IN 1965-1966
SUBMITTED TO DR. TERRENCE J. LINDELL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE COURSE
H1/PS 306 HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS,
BY
RUT S. NASTITI
WAVERLY, IA
04/09/2014
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Background
In September 30th 1965, six army generals were killed in East Jakarta, Indonesia. At the same
period of time until 1966, a great number of civilians who were suspected to uphold communism
ideology were murdered and killed. As an Indonesian, our history books taught us that the six generals
were killed by the member of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Most Indonesians students were
aware that the killings of communist-suspected civilians must have been done by someone with a great
military power. Many suspected that Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Suharto is beyond the
killing of the civilians. There are no written evidences that came up on surfaces to claim who supposed
to be responsible for the genocide. Even though there were, nobody was taunt to go against the military
power in Indonesia.
As I grew up and read more outside sources and critically question the event – studies, articles
and documents reveal that the United States backed up the Indonesian army to execute the coup under
General Suharto, who later became the second president of the country. However, our history system
never mentioned the involvement of the United States Government by its own government or through
the Central Intelligence Agent (CIA).
This claim started to make more sense to me by studying and understanding United States
Foreign Policy especially after the period of World War II when the United States were trying to limit
the movement of communism. With regard to CIA, many argue that the U.S. has supported more coups
against democracies that it perceived as communist, becoming communist, or pro-communist1.
Communism was believed to be a bad ideology and was being combated especially by the Western
allies. Additionally, Sukarno, the founding father and first president of Indonesia, formed a non-aligned
1 Many argue that non-transparent United States government agencies worked in secret sometimes mislead or do not fully implement the decisions of elected civil ian leaders and that this has been an important component of many such
operations (Spencer R Weart. Never at War. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 221–224, 314
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movement during the cold war. History told us that country needed to pick a side during the Cold War.
However, this movement shows that Sukarno did not want to be in both either side. He was also
suspected leaning against western democracy in 1963. These two facts serve as great assumptions to
explore the role of the United States in the mass murder in Indonesia. Some argue that the United States
provide means for Indonesian military to combat members of the communist party (PKI). In the other
hand, many also argue that the United States have been involved years and months before the incident
since 1945. According to Bradley Simpson, the U.S. was involved by covert operations to provoke an
armed clash between the Indonesian army and the communist movement in the month leading up to the
events of Sep.30, 1965, hoping it would eliminate the PKI2. Therefore, this paper is going to discuss,
explore and show supports of U.S. involvement in the killings, directly or indirectly, in a periodic and
chronological order. In order to understand better the role of U.S. in the killings, some terms such as
covert operations, coup d’état, will also be explored and included briefly in this paper. The paper will be
focusing on U.S-Indonesia relations prior to the event from 1956 to 1968, and the event of the killings
from 1965-1966, however events and informations prior to that period of time that might lead to the
event will also be included in the paper to solidify and reach the purpose of the paper.
Introduction
On the morning of October 1, 1965, Lyndon Johnson’s White House received a terse situation
report from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the telegram said “A power move which may have
far reaching implications is underway in Jakarta3. The night before, six generals from the Indonesian
army high command, including commander Lt. General Achad Yani, were kidnapped from their homes
2 Bradley Simpson, who heads a project at the National Security Archive that declassified key US government documents concerning Indonesia and East Timor during the reign of General Suharto (‘Act of Kil l ing’ Director Hopes US Will Admit Role in 1965 Kil l ings, Inter Press Service on 10:08 am Mar 03, 2014) 3 Memo for Johnson, October 1, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1964 -1968, v.26, 300-301
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in Jakarta, killed, and dumped in a well on the outskirts of Halim Air Force Base by self-prescribed
participants of the September 30th Movement who claimed they were acting to forestall a coup by right
wing “Council of Generals”4. According to Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, the Indonesian
Killings of 1965-66 occurred against the backdrop of the Cold War, extreme political tension and
economic hardship5. The killings were part of a massive bloodletting that took an estimated 250,000
lives that started in Central Java and spread around other islands in Indonesia6.
From 1957 to 1965, Sukarno was believed to play a delicate balancing act by supporting both
anticommunist army and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia/PKI). According
to World Socialist Website, the bloody coup in Indonesia was the outcome of the drive by US
imperialism to gain unchallenged control of the immense natural wealth and strategic resources of the
archipelago, often referred to as the “Jewel of Asia”7. This importance was emphasized by U.S.
President Eisenhower in 1953 in a statement that it was imperative for the US to finance the French
colonial war in Vietnam as the "cheapest way" to keep control of Indonesia. The central Intelligence
Agency’s (CIA) active involvement in the Administration’s very personalized campaign against
Sukarno began towards the end of 1956. These information have given an understanding how the
killings is relevant to the context of Cold War and U.S. foreign policy.
4 Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Gun; authoritarian development and U.S. – Indoenesia relations, 1960-1968
(Stanford: Standford University Press, 2008) p.1 5 He claimed that since the Indonesian revolution against the Dutch (1945-49), the system of parliamentary democracy had
failed. Sukarno proposed an alternative in which the president would play a greater role. In addition he called for a ‘return
to the rails of the revolution’ and began to focus increasingly on implementing the next stage of the revolution, a form of
socialist populism (Dr Katharine E. McGregor, The Indonesian Kil lings of 1965-1966 , Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence,
[online], published on 4 August 2009, accessed 7 April 2014, URL : http://www.massviolence.org/The-Indonesian-Kill ings-
of-1965-1966, ISSN 1961-9898) 6 Kathy Kadane, Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for Indonesians, Washington Post, May 21, 1990, Retrieved from http://www.namebase.org/kadane.html 7 Lessons of the 1965 Indonesian Coup “Chapter One: The historical background” Retrieved from:
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/05/ind1-m16.html
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Content
Indirect Role of U.S. Involvement: U.S Foreign Policy in Indonesia from 1948-1955
Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands and Japan in 1945 when the United
States were under Truman administration. Truman administration initially acquiesced to Dutch effort to
reestablish control over their former colonial empire, expressing the same ambivalence about the fitness
of Indonesian for self-government that it did for Vietnam8. For three years (1945-1948), the U.S.
publically professed neutrality in Indonesia’s independence struggle while The Hague used lend-lease
equipment and funds freed up by U.S. Marshall Plain aid to repress Indonesia’s republican sources.
However, the situation quickly changed when Washington decisively back Indonesian independence by
threatening to withhold military and economic aid after the Netherlands unilaterally violated a U.S.-
brokered settlement9. At the same time, the young republican government shows an anti-communism
bona fides to the Truman administration by bloodily crushing a PKI uprising in September 1948 in the
East Java city of Madiun10. Couple agreements were also broken by the Dutch who intended to install a
pliant government in Indonesia to act as a front for the final destruction of the Republic. This situation
quickly changed U.S attitude towards Indonesia independence. However, the United States was playing
its role as a nation who supports Indonesian statehood, however the Administration ensured its support
for the Dutch. At this time, the possibility of Indonesia to become a battleground with the communist
had not been a dominant theme in Washington, despite of Washington’s appropriation of Indonesian
independence as a Cold War propaganda weapon11. Washington was soon found that the nationalists
8 Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Gun, p.14 9 Ibid 10 Katherine McGregor, “A Reassessment of the Significance of the 1948 Madiun Uprising to the Cold War in Indonesia ,”
Kajian Malaysia,(2009) p. 27 See: http://myais.fsktm.um.edu.my/9850/1/KM_SE-_XXVI_NO _1_%26_2_ART_4_%2885-119%29.pdf 11 Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy Toward Indonesia in Truman and Eisenhower years, (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan), p. 75
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were more than capable to deal with the communists, as suppression of the Madiun revolt showed12.
The Administration’s realization that the Republican leadership was anti-communist quickly
transformed its appreciation of the nationalists. The Truman Administration concluded that only a
properly managed transition to independence offered the prospect of peace and economic rehabilitation
in Indonesia13. Therefore the U.S. policy was essentially defensive since it was not directed against
communist aggression but in support of American and Western interest which in the NEI, at the same
time were bound up maintaining Dutch rule.
U.S Policy towards Indonesia were dramatically altered at the first months in 1950, especially
after the approval of NSC 6814 which was a fundamental change on Washington’s policy on the Cold
War in developing countries such as Indonesia. This change in attitude was led by USSR’s acquisition
of atomic weapons and the success of the Communist Chinese in 194915. Relationship between the U.S.
and Indonesia was also seasoned by the status of West Irian. However, Administration believed that it
had interests in common with Indonesia.
By early 1951, pressure was mounting on the Administration to end its ‘hands-off’ policy and to
deploy its ‘strength and proven techniques of technical and economic aid’ so government in Indonesia
would be better able to overcome domestic criticism16. In this period basis US policies towards
Indonesia were made. The administrator’s first priority was to ‘firmly align’ Indonesia with the West by
means of ‘friendly’ assistance or, at minimum, to preserve its non-communist orientation. This policy
12 Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy Toward Indonesia in Truman and Eisenhower years, p. 75 13 Ibid, p.76 14 NSC 68 was important for US policy in the Third World because it was based on assessments of Soviet capabilities rather
than intensions. It predicted that communist would launch proxy wars in the periphery. This also noted Administration’s
decision to move away from economic to military containment of communism (Roadnight, p . 81). 15 Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy Toward Indonesia in Truman and Eisenhower years, p. 80 16 Loc; Papers of Philip C. Jessup (Jessup Papers), Box. 1 170; Philip Jessup – UN General Correspondence 1944-1952;
‘Memorandum on Issues of International Security Policy Affecting ECA Operations’, by Harlan Cleveland and H . Van B. Cleveland, Jan 1951. (Roadnight, p. 85)
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was later helpful to understand as one of the cause that triggered U.S decision to support Indonesian
army to topple Sukarno, since Sukarno later decided to form a non-align movement or famously known
as non-block. At the end of Truman Administration transitioning to President Dwight Eisenhower,
America’s relationship with Indonesia has reached its lowest point since independence.
From 1953 to 1955, Eisenhower Administration created a ‘New Look’ policy towards Indonesia
and Third World countries in Asia. The aim of the new policy is to reduce the cost of defense by
concentration on, and extending, the superiority in air power and atomic weaponry that the US enjoyed
over USSR. Included in the plan, the new policy promised massive retaliation against Soviet aggression
and noticing that it would fight Soviet expansionism by developing an ‘intelligence system’ capable of
detecting communist subversion in any area of the world17. Another policy that is specifically designed
for Indonesia was written in NSC 171/1 noting that Indonesia was ‘strategically important to the United
States’. Most importantly, the document highlights that objective of the new policy was to ‘prevent
Indonesia from passing into the Communist orbit. More specifically the notes includes that Indonesian
Government’s request to supply ample-anticommunist legislation, preliminary discussions of a state visit
for President Sukarno, and increased training for Indonesian army officers in U.S. military service
schools18.
This agreement was not officially reached until November 1953 when Vice President Richard
Nixon came to Jakarta to show seriousness that Indonesia is in dangers. However, Nixon said that the
U.S will find it difficult to help Indonesia until it gave an open and active proof staht is anti-communist
alignment. At that time, many people in State Department thought that Indonesia was becoming a Cold
17 Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy Toward Indonesia in Truman and Eisenhower years, p. 103 18 National Security Council Operations Coordinating Board, Progress Report on NSC 171/1 United States Objective and Courses of Action with Respect to Indonesia,(July 1954), p. 1-3 Retrived from:
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/fi les/document_conversions/5829/CIA-RDP80R01731R003000160006-0.pdf
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War battleground which theorized that it would be the next major area of conflict in Asia19. Supporters
of domino theory believed that communist success in Indochina would lead to the progressive collapse
of the rest of South East Asia. The dilemma at this period also continued when Indonesia under Sukarno
held a Bandung Conference or known AS Asian-African Conference in 1955 which gathered Minsters
of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma. The conference’s aims were to promote Afro-Asian economic
and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism and imperialism. This conference was an important
step stone of the Non-Aligned movement that consisted of group of countries that did not necessarily
supported one block or another.
Indonesia’s Internal Affairs and Higher Level of U.S. Involvement: Sukarno’s Guided Democracy
in 1956 to 1958
From the previous period, it was clear that United States was trying to prevent Indonesia from
falling to communism. Indonesia was seen as possibly having a quality and impact that was necessary
for the U.S. government to assert its stance in Indonesia. However during the period of 1956to 1965,
Sukarno was suspected to give more space to PKI in the parliament and also received aid from USSR.
An article by New York Times described ‘Soviet Point IV’ plan amounting to $100 million which
Indonesia would share with India20. Francis Underhill, the Vice Consul in Jakarta citing Soviet
references considered the plan as ‘mutually beneficial economic relations’ rather than ‘aid’ or
‘assistance’. From U.S. perspective, this attitude was seen as a rejection of Western liberal value, while
for Sukarno he believed that as a nation, Indonesia can choose its own path of being ‘neutral’. Indonesia
want to be seen as an equal partner rather than being preached to. Regardless of the tension, in the early
19 Roadnight, p. 121 20 The New York Times, 7 Nov. 1954 (See Roadnight p. 191, reference)
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months of 1956, Indonesia’s neutralism might be more acceptable to Washington. Sukarno even toured
to the U.S. in May and June 1956. With his approachable style, made a great impression in America’s
public opinion and feted in the newspaper. He was a quiet warm and phenomenal politicians. In his
speech, Sukarno also told America that they had nothing to fear from Asian nationalism and praised
congressional support. However, U.S. Secretary of State denounced it by telling Sukarno that he had to
choose sides in the Cold War21. At the end of October 1955, Sukarno decided to reorganized parliament
that changed Western model democracy into ‘Guided Democracy’ due to the fact that many parties in
Indonesia at that time only caused complications in the society as they were given enough freedom. As
the matter of fact, Indonesia had 40 parties at that time. Sukarno saw this as inefficient. Sukarno also
believed that the situation will lead to divergence and fragmentation. Cumming also reported that
Sukarno’s desire came from disaffection amongst the army and youth as from the lesson he had drawn
from his trips to USSR and PRC22.
This quick change in Indonesia’s invited a stronger military uptake by the U.S23. The Central
Intelligence (CIA) involvement started at this period of time, at the end of 1956. CIA created a very
personalized campaign against Sukarno. In November 1956, Frank Wisner, the CIA Deputy Director
Plans, signaled the beginning of eighteen months of undercover operations against Sukarno when he told
Al Ulmer, the chief of CIA’s for Easter Office that, ‘it’s time we held Sukarno’s feet to the fire’24. At
the end of 1956, Secretary of State Dulles and his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, were convinced
that Indonesia’s government and military were falling under the influence of PKI25. Joseph Smith, the
21 The New York Times, 22 Apr, 1957 (Roadnight, 195) 22 NA; RG 59; DF 2955-1959, Box 3439; 756D.00/10-356; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 30 Oct. and 2 Nov. 1956
(Roadnight, p. 223) 23 By March 1956, planners had concluded that to be successful, any military intervention before communist ta keover
‘would require a substantial and successful conditioning by psychological, political and economic means’ (Roadnight, p . 141) 24 Roadnight, p. 142 25 Bradley Simpsons, Economists with gun. P. 1957
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CIA Agent responsible for Indonesia, attributed Wisner’s remark to secret decision taken by the Dulles
brothers to pressurize Sukarno into changing his policy26. Washington, under the Dulles brothers, also
provided military assistance for rebels against PKI noted in ‘Eyes Only’ memorandum27. Many
believed these provoke by the U.S. only encouraged separatism and pushing Indonesia towards
separatism28. By early 1957, U.S policy objective to Indonesia was no longer friendly by encouraging
Indonesia towards the West but was highly interventionist. Its intention was still to stop Indonesian from
falling to communist camp. The policy has not changed a lot under the Truman and Eisenhower
Administration was believed as a failure to make Indonesia as its friends. At the end of 1957,
Washington had little prospect to influence its policy in Indonesia. In the face of PKI, the
administration’s attitude towards Sukarno was seen as a sense of powerlessness. Most importantly, the
covert intervention in 1957 and 1958 was seen as misunderstanding of the dispute between the regions
and Jakarta. The Washington was also blamed for not understanding the dynamics in Indonesia’s
political life.
U.S. entered Indonesia’s Confrontation: Kennedy Administration
The U.S. entered the new era of Indonesia’s political instability when the country decided to
confront Malaysia’s formation, while Kennedy Administration picked up the pieces from the failure its
precedents did to Indonesia. Kennedy convinced the Congress to provide aid for Indonesia, however
Congress was very skeptical of it. An important note under Kennedy administration was written on NSC
602 3 “all feasible means, including the use of U.S. armed force if necessary and appropriate,29”
26 Joseph Smith, Portrait of a Cold War Warrior. (New York: Putnam, 1976), 197-9 27 Roadnight. P.154 28 Ibid. p.155 29 NSC 602 3, “US Policy on Indonesia,” 27. Retrieved from
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/fi les/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000606461.pdf
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Kennedy administration was also perplexed by risking alienating some oil companies out of Indonesia
while the country was trying to stabilize its economy and cooperated with IMF30. Kennedy was famous
of having strong policy of aiding Indonesia. He also planned to visit Indonesia as the seal of one of the
negotiations with Sukarno. However, his long term economic and technical assistance for Indonesia was
never came to realization because he was assassinated.
The Peak of U.S. Covert Operations: Johnson Administration in 1963-1966
Lyndon Johnson’s Administration continued the Konfrontasi strategy however filled with
regional conflicts and more of CIA Covert actions. The U.S has shown interest of building its relations
with Malaysia. Sukarno who disliked Malaysia for its non-permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council
thought that the U.S. has favored Malaysia. The peak of their deteriorated relationship is when Sukarno
told the U.S. ‘to hell with your aid!31’. Since then, Sukarno’s leftward drift has led the U.S. to a closer
tie with the army. This is an important connection when United States expected the country to be run by
its military32. Johnson administration was seen important to initiate more coverts of CIA and its aim to
overthrow Sukarno administration. CIA’s covert aimed at ‘building up strength among non-communist
and anti-communist groups and or organizations and ‘encouraging direct action against the PKI as a
party’33, however CIA’s proposal has been trying to avoid the term ‘coup’.
During Johnson Administration, Indonesia faced turmoil and the United States was seen as the
chief threat to Indonesia’s interest. Some argue that the U.S. was a bystander to control events in
Indonesia, but for Washington to stand by helplessly while the world fifth largest country went
30 Simpson, Economists with Gun, p.105 31 Sarasota Herald Tribune, Sukarno Tells U.S. To Go to Hell with Foreign Aid. (Feb.1, 1965), p. 2 Retrieved from http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1774&dat=19650201&id=Q9geAAAAIBAJ&sjid=xmUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5351,12732 32 Simpson, Economists with Gun, p. 132 33 Ibid , p, 140
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Communism would be the greatest anomalies of the Cold War34. By no means, U.S. policy in Indonesia
was no anomaly. Officials in Washington and Jakarta reduced the overt U.S. presence, however sought
an expanded program of covert action to exploit political polarization and clash between the army and
PKI or a military coup against Sukarno35. The situation in Indonesia was really dangerous as clashes
between different parties, PKI, and army continued. Anti-Americanism was raised.
The summer 1965 noted the peak of Indonesian instability when Indonesia did not allow foreign
investment and replace all foreign managers with Indonesian managers. Washington was in deep
pessimism. PKI demanded a “fifth force” which is an entity of armed peasants and workers. Sukarno
realized how destabilized Indonesia was and tried to restore the balance of power. Regardless of what
happened, Indonesian army was unwilling to act against Sukarno and they assured U.S. that PKI would
never be allowed to take power. CIA also analyzed that PKI had no weapons for a revolt since its
members were loyal peasants. The situation was worsen when new ambassador of the U.S. for Indonesia
did not receive a warm welcome and the embassy was being protested by PKI. Sukarno’s health was
worsen. In the late August PKI warned all its branches of an impending coup by the army’s Council of
Generals and another warning in September36. On the night of 30th, rumor was swirled that Generals
Yani, Parman and Suprapto met. The morning of October 1, 1965, six army generals were murdered
and dumped into well. Since November 1965 until the end 1966, civilians who were members of PKI or
favor the ideology were slaughtered in different regions in Indonesia.
34 Simpson, Economists with Gun, p. 146 35 Ibid 36 Ibid. p. 170
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Evidences and Correlation of U.S.’s Support Indonesian Army
After the incident, the Washington and U.S. officials were in confusion on deciding who was
behind the coup. There was ‘no active role of Sukarno in the coup and the 30 September group claims
that the alleged Generals' plot was American inspired’, and its immediate purpose appears to be the
‘elimination of any political role by anti-communist Army elements and a change in Army leadership’37.
This memorandum can be interpreted that the coup was inspired by the U.S. in some way. With regards
to a change in Army leadership, as mentioned before, during political instability under Johnson
administration, there can be a correlation. There is a strong indication that the army is behind the coup
since the Army
‘has banned the PKI newspaper but has made no move against PKI headquarters. General
Suharto38, who seems to have firm control of the military situation in and around Djakarta, went
on the radio today with a strong speech denouncing the Air Force for its role in the plot and went
to great lengths to build up public support for the Army by describing the brutal slaying of its top
generals. This is the first indication we have that the Army may be willing to take issue with
Sukarno's policy of trying to gloss over the events of the last few days.39’
This fact is quite surprising considering the fact that the Army at first did not want to go against Sukarno
at the same time assuring that Indonesia will not fall into the hand of communism.
37 Memorandum for President Johnson, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. V, Memos, 10/65–11/65. Secret. Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d142 38 Indonesia Army, Commander of the Indonesian Army's Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) until October 16, 1965,
Chief of Staff of the Indonesia Army and Chairman of Presidium and First Mini ster of Defense and Security Sector; after March 12, 1967 Acting President of Indonesia. Office of Historian, Person.Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines 39 146 Memorandum From the Director of the Far East Region (Blouin) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (McNaughton)1 .
14
The U.S. involvement can’t easily be interpreted directly for the slaughters of 1965 since the
incident happened so fast. The two published notes with regard to the incident showed a surprise and
confusion within Washington and U.S. officials in Jakarta. It did not indicated any involvement by the
U.S., however the U.S. indicated understanding that the military was somewhat responsible or have
power over the slaughter. These two notes only serves as assumption whether U.S. is involved or not
involved.
Additionally, there is no tangible NSC documents that stated about U.S. aided on weaponry,
assistance or any of its kind that supported the claim. However, the claims are supported by statements
from ex-CIA agents and American journalists who did a further investigation on the mass killing. Ex-
agents CIA, Robert J. Martens, stated that he provided a list of names of PKI leaders and senior cadre
system40. Between December 17, 1965 and August 10, 1966, the Embassy sent the Department three
airgrams listing PKI members41. The most evidence was shown on A-74 from U.S. Ambassador to
Indonesia, Marshall Green, and listed 4 senior PKI officials were reported dead and 20 imprisoned. The
airgram also indicated that “A sanitized [embassy attribution removed] version of the lists in A-398 has
been made available to the Indonesian Government last December 1965 and is apparently being used by
Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest over information on PKI leadership
at the time (…)’42. Additionally after the coup, the US administration immediately rushed to express
political support for the Suharto regime. It provided covert monetary assistance to the Indonesian armed
forces, while the CIA organized arms from Thailand. The US government also provided
40 “It is true that I passed names of PKI leaders (…), the real point however is the name I gave were based entirely – I repeat
entirely – on Indonesia Communist press and where available for everyone – a few thousand at most out of the 3.5 mill ion claimed party members.” Retrieved from: Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1964, Volume XXVI http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/exhibit2.pdf 41 Ibid 42 Ibid
15
communications equipment, medicine and a range of other items, including shoes and uniforms43. The
United States seemed to be involved at providing facilities for the mass killings after the coup. From
these evidences, the active U.S. involvement to the mass killing was by providing a list of PKI leaders
and members and possible equipment.
Conclusion, Discussions and Evaluation
U.S. Foreign Policy in Indonesia to prevent Indonesia falling to communism has started since
1945 under Truman Administration, however its objective was not achieved until the U.S. finally
supported a list of names and equipment to support the Army to banish communism under PKI as noted
in Document NSC 171/1. A thorough understanding of Truman and Eisenhower Administration is very
important to see U.S. policy aims in Indonesia and to understand what motives triggered U.S.
involvement in the mass killing during 1965-1966. As it was discussed, Truman and Eisenhower
Administration outlined Indonesia as a communist battle ground, therefore the U.S. involvement in the
killing has been very much perpetuated since 1945. Under Kennedy Administration, the U.S. gained a
little of Indonesia’s favored, however the failure left by the two administrations did not help to better
U.S. objective since Kennedy was assassinated. Johnson Administration was the highlight of a more
involved United States in combatting communism in Indonesia. During Johnson Administration, the
situation in Indonesia enabled the U.S. to have a stronger link to the military, in which becomes the
main entity of Indonesian killing from 1965-66.
43 See John Bardock, Historian says US backed “efficacious terror” in 1965 Indonesian massacre, Global Research Canada, www.globalresearch.ca, see http://www.globalresearch.ca/historian-says-us-backed-efficacious-terror-in-1965-indonesian-
massacre/14254 (Accessed 4/9/2014)
16
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