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Order Code RL32686

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

Updated January 25, 2006

Christopher M. BlanchardAnalyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

Summary

Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant factorsin Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic order over the last 25 years. In 2005,Afghanistan remained the source of 87% of the world’s illicit opium, in spite ofongoing efforts by the Afghan government, the United States, and their internationalpartners to combat poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. U.N. officials estimatethat in-country illicit profits from the 2005 opium poppy crop were equivalent invalue to 50% of the country’s legitimate GDP, sustaining fears that Afghanistan’seconomic recovery continues to be underwritten by drug profits.

Across Afghanistan, regional militia commanders, criminal organizations, andcorrupt government officials have exploited opium production and drug traffickingas reliable sources of revenue and patronage, which has perpetuated the threat thesegroups pose to the country’s fragile internal security and the legitimacy of itsembryonic democratic government. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears toprovide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continueto operate in and around Afghanistan, including remnants of the Taliban regime andsome Al Qaeda operatives. Although coalition forces may be less frequently relyingon figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, manyobservers have warned that drug related corruption among appointed and newlyelected Afghan officials may create new political obstacles to further progress.

The initial failure of U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts to disruptthe Afghan opium trade or sever its links to warlordism and corruption after the fallof the Taliban led some observers to warn that without redoubled multilateral action,Afghanistan would succumb to a state of lawlessness and reemerge as a sanctuary forterrorists. Following his election in late 2004, Afghan president Hamid Karzaiidentified counternarcotics as the top priority for his administration and since hasstated his belief that “the fight against drugs is the fight for Afghanistan.” In 2005,U.S. and Afghan officials implemented a new strategy to provide viable economicalternatives to poppy cultivation and to disrupt corruption and narco-terroristlinkages. According to a U.N. survey, these new initiatives contributed to a 21%decrease in the amount of opium poppy cultivation across Afghanistan in the 2004-2005 growing season. However, better weather and higher crop yields ensured thatoverall opium output remained nearly static at 4,100 metric tons. Survey results andofficial opinions suggest output may rise again in 2006.

In addition to describing the structure and development of the Afghan narcoticstrade, this report provides current statistical information, profiles the trade’s variousparticipants, explores alleged narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews U.S. andinternational policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers currentpolicy debates regarding the role of the U.S. military in counternarcotics operations,opium poppy eradication, alternative livelihood development, and funding issues forCongress. The report will be updated to reflect major developments. For moreinformation on Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-WarGovernance, Security, and U.S. Policy. and CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan:Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Afghanistan’s Opium Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Current Production Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Historical Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Taliban Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Post-Taliban Resurgence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Farmers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Land Owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Traffickers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Narcotics and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Consumption Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Trafficking to the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Regional Security Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

The International Policy Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Institutions and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Public Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Judicial Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Alternative Livelihood Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Defining the Role of the U.S. Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Redefining Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Aerial Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Pending Legislation and Counternarcotics Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Counternarcotics Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Cited Field Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

List of Figures

Figure 1. Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1986-2005 (hectares) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Figure 2. Opium Production, 1980-2005 (metric tons) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Figure 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation by Province, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Figure 4. Narcotics and Security in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

List of Tables

Table 1. Recent Opium Prices in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Table 2. Afghan Extremists’ Links to the Drug Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Table 3. Alternative Livelihood Proposed Spending Targets by Province,

FY2005-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Table 4. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding for Afghanistan by Source,

FY2002-FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Table 5. Planned Use of FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations, P.L. 109-13 . . 39

1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/Government of AfghanistanCounternarcotics Directorate (CND), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, Nov. 2004.

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

Introduction

In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan’s narcotics trade,U.N. officials estimate that Afghanistan produced a massive opium poppy crop in2005 that supplied 87% of the world’s illicit opium for the second year in a row.1

Afghan, U.S., and international officials have stated that opium poppy cultivation anddrug trafficking constitute serious strategic threats to the security and stability ofAfghanistan and jeopardize the success of post-9/11 counterterrorism andreconstruction efforts there. In light of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation thatthe United States make a long-term commitment to the security and stability ofAfghanistan, counternarcotics policy has emerged as a focal point of recurring debatein the Bush Administration and in Congress concerning the United States’ strategicobjectives in Afghanistan and the global war against terrorism.

Concerns include the role of U.S. military personnel in counternarcoticsactivities and strategies for continuing the simultaneous pursuit of counterterrorismand counternarcotics goals, which may be complicated by practical necessities andemerging political realities. Coalition forces pursuing regional security andcounterterrorism objectives may rely on the cooperation of commanders, triballeaders, and local officials who may be involved in the narcotics trade. Similarly,U.S. officials and many observers believe that the introduction of a democraticsystem of government to Afghanistan has likely been accompanied by the electionand appointment of narcotics-associated individuals to positions of public office.

Efforts to combat the opium trade in Afghanistan face the challenge of endinga highly-profitable enterprise that has become deeply interwoven with the economic,political, and social fabric of a war-torn country. Afghan, U.S., and internationalauthorities are engaged in a campaign to reverse an unprecedented upsurge of opiumpoppy cultivation and heroin production: they have begun implementing amultifaceted counternarcotics initiative that includes public awareness campaigns,judicial reform measures, economic and agricultural development assistance, druginterdiction operations, and more robust poppy eradication. The BushAdministration and Congress continue to consider options for upgrading U.S. supportfor counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in order to meet the challenges posed bythe Afghan opium economy to the security of Afghanistan and the internationalcommunity. Questions regarding the likely effectiveness, resource requirements, andimplications of new counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan are likely to arise assuch options continue to be debated.

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2 See Jonathan C. Randal, “Afghanistan’s Promised War on Opium,” Washington Post, Nov.2, 1978, and Stuart Auerbach, “New Heroin Connection: Afghanistan and Pakistan SupplyWest With Opium,” Washington Post, Oct. 11, 1979.

Afghanistan’s Opium Economy

Opium production has become an entrenched element of Afghanistan’s fragilepolitical and economic order over the last 25 years in spite of ongoing local, regional,and international efforts to reverse its growth. At the time of Afghanistan’s pro-Communist coup in 1978, narcotics experts estimated that Afghan farmers produced300 metric tons (MT) of opium annually, enough to satisfy most local and regionaldemand and to supply a handful of heroin production facilities whose products werebound for Western Europe.2 Since the early 1980s, a trend of increasing opiumpoppy cultivation and opium production has unfolded during successive periods ofinsurgency, civil war, fundamentalist government, and recently, internationalengagement (Figures 1 and 2). In 2004, Afghanistan produced a world record opiumpoppy crop that yielded 4200 MT of illicit opium — an estimated 87% of the world’ssupply. A slightly smaller crop in 2005 produced a similar volume of opium, andestimated 4,100 MT, due to improved weather and environmental conditions.

Narcotics experts describe Afghanistan’s opium economy as the backbone ofa multibillion dollar drug trade that stretches throughout Central and Southwest Asiaand supplies heroin to consumption markets in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, andthe United States. Millions of Afghans remain involved with various aspects of theopium trade, including farmers, laborers, traffickers, warlords, and governmentofficials. Some experts have warned that the consolidation of existing relationshipsbetween these groups supports negative trends such as warlordism and corruption andthreatens to transform Afghanistan into a failed narco-state.

Current Production Statistics

According to the 2005 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by the UnitedNations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Ministry ofCounternarcotics (MCN):

! Opium poppy cultivation took place in fewer Afghan provinces in2005 than in 2004, with significant decreases occurring in someprovinces and significant increases occurring in others (see Figure3). Afghan farmers cultivated opium poppy on 104,000 hectares ofland during the 2004-2005 growing season, a 21% decrease from the131,000 hectares cultivated in 2004. The area under cultivation wasequal to 2.3% of Afghanistan’s arable land. U.S. governmentestimates placed the area under cultivation at a similar level of107,400 hectares.

! The 2005 opium poppy crop produced 4,100 MT of illicit opium, asmall decrease from the 4,200 MT produced in 2004. Although thearea of land dedicated to opium poppy cultivation decreased by 21%,crop yields improved due to better weather and other environmental

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3 UNODC/Afghan Gov., Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, Nov. 2004, pp. 105-7.4 See Barnett Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Center forInternational Cooperation, Oct. 7, 2004, and the World Bank Country Economic Report -Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty, Sept. 9, 2004.5 Author interviews with U.S., U.N., and coalition officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, Jan. 2005.

factors. A range of accepted opium to heroin conversion ratesindicate that the 2005 opium yield of 4,100 MT could have produced400 to 650 MT of refined heroin.3 U.S. government estimatesplaced overall opium output lower at 3,375 MT.

! Approximately 309,000 Afghan families cultivated opium poppy in2005, a number equal to roughly 2.0 million people or 8.7% of theAfghan population. An estimated 500,000 laborers and an unknownnumber of traffickers, warlords, and officials also participate.

! The estimated $2.7 billion value of Afghanistan’s 2005 illicit opiumharvest is equivalent to approximately 50% of the country’s licitGDP. Many licit and emerging industries are financed or supportedby profits from narcotics trafficking.4

The 2005 UNODC report credits the public outreach efforts of President Karzai,who has characterized opium as shameful and demanded that regional and localofficials take direct action to curb poppy cultivation and opium trafficking. Thereport also indicates that farmers fear crop eradication and notes that the largestdeclines in opium poppy cultivation occurred in provinces that received the largestinvestments of alternative livelihood assistance. Other observers have pointed to thesteady increase in opium production volume that has occurred since late 2001 andargued that excess opium supply had reduced raw opium price levels (Table 1) andprice incentives for farmers to cultivate poppy. Price levels have shown signs ofincrease since late 2005 which may reinvigorate price incentives in some areas.

Experts have identified two factors that may affect Afghanistan’s future opiumoutput regardless of reported declines in cultivation. Intensified interdiction anderadication efforts by Afghan authorities may fuel a renewed increase in opium pricesthat could enrich traffickers who control large existing stocks of opium andencourage farmers to resume cultivation in the future. In addition, drought and cropdisease problems that limited the output of the 2004 poppy crop may not affect theoutput of future poppy crops. Smaller nationwide poppy crops may yield higheropium outputs if weather and irrigation improve productivity in cultivated areas.

Note: The following figures display trends in poppy cultivation and opiumproduction in Afghanistan over the last 25 years. The sharp decline in cultivation andproduction in the 2000-2001 growing season is related to the Taliban regime’sdecision to ban opium poppy cultivation. According to U.S. officials, opiumtrafficking continued unabated during this period, and Taliban authorities and theirallies collected higher profits from the sale of opium and heroin stockpiles.5

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Source: Graphic from UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005. One hectare is equal to 10,000 square meters. U.S. governmentestimates placed 2005 opium cultivation at 107,400 hectares. The Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in areas under their control in 2001,but allowed opium trafficking to continue and profited from the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks. Limited cultivation continued in areasunder Northern Alliance control.

Figure 1. Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1986-2005 (hectares)

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Source: Graphic adapted from UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Surveys 2004 and 2005. One metric ton is equal to 2,200 pounds. U.S.government estimates placed 2005 opium production at ,3375 metric tons. The Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in areas under theircontrol in 2001 but allowed opium trafficking to continue and profited from the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks. Limited cultivationcontinued in areas under Northern Alliance control.

Figure 2. Opium Production, 1980-2005 (metric tons)

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Source: Map from UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005.

Figure 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation by Province, 2005

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6 In 1978, pro-Communist Afghan officials reportedly requested “a lot of assistance fromabroad, especially economic help, to help replace farmers’ incomes derived from opiumpoppy cultivation.” Randal, Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1978.7 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment ofPermanent Government Institutions [The Bonn Agreement], Dec. 5, 2001.

Table 1. Recent Opium Prices in Afghanistan(regionally weighted fresh opium farmgatea price US$/kilogram)

1999 2000 2001b 2002 2003 2004 2005

Opium Price $40 $28 $301 $350 $283 $92 $102

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004-5.

a. Farmgate price for fresh opium is the price paid to farmers for non-dried opium. b. Dry opium prices skyrocketed to nearly $700/kg immediately following the September 11, 2001

terrorist attacks and fell to $93/kg after U.S. airstrikes began.

Historical Development

During the more than two decades of occupation, foreign interference, and civilwar that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion, opium poppy cultivation and drugtrafficking served as central parts of Afghanistan’s war economy, providing revenueto individuals and groups competing for power and an economic survival mechanismto a growing segment of the impoverished population. In December 2001, Afghanleaders participating in the Bonn conference that formed Afghanistan’s interim post-Taliban government echoed pleas issued by their pro-Communist predecessorsdecades earlier:6 They strongly urged that “the United Nations, the internationalcommunity, and regional organizations cooperate with the Interim Authority tocombat international terrorism, cultivation, and trafficking of illicit drugs and provideAfghan farmers with financial, material and technical resources for alternative cropproduction.”7 In spite of renewed efforts on the part of Afghan and internationalauthorities to combat opium poppy cultivation since the fall of the Taliban,Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium.

Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy. Following the Soviet invasionof 1979 and during the civil war that ensued in the aftermath of the Sovietwithdrawal, opium poppy cultivation expanded in parallel with the gradual collapseof state authority across Afghanistan. As the country’s formal economy succumbedto violence and disorder, opium became one of the few available commoditiescapable of both storing economic value and generating revenue for localadministration and military supplies. Some anti-Soviet mujahideen commandersencouraged and taxed opium poppy cultivation and drug shipments, and, in someinstances, participated in the narcotics trade directly as a means of both economic

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8 See Arthur Bonner, “Afghan Rebel’s Victory Garden: Opium,” New York Times, June 18,1986, and Mary Thornton, “Sales of Opium Reportedly Fund Afghan Rebels,” WashingtonPost, Dec. 17, 1983. 9 See James Rupert and Steve Coll, “U.S. Declines to Probe Afghan Drug Trade: Rebels,Pakistani Officers Implicated,” Washington Post, May 13, 1990; Jim Lobe, “Drugs: U.S.Looks Other Way In Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Inter Press Service, May 18, 1990; JohnF. Burns, “U.S. Cuts Off Arms to Afghan Faction,” New York Times, Nov. 19, 1989; KathyEvans, “Money is the Drug” The Guardian (UK), Nov. 11, 1989; and Lawrence Lifschultz,“Bush, Drugs and Pakistan: Inside the Kingdom of Heroin,” The Nation, Nov. 14, 1988. 10 The Taliban government collected an agricultural tax (approximately 10%, paid in kind),known as ushr, and a traditional Islamic tithe known as zakat (variable percentages). TheTaliban also taxed opium traders and transport syndicates involved in the transportation ofopiates. UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 92, 127-8.11 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 92.12 In December 2001, then Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs Rand Beers stated that the Taliban had not banned opium cultivation“out of kindness, but because they wanted to regulate the market: They simply produced too

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survival and military financing.8 Elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI) agency and Afghan rebel commanders to which the ISI channeled U.S. fundingand weaponry are also alleged to have participated in the Afghan narcotics tradeduring the Soviet occupation and its aftermath, including in the production andtrafficking of refined heroin to U.S. and European markets.9 After the withdrawal ofSoviet troops and a drop in U.S. and Soviet funding, opium poppy cultivation, drugtrafficking, and other criminal activities increasingly provided local leaders andmilitary commanders with a means of supporting their operations and establishingpolitical influence in the areas they controlled.

Taliban Era. The centralization of authority under the Taliban movementduring the mid-to-late 1990s further fueled Afghan opium poppy cultivation andnarcotic production, as Taliban officials coopted their military opponents withpromises of permissive cultivation policies and mirrored the practices of theirwarlord predecessors by collecting tax revenue and profits on the growing output.10

In 1999, Afghanistan produced a peak of over 4500 MT of raw opium, which led togrowing international pressure from states whose populations were consuming theend products of a seemingly endless supply of Afghan drugs. In response, theTaliban announced a ban on opium poppy cultivation in late 2000, but allowed theopiate trade to continue, fueling speculation that the decision was designed tocontribute to their marginalized government’s campaign for international legitimacy.Under the ban, opium poppy cultivation was reduced dramatically and overall opiumoutput fell to 185 MT, mainly because of continued cultivation and production inareas under the control of Northern Alliance forces. Individual Northern Alliancecommanders also taxed opium production and transportation within their zones ofcontrol and continued producing opium and trafficking heroin following the Talibanprohibition.11 Although U.S. and international officials initially applauded theTaliban policy shift, many experts now believe that the ban was designed to increasethe market price for and potential revenue from stocks of Afghan opium maintainedby the Taliban and its powerful trafficking allies within the country.12

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12 (...continued)much opium.” Marc Kaufman, “Surge in Afghan Poppy Crop Is Forecast,” Washington Post,Dec. 25, 2001. See Table 1 and UNODC, Opium Economy in Afghanistan, p. 57.13 The Bonn Agreement, Dec. 5, 2001. 14 Analysis in this report relating to the motives and methods of Afghan farmers, landowners, and traffickers is based on the findings of the UNODC’s “Strategic Studies” serieson Afghanistan’s opium economy and a series of commissioned development reports byDavid Mansfield, the Aga Khan Foundation, Frank Kenefick and Larry Morgan, Adam Pain,and others. UNODC Strategic Studies reports are available at [http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/publications.html]. Complete citations are provided in Appendix A.15 David Mansfield, “The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth andReality,” International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control andCooperation, Aug. 2001.

Post-Taliban Resurgence. Following 9/11, Afghan farmers anticipated thefall of the Taliban government and resumed cultivating opium poppy as U.S.-ledmilitary operations began in October 2001. International efforts to rebuildAfghanistan’s devastated society began with the organization of an interimadministration at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, and Afghan leaderscommitted their new government to combat the resurgence of opium poppycultivation and requested international counternarcotics assistance from the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom and others.13 The United Kingdom was designated thelead nation for international counternarcotics assistance and policy in Afghanistan.On January 17, 2002, the Afghan Interim Administration issued a ban on opiumpoppy cultivation that was enforced with a limited eradication campaign in April2002. In spite of these efforts, the 2001-2002 opium poppy crop produced over 3400MT of opium, reestablishing Afghanistan as the world’s leading producer of illicitopium. Since 2002, further government bans and stronger interdiction and eradicationefforts failed to reverse an overall trend of increasing opium poppy cultivation andopium output, although year-on-year reductions occurred in 2005.

Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy

Farmers, laborers, landowners, and traffickers each play roles in Afghanistan’sopium economy. Ongoing field research indicates that the motives and methods ofeach group vary considerably based on their geographic location, their respectiveeconomic circumstances, their relationships with ethnic groups and external parties,and prevailing political conditions.14 Studies suggest that profit is not the universalmotivating factor fueling opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan: opium trade fieldresearcher David Mansfield argues that the “great diversity in the socio-economicgroups involved in opium poppy in Afghanistan and the assets at their disposal”ensures that “there is great disparity in the revenues that they can accrue from itscultivation.”15 Household debt and land access needs also motivate opium poppycultivation.

Farmers. Field studies have identified several structural barriers that limit theprofitability of opium poppy cultivation for the average Afghan farmer. ManyAfghan farming households cultivate opium poppy in order to improve their access

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16 See UNODC, “An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Poppy Cultivation toNew Districts in Afghanistan,” June 1998. 17 UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003,” p. 8.

to land, water, agricultural supplies, and credit — inputs that remain in short supplyin many of the rural areas where opium poppy is grown. Experts have identified highlevels of household debt as a powerful structural determinant of the continuation ofopium poppy cultivation among some Afghan farmers. An opium-for-credit system,known as salaam, allows farmers to secure loans to buy necessary supplies andprovisions if they agree in advance to sell future opium harvests at rates as low ashalf their expected market value. Crop failures that occurred as a result of a severefour-year nationwide drought (1998-2001) reportedly caused many farminghouseholds to accumulate large amounts of debt in the form of salaam loans basedon future cultivation of opium poppy. In some cases, the introduction of strict poppycultivation bans and crop eradication policies by the Taliban in 2001 and the AfghanInterim Authority in 2002 and 2003 increased the debt levels of many Afghanfarmers by destroying opium crops that served as collateral for salaam arrangements.

Although the Afghan government issued a decree banning opium-based loansand credit in April 2002, the 2005 UNODC/MCN opium survey reports that salaamlending has continued. Increased debt has led some farmers to mortgage land and toagree to cultivate opium poppy in the future through sharecropping arrangements.Other landless farmers have reportedly been forced to accept the crop selectionchoices of landowners who control their access to land and water and who favoropium poppy over other traditional crops. According to experts, this combination ofdrought-induced debt, predatory traditional lending systems, and the unintended side-effects from government cultivation bans and eradication programs has fueled opiumpoppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The 2005 UNODC/MCN opium survey warns thatin areas where farmers carry high salaam and other loan debt, significant decreasesin opium poppy cultivation and associated revenue may be “potentially problematic”and could create “severe financial pressure on to farmers to resume opium production[in 2006] in order not to default.”

Land Owners. Afghan land owners are better positioned to profit from opiumpoppy cultivation because of the labor intensive nature of the opium productionprocess. Land owners who control vital opium cultivation inputs like land, water, andfertilizers enjoy an economic advantage in the opium production cycle, which placesheavy demands on Afghanistan’s rural agricultural labor market during annual opiumpoppy planting, maintenance, and harvesting seasons. Wealthy land owners securethe services of skilled itinerant laborers to assist in the complex opium harvestingprocess, which improves their crop yields and profits. Itinerant laborers, in turn,contribute to the spread of opium cultivation expertise around Afghanistan.16

Although opium prices have fallen since reaching a peak of $350/kg in 2002, farmershave experienced greater profit loss than land owners.17 Land owners also havebenefitted from consolidation of property related to rising debt levels among Afghanfarmers. Land valuation based on potential opium yields also benefits land owners.

Traffickers. International market prices for heroin and intermediate opiatessuch as morphine ensure that individuals and groups engaged in the shipment and

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18 See UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 129-40, 165-8.19 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 139, 158. 20 “The involvement of Afghan groups/individuals is basically limited to the opiumproduction, the trade of opium within Afghanistan, the transformation of some of the opiuminto morphine and heroin, and to some extent, the trafficking of opiates to neighboringcountries.” UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan, p. 64.21 See Tamara Makarenko, “Bumper Afghan Narcotics Crop Indicates Resilience ofNetworks,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1, 2002.

distribution of refined opium products earn substantially higher profits than thoseinvolved with cultivating and producing raw opium gum.18 Although opium refiningfacilities that produce morphine base and heroin traditionally have been located intribal areas along the Afghan border with Pakistan, the growth and spread of opiumcultivation in recent years has led to a corresponding proliferation of opiateprocessing facilities, particularly into northeastern Badakhshan province.19 The largeproportion of heroin in the composition of drugs seized in countries neighboringAfghanistan reflects this proliferation and suggests that the profitability of opiatetrafficking for Afghan groups has increased significantly in recent years.

Although Afghan individuals and groups play a significant role in traffickingopiates within Afghanistan and into surrounding countries, relatively few Afghanshave been identified as participants in the international narcotics traffickingoperations that bring finished opiate products such as heroin to Middle Eastern,European, or North American consumer markets.20 Ethnic and tribal relationshipsfacilitate the opium trade within Afghanistan, while relationships between ethnicTajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, and Baluchi Afghans and their counterparts in Central Asia,Pakistan, and Iran provide a basis for the organization and networking needed todeliver Aghan opiates to regional markets and into the hands of internationaltrafficking organizations.21 Some observers argue that trafficking profits are a sourceof economic and political instability and that interdiction and prosecution shouldprecede eradication efforts so that increased post-eradication opium prices do notenrich trafficking groups further. Multilateral intelligence gathering and interdictionoperations have been initiated since 2001 and are described in further detail below.

Narcotics and Security

Experts and officials have identified three areas of concern about the potentialimpact of the Afghan narcotics trade on the security of Afghanistan, the UnitedStates, and the international community. Each is first summarized, and then morefully developed below.

! Prospects for State Failure: Afghan, U.S., and internationalofficials have identified several correlations between the narcoticstrade and negative political and economic trends that undermineefforts to stabilize Afghanistan, establish the rule of law, and restorea functioning and licit economy. These trends include corruptionand the existence of independent armed groups opposed to the

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22 Testimony of Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcoticsand Law Enforcement Affairs, House International Relations Committee, Sept. 23, 2004.23 See UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 69, and Report of theSecretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for InternationalPeace and Security, Aug. 12, 2004.

Afghan government’s reform and counternarcotics agendas. Similardrug-related trends threaten countries neighboring Afghanistan.Political observers have warned that figures involved with the drugtrade have been elected or appointed to public office and mayoppose or undermine current and future counternarcotics initiatives.

! “Narco-Terrorism”: Afghan and U.S. officials believe that Talibaninsurgents and regional groups associated with Al Qaeda continueto profit from Afghanistan’s burgeoning narcotics trade. Officialsalso suspect that drug profits provide some Al Qaeda operatives withfinancial and logistical support. U.S. officials believe that financialand logistical relationships between narcotics traffickers, terrorists,and criminal groups pose threats to the security of Afghanistan andthe wider international community.

! Consumption and Public Health: World health officials believethat Afghan narcotics pose social and public health risks forpopulations in Afghanistan, its neighbors, Russia, Western Europe,and, to a limited extent, the United States. Increased use of Afghanopiates has been closely associated with increased addiction andHIV infection levels in heroin consumption markets.

Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan

Afghan authorities and international observers have identified negative trendsassociated with the narcotics trade as barriers to the reestablishment of security, therule of law, and a legitimate economy throughout Afghanistan — goals which U.S.and Afghan authorities have characterized as essential for the country’s long termstability. In a September 2004 report on Afghanistan’s economic development, theWorld Bank described these related trends as “a vicious circle” (Figure 5) thatconstitute “a grave danger” to the “entire state-building and reconstruction agenda.”22

Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence. Authorities fear thatheavily armed trafficking groups and regional militia may join Afghan farmers inviolently resisting expanded drug interdiction and crop eradication efforts. Opiumproduction remains a source of revenue and patronage for some armed groups andmilitia leaders seeking to maintain their power and influence over areas of thecountry at the expense of the extension of national government authority.23

According to U.N. and Afghan officials, some armed groups impose informal taxesand checkpoint fees of 10% to 40% on farmers, traffickers, and opiate processing

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24 UNODC/CND, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, p. 66.25 The Afghan government’s Central Eradication Force reportedly was “rocketed by furiousvillagers” during a 2004 eradication mission in Wardak province outside of Kabul. Reuters,Pressure on Karzai as Afghan Drug Problem Worsens, Oct. 5, 2004.

Figure 4. Narcotics and Security in Afghanistan

laboratories within their areas of control, receiving cash or payment in opium.24

Although much of the outright conflict between regional and factional militias thatmotivated opium cultivation in the past has ended, long-established political andcommercial networks linking armed groups, landowning elites, transportation guilds,and drug syndicates continue to constitute the foundation of the opium economy.

Source: World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and ReducingPoverty, Country Economic Report No. 29551-AF September 9, 2004, p. 87.

Fears of widespread violence are based in large part on patterns of clashesbetween Afghan farmers and counternarcotics authorities seeking to eradicate crops.In April 2005, a large government eradication force clashed with approximately2,000 villagers demonstrating against the destruction of opium crops in the southerndistrict of Maiwand, leading to the death of one security officer and the wounding ofseveral civilians. Afghan soldiers and police also were killed during 2005 byattackers firing on government eradication forces in Uruzgan and Kandahar. Theseclashes and attacks follow a pattern evident in previous years, in which eradicationteams employed by provincial authorities faced demonstrations, small arms fire, andmined poppy fields.25 At the outset of the Afghan government’s first eradicationcampaign in April 2002, for example, Pashtun farmers barricaded the major highway

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26 See Agence France Presse, “Afghanistan Deploys 67 Million Dollars in War on Drugs,”Apr. 11, 2002, and Anwar Iqbal, “War on Dug Begins in Afghanistan,” United PressInternational, Apr. 10, 2002.27 Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Mar. 2005. 28 Agence France Presse, “Curbing Rampant Afghan Opium Trade Will Take KarzaiYears,” Dec. 5, 2004.29 See New York Times, “7 Are Killed in a Clash of Afghan Militias,” Feb. 9, 2004, andFBIS IAP20040707000101 - Afghanistan Briefing, July 5-7, 2004.30 See Victoria Burnett, “Outlook Uncertain: Can Afghanistan Take the Next Step toBuilding a State?” Financial Times, Aug. 19, 2004; Carol Harrington, “Ruthless Dostum aRival for Karzai,” Toronto Star, Sept. 20, 2004; and Jurgen Dahlkamp, Susanne Koelbl, andGeorg Mascolo, (tr. Margot Bettauer Dembo), “Bundeswehr: Poppies, Rocks, Shards ofTrouble,” Der Spiegel [Germany], Nov. 10, 2003.31 Human Rights Watch, “The Rule of the Gun.” Sept. 2004.32 Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, “U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan,”Boston Globe, Oct. 20, 2004.

linking Pakistan and Afghanistan, and clashes between opium farmers and Afghaneradication teams killed 16 people.26

Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy. According to theState Department, national government officials are generally “believed to be free ofdirect criminal connection to the drug trade,” although among provincial and districtlevel officials, “drug-related corruption is pervasive.”27 In December 2004, Afghancounternarcotics official Mirwais Yasini indicated that “high government officials,police commanders, governors are involved” in the drug trade.28 Governmentauthorities and security forces in Afghanistan have accused each other ofinvolvement in opium production and trafficking, and militia commanders haveclashed over opium production and profits in various regions of the country,threatening the country’s stability and the lives of civilians.29 Although most ofAfghanistan’s prominent political figures have publicly condemned the country’sopium economy, some political figures and their powerful supporters are alleged tohave links with the trade or hold responsibility for areas of Afghanistan where opiumpoppy cultivation and drug trafficking take place. Commanders under the control offormer cabinet members and former presidential candidates are alleged to participatein the opium trade.30

Some observers fear that as the Afghan government develops strongercounternarcotics policies and capabilities, groups that are involved with the opiumtrade will join others in seeking to corrupt or subvert Afghanistan’s democraticprocess. Although no major attempts were made to disrupt the Afghan nationalpresidential or parliamentary elections, armed factions and local militia leaderscontinue to exert political influence across Afghanistan.31 With regard to recentparliamentary elections, some experts have argued that drug money may havefinanced the campaigns of candidates, and at least one expert warned that “druglords” were candidates.32

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33 World Bank, State Building..., p. 87. 34 International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 05/33 - Islamic State ofAfghanistan: 2004 Article IV Consultation and Second Review, Feb. 2005.35 Author interviews with U.S. officials in Kabul, Afghanistan, Jan. 2005.

Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery. Reportscontinue to indicate that profits from Afghanistan’s opium trade may beoverwhelming efforts to reestablish a functioning, licit economy. According to theUNODC/MCN 2005 opium survey, the value of the 2005 opium harvest, anestimated $2.7 billion, was equal to 50% of the country’s licit GDP from 2004. TheWorld Bank reports that the opium economy has produced significant increases inrural wages and income and remains a significant source of credit for low incomerural households. Opium profits fuel consumption of domestic products and supportimports of high value goods such as automobiles and appliances from abroad. Fundsfrom the drug trade are also a major source of investment for infrastructuredevelopment projects, including major projects in “building construction, trade, andtransport.”33 Analysts argue that efforts to combat narcotics must addressAfghanistan’s economic dependence on opium and replace drug profits with licitcapital and investment. In February 2005, the IMF warned that new counternarcoticsefforts, if successful, “could adversely affect GDP growth, the balance of payments,and government revenue” by lowering drug income and weakening its support fordomestic consumption and taxed imports.34

Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism

Afghan and U.S. officials believe that linkages between insurgents, terrorists,and narcotics traffickers threaten the security of Afghanistan and the internationalcommunity. In addition to moving deadly opiates, sophisticated drug transportationand money laundering networks may also facilitate the movement of wantedindividuals and terrorist funds and support illicit trafficking in persons and weapons.Although some U.S. officials have made unequivocal statements about the existenceof narco-terrorist linkages, most officials address the issue in general terms andindicate that intelligence agencies are continually developing more complete picturesof these relationships. In late 2005 and early 2006, Afghan president Hamid Karzaimade several statements indicating that drug profits were providing financial supportto the ongoing Taliban insurgency, including funding suicide bombing operationsthat killed Afghan civilians. According to U.S. officials, senior Al Qaeda leadersconsidered and subsequently rejected the idea of becoming directly involved inmanaging and profiting from aspects of Afghanistan’s narcotics trade. Ideologicalconsiderations and fear of increased visibility and vulnerability to foreign intelligenceand law enforcement services reportedly were the predominant factors in theirdecision.35 Al Qaeda operatives and the local tribal and criminal networks in theAfghanistan-Pakistan border region that are suspected of supporting and shelteringthem are thought to have some involvement with the regional narcotics trade. Table2 describes known linkages between groups involved in terrorism and the drug tradeas presented by State Department officials to Members of Congress in April 2004 andFebruary 2005.

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Table 2. Afghan Extremists’ Links to the Drug Trade

Afghan Extremists Are they receiving money from thetrade?

Do traffickers provide them with logisticalsupport?

Are they telling farmers to growopium poppy?

Hizb-i Islami/Gulbuddin (HIG)a

Almost Definitely: HIG commandersinvolved in trafficking have led attackson Coalition forces, and U.S. troopshave raided labs linked to the HIG.

Most Likely: HIG commanders involved in thedrug trade may use those ties to facilitateweapons smuggling and money laundering.

Probably: Afghan governmentofficials say the Taliban encourageand in some instances force poppycultivation. Existing StateDepartment estimates suggest othergroups interested in weakening thegovernment in Kabul — like the HIG — may have followed suit.

Taliban Almost Definitely: U.N. and AfghanTransitional Authority officials reportthe group earns money from traffickingand gets donations form drug lords.

Most Likely: Major drug barons who supportedthe Taliban when it was in power remain atlarge, and may be moving people, equipment,and money on the group’s behalf.

Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan (IMU)

Probably: Uzbek officials have accusedthe group of involvement in the drugtrade, and its remnants in Afghanistanmay turn to trafficking to raise funds.

Probably: Members with drug ties may turn totraffickers for help crossing borders.

Possibly: No reports, and thesegroups — as foreigners inAfghanistan — may lack the moraland political authority needed toinfluence farmers’ planting decisions.

Al Qaeda Possibly: Only scattered reports, butfighters in Afghanistan may be engagedin low-level — but still lucrative —drug deals.

Probably: Traffickers stopped during December2003 in the Arabian Sea were linked to AlQaeda. Al Qaeda may hire criminals in SouthAsia to transfer weapons, explosives, money,and people through the region.

Source: Robert Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Testimony Before the House Committee on Government ReformSubcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, April 1, 2004.a. Hizb-i Islami’s leader — former anti-Soviet mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — is alleged to have been involved in the Afghan narcotics trade since the 1980s.

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36 Liz Sly, “Opium Cash Fuels Terror, Experts Say,” Chicago Tribune, Feb. 9, 2004; JohnFullerton, “Live and Let Live for Afghan Warlords, Drug Barons,” Reuters, Feb. 5, 2002.37 See U.S. v. Bashir Noorzai, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S1 05 Cr.19, Apr. 25, 2005.38 See U.S. v. Baz Mohammed, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S14 03Cr. 486 [DC], Oct. 25, 2005.39 Tim McGirk, “Terrorism’s Harvest,” Time Magazine [Asia], Aug. 2, 2004.

Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers. Afghan individuals serve as middlemenbetween the groups described in Table 2 and narcotics producers and traffickers.Press reports and U.S. officials have identified two prominent figures involved inAfghanistan’s drug trade that reportedly have financed Taliban insurgents and somelow-level Al Qaeda operatives:

! Haji Bashir Noorzai is a former confidant of ousted Taliban leaderMullah Omar who served as a military commander during theTaliban era and was reportedly a “major financial supporter of theTaliban.”36 In June 2004, the Bush Administration added HajiBashir Noorzai to the U.S. government’s drug kingpin list. In April2005, Noorzai was arrested by DEA officials and charged withconspiracy to import heroin into the United States over a 15-yearperiod. The indictment charges that Noorzai and his organization“provided demolitions, weaponry, and manpower to the Taliban” inreturn for “protection for its opium crops, heroin laboratories,drug-transportation routes, and members and associates.”37

! Haji Baz Mohammed is an alleged drug organization leader fromthe eastern province of Nangarhar who was extradited to the UnitedStates in October 2005 to face charges of importing Afghan heroininto the United States. According to his indictment, Mohammed’sorganization was “closely aligned with the Taliban” and “providedfinancial support to the Taliban and other associated Islamic-extremist organizations in Afghanistan” in return for protection.38

! Haji Juma Khan has been identified as an alleged drug lord and AlQaeda financier. In August 2004, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary ofState for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) RobertCharles told Time Magazine that Haji Juma Khan is “obviously verytightly tied to the Taliban.” Afghan Counter Narcotics Directoratechief Mirwais Yasini added that “there are central linkages amongKhan, Mullah Omar and [Osama] Bin Laden.”39

U.S. forces reportedly detained and released both Haji Juma Khan and HajiBashir Noorzai in late 2001 and early 2002. Press accounts state that Noorzaivoluntarily provided intelligence about his Taliban and Al Qaeda colleagues during

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40 Haji Bashir reportedly described his time with U.S. forces in the following terms: “I spentmy days and nights comfortably... I was like a guest, not a prisoner.” CBS Evening News,“Newly Arrived US Army Soldiers Find it Difficult to Adjust...,” Feb. 7, 2002. 41 Steve Inskeep, “Afghanistan’s Opium Trade,” National Public Radio, Apr. 26, 2002.42 See Mark Corcoran, “America’s Blind Eye,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation,Foreign Correspondent, Apr. 10, 2002.43 Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, Nov. 12, 2004.44 Drug Enforcement Agency, “The Availability of Southwest Asian Heroin in the UnitedStates,” May 1996.45 Drug Enforcement Agency, “Heroin Signature Program: 2002,” Mar. 2004. 46 In 1985, the DEA developed evidence against a wealthy Afghan national alleged to havebeen “involved in supplying Afghan rebels with weapons in exchange for heroin andhashish, portions of which were eventually distributed in Western Europe and the UnitedStates.” See Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control - Annual Report 1985, Dec.19, 1986, p. 58; See U.S. v. Roeffen, et al. [U.S. District Court of New Jersey (Trenton),86-00013-01] and U.S. v. Wali [860 F.2d 588 (3d Cir.1988)].

questioning at Kandahar’s airport prior to his release.40 DEA officials reportedlywere unable to question him at the time.41 Noorzai’s forces later surrendered a largenumber of weapons to coalition and Afghan authorities and provided security forQandahar province governor Gul Agha Sherzai.42 Juma Khan remains at large, andDepartment of Defense officials indicate that U.S. military forces are not directlypursuing major figures in the Afghan opium trade, although U.S., Afghan, andcoalition authorities continue to monitor and collect intelligence on their activitiesand support Afghan authorities and their operations.43

Consumption Markets

Afghan opium presents significant public health and internal security challengesto downstream markets where refined heroin and other opiates are consumed,including the United States. Russia and Europe have been the main consumptionmarkets for Afghan opiates since the early 1990s, and estimates place Afghan opiumas the source of over 90% of the heroin that enters the United Kingdom and WesternEurope annually. Russian and European leaders have expressed concern over thegrowth of Afghanistan’s opium trade as both a national security threat as well as athreat to public health and safety.

Trafficking to the United States. Heroin originating in southwest Asia(Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) “was the predominant form of heroinavailable in the United States” from 1980 to 1987,44 and the DEA’s Heroin SignatureProgram has indicated that southwest Asia-derived heroin currently constitutes up to10% of the heroin available in the United States.45 Since the 1980s, several figuresinvolved in the Afghan drug trade have been convicted of trafficking illegal drugs,including heroin, into the United States.46 Afghan and Pakistani nationals have beenindicted and convicted on heroin trafficking and money laundering charges in U.S.courts as recently as April 2005. In addition to the cases of Haji Bashir Noorzai and

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47 Marcus W. Brauchli, “Pakistan’s Wild Frontier Breeds Trouble — Drugs, TerrorismCould Overflow Into Other Regions,” Wall Street Journal, June 3,1993; Kathy Gannon,“Pakistan Extradites Suspected Drug Dealers to U.S.,” Associated Press, Oct. 16, 1993;Jeanne King, “U.S. Denies Bail to Alleged Pakistani Drug Baron,” Reuters, Dec. 21, 1995;and Ron Synovitz, “U.S. Indicts 11 In Connection With Drug Ring,” RFE/RL, Sep. 17, 2003.48 U.S. v. Afridi, et. al., [U.S. District Court of Maryland, (Baltimore), AW-03-0211]. 49 Testimony of DEA Administrator Karen Tandy before the House International RelationsCommittee, Feb. 12, 2004.50 James W. Crawley, “U.S. Warships Pinching Persian Gulf Drug Trade,” San DiegoUnion-Tribune, February 9, 2004, and Tony Perry, “2 Convicted of Seeking Missiles for AlQaeda Ally,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 4, 2004.51 Defense Department officials report that steps are taken to educate U.S. troops serving inAfghanistan about the dangers of narcotics use and to monitor and prevent drug use.Testimony of Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Director of Strategic Plans (J-5), Before the HouseInternational Relations Committee, Sept. 23, 2004.

Haji Baz Mohammed noted above, the following other recent cases involve links tothe Taliban and Al Qaeda:

! In the mid-1990s, several Pakistani nationals were extradited to theUnited States and convicted of heroin and hashish trafficking,including Haji Ayub Afridi, a former member of Pakistan’sParliament and alleged drug baron.47

! Since 2001, DEA and FBI investigators have prosecuted severalAfghan and Pakistani nationals in connection with heroin traffickingand money laundering charges, including members of Pakistan’sAfridi clan.48 Officials have indicated that some of the individualsinvolved in these recent cases may have relationships with Talibaninsurgents and members of Al Qaeda.49

! Al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers have been capturedtrafficking large quantities of heroin and hashish and attempting totrade drugs for Stinger missiles.50

Russia. Afghan opiates have been a concern for Russian leaders since the1980s, when Afghan drug dealers targeted Soviet troops and many Russian soldiersreturned from service in Afghanistan addicted to heroin.51 More recently, the Russiangovernment has expressed deep concern about “narco-terrorist” linkages that arealleged to exist between Chechen rebel groups, their Islamist extremist allies, andCaucasian criminal groups that traffic and distribute heroin in Russia. Since 1993,HIV infection and heroin addiction rates have skyrocketed in Russia, and these trendshave been linked to the influx and growing use of Afghan opiates. These concernsmake the Afghan narcotics trade an issue of priority interest to Russian decisionmakers, and motivate attention and initiative on the part of Russian security services

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52 Agence France Presse, “Russia plans anti-drug centre in Kabul,” Mar. 29, 2005.53 House of Commons (UK) - Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report, July 21, 2004.54 For more information see Tamara Makarenko, “Crime, Terror and the Central Asian DrugTrade,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 3 (Summer 2002), and Integrated RegionalInformation Networks (IRIN) Report, “Central Asia: Regional Impact of the Afghan HeroinTrade ,” U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Aug. 2004.Available at [http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/opium/regOvr.asp].55 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 33, 35.

in the region. The head of Russia’s counternarcotics service has announced plans toopen a counternarcotics field office in Kabul.52

Western Europe. In Europe, press outlets and public officials in severalcountries have devoted significant attention to Afghanistan’s opium trade since the1990s. In the United Kingdom, where British officials estimate that 90-95% of theheroin that enters the country annually is derived from Afghan opium, the publicplaces a high priority on combating the Afghan opiate trade. In October 2001, BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair cited the Taliban regime’s tolerance for opium cultivationand heroin production as one justification for the United Kingdom’s involvement inthe U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan. Some British citizens and officialshave criticized the Blair Administration’s counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan andargued that more should be done to stem the flow of Afghan opiates in the future.53

The United Kingdom currently serves as the lead nation for internationalcounternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, and British government officials assistAfghan counternarcotics authorities in intelligence gathering and targeting operationsfor interdiction and eradication. British defense officials have announced plans tosend up to 4,000 British troops to the key opium-producing province of Helmandprovince in southern Afghanistan, where their mission reportedly will include effortsto support security operations and target narcotic traffickers.

Regional Security Implications

Afghanistan’s opiate trade presents a range of policy challenges forAfghanistan’s neighbors, particularly for the Central Asian republics of the formerSoviet Union. As a security issue, regional governments face the challenge ofsecuring their borders and populations against the inflow of Afghan narcotics andinfiltration by armed trafficking and terrorist groups. Regional terrorist organizationsand international criminal syndicates that move Afghan opiates throughout the regionhave been linked to insecurity, corruption, and violence in several countries.54 As apublic health issue, Afghan narcotics have contributed to a dramatic upsurge in opiateuse and addiction rates in countries neighboring Afghanistan, a factor that also hasbeen linked to dramatic increases in HIV infection rates in many of Afghanistan’sneighbors. According to the UNODC, by 2001, “Afghan opiates represented: almost100% of the illicit opiates consumed in... Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan,Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the RussianFederation.”55 With the exception of Turkey, intravenous use of Afghan opiates is

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56 For more information, see the World Health Organization’s Epidemiological Fact Sheetson HIV/AIDS at [http://www.who.int/GlobalAtlas/PDFFactory/HIV/index.asp], and JulieStachowiak and Chris Beyrer, HIV Follows Heroin Trafficking Routes,” Open SocietyInstitute - Central Eurasia Project, Available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/health.security/presentations/hiv_trafficking.shtml].57 For more on Central Asian security and public health, including information on narcoticstrafficking, organized crime, and terrorism see CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’sSecurity: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, and CRS Report RL30970, Health inRussia and Other Soviet Successor States: Context and Issues for Congress, both by JimNichol.58 IRIN Report, “Tajikistan: Stemming the Heroin Tide,” OCHA, Sept. 13, 2004. Availableat [http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/opium/regTaj.asp].59 Agence France Presse, “Tajiks to Take Over Patrolling Half of Tajik-Afghan BorderFrom Russians,” Oct. 1, 2004.60 See Rukhshona Najmiddinova, “Tajikistan Arrests Anti-Drug Agency Head,” AssociatedPress, Aug. 6, 2004.

the dominant driver of growing HIV infection rates in each of these countries.56

These destabilizing factors could provide a powerful pretext for increased attentionto and possible intervention in Afghan affairs on the part of regional powers such asIran and Pakistan.

Central Asia.57 The emergence of the so-called “Northern Route” of opiatetrafficking through Central Asia and the Caucasus in the mid-1990s transformed theregion’s previously small and relatively self-contained opiate market into the centerof global opium and heroin trafficking. Ineffective border control, civil war, andcorruption facilitated this trend, and opiate trafficking and use in Kazakhstan,Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan now pose significant security and publichealth threats to those countries. U.S. officials have implicated the Islamic Movementof Uzbekistan in the regional drug trade, as well as well-organized and heavily armedcriminal syndicates that threaten U.S. interests.

Tajikistan has emerged as the primary transit point for Afghan opiates enteringCentral Asia and being trafficked beyond. From 1998 to 2003, Tajikistan’s DrugControl Agency seized 30 MT of drugs and narcotics, including 16 MT of heroin.U.N. authorities estimate that the European street value of the 5,600 kg of heroinseized by Tajik authorities in 2003 was over $3 billion.58 The 201st Russian ArmyDivision stationed troops along the Afghan-Tajik border to disrupt the activities ofcriminals, narcotics traffickers, and terrorist groups from 1993 through late 2004.Tajik and Russian authorities have begun replacing these Russian military forces withTajik border security guards and are scheduled to complete the process by the end of2006.59 Some observers have expressed concern that the relatively poor training andinexperience of the Tajik forces may result in an increase in the flow of opium andheroin into Central Asia and onward to Russia and Europe. Others fear that Tajiksecurity forces may prove more vulnerable to corruption than their Russiancounterparts.60 In January 2005, Russian press sources reported that Russian borderguards seized 2.5 MT of heroin on the Tajik-Afghan border in 2004. A Russian-led

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61 Moscow Interfax, “Russia Says Around 9 Tonnes of Afghan Drugs Seized in InternationalOperation,” Nov. 13, 2005. FBIS Document CEP20051113029009.62 Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain, “Transcript: Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia andthe Pacific of the House International Relations Committee,” Federal News Service, Mar.20, 2003. See also, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 120-2, andBarnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 197-8.See also Rubin, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe andthe Middle East and Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mar. 7, 1990.

Collective Security Treaty Organization interdiction effort known as Channel-2005seized close to 9 MT of drugs in 2005, including over 200 kg of heroin.61

Pakistan. According to the 2005 State Department International NarcoticsControl Strategy Report (INCSR), “Pakistan remains a substantial trafficking countryfor heroin, morphine, and hashish from Afghanistan,” and Pakistani narcoticstraffickers “play a very prominent role in all aspects of the drug trade” in regions ofAfghanistan that border Pakistan. Trafficking groups routinely use western areas ofAfghanistan and Pakistan as staging areas for the movement of opiates into andthrough Iran. Efforts to control the narcotics trade in Pakistan have historically beencomplicated by the government’s limited ability to assert authority over autonomoustribal zones, although recent cooperative border security efforts with the UnitedStates have increased the presence of government authorities in these regions. ThePakistani government’s efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation and heroinproduction since 2001 have been moderately successful; however, drug usageremains relatively high among some elements of Pakistani society. In March 2003,former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain told a House InternationalRelations Committee panel that the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)agency in the heroin trade from 1997-2003 had been “substantial.”62 The 2003 StateDepartment INCSR stated that U.S. officials have “no evidence” that any seniorgovernment officials were involved with the narcotics trade or drug moneylaundering, although the report also stated that narcotics remained a source of“persistent corruption” among lower level officials.

Iran. Narcotics trafficking and use continue to present serious security andpublic health risks to Iran, which the State Department has called “a major transitroute for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan.” According to the 2003 StateDepartment INCSR, over 3200 Iranian security personnel have been killed in clasheswith heavily-armed narcotics trafficking groups over the last twenty years, and 67%of HIV infections in Iran are related to intravenous drug use by the country’s morethan 1 million estimated addicts. Iran’s interdiction efforts along its eastern borderswith Afghanistan and Pakistan are widely credited with forcing opiate traffickers toestablish and maintain the “Northern Route” through Central Asia. According to theState Department, Iranian officials seized 181 MT of opiates in the first six monthsof 2004.

The 2005 INCSR states that the Iranian government “has demonstratedsustained national political will and taken strong measures against illicit narcotics,including cooperation with the international community.” Although the absence ofbilateral diplomatic relations prevents the United States from directly supporting

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63 Jason Barnes, “The Desert Village that Feeds UK’s Heroin Habit,” The Observer (UK),Dec. 12, 1999.

counternarcotics initiatives in Iran, the INSCR indicates that United States and Iran“have worked together productively” in the UN’s multilateral “Six Plus Two” group.Shared interest in interdiction has led the United Kingdom to support the Iraniangovernment’s counternarcotics efforts since 1999 by providing millions of dollars ingrants for security equipment purchases, including bullet-proof vests for Iran’s borderpatrol guards.63

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64 The Bonn Agreement, Dec. 5, 2001.

The International Policy Response

The Bonn Agreement that established the Afghan Interim Authority committedAfghanistan’s new government to cooperation with the international community “inthe fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime.”64 After taking office in early2002, Hamid Karzai’s transitional administration took a series of steps to combat thegrowth of the Afghan narcotics trade, including issuing a formal ban on opiumcultivation, outlining a national counternarcotics strategy, and establishinginstitutions and forces tasked with eradicating poppy crops and interdicting drugtraffic. Karzai’s government places a high priority on creating alternative livelihoodsand sources of income for opium growing farmers. Many countries have contributedfunding, equipment, forces, and training to various counternarcotics programs inAfghanistan, including crop eradication and judicial reform. The United States andothers work closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors in an effort to contain the flow ofnarcotics and strengthen interdiction efforts.

The United Kingdom serves as the lead coalition nation for internationalcounternarcotics policy and assistance in Afghanistan. Under British leadership,basic eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood development measuresbegan in the spring of 2002. The State Department’s International Narcotics and LawEnforcement (INL) Bureau administers U.S. counternarcotics and law enforcementassistance programs in Afghanistan and coordinates with the U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),the Government of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and the UnitedNations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). To date, U.S. forces in Afghanistanhave engaged in some counternarcotics activities based on limited rules ofengagement, although military officials indicate that the role of the U.S. military incounternarcotics has expanded in 2005 to include police training and interdictionmission support. British military units carry out interdiction missions in cooperationwith Afghan authorities that target drug production laboratories and traffickinginfrastructure. The United States also provides counternarcotics assistance to othercountries in the region.

The Bush Administration has begun a “five pillar” inter-agency initiative toreinvigorate U.S. support for the implementation of Afghanistan’s nationalcounternarcotics strategy. The initiative has been accompanied by a substantialincrease in spending on counternarcotics programs, with particular emphasis onalternative livelihood development and greater U.S. support for crop eradicationefforts. Training of and equipment for Afghan counternarcotics forces andprosecution teams also have figured prominently in the new strategy. Most observersand officials expect that a long-term, sustained international effort will be necessaryto reduce the threat posed by the opium trade to the security and stability ofAfghanistan and the international community.

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65 Afghan Religious Scholars Urge End To Opium Economy, Associated Press, Aug. 3,2004.66 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, National Drug Control Strategy, May 18, 2003.Available at [http://www.cnd.gov.af/ndcs.html].67 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics ImplementationPlan, Feb. 16, 2005. Available at [http://www.cnd.gov.af/imp_plan.htm].

Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces

Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements. Among the first acts of thenewly established Afghan Interim Authority created by the Bonn Agreement was theissuance of a decree that banned the opium poppy cultivation, heroin production,opiate trafficking, and drug use on January 17, 2002. On April 3, 2002, Afghanauthorities released a second decree that described the scope and goals of aneradication program designed to destroy a portion of the opium poppy crop that hadbeen planted during late 2001. In order to prevent further cultivation during theautumn 2002 planting season, the government issued a third, more specific decree inSeptember 2002 that spelled out plans for the enforcement of bans on opiumcultivation, production, trafficking, and abuse.

Religious and political leaders have also spoken out adamantly againstinvolvement in the drug trade. Islamic leaders from Afghanistan’s General Councilof Ulema issued a fatwa or religious ruling in August 2004 that declared poppycultivation to be contrary to Islamic sharia law.65 Following his election in October2004, President Hamid Karzai has made a number of public statements characterizinginvolvement in opium cultivation and trafficking as shameful and stating thatprovincial and district leaders would be held accountable by the central governmentfor failure to combat drug activity in areas under their control.

Afghan authorities developed a national counternarcotics strategy in 2003 inconsultation with experts and officials from the United States, the United Kingdom,and the UNODC.66 The strategy declares the Afghan government’s commitment toreducing opium poppy cultivation by 70% by 2008 and to completely eliminatingpoppy cultivation and drug trafficking by 2013. The strategy identifies five keytactical goals to support its broader commitments: “the provision of alternativelivelihoods for Afghan poppy farmers, the extension of drug law enforcementthroughout Afghanistan, the implementation of drug control legislation, theestablishment of effective institutions, and the introduction of prevention andtreatment programs for addicts.” In 2005, the Afghan government released animplementation plan for the strategy that outlines specific initiatives planned in eachof the five policy areas, as well as for regional cooperation, eradication, and publicinformation campaigns.67 Afghanistan’s new counternarcotics law clarifiesadministrative authorities for counternarcotics policy and establishes clear proceduresfor investigating and prosecuting major drug offenses.

Institutions and Forces. In October 2002, then-Interim President HamidKarzai announced that the Afghan National Security Council would takeresponsibility for counternarcotics policy and would oversee the creation and

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68 Statement of James E. Stahlman, Assistant Operations Officer, U.S. Central Command,Committee on House Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,and Human Resources, May 10, 2005.

activities of a new Counternarcotics Directorate (CND). The CND subsequentlyestablished functional units to analyze data and coordinate action in five areas:judicial reform, law enforcement, alternative livelihood development, demandreduction, and public awareness. Following its establishment in late 2002, the CNDworked with other Afghan ministries, local leaders, and international authorities todevelop counternarcotics policies and coordinate the creation of counternarcoticsinstitutions and the training of effective personnel. The CND was transformed intoa new Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN) in December 2004. Habibullah Qadericurrently serves as Afghanistan’s Minister for Counternarcotics.

Counternarcotics enforcement activities have been directed from within theMinistry of Interior since 2002. General Mohammed Daud was named DeputyMinistry of Interior for Counternarcotics in December 2004. General Daud and hisstaff work closely with U.S. and British officials in implementing the Afghangovernment’s expanded counternarcotics enforcement plan. The Ministry of Interiordirects the activities of the following Afghan counternarcotics and law enforcemententities.

! Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A). The CNP-Aconsists of investigative and enforcement divisions whose officerswork closely with U.S. and British counternarcotics authorities.CNP-A officers continue to receive U.S. training to support theirability to plan and execute counternarcotics activities independently.

! National Interdiction Unit (NIU). The NIU was established as anelement of CNP-A in October 2004 and continues to conductsignificant raids across Afghanistan. Approximately 200 NIUofficers have received U.S. training and now operate in cooperationwith DEA Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST teams, for moresee below).68

! Central Eradication Planning Cell (CPEC). The CPEC is a U.K.-supported targeting and intelligence center that uses sophisticatedtechnology and surveying to target poppy crops and monitor thesuccess of eradication operations. The CPEC provides target datafor the Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF).

! Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF). The U.S.-supportedCPEF conducts ground-based eradication of poppy crops throughoutAfghanistan based on targeting data provided by the CentralEradication Planning Cell (CPEC). The force is made up ofapproximately 1,000 trained eradicators and is supported by securitypersonnel. Plans called for 3,000 CPEF officers to be trained by theend of 2005; however, Afghan and U.S. officials have expressed a

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69 Agence France Presse, “Afghanistan Launches Poppy Eradication Force,” Feb. 2, 2005.70 David Shelby, “United States to Help Afghanistan Attack Narcotics Industry,”Washington File, U.S. Department of State, Nov. 17, 2004.

preference for locally led and administered eradication efforts for2006, after the CPEF failed to meet its targets for 2005.69

! Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF). The elite ASNF, or“Force 333,” has received special training from the British militaryand carries out interdiction missions against high value targets andin remote areas. The U.S. military provides some intelligence andairlift support for the ASNF. According to the Ministry ofCounternarcotics, the ASNF has destroyed over 150 MT of opium,45 MT of precursor chemicals, and 191 drug laboratories.

! Border Police, National Police, and Highway Police.Approximately 27,000 Afghan police have graduated from U.S.-sponsored training facilities, and elements of all three forces havereceived training, equipment, and communications support fromBritish, German, and U.S. authorities to improve theircounternarcotics enforcement capabilities. U.S. and Germanauthorities planned to train 50,000 border and national police byDecember 2005.

U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan

In spite of limited efforts on the part of Afghan, U.S., and internationalauthorities, the land area used for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan andAfghanistan’s corresponding opiate output increased annually from late 2001 through2004. Although public awareness of government opium poppy cultivation bans andlaws outlawing participation in the narcotics trade is widespread, until recently,counternarcotics enforcement activities have been hindered by the Afghangovernment’s tactical inability to carry out nationwide, effective eradication andinterdiction campaigns as well as a lack of adequate legal infrastructure to supportdrug-related prosecutions. International development agencies have made positive,but limited, efforts to address structural economic issues associated with rurallivelihoods and drug production, such as household debt and the destruction of localagricultural market infrastructure. These efforts were not centrally coordinated orlinked directly to counternarcotics goals and initiatives until late 2004.

Substantial growth in opium poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking led U.S.officials, in consultation with their Afghan and coalition partners, to develop a morecomprehensive, complementary plan to support the implementation of the Afghannational counternarcotics strategy. The evolving policy initiative developed by U.S.agencies consists of five key elements, or pillars, that mirror Afghan initiatives andcall for increased interagency and international cooperation.70 The five pillars of theU.S. initiative are public information, judicial reform, alternative livelihooddevelopment, interdiction, and eradication. New initiatives in these areas are

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71 Ibid.72 “Afghan Religious Scholars Urge End To Opium Economy,” Associated Press, Aug. 3,2004.

building upon a range of preexisting policy initiatives being implemented by U.S.,Afghan, and coalition authorities.

Public Information. Afghan and U.S. authorities have initiated publicinformation campaigns to reach out to ordinary Afghans and raise public awarenessabout the threat of narcotics and the danger of participation in the illegal drug trade.71

The efforts build on the Afghan government’s public awareness strategy, whichenlists local community and religious leaders to support the government’scounternarcotics policies and encourages them to speak out in their communitiesagainst drug use and involvement the opium trade. As noted above, Islamic leadersfrom Afghanistan’s General Council of Ulema have supported this effort by publiclycondemning poppy cultivation and involvement in the drug trade.72

The U.S. campaigns supplement existing public information efforts designed toreduce demand for illegal drugs within Afghan society and spread awareness of theAfghan government’s opium poppy cultivation bans and drug laws. TheUNODC/MCN 2005 Opium Survey found that farmers across Afghanistan were wellaware of the government’s ban on opium poppy cultivation and that many farmerswho declined to cultivate opium poppy did so because they feared eradication orincarceration. An earlier survey also reported that farmers in provinces where opiumpoppy cultivation was found to have increased believed that the government couldnot or would not enforce the ban.

Judicial Reform. Department of State (INL office) and Department of Justicepersonnel are undertaking judicial reform efforts to further enable Afghan authoritiesto enforce counternarcotics laws and prosecute prominent individuals involved innarcotics trafficking. A Counternarcotics Vertical Prosecution Task Force (CNVPTF)is under development and will feature integrated teams of Afghan judges,prosecutors, and enforcement officials that are being specially trained to handlecomplex, high-profile cases. Some U.S. federal prosecutors are participating inCNVPTF training activities in Afghanistan. In 2005, an Afghan team of teninvestigators, seven prosecutors, and three judges began serving under thejurisdiction of the Kabul criminal court and are currently processing cases againstnarcotics suspects and detainees. The U.S. Department of Defense is supportingconstruction activities for a maximum-security wing at the Pol-i-Charki prison nearKabul to hold narcotics offenders prosecuted by the Task Force. Afghan andcoalition officials are currently working to identify targets for prosecution, although,according to U.S. officials, political concerns and security considerations will playa role in the targeting of individuals.

The April 2005 arrest of Haji Bashir Noorzai by U.S. officials and theextradition of Haji Baz Mohammed raised concern about the readiness and ability ofAfghan authorities to investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate drug suspectsindependently. According to an Afghan Interior Ministry official, “Afghan policehad no role in [Noorzai’s] arrest,” and Afghan authorities were constrained because

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73 Interior Ministry spokesman Lutfullah Mashal. Agence France Presse, “Afghan DrugsKingpin Seized by US was Untouchable in Afghanistan: Experts,” Apr. 27, 2005.74 Author interview with U.S. officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, Jan. 2005 and Washington,D.C., May 2005.75 Sources: Author interviews with USAID officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, January 2005; andUSAID Alternative Livelihoods Conference, Washington, D.C., May 2005.76 USAID has established a “Good Performer’s Fund” to reward districts that end cultivationwith high visibility infrastructure development projects.77 USAID, Alternative Livelihoods Update: Issue 3, Apr. 1-15, 2005; author consultationwith USAID Afghanistan Desk Office, Jan. 2006.

of “a lack of concrete evidence against him.”73 Discussion of a limited amnestyprogram for prominent narcotics traffickers surfaced in January 2005 but isreportedly no longer under consideration.74 With U.S. and coalition support, thegovernment of Afghanistan drafted and issued a new counternarcotics law inDecember 2005 that clarifies administrative authorities for counternarcotics policyand establishes clear procedures for investigating and prosecuting major drugoffenses.

Alternative Livelihood Development.75 In order to provide viableeconomic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation and drug production, U.S. officialshave developed a three-phased plan that directly links development initiatives tooverall counternarcotics efforts through a comprehensive program targeted to opiumproducing areas. The first phase of the alternative livelihoods plan acceleratedexisting agricultural development initiatives, including improvements to agriculturalmarket infrastructure, farmer education programs, and micro-credit lending systemsto support rural families. The new efforts build on existing USAID programs todevelop integrated systems of crop processing facilities, storage areas, roads, andmarkets, and to restore wheat and other cereal crop production levels. Work beganon phase one projects in early 2005 and will continue through 2006.

The second phase of the plan consists of a one-year “immediate needs”/ “cash-for-work” program that is sponsoring labor intensive work projects to provide non-opium incomes to rural laborers and to rehabilitate agricultural infrastructure. Theprogram began in December 2004 and has been renewed for 2006. USAID personneldesign “immediate needs” projects in consultation with local councils and triballeaders in districts where crop eradication has been planned or where farmers haveagreed to cease poppy cultivation.76 According to USAID, in main opium producingprovinces, USAID-sponsored alternative livelihood cash-for-work programsgenerated 4.5 million work days in 2005 and paid $15.7 million in salaries to 194,000people who otherwise may have engaged in or supported opium poppy cultivation.Over 6,00 km of irrigation canals, drainage ditches, nd traditional watertransportation systems were repaired and cleaned in a number of provinces,improving irrigation and supporting high value agriculture on an estimated 290,000hectares of land.77

The third, “comprehensive development” phase of the plan began in six keypoppy-producing provinces during 2005 and is scheduled to be implemented through

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78 Author consultation with USAID Afghanistan Desk Office, Jan. 2006.

2009. Current and planned projects include long-term infrastructure development forurban and rural areas, credit and financial services expansion, agriculturaldiversification, and private investment support. The Afghan government requestedthat USAID expand alternative livelihood programs into the provinces of Ghor, DaiKundi, Konar, Farah, and Uruzgan, and USAID personnel have consulted withcontractors and security officials and initiated preliminary projects in some of thoseprovinces.

Table 3. Alternative Livelihood Proposed Spending Targets by Province, FY2005-2007

($ millions)

Province ImmediateNeeds

ComprehensiveDevelopment

2004 Province Share of Nationwide Poppy

Cultivated Area

Nangarhar and Laghman $18 $110 21.1%

Helmand and Kandahar $19 $120 34.2%

Badakhshan and Takhar $1.5 $60 8.6%

Source: USAID, Alternative Livelihoods Update: Issue 2, March 16 — 31, 2005.

Accountability standards have been built into the USAID alternative livelihoodprograms, including seed and fertilizer distributions and cash-for-work programs.Seed and fertilizer recipients, including government officials, are required to agreein writing not to grow poppy in exchange for program support. Cash-for-workprogram participants must make similar commitments, and program staff monitorparticipant activities outside of the program to ensure compliance. According toUSAID, all alternative livelihood program assistance is 100% conditional on thereduction of poppy cultivation within one year of the receipt of assistance.78 Forexample, alternative livelihood assistance was denied to the border district of Achinin eastern Nangarhar province during 2005 because its inhabitants refused to haltpoppy cultivation. Some villages in Achin that subsequently agreed to abandonpoppy farming during the current season are scheduled to receive alternativelivelihood assistance on a conditional basis in 2006.

Interdiction. Reflecting on the absence of effective counternarcoticsinstitutions and authorities in post-Taliban Afghanistan, international authorities ledby the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) established a seriesof cooperative interdiction initiatives in countries neighboring Afghanistan beginningin early 2002. The primary U.S.-led effort, known as “Operation Containment,” isdesigned to “implement a joint strategy to deprive drug trafficking organizations oftheir market access and international terrorist groups of financial support from drugs,

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79 DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy, House Committee on Government ReformSubcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Feb. 26, 2004. 80 Ibid.81 Statement of Michael Braun, Chief of Operations - Drug Enforcement Agency, Before theHouse Committee on International Relations, Mar. 17, 2005.82 Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, Nov. 12, 2004.83 Testimony of Thomas W. O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for SpecialOperations and Low-intensity Conflict Before House International Relations Committee,Feb. 12, 2004; and Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, Nov. 12, 2004.

precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunition and currency.”79 Operation Containmenthas continued since early 2002 and currently involves “nineteen countries fromCentral Asia, the Caucasus, Europe and Russia.”80 According to the DEA, OperationContainment activities were responsible for the seizure of “2.4 metric tons of heroin,985 kilograms of morphine base, three metric tons of opium gum, 152.9 metric tonsof cannabis, and 195 arrests” in the first quarter of 2005.81 A similar multinationalDEA-led effort named Operation Topaz has focused on interdicting acetic anhydride — a primary heroin production precursor chemical — to Afghanistan.

In addition to ongoing international narcotics and precursor interdictioninitiatives under Operation Containment and Operation Topaz, U.S. officials areproviding increased support to Afghan government interdiction efforts throughintelligence cooperation, training programs, equipment transfers, and jointoperations. The DEA has expanded its presence in Afghanistan since January 2003,although in the past DEA officials have cited restrictions on the capabilities andfreedom of movement of their staff in Afghanistan due to a general lack of securityoutside of Kabul. DEA Foreign Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) have beendeployed to Afghanistan “to provide guidance and conduct bilateral investigationsthat will identify, target, and disrupt illicit drug trafficking organizations.” The FASTteams receive Defense Department support and are currently conducting operationsand providing mentoring to newly-trained Afghan recruits. DEA received newFY2006 funding to expand its operational presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia,including support for FAST teams, Operation Containment activities, and new fieldofficers.

Current U.S. Department of Defense directives state that U.S. military forces inAfghanistan do not and will not directly target drug production facilities or pursuedrug traffickers as a distinct component of ongoing U.S. counternarcoticsinitiatives.82 Current rules of engagement allow U.S. forces to seize and destroydrugs and drug infrastructure discovered during the course of routine militaryoperations carried out in pursuit of conventional counterterrorism and stabilitymissions.83 U.S. forces continue to provide limited intelligence and air support toAfghan and British forces during interdiction missions, including the destruction ofheroin laboratories and opiate storage warehouses. U.S. initiatives that supplyAfghan police with tents, boots, communication equipment, mobility support,infrastructure improvements, and training are expected to continue. DefenseDepartment and military personnel plan to focus future efforts on further improvingAfghanistan’s border security and providing greater intelligence support to Afghan

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84 Statement of Lennard J. Wolfson, Assistant Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Officeof National Drug Control Policy, Committee on House Government Reform Subcommitteeon Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, May 10, 2005.85 Philip Webster, “4,000 Troops to be Sent to Troubled Afghan Province,” The Times(London), Jan. 25, 2006.86 Author conversation with DEA official, Washington, D.C., May 2005.

law enforcement officials through joint military/DEA/Afghan “intelligence fusioncenters” located at U.S. facilities in Kabul and the Afghan Ministry of Interior.84

British forces currently contribute to a central targeting operation that identifiesopiate warehouses and processing facilities for destruction. British Customs andExcise authorities also work with Afghan officials through mobile heroin detectionunits in Kabul. British military forces reportedly will operate under more permissiverules of engagement that will allow them to carry out “opportunistic strikes” againstnarcotics infrastructure and to support Afghan eradication teams with a “rapid-reaction force.” British defense officials have announced plans to send up to 4,000British troops to the key opium-producing province of Helmand province in southernAfghanistan, where their mission reportedly will include efforts to support securityoperations and target narcotic traffickers. 85

Eradication. Critics have cited growth in opium poppy cultivation figures asevidence that manual eradication campaigns have failed to serve as a credibledeterrent for Afghan farmers. Plans developed by the Department of State, inconsultation with Afghan authorities, called for early and more robust opium poppyeradication measures for the 2004-2005 growing season to provide a strong deterrentto future cultivation. The Afghan Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) carriedout limited operations with support from U.K. intelligence officers, U.S. advisors,and international contractors in early 2005. Field reports indicated that CPEFpersonnel met violent resistance from farmers in some instances and largely failedto meet their eradication targets for the 2004-2005 season.86

The centrally organized and executed eradication plan marked a departure fromprevious eradication campaign strategies, which largely relied upon governors andlocal authorities to target and destroy crops. Most governors pledged to supportPresident Karzai’s eradication initiatives in 2005, and U.S. officials report that areaswhere governors and local leaders embraced and enforced the central government’seradication demands saw significant reductions in poppy cultivation. During thecurrent season, “poppy elimination programs” (PEPs) are being established in selectAfghan provinces. The PEPs are led by small U.S. interagency and internationalteams that will direct and monitor locally led and administered counternarcoticsactivities, including eradication. U.S. officials have stressed the importance of earlyseason, locally executed eradication in order to minimize violent farmer resistanceand give Afghan farmers time to plant licit replacement cash crops.

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87 National Drug Control Strategy, Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, May 18, 2003.88 “Poppy cultivation is likely to continue until responsible governmental authority isestablished throughout the country and until rural poverty levels can be reduced viaprovision of alternative livelihoods and increased rural incomes... Drug processing andtrafficking can be expected to continue until security is established and drug lawenforcement capabilities can be increased. “ State Department, INCSR, Mar. 2005.

Issues for Congress

Experts and government officials have warned that narcotics trafficking mayjeopardize the success of international efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.U.S. officials believe that efforts to reverse the related trends of opium cultivation,drug trafficking, corruption, and insecurity must expand if broader strategicobjectives are to be achieved. A broad interagency initiative to assist Afghanauthorities in combating the narcotics trade has been developed, but the effectivenessof new U.S. efforts will not be apparent until later this year. Primary issues ofinterest to the Congress include program funding, the role of the U.S. military, andthe scope and nature of eradication and development assistance initiatives. The 108th

Congress addressed the issue of counternarcotics in Afghanistan in intelligencereform proposals, and the first session of the 109th Congress considered newcounternarcotics policy proposals in relation to FY2006 appropriation andauthorization requests.

Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle

As noted above, narcotics trafficking and political instability remain intimatelylinked across Afghanistan. U.S. officials have identified narcotics trafficking as aprimary barrier to the establishment of security and consider insecurity to be aprimary barrier to successful counternarcotics operations. Critics of existingcounternarcotics efforts have argued that Afghan authorities and their internationalpartners remain reluctant to directly confront prominent individuals and groupsinvolved in the opium trade because of their fear that confrontation will lead tointernal security disruptions or armed conflict with drug-related groups. Afghanauthorities have expressed their belief that “the beneficiaries of the drugs trade willresist attempts to destroy it,” and have argued that “the political risk of internalinstability caused by counternarcotics measures” must be balanced “with therequirement to project central authority nationally” for counternarcotics purposes.87

Conflict and regional security disruptions have accompanied recent efforts to expandcrop eradication programs and previous efforts to implement central governmentcounternarcotics policies.

U.S. officials have identified rural security and national rule of law asprerequisites for effective counternarcotics policy implementation, whilesimultaneously identifying narcotics as a primary threat to security and stability.88

Although an increasing number of Afghan police, security forces, andcounternarcotics authorities are being trained by U.S. and coalition officials, the sizeand capability of Afghan forces may limit their power to effectively challengeentrenched drug trafficking groups and regional militia in the short term. Specifically,

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89 See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “U.S. Turns to Drug Baron to Rally Support,” Asia Times,Dec. 4, 2001; Charles Clover and Peronet Despeignes, “Murder Undermines KarzaiGovernment,” Financial Times, July 8, 2002; Susan B. Glasser, “U.S. Backing HelpsWarlord Solidify Power,” Washington Post, Feb. 18, 2002; Ron Moreau and SamiYousafzai, with Donatella Lorch, “Flowers of Destruction,” Newsweek, July 14, 2003;Andrew North, “Warlord Tells Police Chief to Go,” BBC News, July 12, 2004; StevenGraham, “Group: Warlords to Hinder Afghan Election,” Associated Press, Sept. 28, 2004;and Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, “U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan,”Boston Globe, Oct. 20, 2004.90 Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Oct. 7, 2004.

questions remain as to whether Afghan security and counternarcotics forces alonewill be able to establish the security conditions necessary for the more robusteradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood programs planned by U.S. andAfghan officials. From a political perspective, U.S. officials expect thatparliamentary and provincial elections will contribute to the political legitimacy ofgovernment counternarcotics initiatives; however, the creation of sufficient politicaland military stability for effective counternarcotics operations is likely to remain asignificant challenge. The death of several local contractor employees working onUSAID alternative livelihood projects in May 2005 brought renewed urgency to theseconcerns.

Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics

In pursuing counterterrorism objectives, Afghan and coalition authorities alsomust consider difficult political choices when confronting corrupt officials, militialeaders, and narcotics traffickers. Regional and local militia commanders withalleged links to the opium trade played significant roles in coalition efforts toundermine the Taliban regime and capture Al Qaeda operatives, particularly insoutheastern Afghanistan. Since late 2001, some of these figures have beenincorporated into government and security structures, including positions ofresponsibility for enforcing counternarcotics policies.89 According to Afghanistanscholar Barnett Rubin, “the empowerment and enrichment of the warlords who alliedwith the United States in the anti-Taliban efforts, and whose weapons and authoritynow enabled them to tax and protect opium traffickers,” have provided the opiumtrade “with powerful new protectors.”90

Pragmatic decisions taken since 2001 to prioritize counterterrorism operationsand current plans to enforce counternarcotics policies more strictly may conflict witheach other, forcing Afghan and coalition authorities to address seemingly difficultcontradictions. “Tactical” coalition allies in militia and other irregular forces withties to the drug trade may inhibit the ability of the central government to extend itsauthority and enforce its counternarcotics policies. These issues may weigh stronglyin decision concerning the feasibility and prospects for success of continuingcounterterrorism and counternarcotics operations. One senior Defense Departmentofficial has argued that U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan must recognize

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91 Testimony of Mary-Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense forCounternarcotics before the House Committee on International Relations, Mar. 17, 2005.92 “U.S. CENTCOM views narcotrafficking as a significant obstacle to the political andeconomic reconstruction of Afghanistan... Local terrorist and criminal leaders have a vestedinterest in using the profits from narcotics to oppose the central government and underminethe security and stability of Afghanistan.” Major Gen. John Sattler, USMC, Dir. ofOperations-US CENTCOM before the House Committee on Government ReformSubcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Apr. 21, 2004.

“the impact the drug trade has on our other policy objectives, while complementing(and not competing with) our other efforts in furtherance of those objectives.”91

Defining the Role of the U.S. Military

Some observers have argued that U.S. and coalition military forces should playan active, direct role in targeting the leaders and infrastructure of the opiate trade.Although U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials have indicated that “theDoD counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan is a key element of our campaignagainst terrorism,”92 military officials reportedly have resisted the establishment ofa direct counternarcotics enforcement role for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Criticsclaim that a direct enforcement role for U.S. or coalition forces may alienate themfrom the Afghan population, jeopardize ongoing counterterrorism missions thatrequire Afghan intelligence support, and divert already stretched military resourcesfrom direct counter-insurgent and counterterrorism operations. According to theDefense Department, U.S. military forces are authorized to seize narcotics and relatedsupplies encountered during the course of normal stability and counterterrorismoperations.

Current U.S. policy calls for an expanded role for U.S. military forces intraining, equipping, and providing intelligence and airlift support for Afghancounternarcotics teams but stops short of elevating narcotics targets to a directpriority for U.S. combat teams. Defense Department officials agreed in March2005 to provide limited airlift assistance (four operations per month) to U.S. andAfghan interdiction teams using U.S. Blackhawk and Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters.Successful interdiction operations in remote areas have been carried out on this basissince mid-March 2005, and further helicopter leasing and pilot training arrangementshave been made.

The conference report (H.Rept. 109-360) on the National Defense AuthorizationAct for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) did not include a provision included in theSenate version of the bill (S. 1042, Section 1033) that would have allowed theDefense Department to provide a range of technical and operational support toAfghan counternarcotics authorities based on an element of the National DefenseAuthorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101- 510, Section 1004). The Senateversion would have authorized “the use of U.S. bases of operation or trainingfacilities to facilitate the conduct of counterdrug activities in Afghanistan” inresponse to the Defense Department’s request “to provide assistance in all aspects ofcounterdrug activities in Afghanistan, including detection, interdiction, and related

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93 S.Rept. 109-69.94 Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy expects that farmers with a “legacy of debt”will find that their “situation will be exacerbated by eradication efforts.” A September 2004British government report argues that “if not targeted properly, eradication can have thereverse effect and encourage farmers to cultivate more poppy to pay off increased debts.”Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (UK) to theSeventh Report from the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Sep. 2004.95 Office of the Spokesperson to the President — Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan,“About the Commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to the Fight Against Narcoticsand Concerns About the Aerial Spraying of Poppy Fields.”

criminal justice activities.”93 This would have included transportation of personneland supplies, maintenance and repair of equipment, the establishment and operationof bases and training facilities, and training for Afghan law enforcement personnel.

Redefining Eradication

Proponents of swift, widespread eradication argued that destroying a largeportion of the 2004-2005 opium poppy crop was necessary in order to establish acredible deterrent before opium production in Afghanistan reaches an irreversiblelevel. Critics of widespread, near-term eradication argued that eradication in theabsence of existing alternative livelihood options for Afghan farmers wouldcontribute to the likelihood that farmers would continue to cultivate opium poppy inthe future by deepening opium based debt and driving up opium prices.94 U.S. andAfghan authorities maintain that the Central Poppy Eradication Force and governor-led eradication programs were effective in deterring and reducing some opium poppycultivation in 2005. However, given recurrent clashes between eradication forces andfarmers, some observers and officials have expressed concern about the safety andeffectiveness of current ground-based eradication efforts. During the 2006 season,“poppy elimination program” teams will be in place in key opium poppy growingprovinces to monitor and direct early season, locally-executed eradication activities.This strategy is designed to minimize violent farmer resistance to central governmentforces and give farming families time to plant replacement cash crops.

Aerial Eradication. Policy makers are likely to engage in further debateconcerning the option of aerial poppy eradication and its possible risks and rewards.Afghan and U.S. authorities discussed the introduction of aerial eradication toAfghanistan in late 2004, but decided against initiating a program in early 2005 dueto financial, logistical, and political considerations. Afghan President Hamid Karzaihas expressed his categorical opposition to the use of aerial eradication, citing publichealth and environmental safety concerns.95 Proponents of aerial eradication arguethat the large amount of rural land under poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and poorroad infrastructure makes ground-based eradication inefficient and subjectseradication teams to unnecessary security threats. Critics of aerial eradication arguethat the mixed-crop cultivation patterns common throughout Afghanistan will exposelegitimate food crops to damage and warn that aerial spraying may producewidespread, possibly violent resistance by villagers with vivid memories of centrallydirected Soviet military campaigns to destroy food crops and agriculturalinfrastructure. The Senate report on the FY2005 supplemental appropriations bill

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96 See David Brunnstrom, “Afghans Committed to Drug War But Against Spraying,”Reuters, Nov. 19, 2004; and Stephen Graham, “Afghan Government Concerned at Sprayingof Opium Crops by Mystery Aircraft,” Associated Press, Nov. 30, 2004.97 Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Poppy Farmers Say Mystery Spraying Killed Crops,” New YorkTimes, Dec. 5, 2004, and Reuters, “U.S. Says Drug Lords May Have Sprayed AfghanOpium,” Dec. 2, 2004.98 See Nicholas Rufford, “Secret Bio-weapon Can Wipe Out Afghan Heroin,” Sunday Times(London), May 26, 2002; Antony Barnett, “UK in Secret Biological War on Drugs,”Observer (London), Sept. 17, 2000; Juanita Darling, “Fungi May Be the Newest Recruitsin War on Drugs Colombia,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 30, 2000.99 According to a USDA official, “The Department of Agriculture, as an agency, is opposedto the idea [of using mycoherbicides in Afghanistan]: The science is far from complete;There are real environmental and possible human health negative implications; There arevery real image problems... the use of any agent like this would be portrayed as biological

(continued...)

(H.R. 1268) specifies that “none of the funds recommended by the Committee maybe available for aerial eradication programs within Afghanistan absent a formalrequest by the President of Afghanistan seeking such support.”

Reports of unauthorized aerial spraying in eastern Nangarhar province in mid-November 2004 angered Afghan officials and led to an investigation by the AfghanMinistries of Agriculture and Health of claims that crops had been sprayed withherbicides by unidentified aircraft. The government investigation reportedly revealedthat unidentified chemicals were present in soil samples, that non-narcotic crops hadbeen destroyed, and that an increase in related illnesses in local villages had occurred.Afghan officials cited U.S. control of Afghan airspace in their subsequent demandsfor an explanation. U.S. and British officials have denied involvement in the sprayingand assured Afghan authorities that they support President Karzai’s position.96 Inearly December 2004, then-U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzadsuggested that “some drug-associated people” may have sprayed the crops “in orderto create the sort of distrust and problem between Afghanistan and some of itsallies.”97 Observers noted that the vocal negative reaction of the Afghan populationand government to an alleged isolated spraying incident illustrates the type of popularopposition that may accompany any future aerial eradication program.

Afghan government officials would have to approve any future aerial sprayingoperations undertaken by U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan. Any future aerialeradication in Afghanistan also would require specific funding and the introductionof airframes and military support aircraft that exceed current U.S. capabilities in theregion. Aerial eradication programs, if employed in the future, could feature the useof chemical herbicide such as the glyphosate compound currently approved for usein Colombia. The use of mycoherbicides, or fungal herbicides, also has beendiscussed. Opium poppy-specific mycoherbicide has been developed with U.N.,U.K., and U.S. support at the Institute of Genetics and Experimental Biology, aformer Soviet biological warfare facility in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.98 Mycoherbicidetests continue, including efforts by USDA’s Agricultural Research Service , althoughUSDA officials and others have expressed various concerns about the use ofmycoherbicides for counternarcotics purposes.99

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99 (...continued)warfare.” USDA response to CRS inquiry, Oct. 19, 2004.

Pending Legislation and Counternarcotics Funding

Several intelligence reform proposals in the 108th Congress sought to addressthe 9/11 Commission’s recommendation on expanding the U.S. commitment toAfghanistan’s security and stability, including U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Section7104 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108 —458) states the sense of Congress that “the President should make the substantialreduction of illegal drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan a priority in theGlobal War on Terrorism” and calls on the Administration to provide a secureenvironment for counternarcotics personnel and to specifically target narcoticsoperations that support terrorist organizations. The act also required the submissionof a joint Defense and State Department report within 120 days of enactment thatdescribed current progress toward the reduction of poppy cultivation and heroinproduction in Afghanistan and provided detail on the extent to which drug profitssupport terrorist groups and anti-government elements in and around Afghanistan.

In the 109th Congress, H.R. 1437, the “Afghan Poppy Eradication and ProsperityAct of 2005,” would authorize $1 billion to support a two-year USAID-led cash-for-work and poppy eradication pilot program in Afghanistan. Under the program,Afghan laborers would receive $10 per day of work. As noted above, cash-for-workprograms are currently being administered by USAID and British authorities inAfghanistan. The bill would require an annual report from USAID on progresstoward poppy eradication and alternative livelihood creation. The bill has beenreferred to the House Committee on International Relations.

Counternarcotics Funding. Funding for U.S. counternarcotics operationsin Afghanistan consists of program administration costs and financial and materialassistance to Afghan counternarcotics authorities. Table 4 displays the fundingappropriated for U.S. counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan and related regionalprograms from FY2002 through FY2006. Table 5 describes the Administration’splanned use for the counternarcotics funding included in the FY2005 supplementalappropriation (P.L. 109-13), which provided $758.15 million of the $773.15 millionin supplemental FY2005 counternarcotics funding originally requested by theAdministration. Under the terms of P.L. 109-13, the Comptroller General mustconduct an audit of the use of all Economic Support Fund and International NarcoticsControl and Law Enforcement funds for bilateral counternarcotics and alternativelivelihood programs in Afghanistan obligated and expended during FY2005. TheGeneral Accounting Office is currently conducting this audit. Requests for furtherfunding for Department of Defense counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan willlikely be made as part of future supplemental funding requests.

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Table 4. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding for Afghanistan by Source, FY2002-FY2006 ($ million)

FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006

AppropriatedFunds

P.L.107-206

AppropriatedFunds

P.L.108-11

AppropriatedFunds

P.L.108-106

P.L.107-38

AppropriatedFunds

P.L.109-13

AppropriatedFunds

Department of State $3.00a $60.00 $3.00a $25.00 - $170.00b $50.00c $89.28 $260.00 $235.00

Department of Defense - - - - - $73.00 - $15.40 $242.00 -

Drug Enforcement Agencyd ($0.58) - ($2.92) - - ($3.96) - ($7.67) $7.65 $17.60e

USAIDf - $9.99 $14.29 - $53.55 - - $95.69 $248.50 $90.50g

Annual Total $73.57 $45.21 $350.51 $966.19 $343.10

Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development - Budget Justifications to the Congress, Department of State - Congressional Budget Justifications for ForeignOperations, Office of the Secretary of Defense - Defense Budget Materials, Office of Management and Budget, and Legislative Information System.

a $3 million funding for Southwest Asia Initiative counternarcotics programs in Pakistan partially designed to restrict the flow of Afghan opiates. b Of the $170 million in supplemental funds, $110 million was channeled toward police training and judicial reform programs.c Reprogrammed funds appropriated as part of $40 billion Emergency Response Fund established in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.d On May 8, 2002, Congress approved a reprogramming of 17 positions and $15,125,000 in Violent Crime Reduction Program prior year funds to support the Drug Enforcement

Administration’s ‘Operation Containment,’ which targets heroin trafficking in Southwest Asia. The figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect annual expenditure of the reprogrammedobligated funds. (DEA response to CRS request, October 2004.)

e FY2006 funds include $7.72 million for Operation Containment, $4.3 million to support Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) teams, and $5.58 million for DEA offices in Kabuland Dushanbe, Tajikistan. New funds were not appropriated for the creation of a DEA office in Dubai, United Arab Emirates authorized in House Report 109-272.

f USAID figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect funds applied to USAID’s “Agriculture” and “Agriculture and Alternative Livelihoods” programs (Program #306-001).g USAID will shift activities currently funded through its”Agriculture and Alternative Livelihoods” program to a “Thriving Economy Led by the Private Sector” program (Program

#306-YYY). Relevant funds include $90.5 million to “Develop and Expand Alternative Development.”

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Table 5. Planned Use of FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations, P.L. 109-13($ million)

Agency Amount Proposed Purpose

Department of Defense(Drug Interdiction and

Counter-Drug Activities)$242

Funds for training, equipment, intelligence, infrastructure, and information operations related to the campaignagainst narcotics trafficking and narcotics-related terrorist activities in Afghanistan and the Central Asia area.Of this amount, $70 million restored funding to other DoD counternarcotics activities from which funds wereused to finance counter-drug assistance to Afghanistan. P.L. 109-13 limited the provision of assistance to $34million for the Afghan government and allows for the delivery of individual and crew-served weapons forcounter-drug security forces. (Note: The Administration’s original request was for $257 million.)

Department of State(International Narcotics Controland Law Enforcement Account)

$260

Funds to continue the expanded counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan begun in FY2005. Of the total amountrequested, $95 million replenished funding advanced to start expanded crop eradication, establishment of aNational Interdiction Unit, prosecution of drug traffickers, and public information programs. The remaining$165 million supported the Department of State’s contribution to expanded efforts in eradication ($89 million),interdiction ($51 million), law enforcement ($22 million), and public information ($3 million).

United States Agency forInternational Development(Economic Support Fund)

$248.5

Funds to support alternative livelihoods programs. A portion ($138.5 million) of the amount replenishedreconstruction and development aid accounts that had been drawn on previously to create alternative livelihoodprograms in late 2004 and early 2005. The balance ($110 million) is being used to expand alternative livelihoodprograms beyond pilot provinces.

Drug Enforcement Agency $7.65Funds to support and equip DEA’s Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) and to provide operationalsupport for a 100-member Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU).

Total FY2005 Supplemental Appropriation $758.15

Source: P.L. 109-13 and Office of Management and Budget, Estimate #1: Emergency Supplemental — Ongoing Military Operations in the War on Terror;Reconstruction Activities in Afghanistan; Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction; and Other Purposes, February 14, 2005.

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Appendix A

Cited Field Surveys

Jonathan Goodhand, “From Holy War to Opium War: A Case Study of the OpiumEconomy in North Eastern Afghanistan,” Peacebuilding and ComplexEmergencies Working Paper Series, Paper No. 5, University of Manchester,1999.

Frank Kenefick, and Larry Morgan, “Opium in Afghanistan: People and Poppies —The Good Evil,” Chemonics International Inc. for USAID, February 5, 2004.

Aga Kahn Foundation, “Badakhshan Province: Suggestions for an AreaDevelopment Based Counter-narcotics Strategy,” April 2004.

David Mansfield, “Coping Strategies, Accumulated Wealth and Shifting Markets:The Story of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Badakhshan 2000-2003,” Agha KhanDevelopment Network, January 2004.

David Mansfield, “Alternative Development in Afghanistan: The Failure of Quid ProQuo,” International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development inDrug Control and Development Cooperation, January 2002.

Adam Pain, “The Impact of the Opium Poppy Economy on Household Livelihoods:Evidence from the Wakhan Corridor and Khustak Valley in Badakhshan,” AgaKahn Development Network, Badakhshan Programme, January 2004.

UNODC, “An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Cultivation to NewDistricts in Afghanistan,” Strategic Study #1, June 1998.

UNODC, “The Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Coping Strategiesof Opium Traders,” Strategic Study #2, October 1998.

UNODC, “The Role of Opium as an Informal Credit,” Preliminary Strategic Study#3, January 1999.

UNODC, “Access to Labour: The Role of Opium in the Livelihood Strategies ofItinerant Harvesters Working in Helmand Province, Afghanistan,” StrategicStudy #4, June 1999.

UNODC, “The Role of Women in Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan,”Strategic Study #6, June 2000.