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Eurasian Geography and Economics

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Untangling the puzzle of “Russia’s influence” inKazakhstan

Marlene Laruelle, Dylan Royce & Serik Beyssembayev

To cite this article: Marlene Laruelle, Dylan Royce & Serik Beyssembayev (2019): Untanglingthe puzzle of “Russia’s influence” in Kazakhstan, Eurasian Geography and Economics, DOI:10.1080/15387216.2019.1645033

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1645033

Published online: 30 Jul 2019.

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Untangling the puzzle of “Russia’s influence” inKazakhstanMarlene Laruellea, Dylan Roycea and Serik Beyssembayevb

aInstitute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, TheGeorge Washington University, Washington, DC, USA; bSociological Center Strategiya, Almaty,Kazakhstan

ABSTRACTThe theme of “Russian influence” has been invading thethink tank world. Yet the concept of influence must bedeployed with care. Analysts have frequently assumedthat, when states do things thought favourable to Russia,it must be because Moscow has either forced them to act inthat manner, or has actively manipulated their domesticpolitics so that they do so. Left largely unconsidered arethe various other reasons that one state might act ina manner desirable to another. In this article we look atthe different vectors that might yield Russia-favorable beha-vior by Kazakhstan: exogenous ones that Russia actively andpassively generates and endogenous ones that are passivelyor even actively generated within Kazakhstan itself. We dis-cuss Russia’s economic and strategic links with Kazakhstan,the issue of the Russian minority, the status of the Russianlanguage, Russian media presence, Russia’s governmentaland non-governmental networks, and the “payoff” of thelatter three vectors: Kazakhstani popular Russophilia. Bydistinguishing between active and passive vectors, as wellas between exogenous and endogenous ones, we proposea more nuanced and better theoretically articulated pictureof Russia’s “influence” in Kazakhstan.

ARTICLE HISTORYReceived 21 March 2019Accepted 14 July 2019

KEYWORDSRussia; Kazakhstan;influence; soft power;vectors

Introduction

The theme of “Russian influence” has been invading the Western think tankworld. Now in common usage both in the media and in expert circles, it is oneof the main byproducts of the current crisis in the U.S.-Russia relationship,which has given birth to a new ecosystem of ideas, with funds dedicated tostudying and “countering” or “deterring” that influence. Yet the concept ofinfluence must be deployed with care. Analysts have frequently assumed that,when states do things thought favourable to Russia, it must be becauseMoscow has either forced them to act in that manner, or has actively manipu-lated their domestic politics so that they do so.1 Left largely unconsidered are

CONTACT Marlene Laruelle laruelle@gwu.edu 1957 E St. NW, Suite 412, Washington, DC 20052, USA

EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICShttps://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1645033

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

the various other reasons that one state might act in a manner desirable toanother: inter alia, that its perspectives and views simply align with those ofthe other state, that its geopolitical or economic circumstances naturally driveit to act in a particular manner, or that the other state “naturally” influences thefirst merely by existing (e.g. via the emission of cultural influence).

Theoretically, there are two main reasons why a given state (B) might act ina manner desirable to another state (A). Its situation may be such that, inmaximizing its own utility (or minimizing utility-loss), B acts in a mannerdesirable to A.2 Alternatively, its perceptions and/or objectives may leave itpursuing objectives and taking actions desirable to A.3 (Nye (2003, 4–5) termsthese hard and soft power, respectively.) B’s situation and perceptions/objec-tives, in turn, may be shaped by its own attributes and actions, by theattributes and actions of A, or by the international system as a whole.Furthermore, A and B might generate the vectors shaping B’s situation andobjectives/perceptions either actively or passively. (Nye largely conceives ofhard power as active and soft power as passive, but this need not necessarilybe the case.)

A may deliberately act so as to shape B’s situation – e.g. it might build up itsmilitary power to place B in a position of insecurity. It and/or the internationalsystem might also passively, or “naturally,” shape B’s situation – e.g. A’s eco-nomic significance might place B in a position of dependence, or its culturalinfluence might impose public opinion constraints on B from B’s own popula-tion, or B’s place in the international system might lead it to look to A forsecurity. A might also deliberately seek to alter B’s objectives/perceptions – e.g.diplomacy or government-supported media might drive not just B’s popula-tion, but also its policymakers, to want to act in a manner beneficial to A. OrA might passively reshape B’s interests/perceptions – e.g. if its cultural influencewere to affect not only public opinion in B, but also elite opinion.

Additionally, B’s situation and objectives/perceptions may be shaped endo-genously. B may “naturally,” passively have interests/perceptions that cause it toact in a manner beneficial to A, or its attributes might passively generate sucha situation – e.g., constituencies that are inherently pro-A or an economicstructure that incentivizes integration with A. Responding to its objectives/perceptions and situation, B might actively further reinforce them – e.g., itmight deepen military or economic cooperation with A and thus intensifydependence upon it.

All of the abovementioned vectors ultimately have the same effect: B actingin a manner beneficial to A. Yet it is important to distinguish between thevarious processes that yield this outcome. Are they exogenous vectors of A’spower/influence, or endogenous to B? Are they generated actively or pas-sively? Figure 1 illustrates the active/passive and endogenous/exogenous vec-tors that might shape B’s situation and interests/perceptions so as to make itsbehavior favorable to A.

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The Russo-Kazakhstani relationship clearly features all of the above vectors-types. Though Kazakhstan is often seen as Moscow’s best partner (or secondbehind Belarus), its relationship with Russia remains largely overlooked. AlexeyMalashenko (2013), as well as a handful of articles, provide a general overviewof Russia’s relations with all of Central Asia. The literature is dominated bynotions of Russia’s push for “authoritarian diffusion” (Cameron and Orenstein2012; Vanderhill and Michael 2013; Jackson 2010; Roberts 2015; Ziegler 2016),Astana’s ambivalent management of Eurasianism (Anceschi 2014; Laruelle2018), the economic implications of the Eurasian Economic Union (Sakwaand Piotr 2014; European Politics and Society 2016), and the role of theCollective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO) (de Haas 2017; Wilhelmsen and Flikke 2011; Pop 2009;Kropatcheva 2016), but the precise drivers of Kazakhstani behavior vis-à-visRussia are rarely addressed.

Research on Russia’s influence in Europe (e.g. Shekhovtsov 2017), and in theBaltics, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova in particular (Hedenskog and Larsson2007; Lutsevych 2016; Szostek 2015; Kaiser 2015; O’Loughlin, Kolossov, andToal 2014; Devyatkov 2017), has been growing rapidly, but Central Asia – and,more specifically, Kazakhstan – continues to be an understudied space where

Figure 1. The different vectors of “influence”.Source: Compiled by the authors.

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Russia’s influence is taken for granted. The only two aspects of the Kazakhstan-Russia relationship to have been partially studied are the Russian minority –a topic that was mostly considered in the 1990s and disappeared in the 2000s(Laruelle and Peyrouse 2007; Peyrouse 2007; Barrington 2001; Ziegler 2006)before re-emerging after Crimea’s annexation (Laruelle 2016b; Diener 2015;Brletich 2015) – and Russian media influence, which has become a fashionablebut superficially-studied topic since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.

We see Russia’s goal as maintaining Kazakhstan as a close partner in allspheres – political, strategic, economic, and cultural. Moscow’s status as thepivotal state of the Eurasian space cannot be validated without Kazakhstanplaying the role of loyal second, even more so now that Ukraine is lost to Russiafor the near future and Belarus is becoming a rather capricious ally. Based on theexisting literature, we look at the different vectors that might yield Russia-favorable behavior by Kazakhstan: exogenous ones that Russia actively andpassively generates (what is conventionally referred to as power or influence)and endogenous ones that are passively or even actively generated withinKazakhstan itself. We discuss Russia’s economic and strategic links withKazakhstan, the issue of the Russian minority, the status of the Russian language,Russian media presence, Russia’s governmental and non-governmental networks,and the “payoff” of the latter three vectors: popular Russophilia in Kazakhstan. Bydistinguishing between active and passive forces, as well as between exogenousand endogenous ones, we hope to achieve a more nuanced and theoretically-articulated picture of Russia’s “influence” in Kazakhstan.

We find that Kazakhstan is a fully-fledged actor in the relationship in its ownright, that the bilateral relationship should be deconstructed into multiplevectors (including those that are promoted or opposed by Astana), and thata simple pattern in Astana’s response to the various vectors can be discerned:when a vector is costless or beneficial, or restraining it or eliminating it wouldhave a higher cost than benefit, the vector is accepted or even reinforced;when, on the other hand, a vector entails higher costs than benefits, Astanaattempts to diminish it.

Economic ties

From the collapse of the USSR until 2010, Russia’s share of Kazakhstan’simports declined continuously. However, as shown in Figure 2, this declinehas since ended and partly reversed, with the result that, in 2017, Kazakhstanreceived 39% of its imports from Russia (UN Comtrade 2017).

The share of Kazakhstani exports going to Russia is far smaller (9%), but thiscould hardly be otherwise, as Kazakhstan’s exports are mainly fossil fuels, rawminerals, and metals that Russia also exports. That said, Kazakhstan doesremain highly dependent on Russia for its oil exports to other countries,especially those in Europe. Despite Astana’s efforts to diversify to China and

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through the Caspian-Caucasus-Turkey route, the vast majority of its energyexports – 85% of its oil and virtually all of its gas, according to Kazakhstan’sVice-Minister of Energy in 2015 – still transit through Russia (Today.kz 2015).

Considering Russo-Kazakhstani ties in more detail, many Russian corpora-tions have substantial assets in Kazakhstan or business relations withKazakhstani companies. Lukoil and Rosneft have stakes in several majorKazakhstani energy concerns.4 Gazprom will participate in exploitingKazakhstan’s Tsentral’noye and Imashevskoye fields. Russian Railroads is oneof the main partners of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, and Rosatom cooperatesclosely with Kazatomprom. Roskosmos is highly active in Kazakhstan, mainlydue to the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Russian defense firms, such as Almaz-Antey,Sukhoy, Irkut, and Uralvagonzavod, partner with the Kazakhstani military-industrial complex. Russian agribusiness firms are also well represented onthe Kazakhstani agricultural market.

In short, Kazakhstan’s economic ties with Russia are undoubtedly morelimited than they were when the two were part of the same country.Nevertheless, they remain relatively strong, and their trajectory over the lastseven years has been basically constant.

Perhapsmost interestingly, both the Russian and the Kazakhstani governmentshave recently takenmajor steps to ensure the endurance of these economic ties –and by means that further increase their interdependence. The large uptick inKazakhstan’s imports from Russia in 2011 coincided with the establishment of theCustoms Union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The slower but con-tinual growth in Russian imports since 2015 follows the foundation of the EurasianEconomic Union (EAEU). As an economic union, the EAEU substantially limits itsmembers’ autonomy in certain economic spheres (though not in fiscal or mone-tary policy) and has mainly had the effect of harmonizing external tariffs andabolishing internal customs. Kazakhstani authorities have pushed for Eurasian

Figure 2. Kazakhstani imports from and exports to Russia as a share of the total, 1995–2017.Source: UN Comtrade, https://comtrade.un.org/labs/data-explorer/.

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regional integration since the dissolution of the USSR –more consistently, in fact,than Russia has (Anceschi 2014). But since the launch of the EAEU, Astana has alsosent clear signals regarding the limits of integration that it will accept: for instance,rejecting a joint parliament, joint citizenship, or a common currency (Libman2018).

The economic vector promoting Russia-favorable Kazakhstani behavior isthus significant yet limited. The EAEU seems to have halted but not substan-tially reversed the decline in Russia’s economic predominance. To a largeextent, the economic vector is a “natural” consequence of Kazakhstan’s geo-graphic position and the economic profiles of it and Russia; it could thereforebe considered passively generated, both endogenously by Kazakhstan andexogenously by Russia. However, both the Russian and Kazakhstani govern-ments also support a certain level of economic integration, meaning that theyare both actively strengthening this vector by linking the two economiesinstitutionally and thus further strengthening raw economic ties. The conse-quence is the stable or increasing importance of Russia to Kazakhstan in aneconomic sense, which in turn generates further Russia-favorable behavior byincentivizing further economic integration – but, as yet, not political integra-tion – and conceivably by providing Russia with leverage to incentivize orcoerce behavior desired from Astana.

Strategic and military cooperation

Kazakhstan’s military dependence on Russia reflects the alignment ofKazakhstani and Russian interests (insofar as it is the product of positivedecisions by Astana), indicates the strength of vectors yielding Russia-favorable Kazakhstani behavior (insofar as they sustain the dependence), anditself constitutes another such vector. Determining which aspects of the mili-tary relationship do which of the above is more complex.

Kazakhstan is under Russia’s military protection, including its nuclearumbrella – Kazakhstan denuclearized in the early 1990s and is part of theCentral Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty – and is a key member of theCollective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The regime in Astana believesthat in the event of an attack, whether a conventional attack by another stateor a non-conventional one such as mass terrorist actions, Russia would rescueit through CSTO mechanisms such as the Collective Rapid Reaction Force.Moreover, since 2013, Russia and Kazakhstan have pursued a “UnitaryRegional Anti-Air Defense System” (Gavrilov 2013; RIA Novosti 2014).Kazakhstan also relies heavily upon Russian assistance in two other domains:training and equipment procurement.

Russia remains the main external actor training Kazakhstani officers andsoldiers, both within the CSTO framework and at a bilateral level, through theMinistries of Defense, Interior, and Emergency Situations, the FSB (Gorenburg

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2014), and the National Guard. Kazakhstan provides about one-third of allforeign officers trained in Russian military academies (Peyrouse 2011, 2017),with the result that more than half of the Kazakhstani army is now trained atleast partly in Russia. Russia provides almost all of the foreign training receivedby some sectors of the military, including the young Kazakhstani navy and airforce (McDermott 2012, 60).

Almost thirty years after independence, Kazakhstan’s military equipment isalmost exclusively of Soviet or Russian origin, and the country is largelydependent upon Russia for the repair of old equipment and procurement ofnew. Weighted by value, about 82% of Kazakhstan’s post-independence armsimports have come from Russia, including 78% in 2010–2017 (SIPRI n.d.). TheKazakhstani military-industrial complex is intimately linked to the Russian one:it operates mostly using Russian technologies and its employees are trained inRussia (Baev 2014; CSTO n.d.)

The only case where Russian military influence does not provide obviousbenefits to Kazakhstan – except financial revenues – is Moscow’s rental ofmore than 100,000km2 of Kazakhstani territory for military tests, mostly for airdefense, ballistic rockets, and space exploration (RIA Novosti 2016) (Figure 3).Were Kazakhstan’s internal stability, or Russo-Kazakhstani relations, to deterio-rate, Russia could potentially pressure Kazakhstan – or even intervene in it – onthe grounds of protecting these strategic interests. Since the 2014 crisis, theKazakhstani authorities, perhaps perceiving a risk in the rental of these sites,have been trying to renegotiate their agreements with Russia, which agreed in

Figure 3. Russia’s military presence in Kazakhstan.Source: Compiled by the authors.

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2015 to return about 15% of the rented territory – albeit parts that were not inuse (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 2015).

Kazakhstan’s military doctrines, issued in 2000, 2007, 2011, and 2017 (Adilet2000, 2007, 2011, 2017), suggest that Astana has increasingly come to viewRussia as its key partner and the US as an inconvenience, if not an outrightthreat (or, conceivably, that Russia’s military-strategic influence overKazakhstan has become so great that Astana wishes to project that positioneven if it does not actually hold it). Russia is continuously named first amongKazakhstan’s military partners. Tertiary and then secondary priority was givento cooperation with China – at least until 2017, when mention of it vanished.Similarly, the US and its allies were given secondary preference in 2000 andtertiary preference in 2007 and 2011; no mention was made of them whatso-ever in 2017.

While there are several passages in Kazakhstan’s military doctrines thatcould be construed as expressing concern about a Russian threat, the onlyconcrete allusions suggest fear of the US. The 2007 doctrine expresses con-cerns about the use of force in international affairs: given the timing and thespecific mention of a crisis in international security institutions, this is likelya reference to U.S. actions in Serbia and/or Iraq, which evaded the UN SecurityCouncil or contradicted its decisions. Similar concerns about the use of force inthe 2011 and 2017 doctrines presumably still refer to the U.S. conflicts in Serbiaand Iraq. They might or might not also refer to the NATO attack on Libya and/or to Russian conflicts with Georgia and (in 2017) Ukraine.

In sum, Russia’s military-strategic significance to Kazakhstan is a majorvector potentially yielding Russia-favorable behavior by the country, given itsdependence upon Moscow for critical support such as security guarantees andthe upkeep of its own military. Moreover, this vector appears to be growing instrength: Kazakhstan is intensifying cooperation with Russia while diminishingcooperation with the US and its allies. To a significant extent, the vector can beregarded as generated by Kazakhstan and the international system, asKazakhstan’s position in the latter makes Russia an attractive security partner.Additionally, as with economic ties, military ones are further reinforced byactive support from both the Kazakhstani and Russian governments.Kazakhstani support is a reflection both of the country’s military relianceupon Russia and of its willingness to intensify that reliance.

Kazakhstan’s ethnic Russian minority

One of the main legacies inherited from the historical interaction between theRussian and Kazakh worlds was the presence of a large Russian minority:5 foryears, Kazakhstan was the Soviet republic with the proportionally smallesttitular ethnic group. Both Moscow and Astana have experienced this demo-graphic situation as an uneasy “inheritance,” in the sense that neither of them

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could substantially alter it except by engaging in mass violence (for Astana,expelling Russians from Kazakhstan; for Moscow, annexing northernKazakhstan to Russia) that neither wanted. Over the past three decades,however, the Russian minority has rapidly declined in absolute and propor-tional terms, due both to emigration by Russians and higher fertility amongKazakhs, falling from 38% of the population (6.2 million) in 1989 (DemoskopWeekly 1989) to 20% (3.5 million) in 2018 (Statistical Agency of the Republic ofKazakhstan 2019). This trend will accelerate in the coming years: Russiansconstituted only 13% of the youngest age cohort in 2013 (Figure 4).

While the waves of emigration from Kazakhstan to Russia have slowedrelative to their peak in the early 1990s (with 235,000 departures as late as1997), they have remained substantial and roughly constant since around2002. As seen in Figure 5, the smallest number of departures (about 20,000)was recorded in 2010, since which time emigration has continued at a slightlyelevated pace, standing at 37,000 departures in 2017.

As a consequence of these demographic trends, the hypothetical threat ofethnic Russian separatism has largely been neutralized. In the early 1990s, theKazakhstani government took several major steps to limit the prospect of

Figure 4. Ethnic breakdown of Kazakhstanis by age group, 2013.Source: Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2013. “Etnodemograficheskii yezhegodnikKazakhstana” (Ethnodemographic Yearbook of Kazakhstan). Accessed 19 March 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20180303164733/http://stat.gov.kz/getImg?id=ESTAT074326. Calculated from all ethnicities by age group(17), Kazakhs by age group (35–36), and Russians by age group (51–52).

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secessionism, moving the country’s capital from Almaty to the more northernAkmola/Astana and promoting the settlement there of ethnic Kazakhs –including repatriated “Oralmans,” more than one million of whom havereturned to the country since independence (Cummings 1998; Diener 2005;Witte 2014). In 2014, likely worried about a possible Crimea domino effect,Astana passed two new laws, one accelerating the process of citizenship-acquisition for the Oralmans (Tengri News 2014b) and one stiffening thepenalty for threatening Kazakhstani territorial integrity or calling for secession(Tengri News 2014a).

However, despite Kazakhstani and Western fears, there was no dominoeffect and the Russian minority did not mobilize in favor of any secessionistgoals (Laruelle 2016b; Diener 2015; Brletich 2015). Many Kazakhstani Russiansare now well-integrated, do not feel discriminated against, and identify asKazakhstanis. Although there are no survey data to confirm this, it seemsthat they were often more supportive than ethnic Kazakhs of Nazarbayev,whom they saw as the guarantor of the status quo. For instance, the 2016land protests were very visible in Kazakh-majority cities, but the Russian-majority cities in the north and east remained tranquil (Putz 2016). EthnicRussian associations in Kazakhstan have been purged of all their potential anti-regime figures and now display loyalty to Astana. Admittedly, in 2017 and2018 they heightened their visibility during May 9 commemorations by orga-nizing a very active Immortal Regiment (mainly composed of ethnic Russians)(Radio Azzatyq 2018) and commemorations of Soviet victory in WWII (CIS2015), but these signals were likely directed more at the nationalistic segmentof the Kazakh population than at the Kazakhstani government itself.

Insofar as the Russian minority historically provided Moscow with influenceover Kazakhstan, this influence is thus rapidly declining. However, it is unclearto what degree it actually did or does provide such influence. Ethnic Kazakhs’attitudes on foreign policy, and on Russia in particular, do not appear to differmuch from those of their ethnic Russian compatriots (Laruelle and Royce

Figure 5. Net migration from Kazakhstan to Russia by year, 1997–2016.Source: Federal State Statistics Service. 2018. “Mezhdunarodnaya migratsiya” (International Migration). Accessed19 March 2019.

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2019). An IMEP (2017) survey offered rare insight into how Kazakhstani citizens’perceptions vary by ethnicity. Only 15% of ethnic Kazakhs see Russia as thecountry toward which Kazakhstan should orient its development, while ethnicRussians are more favorable toward the Russian model, at 30%. But theplurality of both ethnicities prefer that Kazakhstan pursue its own path (51%and 41% respectively). Ethnic background thus seems to play some role inKazakhstanis’ foreign policy orientations, but whatever their ethnicity, they aremore unified than they are divided into pro- and anti-Russian groups.

The Russian government has to some degree actively facilitated the shrink-ing of Kazakhstan’s Russian minority (though presumably not for the sake ofthat result) with a resettlement program (“National Program for SupportingVoluntary Migration to the Russian Federation of Compatriots ResidingAbroad”). Open to all those in the world who would like to resettle in Russiaand can prove some links with it as a homeland, the program has supportedthe “return” of 200,000 Kazakhstani citizens, whose annual share of the totalnumber of program-participants has ranged from 20% to 40% since 2006.6

Thus, it would appear that Moscow itself either does not view RussianKazakhstanis as a significant source of influence, or more highly values theservices that they can perform within Russia’s borders.

The Kazakhstani government, for its part, has done little to diminish itsRussian population. It has not pressured the minority to emigrate, and in the1990s actually worried that mass departures would damage the military andindustrial sectors, in which Russians held numerous and critical positions.Russian remains the second official language of the country, though Kazakhholds a symbolic first place. In practice, ethnic Kazakhs have been favored ingovernment structures and public administration since independence,resulting in the structures’ rapid “Kazakhification,” but many ethnicRussians have accepted that fact as a corollary of independence and donot challenge it.

Thus, the Russian minority can be categorized as an endogenous vector thatoriginates passively or naturally from within Kazakhstan; that is autonomouslydeclining with every passing year (due to fertility and emigration); and that theRussian state, not the Kazakhstani one, is actively diminishing through itsresettlement program. Furthermore, it is unclear and doubtful whether it isaffecting the situation or interests/perceptions of the Kazakhstani governmentin a manner that generates Russia-favorable behavior.

The Russian language in Kazakhstan

Like the Russian minority issue, the question of the place of the Kazakh andRussian languages in the public space and in education has been a sensitivetopic since Kazakhstan’s independence (Fierman 2005; Moore 2014; Bahry et al.2017). The authorities hoped to transition to Kazakh far more rapidly than

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turned out to be possible and passed laws upon laws to improve Kazakh’sposition in the public space.

But, contrary to popular belief, knowledge of Russian has actually grown inKazakhstan in recent decades. In the last Soviet census of 1989, 64% ofKazakhstan’s ethnic Kazakhs either claimed Russian as their native languageor (far more often) reported command of it as a second language (DemoskopWeekly 1989). In 1999, 75% of ethnic Kazakhs reported command of Russian(Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2000). In 2009, the numbergrew to 79% reporting the ability to fluently write Russian, 84% the ability tofluently read it, and 92% the ability to understand it spoken (Statistical Agencyof the Republic of Kazakhstan 2011). And, as seen in Figure 6, the 2009 census

Figure 6. Proportion of Kazakhstan’s age groups with various levels of command of Russianand of traditionally Russophone ethnicities, 2009.Source: Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2010. “Natsional’nyy sostav, veroispovedaniei vladeniya yazykami v Respublike Kazakhstan – itogi Natsional’noy perepisi naseleniya 2009 godav Respubliki Kazakhstan” (National Composition, Religion, and Language Skills in the Republic ofKazakhstan – Results of the 2009 National Census of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan). Accessed19 March 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20180809112751/http://stat.gov.kz/getImg?id=WC16200032705.Calculated from command of Russian by age group (269), total size of age groups (4), and ethnicities by agegroup (29–32).

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reports command of Russian that is constant across the population’s agegroups – despite the rapidly declining share of Russians and otherRussophone ethnicities (Ukrainians, Germans, etc.) in those age groups.

Kazakhstan’s next census, to be conducted in 2019, could theoreticallyindicate a reversal in the expansion of Russian, but this appears unlikely,given how well the language has fared during the first twenty years ofindependence despite the country’s rapid de-Russification in ethnic terms:the share of the country’s ethnic Kazakh population speaking Russian hasincreased by more than 18 percentage points since independence.

All this should not be taken to mean that Russian is expanding or enduringat the expense of Kazakh. On the contrary, as shown in Figure 7, according tothe 2009 census, the share of Kazakhstanis who fluently write, read, andunderstand speech in Kazakh rises sharply with the younger generations.That is, it appears that both Kazakh and Russian are strengthening theirpositions. This is in accordance with official Kazakhstani policy – the govern-ment aims to make virtually its entire population fluent in both by 2020(Akorda.kz 2011, 3), though the deadline is obviously unrealistic.

In the educational system, however, Russian has progressively lost status in favorof Kazakh. As seen in Figure 8, 55% of Kazakhstani students were studying in Kazakh

Figure 7. Proportion of Kazakhstan’s age groups with various levels of command of Kazakh,2009.Source: Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2010. “Natsional’nyy sostav, veroispovedaniei vladeniya yazykami v Respublike Kazakhstan – itogi Natsional’noy perepisi naseleniya 2009 godav Respubliki Kazakhstan” (National Composition, Religion, and Language Skills in the Republic ofKazakhstan – Results of the 2009 National Census of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan). Accessed19 March 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20180809112751/http://stat.gov.kz/getImg?id=WC16200032705.Calculated from command of Russian by age group (p.269) and total size of age groups (4).

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and 41% in Russian in 2003 (Suleimenova 2010, 106). Ten years later, in 2013, 66%were studying in Kazakh and just 31% in Russian. This 10% decrease in Russianreflects the ongoing demographic change in Kazakhstan: as seen in Figure 4, 73%ofschool-age children in 2013 were Kazakh, while only 13% were Russian.

Yet the share of Russian-language students has held constant since 2013.Given ethnic Russians’ continuous decline as a share of Kazakhstan’s popula-tion, this can only have taken place because a growing number of ethnicKazakhs or minorities are now studying in Russian. Moreover, as Figure 9shows, the absolute number of pupils studying in Russian has actually beenincreasing slightly since 2014.

In sum, the Russian language can be categorized as an endogenous vectorthat passively or naturally originates within Kazakhstan, that is either acceptedor at least not actively suppressed by the Kazakhstani government, and that isrising or at least maintaining a high degree of strength. Yet we lack evidenceof it having a direct effect on the objectives/perceptions or situation of theKazakhstani government that might yield Russia-favorable behavior. The onlyresult clearly attributable to the Russian language’s strong position inKazakhstan is its facilitation of Russian media influence, insofar as Russian-origin media does promote Russia-favorable behavior.

Figure 8. Grade school students in Kazakhstan, by language of study, as proportion of total,2003–2018.Source: Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2018. “Chislennost’ uchashhikhsya obshheobrazova-tel’nykh shol po yazykam obucheniya, tysyach chelovek” (Number of General Education Students by Languageof Instruction, Thousands of People). Accessed 19 March 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20180503223048/http://stat.gov.kz/getImg?id=ESTAT094527.

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Russian-origin media in Kazakhstan

By reshaping Kazakhstani public opinion, the vector of Russian-origin mediacan potentially alter the situation of the Kazakhstani government such thatRussia-favorable behavior is incentivized. Media originating from Russia couldalso directly affect the interests/perceptions of the Kazakhstani governmentitself, or indirectly affect them insofar as public opinion “trickles up.”

Russia’s media presence in Kazakhstan can be divided into three vectors:

(1) Public diplomacy directed at foreign audiences such as Kazakhstan. Thisincluded Russia Today, but it ceased broadcasting in Kazakhstan in 2018and no longer has a bureau in the country (Sputnik 2017), as it refusedto register as an in-country legal entity, as required of foreign media bythe Kazakhstani authorities (Alma TV 2017). Sputnik, by contrast, hasbecome one of the most popular websites in Kazakhstan. As of12 March 2019, it had the sixth-most visits of all Kazakhstani newswebsites within the preceding month, and the second-most uniqueusers (Zero.kz n.d.).

(2) Russian media that is state-controlled but not actively directed at foreignaudiences. This includes an important but declining share of the pro-gramming on Kazakhstani channels, which is originally produced forRussian domestic channels.

Figure 9. Grade school students in Kazakhstan by language of study, in thousands,2003–2018.Source: Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2018. “Chislennost’ uchashhikhsya obshheobrazova-tel’nykh shol po yazykam obucheniya, tysyach chelovek” (Number of General Education Students by Languageof Instruction, Thousands of People). Accessed 19 March 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20180503223048/http://stat.gov.kz/getImg?id=ESTAT094527.

EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS 15

(3) Non-governmental cultural products that, like the second category, findaudiences abroad more or less incidentally. This is the case for a lot ofRussian cultural products, from literature to music, which aim at domes-tic audiences but also find success abroad.

Only the first vector constitutes exogenous influence upon Kazakhstan that isactively produced by Russia and intended to “influence” Kazakhstani publicopinion. The latter two vectors are also exogenous, but are aimed at Russianaudiences and emitted by Russia only passively.

The second vector is difficult to study. Of the 15 free channels available inKazakhstan, three are wholly funded by the Kazakhstani state (Khabar, bilin-gual, and Kazakhstan and Balapan, entirely Kazakhophone), one is sponsoredby CIS institutions (Mir, exclusively in Russian), and the other 11 are of mixedproduction (both Russian and Kazakhstani programming) and bilingual. Themost popular channel in Kazakhstan, Pervyi Kanal Yevraziya, owned 80% by theKazakhstani government and 20% by the Russian government, has long led inrebroadcasting Russian programming.7 But the share of Russian-origin contentis declining: in 2014, Russian-origin broadcasts comprised only 24% of itsprogramming (Kiselev 2014). NTK and 31 Kanal are also within the top fewmost popular channels. NTK, controlled by a Kazakhstani company (Business.gov.kz n.d.; Businessnavigator.kz n.d.), rebroadcasts the Russian NTN channel,but less so recently. 31 Kanal, 80% controlled by Vernyi Kapital (owned by BulatUtemuratov, a close advisor to former President Nazarbayev) and 20% byRussian companies, has been used to rebroadcast programs from the Russianchannel STS. Both NTK and 31 Kanal rebroadcast on average 20 to 30% of theircontent from Russia, mostly movies, miniseries, and entertainment shows.Russia’s presence is also significant on satellite and cable channels: of the230 subscription channels available in the country, 103 are of Russianorigin.8 About half the population has access to them (J’son & Partners2014), plus the 15–30% of households that possess an illegal parabolic antenna(Galat n.d.).

As an example of the results of this situation, in the last week ofOctober 2017, the ten most popular programs broadcast on the seven mostpopular mixed-production channels were all in Russian. Of these, three werefrom Russia, five from Kazakhstan, and two were Western films.9

In terms of actual news, KTK (controlled by figures close to Nazarbayev) isthe most significant channel, with more than 50% of survey respondentssaying in October 2017 that they watch it to get their news (Kantar TNS n.d.) – a success explicable by the provocative tone of the broadcast, which iscentered on sensational news and mild criticism of local authorities. Behind itcome 31 Kanal, Pervyi Kanal Yevraziya, and Kazakhstan, each watched by aboutone-third of the population, while the official channel Khabar, with newsproduced entirely in Kazakhstan, collects only one-quarter of viewers. The

16 M. LARUELLE ET AL.

2017 IMEP report on media shows that Russian-owned channels (Rossiya 24,Pervyi Kanal and NTV) are watched by only 12–15% of ethnic Kazakh viewers,but more than a quarter of the Russian minority.

Yet watching does not automatically mean trusting. Higher trust in nationalmedia during a major geopolitical crisis is accompanied by lower trust regard-ing everyday economic or political news that can be cross-checked againstpersonal experience. In 2015, the US Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG2015) and Gallup found that the majority of Kazakhstanis consider Russianmedia to be highly reliable, and significantly more so than Western media(74% against 26%). Yet when asked by IMEP in 2017, without any reference tothe Ukrainian crisis, the trust level collapsed. Among those able/willing toreport their trust in channels, KTK won the leading position (22%), followedby 31 Kanal (12%), Kazakhstan (11%), and Khabar (9%), while the most viewedchannel, Pervyi Kanal Yevraziya, took fifth position, with a less-than-glorious8%. The main Russian channel, Pervyi Kanal, is said to be trusted by only 4% ofrespondents. While these numbers are all low, the trust issue is substantiallyaffected by ethnicity: ethnic Russians tend to trust channels from Russia morethan ethnic Kazakhs do (10% of ethnic Russians trust Pervyi Kanal, versus 2% ofethnic Kazakhs – a similar imbalance is visible for Pervyi Kanal Yevraziya, NTV,and Rossiya 24) but trust the official news channel, Khabar, and the stateKazakh-language channel, Kazakhstan, less (3% for ethnic Russians, comparedto 15% for ethnic Kazakhs). Another survey, conducted among Almaty resi-dents in 2015, confirms that KTK and Pervyi Kanal Yevraziya are the mostpopular among ethnic Russians and that they trust these channels twice asmuch as ethnic Kazakhs do (SME Center for Information and Analysis of theOffice of Internal Policy of Almaty 2015).

Russia’s large presence on the Kazakhstani televisual landscape is replicatedin other media. The Kazakhstani Internet space is intimately linked to Runet,the Russian-speaking internet world (Uffelmann 2011). The most popularservices in Kazakhstan, such as Yandex, vKontakte, Odnoklassniki, and Mail.ru,are all Russian (Alexa.com n.d.). In 2018, among the most searched topics onGoogle in Kazakhstan were two Russian series (Mazhor and Politseiiskiis Rublyovki) and the Russian Bachelor, a remake of the U.S. reality show(Google Trends 2019). The same goes for the Kazakhstani radio space, wherethe two most popular stations, Radio Retro and Russian Radio, are Russian.Russian print media are also prominent: Komsomol’skaya Pravda (45,000 print),and Argumenty i fakty (38,000 print) are widespread throughout the country.

Russia’s major presence on the Kazakhstani media landscape can beexplained by several factors: first, the high quality of Russian state-sponsoredmedia, especially cinema, miniseries, entertainment shows, etc.; second, therelatively low quality of Kazakhstani state-sponsored media, even if this isslowly changing (see below); and third, the vitality of non-state-sponsored

EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS 17

Russian culture, from literature and pop stars to bloggers, which attractsreaders and viewers from abroad.

Unlike the Russian ethnic minority and the Russian language, though, themedia vector is something that the Kazakhstani government is increasinglyseeking to constrict. Both the authorities and some segments of public opinionhave expressed concerns regarding the country’s “information sovereignty” ata time of resurgent Russian influence (Baitelova 2014). A 2012 law on televisionand radio obliged programming to be at least 40% nationally-produced by2016, rising to 50% by 2018 (Zakon.kz 2012). The same law required that halfof all programming be in the Kazakh language. The authorities have increasedthe budget for all media: it jumped from28 billion tenge in 2013 to53 billion in2016, with a large part of that amount (30–40%) devoted to television(Pravovoi media-tsentr n.d.). Astana has also developed has an explicit policyagainst rebroadcasting Russian political talk shows. All the main channels(Pervyi Kanal Yevraziya, KTK, Khabar, Kazakhstan, Astana) now produce theirown weekly prime time analytical/political news shows. Their popularity isrising: the program Analitika of Pervyi Kanal Yevraziya is among the top 10broadcasts (Kantar TNS 2019). Notwithstanding some nuances (Khabar is moreofficial, KTK more critical), they hew to the official line and do not criticize thecentral government. While Kazakh-language production was once mainly con-fined to fiction and entertainment, since 2017 Astana has supported thegrowth of political and social talk shows in Kazakh: the first one appeared onthe Kazakhophone state channel Kazakhstan in 2017 and has been invitingmore nationalist-minded figures. In 2018, Pervyi Kanal Yevraziya launched itsown program, Basty bagdarlama, as the Kazakh-speaking analog to Analitika.

In sum, Russian media can be defined as a major force in Kazakhstan. Bycommunicating Russian viewpoints and developing Kazakhstanis’ identifica-tion with Russia, it alters the situation of the Kazakhstani government such thatit may be driven or constrained to act in a more Russia-favorable manner, andpotentially alters the interests/perspectives of the government itself. Thoughthe media require a receptive audience to have any effect – and we do nothave at our disposal studies confirming that effect – they are ultimately anexogenous source of Russian influence, one that is generated both passivelyby Russian society and actively by the Russian government. However, thetrajectory of this vector is harder to determine, and it is notable as the onlyone considered in this study that the Kazakhstani government is clearlyattempting to limit.

Governmental and nongovernmental networks

Kazakhstani governmental and nongovernmental institutions share numerousties with their Russian counterparts. These ties allow Russian and Kazakhstani

18 M. LARUELLE ET AL.

actors to exchange views and interests and, conceivably, to develop mutualidentification at the state-to-state level discussed by Wendt (1999, 338).

At the elite level, many figures within the two presidential administrations andSecurity Councils act as conduits of Moscow’s interests in Kazakhstan, and viceversa. The two countries employ myriad PR firms to bolster these conduits. At aninstitutional level, Kazakhstan’sMajilis has direct institutional ties with the RussianState Duma, and its Senate with the Federation Council; direct, faction-to-factionmeetings occur regularly at multiple levels. Eurasian institutions such as theAstana-based Eurasian Development Bank, the Eurasian Economic Commission,the Fund for the Development of Eurasian Cooperation, and the EurasianWomen’s Forum also help unite Kazakhstani and Russian policy-making circles.This socialization, along with the frequently parallel interests of Moscow andAstana, contributes to legislative mimesis, such as when Astana passeda foreign agent law and restrictions on NGO activities and unsanctioned protestsjust after Russia did (Walters Forthcoming; Lillis 2013).

Indeed, Russian-Kazakhstani governmental cooperation provides Kazakhstanwith numerous benefits, including normative ones. Russia’s emphasis on stability,state authority, and non-interference suits the Kazakhstani government betterthan political designs advanced by any other external actors, especially Westernones that prioritize democratic and liberal standards. For instance, the CIS ElectionMonitoring Organization (CIS-EMO) counterbalances the OSCE’s (and otherWestern institutions’) narrative on the lack of good governance and transparentelections in Kazakhstan (Shekhovstov 2015). This and other fruits of Russo-Kazakhstani cooperation may potentially further develop Kazakhstani elites’ posi-tive attitude toward Russia.

These contacts at the political elite level are reinforced in society morebroadly. Because the Kazakh and Russian worlds have been interacting forcenturies and belonged to the same state entity for over 150 years, people-to-people relations are quite dense. For Kazakhstan, the “human factor” linking itto Russia is crucial. This is slightly less true for Russia, given Russian society’stighter interpenetration with Ukrainian and Belarusian societies than withKazakhstani society.

Major segments of Kazakhstan’s society remain closely integrated withRussia’s through a vivid ecosystem government-organized non-governmentalorganizations (GONGOs), advancing an agenda of Eurasian regional integra-tion. The main Kazakhstani cities have sister-cities partnerships with theirRussian counterparts that facilitate exchange at the official and people-to-people levels. The Orthodox Church of Kazakhstan, under the jurisdiction ofthe Moscow Patriarchate, has always been very loyal to the Kazakhstaniauthorities and supported Astana’s tightening of religious legislation in thename of the fight against extremism (Peyrouse 2008). It constitutes anotherconduit of communication between Russian and Kazakhstani elites, but couldalso potentially be used to support Moscow’s position more directly.

EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS 19

The past shared by Kazakhstan and Russia, and the position of the Russianlanguage in the former, also cultivates intellectual and academic ties, ina manner that resembles the postcolonial relationships between France andFrancophone Africa, or the UK and India. For the year 2018, for instance, of the89,000 Kazakhstani students studying abroad, 69,000 were studying in Russia(UNESCO 2019), reflecting the attraction of Russian universities, which offerprivileged fellowships to students from Kazakhstan (365Info.kz. 2018). SeveralRussian universities, including Moscow State University and leading Siberianprovincial universities, have opened satellite campuses in Kazakhstan.10

Associated with this higher education network are several associationspromoting the Russian language and bringing together Russian-languageinstructors. The Russian state agency Rossotrudnichestvo serves as anumbrella for cultural activities related to the promotion of Russian languageand culture. It organizes or funds contests, festivals, and Olympiads, offerscertification in Russian language, and provides all kinds of grants andfellowships. The Russian Center for Science and Culture, which opened inAstana in 2004, is Russia’s main cultural body in the capital city, offering,among other things, Russian classes for teachers. The Russian World Fund isin charge of a network of Russia centers at several universities, including thestate Al-Farabi University in Almaty. Its associated website, Russkiy Mir, iswidespread in Kazakhstan, which provides its second largest readership,after Russia (Gusarova 2017).

In sum, Russo-Kazakhstani networks, both governmental and nongovern-mental, institutional and personal, are a stable phenomenon, one that isa “natural” product of Russian and Kazakhstani societies in some cases andthat is actively supported by the Russian government – and, to a lesser extent,by the Kazakhstani one – in others. However, the real level of these networks’significance, and the degree to which they are actually able to alter thesituation or interests/perspectives of Astana in a manner facilitating Russia-favorable behavior, is unclear.

Payoff: Kazakhstan’s popular Russophilia

As discussed, the three abovementioned vectors – Russian media, Russo-Kazakhstani networks, and potentially the Russian language itself – promoteidentification with Russia and understanding or adoption of its perspectivesamong the Kazakhstani population and elites. Other factors endogenous toKazakhstan may also contribute to this, and the resulting Russophilia withinthe Kazakhstani population at large is easily identified. It affects theKazakhstani government’s situation, potentially shaping and constraining itsactions, and even influencing its perspectives and interests insofar as popularattitudes trickle upwards.

20 M. LARUELLE ET AL.

While there are a limited number of surveys on Kazakhstanis’ views onforeign policy, the ones we have at our disposal suggest that public opinionis highly and consistently favorable toward Russia. As we discussed in anearlier article comparing favorability toward the US and Russia in Kazakhstan(Laruelle and Royce 2019), the Russian leadership enjoys high approval, ran-ging from a low of 55% in 2012 to a high of 87% in 2007, for an averagearound 70%, as seen in Figure 10. Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis(which was itself supported by most Kazakhstanis (Taizhanov 2014)) has nothad a noticeable effect on Kazakhstanis’ approval of its leadership, which iscurrently virtually equal to what it was in 2013.

Similarly, Eurasia Monitor’s surveys (2012–2017) on attitudes toward Russiafind that an overwhelming majority of Kazakhstanis consider Russia a friendlycountry that can be counted on for help, though somewhat fewer think that itscultural and economic presence should be further strengthened.

As mentioned above, much of this Russophilia is endogenous to Kazakhstan.The success of Russian media and cultural products is not imposed by Moscowby force and would not be possible absent an extant receptiveness on the partof Kazakhstanis. Kazakhstan’s own cultural products, including Kazakh-language serials and talk shows, tend to present Russia as a close ally, worldpower, and historical partner (Ileuova, Zharmykhambetov, and Sapargaliev2015), even if we also note, in parallel, the rise of a more nationalist discourse

Figure 10. Kazakhstani approval of the Russian leadership, 2006–2017.Source: Gallup Worldwide Research Data

EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS 21

criticizing Russia’s colonial past and today’s imperial attitude, and insisting onthe idea of a genocide of Kazakhs by the Soviet authorities in the 1930s(Laruelle 2016a). The rise of the Kazakh language and cultural production inKazakh thus may or may not translate into a more critical positioning towardRussia.

That said, the Kazakhstani government has taken steps in certain areas tolimit Russophile sentiment and, presumably, preserve its freedom of man-euver. For instance, since accession to the EAEU, the Kazakhstani presiden-tial administration has discreetly supported the rise of young Kazakhethnonationalist figures who criticize Russia’s domination in general andthe EAEU in particular, giving them a platform even within official struc-tures. Criticized by some for ratification of the EAEU, Nazarbayev himself setlimits on Kazakhstani integration by insisting that the EAEU is an economicproject, not a political one (Ordabayev 2014; Newsru.com 2014). Moregenerally, in the media sector in particular, the presidential administrationhas promoted influential young Kazakhs with more nationalist views todecision-making positions, charged with dynamizing media production,especially in the Kazakh language, and reaching out to the younger gen-eration, mainly its more nationalistically-minded segments (see more inLaruelle 2019).

However, in these and other cases, it is difficult to discern when Astana isactually attempting to curtail its population’s pro-Russian sentiments andwhen it is merely seeking to maintain legitimacy among the substantialminority that is more nationalistic. For instance, the transition of the Kazakhlanguage to a Latin alphabet, announced in 2017 and planned for 2025(Akorda.kz 2017, 2018) seems more an example of the latter. Preparing forhis own succession long before it happened on 19 March 2019, Nazarbayevaimed at satisfying the nationalists’ long-standing but largely symbolicdemand, offering the opportunity for the government to shore up its supportamong them – without doing anything to practically diminish the presence orinfluence of the Russian state, culture, or language in Kazakhstan, or alterpopular perceptions of Russia.

Conclusions

Based on our study, several patterns in Astana’s response to the various vectorsemerge.

When a vector is costless, or restraining it or eliminating it would havea higher cost than benefit, the vector is permitted or even reinforced. To givea few examples, the Russian minority was not perceived as a major threat (theprospect of secession in the 1990s was countered by other means, and ethnicRussians are now not especially inclined toward opposition to the govern-ment), whereas attempting to remove it might have had severe consequences

22 M. LARUELLE ET AL.

for relations with Russia and would certainly have meant the loss of a hugenumber of productive citizens. The Russian language is not seen as a zero-sumcompetitor with Kazakh, whereas attempting to suppress or remove it would,again, entail huge complications in the relationship with Russia and diminishKazakhstan’s human capital. Economic ties bring some gains to Kazakhstan butalso limit the diversification of its trade partners and potentially of its econ-omy; integration to strengthen them is therefore desirable so long as it doesnot spill over into political integration. Military dependence obviously entailscosts, hampering Kazakhstan’s multi-vectoral policy, but these are seen asworth paying to avoid the possible consequences of a more isolationist policy,and as less onerous than those that would be imposed by an alternative, moredemanding or unpredictable, patron.

When, on the other hand, a vector entails higher costs than benefits, Astanaattempts to diminish it. Russian media – at least that which contains politicalcontent, and especially that which is under Russian governmental control –provide essentially no benefits to Astana, since any desirable messaging can bereplicated in Kazakhstani state media. On the other hand, it does threaten to atleast potentially impose costs on the Kazakhstani government by limiting its abilityto direct public opinion and, ultimately, restricting Astana’s freedom ofmaneuver.Consequently, the Kazakhstani government has begun working to substituteRussian-origin media with safer domestic replacements.

In sum, many factors that do or might yield Russia-favorable behavior byKazakhstan are not the consequence of active Russian governmental efforts.Many, on the contrary, are the product of the international system (military-strategic ties) or of factors endogenous to Kazakhstan (the Russian languageand minority), or are passively emitted by Russian society for domestic con-sumption (much Russian-origin media). Others (networks, economic ties) arethe product of the two countries’ proximity, in geographical and historicalsenses. Even those that are actively generated by the Russian government(economic and military ties) are often actively supported by Astana, as well,due to its aligned interests and its perception of little cost or threat. Only whenthe costs clearly outweigh the benefits does Astana move to block the avenueof influence. In the one clear instance of this that we have available, this wasthe case because the vector – Russian-origin media – promised virtually nobenefits at all.

In most other instances, the interests of the Kazakhstani and Russian gov-ernments are closely enough aligned that a factor’s promotion of Russia-favorable behavior is seen by Astana as bringing more benefits than costs:even if the EAEU renders the Kazakhstani economy more dependent on Russia,Astana was already interested in intensifying economic ties; even if militarycooperation renders Kazakhstan more dependent upon Russia for its security,it was already interested in acquiring greater Russian support for its militaryand security.

EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS 23

The results of our study invite us to rethink what is conventionally describedas “Russia’s influence.” First, we should move beyond this notion to considerthe multiple vectors – passive and active, endogenous and exogenous, pro-moted or fought against by Astana – that potentially yield Russia-favorablebehavior by Kazakhstan, to enable a more fine-grained approach to thebilateral relationship. Second, Kazakhstan is far from a passive object ofRussia’s actions and should be considered a fully-fledged actor in the relation-ship in its own right, even if the relationship would in theory seem to beweighted toward Russia. Some of the vectors leading to interests/perceptionsand situations that incentivize Russia-favorable behavior (e.g., military coop-eration) are themselves desired by Kazakhstan, and sometimes the behaviorsthemselves are (e.g., economic integration).

This means that Russia is not “dominating” Kazakhstan; trends withinKazakhstan itself, and decisions made by it, will be some of the key determi-nants of the future Russo-Kazakhstani relationship. The Russian ethnic minoritywill surely continue to decline, but most of the other vectors that we haveidentified are stable or potentially rising. Yet a decline in the benefits that theybring to Kazakhstan, or an increase in the costs that they impose upon it, coulddrive the government to turn against them in the future. Ultimately, thequestion is likely one of the continued convergence between Kazakhstaniand Russian interests, the basis upon which most of the vectors rest –a question made increasingly germane by Kazakhstan’s power transition andby rising polarization among younger ethnic Kazakhs regarding their accep-tance or rejection of Russia’s cultural products.

Notes

1. For example, the following have all been at least partly credited to Russian propa-ganda or to Russian influence running through “captured” politicians and business-men: the opposition of some NATO members to Georgian and Ukrainian membershipin 2008 (Lough et al. 2014, 7), Serbia’s, Bulgaria’s, and Hungary’s energy relationshipswith Russia (Conley et al. 2016, 7–9, 15, 19–20), EU members’ opposition to a militaryresponse to the Ukraine crisis (Lough et al. 2014, 8), the reluctance of some EUmembers to maintain anti-Russian sanctions (Conley et al. 2016, 8), Bulgarian reluc-tance to close its airspace to the Russian military in 2015 (Conley et al. 2016, 8),Hungary’s policy on migrants (Rosenberger and Morley 2019, 2–3; Conley 2015, 30),the Dutch vote against Ukraine’s association with the EU (Gude 2017), the British votefor Brexit (Gude 2017; Špalková 2018, 6–7), the Catalan independence movement(Špalková 2018, 8–9). On Central Asia more specifically, see Grigas (2016).

2. The ability to make another actor do something that it would not otherwise do is thedefinition of power, according to Dahl (Dahl 1957). It is the first of Lukes’s “three facesof power” (Lukes 1974).

3. This “third face” of power, the ability to make another actor want to do something,was originally developed by Lukes (1974).

24 M. LARUELLE ET AL.

4. The Kumkol, Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kurmangazy fields, and the Caspian PipelineConsortium (CPC) that connects the Tengiz field to Novorossiysk.

5. The term “Russian” (russkii) is complex, as it can describe not only those who claimRussian ethnicity but also many Russian-speaking populations, such as Ukrainians,Belorussians, and other Russified populations of Polish, Baltic, German, Greek, etc.,descent. In this paper, we use the plural, “Russian minorities,” to encompass thegroups in all their diversity.

6. For data since 2011, see Russian Federal Migration Service, “Monitoring gosudarstvennoyprogrammy,” web.archive.org/web/20190206193511/https://мвд.рф/mvd/structure1/Glavnie_upravlenija/guvm/compatriots/monitoring (accessed 2 January 2019).

7. See Kantar TNS, http://www.tns-global.kz, but only for cities of more than 100,000inhabitants.

8. According to Serik Bessyembayev’s own calculation. For 2016, the Ministry ofInformation and Communication Ministry of the Republic of Kazakhstan recorded270 foreign channels, 185 of them Russian. See http://www.adilet.gov.kz/en/node/177605.

9. This analysis is based on a survey of the seven main television channels in the periodbetween October 23 and 29 October 2017.

10. Almaty branch of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences;Almaty branch of the Academy of Labor and Social Relations; Kostanay branch ofChelyabinsk State University; Ust-Kamenogorsk branch of Moscow State University ofEconomics, Statistics, and Informatics; Baikonur branch of Moscow Aviation Institute;Pavlodar branch of Tyumen State Oil and Gas University (closed in 2012); PrivateKazakhstani-Russian Medical University (Almaty); Private Kazakh-Russian InternationalUniversity (Aktobe); Private Kazakhstani-Russian University (Astana, closed in 2014).We thank Marat Raikhmatov for providing us with this information.

Disclosure statement

This article is part of a three-year project with Eric McGlinchey, Russian, Chinese, Militant, andIdeologically Extremist Messaging Effects on United States Favorability Perceptions in CentralAsia, funded by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Army Research Office/ArmyResearch Laboratory under the Minerva Research Initiative, award W911-NF-17-1-0028. Theviews expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the U.S.Department of Defense or the U.S. Army Research Office/Army Research Laboratory.

Funding

This work was supported by the US Department of Defense and the US Army ResearchOffice/Army Research Laboratory under the Minerva Research Initiative, award W911-NF-17-1-0028.

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