untangling the constitutional labyrinth
TRANSCRIPT
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Bond Law Review
| Issue 1Volume 22 Article 3
6-1-2010
Untangling the Constitutional LabyrinthRabindra Kr Pathak
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Recommended CitationPathak, Rabindra Kr (2010) "Untangling the Constitutional Labyrinth," Bond Law Review: Vol. 22: Iss. 1, Article 3.Available at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1/3
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Untangling the Constitutional Labyrinth
Abstract
The tradition of analytical jurisprudence, from John Austin and Hans Kelsen onwards, highlights, in all its
complexity, the basic notion that constitutions constitute a higher law governing all forms of authoritativelegal enunciations and performances. In a sense, a constitution is an attempt by the society to limit itself toprotect the values it most cherishes. In fact, it is an attempt by the society to tie its own hand, to limit itsability to fall prey to weaknesses that might harm or undermine cherished values. In India, we the people,adopted and gave to ourselves a constitution which recognises certain basic fundamental rights of theindividuals under Part III. The underlying idea in entrenching certain basic and Fundamental Rights is to takethem out of the reach of transient political majorities.
Keywords
Constitutional fundamental rights
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idea inentrenchingcertainbasicandFundamentalRights is to take themoutof the
reachoftransientpoliticalmajorities.Ithas,therefore,cametoberegardedasessential
thattheserightsbeentrenchedinsuchawaythattheymaynotbeviolated,tampered
or interfered with by an oppressive government. These rights put fetters upon thegovernmentalactions6thatare likely to infringeupon the fundamentalrightswhich
findapristineplaceinourconstitution.TheconstitutionalschemeusesArticle13as
thebulwarkagainstany infringementupon thefundamentalrights. Itgives teeth to
the fundamental rights by making them justiciable.7It arms the judiciary with the
powerof judicialreview8andmakesittheguardian,protectorandtheinterpreterof
thefundamentalrights.It,inessence,conferspoweraswellascastsanobligationon
thecourts todeclarea lawvoid if it is found tobe inconsistentwitha fundamental
right.9FramersoftheConstitutionofIndiatookgreatcareandcautioninweavingthe
delicatefabricofArticle13.And,itbecomesapparentwhenthelabyrinthineframing
ofthearticlerevealsthatthewordlaw(s)hasbeenusedtentimes,eachtimehavinga
newcolourdependingupon thecontext inwhich ithasbeenused.Themeaningof
law within the bounds of four clauses changes its colour with beauteous brevity.10
Amid the myriad constitutional provisions, it shows signs of a chameleon, a
constitutional chameleon! This paper, therefore, intends to bring to the fore the
6 ThegovernmentalactionimpliesthattheStateasbroadlydefinedunderArticle12cannot
takeanyactionthatthreatenstheexerciseoffundamentalrights.ThewordStateincludes
theGovernmentandParliamentofIndiaandtheGovernmentandtheLegislatureofeachof
theStatesandalllocalorotherauthoritieswithintheterritoryofIndiaorunderthecontrol
oftheGovernmentofIndia.7 See,MPJain,IndianConstitutionalLaw,827(2005).
8 ThispowerisexercisedbytheSupremeCourtunderArticle32andbytheHighCourts
underArticle226.9 Thefundamentalrightscannotbeinfringedeitherbyenactingalaworthrough
administrativeaction.10
BeginningwithClause(1),thewordlawreferstotheexistingorpreconstitutionallaws
whileClause(2)isconcernedwithpostconstitutionallawsmadebytheState(asdefined
underArticle12).ThelengthierClause(3)provideswhatwillbeincludedwithinthe
meaningoflawashasbeenusedintheprevioustwoclauses.Itmandatesthatthelaws
musthavetheforceoflaw,anexpressionthatrequireslookingbeyondtheboundsofArticle
13,andtherefore,thewordlawhasadifferentconnotationasusedintheaboveexpression.
Theimportoftheexpressionmayhavetobedeterminedjurisprudentiallylookingatthe
variousmeaningsoflawthathavebeengivenbythelegalscholarsandjurists.Thisaspect
oflawhasbeendiscussionindetailinthispaper.Besides,italsoprovidesthemeaningof
whatwouldamounttolawsinforce.Clause(4)providesthatthetermlawinArticle13
excludesanamendmenttotheconstitutionmadeunderArticle368.(See,ShankriPrasadv
UnionofIndia,AIR1951SC458;GolaknathvStateofPunjab,AIR1967SC1643;Kesavananda
BharativStateofKerala,AIR1973SC1461).
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niceties and the nuances that inform the meaning of law under Article 13 of the
constitution.Andwhiledoingso,italsoaimstolookattheconsequent implications
that bear profound importance in understanding the import of constitutional
provisionsandtheirlimitations.11
II Meaningoflaw:ashortjurisprudentialdetour
Thesphereoflawissowidethatitpervadeseverywalkoflife.Itchangesitscolour
andcontourdependinguponthecontext.Whatconstituteslawhasinvigoratedmany
adebate.Legaland juristicmeaningsof lawhavedifferent connotationsdeveloped
overaperiodoftime.Sopersaysthatacitizensmainconcernistoknowtheprobable
consequencesofpastorcontemplatedaction.Forthatitisenoughtoknowthatlawis,
roughly, a set of directives issued or accepted by officialswho enforce the directiveswith
organizedsanctions.12However,whenwedelvedeepintovariouslegaltheories,weget
to see the lack of perspicuity that pervades the jurisprudential discourse. What
constituteamongthebehaviouralcodesbywhichgroupsorindividualsinsocietylive
hasbeendefinedby legalphilosophers in threedifferentways.Austindefined itas
thecommandofthesovereign.Hebelievedthatthematterofjurisprudenceispositive
law; law, simply and strictly so called,or law setby political superiors topolitical
inferiors. A careful reading of his theory reveals that he has not denied a role for
naturallaw,buthassidetrackedit.InsomesenseAustinislegalpluralist:hispositive
theoryoflawisatheoryoflawofonlyonesortoflaw:thecommandsofthepoliticalsuperiors
tothepoliticalinferiorsinanindependentpoliticalsociety.13Hewasawareoftheexistence
of customs and moral prescriptions that played a vital and dominant role in
regulatingpeoplesconductandbehaviour.Naturallawtheorydealtwithquestionof
lawinwaythatwasdifferentfromthewaypositivistsdefinedlaw.Thosewhobelieve
in this theory say that law is theapplicationwithina stateorother communityof
rulesthatarederivedfromuniversalprinciplesofmoralityrootedinturninrevealed
religionorreasonorakindofethicalcommunalsensibility.14ToAquinas,lawisan
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the
community.15BoththeseapproachestodefininglawfindculminationinHLAHarts
11 ReadingofArticle13,especiallythewaythewordlawhasbeenusedintheArticle,
remindedmeofwhatHohfeldsaidaboutthewordright.Itinspiredmetolookatthe
intricaciesthatunderliethebroadcontoursofArticle13.Ashasbeendiscussed,the
meaningoflawseemstobechangingitscolourandcontoureverytimeitappearsinanew
clausewithinthearticle.Ihavetriedtolookatvariousaspectsthatarerelevanttothe
understandingofmeaningoflawunderArticle13oftheConstitution.12
PhilipSoper,ATheoryofLaw,4(1984).13
See,NormanFCantor,ImaginingtheLaw,1(2000).14
See,Supranote11.15
Soperopcitat55.
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conceptoflaw.Hiselucidationoflawisacritiqueofthecommandtheoryasadvanced
by Bentham and Austin. His analysis is in fact a revised positivism which builds
upon the failure of classical positivism. However, it stands in its own right as a
distinctaccountofthejurisprudentialcharacterofpositivelaw.Throughhistheoryhetried to have a better understanding of the resemblances and differences between
law,coercion,andmorality,astypesofsocialphenomenon.HartobservesthatThemost general feature of law at all times and places is that its existence means that
certain kinds of human conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense
obligatory.16His theory of law comprises primary and secondary rules.17Primary
rules are duty imposing rules and the secondary rules are power conferring rules
which take careof threedrawbacks thatarenoticeable inaprelegal societywhich
possesses only primary rules. Thus he identifies the modern legal system as a
unionofwhathetermsasprimaryandsecondaryrules.Theideaofarulereplacesthe
conceptoftheordersofthesovereignasthecentralfocusoflegalpositivism.18He
describedlawastheunionofprimaryandsecondaryrules.Cotterrellobserves:19
Harts legal theory portrays lawasaselfregulating systemof rules. The rule of
recognitionandothersecondaryrulesareseenasgoverningtheentireprocess
of production, interpretation, enforcement, amendment and repeals of rules
within the legal system.Harts image of law is that of a system inwhich rules
govern powerholders; inwhich rules, rather that people, govern. What is, indeed,
impliedhere isanaspectofthedeeplyresonantpoliticalsymbolsoobviously
missing from Austins jurisprudence the symbol of the rule of law, a
governmentoflawsandnotofmen.(Emphasisadded).
16 See,HilaireMcCoubry&NigelDWhite,TextbookonJurisprudence,33(2002).
17 Tohimtheideaofobligationisatthecoreofrule.Arulehasaninternalaspect,i.epeople
useitasastandardbywhichtojudgeandcondemndeviations.Therulesofobligationare
distinguishablefromotherrulesinthattheyaresupportedbygreatsocialpressurebecause
theyarefelttobenecessarytomaintainsociety.See,RWMDias,Jurisprudence,351
356(1994).18
HLAHart,TheConceptofLaw,6(1961).Thekeywordsare,ofcourse,insomesenseand
Hartdeniesthattheclassicalpositivistmodeloflaw,asanimplicitlycoerciveexpressionof
politicalpower,sufficientlyaccountsforthecharacteroflawasanobligationimposing
socialphenomenon.Hartalsoarguesthatanequationofobligatorycharacteristicofpositive
lawwithmoralobligationisequallyinadequateandthusrejectsnaturalistictheoryonthe
groundthatitinsufficientlydistinguishestheparticularcharacteroflegalobligation.19
Cotterrell,ThePoliticsofJurisprudence:ACriticalIntroductiontoLegalPhilosophy,99(1989).
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RMDworkinattackedpositivismusing HLAHartsversionasatarget.Hisnotion
of law differs from the one held by Hart as being a combination of primary and
secondaryrules.Hewrites:20
when lawyers reason or dispute about legal rights and obligations,
particularly in thosehardcaseswhenourproblemswith theseconceptsseem
most acute, they make use of standards that do not function as rules but
operate differently as principles, policies, and other sorts of standards.
Positivismisamodelofandforasystemofrules,anditscentralnotionofa
single fundamental test for law forcesus tomiss the important rolesof these
standardsthatarenotrules.
DavidPannicksaysaccordingtoDworkinLawisneithermerelytherightsandduties
createdbylegislation,customandprecedent;norislawmerelytheedictsofnatural
lawormorality.Rather, law is thebodyofrightsgivenexpression to in legislation,
custom and precedent, plus the political and moral rights that are implied by the
political theory that best explains and justifies the existing legislation, custom and
precedent.21
Article13:anoverviewandsomeobservations
Article 13 provides the meaning of law. However, this meaning does not extend
beyondPartIIIoftheConstitution.Itindetaillaysdownthescopeoflawandwhile
doingsomakesitclearthatunderwhatcircumstancesthepreconstitutionalaswellas
postconstitutionallawsshallbevalidorvoid.22Toputitsimply,theguidinglightisif
thelawsareinconsistentwithorinderogationofthefundamentalrights.
20 RMDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,22(1977).
21 DavidPannick,ANoteonDworkinandPrecedent,43MLR3644(1980).
22 Article13.Lawsinconsistentwithorinderogationofthefundamentalrights.
(1)AlllawsinforceintheterritoryofIndiaimmediatelybeforethecommencementofthis
Constitution,insofarastheyareinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisPart,shall,tothe
extentofsuchinconsistency,bevoid.
(2)TheStateshallnotmakeanylawwhichtakesawayorabridgestherightsconferredby
thisPartandanylawmadeincontraventionofthisclauseshall,totheextentofthe
contravention,bevoid.
(3)Inthisarticle,unlessthecontextotherwiserequires,
(a) lawincludesanyOrdinance,order,byelaw,rule,regulation,notification,custom
orusagehavingintheterritoryofIndiatheforceoflaw;
(b)lawsinforceincludeslawspassedormadebyaLegislatureorothercompetent
authorityintheterritoryofIndiabeforethecommencementofthisConstitutionand
notpreviouslyrepealed,notwithstandingthatanysuchlaworanypartthereofmay
notbetheninoperationeitheratallorinparticularareas.
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ThisclearlyputsadefinitelimitationonthewidelegislativepowersgivenbyArticle
246.ItiscertainlywithinthecompetencyoftheCourtto judgeanddeclarewhether
therehasbeenanycontraventionofthislimitation.
ThelegislativepoweroftheparliamentandtheStatelegislaturehasbeensubjectedto
twolimitations:
1. Thelawmustbewithinthelegislativecompetence;2. ThelawmustbesubjecttotheprovisionsoftheConstitutionandmustnot
takeawayorabridgetherightsconferredunderPartIII.
Boththeselimitationsbeingjustifiable,thecourtscandecideifeitherofthelimitations
hasbeen transgressedby the legislatureof theParliament.Thepowerderived from
Articles
245
and
246
to
make
law
has
to
be
exercised
keeping
in
view
the
limitations
delineated under Article 13 of the Constitution. This power is subject to the above
limitations.Infact,thisarticleequipsthecourtswiththepowerof judicialreviewby
making thePart III rights justiciable.23That iscourtshavebeenentrustedunder the
Indian constitution with the power to decide the question of justiciability24 as is
perspicuous from the provisions contained under Article 13. In order to keep the
executive/legislature within the limits assigned to their authority under the
constitution the interpretation of laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
judiciary.Constitutionisthewillofthepeople,whereasthestatutorylawsarethe
creationoflegislatorswhoaretheelectedrepresentativesofthepeople declaredintheconstitution thewillofthepeoplemustprevail.25Andthereforeifitisfoundthat
anorderpassedisviolativeoffundamentalrights,wasarbitraryanddiscriminatory,
(4)NothinginthisarticleshallapplytoanyamendmentofthisConstitutionmadeunder
article368.23
ExplainingtheimportofthetermjusticiableinthecontextofAmericanConstitution,
ChristopherNMayandAllanIdesobserve:Statedverybroadly,amatterisdeemed
justiciable,ieoneoverwhichanArticleIIIcourtmayexerciseauthorityifitpossessesa
sufficientnumberofthosecharacteristicshistoricallyassociatedwiththejudicialfunctionof
disputeresolutionChristopherNMayandAllanIdes,ConstitutionalLaw Powerand
Federalism,93(2004).24
AetnaLifeInsCovHaworth,300US227,240241(1937),whereitwasobservedthat[A]
justiciablecontroversyisthusdistinguishedfromadifferenceordisputeofahypotheticalor
abstractcharacter;fromthatishypotheticalormoot.Thetermjusticiabilityreferstoabody
ofjudiciallycreateddoctrinesthatdefineandlimitthecircumstancesunderwhichan
ArticleIIIfederalcourtmayexerciseitsconstitutionalauthority,includingitsauthorityto
engageinjudicialreview.25
AKGopalanvStateofMadras,AIR1950SC27(107).InthisrespecttheCourthassupremacy
overthelegislature.
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hardshipwascausedtotheaffectedpersonsasaresultoftheorder,quashingisthe
normalrule,therebeingnogroundforcondoningthebreachoffundamentalrights.A
wellknownauthorityonIndianConstitutionobserves:26
Article 13 lays down that what would otherwise been implied, ie the
supremacy of the fundamental rights over any other law in case of
inconsistencybetween the two. It couldalsomean that theconstitutionmakers
intended to confine the application of fundamental rights towhat is stated in this
article.Thus, for example,preconstitutional laws shall be invalidonly to the
extenttheyfallwithin thecategoryoflaws inforce.Asuncodifiedpersonal
laws do not fall within that category, it could be argued that they were not
intended to become invalid on the ground of any inconsistency with the
fundamentalrights.(Emphasisadded.)
In giving to themselves the Constitution, the people have reserved the fundamental
freedomstothemselves.Article13merelyincorporatesthatreservation.Thearticleisnotthe
sourceofprotectionoffundamentalrights,buttheexpressionofreservation.27InAKGopalan
vStateofMadras,28theSupremeCourtobserved:
The inclusion ofArticle 13(1) and (2) in the constitution appears to be amatter of
abundantcaution.Even in theirabsence, ifanyof the fundamental rightswas
infringed by any legislative enactment, the Court has always the power to
declare the enactment to the extent it transgresses the limits, invalid. The
existenceofArticle13(1)and(2)intheConstitutionthereforeisnotmaterialfor
thedecisionofthequestionwhatfundamentalrightisgivenandtowhatextent
itispermittedtobeabridgedbytheConstitution.(Emphasisadded.)
Thereason,asDDBasuopines,isthattheveryadoptionofwrittenconstitutionwith
aBillofRightsandjudicialreviewimpliesthatCourtsshallhavethepowertostrike
downalawwhichcontravenesafundamentalrightorsomeotherlimitationimposed
bytheconstitution.29
IV Forceoflaw
Clause
3(a)
of
Article
13
gives
an
inclusive
definition
of
law
to
be
used
in
this
Article
andthereforethemeaningoflawgiven intheaboveclauseextendstoboththepre
and postconstitutional laws. It mandates such laws to have the force of law.
Interestingly, constitution is silent as to the meaning of this expression. The
26 MahendraPSingh,vNShuklasConstitutionofIndia,36(2008).
27 GolakNathvStateofPunjab,AIR1967SC1643.
28 (1950)SCR88,100.PerKania,CJ.
29 DDBasu,CommentaryontheConstitutionofIndia,689,Vol1(2007).
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expression, therefore, requiresboth judicialaswellas jurisprudentialexploration to
understanditsmeaning.
NormanFCantorisoftheviewthatLawisthesystemofstateenforcedrulesbywhich
relatively large civil societiesandpolitical entitiesoperate.Thisprogrammed social
functioning isbackedbyapoliticallysovereignbody30Friedmanavoids anattempt
atdefinitionoflaw,andcomesoutwithhisconceptoflawwhenhesays:31
concept of law means a norm of conduct set for a given society and
accepted by it as bindingby an authority equipped with the power to lay
downnormsofadegreeofgeneralapplicationandtoenforcethembyavarietyof
sanctions.(Emphasisadded.)
Theelementofforcebackingthewordsoflawhasbeenconsistentelementinmostof
theattemptsthathavebeenmadetooutlinethecontentoflaw.Classicalpositivistlike
Kelsen who talks about the norms and normative order, also emphasises that law
requiressomekindofcoercion inordertosee that there isanobedienceof the law.
Lawisacoerciveorder.Hesays:32
It follows that a legal order may be characterised as a coercive order, even
thoughnotallitsformsstipulatecoerciveactslawistheprimarynormwhich
stipulatesthesanction.
The lawsmadeby the statehavealways thebackingof themachinery thatensures
that such laws are obeyed as can be seen in the myriad state made laws whichprescribethemeasuresthatcanbeinitiatedincaseofdisobedienceofthelaw.Thatis,
there isalways the forcethatgives life to the lawenactedormadeby thestate.This
force may be said to be the force of law, a force that makes sure that law has the
requisiteeffectivenessamongthoseforwhomitismade.Besidesthestatemadelaws
thereareothercategoriesofpractices thatfind theprotectionandrecognitionofthe
state. Thesemay include the customs andusage of people that form the lifeline of
societal existence. They are laws that precede the positive law. They are prevalent
among the people. They regulate the conduct of the individuals as they enjoy the
acceptance of people who generally regard them as binding their behaviour. And,
when such practices get the protective backing of the state, their enforceability
acquiresanewvigourandlife.
30 See,supranote12.
31 Friedman,LegalTheory,16(2004).
32 DavidSchiff,ModernPositivism:KelsensPureTheoryofLaw,inJamesPenneretal(ed),
JurisprudenceandLegalTheory,195196(2005).ToKelsen,Normisthemeaningofanactby
whichcertainbehavioriscommanded,permitted,orauthorised.Toputitsimply,itimplies
whatoneshoulddoormayorcando.
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V Doctrineofseverability
The doctrine of severability is an important aspect of understanding the import of
Article13.Anyresorttothisdoctrinecanbehadwhenitbecomesapparentthatapart
ofanylawoffendstheconstitution.InthecontextofIndianConstitution,itisthepart
dealingwithfundamentalrightsthatisthedeterminingfactorastowhenalawwill
be subjected to the above doctrine. DD Basu says that doctrine of severability is
nothingbutthecommonlawruleofultraviresimportedintherealmofconstitutional
law.33Simplyput,thisdoctrinemeansthatifanyparticularprovisionofthestatuteis
unconstitutionalandthatprovisionisindependentoforseverablefromtherest,only
theoffendingprovisionwillbedeclaredinvalidbytheCourtandifitisnotseparable,
thewholeofthestatuteshallfail.34However,inPoindextervGreenhow,35theAmerican
Supreme Court held that the doctrine cannot be applied to substitute for the law
intendedbytheLegislatureonetheymayneverbeenwilling,byitself,toenact.
Indianconstitution
UndertheIndianconstitution,Clauses(1)and(2)twoprovidefortheapplicationof
theabovedoctrine.Boththeclausesdealwiththecontraventionoffundamentalrights
ascontainedinthePartIII.Thetwoclausesprovide:
1 AlllawsinforceintheterritoryofIndiaimmediatelybeforethecommencementofthisConstitution,insofarastheyareinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthis
Part,shall,totheextentofsuchinconsistency,bevoid.
2 TheStateshallnotmakeanylaw,whichtakesawayorabridgestherightsconferredbythisPartandanylawmadeincontraventionofthisclauseshall,to
theextentofthecontravention,bevoid.
Thedoctrinesimplyimpliesthatwhereonlyapartoftheoffendinglawisinconsistent
withorcontravenesthefundamentalrights,itisthatpartonlythatshallbedeclaredto
bevoid,andnottheentirelaw.Andthevoidnessiscircumscribedbytheexpressions
to the extent of the contravention and to the extent of such inconsistency. That is, the
applicationof thedoctrineseparates the invalidpartof the law from thevalidpart.
The resultant implication is that thevalidpartof the lawcontinues tobe lawwhile
33 DDBasu,HumanRightsinConstitutionalLaw,217(1994).Alsosee,FieldingvThomas,(1896)
AC600;GreatWSaddleryvR,(1921)2AC91.34
PollockvFarmersLoan&TrustCo,(1895)158US635;LynchvUS,(1933)292US571.InElPaso
RCovGutierrez,(1909)215US,87,itwasheldthatiftheCourtfindsthatanoffending
portionofthestatutetobeseverable,itwillbethedutyoftheCourttodeclareonlythe
offendingpartinvalidandmaintaintherestofthestatute.35
(1885)114US270.
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thatpartofitwhichoffendstheconstitutionceasestohavethecontentoflaw.Itno
longerremainsalaw.HMSeervaiobserves:36
When a law is impugned as violating constitutional limitations, it may be
possibletosavethelawbyapplyingtheprincipleofseverability.Therearetwo
types of severability the provision violating the Constitutional limitations
maybedistinctandseverable,andtheCourtwouldupholdtherestoftheAct
by severing such distinct provisions and declaring them void. But the
impugnedlawmaybeoneandinseverable;sothatnospecificprovisionofthe
Act could be declared to void. In such circumstances, the doctrine of
severabilityinapplicationorenforcementwouldapply.
When the provisions of the impugned law are so interwoven that they are not
severable, then the entire law, say the Act, is ultra vires. The Privy Council in re
InitiativeandReferendumActs,observed:37
AparticularsectionofanActmaynotbeanisolatedandindependentclause,
andmayformpartofoneconnectedindissolubleschemefortheattainmentof
adefiniteobject;inwhichcaseitwouldhavetobeconsideredasaninseparable
partofthewhole.Alawwhichisultraviresinpartonlymaytherebybecome
ultra vires in the whole, if the object of the Act cannot at all be attained by
excludingthebadpart.
InAKGopalanvStateofMadras,38s14ofthePreventionDetentionAct1950wasdeclared
to
be
ultra
vires
by
the
Supreme
Court.
The
Court
observed
that
the
impugned
Act
minusthisSectioncanremainunaffected.Theomissionofthissectionwillnotchange
thenatureofthestructureofthelegislation.Therefore,thedecisionthatSection14is
ultraviresdoesnotaffectthevalidityoftherestoftheAct.However,thecourthasno
jurisdiction to redraft the legislation. The court cannot sever one single provision
whichcoversvalidaswellas invalidsubjects inordertosavesomeportionof it.In
RMDCvUnionofIndia39thePrizeCompetitionAct1955waschallengedontheground
of violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners as secured under Article
19(1)(g)thecourtheldthattheprovisionoftheActwereseverable.Itobserved,ashas
beenpreviouslydiscussed,thatwhenastatutewasinpartvoid,itwouldbeenforcedas regards the rest, if that was severable from what was invalid.40Separability is a
questionof substance,notof form.Hence,while the substance is tobedetermined
36 HMSeervai,ConstitutionalLawofIndia,421(1991).
37 AIR1919PC145.
38 (1950)SCJ174.
39 (1957)SCR930.
40 Alsosee,PunjabProvincevDaulat,(1942)FCR1;ChintamanRaovStateofMadhyaPradesh,
(1950)SCR759;StateofBombayvFNBalsara,(1951)SCR682.StateofBiharvKameshwar
Prasad,AIR1952SCR889;HarakcahandvUnionofIndiaAIR1970SC1453at1468.
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from theprovisionsof the statute asawhole, itwillalsobe legitimate to take into
accountthehistoryofthelegislationanditsobject,apartfromitsenactingprovisions,
title,andpreamble.41
VI Doctrineofeclipse
The above doctrine is important as regards the validation of void laws. Certain
existinglawssometimesmaygeteclipsedbyreasonoftheirclashwiththeexerciseof
fundamental rights contained under Part III of the Constitution. There are certain
pertinentquestionsinthiscontextlikewhetherthedoctrineofeclipseappliesonlyto
thepreconstitutionallawsortothepostconstitutionallawsalso,whetherthelawsin
forcebeforethecommencementoftheconstitutionbecomevoidabinitioorvoidintoto
if theyare inconsistentwitha fundamental right.Andalsowhatabout thepersons
whoserightsitdoesnotaffect:doesthevoidnessofthelawdependupontheperson
whosefundamentalrightsitcontravenes?TheguidinglightcanbetracedtoArticle13
whichprovides interaliathat All laws in force in the territoryofIndia immediately
beforethecommencementofthisConstitution,insofarastheyareinconsistentwith
the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. The
voidnessofsuch law is limited to theextentof inconsistencywith theprovisionsof
Part III of the Constitution. The voidness of law under Clause (1) does not imply
voidness ab initio. InKeshavanMadhavMenonvStateofBombay42the effectofArticle
13(1)wasinquestionbeforetheCourt.TheCourthadtodecidetheimportofArticle
13 in thiscase.Thebroad issue in thiscasewaswhetheraprosecutioncommenced
before the commencement of the Constitution, could be continued after the
Constitutioncame intoforce if theconcernedActbecamevoidgiventhat itviolated
Article19(1)(a)and(2)oftheConstitution.DasJobservedthattheprosecutioncould
be continued because the provisions of the constitution were not retrospective
providedtheywereexplicitlysodeclared.
It is axiomatic from the provisions of the constitution that it has no retrospective
effect.PartIIIoftheconstitutionisprospective.43Andthatbeingso,theexistinglaws
can
become,
and
can
be
rendered,
void
from
the
date
of
the
commencement
of
the
constitution. An existing law becomes inoperative only from the date of the
commencement of the constitution. The very fact that it is inconsistent with the
fundamentalrightsdoesnotmakeitadeadlaw.Asfarasthedeterminationofrights
andobligationincurredbeforecommencementoftheconstitutionisconcerned,sucha
41 RMDCvUnionofIndia,(1957)SCR930.Alsosee,KihotoHollohanvZachilhu,AIR1993SC
412.42
AIR1951SC128.Alsosee,BehramKhurshidPesikakavStateofBombay,AIR1955SC123.43
InPannalalBinjrajvUnionofIndia,(1957)SCR233,itwasheldthatArticle13has
retrospectiveeffect.
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law isagood law. InBhikajiNarayanvStateofMadhyaPradesh,44theSupremeCourt
formulatedthedoctrineofeclipsethus:
Thetruepositionisthattheimpugnedlawbecame,asitwere,eclipsed,forthe
time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First
Amendment)Act,1951wastoremovetheshadowandtomaketheimpugnedAct
freefromallblemishorinfirmity
Therefore,thedoctrineimpliesthattheshadowcastbythefundamentalrightcanbe
removedbyasubsequentamendmenttotheconstitution,andonceitissodone,the
lawinitssuspendedoreclipsedstateistherebyrevived.Itgetsrevived,freedfromall
blemishesand infirmity.Thatis,thepreconstitutional lawscontinuetobe lawthough
in an eclipsed state. They are inoperative laws whose revival in post constitutional
period
is
contingent
upon
a
subsequent
amendment
that
would
remove
the
shadow.
In
KeshavanMadhavaMenon,45Mahajan,CJobservedthat:
thepartofthesectionofanexistinglawwhichisunconstitutionalisnotlaw,
andisnullandvoid.Fordeterminingtherightsandobligationsofcitizensthe
partdeclaredvoidshouldbenotionallytakentobeobliteratedfromthesection
for all intents and purposes, though for the determination of the rights and
obligationsincurredpriorto26January1950,andalsoforthedeterminationof
rights of persons who have not been given fundamental rights by the
constitution.
HMSeervaicomments:46
It isdifficult tounderstandwhat ismeantbynotionallyobliterated from
the section. it is submitted that there is no scope for an unconstitutional
provision being notionally obliterated. The theory of eclipseis quite
inconsistentwithanyobliteration,actualornotional.
Meaningoflaw:pre andpostconstitutionallawtangle
Rivalopinionsaboundas to theapplicationofdoctrineofeclipse topre andpost
constitutional
law.
The
implications
of
different
opinions
are
profound
and
have
a
far
reachingimpactonthenatureoflawasprovidedunderArticle13oftheConstitution.
It is the general view that doctrine of eclipse applies only to the preconstitutional
laws,andnottothepostconstitutionallaws.InDeepChandvStateofUP,47theCourt
held:
44 AIR1955SC781.
45 Supranote41.
46 Supranote4at411.
47 AIR1959SC648.
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...[T]hedoctrineofeclipsecanbe invokedonly in thecaseof lawvalidwhen
made,butashadowiscastonitbysuperveningconstitutionalinconsistency.
InMahendralalJainivState,48theCourtobserved:
The doctrine of eclipse will apply to preConstitutional laws which are
governed byArticle 13(1)andwouldnotapply topostConstitutional lawswhich
aregovernedbyArticle13(2).UnlikealawgovernedbyArticle13(1)whichwas
validwhenmade,thelawmade incontraventionoftheprohibitioncontained
inArticle13(2)isastillbornlaweitherwhollyorpartiallydependinguponthe
extentofthecontravention.Suchlawisdeadfromthebeginningandtherecan
benoquestionof its revivalunder thedoctrineof eclipse [which]cannot
conferpoweronthestatetoenactalawinbreachofArticle13(2)whichwould
be theeffectof theapplicationof thedoctrineofeclipsetopostconstitutional
laws.
However, interestingly in Bhikaji 49 in which the Supreme Court enunciated the
doctrine of eclipse, Das ACJ made the following observation that tells a different
story:
Alllaws,existingorfuture,whichareinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofPartIII
orourConstitution,are,bytheexpressprovisionofarticle13,renderedvoidto
the extent of such inconsistency. Such laws were not dead for all purposes.
TheyexistedforthepurposeofpreConstitutionrightsandliabilitiesandthey
remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against noncitizens. It is
only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or a moribund
condition.
Itisclearlyinferablethattheabovedictumdidnotmakeanydistinctionbetweenpre
andpostConstitutionallaws.HMSeervaihascommentedthat Itisclearthatthese
observationsarenotrestrictedtoArt13(1),whichdealswiththepreConstitutional
laws, but also to Art 13(2), which deals with postConstitutional laws, because the
CourtdidnotrestitsdecisiononthedistinctionmadeinAmericandecisionsbetween
preConstitution and postConstitution laws.50The following submission ofSeervai
sounds
convincing:
48 AIR1963SC1019.
49 Supranote43.
50 Seervaiopcitat413.DasACJinBhikajiobservedthatTheAmericanauthoritiesreferonly
topostconstitutionallawswhichwereinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthe
constitution.TheAmericanauthorities,therefore,cannotfullyapplytopreconstitutional
lawswhichwewereperfectlyvalidbeforetheConstitution.itmustbeheldthatthese
AmericanauthoritiescanhavenoapplicationtoourConstitution.
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[T]he theory of eclipse is based on the premise that a law which violates
fundamental rights is not a nullity or void ab initio, but remains
unenforceable(that is, in a moribund condition); and secondly, it implicitly
recognizesthedistinctionbetweenalawvoidforlegislativecompetenceanda
lawvoidforviolatingfundamentalrights.
DD Basu is of the view that as far as postconstitutional laws are concerned, the
doctrineofeclipseisnotapplicable.51ThesameviewisalsosharedbyMPJain.52
Be thatas itmay, in theStateofGujaratvShriAmbicaMills,53though thedoctrineof
eclipsewasnotanissue,theCourtthroughitsdecisionmadeitclearthatthedoctrine
applies to both the preconstitutional as well as postconstitutional laws. Mathew J
observedthatanystatementthatalawwhichtakesawayorabridgesfundamental
rights conferred under Part III is stillborn or null or void requires qualification in
certainsituations.Althoughthegeneralruleisthatastatutedeclaredunconstitutional
isvoidatalltimesandthatitsinvaliditymustberecognisedandacknowledgedforall
purposes and is no law and nullity, this neither universal nor absolutely true, and
therearemanyexceptionstoit.54Itissubmittedthattheviewwhichholdsthatvoid
underArticle13(2) canonlybevoidagainstpersonswhose fundamental rightsare
takenawayorabridgedbylaw,seemsreasonableandconvincing.Thelawmightbe
stillbornsofarasthepersons,entitiesordenominationswhosefundamentalrights
aretakenawayorabridgedbutthereisnoreasonwhythelawshouldbevoidorstill
bornasagainst thosewhohaveno such rights.55Mathew J inAmbicaMillsmakesa
validpointwhenhereasons:56
[T]herealreasonwhyit(preconstitutionallaw)remainsoperativeasagainst
noncitizens is that it is void only to the extent of its inconsistency with the
rightsconferredunderArticle19andthatitsvoidnessis,therefore,confinedto
citizens, as, exhypothesi, the law became inconsistent with their fundamental
rightsalone.Ifthatbeso,weseenoreasonwhyapostconstitutionallawwhichtakes
awayorabridgestherightsconferredbyArticle19shouldnotbeoperativeinregardto
thenoncitizensasitvoidonlytotheextentofthecontraventionoftherightsconferred
oncitizens,namely,thoseunderArticle19.
The voidness of preConstitution and postConstitution laws to the extent of
contravention of fundamental rights, proclaimed by Article 13(1) and 13(2) of the
constitution has generated much judicial controversy and confusion. One question
51 DDBasu,CommentaryontheConstitutionofIndia,Vol1,692(2007).
52 Supranote6.
53 AIR1974SC1300.
54 Ibid.
55 CfJainopcitat849.
56 Ibid.Para43.
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pertains to the scope of voidness of such laws. Despite the rather lavish use of
expressions such as stillborn, law void ab initio, nonest, obliteration from the
statutebookandrepeal, ithasbeenacknowledgedby theCourt, inaalong line
decisions,thatthevoidnessarisingoutofviolationofrightsconferreduponcitizensdoes not entail voidness for all purposes. Such lawmay apply in full force to non
citizens.57As to the question of deciding the voidness of law, ie when does a law
becomevoid,weneedtomakeadistinctionbetweenvoidnessandunenforceability.
Doesalawwhichisunconstitutionalonthegroundoflackoflegislativecompetence,
standonthesamefootingasthelawwhichisviolativeofconstitutionalprohibitions?
JusticeVenkataramaIyermadeadistinctionbetweenalawmadewithoutlegislative
competenceandalawwhichviolatedconstitutionallimitationsonlegislativepower.
The former would be absolutely null and void and non est; the latter was simply
unenforceable.Theunenforceabilityarisesoutof the fact that it iseclipsedby the
provisionsoffundamentalrights.When the longshadowofeclipse isremoved,this
type of law will be automatically revived from the date of removal, and even
retrospectively,ifitweretobesoprovided.Ontheotherhand,alawvoidforlackof
legislativecompetencedoesnotsoreviveuponprovisionofsuchcompetence;ithas
tobereenacted.58Seervaiobserves:59
[T]here is a clear distinction between lack of power and disregarding a
restrictiononpowerasregardsapartofthesubjectmatterofthatpowerand
the most important result of this distinction is that a legislature having a
legislative power can legislate conditionally on the limitation on its power
beingremoved,whereasa legislaturenotpossessing legislativepowercannot
legislateatall.
VII Article13andjudicialdecisions
InAshokKumarGuptavUnionofIndia,60SupremeCourtobserved that Judgmentor
order isnota legislativeActwhich isvoidunderArticle13(2)buta judicialtoolby
whichtheeffectofjudgmentwasgiven.Itfurtherelaborated:
It
is
true
that
Art.
13(1)
deals
with
pre
Constitutional
law
and
if
it
is
inconsistentwithfundamentalrights,itbecomesvoidfrom26.01.1950andif
a postConstitutional governed by Art.13 (2) violates fundamental rights, it
becomesvoidfromitsinception.Eithercasedealswithstatutelawandnotthelaw
declared by thisCourtunderArticle 141 and directions / ordersunderArticle 142.
(Emphasisadded).
57 UpendraBaxi,KKMathewonDemocracy,Equality,andFreedom,XXXV(1978).
58 IbidatXXXVI.
59 Seervaiopcitat421.
60 (1997)5SCC201at248.
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Article141providesthatthelawdeclaredbytheSupremeCourtshallbebindingon
allcourtswithintheterritoryofIndia.Theexpressionlawdeclarediswiderthanthe
law foundormadeand implies the law creating roleof theCourtand itbecomes
bindingontheState.OnArticle142,thecourthasobservedthatthepowerexistsasaseparateandindependentbasisofjurisdiction,apartfromthestatutes.61Thisplenary
jurisdiction is, thus residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as
necessary whenever is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the
observanceofthedueprocessoflaw,todocompletejusticebetweentheparties,while
administering justice according to law. 62 The power conferred by Article 142 is
curative innatureandcomplementary to thosepowersspecificallyconferredon the
Courts by the statutes. Article 142 is conceived tomeet situations which cannot be
effectivelyandappropriatelytackledbytheexistingprovisionslaw.Itisnotablethat
thoughthe judiciary isanorganoftheStateliketheexecutiveandthelegislature,it
has not been included within the meaning of state as provided under Article 12.
Shouldthisbeconstruedasmeaningthatjudiciarywasnotintendedtobeincludedin
theconceptofstate?Thisquestionassumesimportanceinthatthe actionsofanyof
the bodies comprised within the term state as defined in Article 12 can be
challengedbeforethecourtsonthegroundofviolatingFundamentalRights.
Itistakentobeasettledpositionthatwhileexercisingitsnonjudicialfunctions,the
courts fallwithin themeaningofstateandwhileperforming judicial functions they
wouldnotbeincludedwithinthemeaningofstateasdefinedunderArticle12ofthe
Constitution. That is, the rule makingpower would be within the sweep of the
expressionState,butnottheperformanceofjudicialfunction.Ithasbeenarguedthat
in theexerciseof judicial functionscourtsarerequired todetermine thescopeof
fundamental rightsvisvisa legislativeor executive action.Unless theirpower to
perform that function isexcludedor restrictedby the constitutionoranyother law
theyarecompetent tomakerightsorwrong law.Awrongdetermination insucha
casedoesnotconstituteabreachofanyfundamentalrightbythecourt.Itisgenuine
mistakewhichitiscompetentto,thoughitmustnot,make.63
HMSeervaivehementlyarguesthatjudiciaryisincludedwithinthemeaningofState
asprovidedunderArticle12:64
Article 12 which defines the State for the purpose of Part III, does not
expressly exclude the judiciary, and though Article 12 does not expressly
includethejudiciary,itissubmittedthatthejudiciary,withthelegislatureand
61 MPSingh,NShuklasConstitutionofIndia,454458(2003).
62 Supranote6at267.
63 Supranote60at27.
64 Supranote4at393.
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the executive, is included in theordinarymeaningofaStateasoneof the
threegreatdepartmentsofaState;andfurther,thattheordinarymeaningisnot
outside the inclusive definition of the State given in Article 12. This
conclusionissupportedbyArt.13whichdeclaresthatanylaw,rule,regulation
andthelike,whichviolatesfundamentalrights,void.ThejudiciaryinIndiahas
the rulemakingpowerand if itwerenottheState for thepurposeofPart
IIIrulesmadebythecourtscouldnotbeimpugnedasviolatingfundamental
rights.
SinceArticle13ofourConstitution,declaringunconstitutional legislativeacts tobe
void, has been inserted only by way of abundant caution, there is nothing in the
Constitution to exclude from thepurviewofArticle12orArticle 32or226 judicial
proceedingsortoassertthatajudicialproceedingwhichisviolativeofaconstitutional
guarantee
would
not
be
void
so
as
to
subject
it
to
a
collateral
attack
in
remedial
proceedingswhichareequallyguaranteedby theconstitution. It is tobenoted that
the definitionof law inArticle 13 includes a custom orusage and any customor
usage which contravenes a fundamental right would be void, under Article 13(1).
Againstthisbackdrop,ifwesupposethataninferiorcourtenforces,byitsdecision,a
customwhichhasbecomevoidbyreasonofcontraventionofafundamentalright.If
anappeal lies fromsuchadecision, theappellateCourtwouldnodoubtcorrect the
decisiononthemerits,ifthepointisproperlyplacedbeforeit.Whathappensifthere
isnorightofappeal,andthematterisbroughtbeforetheSupremeCourtoraHigh
Court
under
its
extraordinary
jurisdiction
under
Article
32
or
226?
Would
the
Court
refuse reliefon theground that itwouldnot interferewithanerror in thedecision
unless the error is apparent on the face of the record; or should the guardians of
FundamentalRights,performitsdutybyreversingthedecisionwhichhasbecomea
nullityowingtoitsbeingfoundedonavoidlaw?
Inviewoftheforegoingdiscussion,anyconclusionmayseeminconclusive.Still,the
views that support thepropositions that judiciary shouldbewithin themeaningof
StateasgivenunderArticle12appearsconvincingthoughsuchastandmayleadto
multiplicityofproceedingsbyraisingthesameissuefirstinappealandtheninwrit
proceedings.
VIII Personallaws
In India thereareseveralpersonal lawswhicharebyand largenonstatutory.They
arenotinacodifiedform.And,religionhasastronginfluenceupontheselaws.The
fact that these have a historical existence that precedes the inception of the
constitution,theyarelikelytocomeinconflictwiththefundamentalrightsprovided
undertheconstitution,whichisaproductofmoderntimes.
Certain featuresof these lawshavebeen challengedbefore thecourtsmanya time.Thecourtshaveadoptedanequivocalapproach.Theapproachofthecourthasbeen:
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toholdthatpersonallawsnotcompatiblewithfundamentalrights;
todenythatpersonallawsfallwithinthesweepofArticle13,andtherefore,these
lawscannotbechallengedonthegroundofviolatingfundamentalrights.
Gajendragadkar,JinStateofBombayvNarasuAppuMali65observed:
[T]heframersoftheConstitutionwantedtoleavethepersonal lawsoutside
theambitofPart IIIof theConstitution (viz,Fundamentalrights).Theymust
have been aware that these personal laws needed to be reformed in many
materialparticularsandinfacttheywantedtoabolishthesedifferentpersonal
lawsandtoevolveonecommoncode.Yettheydidnotwishthattheprovisions
of personal laws should be challenged by reason of the Fundamental
Rightsandso theydidnot intend to include thesepersonal lawswithin the
definition
of
the
expression
laws
in
force.
Howeveritcanbearguedthat Afterthecommencementoftheconstitution,several
ActshavebeenpassedbytheParliamentandtheStateLegislaturesmodifyingseveral
aspectsofthesepersonallaws.Primafacie,itisdifficulttoarguethatthesestatutesdo
notfallwithinthescopeofArt.13(3)(a).66Theobviousreasonbehindthestandtaken
by thecourtsmaybe that thecourtshaveadopted thepolicyofnon interference in
thatthesemattersconcernthesusceptibilitiesofthepeopletowhomtheselawsapply.
Article(1)(a)providesthatlawsinforceinclude:
lawspassedormadebyaLegislature
orothercompetentauthority.
Thisisaninclusivedefinition.Thatis,itdoesnotexcludeotherformsoflaws.Therefore,
itshouldalsoincludepersonallaws.
IX Custom
The three main sources of Hindu Dharma or law are the Sruti, the Smriti and the
Custom.InCollectorofMaduravMoottooRamalinga67itwasstressedbythecourtthat:
UndertheHindusystemoflaw,clearproofofusagewilloutweighthewrittentextof
law. Ithasbeen repeatedlystated thatacustommaybe inderogationof smriti law
andwhereproved toexistmay supersede that law.The tenacityof family customs
evenunderthestrainofmigrationhasbeenrepeatedlyrecognizedindecisionsofthe
65 AIR1952Bom84.Alsosee,DanielLatifivUnionofIndia,AIR2001SC3958;AhmedabadWomen
ActionGroupvUnionofIndia,AIR1997SC3614.66
Jainopcitat846.67
See,YouthWelfareFederationRepByItsChairman,K.JPrasadvUnionOfIndia,1996(4)ALT
1138.
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prevailing public opinion of the community in the place where the custom
prevails?IthasbeensaidthattheJudgeshouldnotconsulthisownstandards
orpredilectionsbut thoseof thedominantopinionat thegivenmoment,and
that in arriving at the decisions the Judge should consider the social
consequences of the custom especially in the light of the factual evidence
availableastoitsprobableconsequencestheJudgeshouldnotfollowmerely
themassopinionwhenitisclearlyinerror,butonthecontraryheshoulddirect
it,notbylayingdownhisownpersonalandisolatedconceptionsbutbyresting
upontheopinionofthehealthyelementsofthepopulation,whoseguardiansof
anancient tradition,whichhasproved itselfandwhich serves to inspirenot
only those of a conservative spirit but also those who desire in a loyal and
disinterestedspirit tomakeradicalalterations to theorganizationsofexisting
society.Thus,thejudgeisnotboundtoheedeventotheclearlyheldopinionof
the greater majority of the community if he is satisfied that that opinion is
abhorrenttorightthinkingpeople.
X Amendments:aretheylaw?
ThequestionwhetheranamendmenttotheconstitutionmadeunderArticle368hasa
historywhich canwellbedescribedasa rollercoaster ride. Judicialdecisionshave
varied, so have the opinions. To begin with, in Shankri Prasad vUnion of India,73
SupremeCourtadoptedaliteralinterpretationoftheconstitution,andobservedthat
anamendmentunderArticle368wasenactedintheexerciseofitsconstituentpower
while
the
term
law
used
under
Article
13
referred
to
the
exercise
of
ordinary
legislativepowerconferredontheParliamentbyprovisionsoftheConstitutionother
than Article 368. Therefore, it was held that Article 13(2) does not affect the
amendmentsmadeunderArticle368.74InSajjanSinghvStateofRajasthan,75thesame
questionthatwasraisedinShankriPrasadwasagainraisedbeforetheCourt,andthe
majorityreiteratedtheconclusionofShankriPrasad.However,inL.C.GolaknathvState
ofPunjab76themajority(6:5)heldthatanamendmentmadeunderArticle368isalaw,
andissubjecttoArticle13.Thus,theearliertwocases,ShankriPrasadandSajjanSingh,
wereoverruled.TheConstitution(TwentyFourthAmendment)Act,1971insertedthe
Clause
(4)
which
provided
that
Nothing
in
this
article
shall
apply
to
any
amendment
of this Constitution made under article 368. The Supreme Court in Kesavananda
Bharati v State of Kerala 77 upheld the Constitutionality of the above amendment.
73 AIR1951SC458.
74 Thecourtwasoftheviewthatthewordlawshouldbetakentorefertorulesofregulations
madeintheexerciseofordinarylegislativepower.75
AIR1965SC845.76
AIR1967SC1643.77
AIR1973SC1461.
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Therefore it is settled that law under Article 13 excludes an amendment of the
ConstitutionmadeunderArticle368.
XI Inlieuofaconclusion
TheforegoingdiscussionanddeliberationrevealthattheframersofourConstitution
tookgreatcareandcautiontoconstructthestructureofArticle13,thoughitwasonce
declaredtobeanactofabundantcaution.Article13givesteethtothefundamental
rights, and empowers the courts to protect the fundamental rights from any
unconstitutionalonslaught.Theframingofthearticlesuggeststhatitwasintendedto
broadenthescopeofprotectionof thefundamentalrightsby incorporatingboththe
preConstitutional and postConstitutional laws. They also laid down other
requirements that make them worthy of being called a law. However,
notwithstanding the effort so made, confusions and controversies abound as is
apparentfromthejudicialdecisionsthathaveinterpretedtheimportandimportance
ofArticle13.Certainexpressionsused inthearticlehaveamplescopeofgenerating
invigorated controversies, and they did generate such controversies. Personal laws
presentoneaspectofArticle13thatshowshowtheinterpretationshavevaried,and
so have the opinions. There are cogent arguments that contend that personal laws
should be included within the meaning of law under Article 13. The courts have
adoptedanequivocalapproachashasbeendiscussed.However,whenonesees the
approachof the court in respectof the customs,onewondersas to the reason that
compelled the courts to adopt a different approach as regard the personal laws.
Besides,giventhefactthatthedefinitionoflawunderArticle13isaninclusiveone,it
canbearguedthatotherformsoflawthatarenotexplicitlynotgiventhereinmaybe
readaslaw.
Anamendmentmade to theconstitutionunderArticle368showsanotheraspectof
Article 13 that generated a debate as whether they are law within the meaning of
givenintheArticle.Bethatasitmay,thereisnodenyingthefactthattheuseofthe
termlawunderArticle13showsitschameleoniccharacter.Itcanbeseenaschanging
its
colour
with
the
variations
of
context.
Despite
the
shortcomings
that
give
rise
to
misgivings in theunderstandingof its import,Article13showshowbeautifully the
framingofthearticlehasbeendone,takingnoteofalltheseemingimplicationsthat
mayimpedeanyefforttoeffectuatethegoalsoffundamentalrightsunderPartIII.
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