University of Nigeria / Research Publications

ETAMO, Emmanuel Kengo A

utho

r

PG/ Ph.D/99/27702

Title

Coffee in the Economy of the North West Province of

Cameroon, 1923-1993

Facu

lty

Arts

Dep

artm

ent

History and International Studies

Dat

e

January, 2007

Sign

atur

e

COFFEE IN THE ECONOMY OF THE NORTH WEST

PROVINCE OF CAMEROON

COFFEE IN THE ECONOMY OF THE NORTH WEST PROVINCE OF CAMEROON, 1923-1993

ETAMO EMMANUEL KEN.GO PGlPhDl99127702 '

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF

PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D.) IN ECONOMIC HISTORY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND INTERVATIONAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

NSUKKA

SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR O.N. NJOKU

JANUARY 2007

DEDICATION

In loving memory of my father, Peter Ejah Kengo, and brdther, Maurice Ako Kengo,

for conceiving the idea but could not live to see the dream realised

CERTIFICATION PAGE

Kengo, Emmanuel Etamo, a postgraduate student in the Department of History and

International Studies with Registration Number PGlPhDl99127702, has satisfactorily

completed research requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Economic

History. The work embodied in this thesis is original and has not been submitted in

part or in full for another degree of this or any other university, to the best of our

know ledge:

Professor O.N. Njoku (Supervisor)

C - + -

1, "-. .. .. 3 t -

Dr Uchenna Anyanw (Ag. Head of Departme

Dr I.R. Amadi (External Examiner)

Professor O.K. Oyeoku (Dean)

PREFACE

In Cameroon generally, and the North West Province in particular, the rural

population constitutes more than two-thirds of the total population. The bulk of these

rural dwellers depend on smallholder farming and small-scale pastoral activities for

their livelihood. Although their individual productivity is often low due to reasons

quite often beyond their control, nonetheless, their overall economic contribution is

important to the national economy. It is therefore evident' that economic policies in

Cameroon can only be termed a success if the position and activities of thcse

smallholder farmers are seriously taken into consideration. They are both numerically

and economically very important for any national development policies.

Over the years, the government of Cameroon has been making some efforts to + relaunch the activities of smallholder farmers, a majority of whom are coffee fanners.

This has, however, produced only fragile results. Our central point is that any national

policy, which does not take into consideration the interest of the majority of these

rural farmers, would be an exercise in futility, which cannot bring about sustainable

development. It is for this reason that we have examined some challenges that have

confronted the smallholder coffee farmers in the North .West Province and their

response to these problems.

This work is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one, the introduction, gives a

brief background to the study. The statement of problem, purpose of the study,

significance of study, literature review, scope of the study, methodology and sources

are all examined under this chapter.

Chapter two focuses on the economy of the North West Province prior to the

introduction of coffee. Salient features of the economy such as land tenure,

agriculture, industries and crafts, and transportation are examined. Chapter three looks

at the genesis of coffee in the North West Province and probes into the initial

difficulties confronted by coffee farmers of the province .and the impact of coffee

cultivation on land tenure system.

Chapter four dwells on colonial policy changes after the Second World War

and how these impacted on coffee cultivation and on coffee farmers in the province. I t

attempts to analyse the famous Jervis Report on the Coffee industry in Bamenda and

its recommendations. The relationship between coffee production and national politics

is also brought under spotlight. Chapter five examines the situation of North West

coffee farmers in independent Cameroon from 1961 to 1971. Studies and

recommendations by E. Gablemann and A.N.Lantum on how to improve thc coffee

industry in West Cameroon are examined and analysed.' Growing discontent and

agitation arising from what the coffee farmers saw as unfair treatment by the

government is also examined under this chapter.

Chapter six which spans 1972-1993 focuses on Independei~t Governn~ent

coffee policy in the Province. Organs such as NWCA, NPMB, MIDENO and

FONADER are closely examined and their role in the promotion of coffee farning in

the province reviewed.

Chapter seven concludes the work and makes 9onle recon~inendations for the

improvement of the industry and the lots of the coffee farmers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a debt of gratitude to many persons for the realisation of this work. It is

in~possible to mention and to thank by name, all individuals who have assisted me in

onc way or the other. However, some people deserve special mention.

I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my academic mentor, Professor O.N. Njoku

for meticulously reading through the work and providing constructive criticism. He

also made available to me, some of his own materials on export crops production in

Nigeria. I cannot sufficiently thank him and his wife for the hospitality they extended

to me in Nsukka. I am equally grateful to all the lecturers in the Department of History

and International Studies, UNN, who in various ways, also contr~buted to the

realization of the work. They are Professor Okoro Ijoma, Professor P.O.Esedebe, Dr. +

C.U. Anyanwu, Mr. J.O. Ahazuem, Dr. Paul Obi-Ani, Dr. Egodi Uchendu, Mr.

A.Apeh, and Mr. C.C. Opata. Their contributions in academic seminars and vlvas

were particularly helpfuI.

I highly appreciate the assistance I got from the staff of the Nnamdi Azikiwe

library, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. I am also indebted to the staff of the Cameroon

National Archives, Buea, for the assistance they rendered to me during my research

trips there. I am particularly grateful to Prince Henry Mbaine for his invaluable

assistance at the archives. Dr. U.O.A. Esse of the Nigerian Archives, Enugu (now

retired), was also of great assistance to me when I visited the Enugu Archives. Mr.

Augustine Akundeck of the National Co-operative College Library in Bamenda and

Mr. Fred Ndika of NWCA granted me access to some of the docun~ents of these

institutions. Mr. Sixtus Njokikang, former manager of NWCA also provided me with

some documents on the co-operative movement in the NWP.

Some of my informants went beyond the usual requirement of respondmg to

questions, to showing hospitality. Among the many farmers to whom I am indebted

for assistance and hospitality, the following deserve special mention: H.R.H. Fon P.E.

Fombo of Njindom, Pa Samson Sabum Tata of Sang, Meta, Pa Elias Tembong of

Santa, Pa Joseph Chongwain Nkuo of Wombong-Njinikom, Mr Philip Ndiron Becliia

of Chie-Jiyane, Oku, Pa Zachary Chin Lai of Melim, Nso and Shufai Ngongmvcm

Kiyung Aloys of Melim, Nso.

Some friends and compatriots provided the encouragement, moral or material,

which was needed at moments when the work seemed to be stalling. Mention must bc

madc here of friends like Ikenna Odife, Nna-Emeka Okereke and others too numcrous

to mention by name. Fellow compatriots and friends such as Dr. Akuchu, Dr. and Mrs.

Chah Kennedy, Perpetua Tanyi, William Fontah, Mrs. Foleng Harriet, Colin Lukong,

Paul Banyuy and Dominic Fobellah were a special source of inspiration. My special

gratitude also goes to my housemates and good friends in Nsukka, namely, Nancy

Njilele, Mrs. Shafack Rosemary, Ignatius Tabi Chum, Gerald Anoh, Francis Awah

and Dr. Luc. Ngongeh. I am most indebted to my long-time friend, Greg Fombo, for

the enormous sacrifices he made while we were all pursuing our Ph.D. programme.

Without his selfless assistance, I could have abandoned the programme. I also owe a

debt of gratitude to my friend, Christopher Abinteh, for the assjstance he gave me in

the course of the programme. The encouragement I got from my cousin, Justice Ambo

Jack-Emile, is also appreciated.

My grateful thanks are also due to my siblings; Grace Kengo, Bridget Kengo,

Odilia Kengo, Janet Kengo, Rene Kengo, Frederick Kengo and Maureen Kengo, who

have all borne the sufferings and inconveniences of my protracted educational career.

To my beloved mother, Christina Ada Kengo, I owe my deepest debt of

gratitude for her sacrifices and encouragement. She was able to keep the dream alive

after the passing on of my dad.

Emmanuel Etamo Kengo Department of History and International Studies University of Nigeria, Nsukka November 2006.

vii

Title Page .. . . Certification .. . . Dedication .. . . Preface . . . . Acknowledgements .. Table of Contents .. List of Tables . . Acroiiyms .. . . Illustrations .... . . Abstract . . . .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION Background of the Study .. Statement of Problem Purpose of the Study . . Significance of the Study .. Conceptual Framework .. Literature Review .. . . Scope. Methodology and Sources Geography of the Study Area Notes and References . .

CHAPTER TWO: THE ECONOMY OF THE NORTH WEST PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF COFFEE ..

Land Tenure . . . . Agriculture . . Livestock .. . . . . Craft Production .. . .

i) Iron working .. ii) Weaving . . . iii) Pottery and Carving

Transportation . . Long Distance Trade . . Slavery and Slave Trade .. Notes and References . .

CHAPTER THREE: INTRODUCTION AND PROPAGATION OF COFFEE: THE PERIOD OF INDIGENOUS INITIATIVE. 1923 . 1945

The Genesis .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Initial Difficulties . . . . . . Impact of Coffee on Land Tenure System . . . . . . Notes and References . . . . . . . . . . . .

i I i . . . I l l

I V

vi . . .

v11 X

xi xii xiv

CHAPTER FOUR: THE POST-WORLD WAR I1 PERIOD. 1945 . 1961 Colonial Policy Changes .. . . . . . . Infrastructural Improvements and Innovations .. . . The Santa Coffee Estate .. . . . . . . The Jervis Report of 1958 .. . . . . . . . .

i) Observation of the Report . . . . ii) Recommendations . . ...

Comments on the Report .. . . . . . . . . Coffee Production and National Politics .. . . . . Birth of the Southern Cameroons Coffee Board (SCCB) .. Resolutions of the Board .. . . . . . . . . Notes and References . . . . . .

CHAPTER FIVE: A DECADE OF DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATIONS. 1961 . 1971 120 Bamenda Coffee Farmers and thc New Political Dispensation .. . . 120 The Gablemann Report on West Cameroonian Co-operatives .. 125 The A.N. Lantum Memorandum on West Cameroon Coffee Industry

# 137

Suggestions for Improvement . . . . . 140 . . . . A Critique of the Report . . . . . . . . . . 143

Government Response .. . . . . . . . . 145 The Bamcnda Coffee Farmers Association (BCFA) .. . . . . 158 Notes and References . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

CHAPTER SIX: GOVERNMENT COFFEE POLICY IN THE NWP 1972 . 1993 .. 1 7 0

North West Co-operative Association (NWCA) .. . . The National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB) .. . . Assessment of Government Interventions .. . . . . . . Mission de Development de la Province du Nord Ouest (MIDENO) .. Fond Nationale de Development Rural (FONADER) .. . . Liberalisation of the Commercialisation of Coffee . . Impact of Liberalisation .. . . . . . . . . . . Notes and References . . . . . .

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .. 2 13 Conclusion .. . . . . . . . . 213 Recommendations . . . . . . 221 Notes and Reference . . . . . . 225

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: The introduction and spread of coffee in the NWP ..

Table 2: Road construction projects in Bamenda by the end of 195 1

Table 3: Coffee marketing by the co-operative, 1954 - 1958

Table 4: Coffee export from West Cameroon to traditional and new markets

Table 5: Production of arabica coffee in the NWP, 1960-1 971

Table 6: Coffee Production by Member Unions of NWCA from 1978 -- 1987 ..

Table 7: FONADER loans for Mezam, 1974-1 979 ..

Table 8: FONADER loans for Mezam Division, 1979-198 1 ..

Table 8: Total production, producer price and World Market price,1972-1993

ARCS BBA BCA BCFA BCMA BCPMS CCE CDC CDWA/F CFA CNAB CPMO CPMS DA DO DSC FOB FONADER FSC ICO J AH J AS JEH JHSN LBA MlDENO NAE NPMB NWCA NWDA NWP ONCPB PIB PMO PMO PPCC

- - - - - - - - PTC

- -

RCS- -

RDC S A 0 SCCB SCEAP SCEC SCEPC

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies Bloc Buying Allowance Bamenda Co-operative association Bamcnda Coffee Farmers Association Bamenda Co-operative Marketing Association Bamenda Co-operative Produce Marketing Society Cameroon Co-operatives Exporter Cameroon Development Co-operation Colonial Developmcnt and Welfare ActiFund Corn~nuncutt Financiere Africaine Cameroon National Archivcs, Buea. Co-operative Produce Marketing Organisation Co-operative Produce Marketing Society Director of Agriculture Divisional Officer + Direct Suppliers Company Limited Free on Board Fonds National de Development Rural Farm Service Centre International Coffee Organisation Journal of African History Journal of African Studies Journal of Economic History Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria Licensed Buying Agents Mission de Ddveloppement de la Province du Nord O U C S ~ National Archives, Enugu National Produce Marketing Board North West Co-operative Association North West Development Authority North West Province Of$ce National de commercialisation de Produit de Base Produce lnspection Board Produce Marketing Organisation Principal Marketing Officer Provincial Project Co-ordinating committee Prov~n~~alTechnical~Committee p - - - - - - - - -

Registrar of Co-operative Societies Rural Development Centre Senior Agricultural Officer Southern Cameroons Coffee Board Southern Can~eroons Economic Advisory Panel Southern Cameroons Executive Council Southern Cameroons Economic Planning Council

SCMB TDC U AC UCCAO UN UNN WCDA WCMB

Southern Cameroon Marketing Board Trial and Demonstration Centres United Africa Company Union Centrale des Co-operatives Agricoles des I'Ouest United Nations University of Nigeria, Nsukka West Cameroon Developn~ent Agency West Cameroon Marketing Board

ILLUSTRATIONS

Map showing position of North West Province in Cameroon .. . . xv

Map showing divisions of the North West Province .. .. . . . . 18

Graph showing production of arabica Coffee in the NWP, 1960-1 97 1 167

Chart showing total production, producer price and world market pricc 1972-1 993 208

Graph showing producer price and world market price 1972- 1993 . . . . 209

xiii

ABSTRACT

One of the greatest developments that took place in the colonial economy of Africa was thc

phenomenal expansion in export crop production. Peasant famiers took up the production of

cocoa, coffee, tobacco, tea, palm products etc, depending on thcir ccological environments, at

an unprecedented rate. The cultivation of somc of these crops may be considered a success

story. However, others have remained basically problematic. While much has been written on

export crop cultivation in Africa generally, coffee has not received sufficient specific

scholarly attention, especially from economic historians. Most of the early works on export

crops cultivation focused mainly on cocoa, oil palm, groundnut, cotton and tobacco

industries, among others. In most of these works, passing references are either m d e to coffee

or, in some cases, not at all. This is, in spite of the central position that coffee has occupied in

the economies of many sub-Saharan countries. This is particularly the case in the North West

Province (NWP) of Cameroon. In 1923, the economy of the then Bamenda Division, which is

coterminous with the NWP, was drawn into the vortex of coffee production. Since then,

coffee has remained the main export crop of ihe province. Ironically, not much has been

written on this industry. This work is a study of the problems that have confronted tlie coffee

industry of the NWP from its inception up to 1993. It also examines the way famiers have

responded to the problcms, especially following the world economic crises that have caused a

slump in coffee prices since the 1980s. Specifically, the work examines the impact that coffce

has had on the social, political and economic lives of the people of the NWP. The ambivalent

role of cooperative marketing systems in thc NWP is also examined. The approach to the

study was both thematic and chronological, and combined description with critical analysis. I t

adopted both the synchronic and diachronic methods of historical analysis. Oral information

elicited from sixty informants who were identified as knowledgeable on the subjcct and

chosen from the major coffee producing areas were used to cornplcment written sources.

These included farmers, cooperative workers (both current and erstwhile), elites and civil

servants. Written sources included archival, published and unpublished materials. The

archival sources were made up of colonial assessment reports, annual reports of the League

of Nations and of the government. This research has revealed a number of challenges that have confronted the coffee industry in the NWP. That though coffee has made some meaningf~il contributions to the economy of the NWP, the industry has been more problematic than successfill. Whilc some of the problems are inherent, others are as a result of the nature of the society. Low and constantly fluctuating prices in tlie world market have remained a major problem of the industry. This problem is compounded by the fact that an infinitesi~nal amount of the product is consumcd locally, which leaves the industry without a buffer capacity. Due to the lack of a domestic market, the farmers have no doice-but to accept whatever prices a re offered in the world market. As such, its sustainability is doubtful. Differences in coffee prices, which arise from political than economic reasons, have also been a source of worry to the coffee famlers of :he NWP. Diseases and pests have as well constituted a major inenace to the industry. The low prices, which the famiers get for their produce, do not pennit them to get chemicals and insecticides to combat these diseases since they also nced to support their families. A synergy of these problems has forced many farmers out of the industry and into other ventures for livelihood.

xiv

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION Background of the Study

The period 1880s to the 1960s is thought to constitute a major benchmark in

African history. This period witnessed the colonisation and domination of the entirc

continent with tlie exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, by Europcan powcrs. In tlic

cntire history of the continent, this may indecd be considered a very brief pcriod.

However, because of the imprints and the ripple effects of colonialis~n, it has

constitutcd, and in years to come, may continue to constitute a scrious subject of

academic debate. The differcnt fabrics of African societies were touched by this

experience. As Adu Boahen has rightly observed in rclation to this period, "ncvcr in

the history of Africa did so many changes occur and with such speed as they did

betwecn 1880 and 1935".' While there is a shared view that colonialism impactcd

seriously 011 African societies, the degree and character of this impact rcmain

controversial among academics in general and historians in particular. According to

A.G. Hopkins,

The colonial cra has ceased to bc regarded as the solc substance of African history and there are sound reasons for thinking that colonial rule itself had a less dramatic and a less pervasive economic impact than was once supposed.. . . colonialism did not crcate modernity out of backwardness by suddenly disrupting a traditional state of low-level equilibrium [and that] the main function of the new rulers was to givc impetus to a process of economic development that was already under way. 2

We dissent from the above view. We rather argue that colonialis~n undcrunincd

the econonlic base of African societies and denied them the ability to devclop from

within. Literally, they were indirectly or dircctly forced to dancc to new rliythnis not

in their own interest. To posit that colonialism mainly gave impetus to a proccss that

was already underway is questionable. For, the type of development that resulted from

colonialisni was not autocentric and was hardly a continuation of tlie pre-colonial

development process in Africa. As such, it has not becn sustainable.

We therefore concur with R. Oliver and A. Atinore in their contention that

"measured on the time-scale of history, the colonial period was but an intcrludc of

comparatively short duration. But it was an intcrludc tliat radically changed tlie

direction and momentum of African history ."l

Truc, one of the greatest dcvelopmcnts that took placc in thc colonial economy

of Africa was the phenonienal expansion in export crop production. Pcasant farmers

took up tlie production of cocoa, coffee, tobacco, tea, palm products etc, depending on

their ccological environments, at an unprecedented rate. Some of these crops wcrc

established staples whilc others had been introduced at first on an expcrimcntal basis.

However, while there would scem to be a consensus among economic historians on

the growth and expansion of export crop production, tlie question of who should takc

credit for the initial initiative and expansion remains debatable.

Allan ~ c ~ h e e ~ , arguably, a pioneer researcher on export crops production in #

West Africa, posited that assessing colonial economic development was primarily a

matter of assessing the achievements of the British administration, on which he passcd

a broadly favourable, though qualified, judgement:

The economic progress made by British West Africa is comparatively recent. The reason was that age-long liindranccs blocked the path of advance. Progress, however, was assured with the advent of the three R's in the ninctics - Rule of British [colonial government], railway construction, and Ross's medical achievements. Since then, there have been great changes in all branches of native life and economic activitye5

He concluded that in the "agricultural revolution," the British Colonial Administration

was the prime mover, although it received valuable assistance from missionary bodics

and European traders. It is worth remarking that McPhee did not rccognise tlie rolc

played by the indigenes in his "econon~ic revolution" tlicsis. To him, "tlicre seclns

little doubt that the cocoa industry of the Gold Coast is a fostcr child of tlic

Government, and tliat apart from careful nursing it would havc had a stuntcd

dcvelopment, and not the luxuriant growth as has been tlic cascnO. Howcvcr, this vicw

has been aptly contradicted by R.H. Green and S.H. Hynier who have provcn w ~ t h

academic honesty that, during the crucial years of cocoa expansion, the Dcpartnicnt

was neither inclined towards nor capable of, scientific investigation of the bcst way to

grow cocoa. 7

Unlike Allan McPhec, Helleiner is marc circumspcct and takcs into cognition,

the role played by the peasants. He argues that, econon~ic progress in Nigeria during

the twentieth century was impressive and was attaincd through thc growth of

indigenous peasant agricultural production for export via outward movement on thc

extcnsivc margin. He notes that peasant agriculture is at thc vcry ccntrc of thc

historical development process in ~ l g e r i a . ~ He contends that the impetus for

agricultural change came from the colonial government, especially aftcr World War

IT? He sees the contributive role of the government in providing agricultural

education, improved agricultural technology, industrialisation, and a favourable b

infrastructure as another principal dynamic element in this development

On hcr part, and basing her findings on an extensive investigation of the cocoa

farmers of Southern Ghana, Polly Hill constates that just before World War I thc Gold

Coitst becamc the largest world produccr. Thcrc wcre a small nun~bcr of European-run

plantations, but nearly all production was the responsibility of Africans. Thosc fcw

Europeans who investcd in plantations were, on the wholc, unsucccssfi~l.'~' Shc adds

that Ghanaians made the crucial innovations in the 1880's, and they succeedcd in

spite, not becausc, of the colonial Department's efforts. Even thc effect~vc

introduction of cocoa in the Gold Coast, it is argued, is to be crcditcd to Tcttch

Quarshie, a native blacksmith from the Accra region, who, returning around 1880

from working on the Island of Fernando, brought cocoa beans w ~ t h which hc

established a seed farm."

Focusing on French tropical Africa, Jean Suret-Canale accedcs to thc vicw that

colonial administration played a central role in bringing about thc rapid expansion In

export crops production. She however remains very critical of the methods employcd

by the French colonial administration to keep the indigenes in this industry. Draw111g

examples from French colonies in tropical Africa, Suret-Canale demonstrates thc

appalling conditions under which Afr~cans were forced to produce cxport crops.I2 In

what seems something of a balanced assessment, A.G. Hopkms argucs that both vicws

have their merits, but neither is acceptable without some rnodifi~ations.'~

From the foregoing views and arguments, it is clear that the academic debate

on export crops production is yet to come to a conclusion. The issue still rcquircs

more case studies to permit concrete generalisations. Be this as it may, it was certainly

the case that export crop production witnessed trcmendous expansion during thc

colonial period. Most of the crops were established staples such as palm products and

groundnuts, or had been introduced into African economies, as was the case of coffcc,

cocoa, banana etc.

While much has been written on export crop cultivation in Africa generally,

particularly the colonial period, coffee has not received sufficient specific scholarly

attention, cspecially from economic historians. Most of the early works on export

crops cultivation focused mostly on cocoa, oil palm, groundnuts, cotton and tobacco, 14 among others. In most of the works, passing rekrcnces are either made to coffcc, i n

some cases not at all. This is, in spite of the central position that coffee has occupied

in the economies of many sub-Saharan countries. This is particularly the case in the

North West province of Camcroon. In 1923, the economy of the then Bamenda

division, which is coterminous with the North West province, was drawn into thc

vortex of coffee production. Since then, coffee has remained the main cxport crop

from the province. Yet, not much has been written on this industry. As O.N. Njoku

has observed with reference to the neglect of economic history in Nigcria,

Political history, especially of the colonial period, dominatcs the landscape. This situation is unhealthy, though it is by no means surprising. Two primary considerations explain thc emphasis on political history. First, this genre of history appears to be more exciting than other types, perhaps because it deals mostly with wars, diplon~acy and governance. It is personality- focused and accords high profiles to kings, their courtiers, and military heroes. There is some thrill for thc historian operating along the corridors of power. Second, political

histor provided a psychological and intellectual weapon to the nation lists in the struggle for independence against British colonialism. l 5

The North West Province, which for the better part of the pcriod under considcration

was administered through Nigeria, has suffered even more from the neglect for similar

reasons.

Statement of Problem

As indicated earlier, inucli has been written on cxport crops production 111

particular and the colonial cconornies of Africa in general. Howcvcr, tlic ccoiioiiiic

performance of thcse crops during the post-colonial period has not reccivcd sufficicnt

attention. The rapid expansion in export crops production during thc colonial period

made i t an attractive subject of inquiry for acadcmics of different sliadcs, who workctl

hard to justify the expansion so as to give credit either to the indigcncs or to thc

colonial administration for tlic initiative and expansion. As such, thcrc was thc

temptation (which many scholars fell into) to treat export crops cultivation as i f i t

wcre a bed of roses. Therefore, little or 110 attention has been paid to tlic problcms that

have been closely associated with the production vf these crops from the colonial

period. Literature on thc economic performancc of export crops in the post-colonial

period rcmains scanty and, in some cases, completely lacking.

Also, despite the growing literaturc on agricultural history such as the cocoa

industry in Southern Ghana, and in Wcstern Nigcria, thc groundnut industry in

Senegal and Northern Nigeria, the oil palm industry in South Eastern Nigeria ctc, thc

agricultural history of the North West provincc of Cameroon has not reccivcd

adequate attention from scholars. This is particularly the case with coffee, which

constitutcs thc main export crop of the provincc, but has not becn comprc1icnsively

studied.

In recognition of this problem in Can~eroon and elsewhere in Africa, Polly Hill

has solicited

The study of indigenous cconomics or cconomics, which is concerned with the basic fabric of existent economic life, with such economic activities as the production of export or other cash crops, subsistence farming, cattle raising, fishing (for cash or subsistence), internal trading in foodstuffs, transportation, economically motivated migration, indigenous credit-granting systems, and so forth .... From Dakar to Cameroon, there is very little systematized knowledge relating to the economic organisation of internal trade in West African foodstuffs and raw materials - there is scarcely any literature on this subject fit to be thrust into the hands of the visiting expert.16

In a corroborative observation, David Cohen bemoans thc abscncc of rccords

on African Economic History in relation to what obtains in Europc and America. Hc

observes that:

The Euroamerican historical record is rich and ripe for study; the African record of economic history, on the other hand, nearly does not exist. The embarrassing lacunae of historical work on the economies of Africa is pronounced, whether one is speaking of the transitional economies which through increased trading links first bridged world and African comn~unities in perhaps an irreversible way or whether onc is speaking of the colonial economies of increased independence, or of the development cconomies of more recent years . . . It may be that thc yearnings to design Africa's future directly from Western experience have been diverting the community of economistic scholars from seemingly necessary historical studies of the institutions, values, and forces at the core of African economies and at the root of the development problems of the African states."

@

Most of the existing works on the North West Province (NWP) tend to cmphasizc

political issues while its economic history remains derelict. The few availablc works

that have cxamined coffee in portions of the NWP of Cameroon arc not only limited

in scope, but contain some inadequacies.

Purpose of Study

Considering the controversy that has often beclouded the initiative for cxport

crops cultivation in tropical Africa, this work revisits the debate by exan~ining the case

of the coffee industry of the NWP of Cameroon. It thcrcfore probes thc question of

where the initiative for coffee cultivation in the province began.

Secondly, the work intends to study the problems that have confronted thc

coffec industry of the NWP from its inception up to 1990 and cxaminc the way

farmers have responded to the problems, especially following the world economic

crises that have caused a slump in coffee prices since the 1980s.

Thirdly, this work looks at the impact that coffee has had on the social, polltical

and economic lives of the people of the NWP. Thc ambivalent role of thc coopcrative

marketing systems in the NWP also comes under spotlight.

Significance of Study

This work is written in part in response to the calls of David Cohen and Polly

Hill for the study of African indigcnous cconomics and cconomic history. Atlmittcdly,

considerable research has been carried out ever since they made thcir plca to rcdrcss

the situation. Nevertheless, much research still remains to be done in certain parts of

the continent, especially Cameroon. For, without a detailed knowlcdgc of many local

examples of cxport crop cultivation, sucli as thc case of the NWP of Camcroon,

generalisations on export crops cultivation and the impact of these 011 t11c cconomics

of Africa could be misleading. For, it is through local histories that we can hope to

challenge gcneralisations and speculations that hold sway in the absencc of morc

precise information. Hopefully, this work has filled a hiatus in thc history of t

Cameroon and in particular, the NWP whose history has been don~inated by political

and social issues.

At a time whcn the financial returns from coffee production have dwindlcd to

their lowcst cbb, especially after the liberalisation of the marketing of arabica coffcc

in the NWP, a study of this nature becomcs germane. Such a study bccomcs cvcn

more relevant when we comc to realise that many peasant farmers depcnd cntircly on

the proceeds from their agricultural products. This study should also be useful to the

government of Cameroon, international organisations, Western donors and non-

governmental organisations (NGOs) that are concerned with the plight of peasant

coffee farmers of the NWP arising from falling coffee prices in the world market. The

findings of this work may also be relevant to other third world countries faccd wit11

sinilar problems.

Conceptual Framework

The pre-colonial economy of most African socicties is often described as

subsistent. The socicties werc prescntcd as not bcing reccptivc to cconomic

incentives/opportunities, and lacked the ability for economic initiative. Such views

continued during the colonial period and as late as 1958, tlicy were still cxprcsscd.

Their wants were said to be easily satisfied."

This work dissents from such notions. Colonial prescnce, along with tlic advcnt

of the coffee crop, presented the rural farmers with economic cl~allcnges as wcll as

opportunities. How the people responded to the situation is thc central plank of this

work. I t is an attempt to show that pre-colonial African ccononiy was not static and

uniform as such. The people were receptive to economic incentives/opportui~itics and

on their own, took economic initiatives even during the colo~iial period. It is

recognised that Polly Hill's Rural Capilalism in Wesl Africa is basically an attempt to

dispel some of these myths. This work takes the debate further by examining the case

of the NWP of Cameroon. #

Literature Review

There does not seem to be any comprehensive study yet on this ~ndustry that

spans the colonial and thc post-colonial pcriods. Howcvcr, thcrc cx~st somc works,

which cither examine aspects of coffee in parts of the province, or some government

initiatives aimed at improving the industry.

British colonial records on the NWP in the Cameroon National Archives, Buea

and the Nigerian National Archives, Enugu and Ibadan; prov~de some material, wli~cli

can be very useful if handled with great judgement and care. Such material is only

heipfiil and available up to 1961 when the territory regained ~ndependence from

Britain and joined the French-speaking part. One of tlie carliest works to cxamlnc

some aspects of the coffee industry in the NWP of Camcroon is by Ekkchart

Gablemann. In 1965, Gablemann carried out a study tour of West Cameroonian

cooperatives, which lasted to 30'" March 1966. The outcome of this tour was a 28-

page report in which he examined the problen~s facing coffee and cocoa farmers In tlie

then West ~ a m e r o o n ' ~ . His overall assessment of the performance of farmers was

negative. He then noted that the West Cameroonian farmer needed help. To him, thc

network of cooperative organisations that existed in West Cameroon offcrcd an

excellent opportunity to channel assistance for economic devclopmcnt to thc

individual farmer. To accomplish this task, he observed, it was necessary to providc

farmers with means for increased agricultural production, to build up agricultural

extension services and to create facilities for farmers to save and borrow moncy. He

advocated better integration of these functions to achieve the best possible rcsults. Hc

further recoinmended that, besides the selling of produce, marketing should comprisc

market research and information to farmers on market trends in order to direct

production to the most profitable crops. He argued that this could only be acliievcd

when farmers were supplied with modern tools, chemicals, fertilizers, secds and

planting material. The creation of facilities through which to save and borrow moncy

would provide the finance required to purchase the inputs. The gradual transforn~ation of b

existing primary and secondary marketing societies into multipurpose societies, with the

functions of marketing, supply of agricultural inputs, agricultural extension and acceptance of'

savings and grant of loans for the purpose of enhancing agricultural production was also

recommended. He equates industrial sophistication with econon~ic cfficicncy.

Though Gablemann's work examines some of the problems that farnlers liavc

bccn faced with, this is only up to 1966 when his study tour ended. Tlic issuc of costs

and benefits of coffee production still begs for adequate academic attcntion sincc he

omits that aspect of the people's economy in his work. Secondly, he does not examine

the historical development of the crop in the econonly of the province. Thcsc

shortcon~ings create the need for the present work. However, tl~ough lacking in depth,

the work provides some useful signposts for the present study, especially wit11 rcspcct

to somc of the problen~s facing coffee farmers up to 1966.

In 1981, Marcus Anyi carried out a study titled "Cash Cropping and Changcs in

Traditional Agriculture: The Case of the Coffee Village of ~ g w o " . ~ ~ ' As his title

suggests, his work set out to investigate the impact of coffce growing on tlic

agricultural system of the community. The main elements of traditional structurcs

considered are land and labour. In addition to these elements, he also cxamined non-

farming functions in order to establish the relationship between the growth of these

functions and the rapid expansion of coffee. He notcd tliat coffee farming lias caused

concentric zoncs of land use and that coffcc farming has Icd to a change from sliifting-

field cultivation to pcrmanent field-cultivation. Furthcr, hc contcndcd tliat tlicrc lias

been a decline in food production as a result of increasing coffee production, and tliat

land requirements per household were increasing with the spatial expansion of coffee.

His conclusion is that coffee cultivation has brought about improvemcnt in tlic social

well-being of the coffee village. He used schools, hospitals, residential buildings with

iron shcct roofs and income tax as his indices of social well-bcing.

Anyi highlighted the positive impact but neglccted thc negative. He did not

articulate the problems confronting the coffee industry in this arca and tlic farrncrs'

response to these problems. A major shortcoming of his work in relation to tlic present #

work is its limitation i n geographical scope. Bcsides, its findings arc only iiscful up to

1981 whcn the rcsearch was carricd out and the conclusion hc rcachcd on the

relationship betwecn coffee cultivation and food crops production is d~batablc .~ '

Howcvcr, though his study is bascd on just one of the myriads of villages that makc

up the NWP, his work is relevant to the present study, cspccially as it cxamincs Ihc

impact of coffcc cultivation on thc community in question.

In 1981 still, Blaise Ban completed a postgraduate diploma nicmoir in

gcography from the University of ~ a o u n d e . ~ ~ He set out to cstablisli whctlier increase

in coffee production, accompanied by rising prices in post-independence Mezani

Division, one of the seven divisions that make up the NWP, had been accompanied by

improvement in the living standards of the peasant farrncrs, the main producers of the

crop. Hc contended that with the introduction of coffee, farmers had had a stroligcr

sense of financial security as they did not only depend on what hc referred to as

"petty" trading and subsistence farming for thcir livelihood, but also on the coffee

economy for increased viability. His work examined some of the problcms faced by

coffec fanners in Mezaln division from 1961 - 1981 and government attcmptcd

solutions. He argued that rising coffee prices in the world markct had been lcss felt by

tlie coffee farmers of Mezam than their counterparts in other parts of tlie world

because inflation had pushed up the retail price index of consumer goods even n~ucli

higher. He also attributed farnlers' poor dividends to corruption in the co-opcrativc

societies. For the farmer to reap the fruits of his labour, he recommended a total

overhaul of the cooperative n~oven~ent. Beyond his stated objective, he examined the

entire process of coffee production from planting to harvesting. This is undcrstandablc

because his perspective was geographical. Unfortunately, his work contains an

anachronism because he dates the introduction of coffee in Mezam to 1933 instead of

1923. His work does not provide us with an indepth analysis of the impact of coffec

on the economic, social and political lives of the people of Mezam division. One of

the shortcomings of Ban's work is its limited scope both in time and space in relation

to the present study. In spite of its lin~itations, his work remains instructive to the +

present study as it provides us with some of the problems that have plagued the coffee

industry in that division.

In 1995, Eric Mbutruh completed a masters dissertation entitled "The Economy

and Society of Southern Cameroons Under British Colonial Domination, C. 19 16 -

1961 : A Study of the Impact of British Imperialism on Bamenda Division". As can be

discerned from this title, his work examines the econon~ic and social impact of British

administra.tion on the division. He asserts that the nature of British land, labour and

taxation policies in the division is responsible for its under-developn~ent. He argues

that British approach to development in the division was to ease her process of

exploitation. He therefore sees the establishment of state farms, roads and other socio-

economic structures as infrastructure for exploitation. This policy rendered the factors

of production in the division underdeveloped and dependent. According to him, the

division's dependence on the British enabled the colonialists to introduce some crop

species and promoted the rearing of livestock for cash thereby consolidating Ban~cnda

Division as a peasant agricultural zone while maintaining the plantations of the coastal

region. He argues that colonial econon~ic development through the British approach

also failed in transforming the economy of the division towards industrial

manufacturing, just because of the British interest in maintaining the region dcpcndcnt

on her manufactured goods.2"

Mbutru's examination of coffee in the territory during thc period under

consideration is inadequate and superficial. He claims that coffce was introduced in

the division in 1947, by the colonial government. He does not examine the

implications or consequences of this introduction on the economic and social lives of

the people of Bamenda division. Furthermore, his work does not cxtcnd to thc

independence period, which forms a part of the concern of our study.

John Tosh's article titled "The Cash Crop Revolution in Tropical Africa: An

Agricultural Reappraisal" assesses the progress that has been made in African

agricultural history and concludes that it can, wifh some justice, claim to be the

specialisnl of the 1970s par excellence. He refers to the phenomenal expansion of

tropical Africa's agricultural production between 1890 and 1930 as a " Cash-Crop

revolution"; whether measured in terms of its contribution to world trade or its rolc in

expanding the market in African societies. His reasoning is that cash-crop production

during this period entailed economic change of fundanlental in~~or tancc .~ ' He,

however, cautions that further advance in the agriculture field depends in part 011

recognition that previous works have been raised on far too narrow a base. He notes

that quite often, very little awareness is shown of the circumstances in which cash

crops were actually grown on African smallholdings and most historical discussion is

conducted in a kind of ecological vacuum. He maintains ,that interpretations of the

cash-crop revolution need to be informed, and when necessary restrained by an

awareness of agricultural realities on the ground. Contrary to what is often assunled by

advocates of the vent-for-surplus theory of export growth, he argues, the spread of

cash-crop agriculture was not an economically costless process. While acceding to the

view that there was an abundance of surplus land in Africa, prior to cxport crop

cultivation, he argues that labour was traditionally a scarce factor i l l many savannah

con~munities. In such communities, cash-crop farming could mean the abandonment

of older forms of exchange production, which imposed fewer social strains, or a

decline in standards of subsistence. His work providcs hindsight on thc gcncral trcnd

of the historiography of export crops production in tropical Africa and highlights thc

areas that have been neglected by existing literature. This makcs thc study germane to

the present exercise.

In an article titled "An Experiment with Coffee Production by Kenyans, 1933 -

48",25 Carolyn Barnes analyses why Kenyans had to experimcnt with coffcc

cultivation and provides a case study of one of the trial areas to asscss thc cxtcnt to

which the colonialists directed African response. The work seeks to further an

understanding of the degree of control exercised by the settlers over the Africans'

economic activities. She contends that the British colonial government began to takc

more serious interest in African cultivation p f the crop for purely economic rcasons.

She argues that the initial reluctance or refusal of the British colonial government to

allow Africans to cultivate coffee was dictated, not by the inability of the indigenes to

successfully grow the crop but rather by the economic position of coffec on European

estates and the settlers' demand for cheap labour. Granting Africans thc right to takc

up coffee cultivation was going to cause a shortage if not a complete lack of labour in

European owned plantations.

The fact that Kenya and Southern Cameroons had the same colonial cxpcrience

(British colonies) makes Barnes' work relevant to the present study. The factors that

informed British policy in Kenya would partly explain British attitude towards coffec

cultivation in the NWP at its inception stage.

Mark Delancey's paper titled "The Expansion of Coffee Production in

Bamenda and Bananas in the South also deserves attcntion. In the paper,

Delancey examines British agricultural policies in Southern Cameroon and notes that

the British, like the French, altered hitherto subsistence economies which were largely

self-sufficient into mixed subsistence and export economies tied to the international

economic system as inferior partners in a division of labour that largely defincd

Cameroon as a producer of raw materials and France and England as suppliers of

finished products. He observes that it became necessary for both powers to exact

labour and produce from Cameroonians to pay the cost of colonialism and to providc

the produce dcsired by the European industrics and consumers. 'The need or desirc for

a cash income to pay taxes and to acquire European manufactures cornpclled Africans

to offer themselves to work in the coastal plantations or to producc cxport crops 011

peasant basis. The people of Bamenda (NWP) then took up coffce production dcspitc

initial British nonchalance and even opposition. The reasons he advances for British

lack of action and even opposition to this industry are inadequate. To him, the requcst

by the Divisional officer for permission to encourage the Africans to grow coffcc was

rejected by the agricultural officer on the ground that there was no market for coffec

and that Africans could not properly produce the crop without European supervision.

A second reason for British opposition was the absence of roads linking Bamenda to b

any port at the time. It is also possible that the labour needs of the plantations werc

predominant in British minds. Hindsight derived from similar developments in Kcnya

and ~ i m b a b w e ~ ~ should remind us that we need to dig below the vcnccr of official

colonial pronouncements to find proper explanation for certain colonial politics.

However, Delancey's work, though superficial and skeletal, ren~ains instructivc as it

cxamines the early history of coffee in thc province.

P.M.Kaberry's authoritative work entitled Wonzen of the Grassfields: A Stu4)

of the Economic Position of Wonzen irl Bamenda, British ~anzeroorls"heservcs

special attention here. Kaberry examines the economic position of womcn in

Bamenda, British Cameroon (which is cotern~inous with the North West Provincc)

within the framework of a comprehensive account of the social and economic lifc of

the peoples of Bamenda. She concludes that the titular ownership of land by chiefs is,

in the routine of production and consumption, traditionally quite subsidiary to cie fac/o

control by the head of a kin group, and that both are subject to strong customary

obligations as custodians, breaches of which evoke opposition, non-cooperation and

defection that are held to be morally justified. She also notes that though traditionally

men own land in Bamenda, it is the women who exercise real control over land usc by

virtuc of the fact that they are the chief producers of food crops.

Though Kaberry provides a comprehensive account of thc social and cconon~ic

life of the peoples of Bamenda in her book, she makes only passing refcrenccs to

coffee. She therefore does not examine the place of coffee in thc economy of thc

province and the challenges of the new crop to the fanner population. This

shortcoming notwithstanding, her work provides us with rich background knowlcdgc

of the economy and society of the North West Province up to 1948 whcn her rcsearch

terminates.

Paul Nkwi and J . - P. Warniers' Elements for n Ifislory of the Western

~ r a s s f i e l d s ~ ~ examines a number of basic elements of the history of thc Wcstcrn

Grassfields (North West Province) viz; population dynamics, socio-political

institutions, and economic spccialisation in the pre-colonial period. Against this 6

background, these authors assess some of the changes that have taken place in the

traditional institutions of the Western Grassfields during the colonial and the

postcolonial periods. They argue that the grassfield chiefs have lost most of their pre-

colonial and colonial sources of power and that they can cnjoy a ccrtain amount of it,

only insofar as they are able to find their place within the new nation-statc or play the

role assigned to them by the new politicians.

While this work has examined most of the economic~specialisations carried out

in the province over the centuries, coffee, though of more recent introduction, has

been completely sidelined by the authors. The economic activities in thc province that

have been considered in their work remain basically those which have bccn practised

for centuries. However, while neglecting coffee as an econon~ic activity amongst thc

people of the Grassfields, the work provides us with an in-depth examination of othcr

economic activities that are indigenous to the people of thc NWP and so is an

invaluable document as far as the pre-colonial economy of the province is concerned.

A publication of the North West Co-operative Association entitled The North

West Marketing Co-operatives-In New Deal Era-North West Cooperative Associution

Limited View point3" focuses on the activities of the North West Cooperative

Association Limited as the apex organisation of North West cooperatives and solc

licensed buying agent for the National Produce Marketing Board. I t cxaniincs thc

challcngcs that have confrontcd this organisation over the ycars and lhc efforts made

by the government towards surmounting them. With particular refcrcncc to the "Ncw

Deal" (the Biya Government), this publication projects the government as making

unrelenting contribution towards agricultural development in the NWP through public

parastatals like MIDENO, FONADER, UNVDA etc. One should not bc surprised by

its panegyric stance, considering that it depends to some cxtent on the goodwill of the

government for its continuous functioning. It however provides us with some useful

hints on the history of coopcrative marketing societies in the NWP and the kind of

assistance they have been giving to coffee farmers (albeit paltry) to enable them

overcome some of the major challenges confronting the industry. 8

As one can glean from the above literature, there exists yet no coherent and

comprehensive study of the coffee industry in the NWP of Cameroon covering both

the colonial and the post- colonial periods. Secondly, the available literature does not

compare favourably with what obtains in the export crop production induslrics of

other African economies in terms of depth of analysis. What we have are disjointed

and incohcrent studies on coffee in some parts of the provinec. Yet coffee has

occupied a central position in the economy of the province. This work is therefore an

attempt to fill the existing hiatus in the history of the North West Province of'

Cameroon.

Scope, Methodology and Sources

The work covers the period 1923-1993. 1923 has been chosen as the starting

point because available evidence indicates that it was during that year that coffec

cultivation was first reported in the North West Province of Cameroon. At the end of

1993, the franc CFA was devalued which had some implications on the coffcc

industry in the NWP in particular and Cameroon in general.

The approach to the study is both thematic and chronological, and combincs

descriptive with analytical approach. It also adopts both the synchronic and diachronic

licensed buying agent for the National Produce Marketing Board. 11 cxamincs tlic

challenges that have confronted this organisation over the ycars and thc cfforts made

by the government towards surmounting them. With particular refercncc to thc "Ncw

Deal" (the Biya Government), this publication projccts the gover~~mcnt as making

unrelenting contribution towards agricultural development in the NWP through public

parastatals like MIDENO, FONADER, UNVDA etc. One should not bc surprised by

its panegyric stance, considering that it depends to some cxtent on tlie goodwill of tlic

government for its continuous functioning. It however provides us with some useful

hints on the history of cooperative marketing societies in the NWP and the kind of

assistance they have been giving to coffee farmers (albeit paltry) to enable tliem

overcome some of the major challenges confronting the industry. b

As one can glean from the above literature, there exists yet no coherent and

comprehensive study of the coffee industry in the NWP of Cameroon covcring both

tlie colonial and the post- colonial periods. Secondly, the availablc literature does not

compare favourably with what obtains in the export crop production industries of

other African economies in terms of dcpth of analysis. What we havc arc disjointed

and incoherent studies on coffee in some parts of tlie provincc. Yet coffcc has

occupied a central position in the economy of the province. This work is therefore an

attempt to f i l l the existing hiatus in the history of the Nortli West Provincc of

Cameroon.

Scope, Methodology and Sources

The work covers the pcriod 1923-1 993. 1923 has been clioscn as thc starting

point because available evidence indicates that it was during that year that coffec

cultivation~was first reported-in the North West Province of Cameroon. At the end of - - -

1993, the franc CFA was devalued which had some iniplications 011 tlic coffcc

industry in tlie NWP i11 particular and Cameroon in gencral.

The approach to the study is both thematic and chronolog~cal, and combincs

descriptive with analytical approach. It also adopts both the synchronic and diaclironic

method of historical analysis. Considering the very nature of the topic, the researcher

consulted works belonging to different disciplines such as Geography, Economics and

Agriculture. This work made use of both written and non-written sources. Thc writlcn

sources included archival materials, and published and unpublisl~ed docun~ents. Wit11

respect to archival materials, the National Archives, Enugu, Nigeria and the Camcroon

National Archives, Buea were very useful. For the non-archival sourccs, the following

libraries were of great use for the realisation of this work: Nnanldi Azikiwe Library,

University of Nigeria, the University of Yaounde Library, the National Co-operalive

College Bamenda Library and the Histo~y Departmental Library of thc Un~versily of

Nigeria, Nsukka.

A work of this nature is cxpected to lean more on quantitative analysis. b

Unfortunately, there is an embarrassing dearth of statistics as far as this industry is

concerned especially for the colonial period. There is hardly any figure for t11e total

production, total number of fanners involved in coffee cultivation and the total area

cultivated. For this reason, the work is going to lean more on the qualitativc method of

historical analysis. However, some of the much-needed statistics was obtained from

the North West Cooperative Association (NWCA) head-office in Nkwcn Cameroon

covering mainly the post-colonial period. Non-written sources consisted of oral

information elicited from the farmers, cooperative workers (both current and former)

and from civil servants from a cross section of the province. Oral interviews wcre

conducted to crosscheck and complement the available written documents. The oral

interviews were conducted at group and individual levels. Farmers were interviewed

in many parts of the province. Co-operative workers, both erstwhile and current, wcre

also interviewed. Where the information given was found to be conflicting, many

more informants were consulted to crosscheck the information.

Geography of the Study Area

This work embraces the seven divisions that make up the NWP of Canleroon namely:

Momo, Mezam, Menchum, Bui, Donga-Mantung, Boyo and Ngoli-ketungia. The North West

Province is one of the ten provinces that make up the Republic of Cameroon. It is si~uated

between longitudes 9" 17' and 17" 25' East of the Greenwich meridian and latitudes 5" 15'

and 7" 10' north of the equator. It is bordered on the west by the Federal Republic of Nigeria

and the S.W. Province of Cameroon, on the east by Adamawa and Western provinces, to the

south by the South West and Western Provinces, and to the North by Nigeria. I1 has a surface

area of 17.910km2,which translates to 4 percent of the national territory. It has an estimated

population of 1.126.000 inhabitants, representing 1 1 percent of the total population of

Cameroon. The population density is 65 persons to the square kilometre, which is considcred

high by Cameroon standards and comes secood in national population density figures by

3 1 provinces.

Its dominant geographical feature is the high grassy plateau, which swceps

from the northeast and east over the centre of the province at an average height of

4,500 feet above sea This explains why the province was commonly rcferrcd

to as the grassfields during the colonial years. The plateaux and hills are dissected by

broken valleys and depressions, which are characterised by plantations of raffia palms

in most parts of the province. The study area has a very limited amount of forcst

vegetation, especially timber. However, gallky forest vegetation exists mostly around

the fringes and along watercourses. In the north, there is the low-lying forest of

Mbenibe, which slopes down to the Donga River that forms the northern boundary of

the province. Mount Oku also constitutes another forest resource of the province,

which is being conserved as a result of its rich fauna and flora. The western fringes of

the province mainly around Njikwa sub-division also possess somc amount of forcsts

though these forests have been highly reduced as a result of human activity. The arcas

around Wedikum and Menka also have some amount of forest vegetation.

The Bamenda highlands possess many characteristics that are u~iique a11101ig

West African environments. The altitude, the nature of the local relief, including

steepness of slopes, and the presence of heavy volcanic rocks combine to produce a

region possessing resources that arc denied to most of tropical Wcst Africa. Howcver,

many of thesc samc features present economic development problenis that arc not

encountered c~sewhere.~ ' The region is mountainous with an altitudinal range of 400111

above sea level at the Donga valley, more than 2000m on the Bamcnda Platcau (Santa

region) and more than 3000m at 0ku.j4 These mountains are punctuated at some

points by plains the most prominent of which are the Ndop plain and Mbaw plain.

These plains receive sediments from the hills and this makes them very fertile. Thcy

are of great agricultural value and therefore are usually centres of great agricultural

undertaking. Approximately three-quarters of the total surface area of the province is

more than lOOOm above sea level and most of the highland is of volcanic origin.

These featurcs make the region conducive for coffee cultivation, for, as has bcen P

observed by Wellman,

Coffee is known to flourish well in topsoils of friable nature over a reasonably good, fairly heavy subsoil, and in which the transition is gradual between the two. A grcat deal of the world's finest coffee, es ecially Arabica, is produccd on rathcr P, rccent volcanic deposits:'

The province is not only blessed with volcanic soils, but also with alluvial soils

which are known to support a good deal of agricultural activities. These soils are

found in thc vallcys and plains of Ndop, Mbo-Nso Katsina and the Menchum. On the

high old volcanic plateau of Bamenda, within altitude of 1.500-20001n as wcll as the

Mambila Mountains, is found ferralitic accumulations. Duc to excessivc precipitation

at these altitudes, most of the soil bases are washed away from the very high pcaks.

Most of these soils are not only conducive for coffee cultivation, but also tolcl.atc food

crops such as maize, cocoyams, plantains, potatoes, beans etc. The quantity and

quality of food crops produced in this province bears testimony to its fertil~ty.

The topography of the province makes it well drained with the streams and p p p p p p - - - - - -

rivers having three major orientations. Rivers Noun and Mbam which are to the cast

cmpty their waters into River Sanaga in French-speaking Cameroon; the Donga,

Katsina Ala and Menchum flow west to join the Benue in Nigeria whilc the Mezam

and Momo feed tributaries of the Cross River in ~arnfe." 'Thcre cxist a ~iulnber of

crater lakes in the region such as Lake Awing, Lake Nyos, Lake Oku, Lake Wum and

Lake Bambili, among others.

This hilly region of the country gives it fresh climate with low temperatures

and abundant rains. The province enjoys a climate of two distinct seasons: thc dry and

rainy seasons. The rainy season, which is longer than the dry season, lasts from mid-

March to mid-November. The dry season, on the other hand, starts around mid-

November and ends mid-March. The average annual rainfall in this rcgion is

2,000rnm. Generally, the mornings, especially during the dry season, are cold and

frosty while the afternoons are hot and dry. During the dry season, averagc day

temperatures go up as high as 28°C while in the rainy season the average teniperaturcs b

drop to as low as 1 5 ° ~ . 3 7 However, they do exist some micro-climatic variations in the

province. This is particularly the case in the plain of Ndop and the soutl~eri~ and

northern fringes of the province where there are some forest vegetations. Thesc micro

climatic variations are not, however, so marked as to alter thc gcncral physical

character of the province. The foregoing geographical panorama portrays thc NWP as

a region affording most of the climatic and ecological requisitcs for thc cultivation of

arabica coffee.

Beforc concluding this geographical survey, it is necessary to sumn~arise the

general conditions necessary for the growth of coffee in general and arabica in

particular. These are as follows:

Well-drained loam, rich in nutrients, especially potash, with an ample supply

of humus.

Topsoils of friable nature over a reasonably good, fairly heavy subsoil, and in

which the transition is gradual between the two.

Soils of volcanic origin

Regions with high rainfall and cool temperatures

Lateritic soils (good for arabica coffee cultivation)

Yearly rainfall of 1,905n1m (75in.) for arabica (which is the type mostly grown

in the N WP)

Arabica coffee requires fairly high elevation and is, in fact, a mountain crop

grown best on steep slopes.38

The NWP does not, however, provide an environnient that is only suitable for coffee,

but also for a plethora of food crops. As P.M. Kaberry has rightly observed,

Bamenda [the North West Province] has frequently been cited as one of the most fertile areas of West Africa and certainly one that offers great potentials for development. In the low forest belt, which fringes the north and West of the Plateau, oil palm flourishes; on the uplands there is not only excellent pasture, but also a soil and cliniate favourable to the production of coffee, pyrethrum, linseed and quinine, not to mention local subsistence crops.39

Notes and References

I Adu A. Boahen, "Africa and the Colonial Challenges" in Adu A. Boahen, (ed.) Tlrc Gencr-(11 Hislor?! of Africu, vo1.7, California: Heinemann and California University Press, 1985. p. 1 .

I A.G. Hopkins, An Ecortornic Histoq) of Wesl Africa, Essex: Longnan, 1973. pp. 167, 206,235. See also A. Boalien, "Colonialis111 in Africa: Its impact and significance" in A. Boahen, (4.) UNESCO General History ofAfrlcu, p. 806 for a sumnation of Hopkin's main thesis.

3 R. Oliver and Anthony Atmore, Africa Since 1800, Cambridge: CUP, 1972 p. 275

Allan McPhee, The Econornic Revolution in British West Africu, London: Frank Cass, 1971.

5 . . lhui, Preface, pp x-xi

" ibici. p. 4 1

7 R.H. Green and S.H. Hyrner, "Cocoa in The Gold Coast: A Study in the Relations between African Fanners and Agricultural Experts" Journal ofEconomic History vol. 26, No.3, Sept. 1966, p. 307

t

G.K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growl11 in Nigeriu, Illinois: Homewood, 1966. p. xli

'I Ibid, p. xii

10 Polly Hill, The Gold Coasl Cocoa Farmer: A Prelintinary Survejl, London: CUP, 1956. See also Polly Hill, Studies in Rurul Capilulisnz in West Africa, Cambridge: CUP, 1970, p. .22

I I R.H. Green and S.H. Hymer up. cit. p. 302

12 Jean Suret-Canale, French Colorliulism in Tropicul Afiica, 1900-1945, London: Wurst and Co., 1971. Translated from the French by Till Gotheiner. Part two of his work, which is titled "The Zenith of Colonialisn~ 1919-1945", is particularly instructive and critically examines French economic policies in Tropical Africa.

'"opkins, An Econonlic History of West Africa. p.187

14 Some of these major works which have examined export crop production arc Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-farmers of Southern Ghana, Cambridge 1963, G.K. Helleiner, up. cit:, J.S. Hogendom, "Econon~ic Initiative and African Cash-farming; Pre-colonial Origins and Early Colonial Developments", in P. Duignan and L.H. Gann (eds.) Coloniclli,sm in Afiiccl 1870- IY(iO,vol.4.Cainbridge,1975. 0 . N. Njoku, "Oil Palm Syndrome in Nigeria: Government Policy and Indigenous Response, 19 18-1939", The Calubar Journal o fH i s to r~~ , 3,1,1978.

I 5 O.N. Njoku, Economic History of ~ i ~ e r i u . 1 9 ' ~ and 20'" Centuries, Enugu: Magnet Busincss Enterprlscs,2001. pp 1-2.

- - - - - - - - - - I 6 - ~ o i i ~ ~ i i i , Studies in Rural Cupitulism in West Africa, p..3

17 D. Cohen, "Agenda for African Econolnic History" Journal c.fEcorlor?iic Histoq: xxxi 1971 p.208 I8 Scc A.G. Iiopkins, An Economic History qf West Africa, for a summation of thcsc stercotypcs, wh~ch havc bccn written about pre-colonial African societies. Most of the Colonial Assessment Reports on Banicnda also contain such stercotypcs as will be sccn in the proceeding cliaptcrs.

-

19 Ekkehart Gablemann, Report on a study tour of West Cameroonian cooperatives from 25"' Nov., 1965-30"' March 1966. Unpublished. n.d.

2 0 Marcus A. Anyi, T a s h Cropping and Changes in Traditional Agriculture: The Case of the Coffee Village of Ngwo". Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the BAdegree (Hons.Geography) University of Sierra Leone, 198 1.

2 ' For a contrary view on the relationship between coffee and food production in this village, see Etamo E. Kengo, "Trade in Ngwo, North West Province of Cameroon, c.1900-1982". M.A.projccl report submitted to the department of History, University of Niger~a, Nsukka. 1999.

2 2 Blaise Ban, "Coffee Production and Commercialisation in Mezain Division: Post-Independence Fra (A Geographical Approach)". A memoir submitted in partial fulfilment of the academic requirements for the award of a DlLEG (Postgraduate Teacher's Diploma) in geography, llniversity of Yaounde, I98 1.

23 E.M. Nyiwatumi, "The Economy and Society of Southern Cameroons Under British Colonial Donination c. 1916-1961 .A Study of the Impact of British Imperialisih on Bamenda Division" M.A. Dissertation, Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, 1995.

#

24 John Tosh, "The Cash Crop Revolution in Tropical Africa: An Agricultural Reappraisal" AJkicnn Afairs, vo1.79, No.3 14 Jan 1980, pp. 79-94.

25 Carolyn Barnes, "An Experiment with Coffee Production by Kenyans, 1933-48" AJric.trn Ecorloriric fiistory, No.8, Fall 1979, pp198-209.

26 Mark W. Delancey, "The Expansion of Coffee Production in Banlcnda and Bananas in thc South West" in Peter Geschiere and Piet Konings (eds.) Confirencc on the Pofitic(~/ Ecorron/), oJ'Ctrnreroon- Historical Perspectives, Leiden: June 1988.

27 The unprofessed reason was to keep Africans out of cash crop cultivation and then force them into wage labour in European owned plantations. See M.H. Kaniki "The Colonial Economy: the foriner British Zones" in A. Boahen, (ed.), UNESCO Gcneral History qf Alricu. Vo1.7, pp. 397-398 and Carolyn Barnes, o p cit.

28 P.M. Kaberry, Women qf the Gras~jielcfs: A Study ofthe Econornic Position of Woriicn in Bnnrcntitr. British Camerooris, London: H.M.S.O., 1952.

29 P.N. Nkwi, and J. -P. Warnier, Elements For a History of' the Wester11 Gi-(~.s.s/ield.~, Yaoundc: University of Yaounde, Department of Sociology Publication, 1982.

N.W.C.A. =North West Cooperative Association Ltd. The North West Marketirig Cooprratives 4 1 1

New Ded Era -North West Cooperative Associution View Point, Bamenda, 1985.

'' Vincent A. Azobi, "A Geographical Appraisal for the North West Development Authority (MIDENO) An Agency of Rural Development". Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of thc requirements for the award of doctorat de 3eme cycle in geography. University of Yaounde 1988, p.

32 Kaberry, Women of'the Grassjield, p. 18.

'' M.B. Gleave, and F.M. Thomas, "The Bagango Valley: an example of land Utilisation and Agricultural Practice in the Bamenda Highlands", Bulletin dc L 'I. F.A.N., Tome xxx, serie B, No.2, 1968 p. 655

34 Azobi, "A Geographical Appraisal for tlie North West development Authority"' p.32

35 Frederick L. Wellman, Cufee: Botany, Cultivt~tion, crrrd utilistrtiorr, New York: Interscience Publishers 196 1 .p. 93

I

" P.M. Kaberry, Women of the Gru.ssfield, p.19 see also, Aaron Neba, Motferrl Geog~upIry ~ J ' t l ~ e Republic of Cameroon, Bamenda: Neba Publishers, 1999. pp. 40-41

3 7 Aaron Neba, Modern Geography of the Republic ofCumeroati, 227.

38 For tlie general conditions conducive for the growth of coffee, see Wellman, Botarz): Cullr~~c~trorr, m d utihsution, chap. six.

39 Kaberry, Women of the Grassfield, p. 19

CHAPTER TWO

THE ECONOMY OF THE NORTH WEST PROVINCE PRIOR TO THE

INTRODUCTION OF COFFEE

The economy of the people of Bamenda prior to the introduction of coffcc

remains largely unstudied. Yet, evidence abounds to show that the people carricd out

their economic activities in an organised and impressive manner cven bcfore

colonialism. Surprisingly, the colonialists did not seem to have recognised this fact in

their dealings with the people. This chapter is an attempt to prescnt a coherent picture

of the economy of Bamenda Division prior to the introduction of coffcc. The

discussion and analysis, which follow, will be done under six main rubrics- land

tenure, agriculture, livestock, craft production, transportation and tradc.

* Land Tenure

Land remains an indispensable factor for any agricultural dcvclopment. The

way the land is owned and distributed, and the laws governing land ownership arc of

paramount importance to the agricultural process. A system that allows land to be

conceiitrated in the hands of a privileged class does not only deprive the majority of

its c~tizens of this valuable factor, but also creates a foundation of ~nequality that can

beget social unrest. Co~iversely, land tenurcship that guarantees land rights to all

members of a society, provides a relatively levcl ground for thc ccononiic

advancement of its members. However, we do not presume that land is thc only factor

or condition that enhances economic developn~ent. Other factors not withstanding,

land remains a cardinal factor for economic development, especially for the NWP on

the eve of the introduction of coffee. The NWP of Cameroon had a land tenure system

that guaranteed land for every member of the society. The local custom did not give

rooill for the monopolisation of land by any single individual. Rather, as C.K. Mcck

has observed,

The land-owning unit may be the village, the "quarter" or ward (of village) or the lineage, - - - - according to- tbe localcustoin. It is probably true €0-say-d the Cameroons as a whole that the fundamental land-owning group is the lineage (or extended-family minus wives), whilc tlic fundamental farming unit is the extended-family (including wivcs). The head of thc lineage, or it may be of the extended-family or even of tlie household, allocates land and adjusts the allocation from time to time as requiredi

For most parts of the NWP, the chiefs acted as tlie custodians of tlie villagc lands.

Where the village was the largest autonon~ous political unit, the village head (chief,

.fan or afon) exercised a titular claim to all land within the village boundaries. Actual

control or practical rights over the land were vested in lineage heads wlio saw to it that

each member of the lineage had adequate land either for the cultivation of crops or for

the construction of new homes. The system gave little or no room for land

discrimination or appropriation. It provided checks and balances on tlie powers and

influences of the three interest groups involved in land tenurcship namely; tlie village

head, the lineage head and tlic ordinary citizens. As Kaberry has observcd,

The residuary rights of the paramount authority find exprcssion, as a rule, oiily in certain circun~stances, as for instance when a lineage dics out. Unless obligations have been flagrantly disregarded, any atteiiipt on the part of a titular owner to reclaim land held for generations by a particular lineage would provoke bitter resentndnt and opposition, and would be regarded as a breach of moral right and, indced, of ci~storn.~

Indeed, land was considered the most sacred of all the factors of production.

There existed an intinlate relationship between God, the earth, and the people wlio

lived on and cultivated the land. Land was reckoned as the link betwecn tlie ancestral

past, the present and the future. Productivity of the land was believcd to depend on

peaccful and harmonious relationship between the peoplc and the land. Rituals

carried out by lineage heads were an expression of dependence on the supcrnatural, of

gratitude for a plentiful harvest, and also of peace among the people. This trinity of

tlie supernatural, peace, and productivity or fertility acted as tlie most effcctivc check

on land tenureship. It ensured equity in land matters. Any attempt to appropriate land

from a member of the society against the laws of the land could provoke the wraths of

the gods of the land. The consequences of such actions could be poor harvest, wliicli

few leaders dared to risk. In fact, the situation for Nigeria as shown by C.K. Meek,

can equally pass for the pre-coffee landholding system and custom in the NWP:

Since land is God-given and the source of human sustenance, it bears a sacred character. Among many Nigerian peoples, indeed, the ground is itself a god or equated with Deity. Among the Ibo, for examplc, the earth is sacralized as 'Ala' the Earth-Deity, who is the fount of all fertility and the guardian of public morality. To sell land would, therefore, be sacrilege. Land is also sacred to the ancestors, who are regarded as ever-present members of the living society. "I conccive that land belongs to a vast family of which many arc dead, few arc living and countless members are still unborn," said a Nigerian chief In 19 1 z . ~

Because land was regarded as a link between the past, the present and the future, it

was not a common practice among most of the people of the grassflclds of Bamenda

to sell land. Two important considerations always came into play: the first and

perhaps, the most important, was the consciousiiess that one's ancestors lay buried i n

the lineage land and that their spirits were therefore always present on the land. Any

attempt to sell such land would provoke their spirits. The second consideration was

the fact that the land had to be handed down to posterity. Land was onc of the most

valuable assets that a man was required to bequeath to posterity on his death.

Therefore, no one could afford to leave his children or family landless by selling the

ancestral land while he was still alive. The need to sell or buy land did not often arise

because everybody had access to it. Some sylvan resources such as kola trees, raffia

palms, oil palms and plum, though also considered as belonging to the lineage or

family, with some degree of sacredness attached to them, could either be pawned or

sold if the owner or trustee found himself in a difficult situation. However, this had to

be done in consultation with the male dependents of the family, and only in cases of

necessity and never on a large scale.4

So far, we have argued that the system of land tenure, which existed in most of

the Grassfields of Bamenda prior to the introduction of coffee, guaranteed land

ownership to virtually all the members of the society. However, the rights of women

in this dispensation invite some comments. The NWP is one of those areas in Sub-

Saharan Africa with an established tradition where the hoe is the near preserve of the

women. Food crop cultivation in the North West was largely in the hands of the

women prior to the introduction of coffee and is still so to a large extent.'

By virtue of their economic position as cultivators of the land, women had the

right to usufruct. The traditions and customs of most of the groups in the North West

vested land in the lineage head or family head as already indicated. These lineagc and

family heads were usually men, and tradition demanded that they made land available

to every member of the family who was able and willing to cultivate it. As producers

of food crops, women put the land into agricultural use though men traditionally

owned it. Each woman had a given number of plots allotted to her on which she

cultivated different crops. As long as she cultivated her plot, she was under no

obligation to cede it to a kinsman.

If a woman got married far away from lier parental conipound and was not

prepared to make long daily and weekly journeys to her farm plots, the farms werc

either taken over by her mother or sisters. Where distance did not constitute a

problem, slie continued to farm the land for herself. Her opinion mattered in the

decision as to who took over her farmland if she could not continue to farm it. In a

situation where the farm plots were not required by any of the sisters or mother, they

reverted to grassland and were at the disposal of tlie lineage or family head. If slie

later became a widow or divorced her husband and desired to return to lier parental

home, slie resumed cultivation of her old plots if they had not been re-allocated or she

was given other a l~otments .~ This was the extent to which women had rights of

usufruct over land of their father's lineage. Marriage did not compromise these rights

in any way. However, as Kaberry has noted, " As a general rule, a married woman

found it convenient to have lier farms on the land of her husband's lineage. When a

man got married, the lineage head demarcated an area for him, and, in addition, his

own mother made one or two of her own plots available for the bride"'

What this means is that in the pre- coffee society of Banienda, a man and a

woman enjoyed almost similar rights when it came to making use of tlie land of both

parents and lineages. Both a man and a woman therefore had a number of altcrnativc

means of obtaining land. An individual retained the usufruct of plots received from thc

heads of the lineages of both parents. The tenure system did not give room for any

member of the society to be landless and it carried with it, the implicit assurance of

security of tenure. A change of tenure could not be effected without seeking and

obtaining the express consent and authorisation of the erstwhile cultivator of the land

in question. An individual who for any reason was no longer interested in a piece of

land that was formerly under his or lier use, had tlie free will to dccidc who took over

from him or her. However, the choice had to be witliin niendxrs of his or her I~ncage.

Generally, the concept of ownership in the pre-coffee economy of the NWP

had both moral and legal connotations as it involved trusteeship and responsibility.

The lineage head was the trustce of the land and in some cases, this includcd sylvan

resources such as raffia plantations and kola trccs. Hc was not the owner of thc land as

such. He had the primary responsibility of pronioting the welfare of his people, and

exercising his authority for the group as a whole, and granting to its members tlic

means necessary for their subsistence. It was inconceivable for a lineage head to deny

land to any one of his dependents as land was considered thc major resource.*

Agriculture

By 1923, Cameroon had been colonised for close to four decades. Howevcr,

this early phase of colonial influence would seem to have been concentrated in tlic

coastal part of the country and other more easily accessible areas. The hinterland and #

mountainous Banienda division remained largely unaffected up to the 1920s,

especially in the economic sphere. Most of its economic affairs were conducted in

much thc same way as it obtained before the colonial intervention. The exceptions

were a few central Fondoms like Bali and Mankon, which had had an carlicr taint of

colonial economic influence. This was particularly so with regard to agriculture, the

dominant pursuit of the people. This scenario contrasted with the coastal part whcrc

the Germans had already established large-scale plantations beforc the outbreak of the

First World War.

Agriculture constituted the dominant economic activity in Bamenda division

during this time. There was hardly any community or any individual who did not

practise agriculture in one forni or another. Even those who could be considercd as

traders or artisans also engaged in agriculture in onc form or another. As Ogunrcmi

has rightly observed with regard to the pre-industrial economy of Nigcria, in this type

of "specialisation", workers could not be identified with only one job but with a

multiplicity of jobs. A man could be a farnier in the morning, a tradcr in the afternoon

and an entertainer in the evcning. Hc could also be a farmer in tlic wet scason and a

full-time weaver in the dry season."

The common feature of this economic pursuit was its control by the indigencs.

Agriculture was wholly in the hands of the indigenes with the exception of a few

nomadic Fulani hcrdsmen. Almost all the clans and villages in the division produccd

the same kind of food crops or were able to producc most of thc crops. However, due

to edaphic factors, some crops were better adapted and more cniphasized in ccrtain

places than others. This led to some form of agricultural specialization and exchange.

Basically, a farmer depended on his own labour and that of his immediate and

extended family for agricultural production. Women did most of thc farming, whilc

the man's rolc was limited to clearing the farm and the planting of plantains. Plantains

were generally considered as a male crop in addition to sylvan crops like kola nut, thc

oil palm and the raffia palm. Regarding food crop production, it was, said Kabcrry,

"the women who carry out most of thc agriculture and thus contribute to the

subsistence of the household.""' b

She further observed that,

Throughout the province, sisters, or else a woman and her adolcsccnt or married daughter(s), commonly work together for the more onerous or monotonous tasks. The conlpanionship is prized as greatly as thc assistance, in that labour is lightened by a little gossiping over thc hoe, the small snack at midday, or an occasional pipe. Outside these family relationships, however, regular co-operation among womcn is rare in most of the Tikar tribcs'

While the above system was the vogue among the people of the Tikar group, it did not

find much favour among the Widikum, the Bali, Baniessi, and Ndop womcn. Thc

common organization among these people was the working team or the "working-

bee" which usually consisted of women or girls of the same agc group and from thc

same neighbourhood. They worked in the farms of members in turns. This practicc is

also widespread among some Igbo groups.

The men formed such working parties whose main objcctive was to clear the

farms for the women to cultivate. Such "working-bees" were also constituted during

the dry season to build houses and also to cut grass for the thatching of such houscs. I t

differed from that of the women in that membership did not necessarily require one to

be a kin or a close neighbour. Rather, the determining factor was one's ability, as

hardworking people often formed such groups while lazy ones were eschewcd. Thc

working party became very popular among tlie menfolk in Bamenda division with thc

introduction of coffee. This was as a result of the fact that the planting of coffee In

some cases required the cutting down of trees and clearing of thick bushes. Such work

was better done as a group. The regular clearing of coffee farms also dcmanded such

co-operation.

Owing to the predominance of the Sudan savannah vegetation, much the sanic

range of foodstuffs was grown throughout the province, as it still is thc case today.

However, microclimatic differences made some to be more eniphasised in particular

areas. Generally, the crops grown included maize, yams, beans, cassava, cocoyams,

plantains, finger millet, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, cowpeas, okra, nielon etc. In

addition to these food crops, were stimulants such as tobacco and kola nuts. The oil 1

palm and the raffia palm also constituted part of the wealth of tlie pcople of this

province and could be considered among the most important crops. Colonial

administrators reported the presence of most of these crops in many parts of thc

province.

Maize was arguably the most widely, and perhaps most intensively cultivated

of the food crops. It was one of the most preferred food crops for a number of reasons.

Foremost, it took a shorter period to mature and needed relatively less labour input

than most of the other crops. Secondly, it could be prepared in many ways and could

also be easily preserved for a year or two. This was the situation in places like Ndop,

Bali and Bafut. Ndop, however, had the upper hand in the production of niaize. As

J.C. Drummond-Hay observed,

The crops grown by the Bandop [Ndop] clans are extremely varied, but niaize forms the staple product of the farms and grows here in wild luxuriance. Twice a year this crop is sown, the first is planted at the beginning of the wet season in the months of February or March and harvested in May or June and the second crop is sown in September or October and harvested in December. 12

It was also grown in Banso, Metta, Ngwo, Babanki, Ngi and Nsungli (Nkambe).

Today, maize remains the staple crop in most of these areas. Most of the major

producers of maize were also major producers of guinea corn, for instance, Banso,

Nkambe, Babanki, Oku, Bafut and Bikom. In Bikon~, guinea corn production took

prominence over maize. These areas are mostly located to the eastern part of the

province.

Another crop of great importance and prevalence was the cocoyam, taro

(Colocasia esculenta). According to P.N. Nkwi and J-P. Warnier, this crop was

introduced into West Africa from Southeast Asia as early as 1500 A.D.I3 The crop

appears to have had an early entry into the economy of the NWP as evidenced by its

prevalence by 1923. Colonial assessment reports and oral evidence all point to the fact

that this crop had been well established in the province by the early twenties. With the

exception of the Bandop district, it was reportedly being cultivated in every other

district of the province. However, as with maize, it was more emphasised i n some * parts than in others. The western part of the province would seem to have been more

favourable to, and emphasised the cultivation, of cocoyams than others. This was the

case with Nkwen, Ngwo, Ngi, Metta, Mogamo and Bali where it constituted a major

staple.

Also of pre-eminence was plantain (Musa paradisiaca). This was one of the

most cultivated crops by the early part of the 20"' century and was unique for a

number of reasons. Firstly, of all the food crops, it was the only one that was

considered as a man's crop throughout the province. It was cultivated exclusively by

men. In a society where farming in general and food crop production in particular was

the preserve of women, this made the crop unique and special. Secondly, it was used

in funeral and birth ceremonies, and by most secret organisations. This crop enjoyed

the special advantage of being cultivated very close to the homes and so benefited

from compost manures. Drummond-Hay remarked that at Ndop, "plantains and

bananas grow in great profusion and are to be found near any con~pound while they 14 are also to be found in small plantations". G.V. Evans reported that in Kom,

"plantain and banana trees abound, though the former in quantity which grows in

clumps round the h o ~ s e s " . ' ~ G.B. Williams made similar observations in Ngwo,

stating that " The most important crops grown are plantains and cocoyams which, with

palm oil, form the staple articles of diet throughout the district . . .. Farming operations

arc carried out almost entirely by the women, the nian's share bcing confined to tlic

clcaring of the farm and setting of plantains."'6 1t was cultivatcd in many otlicr parts

of the province with much the same intensity and importance. From tlic importancc

attached to this crop, and its affiliation to men throughout the province, one is wont to

conclude that most of the people might have migrated to their present abode with tlic

crop.

Groundnut also deserves close examination here. Though it was never a prime

crop in any part of the province before the introduction of coffee, it was however

widespread and fairly popular. European owned factories in Nkongsamba, which was

also a railway terminus, provided a market for this crop. The prices offered by tlic #

European firms could not however encourage any significant increasc in the

production for export. Consequently, production remained relatively low and for

domestic consumption. While the entire province was involved in its cultivation in

varying degrees, the crop flourished chiefly in the low-lying areas of Mcnclium, Ndop

and Mbem. The era of groundnuts was still to come.

Before the outbreak of the First World War, German colonisation was

beginning to be felt in one area, namely, the introduction of the Irish potato. The

Germans introduced the Irish potato in the province just before the outbreak of the

First World War. However, the crop was not well propagated and so it did not rcadily

become popular. The Irish potato had an early introduction in places like Bali, Bikolii

and Ndop. As was the case with groundnuts, its era was also still to come, that is,

niany decades after the introduction of the crop in the country.

Sweet potatoes and yams also constituted a major source of food for most of

the peoples of the Bamenda Division. Like with most other food crops, certain parts of

the province were more conducive for their growth than others. These crops were

planted in farms alongside other crops like beans, maize, okra, pumpkin etc. Though

sweet potatoes and yams werc not cultivated intensively in any part of the Division,

these crops were amongst the oldest or traditional crops of the province. Different

types of yams were cultivated. Other crops such as cassava, watermelon and fingcr

millet were also cultivated. In addition to these food crops, werc a variety of

vegetables. In sum, so many different types of food crops were cultivatcd in the NWP

prior to the introduction of coffee.

In addition to the generally cultivated food crops, were a number of trec crops.

As was the case with some food crops, their cultivation was subjcct to the dictates of

ecology. Consequently, their cultivation was better cmphasised in arcas that possesscd

the appropriate natural conditions. The major difference between tlicse crops and othcr

crops lay in the fact that their cultivation or control was mainly in the hands of tlic

men in contrast to the other food crops, which were in the hands of thc women.

Outstanding among these crops was the oil palm. The oil palm was thc most

important food crop in that palm oil was a relish in the prcparat~on of virtually all #

major dishes in the province. However, not all the regions in the province wcre ablc to

meet up with their needs of this relish through domestic production. While the oil

palm grew in abundance in some communities, in others it was hardly seen. As a

rcsult, many communities had to look up to the ecologically favourcd for tlicir supply

of palm oil. There was hardly any conscious effort to plant the crop. Whcrc

conditions were conducive, it often grew naturally and luxuriantly. As Ogunremi has

observed,

The farmers, of course, realizcd that the trees werc too prccious to bc destroyed and efforts were often made to preserve them. The land rotation system peculiarly favoured them, as a piece of land n ~ ~ g h t be left fallow for up to fifteen years. During this long period the trees struggled for survival, and by the time the fallow period was over, tliey would have grown to full maturity, bearing fruits that were actually needed. "

The oil palm thrived on the periphery of the province, in river valleys and oil the edgc

of the forested escarpments that surround the highlands. These included lowcr

Mogamaw, Ngie, Meta, Misaje, Mbembe, Mfumte, Bafut, the Meiichum vallcy, in

Fungom along the Katsina Ala River. Thus palm oil had to be traded from tlic

outskirts of the province towards the centre where it was scarce and expen~ive . '~ The

oil palm was more prodigious in Ngie, but, the people of Ngie did not consider it cost

effective to take up oil processing as their main source of livelihood. Rather, tliey

chose to take up poultry farming where they exhibited a lot of adeptness and made

more economic gains. As it has been argued,

In the domestic economy, the oil palni commanded little market value, in spite of the uses to which it was put. This was so because of its ubiquity and its profusion. Individual ownership was unknown except in respect of those palms growing around homesteads. Any person who had the need, could harvest palm fruits on any comn~unal farmland or land under fallow. Production was basically for family consuinption.. .. I 0

This assertion holds true of the domestic economy of Ngie where tlie crop was

in abundance. The decision by the Ngie not to take up palm oil extraction as

their major livelihood was not seen by the British colonialists as infom~ed by

rational economic considerations, but rather, as a mark of the "lazy native". Hc

was thought of as one who could not take advantage pf economic opportunities

and did not realise or appreciate the wealth that could be got from the oil palm.

A.E. Tweed, a colonial administrator, wrotc of Ngie men as too lazy to extract

more than a little of the oil from the palm trees in which their land was rich,

and preferred to lie about in the sun.20 Stereotypes such as this wcre rccyclcd

as late as the fifties when P.M. Kaberry asserted that;

Without the incentive to accumulate wealth for marriage, the temptation for the average male to sink back into a state of bibulous lethargy would, I think, prove overwhelming, particularly in view of the fact that thc women provide most of the food and, as yet, there is littlc dcmand for European articles.. . As it is, the Ngie or Esimbi man contrives to spend a good deal of time over his cup of palni wine, cracking kernels i11 thc village-shelter, recounting the erstwhile glories of his tribe, bemoaning the tribulations of the present - in particular, the payment of tax, the disrespect shown by the younger generation, the increasing stubbornness of ~ o m e n f o l k . ~ ' .

It is common knowledge that such stereotypes were the vanguard of colonialism

propagated to show the world that European colonisation of Africa was a necessary

altruism. The truth is that the people of Ngie, like those in the rest of tlie province,

were very responsive to market forces. As such, they only took up economic activitics

that they deemed rewarding at a given period of time. When the demand, and

consequently, the price of palm oil increased both in the domestic and intcrnational

markets, the Ngie became the producers of palm oil par excellence in the province.

In addition to being a rclish, palm oil was f~irtlicr put to other uscs, such as the

making of soap and body cream. Thc kernel was catcn, cspccially in tinies of food

scarcity. The establishment of the German factory in Nkongsamba during tlic first

decade of the twentieth century for the processing of palm kemcls, and the

construction of a railway line which linked Nkongsaniba to the sea, heiglitened the

deniand for palm kernels in the province. This also increascd the value of tlic oil palm.

In other words, the oil palm, hitherto neglected, becamc highly valued.

The raffia palm (Rapilia spp) was another tree crop of great importance. It grcw

prolifically and luxuriantly throughout the province. Its importance lies in the fact that

it did not only provide drinklbeverage and food for the people, but also matcrial for

building, weaving, plaiting, furniture, fishing, etc. Like the oil palm, it was also a b

man's crop and still remains so to a large extent. But unlikc the oil palm, i t was

consciously cultivated and at the death of its owner, ownership passed on to his licir.

The two crops are of tropical African origin. The raffia palm was important i n tlie

livcs of tlic people in many respccts. Drummond-Hay capturcd tlic centrality of tlic

raffia palm in the lives of the people of the NWP when he stated that:

From the native point of view, the most important tree in their country IS

the raphia palm (Raphia vingera). To them this is a nzultunz in plzrvo for its uses are countless. The palm supplies the wine drunk in this country (no oil palm wine is drunk); it is used in the making of houscliold furniture, in the building of their houses almost to the exclusioil of other timber, for making mats, bags, fish traps, ropes, and torches; for bridging small streams, for the making of raft-like canoe, and an infinity of other useful articles.22

E.G. Hawkesworth made a similar assessment when he noted that "The false rapliia

palm is found in large quantities and plays a most important part in the lives of tliesc

peoples. They are entirely dependent upon it for building material and its plenty has

produced better housing conditions than elsewhere. It is also used for tlie manufacture

of beds and stools while large supplies of palm-wine are obtained from it."2' So, while

the oil palm provided the essential ingredient and livelihood, the raffia palm provided

wine and the much-needed material for human habitat.

Kola (Cola nitida and Cola anomala) has a long established history in thc

economic life of thc people of the NWP. Like the oil palm and the raffia palm, the

crop is indigenous to the region and its cultivation needs little attcntion. It was an

important crop, which inspired much economic activity not only for the farmers but

also for thc internal and long-distance traders. As J.P. Wainier has rightly statcd,

"until the introduction of coffee cultivation in the Grassfields. kola was the most

important export crop. By 1850, the Grassfields kola nuts were well known i n Takum,

yola, and all the way to orn no".^^ One may add here that the trend continued up to

1923 and cven beyond. Major producing areas were Kom, Oku, Bambui, Bambili,

Bafochu, Bali Nyonga, Banso, and Ndu. The kola tree flourished in thcse placcs i n

great profusion. Metta, Ngie and Ngwo also produced some amount of kola. As stated #

above, most of the kola ended up in Northern Nigeria while some were sold in places

like Banyo and Mambila in Northern Cameroon. Dealers in kola could headload 1000

to 1200 nuts north to either Nigeria or other areas of Cameroon where they had a

ready market for the product. People from different parts of the province used

different routes to get to the same destination and the time taken to and from the

market, varied according to points of departure and ports of call.

The kola nut was traded internally to a reasonable degree. Sonlc of the long-

distance traders bought their nuts from middlemen while a substantial an~ount was

also consumed within the province. Kola served a lot of useful purposes anlong the

people. Firstly, it was used in most ritual ceremonies. Secondly, it was a stimulant

cherished by many, and thirdly, it was taken as an accompaniment to palm wine,

which was quite popular in the province. For these reasons, demand was generated for

the product from within and consequently traded internally.

Other crops of economic importance found in the province prior to thc

introduction of coffee included rubber, cotton, tobacco, shca and cocoa. Whilc somc

of them grew in the wild, others were consciously planted, though to a much lcsscr

extent than the crops named earlier.

Rubber was found in the region of Ndop in great abundance. Though it did not

seen1 to be indigenous to the area, it had been part of the plant culture of the peoplc

for long. The people of Ndop are thought to have brought the tree with them, whcn

they migrated to their present abode. Somc quantity of rubber was also fouild in Bafut.

It is probable that the rubbcr in Bafut was introduced i n the same way as that of Ndop.

Cotton was known in two areas, Banso and the Ndop regions. Unlikc rubbcr, it

is indigenous to these areas. The knowledge to transfom~ cotton into finished cloth

had been acquired before the introduction of coffee into the economy of Bamenda

Division. This led to deliberate cultivation of the crop. It is very likely that without the

colonial intervention, this crop and the accompanying technology would havc diffi~sed

to other parts of the province given its savannah vegetation which makes it conducive

for cotton cultivation. b

Tobacco, a stimulant, was planted and consumed in virtually all the districts i n

the province, though the quantity planted in many villages was minuscule. The major

producers of this stimulant were Banso and to some extent, Pinyin. A fair amount of

trade took place in this product and in Banso, it was only second to kola as an cxport

crop.

Shea (Butyrospermunt parkii) grew in large quantities in the Ndop region on

the foothills north of Bamunka and also on the eastern side of the area betwccn

Bamessi and Bangola. Some cocoa trees also grew in Ngie but the origin of this cocoa

has not bcen clearly established.

The foregoing was the general picture of crop production in the province prior

to the introduction of coffee. Evidently, some of the crops were produced in limited

quantity, scope, and may have even been of poor q u a l i t y . ' ~ l i e ~ remained, howcver,

good indices of the agricultural potentialities of the region. There is no doubt that

many of the crops would have diffused from areas of origin or high production to

areas of low production or no production at all were it not for external intervention.

Also, the quantity and quality of some of these crops would have been improved upon

with an increase in demand. By and large, agriculture was not all about crop

production alone. The raising of livestock, fishing and hunting all constituted an

integral part of agriculture.

Livestock

Apodictically, livestock rearing has been part of the culture of the people of the

North West from time immemorial. They did not only serve as a source of protein, but

also as a means of payments. Livestock formed an important part of the bride wcalth

and they were also used in the settlement of debts and in dispute negotiations. Mere

ownership of certain animals was a reflection of one's social standing. Before the

advent of the Fulani humped cattle in the province, there existed the dwarf cows.

Ownership of these cows was restricted to chiefs and in some cases, other members of

the ruling class. The chiefs slaughtered some of the cows on special occasions.

According to Warnier, the part of a slaughtered animal received by any individual

reflccted his position in society; and exclusively princes used the horns of the dwarf b

25 cows as drinking cups. Because only the ruling elite could own cows, the animal

never became as common and widespread among the people of the Ban~enda Division

as other domestic animals.

With respect to cattle, the major grazers were not the indigencs, but rather,

Fulani herdsmen. Quite naturally, the savannah vegetation of the province is very

conducive to cattle grazing. As such, the area started attracting a good numbcr of

Fulani herdsmen from 1917. By 1923, their number in the division had become

substantial. The availability of phosphate springs in Babungo, salt licks in Bikom and

salt-springs in Babanki and Babanki-Tungaw were attractions needed to complcment

the abundant fodder in the Division. The result was an ever-increasing number of

cattle in the province. By 1923, the number of Fulani cattle in the province was

already in the thousands.

The horse was another animal that symbolised power and authority. it was

introduced in the province by the Balis who had used it in Northern Cameroon for

warfare before migrating to their present abode. As a result, they had more of this

animal than any other district of the province. When subsequently the horse was

introduced into any other district, it was mainly for the chiefs. In Banso, in addition to

cows, sheep for the most part were the preserve of chiefs and elders. On the whole,

goats, sheep, pigs, fowls, cows and to a lesser extcnt horses, were raised by the people

of Bamenda. Generally speaking, livestock werc well looked after, huts being built for

them in some villages while in others, they depended upon the eaves of dwclling

houses for protection. As a rule, the rearing of livestock was the preserve of the men,

except in Bikom whereby poultry farming was the domain of the women. But poultry

farming as an cconomic activity, flourished most in Ngie. Indeed, the people of Ngic

were the poultry farmers of the province par excellence and the colonialists were very

impressed with what they saw there with regard to this profession. A.E. Tweed noted

that:

The Ngi are still the keenest if they cannot in fact be reckoned the only poultry-farmers in the Division. They collect special food for thc fowls, and often in the heat of the day carry them to 9 shady spot far from their compounds where they tend them till towards evening. It is not uncommon to come across one or two men in a patch of forest lying down and watching a few hens with their chicks. Sometimes the men are making a raffia bag while they sit and watch, but more often they do nothing but dig up a piece of ground, in which the fowls can grub, and kecp an eye open for hawk^.^"

Hunting is one of the oldest human pursuits. It was equally an old and

commonly practised occupation in Bamenda. It was a major means by which many

families obtained meat while domestic animals were preserved nlostly for special

occasions and for trade. In addition, hunting was also carried out for economic

reasons: both fresh and smoked animals could be found being sold in the market. Thc

socio-cultural attractions of this profession would seem to have been evcn strongcr

than the mere need for meat. While animals were generally hunted for food, sonic

parts of certain animals constituted an important socio-cultural attraction. The skins of

certain animals were used for amulets. Some animals were of a special iniportance in

the society and - their - body parts served different purposes such as decorative, and

identification. For example, only a chief or person of great achievements was allowed

to wield the tail of a buffalo or drink from its horn while the skin of animals such as

tiger, hyena, leopard and lion were used by titled men and brave hunters for

decoration. Such animals were highly prized and it required much courage arid skill to

kill them and as such, high premium was placed on them. Hunters who killed such

animals were highly praised and given a plume as Izor~oris gratia. As Warnier and

P.N. Nkwi have rightly observed, "Hunters who killed a leopard were rewarded by

being feasted like courageous warriors. They were allowed to stick a red primary

feather of the turaco bird in their cap. It was believed that fons (natural rulers) could

transform themselves into leopards, and so they had an exclusive right on slain

leopards and on leopard pel ts ."27~e should add here that hunters who killed the above

listed animals were also greeted with some respect and adoration.

Fishing was a more circumscribed economic activity limited by the availability

of slow running water. The mountainous nature of the province did not permit nluch

fishing. The major fishing district was the Ndop plain where the lakes and pools

provided a good habitat for fish. Fishing Provided employment for a substantial

proportion of the Ndop population as it still does today. It was only in Ndop that we

had people who practised fishing as a profession. Here, fishing was carried out alnlost

round the year. Some of the fish caught were impaled on a stick and smoked for tlic

market while some were reserved for home consuniption. A limited amount of fish~ng

also took place in Bafut in the Mezam River, Bassa, Bakwa and Konda in Njikwa sub-

division.

Craft Production

Iron Working:

The lynchpin of thc economy of this Division was the iron industry. It provided

matcrial for the sustenance of virtually every other industry, ranging from farming,

hunting, weaving, fishing, to carving. Bamenda Division was self-sufficient in iron

production and the people had acquired the art of smithing and smelting long before - - - - - - -

t h e afienlofEuropeGi cZlorGalis%. As Jeffrey~ observed, "when Europeans first

arrived in Bamenda there were extensive foundries and smithies. Thus iron slag has

been reported from Bamenda-Nkwe, Big Babanki, Abu, Alor, Me, Mbetscn-Oku,

Wum, We, Isu, Zoar, Fungom, Nyus, Bum, Nga, Finfaka, Ntong, Lus, Gom, Ntu

Menang, Bafanji, Mbamba, Oku, Babungo, Ntshangi, Iba, Njigijem, Missaje, Ntundip,

Banten Springs, Mbu, Kwaja, Laakom and Bainessing. At Babungo are astonishing

slag heaps. Some of these are well over fifteen feet high and cover half an acrc of

ground." Such an accumulation of slag is found nowhere else in the division and

points to a long occupation of metal craftsn~anship he adds." The prominence and

antiquity of the iron industry in Bamenda can hardly be disputed. For, Nkwi and

Warnier have corroborated Jeffreys' observation stating that:

The Western Grassfields people may be proud of their traditional iron industry, which is the biggest one on record for the whole of Africa, judging by the number of workshops and the average yearly output computed from the volume of the debris that can still be seenS2"

The headquarters of the iron industry in the division was the Ndop district. Here, thc

art of the smith and the necessary allied trades of iron smelting and charcoal burning #

formed the most important industry of the area, employing possibly 16% of thc able-

bodied male population. Oku, Babungo and Bamessi were the main centres. Most of

the ore used in these centres was gotten from the slags of ancicnt smiths while somc

was smelted from limonite iron ore. In some instances, a person combined smclting

and snithing. Generally, however, craftsmen usually specialised in one or the other.

Smiths also specialised in the production of one or two items. For instance, there wcrc

those who specialised in making hoes, knives and spearheads or axe heads, traps, and

machetes. A craftsman could also specialise in making gongs, fish hooks etc. In such

areas where iron ore could be easily reached, a person in need of an articlc brought

iron ore and charcoal to the smith. For his pay, the smith kept some of the ore or

article produced.

Charcoal burning was an indispensable adjunct of the iron industry. In Oku, the

charcoal burner exchanged his charcoal for articles of the forge. In addition to thc

charcoal, the charcoal b u g q was expected- tcl blow he be1 l o w for-the ffi7if11-wko p - p - p - - - - -

produced the implement he desired. It was only rarely that a smith took his own

articles to the market; it was almost a rule for a middleman to buy them and pcddle thc

articles from one market to another. In this way, articles produced by the smiths, werc

carried from the centre of the division where most of the foundries were located, to thc

areas where these articles could not be produced. One should co~mnient here that the

iron industry of Bamenda is fast becoming a thing of the past. As Jcffreys has

bemoaned, "Cheap European iron hoes, machetes, and knives have sounded the death

knell of the local foundrymen, though this craft revived during the war when the

European supplies of iron ware were cut off."30 In a somewhat coluplementary

remark, Ndishiango stated that up to, and during the German control of tlic

Cameroons, most Oku men were blacksmiths. When the British came, many of tlic

Oku men went trading instead to lbi on the Benue or to Buea and other places on tlic

coast and so the number of ironworkers in Oku has steadily and significantly

decreased. 3 ' From the above, there is no doubt that colonialism impacted very

negatively on the iron industry in Bamenda. b

Weaving:

Weaving was one of the most popular and widespread of the traditional

industries of Bamenda. It was as diversified as it was popular. The main articles

woven included bags, baskets, mat, fishing nets, caps and cloth. The type of weaving

adapted in an area was in response to the material needs of the people as dictated by

the natural environment. Weaving was also a reflection of man's interaction with liis

material environment, as the people used mostly the material that was available in

their local environment. According to Antoinettte Rast-Eicher, differences in

technique and form of basketry (weaving) demonstrate differences between cultures.

She adds that they also reflect differences in the materials available to people in a

particular region, and indicate the lives those particular people led, and their particular

need for objects for storage etc.j2 1n Bamenda, even within the same conmunity or

ethnic group, differences could be discerned. Every craftsman tried to make liis or her

article unique by giving it beauty and elegance. For, a craftsman who distinguislled

himself in his field earned honour, admiration and respect from his conlmunity. Every

community had its weavers of one genre or the other. The raffia palm, as

demonstrated earlier, provided the raw material for a variety of crafts. Cotton and

other plants, which varied with local environments, were also used. Though every

community was involved in weaving to some dcgrec, not evcry community attaincd

thc same level of dexterity. Sccondly; certain communitics were morc endowcd and

more specialised in one or two items.

The Meta particularly distinguished then~selves as the best basket and bag

wcavers of thc division. The British colonialists were quite amazed at what they saw

of this industry and G.J.A. Gregg reported of it in glowing tcrnis:

For workmanship and strength thc native basket is as good as thosc made in England. The design is not queer and could be used without comment in our own streets. The native will cover a bottle or a ten gallon water jar with exquisite wickcr work quite equal to those seen in luncheon baskets in the English shops. Very beautiful bags are rnadc by the Metas, extremely soft, and coloured red with a camwood dye, or many coloured by the numerous nativc vegetable dye: which the native knows how to prepare.33

Raffia bag weaving was equally well developcd in the Ndop district, cspccially in

Bamessing. Here, it was given a rare touch of beauty and value. It was also popular in

Ngwo, Bafut, Nkambe, and Banso. Each villagc or comn~uiiity produccd ~ t s own bags

in a unique and intrinsic way and they n ~ c t the diffcrent needs of tlic pcople.

Basket making was adjunctive to bag weaving. Most of the communities that

werc talented in bag weavlng wcre also good producers of baskets. This was the casc

with Meta as already shown, Bamessing, Bali, Ngwo, Bafut and Ess~rnb~ - pro~iiinent

for back-pack baskets, and Kom. While the men mostly used bags, thc wonicn

predominantly used baskets for carrying crops froni the farms. Spccial baskcts wcrc

designed for the hcadloading of piglets, fowls and kola nuts ovcr long distanccs for

sale. The mat was also a product of significance from the weaving industry. Different

types werc made in different places for different purposes. Generally, mats wcrc

meant to serve as floor and wall carpets, bedspreads, and as umbrellas.

There was a burgeoning textile industry in Bamenda prior to the introduction of

coffee Into the economy. This industry made use not only of cotton, but also of fibrc

froni the raffia palm, certain bark of trees, and othcr local plants processed for tlic

purpose. Sankie Maimo has clearly stated the point,

Eventually, a local cloth industry sprang up in Wum area. Certain coveted cloths (like Kom cloth) were actually made locally. Some used certain barks of trees, which they treated with certain liquids and had them beaten out and dyed to give the cloth an attractive appearance. There were local looms and their presence encouraged the weaving of diverse things; raffia came in very handy and was used e x t e n s i v ~ l ~ . ' ~

Textile had already taken roots in Banso, Nkambe, Bikom and Ndop districts before

the colonial intervention. In Bafut, Bali, Meta and other parts of the division, it was

still gaining grounds. This activity was carried out more by the men than thc womcn.

The products of this industry were mostly cloths and caps. The caps, striped bluc and

white, were made from cotton and worn mostly by traditional rulers and men of titlc.

The techniques of textile production might not have been as sophisticatcd and wcll t

developed as was the case in some other parts of Africa by this time. Be that as it may,

it was efficient for its purpose and was expected to improve with timc. Howevcr, thc

textile industry of the Division, like other industries, was ill-fated and suffered thc

brunt of colonialism. The development of indigenous industries was considcred

antithetical to the economic goals of colonialism and as such, thcy were ncvcr

encouraged and in some cases, they were outrightly discouragcd. This was the casc in

Nkambe (Nsungli) where cloth- making was discouraged by the Gcrmans so as to pre-

empt any competition with European manufactured ~10 th . '~

Pottery and Carving:

The products of pottery industry were mostly utensils for everyday use but thc

pottery industry itself was, to a large extent, circumscribed. The acquisition of the

necessary skills for this art and the location of the industry itself were dictated by the

availability of the required raw material, clay. Nkwi and Warnicr's assertion that

ordinary pottery was produced everywhere in the Grassfields does not seen1 to havc

much evidence in its favour. Available evidence suggests that the main producers of

pottery wares were found in Bamessing, Mbissa, Bali, Meta, Bamumkumbit, Awing,

Mitunlbe and Bafanji. However, Bamessing would seem to have established an

enviable artistic and technical mastery of the art. By and large, earthcnwares were

made by women, except in Mbissa where men made clay pots. The material used was

mostly clay gotten from the bed of streams. The wheel was never used in thc

production of earthenwares in Bamenda and the tools and techniques of production

were simple. Clay tobacco pipes were not moulded but carved. Jeffreys has obscrvcd

that, because clay tobacco pipes were the product of a wood carving tccliniquc

applied, not to a plastic, but to stiff clay, the craft was purely in tlie hands of n ~ e n . ~ ~ '

The finished products of pottery were used mainly for storing palm wine, cooking

food, brewing millet beer, serving food, and to a lesser extent, for storing water. Tlic

calabash remained the main vessel for carrying and storing water in most parts of

Banienda prior to the colonial intervention. The majority of the Division that was not

cndowed with the raw material and consequently could not produce eartlienwares, had

to rely on tlie producing regions for their pottery supplies. People in the South West of

the Division such as Ngwo had to travel to Obudu in present day Cross River State of

Nigeria to procure their pottery needs.

Carving was allied to pottery as exemplified in Carved clay tobacco pipes.

However, carving was not all about clay tobacco pipes alone nor was clay the only

material used in carving. It was not even the main material used in carving. Wood was

central to this industry as it still is today. The products of the industry included

mortars, bowls, pestles, stools, doorposts, figurines, tam-tanis, beds, tlironcs, sccptrcs,

spoons etc. Because some of the products of woodcarving such as doorposts, tam-

tams, mortars, and bowls were bulky but very necessary in every community, they

were produced in almost every district. Nevertheless, Babanki, Babungo, Bamessi and

Oku did achieve enviable artistic and technical excellence that went beyond tlie

general run of the craft.

Others, such as salt and leather industries, were relatively less developed, The

salt needs of the people had to be met through external trade as would be seen later in

this work. There were hardly any professional leather workers. This was so probably

because the people relied mostly on wild animals for their leather works, which could

not be easily and readily available. Nevertheless, hides and skin were being exploited

to some degree in this Division. Such important items like baby carriers, drums, bags,

scabbards, and amulet casings wcrc made from the hides and skins of both do~iiestic

and wild animals. The hides of animals such as antelopes, hyenas, dccr and tigcrs

were highly prized because they were preferred in this nascent industry.

Transportation

We have attempted to show the types of agricultural and craft production in

Bamenda Division prior to the introduction of coffee. As demonstrated, certain arcas

wcre more endowed than others while some ernphasised and specialised in the

production of particular commodities. Such goods or co~mnodities wcre made

availablc to the areas of deficient production through trade. Trade on the other hand,

entailed transportation, which has always played a cardinal role in economic

development and has a functional relationship with trade. Transportation bridges thc

gap between the producer and the consumer. Norton relates it specifically to

specialisation and notes that:

Transportation enablcs society to enjoy advantages of specialisation, of resources, and the benefits of division of la8our by making it possible for products to be brought [transported] distances thus avoiding the necessity for local production needs.37

Admittedly, the modes of transportation in pre-coffee Bamenda were not quite

sophisticated. The mountainous nature of the terrain, the absence of navigable rivers

and the late introduction of pack animals did not help things. All the same, the people

had been ablc to adapt to their environment and responded to the challenge by using

human porterage as their major means of transportation. Men head-loaded kola nuts,

salt, piglets, fowls, palm oil etc in special baskcts designed for the purpose and

trekked hundreds of kilometres to sell their goods and also bought articles of need on

return. Women used backpack baskets in transporting goods of siniilar nature,

including food items. Pack animals were of limited use and it was only among the Bali

that the horse was of common use before the advent of the Mbororo Fulani cattle

herdsmen. Here, it was not commonly used for carrying goods but rather, for human - - - - - - -

transportation- Many early works on thepdiiGibnY including colonial assessment

reports, would seem to have taken more interest in the trading activities of the people

without attempting to show how the goods were being transported. This ~mbalance

may be explained by the lack of vehicular and water transport and even pack animals.

Because of the lack of these modes of transport, this aspect of the economy has always

been overlooked. Nevertheless, the absence of these modes of transportation did not

mean thc absence of transportation as an cconomic activity nor did it P I -CVCII~ thc

people from transporting their goods from one place to the other. Human portcragc

bccame the main mcans of transportation and some people earned their living from

being carriers. Royal retainers performed the function of carriers in royal trade, a

function that was somctimcs performed by slaves.

Though transportation was not all about tradc, it was in t l~c main, an cssential

agent in trade. Tradc, like transport, is known to play a cardinal role in any cconomy.

It is a catalyst to cconomic growth and a mechanism by which an economy is movcd

from subsistence to a market level. During the period under consideration, trade in

Bamenda, like in many other societies, was carried out at two Icvels. Thcrc was b

intcrnal and external trade. In this work, we consider as internal tradc, trading

activities that took place within the Division. Internal trade mostly took placc in thc

marketplace. Polly Hill has described West African marketplaces as:

The sites at which people meet regularly in ordcr to acquirc and or dispose of locally produced and imported goods and scrviccs, to exchange information with relatives, friends and strangers, and to engage in recreational activities. Meetings occur at thesc specific sites according to a set temporal schedule, with gatherings daily, or on evcry second, third or nth day, where n rarely is greater than eight.''

By and large, markets in Bamenda were held once in an eight-day traditional week.

Contiguous communities tended to form themselves into a market ring, so arranged

that no two markets would take place on the same day. Commenting on such an

arrangement, Sankie Maimo has noted that "It is not without significance that thc

market days do not fall on the same day. One could travel from South to North

following the markets, which were on the route in each locality; the market day, was a

day of rest and one had to take a holiday from work on the farm". This arrangement

was not only convenient; it greatly encouraged and facilitated internal tradc in no

small way.3" It enabled hawkers and buyers to attend the markets that held on days

that were convenient to them to either procure particular items or sell trading articles.

Following this arrangcmcnt, a trader could convcniently attend all the maskcts of thc

week.

The organisation of the marketplace was orderly. There were different

allotments for the sale of different wares; that for the salc of game, pottery, kola nuts,

livestock, palm oil, foodstuff, kernels, liquor, salt etc. The markcting of foodstuff was

largely in the hands of women while the men engaged in the salc and purchasc of

kernels, palm oil, livestock, salt, clothes and petty merchandise. Men were niorc

engaged in these articles because they were mostly articles of long distance trading

and long distance trade was in the hands of men. Men's dominance of long distancc

trade was as a result of the physical demand of this activity. Long distancc trade in

most cases entailed many days of very engaging journeys on foot. The physically #

demanding nature of the exercise therefore prevented women and the lcss physically

fit from participating in it. Women on the other hand, dominated the marketplace and

in most cases, short distance trading.

In the areas characterized by chiefdoms, large or small, some dcgrcc of royal

regulation of trade existed. This was expressed most frequently in the control of

markets, which were policed by royal retainers or the masquerades of a regulating

society." The marketplace was the centre of a system of comn~unication between thc

palace and the people. Announcements were made at it by designated officers, public

tasks assigned and criminals admonished, trade with hostile groups forbidden, and

new market sites and days declared. Most markets were located near palaces or close

to major village shrines.

During the period under review, barter was still very much in vogue among the

peoplc of Bamenda. It was particularly common in internal trade. Nevertheless, barter

did not discount the use of other mediums of exchange such as brass rods, iron rods,

cowries, beads, salt, guns etc. The introduction and use of European currcncies did not

stop the circulation of these ancient mediums of exchange either. The diffcrent

mediums circulated pari passu.

Long Distance Trade

Long distance trade is difficult to define with precision. Mcillassoux has

pointed out that, "to define the institution through physical critcria (distanccs

involved) or the nature of the goods as "prestige", "luxury" or "food" itcms docs not

seem very helpful. Relative criteria are more useful, such as tlic notion of

complementary geographical zones producing goods not available or scarce in

neighbouring communities, that is, as Amin points out, goods which do not conipetc

with local production."4' In this work, we are going to consider as long distance tradc,

trading transactions that went beyond the boundaries of the different districts in the

Division. In this category, we will also include trading activities that went beyond the

boundaries of the present day NWP (what we have terped as external trade). Thcre

existed a mutually rcinforcing relationship between internal and long-distance trade.

Internal trade was a feeder of long-distance tradc and vice versa. External trade

followed three main directions. The northern part of the division was conimcrcially

attached to Northern Nigeria, while the Western part did carry out most of its

commercial transactions with Eastern Nigeria, mainly Calabar. The Eastern portion

was morc linked commercially to East Cameroon (French administered Cameroon).

This was the general scenario but there were cases where people in the West prefcrrcd

to sell in and buy from French Cameroon while those from the Eastern part of thc

Division travelled to Northern Nigeria.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Bamenda had four main articles of

international trade. These were kola, kernels, ivory and slaves. However, by 1923, the

trade in slaves and ivory was already fizzling out while palm kernel and kola nuts

were the chief attractions of foreign or external trade. These articles wcrc exportcd in

two main directions. While most of the kola in the Division was exportcd to Nortlicrn

Nigeria, palm kernel was carried and sold mainly in Nkongsamba in Frcnch

administered Cameroon. From Ndop, palm kernel was head-loaded to Nkongsamba

through Bali-Kurnbat; a journey which took six to seven days. Palm l<ernels from

Bafilt, Wum, Ngwo, Meta, Bikom etc were also head-loaded to and sold in

Nkongsamba. The time taken by thc traders to Nkongsamba and back varied with

individuals and places of departure. Some amount of kcrnel fro111 Bamenda was also

exported to Calabar via Manife.

Palm kernel from Bamenda had a good market in Nkongsamba, but ltola nut

from Bamenda had a better markct in Northern Nigeria. Bamenda Division was a

major producer of kola as we have already seen. Most of this product ended up in

Northern Nigeria where it was particularly relished. Some of the major producing

areas were Bafolicu, Bali Nyonga, Bambili, Banso, Ndu, Oku and Kom. Unlike palm

kernel, which was traded to Nkongsamba by people from all parts of the Division, the

trade in kola nuts was largely in the hands of the Bansos and Bikoms. Kunibo market

was the entrcpot for kola from Bamenda and Bagam. Most Kola from the Southern

part of the Division and Bagam (French Cameroon) was sold in Kuinbo market wlicre

it was bought by Banso, Bikoin and Hausa traders and then taken to Northern Nigcria.

The main markets for the kola in Northern Nigeria were Ibi, Takum, Yola and

Makurdi. From Northern Nigeria, salt, leathcr, cloth, beadsand mats were bought and

brought into the division for sale. Traders from the southwestern part of the Division

(Ngwo, Ngie, Meta) sold their kola in the Eastern Nigerian town of Obudu. Those

who were more physically fit proceeded to Northern Nigeria where thcy made more

profit by selling the kola there. Salt, cloths, guns, gunpowder, beads, cowries and

other European manufactures also entered Bamenda from Nigeria.

Slavery and Slave Trade

Slavery and slave trade were practised in Bamenda to some degree. Slavcry, as

an institution, existed in some societies even before the traiis-Atlantic slavc tradc

began. Those enslaved were persistent debtors, war captives, murderers and othcr

criminals. As time went by, and as the demand for slaves increased during the trans-

Atlantic slave tradc, the bulk of the traffic was no longer meant for don~estic purposes

but for export. Some sources suggest that up to the First World War, sonic slave

dealing was still going on in ~ a m c n d a . ~ ~ Slaves from Bamenda wcre sold in thrcc

main areas. Most of the slaves from the south western part wcre sold in the Mamfc

region but ended up in Calabar from whcre they were then transported to North

America and the Caribbean. Some were sold through Banlilikc to Douala. A third

group went to Northern Nigeria through Takum. Generally, slaves were cxchangcd for

guns, cloth, salt, beads and cowries. Some were even exchanged for donlcstic animals

such as goats. Those sold from Bamenda were mostly adult malcs; tlic women and

children were mostly integrated into domestic economy. Chilver has observed that

female slaves had an obvious value as wives and workers i'n societies where the bulk

of food farming was done by them. Boys had some value as servants and wcrc

assimilated as pages, royal-wine tappers and firewood carrier^.^' I t was for these

reasons that women and children were always re-integrated into the donicstic

economy. In some Bamenda chiefdoms, the trade in slaves was a monopoly of tlic

royal family and members of the royal court. Neverthcless, by c. 1904, most of the

external trade had fizzled out and most of the slaves sold to Calabar wcrc dcploycd in

Efik and lgbo owned oil palm plantations. Meanwhilc, donlcstic slavcry lingcrcd on

up to 1 92444 in some Bamenda chiefdoms.

The discussion in this chapter permits the following conclusion. Firstly, the

economy was not sophisticated judged by the standards of our time; yct it was not

static. Secondly, it was a functional economy, which met up with most of the nccds of

the people. Where the needs could not be sufficiently catered for through local

production, this was done through trade. Thirdly, the indigenous iron industry

provided the tools required by the people. Weaving, carving, pottery and basketry had

been developed to an admirable level by the standard of the time, while a textile

industry was burgeoning. The system of land tenure guaranteed land for every

member of the society

I t was against this economic background that the coffee crop was introduced.

However, the in~position of colonialism in general and the introduction of coffee in

particular was going to have a remarkable impact on the pre-existing economy. To this

matter, thc ncxt chapter turns.

Notes and References

-

I C.K. Meek, Lurid Terzure arm' Lmrl Arlrninistrutior~ irl Nigeritr urld ,he C~nrernorrs, London: II.M.S.0, 1957 P. 362.

2 Kaberry, Wornen of the Grassjields, P. 30

week, Land Tenure unrl Lund Adminisfrntiorl P. 1 13

Kaberry, Women of the Grassfields p. 36

1-1. Bauman, "The division of Work according to sex in African Hoe Agriculture", Afi-icn, 1, 1928. Pp 289 - 3 19. See also Kaberry, Worncn of the Grussficlds. P. 27.

Kaberry, Wor~~erz of the Grussjields P . 40

8 P.M. Kaberry, "Land Tenure Among the Nsaw of the British Cameroons", AFRICA, Volume 20 1950. P 320.

R.O. Ogunremi, Counting the Cumels: The Ecorzonzics of Trarzsportatiorl in Pre-lrirlustriol Nigcria, Lagos: NOK Publishers, 1982 p. 3.

10 Kaberry, Women of the Grussfield p. 24. See also Assessment Report of Ngunu Area-Bamcnda Division - Cameroon Province. 28 - 5 - 1924 by G.B Wlllia~ns P. 17.

I I Kaberry, Wonlerl of the Grussfield P . 55.

I2 Cameroon National Archives, Buea (CNAB), Ab22, File No. E.P. 1282, Drummond Hay, J.C,, An Assessment Report on the Clans of the Bandop area in t11c Banlenda Divlsion of the Camcroons Province. 1925 P. 85

I.' Nkwi and Warnier, Elemenf.s,for u History ofthe Western Grassjielris,.

14 Drunmlon-Hay, An Assessment Report on the Clans of the Bandop P. 86.

15 CNAB, Ad 2, File NO. 59126, G.V. Evans, "An Assessment Report on the Kom (~ ikom) 'c lan of Bamenda Division, Can~eroons Province". 1927 P. 6 1.

' 6 National Archives, Enugu (N.A.E.) C5E118513663: Assessment Report of Ngunu Area - Bamenda Division - Cameroon Province. 28 - 5- 1924 Pp 16 - 17.

17 Ogunremi, Counting the Camels. P. 20.

18 Nkwi and J.-P. Warnier, Elements,for a History of the Westerrz G~~us.sfifiells. Pp. 42 -43. See also P.M. Kaberry, Women of the Grassfiel(ls, P. 21 footnote 1.

19 Njoku, Economic History of Nigeria, Pp 18 - 19.

2 0 CNAB, Ab 28 (b), file No. NA 1534, A.E. Tweed, "Ngi Progress Report", March 1938 Par. 8. See also Assessment Report on Ngi by the same author 1925 Pp 37 - 39. .

41 C. Meillassoux, (ed.). The Dcvelopnent of Indigenous Trc~rie (mi M w k e h 111 I.lTcsl A$.icn, 1,ondon: O.U.P., 1971 P. 303.

42 See Sankie Maimo, Early Education and Commerce. 1'. 96.

4' Chilver, "Nineteenth Century Trade in the Banlenda Grassfields", p. 244.

44 N.A.E.,CSE 1/85/3663: Assessment Report of Ngunu Area. P.39

CHAPTER THREE

INTRODUCTION AND PROPAGATION OF COFFEE: THE PERIOD OF

INDIGENOUS INITIATIVE, 1923 - 1945

The Genesis

The exact origin of coffee in Cameroon in general is still unclcar. During thc

German colonial period in Cameroon, some coffee was discovered growing wild ncar

Yaoundc, samples of which were said to be good. Thc crop was expcrimeiited with

and recon~niended for profitable cultivation in the Cameroons. The actual planting of

the crop did not however produce encouraging results.' With the defeat of Germany in

the First World War and consequent partition of her Cameroon colony between Francc

and Britain as Lcague of Nations Mandated territories, Britain encouraged peasant

cultivation of cocoa whilc Francc showed intcrest in coffee planting i n licr own splicrc

in addition to cocoa. However, this interest did not i~imediately translatc into any

* meaningful assistance to the farmers in any of the territories more especially thc

British Mandated territory. British interest in thc cocoa industry was liniitcd to tlic

coastal region while French interest in coffee went beyond tlie coast. An apprcciablc

level of coffee cultivation took place in Dschang and Founiban, near tlie border

bctween the two mandates; specifically Bamenda Division. Men from Ba~ncnda

frequently crossed tlie border, sometimes to work on the new coffee plantations, and

perchance, to observe the rapid spread of the crop and the ~noney it brought. Some

people also crossed the border and worked in the coffee cooperative societics. Tlic *

third group of people were the traders. The partition of Camcroon did not bring an cnd

to trading relations between the two spheres. Strong trading relations continucd

between thc two mandates. These three groups of people who freq~~cntly crosscd tlic

border often returncd with coffee seedlings with which they started their own coffce

farms. They are therefore creditcd with the introduction of coffee in ~ a n ~ e n d a . ~ Once

it had been initiated, coffee cultivation gained currency among the pcople of

Bamenda.

Extant documents affirm that coffee cultivation was first reported in Bamcnda

Division in 1923. In explaining the raison d'6tre of British colonialisn~ in tropical

Africa, Frederick Lugard did not mince words when he stated emphatically that:

The tropics produce in abundance a class of raw materials and of foodstuffs which cannot be grown in the temperate zones, and are so vital to the needs of civilized man that they have in very truth becomc essential to civilization. It was the realization of this fact (as 1 have said) which led the nations of Europe to compete for the control of thc African tropics . . . . It is needless to point to the necessity for raw cotton, - add to these coffee, tea, cocoa, rice, sago, tobacco, sugar, jutc and other fibres, gums, drugs, dye-stuffs, and hard wood timbers, and we can realize how intimately our daily lifc is dependent on the producc of tlic tropics.'

In a bid to achieve these economic goals, Lugard instructed British coloilial

administrators to do the best in their capacity to promote the planting of trees of

economic value in their provinces, especially oil palms, and such crops as the soil and

climate of their localities permitted. He further stressed the necessity of the colonial

officials assisting in the afforestation and in preventing the deforestation of tlicir

administrative areas. The need for these measures was to be impressed upon chiefs.'

However, the enunciation of the policy was one thing; implementation q ~ ~ i t c anothcr.

No concrete action was undertaken to encourage agriculturc in gencral and thc

planting of trees of economic value in particular in Bamenda ab initio. It was not until

1945 that any meaningful action was taken in this direction. When i n 1923, some

people from Bamenda Division embarked on coffee cultivation, apparently against the

wish of the colonial administration, it was lukewarm about it and only fcll short of

outright discouragement.

Three main considerations informed British ncgativc attitude towards coffee - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

cuftivationf n33amendi Division.F6emo% was the transportation aspect. Barnenda

was not connected to any port in British Africa, and thus there was no mcans to cxport

bulky agricultural products. Until the roads to link Bamenda to the ports of Tiko and

Victoria were opened, the British saw no reason to encourage new crops in Bamcnda.

Secondly, it was thought that local economic developn~ent might interferc with the

labour needs of the European-owned coastal plantations. For, local cconomic

opportunities would inhibit migration to thc coastal pla~itations.~ Thc third, and most

articulated reason centred on the culture and econonlics of tlic crop. This point was

unequivocally stated and merits to be stated in extenso:

While it seems possible that the people 111 Bainenda might be able to grow arabica coffee successfully, it is unlikely that they would be able to prepare it properly for the market, without the guidance and advice of a European Agricultural officer. It is our expcrlcnce that the native farmer may be able to grow a pemianent crop iiiorc or less successfully without European help and guidance, but tliat he cannot do without that help and guidance when it conics to preparing the crop for export. Cocoa is an instance of this and even in kola the Nigerian kola producer suffers severely in his pockct for his lack of knowledge and his unwillingness to prepare thc kola crop for the Nigcrian market, in accordance with mcthods, wli~cli we have tested and proved by experiment. When it conies to marketing the coffee the same European guidance and supervision will be rcquircd as is required for cocoa. Before, however, any extension work is undertaken on coffee we want to know more about the economics of coffee, not only thc valuation of home coffee brokers but what pricc local Iirnis arc willing to pay. We should not be justified in advocating coffec growing to farmers in Bamenda or even in encouraging them to grow coffee merely on the assumption tliat it is sound to do so. That, in fact, would be an unsound thing to do. If the farnicrs wlsh to plant coffee we cannot stop them, but this is a very differcut matter to our encouraging them to do so."

Admittedly, the reservations expressed about the economics of coffcc at the

inception stage of the industry have proven to be quite apocalyptic. That not

withstanding, British indifference and lack of support for the industry at the inception

stage can not wholly be considered as altruistic. Put diffcrently, it was not in tlic

economic interest of thc indigenes that the decision was taken not to encourage coffee

eultivatiem irr BamettdaDivision. O.N. Wjoku has made a thoughtful observation tliat

it is little realised by many scholars that colonial administrators were also public

relations officers. Their language was, therefore, invariably the language of public

relations often couched in the garb of altruism, yet so put as to accord well with the

hypocrisy and fundamental raison d'&tre of colonia~isni.~ Hindsight of British colonial

agricultural policies in Zimbabwe and Kenya may permit us to extrapolate a fourth

reason for British reluctance to encourage the production of coffce in Bamcnda. I n

~ c i i ~ a , ~ likc in Bamenda, the issue of proper cultivation and preparation of the crop

and its economics had been raised. Meanwhile, the real intention had been to maintain

coffce production as a n~onopoly of the white settlers. Going by this analysis, one m y

not bc wrong to reason that the colonial government could have had plans to cstablisli

European-owned coffee plantations in Bamenda. This may also cxplain why, i t

decided not to encourage the cultivation of the crop by tlie indigenes. Wliatcvcr

reasons thc colonial government may have had for not encouraging coffce, tlic pcople

of Banlcnda chose to take the initiative to cultivate coffee and in 1923, the first coffce

farms were reported. From 1923 up to about 1937 vety little was reported of this

economic activity in the Division, not even in most of the colonial assessnlent reports

for this period. The reasons for this attitude are not far-fetched. Firstly, as Hynlcr has

rightly pointed out, colonial administrators were not interested in nurturing nativc

capitalists and prefcrred to maintain the economic myths which rationalized thcir

negative policies.9 Secondly, the initiative for the planting. of coffee had conlc from

thc indigenes against official policy and timing. In the face of this, the colonial

administration decided to turn a blind eye to the activity. Thirdly, duc to government

inactivity and apparent hostility towards this economic activity, many farmers werc

not particularly keen on announcing or declaring their cultivation. Fourthly, there was

reticcnce or a general apathy towards declaring assets during the colonial period since

it was believed by most of the indigenes that this would attract taxes. Be that as it

may, the planting of coffee in the province continued unperturbed albeit timidly.

Allan McPhee has, however, contended that in British West Africa, tlie colonial ~ ~ ~

- - - - - - - - - administration had 10- do almost everything in beginning and iniproving agricultural

production, in helping and safeguarding marketing, and i n providing transpoll

facilities."' This assertion rather flies in the face of historical evidence, especially in

thc case of coffee in Bamenda and some other examples in colonial Africa. The

initiative came from the indigenes even against opposition from thc colonial

government. The situation in Bamenda co~npares well with that of thc Gold Coast

whcre, as stated earlier, the indigenes pioneered cocoa cultivation without govcrnmcnt

support. Also, in Northern Nigeria, Hausa farmers cultivated groundnuts whilc thc

colonial administration was canvassing for cotton cultivation. It took thc colonial

government more than two decades to take any positive action in support of thc coffcc

industry in Bamenda.

The important question one may then ask at this juncture is; why had thc

people of Bamenda to insist on cultivating coffee in spite of British lukewarm attitudc

and/ or opposition? Africans were expected to bear the cost of colonial administration

and this was particularly the case with the British, whose guiding principle in tlic

quest for colonies was that a colony should be "self-supporting and self sufficient".

They were also expected to produce goods needed by European industrics. Anotlicr

reason was the need for European manufactures. Money for supporting or running thc

colonial administration was raised mostly through taxation. Africans werc obligcd to

pay taxes without representation and not so much in their own economic interest.

Thesc taxes had to be paid in European currencies. The demand for taxcs was

therefore one of the reasons which induced Africans to look for viable alternativc

forms of earning cash income. In Bamenda, the people were faced with two

alternatives. They could either earn cash income by working on the European owned

coastal plantations, which was what the British colonial administration prcferrcd, or

embark on coffee cultivation, which was preferred by most of the indigenes. As

Walter Rodney has rightly observed, wherever there was a clash betwcen pcasant

farming and hired or wage labour, the African choice was almost invariably in favour

of his own cultivation.' ' Export cash crop curtivation offered Africans slightly greatcr

room for personal initiative than wage labour. Such crops could be grown alongside

food crops both for local consumption and for sale. As such, the peoplc of Bamenda

decided in favour of coffee cultivation. The need to pay taxes, therefore undoubtedly

provided the major force driving Africans into wage labour or cash crop production at

the initial stage. In the case of Bamenda, the people decided to embark on coffcc

cultivation

In addition to taxation, there was the need for European manufactures by tlic

indigenes. By 1923, European manufactures were increasingly becoming popular in

Bamenda markets. Every household needed and made use of onc Europcan

manufacture or the other. This created the need for colonial currencies with wliich to

buy the manufactures since increasingly the acceptable medium of exchange was tlic

colonial currency. Colonial currencies were also needed to pay school fccs. The

people of Bamenda decided in favour of coffee cultivation as a means of earning cash

income becausc their brothers in the French Mandated territory wcrc alrcady

successfully cultivating and making money from the crop., Furthermorc, repugnant

colonial policies also helped to repel most indigenes from working in tlie coastal

plantations and preferring individual cultivation of coffee. The Germans had adopted a

policy of forced labour in the plantations which the British also continued for sonic

time. What is more, working conditions in tlie German plantations wcrc known to bc

appalling and these led to diseases and deaths among the immigrant l a b o ~ r c r s . ' ~

Though statistics is not available for those who finally migrated to tlie

plantations at this early phase, available evidence suggests that some pcoplc still

migrated to work in the coastal plantations despite the odds. However, the expcricnccs

of this first group of migrants were not very encouraging to others, as tlie death rate

among them was known to be alarming. The absence of a motorable road meant that

journeys to the coast had to be done on foot. This situation limited movcnicnt to thc

coastal plantations only to those who wcre physically fit to make the journcy.

It was for the above reasons that the people of Bamenda insistcd on coffee

cultivation in spite of the attitude of the colonial government. Perhaps because of

governn~ent's lack of concern for the industry at this inception stage, thcre is hardly

any data on the volume of production and tlie total area cultivated. DeLancey has

argued that the decision to cultivate coffee by the people of Bamenda was an

indication of the strength of African economic motivation, the inability of tlic colonial

authority to really control events, and also suggestive of the ties that continued

betwcen the two mandates; ties that were to providc a base for the cvcntual rc-

unification of the two terr i t~ries. '~

The introduction and rapid expansion of export crop production in most Third

World Countries during the carly phase of colonialisn~ is often explained by rccoursc

to the surplus - productive - capacity approach othcrwisc I<nown as tlic vcnt- for-

surplus theory. This theory assumes that:

A previously isolated country about to enter into international tradc possesses a surplus productive capacity of some sort or another. The function of trade here is not so much to rcallocate the given resources as to provide the new effective demand for the output of the surplus resources, which would have remained unuscd in tlic absence of trade. It follows that export productioh can be incrcascd without necessarily reducing domestic prod~ct ion. '~

The basic tenets of this theory hold true for Bamenda - namely that export

production was achieved without any significant disruption or shortage in food crop

production. This was because, in many places, coffee was planted on land that was

hitherto not being cultivated. It has even been argued that in many places, coffee

cultivation led to an increase in food production.'5 This resulted from the fact that

farmers were advised to plant certain food crops alongside young coffec plants. Such

crops were supposed to act like shades to the young plants. Secondly, when coffee

was introduced, it was taken up by the men while the women continued in food crop

production. As such, coffee cultivation had little impact on food crop production.

With regard to labour, we have already shown that the people of Bamenda wcrc

involvcd in many economic activities prior to the introduction of coffcc. However,

labour would seem to have been under-utilised. Most of these activities werc on part-

time basis. With the introduction of coffee, labour certainly was exploited to full

capacity. Many people were still able to combine coffee cultivation with thcir

previous cconomic activities.

It is often insinuated that coffee cultivation led to neglect of the cottagc

industry. Wc do not have evidence in support of this argument. As already indicated

above, coffee cultivation could be, and was, combined with most of the previously

practised economic activities. The labour demand placed on the farmers by this crop

was seasonal. It is true that colonialism led to a decline in traditional crafts and

industries but it was not coffee per se that led to this dccline. The cottagc industry

suffercd unhealthy competition from European manufactured substitutcs and il l somc

cases, the colonial authorities deliberately stymied the cottage industry. A case in

point was the cloth industry in Nkambe. The coloiiial officials openly proscribcd a

cloth industry, which was already undcrway in Nkambe beforc tlic colonial

intert.cntion. The fate suffcred by the cottage industry was not as a result of coffce

cultivation as an economic activity, but as a result of colonialis~n as a systcm. Cofrcc

has had its own negative impact, which lies somewhere else.

+ Initial Difficulties

It did not however take long for the people of Bamenda to begin cxpcriencing

some of the challenges confronting thcir new vcnture. Coffcc cultivation had bccn

takcn up against thc wish of the colonial government and the first problem

encountered by the farmers was lack of government support. Coffec cultivation in

Bamenda became the subject of a number of correspondences in thc 1930s. Tlic

indigcncs importuned the colonial government for official backing and support for

coffee cultivation in Bamenda. The colonial administrative officers on their part

showcd a somehow delayed interest and petitioned the Resident of Camcroon

Province for advice and for permission to encourage the Africans to cultivate coffee.

Mr. V.K. Johnson, Assistant District Officer for Bamenda, seems to have been

particularly enthusiastic about the industry. He unilaterally ncgotiatcd for seedlings

from thc French sphere to begin an experimental coffee plantation in Bamcnda. The

agricultural office, however, failed to give its required blessing for the planting of

coffee in Ban~enda. In a discussion with the Divisional Officer (D.0) for Bamenda 011

the subject, the Senior Agricultural Officer (S.A.O), Mr. H. Roebuck, adv~sed that

active cncouragcment should not be given to Afr~can planters in vlew of the low

prices which may be expected. He further advised that those interested in coffce

1 0 cultivation could be given advicc only if they asked for it. This view ran contrary to

a more cautious but more pragmatic optimism earlier exprcssed by thc Supcrintcndcnt

of Agriculture, Cameroons Province, when he observed in 1935 that:

It may bc suggested that it would seem unwise to advocatc coffce growing for the African farmer here when therc is the probability of the price of coffee dropping to a low figure, and the fact that hc will be in competition with countries already well established in coffee production. Personally I think there is less to be feared in respect of this crop than in the case of most other crops. Thc African farmer with his low cost of production should be able to compete on favourablc terms with any country with a crop likc coffee, wherc expensive and elaborate machinery is not ncccssary, provided always his produce is of high standard.I7

The end result of these propositions and counter-propositions was the

emergence of a coffee industry that lacked government support. Morc so, thc + government did not care to take statistics of this economic activity at this early stage.

It should be noted that this lack of support was not only exhibited in thc domain of

coffee. As Victor Amaazee has rightly argued, the British did very littlc to iimprovc on

what the Germans had left behind by way of capital development in roads and

communications. In fact, any visitor to the Cameroons during the almost twenty-fivc

ycars of the Mandate would not have failed to be struck by a scnsc of general ncglcct

throughout the territory.18 This general neglect or lack of.econoinic dcvclopmcnt in

the British Mandate did not augur well with most of its leaders. In their commcrcial

interactions with those of the French Mandate, the people of Bamenda had the chance

to see thc level of development that had taken place in the French Mandated territory

compared to Bamenda. The chiefs were apt to draw invidious conyarisons bctween

the conunercial development that had taken place in the French and English

Cameroons. The French sphere already had the benefit of a railway line and in

addition, a rapidly developing road system, while the English spherc was still

suffering with a very poor road network."' If the British Mandatcd tcrritory was

generally neglected, the case of Bamenda was unpardonably pathetic. This was

particularly the case with road construction. The situation was conlpoundcd by

topography and distance from the sea. As such, Bamenda gcilerally lagged behind in

terms of comnlunication and transportation

Quite naturally, transportation constituted a serious challenge confronting the

coffee farmers of Bamenda during these early years of production. Witliout

government support and with no roads to enable coffee farmers to transport tlicir

produce to the coastal ports, where therc was a better market for their producc, tlic

farmers had to look for alternative ways out of this difficulty. Faced with this

situation, many farmers decided to head-load coffee from Bamenda to the coastal

towns where a market for this product existed. Others head-loaded theirs to M a d e

from where it was transported to Calabar. Still, many more carried their produce to thc

French Mandated town of Nkongsamba against British colonial econoinlc

objectivesz0. These initial difficulties in the transportation and marketing of coffec

were not good omens for the future of the crop. This had an,inimediate effect on tlie

quantity of coffee produced by the farmers. Many farmers were not ready to produce

beyond a given quantity due to transportation d~fficulties. The coffee farmers of

Bamenda were to live with this situation until the outbreak of tlie Second World War.

For these reasons, the expansion of coffee cultivation in Bamenda dusing this phase

was comparatively slower than the subsequent phase (after World War 11). The lack of

an organised or official market outlet for coffee during these early years largely

accounts for the regrettable lack of statistics on production for tlie period. This is a

major stumbling block in rural research.

The difficulties faced by the coffee farmers of Bamenda mirrored the general

scenario in West Africa to a large extent. Generally, colonial governments paid little

attention to agricultural matters. Both the British and the French pursued thc same line

of policy, especially during the inter-war years. The general indolence of colonial

governments in agricultural affairs in the early years was a reflection of the general - - - - -

_palicy that agf icdtura lprdu~t ien was esseda+ly theproblem-of-the Africanpeasaiit,

even if, as in French Africa, he had to be forced into it as, for instance, in the

compulsory production of cocoa in Ivory Coast under Angoulvant's regime. Overall

attempts to assist him increase his output through research into more productive

varieties of the cash crops were negligible in this period. Agricultural tcchniques for

the most part, rcmained just as they were in pre-colonial times.2'

Expenditure on agriculture in both Mandated territories was pcrvcrscly low,

considering that agriculture was the life-blood of those territories. Agricultural

expenditure was evidently much lower in the British territory. Right up t i l l thc Second

World War, the British held that the colonies should pay for their development from

their own slender resources and maintained that the British taxpayer had no

responsibility in this All colonial budgets, both capital and recurrent, devolcd

minuscule amounts to agriculture. The agricultural department had to makc do with

whatever resources were made available to it to help the peasant farmers. The problem

was compounded by the fact that, often, tliesc agricultural departments were undcr- b

staffed. In 1920, for instance, Nigeria had only 20 European officials in the

agricultural department. Bamenda, as a division in the Canieroons Province,

administered as an integral part of Nigeria, had to wait for over two decades for onc

such "luxury". It was in 1927 that an agric officer was sent to Kumba to take cllarge of

the entire province. As Crowdcr has rightly pointed,

Such staff as were recruited lacked specialised training, for the study of tropical African agriculture was still in its infancy. Most of their experience was gained in the field. Hampered by lack of funds, by the vast areas they had to cover, by the difficulty of conversing with peasant farmer, who was by nature unresponsive to changes (sic), it was little wonder that these often devoted men did not have much effect on agricultural practices in West Africa in the inter-war period.23

Because of the problems faced in the initial phase of the industry, coffee

planting during this phase was mostly concentrated along the border rcgions with

French Cameroon. These included areas like Bali, Santa, Nso, anlong others. Tllc p p p p p p p p p p p p p - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

remote par& of the division were slow in embracing the industry. Before the outbreak

of thc Second World War, coffee cultivation had spread to some parts of thc Division

as follows:

Table I : The introduction and spread of coffee in the NWP

Place

Bali *

Year of Place of Origin introduction -FYr-f-- Dschang Cameroun) (East

Pioneer (s)

Chinda France Soppo Councillor Gwangwa David Tanrrwi

Bambui* Santa **

Mathias Fabitich C. 1934 1935 Samuel Cliuachuaiig

Samuel Tsuku

Dschang Bawaju and

( Bafang (French I Cameroun)

Ndop*

Nkainbc Area** -

Nso**

Kom Area* *

Pinyin** Moghanio

Amadu Monkong 1935 Foumban (French

The Fon of Lull 19 ...

1934 I Dschang

Cameroun) Mbouda

Fai Takuni Kui, Fai Banka and Andrcw Tata Bobe Michqel Mbain Nafon, Bobe Kuniananian. The Ronian Catholic Fathcrs

Foumban F were later instrumental in propagating its cultivation in this part of the rxovincc.

1934 I Mbouda Not known Ba Fornunyoli, 1945 Mbouda

ves No. Qc/g l922/l Area**

** Source: Co-operative Express Vols. 5-724

I

The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 had some iniplicat~ons on

agriculture in general and coffee in particular in Bamenda Division. Britain was

compelled to depend very largely on her colonies not only for the supply of men for

the prosecution of the war, but more than ever before also for some raw matcrials,

which as a result of the war, she was not longer able to obtain from the traditional

suppliers. In this regard, West Africa acquired an especial significance in the

econon~ic and strategic calculations of Britain and her allies.25 It was particularly thc

loss of Britain's Far Eastern colonies that gave West Africa a new importance as a

source of supply of raw materials. Not only was there an increase in demand for

traditional exports, but also for new and abandoned ones.20 It was tliereforc in an

effort to make up for the losses in other areas and to meet her rising demand for

* Source: CNAB File No. B. 699 Arc

tropical produce that Britain adopted some measures dcsigncd to stimulate and

increase the production of these exports.

However, Britain's colonial possession in West Africa was large and cmphasis

varied with regions according to tlie ecology and the staple exports prior to the war.

Bamenda, like the rest of British Southern Cameroons, was adniinistered from Nigcria

as part of Eastern Region where palm oil and palm kernel production was bcing

cmphasiscd during the war. Bamenda produced a substantial quantity of palm oil and

palm kcrnels in addition to coffee. This had hardly attracted the attention of the British

colonial administration. Because of the general change in agricultural policy in Wcst

Africa as a result of the war, this policy change trickled down to Bamenda Division.

Secondly, there was a need to make Nigeria (to which Cameroon was attaclicd) b

food self-s~fficient .~~ Coffee was being imported into Nigeria, precisely Lagos, fiom

the Belgian Congo. The quality of that coffee was inferior to what could bc obtaincd

froni Bamenda, though transportation froni Bamenda still constituted a scrious hudtllc.

To meet up with these exigencies, the Scnior Botanist, Mr. Voclker, paid a visit of

several weeks to Bamenda Division to assess the potentialities and possibilities of thc

region supplying Nigeria with such csscntials like coffee, potatoes, and clarified

b ~ t t e r . ~ V h c outcome of his report was the acquisition of some two square ~nilcs of

land for the purpose of starting an experimental agricultural station in Bambui. Hc

requested for a contribution of E200 from the Nativc Administration for starting tlic

experimental station. It was however argued that the benefits to be obtaincd from the

experiment were essentially for Europeans and that government, not the Nativc

Administrations, should bear the cost of the e ~ ~ e r i n ~ e n t a t i o n . ~ ~

Meanwhile, the issue of marketing of Bamenda coffee remained a thorny

qucstion. There was still no regular and guaranteed n~arket for i ~ . Most fauiic~s p p p p p p p - - - - -

continued to sell their crops through the French Mandated territory. The problem was

confounded by lack of roads. Some ad hoe understanding was reached bctween tlie

'French and the British authorities for Bamenda coffee to be sold through co-operativc

societies in thc French tel-ritory. The terms of payment wcre not liowevcr tlic bcst in

the circumstances. A fixed price was to be paid aftcr thc coffcc had becn sold,

irrespective of the situation in the world market. Tlic United Africa Coliipany did not

help matters in any way. Its agents were instructed to buy only whcn tlicy had an ordcr

to supply coffcc. They werc also instructed to buy only tlic quantity that was ordcrcd

for."'

Nevertheless, the fact tliat the colonial government showcd sonic conccrn over

the price and marketing of coffee in Bamenda in 1940, and thought of opcning an

experimental agricultural station, was an indication of an cininent cliangc of policy.

Thc cxperimental agricultural station came into operation in 1941. For tlic first timc,

an agricultural officer was posted to Bamenda Division in that sanlc year, 1941, to

oversee the cxperimental station, among other duties. This station expcrimcnted not #

only with coffcc, but also with other crops such as potatocs, bcans, and also

livestock." The Bambui experiment proved successful and thrcc Nativc

Administration Farms were opened in Banso, Babungo and Wuni.

While coffee faced difficulties in comniercialisation, some traditional staplcs

such as palm oil, groundnuts and maize farcd comparatively bcttcr i n thc domcstic

economy. Not only did these crops fetch better priccs in thc honic markcts, tlicy

witnessed an iniprovement in both quantity and quality. A League of Nations Annual

Rcport for Bamenda Division for the year 1940 indicated that tlicre was a good

internal trade in palm oil and that the price was fair. The rcport also had positivc

remarks on groundnuts and potatoes but regretted the fact tliat the crops could havc

fetched higher prices in Nigeria were it not for transport difficulty. Herc was and still

remains one of the greatest weaknesses of coffee as a cash crop. Though food crops

faced thc same problem of transportation as coffee, the lattcr lacked a buffcr capacity.

The traditional staple crops had a good donlestic demand, which actcd as a buffcr in

times of international crises or in the absence of an international niarkct, which was

just what coffcc as an export cash crop lacked.

Thc British Colonial Govcrnmcnt showed somc conccrn with tlic mcans at thc

disposal of the people of Bamenda in achicving the niuch needed wartime agricultural

improvements. This concern was expressed when in 194 1 the Nigerian Govcrnmcnt

detailed M.D.W. Jeffreys to investigatc the possibilities of augmenting thc local

production of hoes in Bamenda. The sinking of British ships by Gciman subniarincs

during the Second World War was curtailing the imports of this agricultural

implement essential to the African peasant farmer.32 As such, he was assigned to

investigate and report on the iron workers of Banienda and thc type of iniplcments

they produced and their efficiency with particular reference to tlic hoe. The colonial

government was reckoning with the local iron industry for tlic first time duc to

.wartime exigencies. Whatever measures were taken by the colonial governlncnt

during the Second World War to iniprove on coffee in Bamenda and other agricultural

products, such measures did not really make any serious impact. Wartimc measures

meant little or nothing without an adcquatc transport network to cnablc the farniers to

transport their products to the market. Transportation was supposcd to be central to

any agricultural reforms in Bamenda if such reforms were to make any serious impact

on agricultural production. The agricultural officer who was sent to the division in

1941 could not make much impact. Thc division was too large for onc agricultural

officer to make an inipact on thc farmers. Whatevcr results came out from thc

experinlentation farm in Bambui could hardly be disseminated to the farmers duc to

paucity of agricultural field officers. Consequcntly, measures taken during wartime

were largely unproductive and ephemeral.

Impact of Coffee on Land Tenure System

One of the traditional institutions of the people to be impinged upon by coffee

cultivation was the land tenure system. As we have already attempted to demonstrate,

the concept of land ownership had moral as well as legal connotations; it involved

ownership and responsibility. Land was generally considered as communal. Within a

village, each lineagc had claims to a piece of land, which was entrusted to the carc of

a lineage head. He was the custodian of family land and saw to it that each mcnibcr of

tlic family had enough land for subsistence and for building. Tlicre were a number of

alternative ways of obtaining land for subsistence but onc's claims were strongest and

most clearly defined in regard to the land of his own lineage. Allocation of land to a

member of the family carried the implicit assurance of security of tenure ~rrespeclivc

of one's sex. While there was assurance of security of land tenure, this was not the

case with sylvan crops.

The ownership of such sylvan crops as raffia, kola and other fruit trees

traditionally passed on to the lineage head on the dem~se of the owner (planter), and

this often meant more family responsibilities to the lineage head. Thls was the sticky

issue with coffee cultivation, which needed to be addressed for farmers to procccd

with the planting of the crop without nursing any fears. The question was whether

coffee plantations were to be placed under the same category as othcr sylvan resources

traditionally inherited by the lineage head or whether it was to be regarded as personal

property over which the owner had full rights of disposal." Farmcrs nccdcd tlic b

assurance that in the case of their demise, their coffee farms would automatically pass

on to their children. Such clarifications or adjustments were needed for coffcc was of

a new category from kola nut trees and raffia palms which in most cases did not

require much attention and often, grew in tlic wild.

Coffee cultivation entailed some financial outlay, as well as expenditure of

mitiative, time, and labour. It seemed only fair to those who were prepared to take the

risk and branch out into these new fields of economic activity that they should have

some measures of security in regard to land tenure and the disposal of tlmr property

after death.'4 A change in status quo meant that an increase in the cultivation of coffee

and other tree crops was going to create problems in the land tenure system, since the

land involved in the cultivation of such crops would become vcstcd In the farmer and

his heirs. This would be an aberration since the traditional system vested such land in

the lineage head and not the individual farmer. On the other hand, the lineage head

found hiniself trapped in a similar predicament. The cultivation of coffec by a lineage

head on the lineage land which was not yet allocated to any pcrson, or which its

former user had left fallow meant a reduction in the land available for other uses. Both

the lineage head and the lineage members therefore, had to do some delicate balancing

as far as the traditional land tenure system w'as conccrncd in order to accommodatc thc

new crop, coffee.

Therc were, liowever, some exceptions to this common pattern. In Ngwo, Ngie,

Essimbi, Fungom, and Aghem, the land tenure systeni allowcd for individual

ownership of sylvan resources. Such crops as raffia, oil palms and kola trces could bc

pledged, pawned or even sold together with the land on wliicli they wcrc plantcd

without necessarily consulting the lineage head. Similarly, these crops passed on from

father to son directly at the death of the former. Tliis tenurc systcm was niorc

receptive and more accomniodative to the new crop. The qucstion of succcssion on tlic

death of thc planter did not constitute a problem here. As such, coffec was acccptcd in

such places without reservations and without any major disruption to tlic traditional #

tenureship.

A change in the traditional land tenure was therefore required in sonic placcs in

order to accon~modate and guarantee the free planting of coffee. Tliis was ncccssary

for, the fi~ture of the crop depended on the extent to which the traditional land tcnurc

systcm was ready to guarantee the taking over of a coffee farm by the farmer's licirs \

on the passing on of such a farmer. In places where the land was vestcd in thc lincagc

heads therefore, there were adjustments in the traditional systcm of land tenurc and

individuals were given permanent rights over land on wliich they planted coffce. Thc

cultivation of coffee on peasant holdings in Bamenda therefore meant a modification

of the subsistence economy in a numbcr of ways. This should not bc sccn, as

contradicting our previous position on the vent-for-surplus theory for, tlic emphasis

here is different. The change here was not so much with reallocation of rcsources than

with the land-use system. Coffee became the dominant influence on land-usc systeni

wherever it was grown in the Division. However, we must bear in mind that most of

the land devoted to coffee was also under one or more food crops. Also, some fruit

trces such as avocado pears, mangoes, bananas, kola trecs ctc wcrc planted alongsidc

coffee so as to act as shade for the coffee plant. Coffee growing also affected thc

traditional system of agriculture in that men became more involved in agriculturc than

ever before, as coffee growing was taken up mainly by the nicn and this activity took

about fifty days of their working days in a calendar year.35

By the mid-forties, coffee cultivation was alrcady having an influcncc on

fallow periods in sonic of the areas that had taken up coffee cultivation by thc carly

twenties. More land was needed both for subsistcnce and for coffec cultivation with

the result that there was a reduction in the fallow period. For tliosc who embraccd

coffee cultivation late, this stage was still to come. However, this phenomenon

became more visible in the later years whcn increased need for cash incomc lcd to

intensification of coffee cultivation. It was also becoming evidcnt that coffce

cultivation was going to determine the land-use pattern for most of the Division.

Coffee was planted closcst to homesteads or settlements alongside plantains, ballanas #

and other fruit crops. This was followed by the grazing area and then an arcn for crop

rotation in what Marcus Anyi has termed "Concentric Zones" of land uses.30

It is often suggested that the need for family labour to work in coffce faniis was

a cause for polygamy and the resultant large families among thc pcoplc of Bamcnda.

This view would secm to be more lcgcndary than historical. Thcrc docs not scem to

exist any strong historical evidencc to support this view particularly as the practicc

predated coffee cultivation.

In response to a question raised on this issue, three established coffee fanners

cxprcssed opinions that can be said to represent thc two contending views or schools of

thought on the issue. Pa Stephen Fon Forsah, a long time coffee farmer and former prcsidcnt

of Nyen Cooperative Society, was quite emphatic in stating, "Coffee had an influcncc on thc

s i x of my family in that, I needed labour to work on my farnls. I saw women, as a sourcc of

labour supply and that is why I had to many up to three wives and had 29 children"."

However, less than half the number survived to assist him in his coffee famis. Another

farmer, Pa Sabum Samson Tata concurred with this view and said, "Well, I had two wives

and fourteen children, ten of whom survived. I had coffee at the back of my mind whcn I

decided to gct married to two wives and to have this number of children because I needcd

labour to work in my coffee farms".j8

The second view, which is not less representative than the first, is quite dismissive of

support for the industry were ephemeral, others such as transport difficultics and

unstablc prices for thc crop persisted much longer and were almost a pcrmancnt

cliaractcristic of the industry. Despite some of these initial difficulties, tlic famicrs

still forged ahcad with the planting of coffee hoping that thc f~~ti lre situation would bc

better. Thc outbreak of thc Second World War created tlie nccd for tlic Br~tish

the former. His Royal Highness, P.E. Fombo's position excmplities this view or line of

thought. He contends that;

Coffee had no significant effect 011 family sizes. Bcfore tlic advent of coffee, our peoplc were already practising polygamy. Polygamy has been part of our culture even from the time of our forefathers. Coffee is an introduction of yesterday and before the introduction of coffcc, our peoplc got married to more than one wife and had niany children. So, large fanlilies cannot be attributccl to coffee."'

It is not uncommon to find divergent views on issues of this nature. What is

interesting about this issue is thc cogency of the argument on both sidcs of tlic dividc.

Going by cultural and historical antecedents, one cannot but accede to tlic view that

coffee cultivation did not give rise to polygamy and large faniily sizes. I t probably b

gave impetus to a cultural practice that was already deeply rooted i n tlic culture of thc

people. The decision by some farmers to get married to more than onc wife and also

have many children could have been informed by such considerations as coffcc

cultivation. However, such institutions as polygamy and largc family sizcs cannot bc

said to be tlie result of coffee cultivation for they preccdcd coffcc cultivation in

Bamenda Division.

Basically, 1923 - 1945 was a period of indigenous initiative. The initiative to

grow coffee had come from the indigenes. So also was tlic effort to kccp tlie industry

afloat as will be seen later in the work. It did not take long from when the first coffcc

plants were planted in the Division for the farniers to begin expcriencing sonic of tlic

challenges confronting the industry. Such problems were inauspicious for thc future

of the crop in the Division. While some of tlie problems such as lack of govcrnnicnt

colonial government to take some measures to encourage the growing of coffcc

among other crops not just in Bamenda Division but also i n the Cameroon province as

a whole. Howevcr, thesc wartime mcasurcs wcrc not profound enough to make any

significant impact on coffee production in Banienda. All the sanic, this was an

indication that thc colonial government was now willing,and ready to support tlic

growing of coffee in Bamenda by the indigenes. This willingness was demonstrated

more clearly only after the war.

By the end of 1945, a clear picture of the internal organisation of tlic Bamcnda

coffee industry was already emerging. Generally, the coffee farnis in Banicnda wcrc

owned and managed by indigenous peasant farmers on smallholdings, as is still tlic

case today. The average size of a coffee farm ranged between four --six Iiectarcs. Thc

farms were worked through family labour. A few wcaltliy farmers hircd labour to +

supplenient family labour. Coffee farming was done mostly on family land. Howcvcr,

some farmers acquired land over and abovc what they had rights undcr tlic traditional

systcm. Such cases were not many and occurred wherc some families, for sonic

reasons had limitcd access to land. Many coffee farmcrs prcfcrrcd to clcar arcas which

were hitherto not under cultivation for tlic planting of coffee.

Tlie planting of coffee placed some extra demand on tlie labour of the planter.

Hc had to combine coffee cultivation with existing traditional economic activities

such as palm wine tapping, bag weaving, taking care of domestic animals and, in

some cases, hunting. The farmer had to programme his timc in order to accommodate

all these activities. The first thing he did in tlie morning was to tap his raffia palms I

whcre applicable. This was followed by tlie feeding and tethering of his animals. I-lc

then took his breakfast, which prepared him for farm work. Tlie rest of the morning

hours and early afternoon hours were then spent in his coffee farni. Thc labour

demand in 111e coffee industry was heaviest during thc months of October, Novembcr

and December when weeding, harvesting and processing of the coffcc wcrc rcquircd.

During this time, the entire family labour was mostly mobilised to work in the coffcc

farms - harvesting and weeding the famis. Many farmers had more than one cofkc

farm. Right from inception, the farmers of Bamenda adopted the wet mctliod of

processing their arabica coffcc. Wliat the wet n~etliod enta~ls IS that t l~c coffcc IS

harvcstcd, pulpcd, fermented, washed and dried as parched coffcc. This IS 111 contrast

to the dry method where the coffee is harvested and dried in cherry form. Tlic dry

method was mainly used in processing robusta coffee. Pulping of coffcc was mostly

done by hand as at this early stage, pulping machines werc not yet popular. Many

farmers lacked even the capital to buy such machine^.^"

The demand placed on the labour of the farmer, created the need for tlic

revamping of the working bees system. This was an old institution, wli~cli had bccn

popular among the women before this time. Witli the cultivation of coffcc, tlic mcn

had to constitute themselves into working groups to weed the coffcc far~iis of

members in turns. The organisational structure of the industry was sanic in thc #

Division with little variations. Regrettably, statistics are not available for tlic total

production and the total area under cultivation by this timc. Though statistics arc

lacking, one can surmise with some degree of certainty that by tlic cnd of 1945, tlic

quantity of coffcc produced and the total area under cultivation wcrc still rclativcly

small due to marketing and transportation problems. However, it is most probablc that

coffee cultivation was alrcady making some significant contributions to tlic cconomic

wcllbeing of those farmers who had taken up this activity in the 1920s.

References and Notes

I Harry R. Rudin, Gerrnuns in the Cumeroons, 1884 - 1914: A Cuse Stud)? in Mo(1et.11 I I I I I~L~I . I ( I~I .SI I I , London: Jonathan Cape; 193 1 Pp. 273 -274.

2 See Mark W. Delancey, "The Expansion of Coffee Production in Bainenda and Bananas in the Sou~li West" in Peter Geschiere and Piet Konings (eds.) Conjierencc on the Politicul Econotn)~ of'Cutneroon - Historicul perspectives, Leiden, June 1988 P. 309. Also, Cooperative Express ( A bulletill of the Bamenda cooperalive Association Limited (B.C.A.) Vol. 5 Pp. 2 - 3.

' Frederick Lugard, The Duul Montlute in British Troplcul Africa, London: Frank Cass, 1965; Pp 43 44.

A.H.M.Kirk-Greene, The, Political M~tnorandu of Lord Lugur-(1, 1913-1918, Loiidon: Frank Cass,1970. P. 30.

' DeLaiicey, "The Expansion of Coffee Production in Bainenda and Bananas in lhe Soul11 West" 1'. 308. Sec also, Cameroons Report for League of Nations 1937 CNAB, file Ual193811.

" (NAB) Qclg l922/l , File No. B. 699, "Coffee Industry Bainenda". l922!

O.N. Njoku, "Oil Palm Syndrome in Nigeria: Government Policy and Indigenous Iicsponse, 19 1 X 1939" The Culuhur- Journal ofHistory, 3, 1 1978. P. 84.

See Carolyn Barnes, " An Experiment with Coffee Production by Kenyans, 1937 --- 48", ,4Jt.ir~rri Economic Nistoyv No. 8 Fall, 1979.

" S.1-lymer, "Capital and Capitalists": Foreword to Polly Hill, Rurul Cupitulism in Wcst Afi.icv. P.xxiii

I0 Allan MacPhee, The Econornic Revolution in Briti.sh West Africa. Pp. 8-9.

I I Walter Rodney, "The Colonial Economy" in Adu Boahen (ed.), The Generul l-lr.stor:\~ c!f'Afi.ic.u. Vol. 7, UNESCO: I-Ieineinann and California University Press, California; 1985.

12 Edwin Ardener, Shirley Ardener and W.A. Wannington, and M.J. Ruel, Plantrrtlo17 rrnd P"1lmgc 111

the C'umeroons: Sorne Econonlic and Socral Studies, Ibadan: O.U.P, 1960; p. XXV.

I.' Mark Delancey, The Expansion of Coffee Production in Bamenda. P. 309.

14 Hla Myint, "The 'Classical Theory' of International Trade and the Underdeveloped Countries," The Econornic Journal, Vol. 68, 1958, P. 321.

I S See for example, Etaino Kengo, "Trade in Ngwo, North West Province of Cameroon, (1900 1980" M.A. Project, Department of History, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1988.

I h See (NAB) Qclg 192211, File No. B. 699, Coffee Industry in Bainenda.

17 lbid Memo from the Superintendent of Agriculture Canleroons Province, K ~ ~ i n b a to the Divisional Officer, Bainenda Division. P. 16.

I X Victor Bong Amaazee, "The Underdevelopment of the British Southern Cameroons, 19 16 - 196 1 ". Afi.rku Z(lmuni No. 4, 1996. Pp 6 1 - 62.

I 'I See CNAB Ab 2 File No. 3325 Assessment Report on Bafut Arca, Bamenda Divis~on. Cameroons I'rovince 1926 P. 62

?') Fon P.E. Fombo, interview cited

2 I Jean Suret-Canale, L 'Afiique Noire Vol II: I, 'ere Colot~imle, 1 YO0 - 194.5, I'ar~s, 1064; P. 275

22 Michael Crowder, W c ~ t Ajrica Utzder Colotliml Rulc, London: Hutchinson. 1908; P 309.

2 3 Crowder, West Africa. P. 3 14

24 - I'here however, exist some discrepancies between archival sources and co-operative sourccs on thc

dates of introduction and the pioneer farnlers especially for the Ndop area. While thc Co-opcrati\,c

Express has 1950 as the year of introduction for Ndop, archival evidence suggests tlial the pcoplc of

Ndop were already actively experimenting with the crop by 1935 getting their scecls from Frcncli

Cameroun. Considering that the archival records are contemporary with the events dcscribed, thcy

may take precedence over the co-operative sources. Memory'of the exact date of introduction for lnost

of the areas before 1950 would seem to have been lost to time.

2 5 O.N. Njoku, "Export Production Drive in Nigeria During the Second World War" Triiw.si!{i-ii~iit~ Journr~l ($History, Vol. 10, I98 1 1'. 1 1 .

2" Crowder, West Africa, P. 49 1

2 7 Delancey, "The Expansion of Coffee Production in Bamenda" P. 309

28 Bamenda Division: Annual Report 1940 P. 22

29 Ihitl P. 22.

" L.M. Niba, "Origins and Development of Colonial Administration Among the Bafut, 1900 - 1949" M. Phil Dissertation, Department of History, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1981. Pp. 199 - 200.

32 M.D.W. Jeffreys, "Oku Blacksmiths", Nigerian Field Vol. XXVI, No. 1 January 190 1 1'. 139. See also M.D.W Jeffreys, "Some Notes on the Bikom Blacksmiths", MAN, 52, 7 5 , April 1952 and Jeffreys, "Some Notes on the Iron Workers of Bamenda".

" See P.M. Kaberry, Land Tenure Anlong the Nsaw P. 321.

j4 Ihitl

35 M.B. Cleave and M.F. Thomas, "The Bagango Valley: An Exa~nplc of Land lltilisntioii and Agricultural Practice in the Bamenda Highlands" Bullefit~ de I, 'EFAN. Tonic X X X . Scrie B, no, 1968 1' 676.

'" "Marcus Anyi, Cash Cropping and Changes in Traditional Agriculture". P. 29-30.

3 7 Interview with Pa Fon Stephen Forsah, Age: 80 years, farmer and former president of Nyen Co- operative Society, at Wuinnembug, Meta on 20Ih --09-2003.

3 n Interview with Mr. Samson Sabum Tata, Age: 75 years, farmer, at Sang-Meta on 2 ! -09-2003.

3 ' ) Interview with H.R.M., P.E. Fombo, Age: 97 years, traditional ruler of Njirldom-Meta and farmer, at His Njindoin Palace on 20-09-3003.

40 Interview with Pa Elias Teinbong, Age: 75 years, farmer, at Santa on 16- 09- 2003.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE POST-WORLD WAR I1 PERIOD, 1945 - 1961

Colonial Policy Changes The post-WW I1 period witnessed some changes in Britisli colonial economic

and social policies. A parliamentary paper had been published on the British

government's policy on colonial developnlent and welfare in 1940. In that same ycar,

the first Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA) was passed. It grcatly

increased the sums available for colonial development and extended tlie scope of

colonial development to cover both econonlic and social development. The 1940 Act

stipulated that the United Kingdom assistance was for any ,purpose likely to promote

tlie development of the resources of any colony or &elfare of its people. It recogniscd

the fact that however able the governments, however efficient tlicir economic

administration, many colonies could not finance out of their own resources, tlie

research and survey work, the schemes of major capital enterprise and tlie expansion

of administrative and technical staffs which were necessary for their full and vigorous

development.' For the first time, the 1940 Act empowered tlie Secretary of Statc For

the Colonies, with the concurrence of the British Treasury, to make scliemes for any

purpose likely to pronlote the development of the resources of any colony or thc

welfare of its people.2 The sums required for such schemes were to be paid out of

money provided by the British parliament. The impl'ication of this was the

abandonment of the principle of self-sufficiency for the colonies and for tlie first timc,

the British government took up development planning as a policy in its colonies.

Unfortunately, the War had prevented the full implementation of tlie policy in

many of the British colonies, including British Cameroons. However, the CDWA of

1940 was supplemented by tlie Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945,

which provided £120 million for the ten years, 1946-56, including £20 million carried

forward in eonmitments under the 1940 Act. The CDWA introduced far reaching

labour legislation, setting up arbitration boards, conciliation boards, and wage boards

overseeing the operation of new minimum wage laws. In Cameroon, the British

government seemcd to havc particularly rcallsed the economic neglect that her portlon

of thc Mandated Territory had suffered. Consequcntly, some conscious cfforts had to

be made to accclerate the economic development of thc territory. The coastal

plantations, which had been bought back by their original German plantcrs aftcr tlic

First World War, remained the maln source of foreign exchangc earnmgs for tlic

territory. During the inter-war years, substantial profits werc made from thc plantat~on

estates by the German planters as a result of the fact that taxation rates and labourers'

wages wcre low. However, an infinitesimal amount of the profits was used for the

developnlent of the territory.4 Due to the fact that money from thc plantations was

hardly used for the development of the region, in December 1946, tlic Ex-Enemy

Lands Ordinance was promulgated and provided for tpe sale by tlic custodian of

Enemy Property, of the ex-enemy estates in the British Caineroons to tlic Govcrnor of

Nigeria for the common use and benefit of the inhabitants of the Ca~ncroons. For tlic

future administration and development of the Estates, the Governor was cmpowcrcd

by Nigerian Ordinance NO. 39 of 1946 to appoint a corporation to whom the cstatcs

would be leascd. This led to the setting up of thc Cameroons Dcvclop~iiciit

Corporation (CDC), with effect from 1 st January, 1947.

The Corporation was grantcd widc ranging powers. For instancc, ~n additlo11 to

managing and developing the plantation, it could undertake the construction and

maintenance of roads, railways, waterways, quays and wharves, and the provision of

houses, hospitals and welfare facilities for its e m p l o y c e s . ~ l ~ e Corporation increased

thc wagcs of its workers immediately after taking over the estates in accordancc with

the recommendations of the Miller Report on unestablished and daily rated

Government employees, the increase being made retrospective to 1st January, 1946."

The general increase in labour wages in the plantations, couplcd with iniprovcd

health and welfare facilities, was bound to affect the coffee industry in Bamcnda. Tlic

people of Bamcnda had always been faced with the choice of either growing coffcc as

a source of cash income or travelling to the coastal plantations to offer their scrvices

there for wage income. Improved economic and social conditions in the plantations

meant that the plantations were now more attractive than before and could pull

manpower away from the coffee farnls in Bamenda. Tliis also canic at a niomcnt whcn

thc coffee farmers in Bamenda were still grappling with a host of intini~dating

problcms confronting thc industry viz; diseases, transportation and niarkcting.

Infrastructural Improvements and Innovations

Nevertheless, some events also took place in Bamenda almost simultaneously

that changed the fortunes of coffce farmers to somc degree. After tlie war, tlic British

governnient began to take some measures aimed at promoting the coffec industry in

Bamenda. For the first time, Bamenda was connected to tlie port at Victoria (now

Limbe) by an all-season road. This came as a relief tq the farmers who for tlie most

part had had to hcad-load their coffee to the Frencli part for sale or to Mamfc for

onward transmission to Calabar. This development enabled the British to tap tlic

rcsources of the interior. The linking of Bamenda to the port at Victoria by niotorable

road was also part of a general post-war policy aimed at bringing ccononiic

development to a region (British Southern Cameroons), which had suffcrcd from years

of cconomic neglect and underdevclopment. However, the road was not adequatc as it

served only a limited number of farmers. It ran straight from the coast to tlie north of

Bamenda and then, connecting Banienda to ~ i ~ e r i a . ' No feeder roads wcre providcd

to connect farniers in the remote areas to the main road. Tliis was latcr to be providcd

by tlie farmers themselves.

A second and equally very important post-war developnient that came as a

welcome relief to many farmers was the formation of a produce marketing socicty. In

1947, Bafreng Co-operative Produce Marketing Society, later renamed Bamenda Co-

operative Produce Marketing Society (BCPMS), was formed. This formation was tlic

brainchild of some farmers who felt that pooling could be a panacea to some of their

marketing problems. Selling their produce individually made it difficult for the

farmers to secure a good market for their coffee. The problem of transportation could

also bc easily tackled as a group. They were led in this idea by Messrs Jolin Ngu

Foncha, who was later to play a pivotal rolc in thc independcncc struggle in Southcrn

Cameroons, A.G. Geh, John Ako and G.S. ~ n t h o n ~ . ~ With the formation of the

BCPMS, and with the aid of the United Africa Company (UAC), niarkcting was put

on a more satisfactory footing. Interest in the crop was stimulated, cntliusiasm grcw

and planting was given impetus." How long farmers were going to sustain the

enthusiasm in coffee growing and in the co-operatives was going to depend on thc

ability of the co-operatives to effectively market the produce of tlic farmcrs at

acceptable prices. Continuous interest in coffee cultivat~on was also going to depcnd

on the efficiency of the co-operative in providing farm inputs and also in providing

basic education to farmers. The co-operative societies made some determined cfforts

to mcet up with the expectations of the farmers during its early years amid somc #

difficulties.

Still in a bid to develop this part of her mandated territory (Banienda Division),

the British had continued to make some efforts in road construction within Bamenda

Provincc. Administrative restructuring in 1949 had upgraded Bamenda into a province

within the Eastern Region of Nigeria with three Divisions namely, Bamcnda, Wuni

and Nkambe. By 1951, a greater part of an envisaged ring-road linking Banienda-Nso-

Nkanibe-Wum-Bamenda had been constructed. However, due to inadequate

disbursement of funds for the project by the colonial government, the main bridges

and culverts on the road could not be built to make it fully motorable. Yet, conipletion

of this road was vital not only for the transportation of coffee, but also of other

agricultural products, and people.

Nevertheless, the difficulties faced by the people of Bamenda in transporting

not only coffee, but also other agricultural products, and in trekking distances, had

already inspired in them, the desire to construct roads through community

development efforts. A United Nations Annual Report for the provincc for the year

1950 - 195 1 was full of praise for the people, for the great strides made in roads

constructions. It stated thus:

Everywhere in the province, there are milcs of roads which lmvc bccn dug by the enthusiastic peoplc, but which are not motorablc for thcir cntire lengths because there arc not the funds to construct brldgcs and culvcrts. Perhaps thc followmg list of roads undertaken and bcgun undcr Conununity Development will go some way to showing the entlius~asm of the people, though it can give no indication at all of the extraordinary difficult country through which some of them are made. It is invidious to pick out one or two examples where all areas have done so well.. . It is certain that the people, and their leaders, sl~ould be congratulated on the energetic and determined manner in which they havc attackcd thelr self-imposed tasks. l 0

In fact, the report rightly acknowledged that the people had embarked on a

number of self-reliant road projects that could not all be listed. Some of thc

major road projects embarked upon by the indigenes by thc end of 1951 wcrc

as follows: b

Table 2: Road construction projects in Bamenda by the end of 1951

Divisi D n N kam be

Wum

Bamen da

Road

Ndu - Nsob Nsob - Mbaw Nsob - Mbem Ngarum Tangmunken

Dumbo road

Wum - Bu Nj inikoin- Mme

Bamali-Bambalang Banso-Oku Bafut -Bambui Bamessing- Babanki-Tungaw Bamessi-Bangola Bamali- Bamumkumbit

Length completed 12 milcs 30 ,, iapprox.) 12 ,, ,, 3% 7 , 7 ,

4 ,, (dry season only) 12 ,,(only in stretches)

9 miles 10 miles

10 miles

6 miles 5 - 6 miles

4 miles

1 mile

3 miles

.-

Length Motorable 12 milcs 4 niilcs 2 miles 3% niiles 4 milcs

1 mile

1 milc 1 milc -- --

I Y" miles

- 2 miles

Source: Annual Report of the British Governnlent to the United Nations on Bamenda, 1950 - 195 1. Pp 23-24.

Coffee cultivation was a vcry significant factor i n consider~iig road construction,

especially by the indigenes. There emergcd a mutually reinforcing rclationship

bctween coffee cultivation and road construction. In most cases, it was tlic ncccssity to

transport coffee and other agricultural products that led to the digging of roads

through commu~ial efforts and in others, it was the availability of a road that

motivated the people into coffee business. The above-nientioned Annual Rcport

further cautioned that, the ability to sustain the spirit of coni~iiunity development

among the people of Bamenda depended on the availability of funds Gom

government. Government had impressed on the people that funds would be niadc

available for any people or group of people who undertook community dcvclopmcnt

projects either for road construction or any social development projccts. Evidently,

government could not keep its own proniise as many projects did not reccivc the

promised funds or were inadequately funded. Many roads were dug without bridgcs

and culverts to provide through transportation. The people lacked not only tlic f ~ ~ n d s

but also, engineers to carry out the construction of modern bridges and culverts. I n

spitc of tlic pale assistancc from thc colonial governmciit i n this dircction, thc pcoplc

rclnaincd undaunted in thcir resolve towards providing tl~enisclvcs with such

amenities like roads, schools, churches and hospitals. This was donc by providing

labour and materials for the construction of such amenities. Bridges wcrc built across

streams using local materials mostly timber and bamboos.

With the construction of some roads through community efforts with whatever

limited assistance from the colonial government, coffee planting gaincd a new

momentum in the 1950s. A survcy of 1950 plantings in the province revcaled that 328

acres were planted that year bringing the total of peasant-owned coffee farnis in the

province to 1,033 acres." It is likely that not all the plantings could havc been

reported. It is most likely that, most remote areas escaped the survey. Advicc and

assistance was given in the making of ncw farms and in proper nicthods of pruning,

harvesting and treatment of coffee by the Agricultural Department. Thc 1950151

coffee season was particularly attractive to many farmers. Not only did they witncss

an improvement in road networks; there was also an appreciation in the price of coffcc

in the world market and consequently in Bamenda. This created a rush by middlemen

for the coffce of Bamenda farmers. Unfortunately, not all the farmcrs bcncfitcd from

this rise in price. Those who rushed to sell their produce to middlemen did not bcncfit

much from the price rise as the UAC that ended up paying the most attractivc price

came into the market late that year. This was just one of the phases characteristic of

trade cycles of export cash crops. Coffee farmers in Bamenda werc still to gct

accustomed to the fact that even within the same year, coffee prlces could hardly bc

stable.

In that same season (1950/51), the Bambui experimental farm introduccd

another innovation aimed at improving on the productivity of coffee and otlicr

agricultural crops. Various experiments were carried out with mixed farming

(combining crop cultivation with animal rearing), though tlie results werc not vcry

encouraging. Most of those who were trained in mixed farming were ex-scrvicemcn.

The lack of success in this experiment was blamed on the farmers most of wlioni were

ex-servicemen. They had been provided with funds froiii Government and Native

Administration sources. They were blamed by the colonial administration for not

realising that the chief cause of success as a farmer lay i n hard work.I2 It was in tlic

production of coffee that this mixed farming was envisaged to produce the bcst

results. Commenting on the innovation with reference to coffee, Mr. G.Williaiii, tlie

Senior Agricultural Officer for Bambui farm, stated that,

Three other mixed farmers, two of whom received loans from tlie Eastern Regional Development Board, are concentrating on coffec as the main cash-crop of their farms, and the manure produced from their livestock is used mainly for improving their coffee plots. Several coffee farmers have also purchased cattle which they kraal at night for tlie production of manure for their farms. l 3

The question is often asked why coffee farmers have not taken up cattle rearing

as an alternative or a complementary activity to coffee, considering the difficultics

they have been facing in the coffee industry ovcr the years. This question bccomcs

more germane when it is realised that at an early stage of the industry, many farmers

had experimented with mixed farming as pointed above, with cattle providing manure

for the coffee crops. This is a large issue which cannot be examined in detail hcre. It

suffices here to state that the innovation proved not to be so rewardmg for coffce

production and so did not gain currency aniong the coffcc farmers. I~owcver, it was

useful and profitable in the production of other crops especially i n market garctcning.

Cattle continued to be kept by the indigenes as a nieans of investment.

Another innovation was introduced in 1952, which targeted not just coffcc, but

agriculture as a whole. In the December of that year, the first agricultural show was

organised in Bamenda by the colonial government. The agricultural officials wcrc

son~ehow downbeat about its success expressing fear that the farmers would not

understand its raison d ' & m and that exhibits would be few. Contrary to the fears

expressed, the Agricultural Show turned out to be a real showcase of agricultural

achievements. Indeed, results exceeded expectations, as not only food products wcrc

on display, but also, domestic animals of different types. This public exhibition was + planned to take place annually, which it did for some years. As part of this project, a

delegation was chosen by the Agricultural Department to visit coffcc far~iis every year

to select the best and most progressive farn~ers for the award of prices. The agric

shows instilled in the farmers, a spirit of con~petition. Farmers strove to maintain their

coffee farms in accordance with the required standards to at least benefit fiom the cash

price award. This helped to improve on both quality and quantity of coffcc fron~

Banienda.

Road construction through community efforts, which had gained momentum by

1951, was accelerated as more entrants came into the coffee business and as many

more realised the economic and social importance of roads. Work continued on

already started roads while new ones were begun. I11 the Nsaw area, a road linkiug

Mbiami, Ngonsin and Oku totalling 33 miles was constructed. In the Ndop area, a

road was constructed through Bali Kumbat, Bali Gamin, and Bali Gham to link up

with Santa through the Santa Coffee Estate. The road from Tudig to Ngwo whose

construction started on 10"' Noveniber 1950 was accelerated. While the roads

stiniulated coffee transportation, they served broader functions. The people needed to

sell their coffee in order to earn cash income and there was need for roads for the

transportation of the product. They also needed European manufactures whose regular

supply could only bc guaranteed if there wcre motorable roads. Roads wcre also

needed for human transportation. An interplay of tliesc factors made i t vcry attractivc

for thc indigencs to undertake road construction through sclf-rcliancc cfforts

throughout the fifties. The 195 1-52 Annual Report to the Unitcd Nations on Bamcnda,

likc that of the prcvious year, noted that "The desire to construct roads on a voluntary

con-tmunity basis has continued to spread throughout the province likc a contagious

discasc, which fcw areas have escaped. Particularly praiseworthy cfforts havc bccn

madc wlicrc tlic population is thin.. ." Indeed, nothing could be morc apt than tlic

analogy of a "contagious disease" in describing the pl~enomenon of road construction

in Bamenda on community development basis during the fifties. As soon as a pcoplc

real~sed the need for a road, they mobilised themselves and s tar t4 digging onc w~tli or

without government assistance. The example of one village was immediately followcd

by a neighbouring one. Government's contribution was mostly lim~ted to tlie

construction of bridges and culverts.

The Santa Coffee Estate

The most outstanding cxample of post-war government intervent1011 i n corfcc

cultivation in Bamenda was the establishment of the Santa Coffee Estate in tlie

present-day Santa Sub-Division of Mezam Division. This estate was conceived as a

showcase to farmers on coffee cultivation in Bamenda. Under the aegis of tlie Eastcrn

Region Production Development Board, an approval was got for tlic lcase of ovcr

6,000 acres of land for the Santa coffee plantation. The arcas leased includcd 5,000

acres for cattle grazing and the cattle were meant to manure with its droppings, tlie

actual area on which the coffee was to be grown.

In the March of 1952, Mr Mulder was sent to Santa to initiate tlie project as its

pioneer manager. He launched the project by constructing a motorable road to link tlic

site to thc main road leading from Bamenda through Santa to French Canicroons. This

was followed by the planting of coffee seedlings obtained from various sourccs. A

nursery was also established which was to supply 64,000 scedlings while thc cnt~rc

I4 estate was expected to accommodate 60,000 coffee trecs. 111 addition, thc cstatc was

to have a factory with a processing plant whcre farmers could bring thcir coffce for

hulling. The scheme was intended primarily as a dcmonstration to the incrcasing

number of coffee farmers in the province, whose endcavours it was bclicvcd, suffcrcd

from inexperience, lack of advice and machinery.

The project was realised at a very high cost. By April of 1959, sonic £3 13,000

had bccn lent to the estate by the authorities (free of intercst) and sonlc 600 acres had

been planted at a cost of around £500 an acre.'' In spite of the high cost of thc projcct,

it was hoped that the benefits would outweigh the cost. Contrary to expcctations, thc

whole scheme turned out to be a white elephant. For a number of reasons, thc scliemc

became unnecessarily expensive and difficult to maintain. Fiirstly, many things had

bccn taken for granted and the local conditions were not takcn into consideration,

making it difficult for the project to be cost effective. Secondly, the estate had bcen

planned more as a demonstration farm than a commercial venture. This mcant that

expenses naturally exceeded what would have becn acceptable if it had bccn a

commcrcial venture. Thirdly, the site was not close to a main road and so thc cost of

linking it by a motorable road to the main road hiked the cost of the project. Mistakcs

wcre also made in buying too light tractors, and in the methods of cultivation i n thc

early years. K. Berill has argued that one major shortcoming of the industry was its

siting on very poor soils - the soils were leached and poor and fertilizcrs applied in thc

estate were easily washed away.16

This project also suffered severely from the fluctuations in prices characteristic

of cxport cash crops in the world market. It was conceived at a moment whcn arabica

coffee sold at £600 a ton. By 1960, when most of the trees had come into bearing, i t

sold at only £300 a ton; by that time £300,000 had already been invcsted i n the

project. In the 1958159 financial year, the mature acreage cost £30,000 to nia~nta~n

while the receipts from it were valued at just £10,000. The authoritics wcre st111

hoping then that the mature acreage would produce much more by thc timc thcy

attained full bearing age around 1965. However, by 1960, the authoritics wcrc alrcady

openly expressing pessimism about the project. It could not break even and thcre wcrc

suggestions to either cut the losses and close down the place or find some other use for

it. As Berrill rightly summed up the projcct,

This coffee estate is the one large development venture undertaken fro111 Marketing Board profits, and has swallowed up over half the grants and loans made in the territory. It is a great pity that the site should have been so ill-chosen, and that so much money has been poured 111 without hope of return, for the Southern Cameroons is too poor to afford such mistakes. l 7

Indeed, it is really a great pity that the site should Ilave been so ill-chosen. For a

project that was intended primarily as a denionstration to farmers, whose

achievements were said to suffer from inexperience and lack of advice, to exhibit even

greater inexperience than the farmers, was not only an embarrassment to the colonial

governnicnt but also a great contradiction or paradox. Rather, the projcct cnded up as b

a demonstration of government inability and ultimate failure In directing faniiers on

coffee cultivation. It was a vindication of the point that local farmers were better

informed on coffee cultivation than government officials. The indigenous faniiers had

learned better from many years of practical experience than most of the government

officials. R.H. Green and S.H. Hymers' contention that during the crucial years of

cocoa expansion in Ghana, the Colonial Agricultural Department was not capable of

scientific investigation of the best way to grow cocoa may also hold true for coffee in

Bamenda to a large e ~ t e n t . ' ~ The one important lesson, which the government learnt

from the failures of Santa Coffee Estate, was to leave coffee cultivation in Bamenda to

peasant production. As officials were grappling with the problen~s of the cstatc,

peasant cultivation continued to fare better.

In any case, the Estate still contributed to the growth of the coffee industry in

Bamenda directly and indirectly. Those indigenes who worked in the estate during its

early years assisted in no small way in propagating coffee cultivation. Many farmers

got their seedlings from the Santa Coffee Estate. Those indigenes that worked in the

estate learned from some of the mistakes of the estate and were able to corrcct some of

these mistakes in the field.

The Jervis Report of 1958

Thc Jervis Report was another manifest example of thc growing intcrcst that

government showed in the coffee industry in Bamenda after World War 11. Mr. T.S.

Jervis, an adviscr on coffee attached to the Bambui cxperimeiital farins, was

cormnissioned to investigate problems confronting thc coffee industry in Bamenda

and make recommendations for the betterment of the industry. He had acquired son~c

expcrience in coffee growing in East Africa and it was hoped that any

recommendations from him would be quitc professional.

i) Observations of the Report

After studying the coffee industry in Bamenda for some time, Jervis madc a

number of observations. Firstly, he observed thpt poor cultural practiccs wcrc a

hindrance to the growth of the industry. He complaincd of low productivity of coffcc

trees, which he blamcd on poor cultural practices. He reported that many coffec plants

were dying off as a result of bent and twisted tap roots due to the fact that most of tlic

coffee was planted in holes much too small to liclp thc plant to maturity. Such trccs,

he added, were also loosely planted.

He also noted that no attempt was being made to provide shade and protection

from wind, and the trees had suffered in consequence. Growers appcared not to realisc

that the soil as a repository of the nutrients required by the plant for the nxmufacture

of its cherry, was thc very foundation of his crop. Nor did.he realise the necessity to

keep the tree, which he termed "the factory" in first class conditions in ordcr that it

might function, as it should. He saw the methods of the fanner as being dcstructivc to

the health and life of the plant and warned that unless he was weaned from thcsc

practices, his econonlic future and the future of the coffee industry were in

considerable doubt.

'T.S. Jervis reviewed the general rcquirenlents for the growth of arabica coffec

and pointed out that thc crop required a fertile soil with the humus layer extending

from the surface of the soil to the sub-soil. It also required a dcpth of at least 6 feet to

enable the vertical roots to develop and have access to the minerals and tiioistilre

reserves below, because the sub-soil roots sustain the plant in tinics of drought and

othcr adverse weather conditions. Correlating these general requircmcnts with local

conditions in Bamenda, he concluded that local conditions .fell very far short of thcsc

optimum requirements. The soil, through ill-usage, had lost most of its fertility though

it was not beyond recovery. The yearly burning of grass covcr had destroycd thc

humus in the soil, and nitrate deficiency was a marked feature in all coffcc farms ovcr

four years old, he added. Weather conditions, according to him, were generally no1

favourable for coffee cultivation with rainfall evenly distributcd ovcr tlic ycar. l4c

maintained that all these adverse factors were reflected in the performance of tlic

coffce tree, particularly in its health and yield, and it was thercforc csscntial that thc

problem of advcrse circun~stances be met if the welfare of thc produccr and tlic

industry werc to be safeguarded. b

Jervis saw the competition betwecn coffee and food crops, both of wliicli

tended to be cultivated on the same land, as the main problem facing the industry. Thc

practice of planting coffee and food crops on the same plot, according to him, had an

adverse effect both on the coffcc plant and the fruit it bore. The coffcc sccd was

arrested in its development, and failed to fill out; and both quality and yicld wcrc

adversely affected. This practice, when repeated for many years, robbed the trec of thc

means of sustenance at a timc when food was essential to maturc its fruit, and

weakened the tree, which ceased to produce fruit. The reduced yields and poor quality

crop harvested from such debilitated trees affected the coffee from thc youngcr and

more rigorous trccs, and reduced the overall quality of Bamenda coffee.

The report also warned that the more coffee was planted, the less would bc thc

production of food available to the average l~ousehold, and the grcatcr will grow tlie

burden of work carried by the women. It saw an increase in tlie planting of coffec

eminently leading to a reduction in land devoted for food crops. On the method of p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~

processing the coffee, it was quite critical of the wet method generally in usc in

Banienda. Thc rcport said the wet method was expensive and time consuming and was

only recommended for coffee with a high intrinsic quality, which thcrcfore had a high

market value. According to it, arabica coffee in Bamenda had no outstanding liquoring

characteristic to justify all that the wet method entails.

The Report stressed the issue of poor roads comniunication network as still

constituting a serious headache to many farmers in the provincc. It nolcd that thc Kom

area, with the best potentials for high quality coffee in the province, was worsc off

and, this had retarded the development in the arca. It further notcd that as a result of

transportation difficulties, many young men in the area who would havc bccn good

coffee farmers preferred to move to the coast for better econon~ic opportunitics.

On the species planted in Bamenda, the report regretted that robusta coffee had

always been discouraged in the province in favour of arabica. It opined that robusta

was far more suited to peasant production than the exotic arabica spccic, which it

feared, may eventually succumb to the ills that wcre associatcd with it wlicn cultivated

under borderline conditions. It also reported a shortage in supplies of coffec planting + material.

On matters of administration and advice to the farmers, the rcport obscrvcd that

the coffee grower was not getting the attention, instruction and supervision, which

must be the very foundation of any successful industrial development. It statcd that tlic

stimulus of high prices, and the marketing facilities which the co-operative

organisation had provided, would continue to carry the coffee industry forward; but

unless the mechanics of the industry were properly looked after, no lasting bcncfil

could accrue. It argued that this was clearly the function of the Field Service of tlic

Department of Agriculture, and equally clearly, the Department would continue to fail

in its responsibilities unless the field staff was substantially increased, or other staff

appointed which would, in co-operation with the agricultural staff, help it to ~fiect its

commitments. To illustrate the point, it pointed out that there was only onc

Agricultural Officer to organise and supervise the entire agricultural work of the arca,

with a population of approximately 430.000 people. Under him was a field staff of

twentytwo men, only-four of-whom had had any technical education, a very short

course at that.

The report observed that village hcadmen were more concerned with collecting

tax than promoting ways and means of improving the economic status of the taxpayer.

It also noted that income tax assessments were being made on the basis of the number

of coffee trees planted, regardless of the age of thc plants, and this was discouraging

the peasants from increasing the cultivation of coffee.

On diseases and pests, the report noted that the climatic conditions, coupled

with other marginal conditions in the province, gave room for tlic prevalence of

diseases and pests as expected when arabica coffee is cultivated under such marginal

conditions. The report further noted that close planting of coffce on the supposition

that more trees mean more crop, was one of the main obstacles to plantation sanitation

because it shut out ventilation so essential to thc health of the crop, and hclpcd to

spread infection and the incidence of pests. It reported the prcvalcnce of "die-back",

which, it stated, appeared to be due to nitrogen and carbohydrate deficicncics. I t also

reported leaf rust (hemaleia vastatvix ),with a heavy incidence at thc lower altitudes,

some scale insects (very localised), and some stem borer damages. It also rcported

fungus diseases, which destroyed both bearing wood and fruit. It was said to bc

widespread throughout the Eastern part of the province and similar to onc rcportcd in

Babajou Coffee Estate across the border in the French Cameroons. "' i i) Recommendations

Following the observations, a number of suggcstions were made as to the way

out of the problems of the coffee industry in Bamenda. While sonic of the suggcstions

or recommendations were realisablc, others remained controversial and did not

address the practical challenges confronting the coffee growers.

The Report recommended propaganda on a large scale i n order that the growcr

might be convinced that advice offered on the cultivation of coffee had the approval

and authority of the government behind it. It recommended that the growcrs should bc

educated on better planting methods, shades and soil conservation; that mcn should bc

responsible for coffee tending rather than women so that the womenfolk could

concentrate on food cultivation. It also reconlmendcd that arabica coffec should be - - - - - - - - - - - -

planted onry in areaspsuitable for ~ts-gri&h-i.e. 4000 feet - 6500 feet abovc sea lcvel

and that where it had already been plantcd in lower unsuitable levels, it should be

allowed to die out.

On processing, it recommended first and foremost, a change from the wet

method to the dry method of preparing coffee on the grounds that Banicnda coffee had

no high liquoring qualities for which the wet n~ethod was particularly suitcd.

Secondly, it observed that the wet method required unlimited supply of running watcr,

which, it said, was not available in Bamenda. Thirdly, the report opincd that thc wct

method of processing coffee was labour intensive and unecononiical and for thcsc

reasons, a change.from the wet method of processing arabica coffee to the dry mcthod

was recommendcd adding that there would be less variation in quality if the dry

method.were to be adopted.

On the species grown, the report recommendcd the encouragclnent of robusta

coffee on the reasoning that it was better suited to peasant production; more resistant

to disease, and better suited to the lower areas (altitudes) than arabica coffee. Excclsa

coffee was also recommended to be encouraged on the argument that though it was of b

poor quality, it had a good market in Italy and the Scandinavian countries. Being of

Belgian Congo origin, it was believed it would be very tolerant to tropical conditions.

On the marketing of the crop, the report made the most radical and

controversial recommendations. In order to have standard quality coffcc, which i t

considered a sine qua rzon for good price and steady dcniand in the world markct, it

recommended that coffce producers must be trained to produce good gradc coffcc by

refusing all substandard output. To ensure that buyers did not conipcte for coffec and

therefore buy even substandard produce, the report recommended a two stage buying

process for coffee, with the primary stage in the hands of only one buyer, a producers'

co-operative organisation. The idea was to create a nlonopoly at the primary buying

stage in order to ensure uniformity of produce.

On the question of administration and advice to the farmers, it I-ccon~mcndcd

closer collaboration at all levels, between the administrative officials of the

government and the Department of Agriculture, and particularly between the Nativc

Authorities and the Agricultural Field staff. It also recommended the formation of

agricultural committees to be attached to all Native Authority Councils to meet

monthly to develop an awareness of the responsibilities of the Native Authority in

agricultural development, and to help in drawing greater ,attention to the important

part that agriculture plays in the developnlent of a country. The findings of these local

comn~ittees, to be submitted through thcir respective Native Authority Councils,

would be considered by a District Agricultural ~onlmit tee prcsidcd ovcr by the

District Officcr and attended by the Agricultural Officer. Similarly, rccon~mcndations

from District Agricultural Councils should be considered by a Provincial Agricultural

Council, meeting half-yearly under the chairmanship of the Senior Administrative

Officer and attended by the Agricultural Officer.

In order to help the Native Authority to meet their responsibilities with regard

to the agricultural work in the areas, it suggested that two supervisors be attached to

each Native Authority Council, and that they be trained to put across the advice and

instruction in regard to the basic principles of soil conservation and crop production. b

On disease control, the report advised that the Agricultural Department bc

strengthened immediately by adding a plant protection team to it, which would work

as a unit, under an officer qualified to direct operations. Furthermore, the report

strongly recon~mended that research into the many factors affecting crop production

under local conditions be carried out. This research, it suggested, could be carried out

most effectively at Santa Coffee Estate, which was centrally situated and provided all

the facilities in material and supervision necessary for the purpose. I t bclievcd the

Estate would welcome such an arrangement, as the problems confionting the industry

were the same as those confronting the Estate. It also recommended the services of a

Research Officer qualified in plant physiology and, if possible, entomology as well, to

advise the Plant Protection Team on measures to control both disease and pest. T11c

advantage of getting a man of this calibre, it explained, would be that his scope could

be extended beyond the research station to cover all the crops cultivated in Southem

Cameroons.

Furthermore, the report advised that the farmer should be given an opportunity

to contribute directly to the shaping of his future by having a majority vote, in a

Central Executive Council. It noted that the coffee industry in Bamenda was beset by

a host of problenls that could not be dealt with effectively by only one section of the

the price of coffcc in the world markct. By and large, vagarics in thc world market

remamed a perennial probleni of the industry and the fanners nccdcd advicc on this

problem more than any other single problem.

A change from thc wct method of preparing coffee to tlie dry method could bc

desirable on the grounds that it requircs less labour and brings about unirormity in the

product as advanced in the recommendation. However, to advocate for such a changc

on the grounds that the wet method requires unlimited supply of running water, which

it claimed, is not available in Bamenda, is ridiculous. Bamenda is known to bc blcsscd

with a plethora of fast running streams and so, the problcm with thc wct method could

not be the abscnce of an unlimited supply of running strcams.

In spite of its shortcomings, many of the recommendations made by thc rcport b

touched at the very hcart of some of the major problems confronting t l~c industry. A

co-operative method of purchasing and processing coffee, recommended by the report,

is plausible as this method helps in raising and maintaining quality. This would

certainly fetch a better price for Bamcnda coffee in tlie world niarket than poor quality

coffee. Also, by denouncing the method employed by some tax assessment offkcrs,

whereby the number of coffee trees planted were assessed for taxation, irrespective of

whether they were of bearing age or not, the report addressed a tcndency that was

quite inimical to the growth of the industry.

However, the recornmcndations could only make meaning if propcrly

implemented. While some of the recommendations were implemented in the long run,

others nevcr received government attention at all. Government administrative

bottlenecks set in and it took quite some time for most of the recommendations to be

implemented. Implementation was generally slow and gradual, sonic coming only

after independence. There was hardly unanimity amongst government officials on

most of the Report's recomn~endations. This led to a situation whcre many

correspondences had to be exchanged before a single recommendation could bc

implemented. The practice of assessing coffee trees for taxation irrespective of

whether they had attained bearing agc or not was immcdiatcly brought to an elid

though after some bitter exchanges between officials.

On the issue of processing, the dry method of processing arabica coffec in

Bamenda recommended by the report met with steep opposition both from thc coffcc

growers and from the brokers handling Cameroon Co-operative Exporters purcliascs

in tlic London market. They submitted that in spite of adverse market conditions, i t

had becn increasingly easy to sell CCE Bamenda coffee in London whcre the mark

had already bcen known as a reliable filler quality. The brokers argucd that to cliangc

the processing method would mean a fresh start in cstablisliing a name for Bamenda

coffee which would have to compcte with similar qualities which, i t was understood,

coniprised the majority of surplus stocks retained,by the South American producing

countries. The growers on their part were quite apprehensive of tlic proposition on the

grounds that the coffee would take much longer time to dry and indccd would bc

difficult to dry at all in the very high areas where mists arc prevalent.2'

In vicw of these arguments, and in conjunction with othcr factors, tlic dry

mcthod of processing arabica coffec recommended by the report was shclvcd while

the wct method, which was traditionally in vogue in Bameiida continued to bc in use.

This matter was officially debated at a government meeting, held in thc office of thc

Minister of Social Services on 6"' July 1960. At this meeting, thc Registrar of Co-

operative Societies argued that since producing the report in 1958, Mr. Jcrvis had

changed his opinion to correspond more closely with commercial advicc. He claimed

that Jervis's new position was that robusta coffee should be proccsscd by tlic dry

rncthod, while the wet method should be used for processing arabica coffee. Thc

meeting unanimously agreed to recommend that the wet method be uscd for arabica

and the dry method for robusta. However, Jervis later objected to the claim that he had

given in to commercial advice on the method of processing arabica coffec in

Bamenda, maintaining that the dry method was still the best as it Icd to uniforniity in

basic quality. He pointed out that the wet method as practised in Bamcnda produccd

too many rotten and foxy beans, which affected adversely the overall quality of tlic

product. Nevertheless, his view on this particular issue did not win popular opinion

and so never came into effect.

On the formation of a board of directors with statutory powers where the

farmer was expected to contribute directly to the shaping of his destiny, a drafl bill for

a law to provide for the establishment of Coffee Boards and for regulat~on and control

of the coffee industry was prepared for the Icg~slature of the Southern Cameroons 111

1959. The bill provided for two boards; a Coffce Board for Victona, Kumba and

Mamfe D~visions, and another for Bamenda, Wuni and Nkambe Divis~ons, which then

constituted Bamenda province. The Board membership was to consist of:

a) The Administrative Officer for the time being in charge of Bamenda Division,

who shall be chairman. + b) The Registrar of Co-operative Societies or a member of the staff of Co-

operative Societies nominated by the Registrar.

c) The Director of Agriculture or an officer of thc Departrncnt of Agriculture

nominated by the Director.

d) The Adviser on coffee.

e) Persons appointed by the Commissioner (of the Cameroons) on the nomination

of the Minister from amongst coffee growers in Bamenda, Wum and Nkambe

Divisions. The reprcscntation was to be as follows: - three from Bamenda

Division, one from Wum Division and one from Nkan~be Division.

On the functions of the Board, the draft bill stipulated that, the Board would advise

the Minister on:

a) all aspects of the coffee industry within the area of its jurisdiction;

b) measures for promoting and protecting the coffee industry;

c) the framing of regulations under thislaw; and^ ~ ~

p p p p p p p p p p p p - - - - - - - -

d) any other matter, which the Minister may refer to it.

It further stressed that the Minister shall consider any advice received from a

Board, but shall not be bound to accept it. It bcstowed most, if not all, powers for the

product. Neverthelcss, his view on this particular issue did not win popular opinion

and so never came into effcct.

On the formation of a board of directors with statutory powcrs whcrc the

farmer was expected to contribute directly to the shaping of his dcstiny, a drafl bill for

a law to provide for the establishrncnt of Coffee Boards and for regulation and control

of thc coffee industry was prepared for the legislature of the Southern Camcroons in

1959. The bill provided for two boards; a Coffce Board for Victoria, Kumba and

Manife Divisions, and another for Bamenda, Wuni and Nkanibe Divisions, which thcn

constituted Bamenda province. The Board membership was to consist o f

a) The Administrative Officcr for the time being i n charge of Bamcnda DIVISIOII,

who shall bc chairnlan. t

b) The Registrar of Co-operativc Societies or a member of thc staff of Co-

operative Societies nominated by the Registrar.

c) The Director of Agriculture or an officer of the Department of Agriculture

nominated by thc Dircctor.

d) The Adviser on coffee.

e) Persons appointed by the Commissioner (of the Cameroons) on thc nomination

of the Minister from amongst coffcc growers in Barnenda, Wun~ and Nkambc

Divisions. The representation was to be as follows: - three from Bamenda

Division, one from Wum Division and one from Nkambe Division.

On the functions of the Board, the draft bill stipulated that, the Board would advisc

the Minister on:

a) all aspects of the coffee industry within the area of its jurisdiction;

b) measures for promoting and protecting the coffee industry;

c) thc framing of regulations under this law; and

- _ d) _any &her matter, whichthe Minister may xfer to it. - - - - - - -

- - -

It further stressed that the Minister shall considcr any advice rcceivcd from a

Board, but shall not be bound to accept it. It bestowed niost, if not all, powers for the

regulation of the coffee industry on the Commissioner. The draft bill stated that thc

commissioner may make rcgulations:

a) for the control of the planting, growing, drying, processing, storing,

transporting and marketing of coffee;

b) for the inspection and control of any land, place or building where coffee is

grown, dried, processed or stored;

c) prescribing penalties for offences against any regulations made hereunder not

exceeding a fine of fifty pounds or imprisonment for four months or both;

d) specifying fees, expenses or charges to be paid in respect of any matter or act

for which provision is made in any regulation; and

e) generally for carrying into effect the provisions of this law. #

I t further emphasised that nothing in the law shall be construed so as to make it

obligatory for the Commissioner to obtain or act on the advice of a Board beforc

making regulations under subsection ( I ) .

In essence, the draft bill made provisions just for an advisory role for the Board

while concentrating all the regulatory powers over the industry in the hands of the

Conmissioner for Southern Can~eroons. Even then, it openly stated that tlic Minister

shall consider any advice received from the Board, but shall not be conipelled to

accept it. More objectionable was that, at a time when the co-operative movement was

already handling more than half the produce from the Southern Cameroons, the draft

bill did not make provisions for its representation in the Coffee Boards. Government

officials objected to some aspects of the draft bill, which they considered as

inadequate and amendments were duly made.

A mceting of government officials was held in the office of the Minister of

Social Services on 61h July, 1960 to consider the Jervis Report in its totality. Prcscnt at

the meeting were the Permanent Secretaries, Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry

of Co-operatives and Community Development, and Ministry of Commerce and

Industries. Also present were the Director of Agriculture, Registrar of Co-operative

Societies, and the Principal Marketing Officer for the Southern Cameroons. The

Pernianent Sccretary, Ministry of Natural Rcsources rcminded iiienibcrs prcsent that

the Jervis Report on the coffee industry had been under considcration for ncarly two

years. He drew their attention to the fact that its contcnt had bccomc public knowlcdge

as a result of its submission to the then defunct Southern Cameroons Economic

Advisory Panel, which had found the recommendations very contcntious and ncvcr

concluded deliberations on it or submitted any report thereon. Thcreaftcr, it had bccn

examined within the Ministry of Natural Resources, and had reached thc stage at

which draft legislation was prepared, before difficulties arising from the niarkctmg

proposals and the co-operative multi-crop marketing societics Icd to its being

temporarily shelved. He then intimated the meeting that sincc thcn, tlic adviscr 011

coffee had left the country, and the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was shortly b

leaving too. If any action on these reports was to be taken, he added, it had tlicrcforc

better be taken soon.

Three key issues in the Jervis Report constituted thc agenda for tlie mccting,

namely processing, marketing and Board of Directors. On tlie issue of proccssing

which was quite contentious among fdrniers, commercial agents and govcrnnicnt

officials alike, a consensus was easily reached. As carlier stated, the Rcgistrar of Co-

operative Societies held that since producing the Report, the Adviser on coffec had

changed his position to coincide more closely with commercial advice. The Dircctor

of Agriculture undertook to write and confirm that this was in fact tlie opinion of thc

coffee Adviser. The meeting agreed to recommend that the wet n~etliod be uscd for 1

arabica and the dry method for robusta, subject to confirmation that this was the new

position of the Adviser on coffee. However, we must point out that tlie position of the

Advisor on coffee on the method of processing had not changed prior to his departure

from Bamenda. It was mere wishful thinking on the part of the Rcgistrar of Co-

operative Societies that the Adviser on coffee had changed his mind.

The most contentious point on the agenda would seem to havc bcen the issuc of

marketing. It was argued that there were some dangers inherent in the creation of a co-

operative monopoly at the primary stage of the industry as recomniendcd by the

Rcport in view of section 14 of the co-operative law and section 7 of the byelaws. Tlic

Registrar of Co-operative Societies suggested that the difficulty could be overcomc by

modifying the byelaws rather than the ordinance. Some members considcrcd this

suggestion a satisfactory compromise on that aspcct. However, the Per~nanent

Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources, pointed out that the suggestion was very

unpopular with commercial houses, whose view was that improverncnt in quality

could be effected by alternative methods such as produce inspection of the producc in

respect of grades and standards. He added that Holt's company had made substantial

capital investment in processing machinery at Bamenda.

The Produce Marketing Officer argued against the introduction of monopoly 011

these grounds, and maintained that two stage inspection, first at the processing and #

subsequently at the port to the agreed standards with the coffee Adviser, would

achieve the same ends without antagonising commercial firms, and without the risks

inherent under the co-operative law. There seemed to be no legal sanction at the time

for enforcing standards, but he considered that for the sake of maintaining

Government mark, all buyers would voluntarily accept inspection for the interim

period required to introduce enabling legislation.22 Both the Registrar of thc Co-

operative Societies and the Director of Agriculture held that the report was the work

of an expert who had seen this system operating successfully in East Africa. His

advice should therefore not be lightly disregarded.

The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Co-operalives and Community

Development, pointed out that Holt's investment at Bamenda was made after tlie

Report had been submitted to the old Southern Can~eroons Economic Advisory Panel

(SCEAP) and it was therefore done with a knowledge of the reconimendations of the

Report. - - - - - Further, the plant couldprobably be-bought out. The consensus ofopinion was

that the proposal would have the effect of improving the quality. So too would

produce examination. It was accepted that both should be recommended provided

always that tlie power of the co-operative produce societies to extend their monopoly

to other crops could be effectively curtailed.

The question of a coffee Board with statutory powcrs was of paramount

importance. This would seem to have been the only po~nt 011 which thcrc was

unanimous agreement. The meeting was intimatcd that as a result of previous

discussions, the principle behind this proposal had bcen endorscd, but ~t had bccn

planned to create two regional Boards to advise the Commissioncr who in turn would

have the power to make regulations under a new coffcc law. But thcrc was no

machincry for co-ordinating the work of these two units.

The meeting endorsed the crcation of a body as rccommeudcd by the rcport,

adding that it would give conmercial opinion the chance to influence the dcvclopnlent

of the industry. The omission of commercial interests was seen as onc of thc defccts of

the previous proposals. The meeting considered two regional boards for the territory

as not being necessary and would creatc the problcm of co-o!dination. It acceptcd thc

principle of one board for the territory as recommended by thc report. Thc Board

would be purely an advisory and not a statutory body. The Board would therefore be

inexpensive and could operate in the same way as the Board of Agriculture, i t

concluded. The composition of the Board was to be as follows:

1. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources as chairman

2. Director of Agriculture

3. Registrar of co-operative societies

4. Principal Marketing Officer

5. 2 representatives of commercial interests

6. 2 representatives of coffee growers from Bamenda

7. 2 representatives of coffee growers from Kumba

8. The coffee Adviser could be co-opted as adviser to the Board.

To make such a Board effective, it was agreed, legislation conferring on thc

commissioner the power to make regulations would still be neccssary, as the

Agricultural Law could notsover all aspects o f jhe industry Enforcenlent would bc p p p p - - - - - - -

split between staff of the Agricultural Department, and staff of the Produce Inspection

Service, according to subject matter. Both would probably require additional staff, and

i n the case of the Produce Inspection Service, whose expenses werc rcimburscd 100%

by the Marketing Board, it would then be necessary for the traditional charges to comc

from the Southern Cameroons budgets.

At the close of the deliberations, it was unaniniously agreed that the reports

should not bc submitted Lo the Southern Camcroons Economic Planning Council

(SCEPC) as they did not really concern it, and as such submission would be time

consuming. It was agrccd that in view of the delay that had already occurred, the

reports should be presented to the Southern Cameroons Executive Council as soon as

possible. Whatever the case may be, thc meeting did not produce much in ternis of

immediate results.

Coffee Production and National Politics

The Jervis Report had been concerned with the growth of thc coffcc industry in

Bamenda through proper methods of planting, maint~nance, harvesting and processing

of the crop. However, there was also a growing concern in some quarters on how to

properly market the crop so as to get the best price possible for the famler. Such

concern would seem to have been influenced more by political considerations -- the

fear that poor marketing arrangements may influence the opinion of farmers on

political issues - than simple economic considerations. This became more glaring in

the fifties when nationalist activities were gaining grounds and the region was being

prepared for eventual independence.

Such concern was first voiced in 1953 by the Assistant Registrar of Co-

operative Societies (ARCS), Mr. R. Bond, and was supported by the Acting Resident,

Bamenda Province. In a letter to the Commissioner of the Cameroons, they expressed

their concern over what they considered as an unfair price being paid for coffec by thc

UAC, the only buyers in the province then. Thc ARCS'S position on the matler was

that some measures needed to be taken to assist coffee farmers in Bamenda Province

and the Cameroon Provime _to obtains faic price for t h e i ~ ceffee in a free market. As - - - -

long as only one firm was in a position to buy the produce, he argued, there would be

little hope of any change. As a solution, he suggested the formation of a Marketing

Board for coffee on the lines of the Cocoa, Palm oil and Groundnut Boards, with the

board having powers to sell directly to buyers in thc United Kingdom. The Acting

Resident, Bamenda Province and the Agricultural Superintendent concurred with this

view but felt that such a board would have to be appointed on a Nigcrian basis, and

not be limited to Cameroons territory even though little coffee was grown in Nigeria.

The Acting Resident stressed that he would appreciate anything that was donc to

secure a square deal for the coffee farmers. It is almost czrtain that the UAC had been

making excessive profits from the sale of coffee, he added. Comparing the prices

offered by the UAC per ton and London market prices, he accused the UAC of being

patently avaricious. The UAC on its part argued that there was no basis for comparing

local prices with London market prices. It pointed out that there were high markct

risks and expenditures involved in transporting the produce from the Canleroons to

London. #

By 1958, it was abundantly clear that the government was concerned with thc

prices received by the growers for their produce more than ever before. Much was

said and done as will be seen, to avert any situation that would lead to a fall in the

demand and price of Bamenda arabica coffee. This came ,in the wake of increasing

production and falling prices in the World Market. The colonial governnlent's concern

over price and dcmand for coffee in the Cameroons in general and Banicnda in

particular became more evident with heightened nationalist agitations. The rcasons for

this increased concern were not far-fetched as subtly expressed by the Registrar of Co-

operative Societies in 1958:

The economic and political importance of the coffee problem of the Southern Cameroons, particularly the Bamenda area nus t be realised. In this area the proceeds to producers from the sale of coffee, at approximately £300.000 this year, is practically the only source of income apart from cattle production and trading, which is mainly in the hands of the Fulani. The situation is made even more acute by the Treaty of Rome. A situation might arise whereby in Bamenda it will be impossible to sell the crop while in the French territory, protected by high tariff walls, imposed by the Treaty, producers will enjoy reasonable prices. This might well upset the already very delicate political balance in Bamenda and in the Southern Cameroons as a whole. I feel that this possible development should be fully realised by this government, the Federal Government and particularly the colonial office when pressing its representation for modifications of the decisions of the Trcaty of ~ o m e . * ~

Hon. E.M.L. Endeley's Memorandum to the Southern Cameroons Executive Council

on this subject reiterated the above concerns. As Premier and one of the leading

nationalists in the territory, his Memo to the Southern Cameroons Executive Cou~icil

underscored the importance of coffee in the economy of Southern Cameroons in

general and Bamenda in particular. His Memo was also an indication of the extent to

which the nationalists realised the importance of coffee to the BanleiIda economy.

The essence of his memorandum was for thc Council to decidc whetlicr thc

Southern Cameroons Government should or should not agree to join the International

Coffee Organisation (ICO) set up at the Coffee Conference held in Rio dc Janeiro in

January, 1958. He stated that the Southern Cameroons had, in recent years, produced a

steadily increasing quantity of both arabica and robusta coffee. In thc previous season,

approximately 1000 tons of each type was harvested, and brought to the producers a

gross income estimated at £300.000. The bulk of this coffee was produced in

Bamenda, and the income derived from it represented a substantial part of the total

income of the people of that area. Any reduction in world prices, or contraction of

world markets for coffee must therefore, have grave repercussions on the economic

well-being of the Bamenda producers. He therefore stressed that the state of world

demand must thus be a matter of close interest and concern to the Southern

Cameroons ~ o v e r n m e n t . ~ ~ He expressed the fear that world production of coffee may

exceed world requirements in the years ahead. Overproduction may then lead to a

reduction in prices, reduction of production by the producing countries, of to thc

imposition of tariffs and import quotas by importing countries.

To minimise the market difficulties predicted, the South Americans who are the

biggest producers of coffee in the world, had already taken joint action to offset thesc

difficulties by establishing the International Coffee Organisation. Its stated objectives

were to stimulate coffee sales by intensive publicity and to provide an organisation for

the exchange of research and statistical information.

Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of joining such an organisation to

the Southern Cameroons, Endeley concluded that the people had little to gain from

joining the ICO. Hc nevertheless recommended that the activities of that body and of

the other intcrnational organisations dealing with coffcc production and marketing bc

kept under close review. In line with the issues raiscd, he invited the Exccutivc

Council to advisc whether thc Southern Cameroons Government sliould or should not

express an intention of joining the Organisation.

As the dateline for a UN supervised plebiscite to decide on the future of thc

territory drew nearer, politicians and government officials became morc sensitivc to

the problcms of the coffee farmers of Bamenda. This sensitivity was particularly

portrayed in the prices offered to the farmers. Many coffee farmers in Bamcnda in

particular and British Southern Cameroons in general were already aware of what

obtained in the French Cameroons as far as the salc of coffec was conccrned. t

Government officials and politicians on their part were aware of this fact too. The

politicians and government officials knew that unfavourable prices for the farmer's

produce could influence his vote in the plebiscite. It is most probable that this

consideration dictated the above memorandum by Endeley. True, coffcc was a factor

among thc growers of Barnenda in deciding their choice in the plcbiscitc of 11"'

February, 196 1, as this constituted their major source of cash incornc. However, thc

degree to which coffee influenced the political choice of the people in the plcbiscitc

cannot be fully ascertained.

Many, if not all the politicians knew that winning any elections i n Bamenda

required addressing the issue of coffee or identifying with the producers. Onc of thc

first leading nationalist politicians, J.N. Foncha, had been at thc forcfront in the

formation of the first Co-operative Produce Marketing Socicty (CPMS), Bafrcng

CPMS. This Society was conceived to pool the coffee produce of fanners for cffective

marketing. A number of other subsequent politicians from the province worked with

the co-operative movement in one capacity or another and the co-operative movement

provided them with a political power base. S.T. Muna, another Icading nationalist,

realised the importance of this crop to the econon~ic and social life of the pcople. On

his political tours of Bamenda, he had taken it up as an issue. While encouraging thc

growth of coffee, he however advised the farmers of Mcta in particular and Monio

constituency in general to diversify thcir economic activities. He cautioned that thc

price of coffee might onc day drop. As such, he advised then1 to plant plantains, oil

palms, raffia palms and kola trees as to be able to absorb future problems of falliiig

and fluctuating prices of ~ o f f e e . ~ "

But the lesson of economic diversification was learned, more from practical

experience than from politicians and agricultural officials. Many growers had rcaliscd

that though significant, the proceeds from the sale of coffee were realiscd just oncc i n

a year while the need for cash income was perennial. Secondly, such procccds wcrc

very unpredictable due to vagaries in the world market and climatic situations. This

created the need for complementary sources of cash income. Oil palms, raffia palms

and kola trees began to be planted increasingly as supplementary cash crops. Sonic

coffee growers took up trading to supplement their annual incomes while raising their

initial trading capital from the sale of coffee. This was particularly so in places likc

Ngwo and Nso where some farmers traded on kola nuts and othcr itc~iis to Nigcria.

Others chose to diversify their economic activities by raising livestock. There wcrc

already a significant number of Fulani cattle herdsmen in the province by this time,

encouraged by a liberal colonial policy towards them. There was also more demand

for land for the cultivation of food crops. More food was needcd not just to satisfy

family needs, but also, for cash income. Economic diversification, coupled with an

increasing demand for building land, led to competition over land-usc between coffcc,

food crops, grazing and building land. Such competition had not existed prior to thc

introduction of coffee.

Myint concedes that the vent - for -surplus theory is applicable only in the short 26 run. By 1958, land in Bamenda was already being put into several uses. Conflicting

interest over land use had contributed, to a large extent, to a women's uprising in Kom

and Kedjom in 1958. As we have already shown, food crop production in Bamenda

was and still remains the preserve of the womenfolk. Angered by the fact that their

crops were continuously being destroyed by cattle, which competed for the samc land

with the fanners, the women of Kedjom demonstrated in boisterous groups to thc

provincial capital of Bamenda to make their case. The women revolt in Koni was also

as a rcsult of the destruction of crops by cattle, among other r c a ~ o n s . ~ ~ Diduk has

argued that the commitment to cash cropping by the men meant that valuable land for

subsistence was taken out of production during a time of pdpu~ation incrcasc, and that

women were labouring harder t o support their fami~ies.~'

Birth of the Southern Cameroons Coffee Board (SCCB)

111 line with the Jervis Report and its recommendations, thc Southern

Cameroons House of Assembly enacted the SCCB Law on 3 September, 1960. The

Bill was carried, but section 3 was amended to make it obligatory for the Ministcr to

consult co-operative interests before appointing the six representatives of the coffcc

growers from the two provinces. It approved of a single coffee board for the teiritory.

An inaugural meeting of the Board was held on tile 7"' of June, 1961 in Buea.

On a motion by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Mr. Mallet, the Board adoptcd

its standing orders with the necessary changes a draft of which had been circulated

based on the standing orders of the Board of Agriculture. The Board then had the onus

of examining the Jervis Report in its entirety, which had also becn circulated to

members.

After adopting the standing orders, the chairman pointed out to members of the

Board that Mr. Jervis had recommended several fundamental changes in the conduct

of the coffee industry. He added that these were of a controversial nature and it might

not be possible to reach an agreement on the immediate adoption of his

recommendations. Opening discussion on the report, Mr. Burnley, the Director of

Agriculture, concurred with most of Mr. Jervis's recommendations, especially thosc

on preparation and marketing of the crop where the co-operative was siipposcd to be

given a monopoly over marketing.

Mr. Mallet, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, said he did not support a

n~onopoly being granted to the co-operative societies, arguing that such moiioyoly

would lead to inefficiency as had happened in the case of cocoa. He also argued tliat

high quality, which was the object of the measure, could still be achicved by imposing

stringent inspection regulations. He suggested that, if necessary, it would bc bettcr to

introduce regulations relating to the growing, pulping and drying of the crop rathcr

than to impose a monopoly of buying.

Mr. Mohan, representing Messrs. John Holts, one of the larger buyers of thc

coffee crop, pointed out tliat his firm was against buying rilonopoly and would have

little interest in the crop if a monopoly were imposed. He also informed thc Board tliat

his company had installed a modem processing plant at Bamenda and had plans to

install another in Kumba. His company had recently closed down their operations in

the Cameroun Republic, he added, and wished to utilize tliat capital in expanding their #

coffee trade in Southern Cameroons. They wished to bring out a coffce expcrt and

establish an extension service to assist farmers in the growing and marketing of their

crop; they also had ideas for developing other economic crops such as cotton. I f they

wcrc made unable to do this, he further explained, therc was little inccntive lcft for thc

company to remain in the territory. He added that they envisaged operating tl:cir

extension service in liaison with the Agricultural Department.

The Registrar of Co-operatives, Mr Mallet, pointed out that Mr. Jervis had

made his report without cnvisaging political unification of the Southern Cameroons

with the Cameroun Republic, but Southern Cameroons decided in a plebiscite to join

the Republic of Cameroun at independence on 1 1"' February, 196 1 . On the standards

and grade suggested by Mr. Jervis, Mr. Percy was of the opinion that thcy were rathcr

too complicated and that the present grading system had apparently been satisfactory.

Mr. J.E Sone, a representative of the producers of Kumba, supported the dry

method - - - - of g r e p g a g o n This was n o t surprising given &at K ~ ~ n l x i produeed

predominantly robusta coffee, which was best processed using the dry method. Hc

rejected a buying monopoly for the co-operative societies. Mr. J.E. Wongibe,

representative of the producers of Kumbo - Bamenda province, contended that a

change in the method of preparation would very much affect the growers in Bamenda.

Mr. D.K. Mba also from Bamenda argued that a change to the dry nicthod of

preparation would be difficult as it took about a fortnight to dry a batch of coffcc

beans, so that in the meantime it would be difficult to find space to dry filrthcr

pickings of ripe beans while earlier ones were still drying. He pointed out that the wet

method took only three to four days for the beans to get dry which made it most

popular with arabica producers.

The Registrar of Co-operative Societies again referred to the desirability of the

. export of triage and Mr. Percy, the Principal Marketing Officer, Victoria, said that Mr.

Jervis had come to the territory with preconceived ideas derived from his cxperience

in East Africa but had modified his ideas considerably by the time he lcft the territory.

The RCS reminded the Board that the visit of Mr. Jervis had cost much moncy and b

that it would be wasteful to take no action on his reconmendations only to bring in

another expert for the same purpose. He further stressed that the coffee industry was

still fairly young and that the time was ripe for a ~ t i o n . ~ "

Resolutions of the Board

After a comprehensive and an exhaustive examination of the Jervis Report, the

Board decided as follows:

a) Recommendations on the method of preparing the crop should await further

enquiries into the methods of preparing it in the Cameroun Republic and

clarifications on the implication of unification on thc marketing of the coffee

crop.

b) Legislation should bc introduced to prevent the planting of arabica coffce in the

Kumba, Marnfe and Victoria Divisions and that the soil and land-use survey

sliould determine how far it was desirable and feasible to delimit the areas

- - - suitable f o r growing arabicaand ~obusta coffec, respectively; in the Bamenda,

Nkambe and Wum Divisions.

The coffee (Inspection for Export) regulations should be brought into force

before the next season but provision should be made for the cont~nued cxport

of triage.

The Produce Inspection Board should examine the standards set the previous

year in relation to the standards actually found during testing and in the light of

~nternational standards in the Can~eroun Republic.

It should be made an offence to mix arabica and robusta coffee bcans.

There should be no monopoly in the buying of coffee.

Thc coffee export tax should be on a sliding scale according to the market pricc

of the crop, bearing in mind the price of the crop when thc tax was first

introduced. #

Though its role was only advisory, the SCCB had started on a good footing. It

was a matter of time for its recommendations to be implemented. For the first time,

coffee farmers were being represented in a government policy-making body. Thc

inclusion of farmcrs' representatives in the Coffcc Board was not only a recognition

of the economic importance of coffee in the economy of the province, but also of the

fact that the indigenous farmers had, through practical experience, acquired

knowledge which was indispensable for the growth of the industry. The inclusion of

the farmers' representatives in the Coffee Board rekindled the farmers' hope and faith

in thc industry and also prepared the indigenes for the eventual take-over of the Board

after independence.

At independence in 1961, coffee in Bamenda had bccome an industry in its

own right. Every nook and cranny of the province was already feeling the impact of

the crop in one way or another. No government worth the name could ignorc the

importance of the crop in the economic, social and political life of the people. A crop

which cultivation started in 1923 in a few villages amid opposition from thc colonial

government, had by 1961, acquired a provincial status as the number one export crop

of the province. At independence in 1961, its cultivation had spread to virtually all

parts of the province. While some of the late entrants into the industry continued to gct

their seedlmgs from East Camcroon, otlicrs got theirs from thc Santa Coffcc Estatc.

Ezie Nchc Ese had introduced it in Ngwo - a major producing arca In Moiiio L)IVISIOII

- in 1953 getting his seedlings from Santa. Tebit Ayong and Asangbaiig also

introduced it in Meta with seedlings from Santa around 1 955.30

With the formation of co-operative societ~es, they were ablc to handlc so~iic of

the coffee produced in the province while commercial houses handled tlic rcst. A

better picture of thc total production of coffee in the province could bc got from tlicsc

relatively more organised marketing channels in the fifties than for the prcvious

decades. However, while the statistics for the produce handled by the co-opcrativcs is

available, that for tlic proportion handled by commercial houses is lacking. Thc total

produce handled by the co-operatives from 1954 - 1958 bas as follows:

Table 3: Coffee marketing by the co-operative, 1954 - 1958

Year

1954 - 1955

Not available

Coffee

1955-1956

1956 - 1957

1957 - 58

Not available

275,320 t--

Arabica

Robusta

I Not available

Sales (tons)

Arabica

Robusta

Arabica

Robusta

Arabica

Robusta

'% of total Value (£)

107

50

175

398

185

298

501

423

production 1 47,480

Not available Not available I Not available

63.5%

40.0%

48.2%

47.2%

50.4%

Source: Report of the Co-operative Department, Southern Canieroo~is, 1956 - 58, p.3

Not all the coffee marketed by the co-operatives was from Bamenda Provincc and not

all the coffee produced in Bamcnda was marketed by the co-operatives. Bamenda

Province produced predominantly arabica coffee as it still does today and most of thc

coffee produced in the region at this time was handled by private concerns. For

instance, of a total production of 463 and 1,062 tons of arabica coffee produced in the

territory in the 195617 and 1957158 seasons, the quantities handled by the co-operative

were as follows:

Apart of three tons from the Mananguba area of Bakossi, all of the arabica purchases

were from Bamenda. However, as the above table shows, the percentage marketed by

the co-operatives was but a smaller fraction of the total production in Bamenda.

Commercial houses handled the larger share. The Cameroons Co-operative Exporters + Limited (CCE ) acted as agent for the co-operatives and sold either locally or exported

the produce on their behalf depending on which promised to bring the best returns to

the producer. After a boom in the 1956-57 season, the co-operatives paid a bonus,

which made the total price paid to members of co-operative societies affiliated to

Bamenda Provincial Co-operative Produce Marketing Union (BPCPMU) higher than

those enjoyed by non-members. This benefit enticed the Santa CPMS, which for some

reasons had reneged from BPCPMU, and was selling through other channels and

failed to benefit from the boom, to apply for readmission." It was duly accepted for

readmission. In February of the 1957158 coffee season, there was a sudden slide in

world market prices and other exporting companies operating in the territory virtually

Year

1956-57

1957-58

stopped purchasing. In addition, owing to inferior quality exports at the beginning of

that season, merchants refused forward contracts for Southern Cameroons coffee and

could only negotiate on the spot purchases ex-store in London. This made the disposal

of the unsold stocks of Bamenda Union purchases of approximately 300 tons a

protracted and extremely hazardous business. However, sales were concluded by July

at rates, which allowed payments with bonuses at 2/8%d for the first 450 tons and

2/0'/2d for the remaining 50 tons, which were sold when local prices of llbd a Ib, were

offered.32

Co-operative

purchases (tons)

185

5 00

% of total

40.0

47.2

Co-operative

exports (tons)

135

39.5

% of total

29.2

37.5

The coffee industry enabled the people of Bamenda to meet their basic cash

needs, coupled with other supplementary economic activities within thc province. This

significantly reduced the rate of migration to the coastal plantations prior to

independence. Bamenda or the NWP was often thought of as onc of thc higlicst

suppliers of migrant labour to the coastal plantations before and after independence. In

1955, it supplied 9,142 men amounting to 38 percent of the labour force to Victoria

Division plantations and a further 958 men to CDC estates in Kuniba Division.

Viewed in relation to the ratio of other supplying areas, the number is largc but as

Edwin Ardener has rightly pointed out, this contribution was quite sniall in relation to

thc population of the a r ~ a . ~ ~ However, such high figures of labour outflow from thc

area, betray the problems that continued t? confront the coffee industry in particular

and the economy of the NWP in general, despite government efforts to overconlc

them. They are also an indictment of the successive governments' inability to provide

adequate road infrastructure to disenclave certain parts of the provincc, and to crcatc

adequate cconomic opportunities within the province. For, such migrants who

travelled to the plantations camc from the most remote areas of the province with little

or no economic opportunities. As soon as an area was opened up to road transport, the

people took advantage of this and planted coffee and the very presence of a road

created other economic opportunitics at home in addition to coffce. All this

discouraged migration to the plantations.

At independence in 1961, coffee was the main source of income in the N WP,

contributing more than £300.000 to the cconomy. The only other major economic

contributors were cattle rearing and trading, as Premier Endeley himself pointed out.

Notes and References

I R.O. Ekundare, An Economic History o f Nigeria 1860-11960. London: Methuen and Co. 1973 pp 124-126.

Ibid p. 126

' Crowder, West Africa U d e r Colonial Rule p.504

4 Edwin Arderner, Shirley Arderher, W.A. Warnlington and M.J. Kuel., Pluritutiorr crnd b'illcrgc ir~ tlrc Cumeroorzs: Some Economic and Social Studies. Ibadan: O.U.P. 1960 P. xxviii

Ibid

" Ibid P. 15

See Corona Volume I1 1950 P. 106. Delancey, "The Expansion of Coffee". P. 3 10

' N.W.C.A. = North West Co-operative Association Ltd. The North West Marketing in New Deal Era. P. 53 See also CNAB QCIg (1958)4 P. 2. However, earlitr publications by Bainenda Co-operative Association (B.C.A) such as Co-operative Express Volumes 1 and 5 anachronically have 1950 as the date when the co-operative movement started in Bamenda.

CNAB QCIg (1958)* P. 2

l o Annual Report of the British Governinent to the United Nations on Bamenda 1950 - 195 1 . Pp 23- 24.

' I Ibid P. 29

'* Ibid P. 30

I' Ibid P. 30

l 4 Bamenda Division - Annual Report 1951 - 1952 P. 23.

I5 Kenneth Berrill, "The Econon~y of the Southern Cameroons under United Kingdoin Trusteeship". CNAB, file No. Qbla (1960),

I " lbid

17 Kenneth Berrill, "The Econon~y of the Southern Cameroons" P. 19 Berrills work remains invaluable for any discussion on the Santa Coffee Estate though there are some discrepancies in statistical figures between his work and the Annual Reports of the British government to the UN on the territory relating to the estate.

- - - - -

I8 See K.H. Green and S.H. Hyiner, "Cocoa in the God Coast: A Study in Relations between African Farmers and Agricultural Experts". Jourt~al ofEconornic History, Vol. 26. NO. 3, 1966. P. 307.

19 See CNAB, AC/g (1 958)4 "Coffee Production Southern Cameroons, 1958." For a full text of the Jervis Report and the reconmendations he made for the improvement of the Industry.

20 Sce P.M. Kaberry, Woiner~ of the Grussjkl~1.s P. 19 for her position on the so~ls of Bamcnda 11.1

relation to coffee cultivation. Also, M.B. Gleave and M.F. Thomas, "The Bagango Valley Pp 055 - 656.

2 1 Registrar of Cooperative Societies Southern Canleroons to the ~ennanent Secretary Ministry of National Resources, Buea CNAB, QCIg (1958), P. 49.

22 Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Office of the Minister of Social Services on 6"' July, 1960. CNAB QCIg (1 9510, P. 2

23 CNAB, QClg 195 112, file No. None, "Coffee Marketing of Southern Cameroons" 195 1 P. I 1-1 2.

24 Memorandum by Dr. the Honourable E.M.L. Endeley, Premier. To: The Southern Cameroons Executive Council; to decide whether the Southern Cameroons Government should or should not agree to join the International Coffee Organisation (I.C.O.) set up at the coffee conference held in Rio de Janeiro in Janurary, 1958. CN AR QClg 195112

2 5 Fon Stephen Forsah, Interview cited.

26 b Hla Myint, "The 'Classical Theory' of International" Trade. P. 334

27 For a detailed account of these women uprisings, see Susai~ Diduk, "Women's Agricultural Production and Political Action in the Cameroon Grassfield", Africa,' Vol. 59 No. 3, 1989. Pp 338- 355. Hcr enlphasis is on Fombuen - the Kedjonl revolt and Robert Ritzenthaler, "Anlu: A Womcn's Uprising in the British Cameroons," African Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1960. Pp 150 - 156.

2R Diduk, "Women's Agricultural Production and Political Action," P. 348.

29 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Southern Cameroons Coffee Board, Held in Buea on 7"' June, I96 1. QClg 1960 / 9

30 H.R.H., P.E. Fombo, Interview cited.

3 1 Report of the Co-operative Department, Southern Cameroons, 1956 - 58. p 10

" Ibid pp 10 - 1 1.

.I 3 Edwin Ardener, Shirley Ardener and W.A. Warnington, Plantation and Villngcl irr /hc Crrmcrmrr.~. Pp. 203 - 203.

CHAPTER FIVE

A DECADE OF DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATIONS, 1961 - 1971

Bamenda Coffee Farmers and the New Political Dispensation

The comparatively better coffee prices offered in Cameroon fol-nicrly under

French administration, coupled with its relatively better economic development, had

made re-unification more attractive to many farmers in general and coffee fanners i n

. particular. However, such high economic expectations from unification soon met w~th

disappo~ntment. The farmers soon discovered that there was basically no marked

difference between the colonial and post-colonial arrangements, at least in tlic coffee

industry of Bamenda in particular and West Cameroon as a whole. The polic~cs of the

post-colonial government were essentially a continuatrion of the colonial policies. The

two sectors (British and French Cameroons) continued to emphasise export cash crops

production at independence.' The challenges confronting the coffee industry i n

Bamenda persisted without any obvious solutions.

In spite of Premier Endeley's pre-independence apprehension of West

Cameroon joining the ICO and any other international organisation dcaling with

coffee, Cameroon played host to the Annual General Asscmbly of the Inter-Afr~can

Coffce Organisation from the 4"' - 6Ih of December, 1962 in Douala. West Cameroon

was duly represented at the meeting by the chairman of the West Cameroon Marketmg

Board. By accepting membership of the Inter-African Coffee Organisation, Cameroon,

by affiliation, joined the ICO: an idea, which West Cameroon had bccn quite

apprehensive of before independence. The aims of the Inter-African Coffce

Organisation appeared to have been mainly directed towards thc control of production

and quota arrangements. Members of the Organisation were also party to what was

termed the "Short-term agreement" of world coffee producers drawn up at the end of

the nineteen-fifties and aimed at taking whatever steps possible to guard against further

excess production of coffee and keeping prices stable. Though we cannot be sure of

the reasons for this change, it is most likely that economic calculat~ons were at thc

heart of the matter.

The Inter-African Coffee Organisation had in 1962 participated together with

the coffee producers of South America and elsewhere and representatives of the major

consunling countries, in a conference in the United States of America, which resultcd

in the drafting of a "long term agreement" between world consumers and producers of

coffee. The long-term agreement, aimed at controlling coffee production and

stabilizing and improving prices.2 By joining the Inter-African Coffee Organisation

and consequently the ICO, the Cameroon government believed it was doing so in the

best interest of its coffee farmers a significant proportion of whom were from

Bamenda and dependcd largely on coffee for their fii~ancial earnings. Howevcr, little

was done on the part of the government to regulate domestic production in line with

ICO policies. +

On the other hand, there was discontent among many farmers in Bamenda who

felt that government was not doing enough to address their immediate problems. They

felt that the need for prompt payment for thcir produce and the lack of adcquate

Licensed Buying Agents (LBAs) was of more immediate iinportaiicc to them than

issues with the Inter-African Coffee Organisation and the ICO. Many fanners also

considered the price paid for their coffee by the Marketing Board as not being

encouraging enough especially when they had to compare it with what was being

offered in East Cameroon. However, government officials would sccm not to have

been quite sensitive to the feelings of the coffee farmers on the issue.

In a memorandum to the West Cameroon Executive Council on producer prices

for the 1962/63 coffee season, the Secretary of State for Labour, Internal Trade,

Marketing and Inspection, instead argued that the Marketing Board paid an

uneconomic price for arabica coffee the previous season which resulted in a loss of

£120,000 to the Board, while the Federal Government did not make any subventions

for that purpose.3 He then suggested that government should provide additional liquid

cash to the Marketing Board, by refunding the financial losses, which it incurred on

arabica coffee purchases in the 196 1/62 coffee season. He also pointed out that i t was

the Federal Government that initiated the move for the Marketing Board to take over

the marketing of coffce the previous year and that originally a subvcntlon was

promised to the Board in its discussions with the Federal Government, which was

never given. He felt it was proper for the Federal Government to assist the Board in

view of the effects of coffee marketing on the Marketing Board's finances. He

observed that the Ministry of National Economy in Douala had dccreed for the

purchase of Arabica coffee in East Cameroon to commence on the 15"' of Novanbcr

and thc price being paid was 120frs per kilo.

Unification with East Cameroon had made it imperative for some level of

harn~onization as far as the coffee industry was concerned. This was supposed to be so

particularly with regard to prices. However, as the above memorandum observed, the

arrangements for the purchase of arabica coffee in East Cameroon remaincd different

from those in West Cameroon. In East Cameroon, it noted, the purchase of arabica

coffee was made almost entirely by the co-operative societies and the price was not

subsidised by the Caisse de stabilization (Stabilisation Fund). At the beginning of cadi

scason an advanced price was fixed and if the world market prices improved during thc

season, the co-operatives then paid an addition to the original price to the producers.

To substantiate, he pointed out that for the 196111962 coffee season, an additional 25 --

30frs CFA per kilo was paid at the end ofthe season. It was not known therefore, at the

beginning of the season, what the cventual price paid for coffee was going to be.

The Secretary of State then drew the attention of the West Cameroon Executive

Council to what he termed "possible dangers" inherent the Marketing Board

continuing to pay an uneconomic price for arab~ca coffee in 1962163. Firstly, hc

iterated that arabica coffee was not being subsidized in East Cameroon and it would be

inconsistent with the general policy of harmonization for it to be subsidized in West - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - G a m e ~ o o ~ at-the expmseof-fun-ds atfributable to other crops. He pointed out that the

loss of .E120,0000 incurred in 1961162 coffee season was made lip for from the surplus

accruing from the marketing of cocoa. He argued that it could hardly be regarded as

equitable that cocoa farmers should subsidise arabica coffee farmers and that if the

situation were fully appreciated by the public it could lead to serious trouble for the

Marketing Board and for the government. He opined that if it were widely known to

the public, more especially the cocoa farmers, the situation could q ~ ~ i t e well result in

more serious criticism than the government had faced. He stated further that on the

grounds of equity, the action was untenable and, indeed, illegal undcr the tcrms of the

Marketing Board Law which states, in clause 30 (ii) that "The reserves or funds in the

account of any commodity or comn~odities shall not be used in connection with the

purchase, processing, transporting, storing or clearing of any other c ~ n i r n o d i t ~ " . ~ 011

thc basis of the foregoing arguments, he concluded that the Marketing Board acted on

the directions of the government, in a way that was ultm-vires under the tcims of t11c

law in the 1961-62 coffee season. This fact, to him, gave added emphasis to the necd

for the government to reimburse the West Cameroon Mqrketing Board the amount lost

in the purchase of arabica coffee in 1961 - 62.

Furthermore, he stressed that if an uncconomic price was paid for arabica

coffee, it would be the only crop subsidised for the 1962-63 crop season. He observed

that in the case of robusta coffee, cocoa and palm kernels, the prices fixed were in all

cases related to the economic price, which the Marketing Board could pay, taking into

account the forecasts for the world market price. In the circumstance, lie noted, i t was

difficult to justify the continuation of an uneconomic price for one crop only. He

pointed out that in the event of the Marketing Board paying an uneconon~ic price for

arabica coffee again in the 1962-63 coffee season, it could have thc effect of attracting

further coffee from East Cameroon and thereby increasing the burden on tlic West

Cameroon Marketing Board (WCMB). This was particularly likely to be so if a

significantly higher price was fixed at the beginning of the season taking into account

the price of 12Ofrancs per kilo already fixed as an advanced price in East Cameroon.

He submitted that if significant quantities of arabica coffee were to be ~mported into

West Cameroon becausc of a substantially higher price being paid, i t would likely

result in the Marketing Board being placed in an impossible financial position. This

would also contravene the agreement between the United Kingdom and the Federal

Government of Cameroon in July 1962. The agreement stated that, all steps would be

taken to ensure that produce receiving the benefit of commonwealth prcfcrcncc

exported from West Cameroon to the United Kmgdonl would be confined solcly lo

produce originating from West Cameroon.

Contrary to a previous rncmorandum submitted by him to the West Can~croon

Executive Council, he advised against the waiving of the produce sales tax on coffec

on the grounds that it would be difficult to justify such a decision unless the samc tax

was waived on othcr produce. He also adviscd that in each produce scason,

consideration should be given by tlie selling agents of the Board to [he placing of

forward contracts for produce if the indicators were that prices were l~kely to fall. He

thcn prayed the Council to consider the facts contained in his menlorandurn and to

propose to the WCMB that the prices for arabica and,robusta Coffee In the 1962-63

season should be 25frs per 1 b. for robusta coffee and 55frs per lb. for arabica coffee.

The Secretary of State's approach to the issues was just what the coffee farmers

in Bamenda did not want at that moment in time and signified the confl~ct that

charactenzed relations between the farmers and the WCMB. Such differelices also

character~sed relations between the WCMB and the West Camcroon Executive

Council, WCMB and the Federal Government of Cameroon (FGC) and between tlie

farmers and the FGC over issues concerning coffee. Therc was hardly any harmonized

policy on coffee for the two territories at independence. This gavc room for

discrepancies and acrimony, especially as niany farmers tended to compare the

operations in West Cameroon with those in East Cameroon. It was surely wrong for

thc Marketing Board to use money accruing from the marketing of cocoa to subs~disc

coffee prices as the Secretary of State for Labour, Internal Trade, Marketing and

Inspection rightly pointed out. What he did not seem to have realizcd or at least

- - - - - - - actckftowledgd, w a s the fact-thzt a-percentage of fheprofits froinpthe salesofpcoffee

was being reserved in the stabilization fund as a matter of policy. This money was

supposed to be used to subsidise the prices paid to coffee farmers in years when therc

was a fall in thc price of coffee in the world market. One error the Board madc was

that it got money rather from the reserves of cocoa. Otherwise, there was no crime in

subsidizing coffee prices. Such misunderstandings characterised relations between

coffee farmers and government officials from independence right up to tlic 1990s.

Many farmers were also tempted to treat thc co-operatives with suspicion and tcntfctf

to regard the organisation as an arm of the governmcnt, which could not be exoncratctf

from what they saw as government exploitation of the farmers. Meanwhile, thc

government and some international organisations and accredited individuals saw the

. co-operative network as an indispensable partner if the coffee industry i n Bamcnda in

particular and West Cameroon in general was to achievc an international rcputation.

The Gablemann Report on West Cameroonian Co-operatives, 1966

In an effort to improve the image of the co-operatives in the eyes of the planters

as a creditable working association, Mr. Ekkehart Gablemann, a German cconomist,

was commissioned to study the problems facing the co-operatives in West Camcroon

with special reference to export crops and suggest possible solutions. This was the first

attempt by the post-colonial government to closely examine the problems of the

farmers not only in Bamenda, but also in West Cameroon as a whole. As late as 1966,

the majority of the co-operatives in West Cameroon were concentrated in Bamcnda

and constituted mostly of coffee co-operative produce marketing societies. An

examination of the problems confronting the co-operatives was therefore more or less

an investigation into the problems of the coffee farmers in Bamenda. Thc outcome of

the report vindicated this fact.

Beginning with the agrarian structure of the West Cameroonian economy, the

rcport observed that the largest group of West Cameroonian farmers consisted of small

holders owning four to six acres on average with only a limited group holding larger

farms. It also observed that land belonging to farmers consisted of many small plots

dispersed over the whole village area which was an obstacle to niecl~anizcd

agriculture, which requires large units of land to render the use of modern machinery

technically feasible and economical. It however, suggested that the problcni could be

solved by what he termed "large scale land reclamation," noting that West Cameroon

was fortunate enough to have large areas of surplus virgin land. He showed that fiom

the total land area, only about 4% was under farm crops, about 5.5% under trce crops

and the rest was uncultivated bush, pastures and forests. He concluded that West I

Cameroon, like many other developing countries had no land problem and tlic

availability of sufficient land did not constitute a problem for agricultural

development.

On capital, the report noted that the West Cameroonian farmer was suffering

scverely from lack of capital in the form of permanent buildings, modcrn farming

implements, stocks of chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, planting material and cash. Thc

farmer's only asset, the report observed, was his land, which, it said, was of little value

if the othcr complementary factors were lacking. It wid the big farmers wcre as poor as

the small farmcrs because they used only a small part of their land leaving the rcst

fallow. It also noted that capital formation from farmers' efforts was getting more

1 difficult because of the downward trend of world market prices.

On labour- related problems, the report observed that as a general rule, in thc

West Cameroonian agriculture, women were responsible for the cultivation of food

crops and men for the production of export crops. It held that the average male farmcr

In West Cameroon employed hired labour to work in his farm and did very little

physical work. It stated that production was bound to be low as the hired labour had

very little vital interest in the work. It went further to state that farmers could scarccly

be seen working on their farms, not even during the favourable morning hours. Thc 1

report claimed that farmers had little interest in work as a rcsult of phys~cal weakncss

caused by insufficient nutrition, lack of medicare, and ths wearing down cffect of the

c~ imate .~

The Report assessed the standard of technical know-how of West Canieroonian

farmers to be very low and that any little knowledge which a farmer may have had was

the result of practical experience gained in his farm. With regard to modern scientific

methods of agriculture, the report noted that such knowledge as existed among tlic

farmers was fragmented and restricted. The methods used by farmers were said to bc

inefficient and uneconomic as a result of the complete lack of systematic agricultural

training. The low level of tcchnical know-how and the lack of working capital led to a

low level of mechanization with very few fanners having sinall machinery for the

processing of produce. It reported that the most common implements used wcsc

machetes and hocs which, it said, could be quite useful for certain purposes but wcre

being used as all-purpose tools making them inefficient in sonic respects. The rcport

concluded that the low level, and in some cases, complete absence of mccllanization,

was one of the main factors accounting for thc low level of agricultusal productivity i n

West Cameroon

Gablemann's position with regard to the level of technical know-how of the

farmers and the degree of mechanisation of the coffee industry calls for some b

comments at this point. Gablemann would not seem to have bcen well infosmcd of thc

type of farmcrs concerned with coffee cultivation in Ba~nenda nor the environment

involved. That probably explains why he tried to equate technical efficiency with

economic efficiency and assumed that without a high level of technical know-how, thc

farmers would be inefficient and uneconomical in their methods. In any case, as

Schumacher has rightly observed,

... it is wrong to assume that the most sophisticated equipment, transplanted into an unsophisticatcd environment, will be regularly worked at full capacity, and if capacity utilisat~on IS

low, then the capitalJoutput ratio is also low. It is therefore fallacious to treat capital/output ratios as technological facts, whcn they are so largely dependent on quite othcr factors."

Technology has to be appropriate to the environment and for its purpose in

order to be efficient. It needs not to be very high or sophisticated in ordcr to be

efficient. After all, the people of Bamenda were able to produce coffee successfully

and economically even when the Santa Coffee Estate, which cmployed "high

technology", had failed. As Schumacher has rightly summed it, "the poor can bc

helped to help themselves, but only by making available to them a technology that

recogniscs the economic boundaries and limitations of poverty - an intermediate

On the incthod of cultivation, the report observed that land, which was used for

the cultivation of export crops, was hardly conlpletely cleared of grass. All kinds of

plants werc allowed to grow on the cultivated land with the capacity to multiply and

impair the growth of thc newly planted crops. It also noted that all kinds of cash crops

and food crops were interplanted with each other, which madc an individual treatinent

of the different plants impossible. The farms were reportedly overgrown by wecds, this

being one of the most serious problems farmers had to contain. The report added that i t

was often impossible to dstmguish farms from bush and farmcrs did not have tools

efficient enough to clear their farms several times a year. The report opined that bad

maintenance of the farms reduced yields considerably as wecds were consuming a big

quantity of the soil nutrients. b

On the use of fertilizers, the Gablemann report noted that the practice of

fertilizing crops was still unknown to most fanners and that in many parts of the

country, the soils wcre fertile enough to the extent that the application of fertilizer was

not necessary. It however noted, with satisfaction, that in Bamenda and Victoria

Divisions, some farmers were successfully applying fertilizers. It stated that pruning of

coffec and cocoa trees was still unknown to many farmers.

On diseases and pests, Thc Report noted the prevalence of dieback and coffee

berry disease stressing that they reduced yields significantly. It statcd fui-ther that

fanners generally did not have the financial means to cope with these problems.

However, in many villages, there wcre some progressive farmcrs who had introduced

modern methods of pest and disease control on their farms. It estimated that only about

five to ten per cent of thc West Cameroonian farmers sprayed their coffee, cocoa and

banana farms regularly.

On yields, the report stated that the poor agrarian structure, lack of capital and

the low standard of technical know-how and poor cultivation methods contributed

substantially to very low yields compared with plantation agriculture. It howcvcr

clarified that though yields were generally poor, i t was very difficult to measure per

acre yields because of interplanting of different crops, which made a comparison of thc

cfficicncy of smallholdcr agriculture and plantation agriculture difficult. I t furthcr

observed that the low yields resulted in low incomes to the farmers.

From the foregoing, the report concluded that the West Cameroonian farn~cr

needed assistance in every aspect of agriculture. It observed that the network of co-

operatives (which will be examined in the next chapter) that existed in the territory and

which had mainly been concerned with marketing could be a good channel through

which assistance could be offered to the individual farmers. The report suggested that

for the attainment of meaningful development, farmers should be provided with: thc

means for agricultural production, agricultural extension services, and facilities to save

and borrow money. The report recommended that these services should be well

integrated in order to achieve the bcst possible results. Besides sclling of produce, the

report recommended that the co-operatives +should undertake market research and

information to farmers on market trends in order to direct production to the most

profitable commodities. It further recommended agricultural extension in ordcr to

bring the cultivation of the most profitable crops to the highest possible level. The

report however recognizcd that this was not feasible without the supply of fanncrs

with modern tools, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds and planting material. Thc creation of

facilities to save and borrow money would therefore provide the finance required to

purchase these farm inputs. It further recomnlendcd the gradual transformation of thc

existing primary and secondary marketing societies into ~nultipurposc societies to

perform the functions of marketing, agricultural extension, acceptance of savings and

grant of loans for productive purposes. It saw the nlultipurpose society as the most

cconomical and efficient instrument of assistance to the farmer, because it offers all

services requircd for agricultural development and makes possible co-ordination of the

diffcrent services for certain productive purposes at the village level.

The report obscrved that though there was a continuous fall in the price of

coffee in the world market, production was on a steady increase and this was

particularly thc case with Bamenda. The main reason it advanced for the trend was that

for a long time, coffee had been regarded to be the only exportable crop, which could

be cultivated in the Bamenda highlands. Many farmers had therefore increased

production in order to receive higher revenues regardless of falling prices. As a result,

the report strongly rccon~mendcd diversification of agricultural production i n

Bamenda. It rccommended the production of vegetables, fiuits, staple food crops,

poultry and eggs, nieat, dairy farming and fish as a means of achieving diversification

of the cconomy of Bamenda. The report concludcd that Cameroon was spending

considerable amounts of foreign exchange on the importation of most of the mentioned

commodities, because domestic production could r,ot mcct the dcmand. It thcn

submitted that the highest target of Cameroonian farmers should be thc satisfactory

supply of domestic markets and substitution of food imports' for local production. Such

agricultural reforms, it hopcd, would make the economy of Bamenda lcss depcndcnt

on coffee and West Cameroon would generally be food self-sufficient.

Galemann's report was the outcome of a study tour of West Camcroonian co- b

operatives, which lasted barely five months from 2.5"' November 1963 to 30"' Marc11

1966. The short period of time taken by Gablcmann to study the economy of West

Cameroon in general and the co-operatives in particular probably explains sonlc

generalizations he arrived at, which no doubt were ill-informed.

Thc Gablemann Report, like the Jervis Report, viewed the co-operatives as a

vehicle through which the coffee industry could be reformed. But unlike the Jervis

Report, the Gablemann Report had a broader perspective both geographically and

economically. The Gablemann Report examined not just coffee, but also, other export

crops produced in the whole of West Cameroon. It examined the challenges facing

their cultivation and proffcrcd some possible solutions. Anyway, like the Jcrvis Report,

the greatest drawback with the Gablemann Report lay in the implementation. While

some of the recommendations received favourable attention, many never came undcr

consideration at all.

The co-operativc marketing societies were reformed as reconmended by the - - - - - -

- - ~ - - - ~ ~ ~-~

Report. T h e co-operative -marketing sociedes lncorporated the functions of supply of

agricultural equipment to farmers, agricultural education and agricultural extension.

Agricultural diversification also bccame a cornerstone of government agricultural

policy as recommended by the Rcport. However, though government took up

diversification as a policy, the farmers were hardly provided with the means for

achieving that. Diversification required capital that was not affordable by many

fanners. Market gardening as recommended by the report, required storagc facilities

and good roads for immediate and easy transportation of fresh fruits and vegetables.

But, these facilities eluded the NWP long after itldependence, rendering the

transportation and marketing of such products very difficult in most parts of the

province. Littlc was done to Improve on the standards of technical know-IIOW and

mechanization in the industry, which was reported to be very low. Generally, not much

was done to implement the recommendations of the Gablemann Report. The 1978 co-

operatwe reforms in the NWP (to be examined In the next chapter) could be regarded

as the first comprehensive attempt to address the issues raised in the Gablemann

Rcport as far as the coffee farmers of the NWP of Cameroon were concerned. Until I

then, most of the recommendations contained in the Report renlained largely

unimplemented.

Be that as it may, the immediate concern of the h-mers remained the price paid

for their produce. In the interim, a somehow frosty relationship developed between the

coffee farmers of Bamenda on the one hand, and the NW Co-operatives and the West

Cameroon Marketing Board on the other over prices. The Bamenda coffee fai-mcrs

accused the WCMB of colluding with Licensed Buying Agents (LBAs) to exploit the

farmers. Bamenda coffee farmers were also hlghly disappointed by the fact that dcspitc

unification with East Cameroon, there still existed discrepancics in the prices of

arabica coffee paid in Bamenda and in East Cameroon. The prices paid for arab~ca

coffee in East Cameroon were unjustifiably higher than what obtaincd in Bamenda.

During the 1964-65 coffee season, a delegation of the Ban~enda Co-operative

Marketing Association (BCMA) led by Mr. Geh, the then president, visited the arabica

coffee co-operatives of East Cameroon in Dschang, Mbouda Baffoussam atid - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - -

Foumban. There, they had been able to lcarn that Union Centrale des Cooperativcs

Agricoles de L'Ouest (UCCAO) had completc monopoly of the sale of the arabica

coffec crop and that there was no marketing board intervention as in West Cameroon.

They also came to understand that in East Cameroon, arabica coffee prices were higher

than what obtained in West Cameroon. This ~nfuriated most of tlic farmers and became

a source of friction between the farmers and the WCMB.

An official complaint was lodged to that effect with thc Prme Minlstcr of Wcsl

Cameroon in Buea by the Bamenda coffee farmers. In a letter (Ref. No.

PM0.339/108) of 5"' July 1966, the Prime Minister called on the Co-operativc

Department to comment on the complaints of the Bamenda coffee farmers which

included; exploitation of planters by co-operatives, irregular payment for their coffee,

.lower prices for arabica coffee in Bamenda than in East Camcroon, and non-paynient

of bonuses to farmers, among others. The Registrar of Co-operative Societics, West

Cameroon, S.S. Shang, put up a spirited argument against the clai~ns of the Ba~ncnda

coffee farmers. + Shang saw in the Bamenda coffee farmers behind the petition, "divisionist"

tendencies which, to him, were unhealthy for the well-being of the co-operative

movement in Bamenda. On the complaint of exploitation of plantcrs by the co-

operatives, he argued that the allegation was false pomling out that both the arabica

and robusta coffee in West Cameroon were declared Marketing Board crops in the

1961-62 season. This meant that the final price paid to the producer was fixed by thc

Board and appeared in the Official Gazette. The price was also approved by the

Mmister of Economic Affairs, ~ a o u n d e . ~ This implied that the priccs offercd by thc

co-operatives cach season were not decided by the co-operatives, but rather, by the

West Cameroon Marketing Board in consultation with Yaounde. He went further to

explain that the Marketing Board used "Licensed Buying Agents (LBAs)" to channcl

payments to the producers and that it was illegal for these agents of the Board to pay

less than the minimum price fixed by the Board. All farmers were informed of the

fixed price at the commencement of each coffee season. He maintained that thc Co-

operative Movement in Bamenda was one of the LBAs of the marketing board catering

for the intercst of nearly 75% of the arabica coffee producers in Bamenda. Me stated

further that the co-operatives had been known to possess the best system of payment to

the producer since the organisation was run from top to bottom by the produccrs

themselves. He felt that the farmers could not exploit themselves since exploitation

was the one thing that a true co-operative organisation sought to destroy. His argument

did not however, seem to have cancelled out the exploitation accusation levied against

the co-operatives by the farmers.

He added that when the markcting board discovered that certain LBAs who

were traders and who did not represent any group of producers were exploiting thc

farmers, especially in the payment of bonuses, the Board imposed the use of Produce

Rcceipts, based on the co-operative system. According to him, the arabica coffee

farmers were aware of this significant change and knew fully well that thc co-

operatives wcrc instrumental in the change. He could therefore not understand how

these same farmers could turn round to charge their co-operatives of exploitation.

Shang described as false, the allegation of irregular payment and argued that

the Marketing Board made two payments for arabica coffee. The first payment was the t

season's gazetted price paid throughout a season. At the end of the season, that is

betwecn July and October, the second payment, the bonus, was finally paid to the

producers always. Comparing these arrangements with what obtained in East

Cameroon, hc showed that UCCAO, the arabica co-operative, to which the petitioners

referred, made as many as four payments during the season.

On non-paymcnt of bonuses to farmers, the Registrar argued that thc co-

operatives were instrumental in the introduction of an orderly system of paying

bonuses to farmers and that hc had not received a single complaint from a farnier in

Bamcnda who had not been paid his or her bonus by a co-operative society. Hc argued

that the co-operative staff supervised thc payment of bonus in all societics and all thc

records rcvealed that farmers who were members of co-operative societies had been

paid their full dues, adding that at the end of the 1963-64 season the co-operatives in

Bamenda paid an additional franc per kilo vis-a-vis the three francs CFA paid by the

Marketing Board. He said he was inclined to suspcct that the petitioners could be 11011-

co-operative society mernbcrs in which case it would be advisable to know who they

wcre, so that the Marketing Board could investigate their casc and ensure they wcrc

paid, citing that one company in thc Santa Area had attempted defrauding fam~ers i n

that rcspect.

On the contentious issue of lower prices in Bainenda than those paid by East

Cameroon co-operatives, he conceded that the total price paid to tlie West Cameroon

arabica coffee farmers for their coffee was less than that paid by UCCAO in East

Cameroon. Using the figures for 1964-65, he sliowcd that while East Canlcroon

arabica coffee farmers reccived 190frs per kilo, West Cameroon farmers reccived only

170frs per kilogram of coffee. This was common knowledge to the farmers tl~ougli.

He, however, explained that the difference was due to matters of policy and that wliilc

in West Cameroon the crop was marketed by the government controlled Markcting

Board which fixed the price, and was responsible for the sale of the crop overseas, the

East Cameroon crop was controlled by UCCAO, the one co-operative which enjoyed

complete monopoly of the purchase an$ sale of the crop.') He however exonerated

himself by stating that the Chief Produce Marketing Officer was the most competent

person to give details of the nature of payments to the farmers. As far as the co-

operatives were concerned, they paid to the producer tlie price fixed by tlic

Government, and were therefore not responsible for the low priccs in West Camcroon,

he maintained. The Registrar's argument rather vindicated the fact that the fanners

were at least being exploited in a way. And, the fact therefore remains that tlie far~i~ers'

complaint was somehow legitimate.

Addressing the intended plans to break away from the Bamenda co-operatives

by the petitioners, he submitted that the explanation so far offered exonerated tlie co-

operatives from any charge of exploitation. It was therefore unjustifiable for any

aggrieved persons to base their secessionist intentions on the activities of the co-

operatives. He maintained that the threat to break away from Bamcnda co-operatives

was motivated exclusively by the differential prices paid in tlie two states and every

other allegation made in the petition was merely a feeble attempt to give tlic matter

more colour and emphasis. He explained further that their grievances had stemmed

from the visit they made to East Cameroon during the 1964-65 coffce season wlicrc

they had been able to compare a number of things. The farmers had learnt from tlicir

visit that in the final analysis, the East Cameroon arabica coffee price was slightly

higher than in West Cameroon. Again, they also discovered that UCCAO offered a

variety of services to the farmers, which were not offered by the co-opcrativcs in Wcst

Cameroon.

Shang went further to explain that in May 1966, a delegation of East Cameroon

co-operators paid a working visit to West Cameroon and spoke frecly with their

counterparts there. During the discussions at the Bamenda co-operatives, the two

systems were examined and naturally, the members of BCMA were inclined to favour

the UCCAO system because, unlike in Bamenda where the Marketing Board marketed

the produce overseas, complete control was in the hands of the farmers in the East

Cameroon co-operatives. After the discussions, it was agreed by all the board members

of the BCMA, that the co-operatives would, after studying carefully the actual set up #

and functioning of the East Cameroon arabica coffee co-operatives, request the Wcst

Cameroon Government to either grant it a monopoly for the control of the arabica

coffee in Bamenda, or seek adequate representation at the Marketing Board so that

conditions in both East and West Canieroon could bc liannonized.

Mr. Geh was directly accused by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, for

orchestrating the moves by some coffee farmers to break away from the Bamenda co-

operatives. He expressed surprise that Geh could initiate such action, when hc was

actually the president of Bamenda Co-operative Marketing Association Ltd. Tlic

Registrar opined that since Geh had lcd a delegation to East Camcroon and seen the

advantages of UCCAO over BCMA, hc felt that Banlenda co-operatives should be

members of the UCCAO so as to bcncfit from these advantages. He had als; led

delegations to Buea asking government to grant BCMA a monopoly 111 the arabica

coffee trade. The Registrar held that Mr. Gel1 was guilty of some acts of misden~canour

for which action was being taken to remove him from office and it was therefore not

surpllsing _that 1 ~ - w a o at-thaL point h-tfme act ing overthetveads o f both tlTe West

Cameroon government and the co-operatives where he had played a leading role in thc

past. He submitted that if Geh accused the co-operatives of exploiting the farmers, he

himself must bear full responsibility becausc he was the president BCMA.

The Registrar concluded that the co-operatives were not guilty of tlic chargcs

levelled against them and that rather, the fact that they handled more than two-thirds of

the crop was evidence that farmers preferred them to any other LBA. He drcw the

attent1011 of the governrncnt to the fact that the matter threatened the very existcncc of

the Marketing Board and that it was necessary to call a round-table conference to get

more views on the matter. He expressed conviction that the two movcmcnts (UCCAO

and Bamenda Co-operatives) would succeed bcttcr and the stability of the stntcs

ensured if the collaboration and coming together was carried out on equal basis, and

through mutual understanding. As far as arabica coffee was concerned, hc addcd, the

Marketing Board sold the crop overseas through the same agent that sold for East

Cameroon and that the standards had been harmonized. The main difference, 11e

pointed out, lay in the control, and the final price, which to him, was a rnattcr for the

state government to make a statement on.

It is not surprising that the Registrar of Co-operatives put up such an argument

in response to the petition from the coffee producers of Bamenda. As a co-opcrator, hc

did just what was expected of him - to dcfend the moven~ent he served and for which

he was being paid. Though his arguments were cogent enough, many coffee farn~ers

had their misgivings about the co-operativcs even when they were members of the co-

operatives. They were tempted to always associate the co-operatives with thc

government. They saw the co-operative as an instrument through which tlic

government was exploiting the farmers. Meanwhile, the bone of contention was. tlic

disparity in the prices of arabica coffee in West Cameroon and East Cameroon, as tlic

Registrar himself recognized. After adopting several methods to get the issue rcsolvcd

to no avail, the farmers' anger was directed at the co-operatives for not having enough

powers to enable the farmers to reap equal bcnefits as those in UCCAO. The problem

was not within the competence of the co-operatives but rather, a political one that

required government action. Indeed, the farmers were just beginning to see solnc of the

economic imbalances implicit in unification. The perceived economic benefits from

unification and independencc appeared to be a mirage. Many farn~ers becamc

disappointed with the new political dispensation, as they could not comprehend why

they should get a lower price for their produce than thosc in East Cameroon, given that

there was no difference in quality between the arabica cofree produced in East

Cameroon and that produced in Bamenda in particular and West Catneroon in gcncral.

The A.N. Lantum Memorandum on West Cameroon Coffee Industry

The main crusader for the arabica coffee industry in Banlenda in the sixties was

A.N. Lantum. Unlike the previous complainants, who wcrc the coffee farn~el-s

themselves, Lantum was the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies for the

Bamenda Area. His memorandum was not so much on the exploitation of farn~ers by

the co-operatives as the coffee farmers had alleged, but rather focused on ~mprovcmcnt

of quality through improved cultural practices,'so as to attract a bettcr price in the

world market. Ironically, he was advocating for higher prices through improved

quality when lower prices in Bamenda vis-6-vis East Cameroon was not a function of

quality per se.

He claimed that the arabica coffee industry was facing a steady decline. Prices

continued to drop because of the low quality coffee offercd for sale, which compared

unfavourably with that from other producing countries with more modern methods of

farming techniques and processing equipment. He lamented that old farms were being

invaded by numerous pests and diseases, and that farmers complaining of lack of

encouragement from the government had become lax and careless in the harvesting

and processing of coffee. The result of this laxity and carelessness on the part of the

farmers was the presence of rotten beans, damaged bcans, stinkers, insect eaten beans

and extraneous matter found in the coffee delivered to the co-opcrativcs by such

farmers. He also observed that some enthusiastic farmers had attempted chemical

spraying of their plants but failed because their neighbours would not do likew~se a11d - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - -

therepwere no artificial barriers against the sprcad of the air borne fungus. Others

d~ssatisfied with the old farms abandoned them for ncw ones, which he saw as a more

expensive and time-consuming exercise. He then stated that "when we come to think

that most of Bamenda depends solely on the arabica coffee then we can see the

necessity for quick action to save the industry from a total c~l lapse". '~ ' Lantum then

made some effort to bring to light in a clear manner, some of the remote and proximate

causes, contributing to thc low quality of Bamenda coffcc.

The Assistant Registrar drew attention to the fact that somc farmers attempted

to plant more trees than they could actually afford to care for and found it financially

difficult to recruit labour for the harvesting of the coffee when ripc. The result of such

imprudent act was that most of the coffee dried up in clicrries before the Iiarvcsting

was done. In some parts the dried cherries from thc trces were allowed to stay in water

for several days before the pericarp was washed off with the result that the taste of the

coffee was badly affected.

Lantum also bemoaned the fact that small-scale farmers and even entire villages

were unable to raisc 28.000frs to procure pulpers. Tbey had to depend on the

generosity of richer fanners some times living outside the villagc. Such farmers

harvcsted and stored the cherries in baskets till the coffec pulper was lent to them. It

was therefore difficult for such farmers to pulp their coffee within the recomrnendcd

12 hours after picking. He also pointed out that even when there was a pulpcr, somc of

the farmers considered wrongly, that it was a waste of timc and energy pulping only

small quantities at a time.

Most of the pulpers in use had to be adjusted to suit the size of the ripc cherries.

But, what he realized was that many farmers did not know how to cffect thesc

adjustments with the result that most of the beans were damaged in the course of

pulping. He also observed that because of insufficient water and carelessness in certain

cases, thc pulpers and baskets were not thoroughly flushed to get rid of all the bcatis.

In subsequent usage, the old beans got mixed up with the new lots and surfaced at thc

time of grading as stinkers. To him, this made it necessary for the farmcr to be

educated and supervised constantly.

On fermentation after pulping, he noted that a minimum and maximum limit of

time ought to have been set out and farmers propcrly educated on it. If the cherries had

to be pulped within twelve hours, then the farmers ought equally to be told how long

and in what condition the fermentation must take place. This, to his surprise, was not

known to many farmers.

The Assistant Registrar also pointed out that after proper fermentation, the

coffee had to be properly washed. This depended largely on the availabil~ty of clean

water. However, he noted that where water was scarce and distant to access, a small

quantity of water was used to wash tins upon tins of coffee. In certain instances, thc

same water used in soaking the beans during pulping, was used again in washing the

coffee after fermentation.

Regarding the drying of the coffee crop, he noted that some good farmers uscd

"karanga" matting on raised platforms to avoid extrancous matter mixing up with the

coffee. Others preferred to dry the coffee on slabs, some on thc ground just as it was

judged convenient to them. Many farmers, he claimed, because of multifarious social

engagements, found little or no time for proper drying of their coffee. For want of

time, some farmers exposed parchment coffee to the sun fo ra day, the next day or two

it remained in the baskets, then sunned, then neglected again until it finally got dry. 011

careful cxamination of such beans he opined, it could be clearly seen that there was a

differencc in colour, scent and taste fi-om the normally processed coffee.

He also alleged that farmers were plucking ripe as well as unripe cherries, in

fact, anything in the shape of coffee on the trees. This mixture of good and bad beans

he claitned, was soaked and remained in water till the fleshy skin gave way on the rub.

It was then thoroughly washed and dried. On the surface such parchment looked very

clean but contained immature, insect beaten and rotten beans.

Lantum also noted that most fanncrs were still ignorant of the proper methods

to prune their coffee, when to do so, the types of fertilizers to use on their coffee crops,

and when and how to apply the fertilizers. According to him, the farmers were also

ignorant of the various arabica coffee diseases/pests and how they could be effectively

dealt with. The farmers were not also conscious of the necessity for constant tillage of

the soil and the need for suitable types of shade trees for the young coffee plants.

Granted that planting of coffee was undertaken as advised by extension workcrs

of the Agriculture Department, he noted, the farms were frequently allowed to grow

into bushes and in the ensued struggle with weeds and shrubs for survival, most of the

cherries on the branches withered and dropped away.

Suggestions for Improvement

After critically examining those problems which he considered as the main

cause of the decline of the coffee industry in West Cameroon with special referencc to

Bamenda, lie offered a number of suggestions for the improvement of thc industry. His

recommendations would seem not to have dcviated much from those carllcr made by

T.S. Jervis.

Firstly, hc strongly recommended that the ~ a r k e t j n g Board sliould allocate

enough funds for a "Save the Industry Campaign" for which he inadc a detailed

cstimatc. Secondly, he recommended the rccruitnient of a dynamic coffee specialist

officer for a two-year term and to be attached to the Ministry of Agriculture to

undertake the following: #

(i) Establish coffee demonstration plots at strategic areas.

(ii) Take responsibility for control of plant pests and diseases

(iii) Recruit and train workers, including those from local authorities, in order to

achieve (i) and (ii) above

Regarding information to the farmcrs, he suggesied that pamphlets, handbills

etc should be provided en masse for public circulation. Churches, schools, local

councils, the Ministry of Agriculture, co-operatives and community development

associations were to be invaluable vehicles in explaining and spreading the

information. Short articles on the coffee industry in local newspapers and broadcast

over Radio Yaounde were recommended to be regular media of information

dissemination. The broadcast could take place once a week but the public must be U

informed well in advance of when it was going to take place. He reconlmended that

articles should be in simple and plain language and technical terms should be avoided

as much as possible. - - - - - -

On plant pest and disease control, he recommended that the WCMB should

supply chemicals and pumps to each coffee marketing co-operative society free.

Before determining thc price to be paid for coffee or in the alternative the bol~us at the

close of the coffee season, sufficient deduction sliould have been made to cover the

cost of the pumps and chemicals supplied or to be supplicd. All farmcrs residing in a

village served by a co-operative wcre to be organized to undertake niass spraying by

mutual and joint effort under the supervision of the co-operatives. Such operations

were to be directly supervised by the coffee specialist officer and his extension field

staff.

The Assistant Registrar recommended that persuasion, coercion, and other

measures of force should be used in saving the arabica coffee industry. To this end, lie

suggested that laws and regulations on coffee cultivation and processing be enacted

and a machinery for enforcement set up. The special arabica coffee section in the

Ministry of Agriculture headed by a dynamic and enthusiastic coffee specialist was to

undertake extension work as well as enforce the regulations. #

Lantum condemned thc cxisting system of harvesting coffee whcrcby each

farmer fended for himself as most unsatisfactory and enjoined the Ministry of Co-

operatives and Community Development to organize the villagers in gangs for mutual

and joint picking. He called on the WCMB to rnake available to each district a simplc

mobile trailer engine driven pulper with a water tank attachment. The co-operative

societies were to take chargc and control of such equipment for the benefit of the entirc

district. During the season, the machine could be pushed to all corners of the village to

provide service to thc farmers on a nominal charge of 1Cfrs CFA or so per tin. It was

hoped that as time rolled on and farmers got to appreciate these services, the hand

pulpers would be withdrawn.

On demonstration plots, he recommended that existing coffee farms in more

central positions in the village or district could be sclccted as demonstration farnis to

the farmers for a certain number of years after which other farms could be takcn up for

that purpose. He recommended that tilling, pruning, spraying etc should be undertaken

jointly with the farmers but the entire harvest should go to the farmer owning the farm.

Also, he recommended that coffee farmers within a district be invited for

demonstration classes during pruning, harvesting, and spraying, and also, when

fertilizers were due to bc used on the farms.

Lantum also recomrncndccl thc organisation of seminars and education of thc

farmers on the types of fertilizers to be used and the correct mcthods of application. Hc

further recommended that, it should be ensured the fertilizers are brought within easy

reach of the growers at very modcrate prices. He pointed out that the Ramenda Co-

operative Marketing Association was the main importer of fcrtilizcrs into Bamenda but

was impeded in the task by financial constraints. With its limited resourccs, it

observed, it could not afford to tie down much capital in chemicals. He then suggestcd

that the WCMB, in partnership with the BCMA, should invest some fivc million francs

yearly on chemical fertilizers so as to meet up with the needs of tlie famicrs.

While Lantum would seen1 to have agreed on a number of issucs with the .lervis

Report, especially on demonstration methods to the farmers, and plant pest and disease b

control, the two officials disagreed sharply in their recornmcndations on the mcthod of

preparing coffee for the market. Lantum called on the WCMB to legislate against the

preparation of arabica coffee by the dry method contrary to what Jervis had advocated.

He argued that when the cherry beans were processed and mixed with beans from

parchment coffee, it was hard to tcll the difference by the look as some of the cherry

bcans appeared usually very clean. I t was only by roasting and tasting of samplcs that

quality could be detcrmined. Since the Department of Marketing and Inspection did

not adopt the method of roasting and tasting for grading coffee, he requested for tlie

prevention of such mixed lots of coffee from getting into the International Market.

In his Memo, Lantum callcd on the Marketing Board and the Government to

take careful stock of the activities of the LBAs and find out whether they had

contributed anything towards the improvement of the industry. Likc Jcrvis, he

castigated the LBAs as concentrating on profit making for themselves and as being

responsible for some of the problems, -which co~lfronted- t h e indust ry . Hc- - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - -

recommended that the LBAs should get out of produce marketing, thereby advocating

for a marketing n~onopoly for the co-operatives, like Jervis had done.

He concluded that most of the suggestions made in the implementation of

preventive and corrective measures to save the future of the arabica coffee needed to

be put into effect by mcans of group activity. As such, certam serviccs would have to

bc centralized, and produccrs would have to contribute both i n cash and In kmd.

Thereforc, the only institution that would best serve the farmer and the nat~on,

according to him, was thc co-operative movement. He noted that thc rccord of thc

BCMA in the field of arabica coffee marketing had not bcen a bad onc at all. Tllc

foundation had therefore been laid. Secondly, the BCMA was the counterpart of thc

UCCAO, which had the monopoly of marketing the coffee in East Canicroon. I t was

therefore logical, hc argued, that BCMA should claim thc samc monopoly i n

Bamenda.

Critique of the Report + Arguably, the Lantum submission was more fundamental and realistic and

addressed onc of the central issues in thc coffcc dcbate. His main argument was that

enough should be done to improve the quality of Bamenda coffee through proper

cultivation and processing practices so as to attract better prices for it in the world

market. For, as a report of the co-operative department had earlier notcd,

The greatest problems facing the area (Bamenda) are the decline i n world market prices for coffee and the inferior quality produced both through ignorance of proper mcthods of cultivation and faulty processing. Thc difficulty of disposing of the last season crop was, as stated, largely due to inferior quality."

Admittedly, poor or inferior quality was perhaps largely responsible for the lowcr

prices received for Bamenda arabica coffee in the world market. While the above

report attributed the inferior quality to both ignorance of proper methods of cultivation

and faulty processing, it did not explain why the coffee farmers of Bamenda were still

ignorant and faulty in their methods, 25 years after embracing the coffee business. The

explanation to this problem may be simple. A bulletin of the North West Co-operative

Association madc an interesting analogy between coffee and the local liquor, and

reads:

Coffee is just like corn beer or palm wine. If you do not follow the correct processing procedures, the drink will taste bad. Thc filtul-c of NWCA coffec depends on producing coffee with a good taste.

While it is true that coffee is like corn beer or palm wine, thc main differencc in

them lies in the fact that while corn beer and palm wine are produccd and consunled

mainly within the province, coffee is produced in the province and consurncd mainly

in Europc, North America and the Middle East and that may partly cxplain thc

problem. While the people of Bamenda may know exactly how their corn beer or palni

wine will taste when they don't follow the rightful processing procedures, they may

Iiardly determine how the coffec will taste like if the correct processing procedures arc

not followed since the farmers hardly consume it. This made attempts aimcd at

improving quality difficult to achieve. However, more'fundamental is the fact that

returns hardly justified efforts. While good quality liquor may fetch a better pricc and a

niore ready market, there was hardly any significant difference in prices between good

quality and poor quality coffee. This was especially the case when LBAs started

competing for the produce of the fanners. As such, there was no particular incentive

for farmers to produce high quality coffee. Those who sold their produce to private

LBAs received about the same price as was paid by the co-operatives wlicrc quality

was much emphasised. The only difference was that private LBAs did not pay any

bonus after the official price.

The truth of the matter was that many farmers did not see the econoniics of

what Lantum considercd to be a problem. Though capital constituted a problcm to

many farmers, the unwillingness to buy coffee pulpers by many farmers involved other

economic considerations, which he did not realise. Pulping and washing of coffec was

conveniently and cheaply done by hand, using family labour. Some women even made

an income from this activity as in the Kom area. As such, many farmers did not judge

it right to invest in such machines when they were not sure of adequate rcturns to such

out lay.

Government Response

However, Lantum would seem to have struck the right note as far as the

government was concerned and government rcsponse was almost inimcdiatc. Thc

Prime Minister of West Camcroon realized the urgency o r the mattcr. "I havc takcn

note", he wrote,

... of the grave dangers which are affecting the arabica coffee industry in West Cameroon. Since this industry is the main stay of the economy of the people of the northern sector of West Camcroon, I think that time has arrived when organized campaigns against poorly produced coffee should be staged both by thc department and other government organisations, for if nothing were done and the industry went into ruins, then the consequences would be far reaching. It will be necessary for the Registrar of Co- operatives to infonn me of what necessary action he is taking to scc

13 that this industry does not get into ruins.

Some frantic efforts were made within government circles to address the issues

raised by Lantum. The Memo. was discussed by the WCMB at its 69'" ~mccting of

18/2/67 barely three days after submission. Though final decisions wcrc not takcn on

the Memo. at the meeting, the prompt response to it by the government contrasted with

the slow rcaction to the Jervis's report, which had had to drag on for a much longer

period before any meaningful decision was made on it. This was probably bccause thc

issues raised in the Lantum Memo. were more fundamental and lcss controversial.

Whatever the case, Mr. Lantum himself was in attendance at the meeting when his

Memo. was discussed. He explained that since writing the memorandum, he had

visited the UCCAO factories at Bafoussam and had observed that in East Cameroon.

each farmer's coffee was tested on delivery at the factory in parchment form and that

the farmers were only paid for that percentage of the coffee, which was considered

good coffee. This, according to him, provided an incentive to every farmer to deliver -

good coffee. He then stated that in view of this, he wished to review the

recommendations he had made regarding bulk pulping which would make it difficult

to test each farmer's coffee individually for quality.

Nevertheless, the WCMB considered the Lantum Memo. in dctail with Mr.

Oyebog, the Agricultural Officer, Bamenda, also in attendance. The Board nicmbcrs

expressed anxiety to present a scheme to government for improv~ng tlie West

Cameroon arabica coffee crop and to consider the possibility of tlic Board linancing

such a scheme. However, members felt it would be unwise to prcparc sucli a sclienic

without checking carefully what was being done in East Canicroon to improvc tlic

arabica crop since it was understood considerable progress had bcen niadc In

improving the East Cameroon arabica coffee crop during the two previous I n

line with this reasoning, the Board appointed a delegation, which included Mcssrs.

Oyebog and Lantum, to visit Baffoussani to inspect the processing arrangcnients tlicrc.

The delegation was also expected to visit the field work pf UCCAO and i n particular,

to meet officials of the Agricultural Department in the East Cameroon arabica area, to

discuss what the said Agricultural Department was doing in this field and to see some

of thc agricultural extension work on arabica in process.

The outcome of this visit was the adoption of a number of measures by tlic

WCMB to improve the quality of arabica coffee in West Cameroon. Firstly, tlie Board

adopted the system of buying by quality practised in East Cameroon. In East

Cameroon, all arabica coffee was delivered by the farmers in parclimcnt form to tlic

co-operative unions coffee factories. A sample was collected from every farmer's

coffee and then hulled and polished in a hand huller/polisher specially dcsigned for

testing small samples. The hulled/polished beans were then examined for defects. The

percentage of defects in the sample was then calculated after which tlie farmer was

paid at the gazetted rate for that percentage of his coffee constituting good coffee and

was paid nothing for the percentage representing defective beans. Initially, UCCAO

paid a reduced price for defective coffee beans but abandoned the policy when it was

anticipated that the ICO might forbid the export of triage. This system of buying by

quality was thought to be advantageous to the industry in that farmers who took

adequate care of their coffee had a lower percentage of defects and tliereforc a higher

percentage of their coffee was paid for. To enable the system to be introduced during

the 1967168 arabica coffee season, the Board ordered fifteen hand-operated

hullinglpolishing machines to experiment with at a cost of 26,800 CFA each and

embarked on a campaign to publicise the new method of buying.

Secondly, in East Cameroon UCCAO had a monopoly which enabled it to take

strict measures to enforce quality and the farmers were obliged to co-opcrate since i f

their coffee was of poor quality, there was no rival buying agent that could buy it. The

situation was however different in West Cameroon where government was not

prepared to create such a monopoly as a matter of policy but rather directed that thc

Marketing Board should only give advances to co-operative organisations and thc

West Cameroon Development Agency. The Marketing Board was only hoping that the

other arabica coffee licensed buying agents faced with the prospects of not having #

advances, would agree to let the Board buy them out or rent their mills and with

buying limited to the co-operatives and the West Cameroon Development Agency, it

would then be possible to implement strict policies to improve quality.

Thirdly, the Board made 2,000,000 CFA francs worth of fertilizer available to

farmers. The fertilizer was to be distributed to the farmers on credit the cost of which

was to be deducted from their bonuses for the 1966167 coffee season expected to be

paid in October 1967.

Fourthly, the Board requested the Department of Agriculture to draw up a

scheme for an extension service purely for arabica coffee to be financed by the Board.

An essential part of this was to be (assuming the Department considered it feasible), a

trained blacksmith in each of the main arabica areas with equipment to enable him to

repair pulping machines. It requested that the extension service should also include

staff to move round and advise farmers on how to ferment their coffee and on proper

use of their pulping machines and to see that these machines were correctly set. p p p p p p p p - - - - - - - -

Emphasis was placed on pulping machines maintenance, and fermentation since it was

felt that a large part of the stinkers and damaged beans were created at this stage. The

Chicf Produce Marketing Officer suggested that the Department of Agriculture should

put up an arabica coffee scheme of 3,000,000CFA, which could be in operation by

November 1967 bearing in mind that the Board would be prepared to consider making IS such expenditure recurrent, and perhaps be able to increase it at a later stagc.

The Board counted on the Department of Agriculture to declare any practices

that led to poor quality of arabica coffee illegal and to see to it that standards laid down

were enforced together with the restriction of the cultivation of arabica coffee to

suitable areas. It was to be unlawful to plant arabica coffee in arcas which had bccn

declared as unsuitable for its cultivation by the Department of Agriculture.

In accordance with the request of the WCMB, the Director of Agriculture

submitted a scheme for arabica coffee quality improvement for West Cameroon. The

cost of the scheme was limited to three million CFA francs which amount was lodgcd

with the Director of Agriculture in September 1967. The scheme was costed as + follows:

1 tem Amount

A. Staff 2.369.016 francs CFA

B. Demonstration equipment 344.000 francs

C. Advisory leaflets 70.000 francs

D. Coffee nursery (Bamenda) 200.000 francs

E. Staff training and training

equipment 16.984 francs

Total 3.000.000 francs CFA

On the question of blacksmiths, the Director of Agriculture explained that

excellent repair facilities existed in Bambui Workshops (Bamenda) for the repair of

pulpers and during the arabica coffee processing season, the Agricultural Engineering

Mobile team would go round to look into the problems. He added that the correct

adjustment of pulpers was a question to be handled ably by the coffee demonstrators.

He did not therefore recommend the recruitment of blacksnliths specifically for the

repair of coffee pulpers.

The Director of Agriculture strongly recommended that all coffee farmers

should be educated through the co-operative on the anticipated changes in the coffcc

marketing system, namely: coffee purchase on quality basis, thc official coffee buycr;

the channel through which farrncrs could obtain agricultural chemicals (fertilizers and

pesticides) etc.

With regard to staff, he reconlmended that coffee den~onstrators be distributed

as follows to Divisions within Bamenda Province:

Division Number of Demonstrators

Bamenda 6

Gwofon 3

Nso 8

Nkambe 2

Wum 3 + Total 22

The efforts of the coffee demonstrators were to be supplementcd by that of the

existing field staff in the Bamenda province. He however, cautioned that the work of

the 22 coffee demonstrators would be highly handicapped as the villages and liouscs

within an area were widely dispersed. 113 this regard, he recommended that they bc

prov~ded with 22 bicycles to facilitate their work. In addition, he recommended a

bicycle allowance of 5 19 CFA francs annually for each of the 22 demonstrators to easc

their transportation.

He suggested that for success to be achieved, legislation must bc considered on:

- Compulsory fermentation of coffee, washing the beans in clean water and

drying the wet parchment coffee either on raised platforms or fenced cenienl

slabs.

- Stopping farmers from using the dry method for preparing coffee except for

robusta coffee.

- Cutting down of neglected coffee trees without compensation to their owncrs as

they constitute a source of danger to the neighbouring coffee farms.

- No intercropping of coffee with any other crops except the plantain/banana

shade

In the case of very serious outbreaks of coffee diseases such as coffee berry

disease, which was reported in Upper Ngemba, and pink disease in Nso Area, he

recommended that the Marketing Board provide free chemicals to farnicrs to combat

such epidemics. He concluded that the economic future of the territory dependcd on

the production of top quality coffee i.e. coffee, which would be eagerly sought in

world markets at premium prices. He was therefore pleased to learn that the Marketing

Board was prepared to make the proposed allocation for the coffee scheme recurrent

and to increase it in future. He appealed for the early approval of his proposals i n order

to effect the early commencement of staff training, expressing appreciation for the

contribution the Board was making towards revolutionizing agriculture in Wcst

Cameroon." The said scheme was approved by the Board at its 731d meeting and +

confirmed at the 74t" meeting held on 27/9/1967.

While it may be conceded that much of what was recommended in the Lantum

Memo. especially concerning quality improvement received attention in terms of

implementation, onc must also recognize the fdct that the Memo. itself did not addrcss

all the problems afflicting the coffee industry in Bamenda in particular and Wcst

Cameroon in general. Consciously or unconsciously, Lantum left out one of the most

vexing issues of the time which was causing a lot of acrimony among the arabica

coffee farmers of Bamenda, and which was already causing some political tension

also. While recommending the system of "Buying by Quality" adoptcd in East

Cameroon for quality control following his visit to Baffoussam, he failed to remind the

WCMB that prices of arabica coffee were higher in East Cameroon than in Bamcnda,

with no major differences in quality to justify the higher prices in the Eastern part of

the territory. Meanwhile, the price dichotomy between East and West Canieroon

without any meaningful economic justification was an existing fact,wl~&h had b e e ~ - p p p p p - p - - - - -

- - - -

recognized by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, West Cameroon, S.S. ~hang."

While recognizing the problem, he had however expressed his incompetence to resolve

it conceding that only the state government could adequately explain the rationale

behind the policy.

Lantum's Memo. would have made more impact had i t raised the issue. Thc

implementation of the recommendations made in the memo. therefore, did not address

the price issue, as far as the coffee farmers of Bamenda were concerned. Truc, he felt

the prices could be improved through improved coffee quality, but he failed to address

a crucial issue, which was that of differential prices for coffee of the same quality in

the two regions.

This grievance found expression at an Annual General Meeting of the BCMA

held on the 22 December, 1967. At that meeting, the BCMA resolved to pctition the

govornment over the matter. The petition was addressed to thc Prime Ministcr of West

Cameroon, and stated emphatically, inter alia, that;

Unification has brought along with it harmonization in several fields of activity at different stages: and those affected are now enjoying the fruits of it. But the Arabica coffee farmers seem to have been forgotten as this docs not seem to have affectcd them directly. The Arabica coffee farmer of East Cameroon continues to receive higher price for the same quality of coffee year after ycar than ourselves and this is striking to note, when it is considercd that all our coffee is being sold in the same world market. Formerly we were not grading our coffee in the same way as they wcrc doing and this was responsible for the difference in the price, but two years ago we acquired the necessary grading machines, processing techniques and have since been producing same qualities as they of the East; but still we do not receive the same pricc for our coffee. This is confirmed by the recent report of Mr. Frank Cavanagh, thc Cameroon coffee broker, for the 1966167 coffee season.

In its petition, the BCMA adduced reasons for the bcttcr pricc paid in East

Cameroon. It explained that all world arabica coffee was sold in the traditional world

market by quota allocations. The quota allocated to Cameroon was always so sniall

that it did not allow for the sale of all her coffee to the traditional market, which paid

qu i t e a gooctprice. As such,the 3 r o E r was forced toselltheTestof Camerooi's coffce

in the new market, which paid but very low price for it.

Following this, it explained that in East Cameroon, the government levied

produce sales tax only on the coffee sold in the traditional market as it fetched a good

price and no taxes were collected on any coffee sold to the new market; this brought a

bettcr price on the whole to the East Cameroon arabica coffee farmer. Contrasting il

with West Cameroon, the petition pointed out that the Wcst Cameroon farmer paid

produce sales tax on all his coffee irrespective of where it was sold. It inainlaincd that *

such arrangement would continue to affect the price year in year out if thc samc

system was not adopted as in East Cameroon as there could be no other remedy

The petition went on to point out that in addition to the non-payment of tax 011

coffee sold in the new market, the government further subsidized arabica coffee priccs

in East Cameroon by mcans of payment of a block sum of money to the farn~crs'

organisation. The BCMA could therefore not understand why the government could

not adopt the same policies for the arabica coffee farmers of Bamenda. The coffcc

farmers of Bamenda in particular and West Cameroon in general were then tcmpled by +

the circumstances to look back at the marketing arrangements during thc colonial

period with some nostalgia. From 1955 when the Southern Cameroons Marketing

Board became operational, it ensured a yearly stable price for the farmcrs' produce by V

paying the farmers a price lower than the foreign market price. After inceting thc

expenses of the marketing organisation, the balance was divided into two parts - thc

bigger part was put into a reserve fund so as to ensure a stablc price for the farmcrs in

years when world prices dropped. The smaller part was used for development projects

that directly benefited the farmer such as farm-to-market roads, rural schools,

dispensaries, fertilizers etc. Thus, the tacit concept remained that the produce was thc

property of the farmer and government only came in to ensure a stable and profitable

4 price for him.19~he BCMA also pointed out in its petition that arabica coffee was

charged the highest Produce Sales Tax in the country compared to what was levied on

other crops such as cocoa, palm kernel, and robusta coffee, with the rate for arabica as

high as 12,500 francs per ton.

In view of the above observations, the BCMA pleaded with the government as

follows: firstly, that the Produce Sales Tax of 12,500frs per ton, which it was paying,

was too high and should be reduced. Secondly, no produce sales tax should be paid 011

any coffee sold to the new market. Thirdly, the marketing board should subsidise

prices fetched on coffee sold to the new markets. It concluded by reminding thc

government that the economy of most families in the arabica regions rested on thc

coffee industry adding that coffee was a seasonal crop and each family had to spread

its meagre earnings over 12 months of the year. It contrasted this situation with that of

the Southern part where farmers were growing and marketing a variety of cash crops

some of which earnings were year round.

The case of BCMA was too true and straightforward to demand any objections

from the government. In a correspondence to the Secretary to the Prime Minister, thc

Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Resources concurred with the pctitioners

and noted that:

The arabica coffee crop pays the highest produce sales tax in West Cameroon. The rate is arbitrary and s i d e it was bequeathed to us by the colonial administration, it has no relation to our.present marketing situation. Considering that in addition to this very high tax, thc farmers have to pay an export (federal) tax on this coffee, this appears to leave the farmers in an unviable situation demanding the most urgent relief measures. It is because of these considerations that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies has expressed sympathy for the plight of the farmers and has in consequence recommended a review of the rate of the Produce Sales Tax and an abolition of such on arabica coffee exported to the new markets. The issues raised in the petition are both pathetic and intricate and thus requiring quite careful studyb2'

He explained that the "New Markets" referred to in the petition included the Eastern countries

of the communist bloc where, because prices were uneconomically low, the official

stabilization fund in East Cameroon did not only exempt coffee exported to such countries

from the usual taxes, but in addition, granted a subsidy to the tune of 15.000francs CI;A per

ton so as to improve the price and the lot of the fanners as well.

He however, pointed out that in building up the current estimates, account was

taken of the revenue accruing from produce sales tax at the prevailing rates and in that

connection, his Ministry could not recommend a reduction of the current rate of

12.500francs CFA per ton of produce sales tax. He could not determine the quantity of

arabica coffee that was sold to the new markets and could not therefore endorse the

suggestion that produce sales tax on them be abolished. The Permanent Secretary,

Ministry of Natural Resources, was thcrefore of the opinion that: -

(a) Produce Sales Tax should remain at the prevailing rate at least up to the close of

that financial year.

(b) A careful study should be made to determine the amount of coffee sold in the

new markets. Since the Marketing Board was seen to be very helpful 111 this

direction, it should be requested to comment on the petition pointing out the

possible immediate effects of either reducing the rate of Produce Sales Tax or

completcly exempting coffee sold in the new markets from the tax. It should

also comment on the long term effects of the alternatives open to the

government and any decision on the subject should be reflected in the 1968169

budget. + (c) It was unfortunately impracticable at that moment to subsidize the new market

prices since the Marketing Board reserves on arabica coffee were already so

gravely depleted. This depletion, he added, had been progressively aggravated

by the fact that Marketing Board produce were being evacuated through East

Cameroon and so the sooner the government sought measures to arrest the

trend, the better it would be.

The Permanent Secretary's comments were intended to guide the Prime

Minister to whom the petition was addressed, in responding to the petitioners. The

Prime Minister on his part acted accordingly. The Chief Produce Marketing Officer

was requested to assess the amount of coffee sold in the "new markets" and the

possible immediate and long term effects of either reducing the rate of Produce Sales

Tax or completely exempting coffee sold in the "new markets" from the tax. In view of

the fact that the preparation of the 1968169 Draft Estimates was near, he was requested

to treat the issue with urgency."

Calculations were accordingly made to that effect showing the export of coffee

(both arabica and robusta) from West Cameroon to the traditional markets and the

"new markets" for the two previous international coffee years that is from 1" October

to 30 '~ September. The figures read as follows:

Source: CNAB, Qclg 196 112 p. 152

Table 4: Export of coffee from West Cameroon to traditional and new markets

N.B. While the arabica coffee was mainly from Bamcnda, robusta was mostly

Year

1965166 Season

Arabica

1965166 Season

Robusta

1966167 Season

Arabica

1966167 Season

produced in the South West Province.

The Chief Produce Marketing Officer then buttressed the point of the BCMA by

I Robusta 1 1623 tons I - 1 1623 tons

explaining that the ICO laid down quotas for each country or group of countries for thc

Total

5273 tons

21 17 tons

696 1 tons

Traditional Markets

3776 tons

1371 tons

5616 tons

export of coffee to traditional markets during each international coffee year with tlie

New Markets

1497 tons

746 tons

1345 tons

b

object of ensuring that more coffee was not brought into the market than dernanded so

as to affect the price negatively.22 These quotas, he went further, were either incrcascd

or decreased during the international coffee year if the market price varied greatly; the

quotas being reduced if the price fell and being raised if the price went up. Coffce

exporting countrics then had to sell all the coffee which they had above their givcn

quota in what were termed "new markets" such as the Middle East, the Far East, and ~-~ ~ ~ ~

communist countries. The price of coffee in the "new markets" was just betwcen 60 to

70% of the price paid in the traditional markets because of the small demand in tlie

new markets and the competition to sell in them.

The PMO revealed that in West Cameroon, 12,7 13CFA a ton produce sales tax

was being charged on arabica coffee. This was paid by the WCMB and not directly by

the farmer and the WCMB paid the same 15OCFA francs advance price to the fanners 1 as was paid in East Cameroon. However, the result of the produce sales tax, which was

not paid at all in East Cameroon, was that the Board had less balance available with

which to pay further advance prices and bonuses to the fam~er than in the case of East

Cameroon.

He further revealed that although the East Cameroon arabica coffee farmers did

not pay produce sales tax, their marketing organisation, UCCAO, had to pay 15 CFA a

kilo i.e. 15.000 CFA a ton to the stabilization fund of the Caisse for arabica coffee.

However, UCCAO did not have to pay this 15CFA a kilo to the Caissc in respect of b

"new market'' shipments; instead it received a subsidy of 25 FCFA a kilo. This

contrasted sharply with what obtained in West Cameroon where the sales tax was paid

on coffee exported to both the traditional markets and the "new markets".

Regarding the proposals of the Bamenda Co-operative Marketing Association,

he remarked as follows:

On the reduction of the rate of produce sales tax on arabica coffec, the rate of

12,713 CFA a ton was fixed at a time when arabica coffee fetched about £400 per ton

FOB which translated to 274,000 CFA compared with about 200.000CFA in 1968. He

went further to explain that the rate for arabica coffee was fixed at twice the rate for

robusta coffee i.e. 6357 CFA a ton because robusta was then fetching about £200 per

ton FOB which translated to about 137.000CFA. However, the situation had changed

and robusta coffee was currently fetching about 160.000 CFA a ton necessitating a

revision of the rates. He reminded that in a letter reference No.2151110 of 2111 111966,

he had put up proposals to the financial secretary for revising the rates ofproduce sales

tax which the Ministry of Finance later informed him were realistic and were being

considered against the next financial year i.e. 1968 without any amendments. He added

that in drawing up draft estimates of revenue from produce sales tax for the next

financial year he had again drawn the attention of the Ministry of Financc to his

proposals for the adjustment of rates.

On the suggestion by BCMA that no produce sales tax be paid on coffce sold in

the "new markets", he observed that he had put up to the Permanent Secretary of the

Department of statc Development in his letter WCMB/CONF/20/18 of 21/2/68,

detailed proposals for improving the financial position of the Marketing Board for thc

consideration of government. These proposals included a suggested mcans by which

produce sales tax could be waived in the current financial year (1968) and the next

financial year at no cost to governnient while government endeavour to find otlicr

means-of revenue to replace the loss of revenue which the permanent abolition of

produce sales tax on new market sales of coffee would involve. +

On the subsidizing of "new market" sales by the Marketing Board, lie noted that

for the past two seasons the Marketing Board had incurrcd a loss on arabica coffce in

order to be able to pay a bonus of 10CFA a kilo to arabica coffee farrncrs at the cnd of

the season. This was necessary sincc even 10 CFA a kilo was less than thc amount tlic

East Cameroon arabica coffee farmers were receiving. He however pointcd out that tlic

Board's law forbids the Board from using funds from one produce to finance another

producc, and that the arabica coffee reserve of the Board was becoming so dcplctcd

that the Board would not be able to subsidise the arabica payments much longcr.

The case of the Bamenda arabica coffee farmers as was presented by the

BCMA and confirmed in toto by the Chief Produce Marketing Officer, Victoria, was

an indictment on the government and required speedy action to redress such injustice.

In order to harmonise and regularize the position, the Financial Secrctary, Wcst

Cameroon, entreated the Legal Adviser, Prime Minister's Office, Buea, to draw up the

necessary draft bill to effect the amendment required for the exemption of coffee sold

to "new markets" from Produce Tax. It was proposed that the draft Icgislation come

into effect on 1" July, 1968.~' However, it was not until the end of 1968 that thc

legislation came into effect and arabica coffee from Bamenda, which was sold in thc

"new markets", was exempted from produce sales tax.

financial year he had again drawn the attention of the Ministry of Finance to his

proposals for the adjustment of rates.

On the suggestion by BCMA that no produce sales tax be paid on coffee sold in

the "new markets", he observed that he had put up to the Permanent Secretary of the

Department of state Development in his letter WCMB/CONF/20/18 of 21/2/68,

detailed proposals for improving the financial position of the Marketing Board for the

consideration of government. These proposals included a suggested means by which

produce sales tax could be waived in the current financial year (1968) and the next

financial year at no cost to government while government endeavour to find othcr

nieans -of revenue to replace the loss of revenue which the permanent abolition of

produce sales tax on new market sales of coffee would involve. b

On the subsidizing of "new market" sales by the Marketing Board, lie noted that

for the past two seasons the Marketing Board had incurred a loss on arabica coffee i l l

order to be able to pay a bonus of lOCFA a kilo to arabica coffee farmers at the end of

thc season. This was necessary since even 10 CFA a kilo was less than the amount thc

East Cameroon arabica coffee farmers were receiving. He however pointed out that tlie

Board's law forbids the Board from using funds from one produce to finance another

produce, and that the arabica coffee reserve of the Board was becoming so dcpleted

that the Board would not be able to subsidise the arabica payments much longcr.

The case of the Bamenda arabica coffee farmers as was presented by tlie

BCMA and confirmed in toto by the Chief Produce Marketing Officer, Victoria, was

an indictment on the government and required speedy action to rcdress such injustice.

In order to harmonise and regularize the position, the Financial Secretary, Wcst

Cameroon, entreated the Legal Adviser, Prime Minister's Office, Buea, to draw up the

necessary draft bill to effect the amendment required for the exemption of coffee sold

to "new markets" from Produce Tax. It was proposed that the draft legislation come

into effect on 1" July, 1 9 6 8 . ~ ~ However, it was not until the end of 1968 that thc

legislation came into effect and arabica coffee from Bamenda, which was sold in the

"new markets", was exempted from produce sales tax.

The Bamenda Coffee Farmers Association (BCFA)

Growing apprehension and dissatisfaction with the co-operative movement i n

Bamenda, which many coffee farmers accused of colluding with tlic govcrnmcnt to

exploit them, had led to the formation of the Bamenda Coffee Farmers Associat~on

(BCFA) by a section of the coffee farmers of Bamenda. The BCFA sought to ach~cvc

for the farmers, what they felt the co-operatives had failed to do. Its membership

included some members of the co-operatives as well as non-members. It considered

itself as the mouthpiece of the farmers and without trying to assume the role of a

Licensed Buying Agent, championed the course for better and regular payment for thc

farmer's produce. + As an association that aimed at safeguarding the welfare of its members,

petition writing became its characteristic weapon. It sought to draw the attcntion of tlic

govcrnrnent to the problems facing the coffee farmers of Bamenda through petitions. It

addressed a number of petitions to both the WCMB and the govcrnmcnt on thc

problems facing the coffee industry in Bamenda. In one of such petitions addresscd to

the Pr~me Minister of West Cameroon, the farmers reminded that on the 5"' of Octobcr,

1967, in a welcome address presented to the Secretary of State for Development and

Internal Economic Planning, they did outline some of the difficultics facing thc arabica

coffee farmers. The farmers added that in another letter of 10"' October 1967 to tlic

CPMO, Victoria, they took up another issue, which affected the ordinary coffec farmcr

in Bamenda very seriously.24 They then proceeded to outline the problems facing the

farmers more closely while appealing to the government to help solve their difficultics.

Firstly, the Association noted with satisfaction that the method of paying

farmers which was adopted in 1965166 coffee season was very suitable as paymcnt

was made on declaration of stock in hand. They could not understand why this method

had to be abandoned when a more efficient system had not bcen found. Thc

Association expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that LBAs usually delayed in

paying the farmers for their produce and implored thc government to look into better

ways of paying the farmers. It suggested that in the absence of a better option, the

government should adopt the former method of payment whereby farmers were paid

for their produce on declaration of stock in hand.

Secondly, the Association pointed out that there werc many privileges enjoyed

by the LBAs, such as the middleman's buying allowance, transport facilitics ctc while

the farmers enjoyed none of these privileges from the LBA. It noted that in thc

1965166 coffee season, bonus was declared to be 35frs per kilo of coffee. The farmcrs

could not understand why the rate of bonus payable was reduced to lofrancs per kilo,

when a farmer hardly earned 5.000francs when the bonus rate was 35frailcs per kilo.

The Association then called on the government to take steps. to halt what they termed a

"system of milking the farmcrs". b

On Board membership, the Association alleged that many of its difficultics

were as a rcsult of the inadequate representation, which farn~ers had on the Marketing

P Board. The petitioners argued that most of the non-farmer members were not in any

way acquainted with the problems of growing and producing coffee. They therefore

tended to regard any reasonable price paid for this crop as fantastic. They maintained

that it was not even correct for people who were not conversant with the problems of

producing a given crop to be entrusted with the authority to take major decisions

affecting the producers of the crop. The farmers' representation on thc Board must be

increased to correct this abnormality, they argued. They added that only farmers and

those who knew the crops could make fair and just decisions concerning them.

The Association also expressed concern over the fate of Direct Suppliers

Company Limited (DSC), one of the Licensed Buying Agents which had been

operating in the region and which licenses were said to have been withdrawn by the

government at the behest of farmers. It stated that the withdrawal of the company's

licenses did not help the coffee farmers in any way. The Association pointed out that

the company was owing coffee farmers about 11 million francs CFA and it did not see

how the farmers could recover the money if the company was prcvented from

continuing in business. Members expressed surprise over the allegation that the

licenses of the company were withdrawn because farmers wrote complaining that the

said company was owing them. The Association denied ever advocating in any of its

letters that the licenses of the company should be withdrawn though not all coffee

farmers in Bamenda were members of it. The Association dismissed an explanation it

understood was being advanced that the lieenses were withdrawn because the company

owed both the WCMB and the farmers. The Association felt the reason was quite

unconvincing because some other licensed buying agents also owed the Board and or

farmers and yet their licenses were not withheld.

11 further noted that when the DSC did business in coffee, ~t provided

en~ployment to well over 200 men and women in its coffee factory alone, thereby

reducing the scale of unemployment in Bamenda and consequently the whole country. #

It also assisted the poor farmers in various ways by making it possible for them to have

fertilizer, coffee pulpers, palm kernel crackers, zinc, cement, corn mills e k 2 ' The

Association then expressed the opinion that it was not in the common interest of the

farmers to force liquidation upon this company. If the government thought that 11 could

recover the money the company owed its agencies what of the poor farmer's money

and the millions of francs, which the company had invested in produce business,

buildings and machinery, the farmers asked? In normal commercial practice, it added,

the fact that a company had suffered some reverses in trade in one year did not mean

that it could not get on any more. They then appealed to the government to takc the

following steps in the interest of the coffee farmers:

Enter into proper arrangements with DSC in regard to the liquidation of the

company's indebtedness to the WCMB

Stop all threats to liquidate the company or interfere with its other financial

arrangements with banks etc.

Renew its licenses so that it can continue business in full swing and thereby

recover its former position

Negotiate with the company for the sale of any of its factories, like the one

at Kumba, to enable it pay the farmers.

It called on the government to grant as many licenses as poss~ble to pr~vate

LBAs so as to buy the fanners' coffee in Bamenda. It noted that arabica coffce

occupied almost the first position in terms of income generated and quantity cxported

among export crops in West Cameroon and should therefore be given priorlty by the

government. It argued that there were over twelve licersed buying agents for cocoa

and robusta coffee in Kumba and that there was no convincing reason why government

should appoint only three or four licensed buying agents for arab~ca coffee 111

Bamenda. It opined that the more the licensed buying agents, the more opcn thc

competition and the better the price offered to farmers.

On debts owed to the farmers by licensed buying agents, the Assoc~ation

claimed that the DSC was q u ~ t e prepared to pay the farmers it owed, if thc Marketing #

Board or government could buy its big factory in Kumba, which it was disposed to

sell. In addition, it stated that the company was quite prepared to pay the farmers if it

was called back into business by revoking those measures, which had been adopted by

government to put the company out of business. The Association expressed surprise

over a statement made by the Secretary of State for Development and Internal

Economic Planning, in a publication of the Cameroon Times of 18 October, 1967, that

debts owed farmers by licensed buying agents for their produce was a pr~vate affair.

The Association maintained that government should have informed them of 11s

positlon earlier and not to have kept them in suspense while making vague promses

that efforts were being made to recover this money from the DSC for the farmers when

actually it did not intend to do so. "This is therefore the good reason why we pray the

government to return the said company into business, so as to enable lt settlc its debts

with the farmers", the Association maintained. It concluded that it had been revealed to

the farmers by the Secretary of State's statement that the withholding of the s a ~ d

company's license was not in the interest of the farmers. The Assoc~ation quest~oned

why the government recovered only the debts of the Nkambe fanners from the

Company.

The last issue raised in the petition was thc payment of coffcc bonus during thc

196511966 coffee season. The Association praiscd thc governmcnt for undcrtaking thc

payment of coffee bonus for the said year. It, however, blamed the government ovcr

the fact that cven when it had been well known to it that DSC was indcbtcd to many

farmers and some farmers also owed the company, the governmcnt still went on to by-

pass the said company and paid bonuses to farmers who owed the company. 11 argued

that the company could have recovered monies from the farmers who owed i t to pay

those it owed. It then submitted that many farmers doin2 business with the company

had not up to the time of writing the petition, received their own bonus bccause of thc

negligence. Thc Association prayed the government to get into immed~ate arrangement

with the company so as to pay the farmers who had not yet received their bonus from

the BoardICompany for the 1965166 season. observed that, the fact that thc

Boardlgovernment undertook to collect the company's debts from the farmers and

could not collect the farmers' own debts from the company was a clear ~ndication that

the interest of the arabica coffee farmers of Bamenda was not being safeguarded by thc

govcniment.

The Chief Produce Marketing Officer duly commented on the petition of thc

BCFA. His comments were not kind on the petitioners and portrayed them as be~ng

ignorant of what obtained in the industry. He began by quest~oning the authority of

BCFA to pontificate on behalf of coffee farmers in Bamenda. To buttress his point, hc

pointed out that in the preceding arabica coffee season, 75% of the arabica coffee

farmers of West Cameroon marketed their coffee through the co-operatives while 1 1%

marketed their produce through the West Cameroon Development Authority. Mc

maintained that all the farmers who were members of thc co-operatives exprcsscd tlicir

grievances through the co-operatives while those who sold their produce through the

WCDA were in a position to voice their own grievances through the Agency. Hc

argued that most of the members of BCFA were customers of Kameroun Mountain

Company, kilo Bros Limited, former Nikang and Kamsang Company, and DSC.

Commenting on the issue of payment for arabica coffee, he pointed out that the

Board did not pay for arabica coffee against stock declaration during the 1965166

coffee season as alleged by thc petitioners. He cxplaincd that in that season the Board

gave advances to its licensed buying agents for the first timc bccausc thc Bonquc

Centrale declined to continue making funds available to Cameroon Bank for financmg

the Board's agents. The disbursement of the first advancements was based on past

performance of the agents involved and later in the season, such disbursements wcsc

based on stocks declared by the LBAs. As a result of this system he observcd, thc

Board incurred many bad debts and in May 1967, the Executive Council decided that

in future the Board should only advance money for produce procurcmcnt to thc co-

operatives and the WCDA. He explained that the way some of the LBAs such as DSC

and Kilo Bros. handled the advanced payments, was onc whicl~ d~scouragcd thc

Marketing Board from giving out money to any LBA when it had 1101 delivcrcd #

produce to the Board's store. On farmers' privileges, he explained that the LBAs d ~ d

not receive any allowance for transporting arabica coffee to processing centrcs and that

the buying allowance paid to them was designed to cover thelr operational costs,

including bags, insurance, bank charges, processing, etc. plus the payment of an

allowance to their middlemen who collected coffee for them. There was no part of the

buying allowance, which was intended to be paid to the farmers. He cxplaincd furthcr

that what was intended for the farmers was the advanced price plus any balance that

the Board was able to pay after selling the arabica coffee. He pointed out that in the

1965166 season, the Board was able to pay a bonus of 35 FCFA a kilo and still had a

balance left which was carried over to the arabica coffee reserve. But in the 1966167

season due to a fall in the world market price for arabica coffee, the Board was only

able to pay a bonus of 10 FCFA a kilo to the farmers and still incurred a loss of

29,692,59 1 FCFA on arabica coffee.

He reminded that four out of the five unofficial members on the recently

dissolved Marketing Board, were from the arabica coffee area and werc all acquainted

with the problems of arabica coffee farmers. His personal opinion was that arabica

coffec was over-represented on the Board and the case of the petitioners on this issue

lacked credence.

On the question of debts owed to the farmers by LBAs, he stated that

government had made a decision on the matter of DSC and that 11c had no knowledge

of the big factory at Kumba owned by DSC to which the petition referrcd. One finds it

difficult to believe that BCFA was making an empty allegation and that no such

factory actually existed in Kumba which was owned by DSC.

On the issue of LBAs, he responded that robusta coffee was easy to sell but

arabica coffee was becoming more and more difficult to sell. It could only be sold by

continually improving its quality since the standard demanded by the buyers becarnc

stricter each year. The difficulty faced in selling arabica was reflected in the fact that

over the past 10 years its FOB price had fallen from about 270.000 CFA a ton to

200.000 CFA while that of robusta had risen from 135.000 CFA a ton to 160.000 CFA. #

To further improve the quality of the arabica crop, he said, it was felt that it was

necessary to limit competition in buying arabica coffee so, that farmers who did not

produce high quality arabica would find it impossible to sell their bad coffee. He

argued that with competition in buying, farmers who had poor quality coffee could still

sell it because competing LBAs would lower their standards in a competing market

since they know that if they refuse to buy the coffee, their rivals could do. He again

reminded that there was only one organisation for marketing all the farmers' arabica

coffee in East Cameroon for that very reason and it was recommended that thcre

should be only one for West Cameroon also.26

On arabica coffee bonus during the 1965166 season, he said that the 1965166

season arabica coffee bonus was paid directly to the farmers by the West Cameroon

Marketing Board on the direction of the Executive Council. He further explained that

in the case of some farmers who were owing DSC, their bonus was retained and

credited to the account of the latter in the Board's books because of the large

indebtedness of that company to the Board.

He maintained that the Board relied on LBAs to pay their farmers the advanced

price for arabica coffee, which was the major part of the price. Since payment of the

balance directly to the farmers was an expensive venture to be undertaken by the

board, he reconmended that it should be done by the LBAs since they had their buymg

staff spread all ovcr the arabica tcrritory. In the process, they could rccovcr any dcbts

owed to them by the farmers. If any LBA could not be trustcd to handlc thc farmcrs'

money, then he should not be a LBA, he concluded.

The BCFA might havc overstated its point. However, the fact remains that the

Bamenda arabica coffee farmers continued to confront many challenges after

independence. It is true that a majority of the farmers were members of thc Co-

operative Marketing Societies through which they could channel their grievanccs. But,

tlie co-operative movement was becoming complacent for the liking of many farmers.

Arguably, most of the members of the BCFA represented mainly custonlers of

Kameroun Mountain Company, Kilo Bros. Limited, former custpmers of Nikang and

Kamsang Company and DSC which were all LBAs. The fact is, most of the gricvanccs

expressed in the petition reflected the general feelings of the farmers in Bamenda.

While a majority of the farmers belonged to the co-operative, thc coopcrativc as a

LBA of the WCMB often acquiesced to the decisions of thc latter and by implication,

thosc of the government. Thc BCFA established the tradition of mecting whcncvcr a

major problem affecting the farmers cropped up and addressed many petitions to both

tlie WCMB and the government in that direction. By so doing, it becalnc so mll~tant

that the government was not comfortable with its meetings. This resulted 111 the

cancellation of some of its meetings by government officials whilc othcrs wcrc

attendcd by security officials (overtly and covertly).

While many of the complaints centred on price and the mcthod of paymcnt,

most of the factors affecting the price and quantity of coffee demanded were bcyond

the scope and influence of thc WCMB. Such included changes in coffee production In

other countries, changes in the consumption of and demand for coffee, political and

cconoinic problems in other countries, and world price controlling schemes. These

extcrnal constraints notwithstanding, many of the coffce farmers' concerns remained

internal. Their main worry being the discrepancies that persisted in thc markct~ng

arrangements between the two territories, West and East Cameroon. The high

expectations of the coffee farmers that they were going to get better prices for their

crop after reunification and independence remained very elusive ten years after

independence. This left many farmers very disappointed though not discouraged as

total production continued to soar for most of the years as is evident fiom the table

below. Prices, though, continued to fluctuate in the world market.

Table 5: Production of Arabica Coffee in the NWP, 1960-1971 --

Year Production (tons) . - -

1960 1250

Source:North West Cooperative Association, Bamenda.

Production of Arabica Coffee In NWP from 1960-1971

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

Year

Notes and References

I Mark W. Delancey, "Cameroon National Food Policies and Organisations: The Green Revolution and Structural Proliferation", Journal (f Africun Studies (J.A.S) vol. 7, Number 2, Summer 1980, p.112.

2 CNAB, Qclg 196019, File No. None, "Note on Meeting of the Annual General Assenlbly of the Intcr- African Coffee Organisation at Douala between 4Ih - 6"' December l962", P. 1.

' Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Labour, Internal Tradz, Marketing and Inspection to the West Cameroon Executive Council on Coffee producers prices for 1962-63 Season (CNAI3, Qclg 1960/9), File No. None, "Coffee Marketing Arrangements". P. 39 - 40.

' Ekkehart Gablemann, "Report on study tour of West Cameroonian co-operatives from 25"' November, 1965 to 30"' March, 1966". Unpublished n.d. p.2.

E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beuutijiul: A Study o f Economics us lf People Muttered, London: Blond& Briggs,] 973. p. 170. b

lbid P.177.

8 Coffee Marketing Arrangements Qclg 196 112.

' lbid

10 A.N. Lantum, "Memo on West Cameroon Coffee Industry - The Dangers that lie ahead some possible solutions" (CNAB Qclg 196 1 12), p.2

I I Southern Cameroons, Report of the Co-operative Department, 1956-1 958. Government Press: Buea, 1959p.11.

I2 NWCA = Coffee Quality Education Notes No. 3: Understanding Coffee Quality. n.d

" CNAB, Qclg 1961 12, p. 129

14 CNAB, File No. None Qclg 196112 "Coffee Marketing Arrangements p. 132

15 The Chief Produce Marketing Officer to the Director of Agriculture, 7"' July 1967, CNAB Qclg 196112, p.2

l 6 CNAB, Qclg 1 96 1 12 "Coffee Marketing Arrangements" pp 145 - 146.

17 See his response of 7Ih July, 1966 to the complaint by Bamenda coffee producers of the accusation that they were being exploited by the co-operatives. CNAB, Qclg 1961 12 p.4

I8 BCMA Itd to the Hon. Prime Minister of West Cameroon, 28"' December 1967 CNAB, Qclg 196112

1 0 See Albert Mukong, (ed.) The case for the Southern Cameroons, CAMFECO: USA, 1990 p.28

2U CNAB, Qclg 196112 File No. None "Coffee Marketing Arrangements" p. 147.

2 1 See Secretary to the Prime Minister, to the Chief Produce Marketmg Officer, Department of Marketing and Inspection, Buea, 6Ih March 1968 CNAB, Qclg 1961 I2 p. 15 1

22 CNAB, Qclg 196112 p. 153

23 See Financial Secretary, West Cameroon to the Legal Adviser, Prime Minister's Office, Buea, West Cameroon. 241h May, 1968. CNAB, Qclg 196112 p.158.

24 CNAB, File Number p. 1527 Archive No. Qclg 196511 p.1.

2S Ibid p.2

26. This view is consistent with the Jervis recommendations and the Lantum Memorandum.

CHAPTER SIX

GOVERNMENT COFFEE POLICY IN THE NWP, 1972-1993

The period 1972-1990 can be considered as a period of great reforms in the

coffee industry of the NWP of Cameroon. It was also a period of serious intervention

in the industry by the state. Yet, this was a period of real crises in the history of thc

industry. It experienced a host of intimidating managerial crises i n the co-operatives,

which affected the entire fabric of the industry. The criscs inadvertently attracted the

intervention of the state. This chapter will examine the nature and extent of such

intervention by the state vis-a-vis the problems. We will also examine the impact of

government intervention in the industry. Did intervention provide a lasting solution to

the problems or was it a cure that proved to be more dadgcrous than the problem?

The co-operative marketing society remained the main mechanism by which

coffee and other export crops such as palm kernel and cocoa were marketed in thc

province in particular and West Cameroon in general. This made the co-operativc very

central to the coffee industry and so any problem or decisioii affecting the co-

operative affected virtually all the coffee farmers. However, the two parts of the

Federation - East and West Cameroon - operated under different co-operative laws

following their different colonial heritage even after indepcndence. The 20''' May 1972

referendum whose conduct remains questionable brought about a unitary state and

harmonization of the co-operative law among other things. Law no. 7311 5 of 711 2/73

and its text of application harmonized the co-operatives in West and East Cameroon 1 and adopted more of the former East Cameroon co-operative law. This

"harmonization" marked the beginning of a state interventionist policy not only in thc

marketing, but to some extent, also in the production of coffee in the province i n the

Unified Cameroon. The producer's co-operatives became the main medium through

which the government could affect production through subsidized farm inputs,

agricultural extension workers, and other forms of assistance to the farmers. On the

other hand, a completely government controlled Produce Marketing Board was in

charge of the marketing of export crops from this region overseas. The role of the

producers' co-operatives was therefore rcduced to that of a middleman bctwcen thc

farmers and the Marketing Board. Unfortunately, thesc two bodies turncd out to

exhibit much inefficiency, mismanagement and extravagance. Thc rclationsliip w

betwcen the two bodies came to be characterized by conflicts and mutual suspicion.

This was understandably so because the apex organ of the co-operative societics fclt

that the Marketing Board was usurping its role and making much profit fiom it

without rendering services to the farmers to justify such a privileged position.

Given the fact that these two bodies - the NWCA and the National Produce

Marketing Board (NPMB) - became thc main mediums through wliich the statc

intervened in thc industry, and the fact that they experienced crises in one form or t l ~ c

other, a brief history of the two institutions will be neccssary here. The centrality of

these bodies to the industry also demands that we explain their origin and evolution in

the North West Province of Cameroon. We will also assess the performance of tlic

e two institutions in the general context of the concept of co-operative produce

marketing societies and produce marketing boards. This will enable us to make a fair

assessment of the role of these bodies in the NWP in particular and Cameroon in

general. We will then see if the reasons that informed the formation of thc institutions

and the functions, which they have discharged over the years, are in consonancc with

the needs of the people and the general objectives of such bodies worldwide.

North West Co-operative Association (NWCA)

The activities of the co-operative produce marketing societies in thc provincc

span a wider period than the time span of this chapter. For the sake of brcvity and

clarity, we have decided to examine them under this single chapter rather than in

several chapters, which could create a muddle. The concept of co-operative has

evolved over time and space. H.E. Babcock defined co-operatives as Icgal, practical

means by which a group of self-selected, selfish capitalists seek to improve tlicir

individual economic position in a competitive society. Richard Kohls has underlined

some aspects of this definition as deserving attention in an understanding of what co-

operatives arc supposed to be. First, is that a co-operative is a device which pem~its

group action for the economic gain of the individual members. Second, it is an activc

part of the competitive business framework. And third, co-operative is one of the legal

forms of business ~rganizat ion.~ According to E.H. Whethani, thc csscntials of a

formal co-operative society are a group of members combining their capital and

enterprise for their mutual benefit. There is usually a limit to the number of sharcs

which any one member can hold (that is, to the proportion of thc socicty's capital

provided by any one member); the interest payable on s!iare capital is also limited to

discourage the speculative investor. 3

The Rochdale principles are generally accepted as the governing principles of

the modern co-operative. This ideology originated from a group of weavers in

Roclidale, England, who are credited with the opening of a store in 1844, which was

governed by these principles. These principles of co-operative operation as developed

by the Rochdale pioneers are: open membership, democratic c,ontrol, dividends on the . basis of purchases, limited returns on capital, political and religious neutrality, cash

4 trading and promotion of member education. These principles constitute the

foundation and guiding principles of modern co-operatives.

With some background knowledge of these guiding principles in mind, a group

of hrmers from Bamenda formed the first co-operative marketing society in Bafreng

(Nkwen) in 1947. As earlier explained, their main objective was to overcome somc of

the marketing difficulties confronted by the farmers when they marketed their producc

as individuals. Secondly, they wanted to bring the general bcnefits of co-operative

marketing to the coffee farmers, a majority of whom were illiterate and new in the

coffee business. As this co-operative handled produce from the entire province, it was

soon realized that thc area was too vast for a single society. Thirdly, it was scen that

the individual farmers incurred much expenditure to transport their produce to the lone

Co-operative Produce Marketing Society (CPMS) located at Nkwen. In order to

overcome the shortcomings of a centralisation, more societies were formed in thc

different areas so that the farmers of each area could bring their produce togetlicr

without much difficulty. By 1953, five primary soclet~es had been rormcd narncly:

Bafreng CPMS., Nso CPMS, Santa CPMS., Bali CPMS, and Bafut CPMS. In a jomt

ntecting of these societies held on the 21 August, 1953, they unanimously rcsolvcd to T

form an apex organ or union to market the arabica coffee produccd by farmers of t l~c

primary societies in the province. This gave birth to Bamenda Co-opcrative Producc

Marketing Union (BCPMU). The following executive was elected into officc to pilot

the affairs of the Union; A.A. Geh as President, G.S. Anthony as Treasurcr, Aloysius

Njodzeka Shang - Vice President, J.S. Fon as pionccr manager.5

Between 1953 when BCPMU was formed and 1959, many morc prlmary

societies came up on the principle that proximity of the co-operative to the farmer

meant better services to him. The formatipn of more societies i~ccessitatcd the

formation also of more unions to cater for these societies. In a mccting of BCPMU

held on the 16 October, 1959 and attended by J.R. Austin, expatriatc Registrar of Co-

operative Societies for Southern Cameroons, P.N.C. Cunins-Assistant Registrar of co-

operative societies, and Mr. George Tambi - government Co-operativc Inspector, thc

decision was taken that more unions should be formed. This led to the formation of six

co-operative unions from the hitherto existing BCPMU. These were:

Nso Area Co-operative Union Ltd.

Kom Area Co-operative Union Ltd.

Bamenda Central Area Co-operative Union Ltd.

Santa Area Co-operative Union Ltd.

Bali Area Co-operative Union Ltd.

Ndop Area Co-operative Union Ltd.

It was also resolved at that meeting that the Bamenda Provincial Co-operative

Marketing Union should from that day forward be called the Bamenda Co-opcrativc

Marketing Association Limited (BCMA). The byelaws of the defunct BPCMU were

amended, read out and adopted as byelaws of the BCMA on the same day. Thus,

emerged a three-tier co-operative structure in the North West made up of the primary

co-operative produce marketing societies, the six unions and the BCMA as the apcx

organ of the marketing co-operative structure.' Mr. N.W. Munga, who was the

president of the defunct BPCMU, was elected the pioneer pres~dent of the BCMA. Mr.

George Tambi was elected its first manager and K.V.S. Ngam its secretary. As thc *

societies grew in number, therc was the need for more unions, to co-ordinate the

affairs of these societies. As a result, between 1959 when BCMA was formed and

1967, three more unions were formed. These were:

- Pmyin Area Co-operative Produce Marketing Union Ltd, which was

established in 1960 and officially registered in 1964.

- Moghamo Area Co-operative Produce Marketing Union Ltd formed in 1963

and registered in 1964, and

- Nkambe Area Co-operative Produce Marketing Union, established on 16 t

November, 1967 and formally registered on the 17"' February 1969.

While economic considerations informed the fornation of these unions, it

should be noted that most of these unions were made up of people from the same

ethnic background. Most fdrmers felt that a better working relation and understanding

could easily be forged amongst people of the same ethnic background and so some of

the later unions emerged on ethnic lines.' From the 1968169 coffee season, the

individual unions were granted autonomy as separate Licensed Buying Agents.

However, BCMA continued to hull and process the coffee for the unions. Coffee from

each union was processed separately and bore the name of that union when being

exported. The question that readily comes to mind then is who were these unions

buying for? As we have already indicated, the co-operatives in Barnenda for the

period under review played the role of intermediaries between the farmers and the

marketing Board. The role of the Marketing Board will be examined shortly.

The arrangement, which gave autonomy to the unions as LBAs aln~ost brought

an end to BCMA, the apex co-operative organ in the province. The BCMA almost

became redundant as its main functions were reduced to the processing of coffee for

the unions. Crises set in and a split in the BCMA was contemplated. To salvage the

situation, an ad hoc body - Arabica Coffee Co-operative Organization - was

constituted to look into the byelaws of BCMA and amend them to accon~modate the

new functions of BCMA. Several meetings were held to that effect by the trd hoe

body. In two separate general meetings with the farmers, one held in Nso for the Nso

and Nkambe unions on 30 June, 1970 and one in Mankon on July 9, 1970 for the rest

of the unions, the amended bye-laws were presented and it was unanimously resolved

by the farmers that BCMA should from then forth be known as Bamenda Co-

operative Association limited (BCA). This new apex organ was given wider powers to

do business on behalf of the unions in the province. Mr. M.E. Achonduh was elected

president of the Association and Lawrence Fonka Shang as vice. Representation 011

the Board of Management by the unions was to be on the basis of total production of

each union, as follows:

1 - 500 tons = 1 board member

501 - I000 tons = 2 board members.

100 1 - 1 500 tons = 3 board members

1501 - 2000 tons and above 4 board rnember~ .~

The functions of BCA were to;

Formulate co-operative policy in the area of operation.

Undertake co-operative education, information and publicity.

Improve the production and processing of members' coffee and other produce.

Arrange the purchase of equipment and other requirements of members

societies or their members.

Provide technical and maintenance services.

Further the extension of co-operative marketing and other forms of. co-

operative activities in the area of operation.

Raise capital and do such other things as are necessary to carry out these

functions.

Administer the property taken over from the former Bamenda Co-operative

Marketing Association.

Act as the mouth-piece of the co-operative movement in its area of operation.

10.Do such other things as decided upon from time to time by the General

Meeting in order to carry out the above objectives or functions.

These objectives or mission statement of the BCA may sound quite ambitious,

especially against the background of the faltering experiment In co-operatives In the

province before this time. These functions or objectives were essentially a rc-

statement of the functions of a co-operative, especially a marketing co-operative

society to its members. It required a dedicated and experienced management to realize

these objectives and win the confidence of the unions, the societies and the farmers on

which this apex association depended for its continuous existence. Otherwise, BCA,

likc its predecessor the BCMA, could become ephemeral. With the changeover from

BCMA to BCA, the organization was to be headed by a secretary and not by a

manager, as was the case with BCMA. As a rcsult of thc change, Mr. Mosi, who was

the manager of BCMA, became the secretary of the BCA. T,he services promised to

thc farmers in the mission statement or objectives of BCA were direly needed by thc

farmers. It was the inability of BCMA to provide the farmers with somc of these

services that contributed to its being short-lived. Mosi would secm to have possessed

the professional training and experiences to enable him execute the lofty ideals of

BCA. He had training in co-operative management in Nigcria (Ibadan), Tanganyika

and the USA (Wisconsin University). Unfortunatcly, lie held the post for just SIX

months and was called to other duties. However, he was replaced by another

apparently competent person, in the person of Njokikang Sixtus. Sixtus held the post

from 1" January 1971 up till 1" September 1973 when Mr. Mosi took over again as

secretary.

While the BCA faced a number of challenges during this period, a

commendable effort was made to meet up with the stated objectives of tlic association.

In line with its sixth objective, to further the extension of marketing co-operatives and

other co-operatives in the area, by 1972 BCA had over 300 primary societics affiliatcd

to its unions. The Kom area alone had over 74 soc ie t i e~ .~ This development brought

the services of the co-operative nearer to thc farmers. The BCA also solicited and got

coffee processing machines from the European Development Fund on 1 4 ' ~ of March

1974. This was also in line with one of its objectives, that of enabling it to iniprovc on

the processing of membcrs' producc. Moves were also made for the formation of a

Nat~onal Association of Co-operativcs in the province. This did not rnatcrializc,

however. Meetings were also held from 9-10 of July, 1974 in which the BCA movcd a

motion requesting the government to allow it market directly ovcrseas, by-passing the

Produce Marketing Board. It should be borne in mind that UCCAO, the counterpart of

BCA in East Cameroon, sold its produce overseas directly without passing through thc

Produce Marketing Board. The BCA failed to receive a favourable reply in that

direction from the government. It was not until 1990 that this privilcgc was grantcd

when the name of the Association had changed from BCA to NWCA. Still III 1974,

for the first time, 7 US Peace Corps Volunteers were sent to work with BCA. Thcy

were to extend their services through the union right down to t k primary socictics. In

the same year, the BCA fought hard and a 13,000frs CFA per ton sales tax hithcrto

paid to the Produce Marketing Board was annulled. BCA was also grantcd thc

monopoly to buy coffee in the province.'0 This monopoly did not, howcvcr, mcan that

it had becn granted thc powers to market the producc of its members overseas as

rcquested for by the Association. What this monopoly meant was that BCA became

the only autliorizcd LBA for the Produce Marketing Board in the province. BCA also

played a vcry important role in the promotion of other specialized co-opcratives in tlic

province such as the Vegetable Co-operative Society and the Co-operative Crcdit

Union. This was in line with its stated objectives.

The Marketing Board, on its part, increased the Block Buying Allowancc

(BBA) for the BCA from 20frslkg to 30frslkg. BBA was the amount paid by tlic

Marketing Board for every kilogram of coffee sold to it by BCA considered as tlic

handling cost. In sum, the BCA can be said to have achieved much for the farmers,

especially when compared with its predecessors. In fact 1974 marked the climax of

such achievements and coincidentally, even the price of arabica coffee rose from 175

FCFA per kilogram in 1973 to 200 FCFA per kilogram in 1974. The good

performanee of BCA was reflected in the total production of arabica coffce i n the

province the following year, when it rose from 8500 tons in 1974 to 10.000 tons in

1975. Unfortunately for thc farrncrs, thc Markcting Board paid just 190 FCFAKg of

coffee that year, 10 FCFA lower than that for 1974. But, BCA was also short-l~vcd,

existing for less than eight ycars.

In 1978, the government of Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo announced a

new development programme for the farmers of the NWP. This programme was

intended to be executed through the BCA. As such, it was deemed necessary that thc

operational structure of the co-operative be enlarged. In addition to its already existing

position as the sole LBA of the Produce Marketing Organization, it was hoped that the

BCA would, like its counterpart in the Western Province In East Camcroon, also

acquire an export status. It was thought this would give it better opportunities of

getting for its member farmers the n~aximun~ profit, derivqble from their producc. It

was hoped to expand its activities so that it could absorb and undertake rural

dcvelopment projects previewed for the province by the government.

In anticipation of this new development program, thc BCA at an extraordinary

meeting on 29th arch 1978, decided to change its name to the North West Co-

operative Association limited (NWCA) in order to accommodate its ncw

responsibility. The NWCA thus came into being with the cleven unions as existcd

under BCA. It should be noted that by 1978 when NWCA was formed, 2 other unions

had emerged making the total number of unions in the province eleven. These were

OkuINoni Co-operative Union Ltd and Mbengwi Area Co-operative Union Ltd.

Though data on coffee production by the Unions for most of the years is wanting, thc

production figures for a ten-year period spanning 1978 - 1987 reflect the general trend

of production by the eleven Unions.

Moqbamo Umiom

1378 1980 1982 1984 198fi

Bali Union

1978 1980 1982 1994 1396

Mbengwi Union

R d o p Umiom

1975 1980 1982 1984 1986

Nso Union

The aims and objectives of the association (NWCA), spelt out in its byelaws

were to;

a. Arrange for and raise funds for financing the legitimate operations of its

members. In this connection, it may contract for loans and solicit for

grants/subsidies from sources approved by the Supervisory Minister on behalf

of its members.

b. Supply members with farm inputs and equipment as well as with building

materials and produce of primary necessity and household usage.

c. Undertake or cause to be undertaken in an organized and orderly manner, the

collection, transport, storage, packaging, grading, preservation, processing and

sale of agricultural, livestock and fishery products in the best interest of the #

producers. To this end, it may acquire, set up, uss and manage offices, stores,

warehouses, industrial installations, workshops, material and equipment

necessary, anywhere in the Republic of Cameroon, as well as open or manage

agencies abroad.

d. Improve the management of member unions and their affiliates; establish,

develop and enforce any system of management and supervision which

guarantees the smooth running of the co-operatives and the provision of better

services for its members.

e. Encourage and provide education, training and refresher courses for the

farmers, the general public, officials and en~ployees of the co-operative

societies.

f. Promote and develop other forms of co-operatives and in particular agro-

industrial or handicraft co-operatives and provide them with services and

advice which may foster their efficient running or the achievement of their

objectives.

g. Act as mouthpiece for the coffee marketing co-operatives of the province.

h. Generally speaking, to carry out for its members any transactions, operations,

works, services, studies and research related to any of the above-mentioned

objectives as well as represent and defend the interests of its members

anywhere. ' ' Unfortunately, from 1978 when NWCA was formed, to 198 1, a lot of financial

mismanagement took place in all three tiers of the co-operativc movcmcnt in thc

NWP. Socicties, Unions and the apex organization - the NWCA were all implicated

in financial mismanagement in some form. In anticipation of thc development projcct,

which the government had envisaged to be under the direct control of NWCA, thc

association employed so many workers when the development projcct had not startcd

and the funds were not yet available to sustain such enlarged staff. Becausc of thc

largc work force and indeed much financial mismanagement, the association took

bank overdrafts and this plunged its finances as well as thosc of the affiliatcd unions

into a crisis. An external audit investigation report covering

and its affiliated unions, revealed gross mismanagement

situation, the government of Cameroon and the external

involved in the financing of the NWP rural developmznt

978-1980 for the NWCA

With this discouraging

bodies that were to bc

project had a change of

mind.

A separate parastatal was set up and charged with the execution of the

development project for the NWP. This parastatal was known as the North Wcst

Development Authority (NWDA), in French "Missio~z de Developnze~it de In Province

du Nord Ouest" (MIDENO). While the NWCA remained the sole LBA to the NPMB

and still provided supply and other services to its members, as stated in its aims and

objectives, MIDENO was charged with the general development of the province. As

we shall see later, this arrangement gave room for overlapping and duplication of

functions. Meanwhile, the government was compelled to undertakc some rcforn~s in

the co-operative movement following the external audits investigations rcports so as

to protect the interest of the farmers. As a result, on July 20'" 1981, the Minister of

Agriculture dissolved the Board of Directors of the NWCA Ltd and appointed a

Provisional Administrative Committee to replace the NWCA Board. Thus, emcrged

two structures, NWCA Ltd and MIDENO both involved in the development of thc

coffee industry in one way or another. These became the main mediums through

which the government intervened in the coffee industry. How the government

intervened through these structures, will be explained whcn wc must have cxamincd

the govcmment controlled marketing board system.

National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB)

All along, we have stated that thc BCA and the NWCA playcd a subordinate

role to the Produce Marketing Board. We want to examine the ongin and naturc or

this subordinate role of the Association to the Marketing Board. In truth it is difficult

to separate the functions of :he Co-operative from those of the Marketing Board as far

as their relationship with the farmers is concerned. This situation often led to a clash

of interests resulting in a strained relationship betwecn the Board and the NWCA.

Dupe Olatunbosun and Olajuwon Olayide have argued that, con~n~odity +

marketing boards (CMB) were originally set up as a means to control cxport

marketing and as an end result of the official lack of sympathy for the chaotic

marketing systems, which prevailed on the eve of the Second World War. They add

that it was a crawling baby of colonialism whose infantile death one would have

expected with the end of col~nial ism. '~ Helleiner contends that the only justification

for its continuancc long after the "political" liquidation of colonialism is thc "fiscal

rolc" which it has come to serve. It has becomc a vchicle for the mobilization or

agricultural earnings designed to meet the ever-increasing developmental needs of the

country. This fiscal role, according to Terriba, has resulted in replacing privatc

investment with public investment in a most wasteful and grossly inefficient f o r n ~ . ' ~

The origin and development of the Marketing Board System in Bamcnda in

particular and Cameroon in general is closely linked to its colonial expericnce. Thc

first marketing board for the area emerged in 1955 when Southern Can~eroon law No.

10 of 1955 created the Southern Cameroon Marketing Board (SCMB). This was but

part of the Nigerian Marketing Board which at independence paid ovcr to thc

Southem Cameroons government the sum of one million pounds sterling as their sl~arc

of the Board's Reserve Funds.I4 The functions of this Board wcrc howcver limitcd to

the marketing of cocoa and palm products, production development and the

rehabilitation of the producing industry.I5 With the attainment of independence in

1961 through re-unification with former French Cameroon, the SCMB became West

Cameroon Marketing Board (WCMB) but the Department of Marketing and

Inspection was preserved. The main change that came with this change of namc was

the inclusion of arabica and robusta coffee to the list of crops to be marketed by the

WCMB. With this political transformation, a different marketing arrangement

operated in East Cameroon from that which obtained in West Cameroon. In West

Cameroon, the apex co-operative organization became a licensed buying agent to the

Marketing Board, while the Marketing Board remained the sole exporter of export

crops. This arrangement derived from the fact that the Marketing Board had played

such a role, that of export marketing in West Cameroon during the British colonial b

administration. However, this arrangement also made it imperative for the Board to

render certain services to the farmers. In East Cameroon, UCCAO, the apex farmers'

co-operative dealing with coffee, was given the right to export the produce of its

members ovcrseas. Under this arrangement, UCCAO and other bodies exporting such

crops overseas paid a given percentage of the revenue per kilogram to a Fzmi la

Caisse Nationale de Stabilization.

On the other side of the Federation, the profits made by the WCMB were saved

in a fund, which built up the Marketing Board Reserves. These funds were used to

fund organisations like the West Cameroon Development Agency as well as the Wcst

Cameroon Electricity Corporation (POWERCAM). Part of this reserve was set a s~dc

as a stabilization fund to ensure a stable price to the farmers within and bctwecn

seasons. It therefore served the same purpose as the Caisse de Stabilizatiorz in East

Cameroon. In 1974, following a referendum in 1972, the WCMB including its

affiliated Department of Marketing and Inspection were abolished. Law No. 74/76 of

I" February 1974 created the Produce Marketing Organization (PMO) in place of the

WCMB. The PMO absorbed the Department of Marketing and Inspection.

1978 marked a turning point in the history of Marketing Boards in Cameroon

as a whole. That year, the National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB) or Office

National de Co~n~~rercialisatio~z de Prodzrit de Base (ONCPB) was formed. This

became a national body and absorbed the functions of the PMO of West Catncroon

and the Caisse de stabilizatiolz of East Cameroon. The law, which creatcd the NPMB,

previewed the con~plete abolition of all licensed exporters except the NPMB, which

was supposed to have absolute exporting monopoly.1" The Board was confcrrcd with

the responsibility to:

Secure the most favourable arrangement for thc purchase, evacuation and

exportation of produce subject to the law.

Fix guaranteed prices for the produce through the operation of thc price

stabilization fund.

Make grants as and when funds are available for the development of industries

for the benefit and prosperity of farmers in particular and Cameroon as a

whole.

Constr~~ct secondary and feeder roads to enable easy evacuation of produce

from the fanns to thc markets.

Ensure that the LBAs buy produce at the same price throughout Cameroon.

Contribute to the financing of government corporations etc.

Right from year one of its existence, the NPMB was partial in implementing its

functions. A three-years grace period was granted to all licensed exporters in the

country to meet with their international engagements after which they would then cede

all export business to the NPMB." Unfortunately, things did not movc as stated by the

law and so very little changed after 1978. While the law went fully operational in

English-speaking Cameroon, the situation in the French-speaking section remained

basically unchanged but for the fact that the Caisse Natiorzale de Stabzlisatioil was

taken over by the NPMB. As such, while the PMO of former West Canleroon was

completely taken over by the NPMB, only the functions of Caisse de Stabilisatiolt

were taken over by the NPMB in East Cameroon. UCCAO and other licenscd

exporting companies in East Cameroon continued to export coffee and cocoa. The

NWCA continued to function only as a LBA for the NPMB in the NWP.

The NWCA later agued that, though UCCAO and tlic Licensed Exporters in

French Cameroon paid a certaln percentage of their overseas sales to the Stabilization

Fund of the NPMB, they still made away with much more profit than those for whom

the NPMB exported their produce. In the light of this situation and In the face of its

financial problems arising from the over-weighted debts incurred in its days of gross

mismanagement, the NWCA requested for exporting rights like UCCAO and other

exporting bodies in the former East ~ameroon . ' "~ was only in I990 that the

Cameroon government granted NWCA the right to export coffee ovcrseas. This

privilege was probably given because the price of coffee had pluninieted in the world

market by 1990 to the extent that the NPMB was not longer making much profit.

The fourth responsibility conferred on the Board required that it use its hnds

for the construction of secondary and feeder roads for casy evacuation of producc

from farm to market. It is in this direction that the Board could have nladc a

difference. Unfortunately, even after the liquidation of the ,Board, many of thc major

coffee producing areas in the NWP were still not very motorable. Some wcrc barcly I 0 accessible during the dry season and inaccessible during the rainy season, for

instance, parts of Oku, Fundong, and Njikwa.

The NPMB has been criticised for tlie fact that it took over not only the

functions, but also, the assets of the PMO but failed to develop British Canieroon. Tlic

PMO had acquired produce stores, machinery, residential buildings for its staff,

offices and office equipment, vehicles etc. Over and above these, their reserve fund

had amounted to about forty eight billion francs CFA.~' This money was hardly uscd

for the development of the coffee and cocoa industries from which the money had

been raised. Neither was it used for the development of the producing regions. Board

funds were diverted to scctors not linked with agricultural production and subvcntions

made to public corporations which did not contribute to tlie funds. This was howcver

in line with the last objective of the NPMB. The problem is that UCCAO and othcr

licensed exporters in the East did not cede their exporting rights as the dccrcc creating

NPMB demanded. As such, it was no longer justifiablc to use the funds of onc section

for the development of the nat~onal territory

Whatever the case may be, the government controlled NPMB became a major

structure through which the state intervened in the coffee industry in Bamcnda. Thc

state also used public parastatals like MIDENO and Fond Natiotzal tic Development

Rural (FONADER) to affect coffee production in Bamenda. It is not bad for lhc

government to intervene in agricultural production and marketing nor is such

intervention unique to Cameroon. It has been argued that the government may need lo

intervene in agricultural marketing in particular and agricultural production in gcncral

In order to:

Foster economic and social progress

Facilitate trade and provide services

Support or raise farm incomes

Protect or preserve small farms and slow the rate of exodus from rural arcas. 2 1

R.L. Kohls has noted that in order to foster economic and social progrcss, thcrc

have bcen some legislative developmcnts which addrcss themsclvcs specifically to thc

general purpose of what he terms "holding the carrot in front of the horsc", so that thc

economy will have the push and urge to move forward. This aspect can also be

achieved through the provision of facilities for agricultural education and research.

Experimental stations and agricultural colleges are solicited as an easicr mcans in

achicving this. Agricultural extension services will enable individual farn~crs to gel

thc results of experimentation. lt requires that the government promote rcsearch in

agricultural marketing. The government also has the responsibility of seeing to it that

the agricultural commodities are of good grades and standards.

Assessment of Government Interventions

NWCA and NPMB were not the only structures through which the slatc

intervened in the coffee industry in the NWP. After independence, the government of

Cameroon was reasonably aware of the place of agriculture in the national economy.

As a result, some conscious effort was constantly being made to promote and

revitalize agricultural production. With coffcc bcing the main export crop from thc

NWP, it received some extra attention from the government. Thc Ministry of

Agriculture was generally concerned with agricultural developments in the country as

it still is. This Ministry was represented in the NWP by the Provincial Dclcgation of

Agriculture. It was through this Delegation that assistance was given to the coffcc

farmers. In the Provincial Delegation of Agriculturc, there was a pliytosanitary unit

charged with plant protection. This service had a team of trained personnel that wcnt

round the farms of the farmers to spray them against plant diseases and pests. The

phytosanitary unit had extensions at the Divisional level known as phytosanitary

brigades. Members of this brigade could be quickly contacted by coffee farmers in

case of an outbreak of any coffee disease. 22, At the district levels, thc govcrnmcnt,

through the Delegation of Agriculture, opened agricultural posts to advise the firmcrs

on the best methods of farming arid the best combination of inputs for the best yields.

Some of the inputs were even supplied to the farmers at the agricultural posts at fairly

reduced prices. Still within the provincial service of agriculture, therc was thc

multiplication farm, which cxperimcnted and produced improvcd varieties of seeds

and scedlings, which were then made available to the farnicrs. It should bc noted hcrc

that many farmers in the province acknowledge and appreciate tlicse services, wliicli

the government rendered then, and regret the fact that these services are no longer

being provided. However, many don't seem to know how much money was bcing

expropriated from them by the government through taxes and the govcrnmcnt

controlled Marketing Board for those services. Also, the ratio of agricultural workcrs

to the farmers was such that some farmers did not feel the impact of the activities.

In 1984, the Phytosanitary Base sprayed 15,763 hectares of coffee against

antesia, 10,338 hectares of coffee against anthracnose (coffec berry disease), 7000

hectares of coffee against Scolyte - the bora insect. By 1985, therc wcre tlirec sced

multiplication farms in the province: one at Santa in Mezam Division, onc at Modclc

in Menchunl and a third in Bambui. In the Bambui farm, 27.469 plants of Java arabica

coffee were raised. We may also need to know that thc total number of hectares of

coffee sprayed in the province against the coffee berry disease and the bora insect was

a vcry small fraction of thc total number, which suffcred from the discasc and thc pcst,

as many coffee producing areas werc inaccessible by car. Members of the

Phytosanitary Base could not reach such inaccessible areas.

As a way of impacting on agriculture in the province in general and coffcc

production in particular, the government initiated a young farmers schcme for thc

NWP during the 1977178 fiscal year. This was also done under the supcrvision of thc

Provincial Delegation of Agriculture. Under the Scheme, young school leavcrs wcrc

trained on farm work by the government. They were then resettled on thcir own land

through a combined grant and loan scheme totalling 360.000frs CFA. Of this sum,

160.000frs was a non-refundable grant while 200.000 francs CFA constituted a loan to

be refunded by the Young Farmers. A young farmer was grantcd six ycars of grace b

after which the loan was again renewable for a period of six years. Thc loan was givcn

partly in cash and partly in agricultural inputs like tools, seeds, fertilizers etc. 21 By

June 1984, 1.422 trained youths had got the approval for loans to be granted to thcm

under the scheme. Of this number, 1.028 had received the loan and had already

opened up their farms. By thc close of 1985, a further 394 youths had bcnefitcd from

the scheme. By 1985, these young farmers had already put under cultivation, 1,560

hectares of perennial crops namely coffee, cocoa and oil palm.

Mission de De'veloyyement de la Province du Nord Ouest (MIDENO)

We have already examined the circumstances that led to the formation of MIDENO

(North West Development Authority) a public parastatal charged with rural dcvelopmcnt

in the NWP. It was created by presidential Decree No. 811350 of 1 3'h ~ u g u s t 198 1

with the following objectives:

a. To raise farm family incomes - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - $ . - -To irnp~v~income~distributlo~n~ - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

c. To increase food crop production

d. To improve communication and acccss to and from markets

e. To increase foreign exchange reserves by raising the level of cash crops

production especially coffee.

As can be seen from its objectives, while MIDENO was particularly concerned with

coffce improvement, i t was also gcncrally involved with agriculture as a wholc. I t was

established like a general funding body also providing supervisory serviccs.

MIDENO operations were jointly funded as follows: the Canicroon

Government 20%, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 30%, the

European Development Fund (EDF) 26% and the Govcrnnicnt of thc Fcdcral

Republic of Germany (KFW) 24%. The first phase of the project startcd in 1982 and

ended in 1987. This phase was estimated to cost 10.2 billion francs CFA. MTDENO

was not dircctly involved with the execution of the North West Dcvclopment projcct

but rather, implemented the different components of the project through executing

agencies which were services that existed before tlx coining into being of MIDENO. 24

+ These executing agencies were:

1. The Department of Agriculture

11. The North West Co-operative Association Limited

111. The Highways Department

IV. The Community Department and

V. FONADER

MIDENO funded programmes were therefore simply an extension or

intensification of the existing activities of the above agencies. One cannot hesitate to

ask why the government could not improve on the management style and pcrformancc

of these existing agencies without necessarily creating a new body. This question

becomes more pertinent when we discover that the implementation of MIDENO

programmes led to overlapping of functions by some of the hitherto existing agencics.

Most of MIDENO assistance to the farmers of the NWP through these agencics

was in the form of personnel and equipment, depending on the needs of the farmers.

In collaboration with the Agricultural Department, MIDENO assisted in funding the

training programme of extension workers while at the same time also providing

personnel to help in this programme. MIDENO also executed some of its agricult~u-al

input credit programme through the Agricultural Department, which involved the

supply of tools, seedling, chem~cals, fertilizers etc. Furtliemiorc, MIDENO Iielped thc

NWCA Ltd by providing it with managerial personnel and f ~ ~ n d c d tlic small Holder

Farm Credits through the primary societies of NWCA. T h ~ s credit was made available

to FONADER, which then grantcd it to the farmers through tlic prlniary co-opcrativc

societies.

MIDENO also contributed to the improvement of the road infrastructure of tlie

NWP. In the first phase of the projcct, which ended In 1987, 150 kilometres of

seasonal roads wcrc earmarked to be improved and brought to all weather roads. T h ~ s

was supposed to be done through the Highways Department. Some twenty-village

water supply scliemes were also earmarked for completion during the phase. This was

to be executed through the Community Development Department. b.

For a project whose primary goal was to brmg about developtiicnt in tlic

province, the emphasis on road infrastructural development was quite gcrmane. This

was more especially as it enabled easy evacuation of agricultural produce to tlic

market. The absence of good roads and in some cases the non-existence of such roads

at all, had constituted a serious problem to coffee farmers. The problem with this

aspect of the project was that it was being executed through a govcnin~ent dcpartmcnt,

the Department of Highways, which had manifested incompetence and nonchalance

when the state of roads in the province was appalling. This was like putting ncw wine

in an old wine skin. However, the Department of Highways did not seem to hnvc

performed any better under this new arrangement. Thcre was no major improvcmcnt

in roads infrastructure at the end of the first phase of tlie MIDENO projcct. 2 5

MIDENO also provided credit facilities to coffee farmcrs in tlic provincc

through FONADER, which were more often in kind than in cash. The credit inputs

included the supply of coffee pulpers, sprayers for coffee farmers, and fertilizcrs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Generally speaking, MIDENO catered for the training of agricultural extcnsion

workers in a bit to improve on agricultural output. It trained personnel for Trial and

Demonstration Centres (TDCs), trained staff for credit and input supplies, and also

trained village extension Workers. At the conuncncement of the MIDENO training

programme, the Agricultural Department had extension workers in thc ratio of 1

extension worker to 1000 farmers. It was therefore hoped that by tlic end of tlic first

phase the ratio would have been improved and brought to about one cxtension workcr 2 0 to 400 farmcrs. Though there is no evidence to suggest that this targct was acliicvccl

by the end of the first phase of the progranune, however, many extension workcrs

were trained suggestive of the fact that the ratio was reduced cven if the real target

might not have been achieved.

MIDENO also established Rural. Development Centres (RDCs) throughout thc

province, which were somehow attached to the co-operative unions. Tlic idca was to

niakc essential farm inputs likc fertilizers, pesticides, improved seeds and siniplc tools

available to farniers at affordable prices. Sixty four Farmcr Service Ccntrcs (FSCs)

werc also established at the level of primary co-operative societies. Thcsc wcrc #

intended to serve as farmer shops, where the farmers could directly gct inputs while

RDCs served as depots. The FSCs were conceived as refresher ccntres for agricultural

activity in direct liaison with the peasant farmer. From here, the pcasant farmcr could

get his tools, fertilizer, chemicals, pulpers and other agricultural inputs at subsidized

rates. The farmer could also get thc technical advice of the extcnsion workcrs traiiicd

by MIDENO for the Agricultural Department and placcd at the service of the pcasant

farmer.

MIDENO, had one major inherent weakness. Because most, if not all the

projects under it were executed through existing government structures, goveninicnt

influence in the execution of the projects was overwhelming. As such, MIDENO was

not much different from the Department of Agriculture and othcr government units

through which projects were executed. The influence of the foreign contributors was

not very much felt in the administration and execution of thc project. An examination

of the administrative and co-ordinating mechanisnis of MIDENO clcarly betrays this

fact.

Principally, two committees wcre in charge of tlic affairs of MIDENO. At tlic

top was the Provincial Project Co-ordinating Cornmittce (PPCC), which was placed

undcr the chairmanship of the Provincial Governor of the North West. Its niembership

included some economic, social and political elites of the province. This Colniniltcc

acted in an advisory and co-ordinating capacity at the provincial level. A sccond

committee, the Provincial Technical Committee (PTC) was made up of the heads of

the executing services or agencies. This Committee was placed under the

chairmanship of the MIDENO manger. It should be noted that evcn thc General

Manager of MIDENO was a govcmment appointee. The main determinant in tlic

choice of a manager for MIDENO was his loyalty to the government and competcnce

was only a secondary consideration. The Minister of Agriculture was thc supervisory

authority of MIDENO and was responsible for the over-all policy and performancc of

MIDENO. An eleven-man Board of Directors appointed by decree formulated the

policy of MIDENO. The Governor of the province was again the chairman of this

Board. 27 b

The input service of the programme was operated through the NWCA, whilc

MIDENO ensured its supervision and co-ordination. On the other hand, credits to

farmers in the form of loans were operated through FONADER. It was hoped that this

aspect of loans will be passed over to the NWCA at a future date. This arrangement o f

executing MIDENO projects through existing agencies thcrefore led to somc degree

of duplication and overlapping of functions within the agencies.

Essentially, MIDENO was a government run project. Not only was it executed

through existing government agencies, i t was directly under the control of civil

servants and politicians with the exception of R.D.B. Hughs, an expatriate, who was

the project manager. Donor countries and organisations did not do much to supervise

or participate in the supervision of the execution and implementation of the project.

Howevcr, the impact of this project was felt by a good fraction of the farmers i n the

NWP. Many farmers benefited from the input service through the co-operatives.2x

Though, MlDENO would not seem to have achicved much in the dircction of roads - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

construction, which was one of its main objectives, the main problem with MlDENW - - - - - -

was that the programme lacked sustainability. The moment the programme ended, the

Trial and Demonstration Farms that had been opened undcr the scheinc grew into

bushes. The government failed to continue with the project, rather i t looked up to

foreign assistance for its continuity and sustenance.

Fond National de De'veloppetnent Rural (FONADER)

FONADER was another agency through which the government of Cameroon

intervened in coffee production in the NWP. As we have already indicated, this was

also an executing agency of MIDENO projects. Fondly known as tlic Farnicr's bank,

FONADER was set up by the government of Cameroon in 1973 w ~ t h tlic objcctive of

making credit inputs available to farmers and also of ensuring the supervision of tlic

proper use of this credit. It was realised that the farmers faced somc difficulties in

acquiring bank loans and the credit unions constituted their only sourcc of financial

loans. The terms on which credit union loans were given were not deemed conducivc

enough by the government for the promotion of export crop cultivation such as coffcc,

cocoa and palm oil. Against this background, FONADER was created to overcome tlic b

difficulties faced by farmers in securing bank loans.

The creation of MIDENO gave an impetus to FONADER. MIDENO loans

were made available to the farmers by FONADEK, acting through the co-operatives.

Farmers applied for MIDENO loans through the co-operative societies, wherc tlicre

was a credit committee, which had at its disposal Field Technical Staff and staff

members of FONADEK, to advise on such matters. From the credit committee, the

application made the tortuous journey through the society's board of directors to thc

FONADER office. The arrangement did not give room for a farmer to take a loan

without first of all clearing all his outstanding debts with FONADER if there were any.

FONADER loans were exclusively nieant for agricultural development as follows;

a) The provision of specific items for planting coffee.

b) The provision of knapsack sprayers and hand coffee pulpers.

c) The provision of fertilizers and chemicals for application to coffee trees.

d) The provision of fertilizers and chemicals and seeds for maize production.

e) The provision of labour costs and hand tools for general farm maintenance.

FONDADER loans were mostly in kind except for cash payments in respect of

hired labour. The co-operative societies were supplied by FONADER with all the

materials for loan through the farm support service of the NWCA, except In a casc

where it was proven that the farm support service could not supply a particular type of

20 input material. In such cascs, the co-operative was expectcd to make alternative

arrangements acceptable to FONADER. The onus of recovcring the loan fiom tlic

farmer also lay with the co-operatives. Recovery of loans was done by deductmg

money from the proceeds of the farmer and this had to be in conformity with tlic tcmis

of a protocol agreement, which existed on this aspect of the loan.

Before the advent of the MIDENO credit component and its protocol agreement with

FONADER, loans had been granted to individual farmers and cattle dealers by FONADEK.

These loans were given to farmers irrespective of whether they belonged to the marketing co-

operative societies or not. However, loans granted through the co-operatives were limited lo

the growing of coffee and cocoa, that is, crops marketed by the marketing co-opcralivcs. 'I'hc

procedure for getting a FONADER loan was long add tortuous. Out of the total numbcr who

applied for the loans, only a very limited number of farmers actually benefited from tlic

scheme as can be seen from the case of Mezam Division (as shown in the table bclow).

Table 7: FONADER Loans for Mezam Division, 1974-79

/ Amount (FCFA)

I Loans granted 1 4,908,000 1 l 2 I

Number of farmers 1 Loans requested

I % of total 1 2.82 1 1.76 I Source: Divisional Delegation of Agriculture, FONADER files, 1974-79

173,750,000

As Ban has rightly observed, up to 1979, FONADER was not yet a solution to

the poor peasant farmers in providing them with loans." Between 1979 and 198 I,

there was still no significant change in the percentages of loans requested for and

loans granted in Mezam. Though there was an increase in the percentage of loans

granted from 2.8%-23%, this only represented a relative increase and not an absolutc

increase. The statistics are as follows.

683

Table 8: FONADER loans for Mezam Division, 1979-1981

Union area

Santa Central Bafut

Bali

Ndop

Total Source: B. I

240,367,000 1 779 / 67,850,000 1 178 / 23.0 aise, Coffee Production and Commercialisation in Mezam.

Loans requested (FCFA)

97,390,000 16,000,000 47,375,000

1 0,950,000 68,650,000

The conclusion one readily draws from these statistics is that up to the creation

of MIDENO in 1981, a majority of coffee farmers in,Mezam Division did not bencfit

from FONADER loans. The situation in Mezam Division mirrored that of the entire

province up to that date. Because of the difficulty in getting thesc loans, some

unscrupulous workers took advantage of the situation to exploit farmers who applicd

for it.

Number of farmers

245 40 1 10

35

349

With the creation of MIDENO, for which FONADER became an executing

agency, the government attempted to overhaul the system by decentralising MIDENO

Loans Granted (FCFA)

27,565,000 14,063,000 13,525,000

3,300,000 9,397,000

so as to make it easier for farmers to obtain the loans. This does not seem to have

brought any significant change, judging by the reaction of a farmer on the

Number of farmers

84 29 30

5

30

performance of the marketing co-operatives. He said,

% loans Grantcd

34.3

72.5 27.3

14.3

8.6

. . . I see them as cheats. There is an instance where I applied for a MIDENO loan of 100,000 FCFA and what was actually given to me was 70,000 FCFA but I was to pay interest on 100,000 FCFA and to pay back the sum of 100,000 FCFA through the co- operative. Co-operative workers and MIDENO workers curtailed the remaining 30,000frs as bribe for giving me the opportunity of benefiting from FONADER loan. So I had to pay back 100,000frs at the end when I actually received just 70,000 FCFA. This is just an example of the many ways by which they cheat farmers. So, my impression about them s a negative onea3'

Records show that from 1979-1983, FONADER loans to farmers in the entire

province totalled the sum of 552,744,571 CFA. This was in addition to the sum of

3 2 187, 426, 325 francs CFA granted to the co-operatives. What t h ~ s record docs not

tell us is how much money was actually sol~cited for by the farmers and how many of

them benefited from the amount stated above. One is tempted to wonder how niuch of

this amount actually got to the farmers since the experience of the above quoted

farmer seemed to have become the general formula in getting the loans. Probably not

less than 30% of the above amount went to the officers of the co-operatives, MIDENO

and FONADER as bribes to qualify the farmers for such loans.

From the above picture, one can rightly conclude that the co-operative society

was the ultimate vehicle through which all government assisted projects or

programmes that were meant for the farmers were executed. The co-operative became

an instrument in the hands of the government to influence or intervene in the activities b

of the farmers. Input and consequently output were directly a id indirectly being

influenced by the government through the co-operative. Government ~ntervention in

coffee production had both desirous and negat~ve consequences to the ~ndustry as will

be demonstrated later in the work.

The government-controlled NPMB operated on the same lines as the co-

operatives. Being the only authorised exporter of NWCA coffee, its intervention in the

industry was geared towards improved quality producc. To this end, its quality control

unit was quite instrumental. The NPMB also assisted the NWCA and its affiliated

unions in transporting coffee, especially during peak periods, when the vehicles of

NWCA and the affiliated unions could not sufficiently handle thc produce. This was

in a bid to avoid the coffee from mulling in society and union warehouses for want of

transport facilities. This service also helped to preserve the quality of the coffec and

enabled it to be exported in good state.

In theory, the NPMB was supposed to ensure price stability for export produce p p p p p p p p - - p - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

such as coffee, cocoa, palm kernels and banana. This was to be done by removing

money from the Board's stabilisation fund to subsidise producer prices in years when

the prices were low in the world market. Money was being deducted from the sales of

farmers during years of good prices for this purpose. However, an examination of the

prices paid to farmers over the years shows that the prices rose and fell mirroring the

situation in the world market.

Through subventions to different agricultural services, the NPMB made

available to farmers, technical services on how best to grow coffcc and cnsure good

yield as well as got engaged in the fight against plant disease. In somc cases where tlic

phytosanitary scrvices were not very efficient, the NPMB maintained a disease control

service with its quality control department. j3 I h e NPMB also promotcd and fundcd

agro-industrial projects through the various agencies charged with thesc activities such

as FONADER and MIDENO. Thus, it was both directly and indirectly involved in the

dcvelopment and improvement of the farm credit input services of the various farn~er-

funding bodies. In this way, it helped through the co-operatives to bring the necded b

farm inputs to the actual farmcrs. It also assisted to provide machines e.g. mills and

pulpers to the farmers through their co-operative societies. 34

It is obvious that government intervention in the coffee industry of the North

West was driven by the realisation that coffee was the main source of income for a

majority of the people in the province. By the same token, it was also a major source

of revenue for the government. The state generated income from coffee directly

through taxation and indirectly through the stabilisation fund (caisse de stabilisation).

As such, the government could not be indifferent in the face of the problems

confronting coffee farmers. Intervention was therefore primarily geared towards

tackling the challenges confronting the industry and making coffee fanning more

attractive. However, what the International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development/World Bank observed of Africa in general applies specifically to the

Cameroon case:

Data on public spending and investment in African agriculture are hard to come by, but the available evidence suggests that since 1960s the level of public resources allocated to agriculture has been consistently low relative to the sector's size and contribution to the economy. In most African countries the sector receives less than 10 percent of public (recurrent and investment) spending but accounts for 30-80 percent of gross domestic output.

Moreover, the direct and indirect transfers of income from agriculture to government and the rest of the economy havc bccn larger than the public resources allocated to the sector. lnadcquate public resources have constrained the development of rural public goods (infrastructure, institutions, human capital, support services) and the ability of the private sector to develop. In turn, these policies have stifled economic development by forfeiting the strong linkage effects of high agricultural growth on the rest of thc economy. Moreover, where public investments in African agriculture have becn high, as in a number of countries in the postcolo~iial period, they have often been misallocated. Or the recurrent budgets to maintain these investments have been low. '"

It was somehow known to the coffee farmers of the NWP that the NPMB was making

so much profit from its ovcrseas marketing but not much of the profit was invcstcd in #

the industry compared to the profits made from it. The farmcrs were unhappy that the

NPMB never fully disclosed the results obtained from marketing thcir coffce.

Understandably, non-disclosure to them meant that they were being exploited. 111

1982J83 when the NPMB disclosed the marketing statistics of that year, it was allcged

that the Board made a net profit of over 2,300,000,000 francs CFA on coffec from thc

NWP (there is likely to be some exaggeration here) out of which the NPMB paid only

600,000,000 francs CFA to the farmers as bonuses that is 26.09%. This was on a

tonnage of about 7700 tons. Thc farmers concluded that the NPMB had madc evcn

higher profits in previous years when the total tonnage from the province was higher.

The farmers could therefore not understand why any grants given to the co-operatives

36 were regarded by the NPMB as a special favour. From this, one can righily

conclude that whatever funds were injected into the coffee economy of the NWP by

the government through MIDENO, FONADER, and the co-operatives, were relativcly

small compared to what was generated from the industry

The method adopted by the government in assisting the coffee industry in the

NWP leaves much to be desired. The fact that the government used many agcncies for

the same objective without a very clear distinction of functions gave room for

duplication, inefficiency and wasteful use of resources. For instance, FONADER

employed agric extension workers just as MIDENO did. Both also eniployed coffee

demonstrators. These activities could have been harmonised and cntrusted to a single

agency for greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness. MIDENO loans were granted

through FONADER and FONADER in turn gave out the loans to the farmers through

the co-operative societies. This gave room for overlapping and duplication of

functions, frictions, and unnecessary administrative bottlenecks. Such friction, arising

from overlapping of functions, was more manifest between the NPMB and NWCA

with NWCA accusing the NPMB of trying to bypass it and deal directly with thc

farmers. Inter-ministerial and interdepartmental co-operation is not bad nor is it

unique to Cameroon. Where there is such co-operation, it must be nieaningful and cost

effective. b

While government intervention in agricultural productioii has its merit, thc type

adopted by the government was not the best in the circun~stances. Thc indcpcndcnt

government did not assess the future prospects of coffee and ciiiphasiscd its

cultivation with little emphasis on diversification. If a fair assessment had rcvealcd

that this crop was worth encouraging, one of the first things to have been done would

have been to encourage some level of domestic consumption of the crop so as to build

a buffer capacity for it. Some campaign was made to encourage domestic

consumption of coffee only when there was a persistent fall in the price of coffee in

the world market after 1990. Lack of a buffer capacity has been one of the major

problems facing this industry in the NWP of Cameroon. The government was caught

between diversification and the promotion of the existing crop. Even wlicn

diversification was taken up as a policy, it was seen as meaning one additional export

crop to the existing ones. Cotton and cocoa cultivation was contemplated as a way of

diversifying the economy of the NWP. The idea of encouraging a crop with a good

domestic market was hardly seen as a way of diversifying the economy and reducing

the reliance on coffee. Cash income could not only be made from an export crop; a

crop with both a domestic and a foreign market such as groundnuts and the oil palm

would have been better. However, fanners on their own initiative diversified in

response to market forces to cultivating food crops, especially after the 1990s.

Liberalisation of the Commercialisation of Coffee

The government of Cameroon decided to liberalise the coninierc~al~sat~on or

arabica coffee in the NWP from the 1989190 coffee season. This meant that thc

marketing of arabica coffee in the province was no longer the nioiiopoly of thc

Marketing Board. NWCA no longer had the sole right to buy from the farmers either.

Government's decision to liberalise the marketing of coffee in the NWP was sccn as a

betrayal by thc farmers. The government decided to liberalise at a moment whcn the

farmers needed government intervention, subvention and price stabilisation most.

Government liberalised the marketing of coffee at a time when world market priccs

for arabica coffee had dropped below the break-even point and the govel-nnicnt was

not longcr making profits from it. With the liberalisation of the marketing of arabica b

coffee in the NWP, NWCA was given the right to sell the produce of its nienibers

directly overseas, without passing through the Marketing Board. Governrncnt

therefore gave the privilege to NWCA to sell overseas, at a time when NWCA could

not make profit from doing so. As such, unlike UCCAO, NWCA has never been in a

position to accun~ulate reserves at the time when world market prices were high. The

following table gives a clue of the profits UCCAO had been making over the years for

selling its produce directly overseas when prices were still fairly high in tlie world

market and NWCA was not having the same privilege.

Year World market price Net profit (approx.)

It has been asserted that in 1984185 alone, the NPMB realised a net profit of about

3.500.000.000FCFA from tlie sales of arabica coffee from the NWP." When the

marketing of coffee was liberalised, the money that had been accumulated in the

Caisse de stabilisation was not used for the interest of the farmers. Liberalisation of

the marketing of arabica coffee in the NWP by the government, was an acceptance of

failure of government's policy of state intervention in agricultural production and

marketing in Cameroon even though liberalisation was imposed externally by Wcstcrn

donor countries and the Bretton Woods institutions.

Impact of Liberalisation

Liberalisation of the marketing of arabica coffee in the NWP as a policy, had

both negative and positive results on the industry as a whole.

With tlie prices of arabica coffee falling in the world market to a ridiculous level froni

1412 FCFA in 1986 to 378 FCFA in 1990, the state failed to take any serious

measures to hedge the effects of the falling prices on the farmers. Rather, it chose to

liberalise the marketing of arabica coffee in the province, which had hitherto been the #

exclusive right of the NPMB, with NWCA being the only LBA for the NPMB.

Liberalisation turned out to create more problems for the industry than it was

intended to solve. With liberalisation of the marketing of arabica coffee in the

province, private LBAs entered the market like hungry wolves. This led to an

unhealthy competition for the produce of the farmer. This competition produced two

negative effects. Firstly, private LBAs did not care much about quality. They bought

even poor quality coffee beans from farn~ers knowing that if they did not buy, their

rival LBAs would do. Some even bought parchment coffee (coffee processcd by the

wet method) and mixed this with hauled coffee processed by the dry method while

others even mixed robusta coffee with arabica coffee. Secondly, the fdriners

themselves became less concerned with the quality of their coffee as the private LBAs

did no longer buy by quality as the co-operatives had been doing. Prices no longer

reflected the quality of coffee and the prices were not very attractive as to permit the

purchase of farm inputs such as fertilisers and chemicals. The net rcsult was the

exportation of poor quality coffee from the NWP and a bad reputation for coffee froni

the NWP in the world market. '' The private LBAs also did not have tlie time and

patience to pick the coffee beans so as to select the bad beans from the good one as the

co-operative had been doing. As such, they got just anything in the name of coffee to

the world market and tarnished the reputation of NWCA coffee and so it failed to

attract a good price to the farmers.j9 The paradox in it all is that despite the heightened

competition for the farmers' produce, prices remained generally low. In 1991 a

kilogram of arabica coffee sold at 250 FCFA only and in 1992, the official price was

as low as 135 FCFA per kilogram.

Many farmers remain critical of the decision by the government to libcralise

the commercialisation of arabica coffee in the NWP, especially as this happened when

the prices had dropped very significantly in the world market. Their argument is that

since liberalisation, private LBAs have been cheating the farniers by using

manipulated scales in measuring the farmer's produce. The second point advanced

against LBAs is that they hardly came back to pay any bonuses to tlie farmers when b

they made abnormal profits and still do not do so. Here they were compared

unfavourably with the co-operative which paid a bonus to the farmers when the prices

rose in the world market far above the prices announced at the beginning of the coffee

season. The farmers on their part failed to realise that there were seasons when thc

private LBAs also had to sell at a loss. A third argument against private LBAs was

that while they made away with huge profits from the farmer's produce, they could

hardly provide the farmers with the services that the co-operatives used to provide like

farm inputs at subsidised rates and credit facilities.

However, liberalisation also had its positive side. The main advantage it

brought to tlie farmers was the fact that the farmer's produce had to be bargained and

paid for on the spot. There were no longer many cases of the farniers being owed for

their produce, as had been the case with the co-operatives prior to liberalisation. The

private LBAs hardly owed the farmers for their produce. While the co-operative

loyalists complained that they were being owed by the co-operatives, those who sold

to the private LBAs got their money on the spot. The private LBAs even paid higher

prices for coffee than the co-operatives. This is explained by the fact that they had no

fixed assets and so had fewer taxes to pay compared to the co-operatives. This,

however, does not cancel the fact that the prices paid to farmers after liberalisation

were generally lower whether by the co-operatives or tlic prlvate licensed buying

agents. The co-operatives in Cameroon suffered and still sufrer undcr tlic weight of

heavy taxation like many businesses in the country. The incidence of these taxes

inevitably fell on the member farmers. However, the co-operatives still occasionally

paid bonuses to the farmers when the situation in the world market bccamc morc

favourable than previously anticipated which the private LBAs never dld.

The fall in the price of coffee in the world market and the failure of the state to

take adequate measures to cushion the effect had more serious conscquenccs on thc

industry than liberalisation entailed. Coffee farmers started looking for vlablc

economic alternatives. In the face of the problem, some farmers decidcd to

supplement coffee cultivation with other economic activities while othcrs decided 10 #

substitute other economic activities for coffee. In the Santa Sub-Division, many coffee

farmers decided to cut down their coffee farms and to cultivate food crops such as

Irish potatoes, beans, maize etc. while others took to market gardenmg. There thus

cmerged a new trend in agricultural production, where both nien and womc~l got

involved in food crop production in Santa Sub-Division. 40 This trend has persisted

and the argument advanced for it by the farmers is that food crops now pay niorc per

acreage of land cultivatcd than coffee. Secondly, part of the food is consumed by the

farmers and their families, and this makes it more relevant than coffee. Whilc some

farmers were cutting down their coffee plants to cultivate food crops, others simply

abandoned theirs to grow into bushes. In Mbengwi Sub-Division, farmers started

emphasising the planting of oil palms, a traditional crop of the area. Whilc palm oil

was being sold in the local rnarkcts, some was used for domestic purposes. The kernel

was (and still remains) in demand both by foreign and local industries for the

manufacture of soap and other items. Some of the kernel was also consumed in the

homcs as food. Some farmers also embarked on traditional industries such as bag

weaving with more devotion. 4 1

In Njikwa Sub-Division and Batibo Sub-Division, the farmers responded to the

fall by emphasising the planting and tapping of raffia palms for wine. This became tlic

major source of income for the men while still reserving food crop production in thc

hands of the women. In Njinikom, Fundong, and Oku Sub-Divisions, farmers

reluctantly continued with coffee cultivation almost with the same intensity as bcforc

for want of any viable economic alternatives and also hoping that priccs may still 42 improve over time.

Though much has been blamed on the fall in the price of coffec in the world

market and the decision by the government to liberalise the comn~crcialisation of

coffee for the near collapse of the coffee industry in the NWP, thc m a k e r in which

the co-operatives were being run is also to be blamed. Some workers of the co-

operatives issued receipts to farmers for coffee that was never delivered to thc socicty.

The money paid to the farmer against such a wceipt was then sharcd bctwccn thc

farmer and the co-operative worker in question. 43 Some co-operative workers even

gypped the farmers by using faulty scales to under-weigh thcir producc. The

difference between the real wcights and the fake weights were later dcducted by the

workers in question and weighed separately either against their own namc or thc namc

of a comprador farmer. The proceeds from the coffee then went to the worker.

A long drawn legal battle between Fai Tawong Aloys Kiyung of Melim-Nso,

arguably the highest coffee producer in the province and one of the best in thc

country, and the co-operative deserves some analysis. Though this casc falls

somewhat outside the time frame of the work, in perspective, it hclps to illuminate

some of the weaknesses of the co-operative movement in thc province especially after

liberalisation. The above farmer is said to have delivered 'coffee to the co-operativc

during the 1994195 coffee season amounting to more than four n~illion francs CFA.

The money was never paid to the farmer and he decided to sue the co-operative in thc

Kumbo Magistrate Court where he won the case. Instead of trying to make amends,

the co-operative appealed to the Appeal Court in Bamenda where the farmer again

won. Even after winning the case, the money has not yet been paid to the farmer for

his produce. The co-operative on its part argued that the producc exported that year

was never bought in the world market. Though the details of the case may not be

known to us, such experienccs only helped to alicnatc thc farmcrs from thc co- 44 operative. This farnlcr has since refused to sell his produce through the co-operatives.

On the other hand, some farmers were not honest in thcir dealings with thc co-

operatives. They did not give their produce to the co-operative society evcn after

receiving advances from the societies. Such dubious behaviours by some farnlcrs

contributed to get the co-opcratives into financial difficulties at the cnd of the scason

since they had neither the money nor the produce to give to the unions. However, one

major problem with coffee, like many other agricultural products, has been that i t is

not only the price that fluctuates but also, output. Climatic factors at times havc a

negative influence on output to the extent that output tends to be poor in some years

irrespective of inputs. During such years, many farmers failed to honour thcir #

engagements with the co-operatives. Some farmers also deliberately dccided not to

give the coffee to the co-operatives even when the harvest was good.

Whatever the case may be, government intervention or assistance to coffcc

fam~ers would seem to have had some positive impact as the production for most of

the years during this period shows an upward trend as illustrated below. However, the

Sincrease in production cannot wholly be credited to government mtcrventlon. By this

fl time, most of the coffee trees in the province had reached their full bearing age (10-25

years), which may partly explain why this period witnessed a sonlewhat steady

increase in production. Also, during most of this period, returns on investment

justified capital outlay. As a result, the farmers paid better attention to the crop.

207

Table 9: Total Production, Producer Price and World Market Price 1972-1993

Year

1972

1973

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

1979 1980

1981

1982

1983

1984 1985 1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

Source: NPM

Production (tons)

7750

9250

850

10.000 8250 6500 6100

10900 8480

8950

8340

8500

4490 8180 6960

5950

5 100

5800

2 100

2 100

4700

2400

and NWCA Ltd

Producer Price (FCFAIKg)

World Market Price (FCFAIKg)

Total Production (tons) from 1972 - 1993

Producer Price and World Market Price (FCFNKg) 4972 to 1993

-

- . I -

- I - - +

200

o * , , , , . . . . . . . , , , , , . , , , , 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1964 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Year

Notes and References

I N.P. Bantar, "The North West Coffee Marketing Co-operative System, 1947-1997". Ilnpublislled n.d.p.2

2 Richard L. Kohls, Marketing ofAgriculturu1 Products, New York: Macmillan, 1961, p. 383.

3 Edith Whetham, Agricultural Marketing in Africa, London: OUP, 1972, p. 93

4 . ~ ~ h l s , Marketing of Agricultural Products p.384.

5 BCA = Bamenda Co-operative Association 2ed. (no date), "Co-operative Development in the North West Province" P. 10 see also NWCA = North West Co-ol)cru/r\~c Association Ltd. (1 985) T h e North West Marketing Co-operatives pp. 5 3-55.

three sources have examined the history and evolution of the co-operative marketing structure in the North West Province. These are; Paul Ngabir, "The North West Coffee Market~ng Co-operative System 1947-1997" pp. 43-63, BCA. = Banienda Co-operative Association Itd., Co-operative Development pp.10-16 and NWCA = North West Co-operative Association ltd. (1985) Thc North Wcst Marketing Co-operalive Pp. 53-56 b

7 interview with Pa Chongwain Joseph Nkuo, farmer and former co-operative president, Age: 93 years at Wombong, Njinikom, Boyo Division on 05-01-20006.

' BCA = Bamenda Co-operative Association Ltd. (no date) Co-operative Development in the North West Province Pp 14-1 5

9 Paul Ngabir, "The North West Coffee Marketing Co-operative system" p.49

10 Paul Ngabir, "The North West Coffee marketing" p

I I The aims and objectives, membership, members' obligations, the General Assembly, the staff and their duties etc. of the NWCA as conceived at its inception have been examined in N.W.C.A. = Nor111 West Co-opera fives Association Ltd, The North West Marketing Co-opercitives Pp. 0-8

I2 Dupe Olatunbosun and S.O. Olayide, "The Effect of The Marketing Boards on the Output and Income of Primary Producers. International conference on the A4arketing Board systcrn 29'" M(~rc11- 3 " ' ~ ~ r i l , 1971. NISER, University of Ibadan, 1971. p. 1.

13 Cited in Dupe Olatunbosun and S.O. Olayide, "The Effect of The Marketing Boards" Pp. 1-2

14 Mukong (ed.), The Casefur Southern Cumeroorts P.28

IS Ngabir, "The North West Coffee Marketing Co-operative Systen~" p.8 1

16 N.W.C.A =North West Co-operative Association Ltd., The North West Murketing Co-oper~tivcs p.30

17 Mukong (ed), The Cuse.fir the Southern Cameroons p.29-30. See also, N.W.C.A = North West co- operative Association Ltd, The North West Marketing co-oyerut~ves p.30

N WCA=North West Co-operutive Association Ltd, The North West Marketing Co-opcrc~th~es P.3 1.

I Y Interview with Bechia Philip Ndifon, farmer, Age: 45 years at Chie-Jiyane, Oku on 09-01 -2006. Interview with Shey Katu Lot, Jiyane-Oku, farmer and fornier president, Oku C'o-operative union, Age: 75 years on 09-01-2006. Also, interview with Ngong Philip Njuasu, farmer and president of NAM C.P.M.S., Age 55 years at Abuh Fundong sub-division.

20 Mukong (ed), The case for the Southern Ca~neroons p. 29.

2 1 W.G. Tomek and K.L. Robinson, Agricultural Product Prices, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990 p. 264. See also, Kohls, Marketing ofAgricultura1 Products P. 404-41 1.

22 Interview with Amana Peter Mbuat, Farmer and former board member of NWCA Ltd at Ngebenge Ngwo Njikwa Sub-Division. Age 60 years. See also NWCA - North West Co-operutive As.soc.itrtion Itrl. The North West Murketing Co-operutive p. 18

23 North West Co-operative Association Ltd, The North West Marketing Co-opcrutive p. 18-19

2 4 NWCA = North West Co-operative Associution Ltd, The Nortk West Marketing Co-Ol~erution 11. 21.

2 5 b Interview with Shey Katu lot at Elak-Oku, farmer and former president of Oku Co-operative union. Age: 75 years on 09-0 1 - 2006.

26 NWCA = North West Marketing Co-operatives Association Ltd, The North West M(~rkeling Co- opertltives P.22

27 Ibid p. 23

28 Interview with Pa Chin Zachary Lai, fanner, Age 75 years at Melim Nso on 1 1-01 -2006. 2 9 NW.C.A = North West Co-operative Association Lid, The Nortk West Markctirlg Co-operc~livcs p. 25.

30 Ban, coffee production and Commercialisation

3 1 Fon P.E. Fombo, Interview Cited

j2 NWCA = North West Co-operative Association Ltd., The North West Marketing Co-operolirvs p.27.

3 3 NWCA = North West co-operative Association Ltd, The Nortk West marketing Co-opcrotivcs. Pp 53-55.

34 While many farmers acknowledge that these services were provided by the co-operatives, they can hardly make out which o f them was actually provided by MIDENO, NPMB., or the co-operative itself since they were all provided through the co-operative societies.

. ' "BRD/WO~~~ Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21" century? Washington D.C. IBRDIWorld Bank, 2001 pp. 188-1 89.

" Mukong, (ed) The case,fi)r the Southern Cameroon pp. 46-47

37 Hartmut Hofmeister, North West Rural Development project: Co-operative component. Unpublished, n.d. no page..

38 Interview with Mr. Atanga Martin Fombong, Farmer, at Santa Agc 67 years on 16-09-2003. Also, lnterview with Mr. Godfrey Njita, Farmer, Age: 71 years at Santa on 16-09-2003.

29 Interview with Zachariah Angwantu, farmer and former president of Ngwo Co-operative society 1970-1983, former president of Mbengwi Co-operative union and member of NWCA Board of Directors, 1984-1 996.

40 Interview with Mr. Mbonying Moses, farmer and president of Bali-Gliam co-operative produce marketing society, Age 56 years at the Santa co-operative union on 16-09-2003. See also Atanga Martin Fombon. interview cited.

4 1 interview with Mr. Sabuln Samson Tatah farmer Age: 75 years at sang-Meta on 21 -09-2003

42 Interviews with Yong Simon, farmer, Age: 50 years at Aluayu-Njinikom on 05-0 1-2006 a i ~ d Ngoi~g Simon Mobuli, farmer and former president of Ngwali CP.S, Age: 33 years at Abuh Fundong on 15- 0 1-2006.

43 Angwantu, Interview cited.

44 b Interview with Fai Tawong Kiyung Aloys, fanner Age: 68 years at Melim, Nso on 11-01 -2006.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The discussions in the preceding chapters permit us to draw certain

conclusions. The first is that coffee as an economic activity in the economy of the

NWP of Cameroon has been very problematic. An inherent problem with coffee

farming is the fact that the crop is prone to many diseases and pests. Diseases such as

leaf rust (Hemileia vastatrix), coffee berry disease (A?ztlzrarzosis), black pods etc. have

constituted a serious threat to the industry. This problem has been coinpounded by

pests such as coffee bug (antestia) and stein borers (Bexodus sienzicala). Any effective

eradication of these diseases and pests requires the jqifit efforts of both the farniers

and the government. Government policy of assisting the farmers in this direction in

the seventies and eighties was a right step in the right direction though implementatioil

left much to be desired.

The decision by the government to stop assisting the fanners combat these

problems with subsidised chemicals and insecticides did not help matters in any way.

The problem was again compounded by the persistent drop in the price of coffee in

the world market from 1987. As a result, the farmers were not able to buy the

insecticides and chemicals needed in their farms from their meagre earnings. The

result was a general fall in the quantity and quality of coffee produced in the NWP

after liberalisation in 1990 when the government decided to hands off from

subsidising the industry.

Generally, coffee farms in the NWP had passed the maximum productive age

of between 25 and 30 years by 1990. Production per tree had therefore dropped

significantly. This scenario demanded the planting of new trees and regeneration -

cutting of the older plants so that they can germinate again. But because of the falling

prices, few farmers were willing to invest the time and resources that this entailed.

Secondly, young people were no longer interested in the industry and so both the

farms and the farmers were old. One of its greatest problems is that coffee is a

seasonal crop. It is harvested just once a year and so any investments into a coffcc

fann is assessed on a single harvest. This made the crop to coniparc unfavourably with

food crops especially after 1990.

Some farmers saw the co-operatives as a source of their problem rather than tlic

solution they were meant to be. Some argue that the co-operativcs used to deduct

money from their produce, which did not reflect the services thcy rcndcred. Thcy

contend that the charges levied by the co-operatives, beginning from the apex organ,

the NWCA, through tlie unions to the primary societies left the farmcr with very little

to takc home for his produce. They compare the prices paid by the co-operatives after

liberalisation and those paid by the private LBAs and conclude that the co-opcratives

had been cheating them over the years. b

While some of the accusations levied against the co-operatives are founded,

others are baseless and flagrant exaggerations. It is true that some of thc co-operative

workers have been funny over the years. Certain decisions taken by some societies or

unions at a point in time might not have been thc bcst in those circumstanccs. Be that

as it may, the co-operatives cannot be roundly condemned for incfficiency and

corruption. They have been very instrumental in the development of thc coffcc

industry in the NWP and still constitute a good contact point between the governn~ent

and the farmers, and non-governmental or Western donor countries and the farmers.

With all its manifest faults, the co-operatives have provided a forum for the collcctive

expression of the farmers' opinion on matters concerning their future. They also

provide channels through which to disseminatc agricultural knowledge and to

introducc mcthods of combating diseases and pests. The money deducted by thc three

tiers of the organisation was used in providing certain services such as transportation

of produce, purchase of farm inputs which were supplied to the farmers at affordablc p p p p p p p p p p - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

and subsidised rates, payment of co-operative workers, construction of co-operatlve

premises etc. Liberalisation of the marketing of arabica coffee in tlie province, which I

has undermined the position of the co-operatives, has been a mixcd blcssing to the I

coffee farmers. Thc taxation policy of the government has helped to Increase the I i

financial burden of the co-operatives. The taxes levied on the co-operat~ves are quite

high and thc incident of such taxes fall on the farmcrs.

From the introduction of coffee in the economy of the NWP in 1923 up to 1990

when the commercialisation of the crop was liberalised, poor roads and in somc cascs,

the completc absence of motorable roads constituted a major problem to many

farmers. Government assistance in this direction summcd up to very little or nothing

as most of the roads in the province remained seasonal. Bad roads or the coniplete

absence of motorable roads as the case may be also contributed in reducing the profit

margin of the farmers.

Though the government made some efforts towards the development of the

coffee industry in the NWP, generally speaking, this conttibution pales to near nothing

when comparcd with the sector's contribution to the economy especially betwcen the

sixties and early eighties when the prices were more favourable in the world market.

The main challenge confronting this industry remains the vagaries in the world

market. Thc problem is compounded by the fact that coffee has no buffer capacity as

an infinitesimal amount of the produce is consumed locally, putting the farmers at the

mercy of the international market and prices. This dependence on cxternal factors

tends to imperil the sustainability of the industry. As a response, some farmers took up

food crop production as a means of augmenting the meagre incomes from coffee. As

food crop production tended to be increasingly more rewarding than coffee, more land

was allocated to it than to coffee. With increasingly decreasing coffee prices, even

land that was initially planted with coffee, was being converted to food crop

production in somc areas. This situation has however helped to guarantee food

security not only in the province, but also in thc entire nation, which is one of the

- - - - - greatest ch~llengesfacing thirdwor4d countries today. Inather areas, palms took over

prominence. Therefore, food crop production is not a challenge to coffee production i n

Bamenda as is often believed, but rather, an appropriate response to the challenge of

falling coffee prices. Thus, we come to the conclusion that to educate the farmers on

better ways of producing and preserving these food crops, and also open up new

market avenues for these farmers (especially external markets), will certamly fetch

them better incomes and improve their lots.

The problem nature of the coffee industry does not imply that coffce has not

produced some positive results in the society in question; far from that. 011 tlic

contrary, coffee production has had far-reaching consequences on thc people of tlic

NWP of Cameroon, both positive and negative. While some of the consequcnccs of

coffee production in the province have been ephemeral, others have becn long lasting

and niay still be evident to date. Though hard statistical evidence niay bc wanting in

some cases, yet, indices point to this direction. The impact of coffee farnilng has becn

economic, social and political.

In the economic domain, coffee cultivation led 40 a boost in animal husbandry.

Some coffee farn~ers used their income from coffee to buy domestic anin~als such as

cattle, sheep and goats. This was the case in villages like Ngwo and Menka where

some farmers used their proceeds from coffee to buy animals such as goats, sliecp,

pigs and cattle. Coffee cultivation also helped in improving the incomcs of thc farnicrs

in a significant way though precise data are wanting, indices such as bicycles, houses

roofed with corrugated iron sheets, number of children sent to school etc are indicative

of this fact. However, a study carried out by the German Volunteer service in

Cameroon showed that for most of the years from 1960 up to 1993, increase in cash

crop prices whenever they occurred, were cancelled out by higher increase in

consumer prices.

Coffee farming offered good prospects of employment for young pcoplc who

had limited employment opportunities. This activity improved not only their financial

status but also their social wellbeing. Proceeds from the sale of coffee went a long

way to enhance the financial position of many of the young men in the society. With

the introduction of coffee, there was some sense of financial security and many young

men embraced this economic activity. This enabled them to marry and to take up 1 responsibilities in society. Some farmers who fourAd themselves in a difficult

financial situation used their coffee farms as collateral to borrow money eithcr from

friends or financial houses. This asset was easily accepted and recogniscd as such

especially when the farm was assessed to bc yielding well. A second consideration in

accepting such farms as collateral was the prevailing price of coffee i n thc world

market. When the prices of coffee were good in the world market, coffce farms wcre

easily accepted as ~ol la tera l .~

One aspect of the lives of the people of the NWP which coffee has contributed

very significantly to its development is education. Onc cannot disputc the fact that

coffee has contributed immensely in the education of many people in the NWP of

Cameroon. This is the one aspect on which there is near consensus anlong the farmers

on its impact on their lives. Conscious of the important role the proceeds from this

economic activity played in the education of the farmers' children, the co-operatives #

organised payments for produce to coincide with school resumption around the nionth

of September each year. This eased for the farmers, the problem of sending thcir

children to school. Not all the farmers saw formal education as an attractive

investment, though. Coffee was thc main source of income for many fanlilies in tllc

province, especially from the sixties to the eighties and so constituted the niain source

of sending children to school. Of course, other economic activities contributed but thc

contribution from these activities was small, especially from 1960 to the 1980s.

Roads construction in the province have always been linked with coffee

production. In a province with little natural resource endowment, coffee was a serious

factor in determining roads construction. Beginning from the colonial period, it was

the need to transport coffee inter alia, which gingered many communities to embark

on self-reliant road construction development projects. Roads construction in thc

province in the post-colonial period followed the same pattern to a large extent. It was

the necessity to transport coffee, which informed government's decision to either

maintain or construct some of the major roads in the province in the post-colonial

period. Most of the roads remained seasonal that notwithstanding. MIDENO road

projects had a similar orientation and objective - to disenclave agricultural areas,

mostly coffee producing areas.

Coffee farming also impacted 011 the lives of the people socially. I t Icd to an

improvement in their social welfare. Many farmers could afford to treat themsclvcs

and their families in hospitals when they took ill thanks to the income they were ablc

to make from coffee. This contributed to a better health situation in the society.

Coffee farming also assisted in improving the housing situation of the farmcrs

in a very significant way. The proceeds from coffee were used in purchasing building

materials such as corrugated iron sheets, cement, wood, etc with which the farmcrs

were able to build better houses for themselves than before. Here again, the co-

operatives played an important role by providing such building materials to the

farmers as were needed and the money for such items deducted from their procecds 3 when they supplied their produce to the co-operatives. , Some farmers were also ablc

to buy goods like radios, bicycles etc which improved their general social wellbeing.

Still in the social realm, coffee farming elevated the social status of some

farmers in the society. The Minister of Agriculture paid visits to distinguished coffee

farmers and researchers also frequently visited such distinguished farmers from both

within and out of the country. In some cases, their farms were used by expatriates for

demonstration work to other fanners. Such farmers saw themselves as recognised and

distinguished in the society. They became popular village hcroes and the envy of

many smaller farmers. They thus constituted an elite class. 4

Another social institution of the society, which came under the influence of the

coffee industry to some extent, was marriage institution. We have already shown that

polygamy was an established institution in the NWP prior to the imposition of

colonial rule. However, when some farmers had made enough money from coffcc,

they were encouraged to marry more than one wife since they now considered

themselves to be financially viable to support a larger family. Some farmers also

decidcd to get more than one wife so as to get enough labour to work in their coffcc

farms. Some young people also got married early in life because the moncy thcy wcre

able to make from coffee enabled them to pay for bride wealth.

Politically, coffee production came to play an important role in the political lifc

of the province. Some of the parliamentarians, mayors and even the former Prime

Minister of the country, Honourable Simon Achidi Achu, served in one capac~ty or

another in the coffee co-operatives where they were able to gam somc popularity

before jo~ning politics. Hon. Simon Achidi Achu had been the president of NWCA

before his appointment as Prime Minister of the Republic. The late Hon. Lawrcncc

Fonkang Shang, former Speaker of the National Assembly, had been the Vice

President of BCMA from which NWCA evolved. John Ngu Fonclia, the first P r ~ m

Minister of West Cameroon and Vice President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon

was a founding member of BCPMS, the first co-operative produce marketing society

in the province. So, coffee in general and the coffee co-operatives in particular

provided a springboard for most politicians in the province. On the other hand,

farmers were able to see some of the inequalities that exi3ted between the two sections

of the Federation from the marketing arrangement that existed. There was a different

arrangement for the marketing of coffee in the Eastern part, which was more

advantageous to that which obtained in the West.

A major disruptive impact of the coffee industry is the fact that in the long run,

there was competition for land for the planting of coffee and the plant~ng of food

crops. While there would not seem to have been any shortage of land for the two

activities at the initial stage, eventually land was being competed for between coffce,

food crops and even animal rearing. This created conflicts amongst the various

interest groups and also affected the land tenureship.

One problem with coffee farmers in the NWP is that, when the prices of coffee

were good, many farmers failed to diversify their econonlic activ~tics probably

because they did not anticipate that the prices would eventually fall. They tended to

rely much on coffee and did not see the need to diversify into other cconon~ically

rewarding activities. Such farmers were taken off guard when the prices of coffee in

the world market started falling to ridiculous levels. However, some farmers were able

to use their incomes from coffee to invest in cattle rearing while somc even used the

money to learn a trade for themselves.

We may pause here to pose the question: has coffee farming in the NWP of

Cameroon brought about economic developmcnt? Allan McPhee suggested in his

Economic Revolution in British West Africa that, the cultivation of export cash crops

by the "natives" with the help of the English Colonial Adniinistration has brought

about economic developn~ent in the region. ' We have already considered thc benefits

of coffee farming to the people of the NWP of Cameroon. Do these bcnefits amount to

economic development? What is economic development then? Waltcr Rodncy has

rightly observed that:

A society develops economically as its members increase jointly, their capacity for dealing with the environment. This capacity for dealing with the environment is dependent on the extent to which they understand the laws of nature (science), on the extent to which they put that understanding into practicebby devising tools (technology), and on the manner in which work is organised."

From this definition, it follows that for development to take place, it requires first and

foremost a mastery of the environment by its people and therefore, econoniic

development must be initiated and sustained from within.

Gerald M. Meier on his part, defines economic development as:

The "upward movement of the entire social system", or it may be interpreted as the attainment of a number of "ideals of modernization", such as a rise in productivity, social and economic equalization, modem knowledge, improved institutions and attitudes, and a rationally co-ordinated system of policy measurcs that can remove the host of undesirable conditions in the social system that have perpetuated a state of underdevelopment. ... Development is taken to mean growth plus change."

He goes further to explain that, to interpret development in terms of a process

involving causal relationships should prove more meaningful than merely to identify

development with a set of conditions or a catalogue of characteristics.

Going by the above definitions, the processes that have taken place in the

economy of the NWP resulting from the cultivation of coffee cannot pass for

econonic development. As Schumacher has rightly pointed out, developn~ent does

not start with goods; it starts with people and their education, organisation, and

discipline.8 A genuine process of development only begins when these sine quo 11017

conditions are put in place. For, as observed above, economic devclopment takcs

place when there is an upward moment in the entire social system and the socicty

increases its capacity for dealing with the environment. We cannot therefore say that

coffee cultivation has brought about economic development in the North Wcst

Province of Cameroon. An increase in economic welfare cannot be equated with

economic development. Its benefits to the people notwithstanding, the introduction of

coffee and colonialism in general put the people and their economy in a state of

perpetual dependency. They lost the capacity to initiate development from within.

This ability to develop from within was already part of the people's economic culture

before the imposition of colonial rule as we have shown 111 the pre-coffce economy of +

the province. An important considcration in development is that i t should bc

sustainable. But, coffee has not been sustainable as a developn~ent catalyst as cvident

in events in the province after 1990. It has contributed to growth and not economic

development. Even some of the supposed financial benefits from coffec are oftcn

exaggerated because in recounting their achievements within this period, some of thc

farmers hardly take into consideration some other petty cconoinic activities which

most of them indulged in within the year to make money. Often, only coffee is

considered as the source of income, which enabled them to achieve whatever has

been accomplished. Though coffee was the main source of income, it was not the

only source of income for most of the farmers. Some farmers indulged in petty

activities such as carving, smithing, weaving etc when their labour was not necded on

their farms.

Recommendations

This work also permits us to make some recommendations for the

improvement of the coffee industry in the NWP of Cameroon and the betterment of

the lots of the farmers in the province.

Our first recommendation is that the situation in the NWP demands

diversification of the economic activities of the people. Diversification in this casc

should not be seen as substituting one export crop for another nor one additional

export crop to the existing one. Adding a second export crop to the exlstmg one may

not be bad but the most acceptable thing in thc circumstance is to encouragc thc

cultivation of food crops, which have a good domestic market. The NWP 111 particular

and Cameroon in general lack the potential for the domestic consumption of coffee.

This exposes the farmers to the vagaries of the world market.

Diversifying into a crop with a domestic market therefore rcduces the

complete dependence on external forces. Diversification should also takc into

consideration the micro-climatic and ecological peculiarities of the region. Soinc of

the crops already being cultivated in different parts of the province should bc

encouraged as a way of diversifying the economy. For instance, beans and Irish

potatoes should be encouraged in Bui Division, rice and maize in Ngoh-Ketungia

Division, Irish potatoes and market gardening in Mezam, Malzc and soybeans in

Donga and Mantung, oil palms, raffia palms and cocoyam in Momo Division and ricc

and groundnuts in Menchum Division. These crops are already providing steady

incomes to a number of families in thesc parts of the provlnce but could do better if

the government could take it as a policy to encourage and support their cultivation.

These crops have the advantage that they have both an external and domestic market.

Even when such crops are not sold in the market, they can serve as food for the

farmers. There are several ways by which the government can encouragc these food

crops beyond their existing levels. The first thing is to open the borders and allow

traders to export these food items into Nigeria, which borders the provlnce to the

West. Presently, some of these food items are being smuggled into Nigeria and

neighbouring Gabon because of tight government control measures and stringent

taxation policies. The second way by which the government can encourage this

process is to improve on the road network in the province. This will enable the

farmers to easily transport the agricultural produce to the market without them

perishing on the way. The road linking the province to Nigeria could also be

improved to facilitate the transportation of such foodstuff.

Secondly, encouraging cattle rearing can be another way of diversifying the

economy. The Sudan savannah type of vegetation, which pre-dominates in most of

the province, is conducive for livestock rearing. Presently, this economic activity in

the province is dominated by the immigrant Fulani with a handful of md~ge~ics

engaged in it. Many more indigenes could be encouraged to take ~t up as a source of

livel~hood.

The existing coffee co-operatives could be integrated to combine thc

marketing of coffee and food crops for greater efficiency. The various societ~es and

unions should be given the free hand to elect their managers and not allow than to be

appointed by the apex organisation. This will help improvc on the efficiency of

managenlcnt of the co-operatives in that, management will be directly accountable to

the members and will be more responsive to their nceds. The government should not

influence elections into offices in the co-operative organisation.

The taxation policy of the government could be reviewed to makc it more b

accommodating to the co-operatives and the farmers on whom the inc~dcnce of thc

taxes falls. Reduced taxes may also encourage traders to get into the business of food

exportation, and the importation of chemicals and insecticides for coffee and food

crops at affordable prices to the farmers.

The government should make it as a policy that further planting of coffee is

not allowed. Even in the long run, further planting of coffee should not be encouragcd

sincc it suffers much from the vagaries of world market, which makes it not

sustainable. Rather, efforts should be directed at maintaining existing farms so that

they can bear to full capacity. When the existing farms become too old, they should

not be regenerated but rather, the land should be put to other uses. Land that should

have been used for further coffee planting should be used for food crops product~on

because of the obvious advantages of food crops. This will provide financial security

to the farmers when the price of coffee falls in the world market to very low levels, as

has been the case for the past eight years. The activities of private licenscd buying

agents, some of whom are so unscrupulous that they have tarnished the reputation of

North West coffee, must be brought under control if they must continuc to operate in

the province. Campaigns should also be carried out to encourage local consu~nption

of coffee as only an infinitesimal amount of the produce is currently being consumed

locally (less than 3%). Coffee is a caffeinated beverage, which could be good for

human consumption in a generally cold environment like the NWP. Local

consumption of coffee will help to build a buffer capacity for tlie crop. As A.T.

Mosher has strongly stated in relation to the domestic market for agricultural

products,

In only a few countries can there be sustained agricultural development without growth of a strong niarket demand for agricultural products within the country itself. This is one of the ways in which agricultural and industrial developn~ent are dependent on each other.9

We have already argued that not only are most of the farms old, but also, tlie

farmer population is equally old. The youths need to be encouraged to get into

agricultural pursuits. They must take over the relay baton from the old ones and

continue not with coffee, but with food crofls production. However, the rural milieu

must be made attractive to prevent the youthful population from migrating to the

urban areas where some of them remain idle. The rural areas can be made more

attractive through integrated rural development policies, where, econon~ic

opportunities are made available in the rural areas alongside social amenities such as

schools, hospitals, nightclubs, video clubs, etc. But ultimately, there must be a market

for food crops for young people to be able to get into food crops production. Food

insecurity seems to be one of the greatest national challenges facing many Third

World countries. As such, a niarket for food crops can be readily sought in other

Third World countries, even within Africa, if there is a proper understanding among

the Third World countries. This will be more acceptable than coffee, which depends

mostly on Western Countries for both the price and quantity demanded.

Hopefully, these recommendations will also be helpful and relevant to other

Third World regions faced with similar problems pertaining to coffee in particular

and export crop production in general. We cannot claim to have exhausted everything

about the industry nor do we assume our recommendatioiis to be the last word. We

hope that any lacuna in the work is going to trigger other researchers to commit time

and resources to investigate further this industry for the advancement of knowledge.

Notes and References

' E.E. Kengo, "Trade in Ngwo, North West Province of Cameroon, C. 1900-1980". Unpublished M.A. Project Report, Department of History, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. September 1998.

Interview with Fai Moum Meluf, farmer and traditional ruler, Age: 55 years at Nsame- Meluf, Nso on 1 1-0 1 -06.

3 A majority of the farmers agree that they either got building materials from the coffee co-operatives or bought the materials tliemselves with proceeds from coffee.

Farniers such as Bechia Philip Ndifon of Chieh-Jiyane in Oku, Shufai Ngongmvem Kiyung Aloys of Melim-Nso and Pa Elias Teinbong of Santa may be considered as good examples.

5 Allan McPhee, The Economic Revolution. See for example, his introduction and concluding remarks. He contends that the British Administration assisted the process through improved medical facilities, improved communication, peace and justice.

" Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Enugu: Ikepga Publishers, 1982, p.5

7 G.M. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Developmerzt: Studies irz Interrirrtionrrl Pol~crty, London: O.U.P, 1970, p.6.

Schumaclier, Small is Beautiful p. 157

". T. Mosher, Getting Agriculture Moving: Essewtial.for Developme~it and Modcrnizntiorr, New York: Frederick Praeger publishers, 1966, P. 63.

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1

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4

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I

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6

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56

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1 2

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13 14

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15 16 17 18 1 9 20

2 1

22

23

24 25 - 26

1 president of Oku union

75

- -

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27

7 1

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-- -

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--

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--

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I

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The National Centre For The Development Of Cooperative Enterprises (CENADEC), - A great prpj_ect for the promation af cooperative-societies in-Cameroon.Yaounde, 1973

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Statistics on the Cooperative Movement in the North West Province of the United Republic of Cameroon. 2"* Issue, July 1975. Collected and compiled by CENADEC, Bamenda sector, Field branch.

Co-operative Express (A bulletin of the Bamenda Co-operative Association Limitcd (RCA) Vo1.3

Co-operative Express Vol. 5

Co-operative Express Vol.6

Co-operative Express Vo1.7

Co-operative Express Vo1.8

Co-operative Express Vo1.12

Co-operative Express Vol. 13

Co-opcrativc Express Vol. 14

Co-operative Express Vol. 15

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Cameroon Cultural Review, No 4, December 1963: 1 17-1 33

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Maviden, M. A., "The History of Crop Cultivation in West African" Econonlic History Review, No. 23, April 1970.

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#

Njoku, 0. N., "Oil Palm Syndrome in Nigeria: Government Policy and Indigenous Response, 1918-1939" The Calabur Journal of History, 3, 1, 1978: 78-97.

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Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa London: Frank Cass, 1965.

Macbean, A., Export Instability and Econontic Developntent. London, 1 966. 'r

Meek, C.K., Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria and the Cc~r~~eroons, London: H.M.S.0, 1957.

Meier, G.M., Leading Issues in Economic Development: Studies in International Poverty, London: O.U.P, 1970

Meillassoux, C.,(ed.). The Development of Indigenous Trade a d Markels in West Africa, London: O.U.P., 1971.

McPhee, A., The Econornic Revolution in British West Africa, London: Frank Cass, 197 1

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Nkwi, P. N. Traditional Diplomacy: A Study of Inter-Chiefdonz Relatiom ill the Westerrr Gras:fields, North West Province of Cameroon, Yaounde: Department of Sociology, University of Yaounde, 1987.

NWCA = North West Cooperative Association Ltd. The North West Marketing Cooper-cctives- in New Deal Era-North West Cooperative Association View Point, Bamenda 1985.

Ogunremi, B.O., Counting the Camels: The Economics of Transportation in Pre- Industrial Nigeria, Lagos: NOK Publishers, 1982.

Olatunbosun, Dupe, and S.O. Olayide, "The Effect of The Marketing Boards on the Output and Income of Primary Producers". International conference on tlzc Marketing Board System 29'" arch-3"' April, 1971. NISER, Univcrsity of Ibadan, 197 1.

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#

Wellman, Frederick L., Cqfee: Botany, Cultivution, untl Utilization, London: Leonard I-lill, 1961.

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iii) lJnpublished Theses, Projects, Field Reports and Memoranda

Anyi, M.A., "Cash Cropping and Changes in Traditional Agriculture: The Case of the Coffee Village of Ngwo". B.A. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Sierra Leone, 198 1.

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Ban, B.B., "Coffee Production and Commercialisation in Mezani Division: Post Independence Era." Postgraduate Teacher's Diploma Dissertation, ENS, University of Yaounde, 198 1.

Che-Mfombong, Walters, "Bamenda Division Under British Administration 19 16-1 96 1. From Native Administration to Local Government." M.A. Dissertation, University of Yaounde. 1980.

Gab1ernannJ.B. "Report on Study Tour of West Cameroonian Cooperatives from 25"' November, 1965 to 301h March1l966."Unpublished, n.d.

Kengo, E.E.; "Trade in Ngwo, North West Province of Cameroon, C. 1900 - 1982". M.A. Project, Department of History, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1998.

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., Lugard, Political Memoranda, Memo. 1.

Ngabir, P.B., "The North West Coffee Marketing Cooperative System, 1947-1 997". Bamenda, Unpublished, n.d.

Ngwa, C.A., "The Upper Nun Valley Development Authority in the Social and Economic Development of the Ndop Area of Cameroon since 1970", Ph. D Thesis, Department of History, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1998.

Niba, M.L., "Origins and Development of Colonial Administration Among the Bafut, 1900 - 1949." M. Phil Dissertation, Department of History, University Of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1981.

Nyiwantumi, M.E., "The Economy and Society of Southern Cameroons Under British Colonial Domination C. 1916 - 1961. A Study of the Impact of British Impcri a 1' lsni on Bamenda Division." M.A. Thesis, Department of History, Ahniadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, 1995.