united states district court southern district of … · 2021. 2. 12. · case no....

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 18-25446-CIV-ALTONAGA/Goodman

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, Plaintiff, v. US MOVING SERVICES INC.; et al. Defendants. _____________________________________/

CONSENT FINAL JUDGMENT AND STIPULATED PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Plaintiff, Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida, Department of Legal Affairs

(“Plaintiff,” or “Attorney General”); and Defendants, US Moving Services, Inc., d/b/a Safeway

Moving & Storage, Apex Moving, Number One Van Lines, Moving Services, Proud American

Vanlines, Up Line Moving, Spartan Moving, Spartan Van Lines and/or Prodigy Moving & Storage

(“US Moving”), Moving & Storage SF Inc., f/k/a Safeway Moving & Storage Inc, d/b/a Apex

Moving & Storage, Moving and Storage Inc, Upline Moving and/or Prodigy Moving & Storage,

(“Safeway”), Moving Systems Inc., f/k/a Spartan Moving System Inc, d/b/a Spartan Van Lines

(“Spartan”), and Yehoshua Vaknin (“Vaknin”) (collectively referred to as “Consent Defendants”);

have agreed to and consent to entry of this Consent Final Judgment and Stipulated Permanent

Injunction (“Judgment”) and the findings set forth below. The Court, having reviewed the file and

necessary papers, ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows:

Final Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff, Office of the Attorney General,

State of Florida, Department of Legal Affairs, 1515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 900, West Palm Beach,

Florida 33401, and against Defendant Yehoshua Vaknin (25 Greens Rd. Hollywood, Florida), and

Case 1:18-cv-25446-CMA Document 101 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/15/2020 of 29


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Defendants US Moving (c/o Yehoshua Vaknin, 25 Greens Rd. Hollywood, Florida), Safeway (c/o

Yehoshua Vaknin, 25 Greens Rd. Hollywood, Florida) and Spartan (c/o Yehoshua Vaknin, 25

Greens Rd. Hollywood, Florida).

I. DEFINITIONS

1. For purposes of this Judgment, the following terms have the meanings set forth

below:

a. “Accessorial services” means any service performed by a Consent Defendant which

results in a charge to the shipper and is incidental to the transportation or shipment of household

goods, including, but not limited to, valuation coverage; preparation of written inventory;

equipment, including dollies, hand trucks, pads, blankets, and straps; storage, packing,

unpacking, or crating of articles; hoisting or lowering; waiting time; carrying articles excessive

distances to or from the mover’s vehicle, which may be cited as “long carry”; overtime loading

and unloading; reweighing; disassembly or reassembly; elevator or stair carrying; boxing or

servicing of appliances; and furnishing of packing or crating materials. The term also includes

services not performed by the Consent Defendants but performed by a third party at the request

of the shipper or the Consent Defendants, if the charges for these services are to be paid to the

Consent Defendants by the shipper at or before the time of delivery.

b. “Advertise” means to advise, announce, give notice of, publish, or call attention by

use of oral, written, or graphic statement made in a newspaper or other publication or on radio

or television, any electronic medium, or contained in any notice, handbill, sign, including

signage on vehicle, flyer, catalog or letter, or printed on or contained in any tag or label attached

to or accompanying any good.



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c. “Carrier” or “motor carrier” means any “person” (as defined in Section 13102(18)

of the I.T.C. to include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies,

and joint stock companies, as well as individuals), who provide motor vehicle transportation

for compensation.

d. “Complaint” or “Amended Complaint” means the complaint filed in this civil

action on December 27, 2018 [ECF No. 1] and amended on March 18, 2019 [ECF No. 53].

e. “Contract for service” or “bill of lading” means a written document approved by

the shipper in writing before the performance of any service which authorizes services from

the named mover and lists the services and all costs associated with the household move and

accessorial services to be performed.

f. “Consent Defendants” means Defendants Vaknin, US Moving, Safeway and

Spartan, any entity owned or controlled by them, individually, collectively, or in any

combination, and each of them by whatever names each might be known, including Safeway

Moving & Storage, Apex Moving, Apex Moving & Storage, Number One Van Lines, Moving

Services, Proud American Vanlines, Up Line Moving, Upline Moving, Spartan Moving,

Spartan Van Lines, Spartan Moving Systems Inc, Safeway Moving & Storage Inc, and Moving

and Storage Inc.

g. “Consumer” means an individual; child, by and through its parent or legal

guardian; business; firm; association; joint venture; partnership; estate; trust; business trust;

syndicate; fiduciary; corporation; any commercial entity, however denominated; or any other

group or combination.

h. “Corporate Defendants” means the corporate entities named as defendants in this

action, to wit: Defendants US Moving; Safeway; and Spartan.



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i. “Household goods” or “goods” means personal effects or other personal property

commonly found in a home, personal residence, or other dwelling, including, but not limited

to, household furniture.

j. “Household move” or “household moving services” means the loading of

household goods into a vehicle, moving container, or other mode of transportation or shipment;

the transportation or shipment of those household goods; and the unloading of those household

goods, when the transportation or shipment originates and terminates at one of the following

ultimate locations, regardless of whether the mover temporarily stores the goods while in route

between the originating and terminating locations:

i. From one dwelling to another dwelling;

ii. From a dwelling to a storehouse or warehouse that is owned or rented by the shipper or the shipper’s agent; or

iii. From a storehouse or warehouse that is owned or rented by the shipper or the shipper’s agent to a dwelling.

k. “Impracticable” means conditions that make it impossible, exceedingly difficult or

dangerous for a mover to perform pickup or delivery for a household move.

l. “Mover” means a person who, for compensation, contracts for or engages in the

loading, transportation or shipment, or unloading of household goods as part of a household

move.

m. “Moving broker” or “broker” means a person who, for compensation, arranges for

another person to load, transport or ship, or unload household goods as part of a household

move or who, for compensation, refers a shipper to a mover by telephone, postal or electronic

mail, Internet website, or other means.



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n. “Moving Services” means any services relating to the moving, transportation,

arranging for the transportation or the physical movement and/or storage of household goods.

o. “Shipper” means a “consumer” who uses the services of a mover to transport or

ship household goods as part of a household move either solely within the State of Florida

(intrastate moves) or crossing state boundaries or involving more than one state (interstate

moves).

p. “Storage” means the temporary warehousing of a shipper’s goods while under the

care, custody, and control of the mover.

q. “Writing” or “Written” means any physical or electronic document or signature;

any “copy” required by this Judgment may also be kept or transmitted electronically.

II. FINDINGS

2. Plaintiff, Office of the Attorney General, is an agency of the State of Florida and

an enforcing authority under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Chapter 501,

Part II, Florida Statutes (“FDUTPA”).

3. Pursuant to Section 14711 of Title 49 U.S.C., Subtitle IV, Part B (hereinafter the

“Interstate Transportation Code” or “I.T.C.”), Plaintiff is authorized to bring a civil action on

behalf of the residents of the State of Florida in an appropriate district court of the United States

to enforce the consumer protection provisions of the Interstate Transportation Code that apply to

individual shippers and are related to the delivery and transportation of household goods by a

household goods motor carrier subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I of Chapter 135 of the

I.T.C.

4. Consent Defendant Vaknin is an individual residing in Broward County, Florida, is

not in the military and is otherwise sui juris.



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5. Consent Defendant US Moving is a Florida corporation with its registered principal

place of business located at 18350 NW 2nd Avenue, #318, N Miami, Florida 33169, Miami Dade

County, Florida.

6. Consent Defendant Safeway is a Florida corporation with its registered principal


County, Florida.

7. Consent Defendant Spartan is a Florida corporation with its registered principal


County, Florida.

8. Plaintiff initiated an investigation into allegations that Consent Defendants and

others engaged in acts or practices that were misleading, unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable in

the marketing, advertising, and performance of Household Goods moving services. The Plaintiff,

Attorney General, determined that this enforcement action serves the public interest, as set forth

in Section 501.207(2), Florida Statutes, and that there was reason to believe the interests of the

residents of the State of Florida have been or were being threatened or adversely affected by the

Defendants, who operated as motor carriers or brokers providing transportation subject to

jurisdiction under subchapters I or III of Chapter 135 of the Interstate Transportation Code.

9. Plaintiff commenced this action by filing its Complaint for injunctive relief,

equitable restitution, civil penalties and other statutory relief pursuant to Section 501.207(1) of the

FDUTPA, and for civil penalties pursuant to Section 14711(a) of the I.T.C. and the regulations

promulgated thereunder by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”), as

contained in Title 49 C.F.R., Chapter III, Subchapter B, Sections 350-399 (“FMCSA Regulations”

or “the Regulations”).



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10. Only for the purpose of this action, the Consent Defendants admit the facts

necessary to establish the Court’s jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action

pursuant to the provisions of the FDUTPA, and that venue is proper in this Court as the actions at

issue took place in more than one county in the State of Florida.

11. Consent Defendants, at all times material hereto, have acted either as an interstate

“household goods motor carrier,” as defined by Section 13102(12) of the I.T.C. and Section

375.103 of the Regulations; or as an intrastate “mover” as defined in Section 507.01(9) of the

Florida Household Moving Services Act, Chapter 507, Sections 507.01-507.13, Florida Statutes

(“Florida Moving Act” or “F.M.A.”).

12. Consent Defendants, at all material times, solicited consumers within the definition

of Section 501.203(7) of the FDUTPA. Those persons who used the Defendants’ Moving Services

as part of a household move were “shippers” or “individual shippers” within the meaning of the

Florida Moving Act (Section 507.01(12)) or the I.T.C. (Section 13102(13)), as well as being

“consumers” under the FDUTPA.

13. Consent Defendants, at all material times, provided goods or services within the

meaning of Section 501.203(8), Florida Statutes.

14. Consent Defendants, at all material times, engaged in trade or commerce within the

definition of Section 501.203(8), Florida Statutes.

15. On December 27, 2018 and March 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed its initial Complaint and

Amended Complaint, respectively, against Defendants, alleging Defendants’ acts and practices

constituted direct violations of the FDUTPA and per se FDUTPA violations, as well as violations

of various provisions of the I.T.C. and FMCSA Regulations.



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16. The Attorney General’s Amended Complaint alleged that since at least in or about

January 2014, the Consent Defendants advertised themselves as being professional movers staffed

by well-trained employees who use the utmost care with shippers’ belongings and are scrupulous

in preparing and following estimates. Instead, Consent Defendants and their affiliates are alleged

to have regularly used unskilled, untrained laborers who often damaged or failed to deliver

consumers’ property, and provided deceptive, “low ball” estimates and then extorted higher fees

by holding shippers’ property hostage.

17. Consent Defendant Vaknin allegedly controlled the acts and practices of the

Corporate Defendants, which were operated as part of a common enterprise (“the Enterprise”).

The Complaint alleges that Consent Defendants utilized unfair and deceptive trade practices in

connection with advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, selling or distributing the Enterprises’

Moving Services to consumers residing in Florida and elsewhere throughout the United States.

18. The Attorney General alleged that the Consent Defendants and their agents

misrepresented or deceptively represented to consumers the price, nature, extent, qualities, timing

or characteristics of the Moving Services being offered. The Consent Defendants’ deceptive acts

and practices included making numerous false and/or misleading representations and promises

(expressly and by implication) on the Defendants’ website.

19. The Amended Complaint further alleged that oftentimes, the Consent Defendants

and their agents allegedly quoted consumers an artificially low estimate for providing their Moving

Services, but thereafter, failed to honor that “low ball” estimate. Instead, Consent Defendants and

their agents substantially increased the price charged to the consumer within days of the scheduled

move, or at the time the actual move occurred, often waiting until after the consumer’s household

goods had been loaded onto their trucks before disclosing the price hike. It was further alleged



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that in numerous instances, Consent Defendants and/or their agents refused to deliver the

consumer’s household goods notwithstanding the consumer’s attempts to tender the amount

specified in the service agreement or estimate they were previously provided, and instead, held the

goods hostage until the consumer paid the higher fees.

20. Likewise, Consent Defendants and their agents also allegedly misrepresented or

deceptively represented the timeframe or schedule for pickup, delivery and/or storage of the

consumers’ household goods. In numerous instances, Consent Defendants’ agents allegedly

arrived late to pick up the consumers’ goods or delivered the consumers’ goods well beyond

(sometimes many weeks beyond) the promised delivery dates, with insufficient notice and little or

no recompense provided to the consumer.

21. Consent Defendants allegedly directly participated in, controlled, and had the

authority to control the Enterprise’s deceptive acts and practices, and had actual or constructive

knowledge of the Enterprise’s deceptive acts and practices.

22. Numerous consumers in the State of Florida and elsewhere were allegedly injured

by the unfair, deceptive and unconscionable practices of the Consent Defendants and their agents

in violation of the FDUTPA, and at least 110 consumers filed complaints with the Attorney General

and other agencies during the relevant time period in this case.

23. During the relevant time period, Consent Defendants received revenues totaling

between about $78,000 to $131,000 from complaining consumers who may have purchased

Moving Services based on Defendants’ allegedly deceptive acts and practices.

24. Consent Defendant Vaknin stipulates that Consent Defendants did not and will not

conceal, transfer or convey assets of any type (whether monetary, personal property, real property

or otherwise) to any other third person or entity as a means to influence the terms of this Judgment,



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avoid enforcement of this Judgment, or avoid payment of any amounts due in this matter or

pursuant to this Judgment.

III. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS/APPLICABLE LAW

25. The purpose of the FDUTPA is to “protect the consuming public and legitimate

business enterprises from those who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable,

deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Section 501.202(2),

Florida Statutes.

26. Additionally, any violation of the Florida Moving Act is a per se violation of the

FDUTPA pursuant to Section 501.203(3), Florida Statutes, which establishes that a violation of

the FDUTPA may be based upon, among other things, “any law, statute, rule, regulation, or

ordinance which proscribes unfair methods of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable

acts or practices.”

27. Pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes, the Attorney General is authorized

to bring: (a) An action to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this part;

and (b) An action to enjoin any person who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise likely to

violate, this part. Further, the Attorney General is entitled to seek equitable relief in the form of

restitution for all consumers who have been injured, in addition to ancillary equitable relief, civil

penalties and attorney’s fees pursuant to Sections 501.207, 501.2075 and 501.2077, Florida

Statutes.

28. “Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate when ‘the defendant’s past conduct

indicates that there is a reasonable likelihood of further violations in the future.’” FTC v. Lalonde,

545 F. App’x 825, 841 (11th Cir. 2013). To that end, “reasonable restrictions upon the future



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activities of any defendant to impede her or him from engaging in or establishing the same type of

endeavor” are permitted by the Act. Section 501.207(3), Florida Statutes.

29. The FDUTPA authorizes equitable relief to consumers. Section 501.207(3), Florida

Statutes. All consumers who paid money in response to a deceptive trade practice are entitled to

their money back, and there is no need for an individualized inquiry into how each consumer

reacted to the practice. See Dorestin v. Hollywood Imports, Inc., 45 So. 3d 819, 831 (Fla. 4th DCA

2010) (citing State, Office of Atty. Gen., Dept of Legal Affairs v. Wyndham Intern., Inc., 869 So.

2d 592, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)).

30. “Among the equitable powers of a court is the power to grant restitution and

disgorgement.” FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir. 1996). In an equitable

enforcement action like this one, the defendants are liable to the extent of their ill-gotten gains.

See FTC v. IAB Marketing Associates, LP, 972 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2013). The

proper measure of ill-gotten gains in such cases is the amount of net revenue (gross receipts minus

refunds), rather than the amount of profit (net revenues minus expenses). See FTC v. Washington

Data Resources, Inc., 704 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654

F.3d 359, 375 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Direct Mkg. Concepts Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 14–16 (1st Cir. 2010);

FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 536 (7th Cir. 1997).

31. The FDUTPA provides that any person, firm, corporation, association, or entity, or

any agent or employee of the foregoing, who is willfully using, or has willfully used, a method,

act, or practice declared unlawful under the FDUTPA is liable for a civil penalty. Section 501.2075,

Florida Statutes. Willful violations occur when the person knew or should have known that his or

her conduct was unfair, deceptive or prohibited by rule. See id.



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32. Civil penalties in the amount of up to Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) per

violation may be assessed against any person who has willfully engaged in an unfair or deceptive

act or practice, pursuant to Section 501.2075, Florida Statutes; and up to Fifteen Thousand Dollars

($15,000), against any person willfully using an act or practice that violates the FDUTPA which

victimizes a senior citizen, or a person who has a disability, or is directed at a military

servicemember or the spouse or dependent child of a military servicemember, pursuant to Section

501.2077, Florida Statutes. Each instance in which a deceptive representation is disseminated

constitutes a violation. See U.S. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 662 F.2d 955, 966 (3d Cir. 1981).

33. The Court may additionally assess civil penalties against Consent Defendants,

jointly and severally, in amount provided for under Chapter 149 of the I.T.C. and the Civil Penalties

Inflation Adjustment Improvements Act of 2015 (Appendix B to 49 C.F.R. Part 386), further

described below.

34. Section 501.2105, Florida Statutes, provides that the prevailing party may recover

fees and costs from the non-prevailing party in certain circumstances. See Humane Society of

Broward Cty. v. Fla. Humane Soc’y, 951 So. 2d 966, 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Smith v. Bilgin,

534 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “If civil penalties are assessed in any litigation, the

enforcing authority is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Section 501.2075, Florida

Statutes.

IV. ORDER

A. INJUNCTIVE TERMS

35. The Court hereby permanently ENJOINS the Consent Defendants and any person

or entity acting on their behalf, as well as those persons in active concert or participation with them

who receive actual notice of this Judgment, directly or indirectly, from:



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a. Violating the provisions of the FDUTPA by making false or misleading representations to consumers in the conduct of any trade or commerce, including but not limited to, in connection with advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, selling or distributing any goods or services, including misrepresenting:

i. any material aspect of the nature or terms of any refund or cancellation, including the likelihood of a consumer obtaining a full or partial refund, or the circumstances in which a full or partial refund will be granted to the consumer;

ii. the qualifications, training, experience, expertise or skill level of any employees or agents used by, or on behalf of, Consent Defendants to perform household goods moving services on behalf of a consumer;

iii. the price, size, nature, extent, qualities, or characteristics of accessorial or moving services offered;

iv. the structure, size, or operating history of any moving companies used by, or on behalf of, Consent Defendants;

v. the timeframe or schedule for delivery or storage of household goods, except where delay results from circumstances beyond Consent Defendants’ control;

vi. that reviews of any product, service, plan, or program are independent reviews reflecting the views of ordinary consumers;

vii. that any person providing a testimonial has purchased, received, or used the product, service, plan, or program;

viii. that the experience represented in a testimonial of the product, service, plan, or program represents the person’s actual experience resulting from the use of the product, service, plan, or program under the circumstances depicted in the advertisement; and

ix. any other fact material to consumers concerning the good or service, such as: the total costs; any material restrictions, limitations, or conditions; or any material aspect of its performance, efficacy, nature, or central characteristics.

b. Violating the provisions of the FDUTPA by engaging in unfair acts and practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, including but not limited to, in connection with



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advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, selling or distributing any Moving Services, including:

i. Providing artificially low quotes or written estimates for Moving Services to a consumer and thereafter substantially increasing the price quoted or estimated to the consumer for the Moving Services prior to the move;

ii. Increasing the amount of a previously issued written estimate for Moving Services within three (3) business days before the consumer’s scheduled move (except where the Defendants can affirmatively demonstrate that the services previously requested and agreed to by the consumer have materially changed, including, volume of goods based on new or additional items, specialty items, accessorial services, undisclosed stairs, long carries, or need for shuttle service); and

iii. Refusing to return the deposit(s) paid by a consumer who elects to timely cancel their move due to an increase in the amount quoted for moving services made less than five (5) business days prior to the scheduled move. Consumers shall be provided a period of 24 hours after any revision of an estimate to cancel their move without penalty;

c. Committing any acts or practices that constitute a per se violation of the FDUTPA based upon any violation of the Florida Moving Act, Chapter 507, Sections 507.01-507.13, Florida Statutes;

d. Misrepresenting or failing to clearly and conspicuously disclose to the consumer that any portion of the Moving Serves provided may be performed by a third-party contractor;

e. Misrepresenting, misleading or failing to disclose upon any inquiry to the consumer that their household goods may be unloaded prior to delivery and placed into a storage until the shipment can be combined with one or more shipments from other consumers who are moving to the same geographic region or vicinity as the consumer;

f. Failing to appropriately train and/or supervise employees or agents who will enter a consumer’s home in connection with the providing of any Moving Services;

g. Failing to conduct reasonable background checks of all other representatives, employees and other agents who regularly and directly are involved in providing household moving services for consumers; and



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h. Failing to implement and follow within thirty (30) days of entry of this Judgment reasonable procedures designed to ensure that no person who is presently under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, or (within five years preceding the date of a household move) was convicted of a felony, is permitted to enter the residence of any consumer, or otherwise have access to a consumer's household goods, in connection with any Moving Services being offered or provided by Consent Defendants to consumers.

B. EQUITABLE MONETARY RELIEF

36. Judgment is hereby entered against Consent Defendants for equitable restitution in

the total amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and No Cents

($131,000.00) (“Restitution Amount”), plus interest as prescribed under section 55.03 Florida

Statutes, for which let execution issue forthwith. The Restitution Amount shall be paid by wire

transfer, certified funds or cashier’s checks, to the Department of Legal Affairs, c/o Howard S.

Dargan, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Consumer Protection

Division, 1515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 900, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401. Upon receipt, the

check shall be deposited into the Department of Legal Affairs Escrow Fund, and in accordance

with Section 501.2101(1), Florida Statutes, the Restitution Amount shall be used for distribution

to consumers according to the sole business judgment of the Attorney General.

37. In the event actual restitution for future complainants exceeds the Restitution

Amount, then the Restitution Amount will be distributed pro-rata to the complainants determined

by the Attorney General to be eligible for restitution. In no event shall any individual consumer

receive more than the amount they are actually owed. If any restitution monies remain after the

distribution of the Restitution Amount, the Attorney General will deposit the remaining monies

into the Department of Legal Affairs Revolving Trust Fund, and it shall be used to defray the costs

of restitution distribution and any attorney’s fees and costs incurred in enforcing this Judgment, or



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as fees and costs associated with ongoing and future enforcements initiatives pursuant to the

FDUTPA.

38. The Attorney General agrees that the Restitution Amount entered against Consent

Defendants is subject to the Partial Suspension of Full Judgment Amounts provisions set forth

below.

C. CIVIL PENALTIES

39. The Consent Defendants understand and agree that a civil penalty may be imposed

under both State law (FDUTPA) and Federal law (I.T.C. and FMCSA Regulations). The Attorney

General agrees that any such penalties that may be entered against Consent Defendants are subject

to the Suspension of Full Judgment Amounts provisions below.

State Penalties Under the FDUTPA

40. In this case, at least 23 transactions of unfair or deceptive conduct occurred in which

the Consent Defendants or their representatives willfully violated the FDUTPA by making false

representations directly to consumers including transactions involving senior citizens, persons with

a disability, military servicemembers, or the spouses or dependent children of military

servicemembers. Given the blatant nature of the violations and the egregiousness of the consumer

harm, the appropriate penalty is $10,000 per violation generally; and $15,000 per violation

involving senior citizens, persons with a disability, military servicemembers, and the spouses or

dependent children of military servicemembers, for a total penalty of TWO HUNDRED

NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS and No Cents ($295,000.00). In light of the entry of

this Judgment, the Attorney General has agreed to suspend civil penalties as to Defendant Vaknin

in the amount of $100,000.00.



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41. Judgment is entered against the Corporate Defendants, jointly and severally, for

civil penalties pursuant to Sections 501.2075 and 501.2077, Florida Statutes, in the amount of

TWO HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS and No Cents ($295,000.00)

(“State Penalty”), plus interest as prescribed under Section 55.03, Florida Statutes, for which let

execution issue forthwith. The State Penalty shall be paid via wire transfer, cashier’s check or

other certified funds, with $100,000 payable to Department of Legal Affairs, to be deposited in

the Department of Legal Affairs General Revenue Fund, and $195,000 payable to the Department

of Legal Affairs, to be deposited in the Department of Legal Affairs Revolving Trust Fund, or as

otherwise directed by the Attorney General.

42. Judgment is hereby entered against Consent Defendant Vaknin, jointly and

severally with the Corporate Defendants, for civil penalties pursuant to Sections 501.2075 and

501.2077, Florida Statutes, in the amount of ONE HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND

DOLLARS and No Cents ($195,000.00) (“Vaknin Penalty”), plus interest as prescribed under

Section 55.03, Florida Statutes, for which let execution issue forthwith. The Vaknin Penalty shall

be paid via wire transfer, cashier’s check or other certified funds totaling $195,000 payable to the

Department of Legal Affairs, to be deposited in the Department of Legal Affairs Revolving Trust

Fund, or as otherwise directed by the Attorney General.

Federal Penalties Under I.T.C. and Regulations

43. The Corporate Defendants violated the following provisions of the I.T.C. and/or

FMCSA Regulations and therefore are liable for civil penalties in the amounts provided for under

Chapter 149 of the I.T.C. and the Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of

2015 (Appendix B to 49 C.F.R. Part 386), as follows:

a. Violation of Section 49 C.F.R. §375.207 (advertising violation) with an inflation adjusted minimum penalty of $1,572 per violation;



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b. Violation of Title 49 U.S.C. §14104(b) and C.F.R. Part 375 (§375.401) (failure to

provide proper written estimates) with an inflation adjusted minimum penalty of $1,572 per violation;

c. Violation of Title 49 U.S.C. §13707(b)(3) and C.F.R. Part 375 (§§375.403(7) and

375.703(a)) (failure to relinquish goods on Binding Estimate) with an inflation adjusted minimum penalty of $15,727 per violation;

d. Violation of Title 49 C.F.R. Part 375 (§§375.603 and 375.605) (failure to pick

up/tender shipment and provide notification) with an inflation adjusted minimum penalty of $1,572 per violation; and

for a total Federal Penalty of FIFTY-THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE

DOLLARS and No Cents ($53,455.00).

44. Judgment is hereby entered against Corporate Defendants, jointly and severally, for

civil penalties pursuant to the above-referenced provisions of the I.T.C. and FMCSA Regulations,

in the amount of FIFTY-THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE DOLLARS

and No Cents ($53,455.00) (“Federal Penalty”), for which let execution issue forthwith. The

Federal Penalty shall be paid via wire transfer, cashier’s check or other certified funds as directed

by the Attorney General.

45. The Consent Defendants agree that the State Penalty and Federal Penalty imposed

against the Corporate Defendants in connection with this case (collectively referred to as the

“Corporate Penalty Amount”) total THREE HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR

HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE DOLLARS and No Cents ($348,455.00), and that the Vaknin Penalty

Amount totals ONE HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS and No Cents

($195,000.00).

46. The Consent Defendants agree that neither the Corporate Penalty Amount nor the

Vaknin Penalty Amount is subject to discharge under the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

section 523(a)(7). Consent Defendants further agree not to object to or otherwise dispute any claim



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for non-dischargeability of the Corporate Penalty Amount or the Vaknin Penalty Amount in any

voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. In any bankruptcy proceeding relating to the

non-dischargeability of these penalty amounts, the Consent Defendants stipulate that the

allegations of the Amended Complaint and the findings of this Court may be taken as true and

correct without further proof.

47. Further, the Consent Defendants agree that the facts alleged in the Amended

Complaint establish all elements necessary to find the Corporate Penalty Amount and Vaknin

Penalty Amount are not subject to discharge pursuant to Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy

Code, and this Judgment will have collateral estoppel effect for such purposes.

48. The Attorney General agrees that the Corporate Penalty Amount and the Vaknin

Penalty Amount entered against Consent Defendants are subject to the Suspension of Full

Judgment Amounts provisions below.

D. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

49. The parties stipulate and agree that the Attorney General is entitled to payment of

its attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND

DOLLARS and No Cents ($250,000.00). In light of the entry of this Judgment, the Attorney

General has agreed to suspend imposition of attorney’s fees and cost as to Defendant Vaknin only.

50. Judgment is hereby entered against the Corporate Defendants, jointly and severally,

for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND

DOLLARS and No Cents ($250,000.00) (“Corporate Fees Amount”), plus interest as prescribed

under section 55.03, Florida Statutes, for which let execution issue forthwith. The Corporate Fees

Amount shall be paid via wire transfer, cashier’s check or other certified funds to Department of

Legal Affairs, to be deposited in the Department of Legal Affairs Revolving Trust Fund or as

otherwise directed by the Attorney General.



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E. PARTIAL SUSPENSION OF FULL JUDGMENT AMOUNTS

51. Together, the total of the stipulated Restitution, Corporate Penalty, and Corporate

Fees Amounts is SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY-NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED

FIFTY-FIVE DOLLARS and No Cents ($729,455) (the “Corporate Full Judgment Amount”).

Together, the total of the stipulated Restitution and Vaknin Penalty Amount is THREE

HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS and No Cents ($326,000) (“Vaknin

Full Judgment Amount”).

52. Due to the Corporate Defendants’ and Consent Defendant Vaknin’s respective

inability to pay the Corporate Full Judgment Amount and the Vaknin Full Judgment Amount, as

demonstrated by their sworn financial affidavits submitted under oath, the Attorney General and

Consent Defendants agree and stipulate that upon the receipt of SEVENTY-EIGHT

THOUSAND DOLLARS and No Cents ($78,000.00) (the “Suspension Amount”) from the

Consent Defendants for consumer restitution, the Attorney General shall suspend payment of the

Corporate Full Judgment Amount and Vaknin Full Judgment Amount due as to the respective

Consent Defendants.

53. The Attorney General agrees that, in lieu of making a lump sum payment of the

Suspension Amount ($78,000.00), the Consent Defendants may pay the following installments

to the Attorney General: $30,000.00 to be paid within ten days of entry of this Judgment by the

Consent Defendants; and $2,000.00 to be paid on the first day of each month thereafter for twenty-

four (24) consecutive months. The Attorney General agrees that, upon a reasonable request, the

Consent Defendants may have an additional five (5)-day grace period for making a required

monthly payment.



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54. The Attorney General’s agreement to partially suspend payment of the Corporate

Full Judgment Amount and the Vaknin Full Judgment Amount is expressly premised upon the

respective Consent Defendants’ inability to pay those respective Full Judgment Amounts, and

upon the Consent Defendants’: (a) payment of the Suspension Amount as provided in paragraphs

52 and 53, above; (b) future compliance with this Judgment’s Injunctive Terms and all other non-

monetary terms; (c) stipulation, and compliance with the stipulation, that Consent Defendants did

not and will not conceal, transfer or convey assets of any type (whether monetary, personal

property, real property or otherwise) to any other third person or entity as a means to influence the

terms of this Judgment, avoid enforcement of this Judgment, or avoid payment of any amounts

due in this matter or pursuant to this Judgment; and (d) the truthfulness, accuracy, and

completeness of Consent Defendants’ sworn financial statements and supporting documents

submitted to the Attorney General on January 30, 2020, and supplemented on March 10, 2020, and

signed under penalty of perjury. These sworn financial statements, stipulations, and

representations of Consent Defendants include material information upon which the Attorney

General relied in negotiating and agreeing to this Judgment. If the Attorney General has a

reasonable basis to believe that Consent Defendants have failed to comply with this Judgment, or

have failed to disclose any material asset, misstated the value of any material asset, or made any

other material misstatement or omission in any representation to the Attorney General, the

Attorney General may file an appropriate motion with the Court to reinstate the Corporate Full

Judgment Amount and/or Vaknin Full Judgment Amount.

55. In the event the Corporate Full Judgment Amount or Vaknin Full Judgment

Amount is reinstated as to a Consent Defendant, the Attorney General shall credit toward the

Corporate Full Judgment Amount and the Vaknin Full Judgment Amount any prior payments



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received from any of the Consent Defendants. The Attorney General shall apply any payments

received from any Consent Defendant toward the Corporate Full Judgment Amount and the

Vaknin Full Judgment Amount in the following order: First, to payment of the stipulated

Restitution Amount; Second, to payment of the Fees Amount; Third, to payment of any applicable

State Penalty; and Fourth, to payment of the Federal Penalty.

56. In the event the Corporate Full Judgment Amount or Vaknin Full Judgment

Amount is reinstated, Consent Defendants shall complete under oath Florida Rule of Civil

Procedure Form 1.977 (Fact Information Sheet), and an IRS Form 4506 or 4506t for each year

requested by the Attorney General, including all required attachments, and serve them on the

Attorney General, within 45 days from the Effective Date, unless the Judgment is satisfied or post-

judgment discovery is stayed.

57. Upon full payment of the Suspension Amount as set forth in paragraphs 52 and 53,

above, the Attorney General agrees to file a Satisfaction of Judgment discharging the Suspension

Amount as to the Consent Defendants. Thereafter, upon Defendant Vaknin’s continued

compliance with the terms of this Judgment for a period of three (3) additional years, the Attorney

General agrees to file a Satisfaction of Judgment discharging the Vaknin Full Judgment Amount.

F. FUTURE VIOLATIONS

58. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, upon the express agreement of the parties, that any

failure to comply with the terms and conditions of this Judgment by any Consent Defendant, as

determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is prima facie evidence of a FDUTPA violation.

In addition, any failure to comply with the terms and conditions of this Judgment by any Consent

Defendant, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, will subject that Consent Defendant

to a modified consent final judgment in the amount of the Corporate Full Judgment Amount or the



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Vaknin Full Judgment Amount, as applicable, and any and all additional civil penalties and

sanctions authorized by law, including attorney’s fees and costs incurred in enforcing this

Judgment. Any sanction or payment provided by this Judgment does not preclude the Attorney

General from pursuing any other action, relief, or sanction available to the Attorney General for

any act which, independent of this Judgment, would constitute a violation of the laws of Florida.

G. COMPLIANCE MONITORING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

59. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that beginning from the Effective Date of this

Judgment, all of the Consent Defendants’ records must be retained for a minimum of three (3)

years. The Consent Defendants shall maintain and make available to the Attorney General’s

representative, upon any reasonable written request, all books, records and other documents, except

privileged documents, in the format in which they exist, which reflect the implementation of the

terms of this Judgment and compliance with its terms. Any such records requested by the Attorney

General shall be made available for inspection within ten (10) business days of the Consent

Defendant’s receipt of the request. The Consent Defendants shall honor any request from the

Attorney General to make such records available without legal process.

60. For a period of two years, the Consent Defendants shall submit to the Attorney

General upon any reasonable request an affidavit attesting to their compliance with the injunctive

provisions in this Judgment.

61. For a period of two (2) years from the Effective Date, the Consent Defendants shall

provide the Attorney General the following information within ten (10) days of the following:

a. Any changes in a Consent Defendant’s residence, mailing address, and telephone number;

b. Any changes in a Consent Defendant’s employment status (including self-employment), and any change in a Consent Defendant’s ownership in any business entity, including the name and address of each business that the Consent Defendant



24

is affiliated with, employed by, creates or forms, or performs services for; a detailed description of the nature of the business; and a detailed description of Consent Defendant’s duties and responsibilities in connection with the business or employment; and

c. Any changes in a Consent Defendant’s name or use of any aliases or fictitious names.

62. While any portion of the stipulated Restitution, Penalty and/or Fees Amount is

outstanding, and for 91 days after making any payment, the Consent Defendants shall notify the

Attorney General of the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a Consent Defendant within fifteen (15)

days of filing.

63. For two (2) years from the Effective Date, upon any reasonable written request by

the Attorney General, the Consent Defendants shall:

a. Designate at least one telephone number and email, physical, and postal address as points of contact, which the Attorney General may use to communicate with Consent Defendants;

b. Identify all businesses the Consent Defendants own, or directly or indirectly

control, by all of their names, telephone numbers, and physical, postal, email, and Internet addresses;

c. Describe the activities of each such business, including the products and services offered, and the means of advertising, marketing, and sales;

d. Describe in detail the Consent Defendant’s current employment, whether as an employee, independent contractor, owner, manager, consultant or partner, and describe the nature of such employment including Consent Defendant’s title, role, responsibilities, participation, authority, control, and ownership

64. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Attorney General is authorized to monitor

the Consent Defendants’ compliance with this Judgment, without further leave of the Court, by all

lawful means, including but not limited to the use of representatives posing as consumers to the



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Consent Defendants, any of the Consent Defendants’ employees, or any other entity managed or

controlled in whole or in part by the Consent Defendants, without the necessity of identification or

prior notice.

65. Consent Defendants stipulate that the Attorney General, in connection with efforts

to enforce this Judgment, may execute post-judgment third-party discovery in any subsequent

proceeding to enforce this Judgment.

66. The Consent Defendants shall not effect any change in the form of doing business

or the organizational identity of any of the existing business entities or create any new business

entities as a method of avoiding the obligations and terms and conditions set forth in this Judgment.

67. While any portion of the stipulated Restitution, Penalty and/or Fees Amount is

outstanding, the Attorney General is explicitly authorized to obtain credit reports from the

consumer reporting agencies (i.e., EXPERIAN, EQUIFAX and TRANSUNION, including

banking information from Microbilt or other asset searching entities) concerning Consent

Defendants and to share this authorization with any entity that may require it, pursuant to Consent

Defendant’s submission of an executed Credit Authorization and Release Form prior to or upon

execution of this Judgment. Upon written request from a representative of the Attorney General,

any consumer reporting agency must furnish consumer reports concerning Consent Defendant

pursuant to section 604(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1). This

authorization shall remain in effect until such time that the monetary terms of this Judgment are

satisfied.

H. EFFECTIVE DATE

68. The “Effective Date” of this Judgment is the date upon which the Judgment is

entered by the Court.



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I. GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

69. Acceptance by the Attorney General shall be established by the signature of the

Deputy Attorney General.

70. The receipt by the Attorney General of any monies pursuant to the Judgment does

not constitute acceptance by the Attorney General, and any monies received shall be returned to

Consent Defendants if this Judgment is not accepted and fully executed by the Attorney General.

71. It is further agreed that facsimile copies of signatures and notary seals may be

accepted as originals for the purposes of establishing the existence of this agreement, and this

Judgment may be executed in counterparts the compilation of which shall constitute the full and

final agreement.

72. Nothing herein constitutes approval by the Attorney General of any person or

corporation’s past or future business practices. The Consent Defendants shall not make any

representation contrary to this paragraph.

73. Nothing herein shall be construed as a waiver of any private rights, causes of action,

or remedies of any private person, business, corporation, government or legal entity against the

Consent Defendants. Similarly, nothing contained herein shall waive the right of the Consent

Defendants to assert any lawful defenses in response to a claim of a consumer. Any and all findings

contained herein are solely for the purposes of this Judgment, and shall not be binding against

Consent Defendants for the purpose of establishing liability in any action asserted by any private

person, business, corporation, government or legal entity against Consent Defendants, except in

any bankruptcy proceeding relating to the discharge or dischargeability of any monetary award in

this Judgment as set forth above.



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74. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Judgment, nothing herein shall be

construed to impair, compromise or affect any right of any government agency other than the

Attorney General except as expressly limited herein.

75. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Attorney General may institute an action or

proceeding to enforce the terms and provisions of this Judgment or take action based on future

conduct by the Consent Defendants, or conduct relating to matters not released by this Judgment.

The fact that such conduct was not expressly prohibited by the terms of this Judgment shall not be

a defense to any such enforcement action.

76. Consent Defendants shall release and forever discharge the Office of the Attorney

General (including any of its past, present or future administrators, employees, officers, attorneys,

agents, representatives, officials acting in their official capacities, agencies, departments,

commissions, and divisions) from any and all manner of civil claims, demands, actions, suits and

causes of action, damages whenever incurred, liabilities of any nature whatsoever, whether known

or unknown, accrued or unaccrued, legal, equitable or statutory, arising out of or in any way related

to, in whole or in part, to the subject matter investigated and the factual matters alleged in the

Complaint.

77. Consent Defendants waive all rights to appeal or otherwise challenge or contest the

validity of this Judgment.

78. Nothing herein relieves the Consent Defendants of their continuing duty to comply

with applicable laws of the State of Florida nor constitutes authorization by the Attorney General

for the Consent Defendants to engage in acts and practices prohibited by such laws.

79. The Consent Defendants expressly acknowledge that they have obtained or had the

opportunity to obtain the advice and counsel of an independent attorney of their choosing to assist



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in the negotiation and preparation of this Judgment. The Consent Defendants have read this

Judgment, are aware of its terms and have voluntarily agreed to and signed this Judgment. Further,

Consent Defendants acknowledge that to the extent they have waived any rights or defenses by

entry into this Judgment, such waiver was made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the

ramifications of such waiver.

80. Further, the parties acknowledge that this Judgment constitutes the final, complete,

and exclusive statement of the parties’ agreement on the matters contained in this Judgment, and

it supersedes all previous negotiations and agreements. Other than any representation expressly

stated in this Judgment, the parties have not made any promises, representations or warranties to

each other, and neither party’s decision to enter this Judgment is based upon any statements by the

other party outside of those reflected in this Judgment.

81. The Consent Defendants state that no promises of any kind or nature whatsoever,

other than the written terms of this Judgment, were made to induce the Consent Defendants into

entering this Judgment.

82. If any term of this Judgment is to any extent unenforceable, invalid, or illegal, such

term shall be excluded to the extent of such invalidity or unenforceability; all other terms hereof

shall remain in full force and effect; and, to the extent permitted and possible, the invalid or

unenforceable term shall be deemed replaced by a term that is valid and enforceable and that comes

closest to expressing the intention of such invalid or unenforceable term.

83. This Judgment shall be governed by laws of the State of Florida.

84. The Consent Defendants and the Attorney General agree that any post-judgment

deposition of Consent Defendants that may be held shall be had in Broward County, Florida, unless

the Parties agree otherwise.



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85. This document is signed in anticipation of this Judgment being submitted to the

Court for approval, without necessity of hearing, which is hereby WAIVED by all parties. The

signatures below1 indicate the parties’ consent and agreement to this Judgment.

J. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION

86. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court retains jurisdiction of this case to

enforce the terms of this Judgment and enter any further Orders as may be necessary to ensure

compliance with this Judgment, including by issuing additional injunctive relief. Accordingly, this

Court shall enter any further orders as may be necessary to ensure compliance with this Judgment,

including civil and/or criminal contempt proceedings.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 15th day of April, 2020.

_______________________________ CECILIA M. ALTONAGA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE cc: counsel of record

1 This Order incorporates the parties’ executed Consent Final Judgment . . . [ECF No. 100-1] which includes the signatures of the parties. (See id. 30–34).


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