united nations conference on trade and …• on-line help function and handbook available •...
TRANSCRIPT
To download ATPSM and for more info:http://192.91.247.38/tab/ATPSMdwnlds.asp
ARTNeT Capacity Building Workshop on Trade Research
UN ESCAP
ATPSMAgricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model
Ralf PetersUNCTAD
United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUnited Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Bangkok, March 2005
Agenda
• Introduction to ATPSM: General Overview about the Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model ATPSM
• Details of ATPSM: Technical description of ATPSM, Assumptions, Equations and Database
• Operating the ATPSM: Installation, Setting up Scenarios, Reading and Interpreting the Results
• Application of ATPSM: Analysing WTO negotiations on agriculture
• Hands-on Training of ATPSM: Participants will use the model and set up their own scenarios
• Outlook: Expanding the database and technical limitations of ATPSM
General Overview: What is ATPSM?
• Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model• Computable international trade model• Analyse agricultural trade policy issues• Quantify economic effects
- unilateral changes- multilateral changes
• Comprehensive database
ATPSM developed by UNCTAD* and FAO
• Easy to use for negotiators and researchers• Graphical user interface• On-line help function and
handbook available• Report writer - Export to Excel
* UNCTAD acknowledges funding from the UK DFID
Coverage of ATPSM
• 175 countries• EU-15 one region• Detailed trade policy data for
141 countries• 35 agricultural commodities
Asian Countries in ATPSM•Japan
•Kazakhstan
•Korea DPR
•Korea Rep.
•Laos
•Macao
•Malaysia
•Maldives
•Malta
•Mauritania
•Mauritius
•Mongolia
•Myanmar
•Nepal
•Neth. Antilles
•New Zealand
•Pakistan
•Panama
•Philippines
•Sao Tome
•Seychelles
•Solomon Islands
•Sri Lanka
•St. Lucia
•St. Vincent
•Suriname•Taiwan•Tajikistan•Thailand•Turkmenistan•Uzbekistan•Vanuatu•Viet Nam
• Australia• Bahamas• Bangladesh• Barbados• Belize• Brunei• Cambodia• Cape Verde• China• Comoros• Fiji• French
Polynesia• Guyana• Hong Kong• India• Indonesia
ATPSM Commodity Aggregation (1)
• Maize • Sorghum • Barley• Rice• Sugar, raw• Sugar, refined• Oilseeds, temp.• Oilseeds, trop.• Vegetable oils• Pulses• Roots, tubers
• Livestock• Bovine meat• Sheepmeat• Pigmeat• Poultry• Milk, fresh• Milk, conc. • Butter • Cheese• Wheat
ATPSM Commodity Aggregation (2)
• Tomatoes • Non-tropical fruits• Citrus fruits• Bananas• Other tropical fruits• Coffee green • Coffee processed• Cocoa beans
• Cocoa, processed• Tea• Tobacco leaves• Tobacco, processed• Cotton linters• Hides & Skines
Features of ATPSM (1): Trade Policies Specified
• Global import quota• Bound in-quota tariff rates• Bound out-of-quota tariff rates• Distribution of quota rents• Applied tariff rates
Two tier tariffstructure
Features of ATPSM (2):Trade Policies Specified
• Export subsidies• Domestic support• Two-way trade
Trade Policy Questions
• Impact of reductions in bound out-of-quota tariff rates in all developed countries on- trade flows- export revenues - tariff revenues
• Impact of reductions in export subsidies on- world market prices - net food importers
• Impact of possible WTO agreements on developing countries
More questions
• How long to run the model?• Can we change the data?• Can we change the equations?• Do we need expensive software?• Who updates the model?
Operating the ATPSM
Limitations
• Data quality• Allocation of quota rents• Bilateral quotas• Preferential tariffs• Fill rates?
Details of ATPSM
What does it cost?
• Available free on CDATPSM Project CoordinatorUNCTAD / DITCPalais des NationsCH-1211 Geneva
• Available from UNCTAD websitewww.unctad.org/tab
• Support [email protected]
Details of ATPSM
Outline• Tariff rate quotas and quota rents• Two-way trade• Equations and assumptions• Domestic support• Database
ImportsM
PW
Price
t1
Inquota tariff revenue
Quota rent Over quota tariff
revenue
Quota rents
PD
t2
Q
Quota rents: Assumptions
• Quotas are always filled• Total rents add up to $10 billion• Default assumption: Producers in exporting
countries receive all quota rents if allocationis on historical bases
• No supply response if quotas are changed, e.g. through change of in-quota tariffs
Two-way trade: Volume determination
• Demand D is determined by the demand elasticity and cross-price demand elasticities
• Supply S is determined by the supply elasticity and cross-price supply elasticities
• Two versions to determine imports M and exports X : “Standard” and “Armington”
• Global market clearing (change of imports = change of exports)
M
PW
Price
t1 Tariff revenue
Exports=f(S)
Two-way trade
PD
Domestic Supply
Demand
M=D-S+X
Total supply
QuantityS D
Determination of Imports and Exports• “Standard”: Percentage change of exports
equals percentage change of supply / production• Imports are the residual (in each country:
production+imports=consumption+exports)• “Armington”: Consumers first decide how much
to consume and in a second step how much to buy from abroad and from domestic producers
• Exports are the residual
m d
d m
PMD M P
σαα⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠
Model equations “Standard”
;1ˆ1ˆˆ)11
,,,,,,, ∑≠=
∧∧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎠⎞
⎜⎝⎛ ++=
J
jij
rjcjwrjiriciwriiri tPtPD ηη
;1ˆ1ˆˆ)21
,,,,,,, ∑≠=
∧∧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+++⎥
⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛++=
J
jij
rjsjwrjirisiwriiri tPtPS εε
;ˆ)3 ,,, ririri SXX =∆
;ˆˆ)4 ,,,,,, riririririri XSSDDM ∆+−=∆
;0)()51
=∆−∆∑=
N
nnn MX
Model equations “Armington”
, , , ,
,
ˆ4) , where ;1 1 1
new init new m di r i r i r i r y
new init new d m y i r
A A A PM D D D AA A A P
σ
αα
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∆ = − − =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
;1ˆ1ˆˆ)11
,,,,,,, ∑≠=
∧∧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎠⎞
⎜⎝⎛ ++=
J
jij
rjcjwrjiriciwriiri tPtPD ηη
;1ˆ1ˆˆ)21
,,,,,,, ∑≠=
∧∧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+++⎥
⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛++=
J
jij
rjsjwrjirisiwriiri tPtPS εε
, , , , , ,ˆˆ3) ;i r i r i r i r i r i rX M D D S S∆ = ∆ − +
;0)()51
=∆−∆∑=
N
nnn MX
Two-way trade: Price determination• Heterogeneous products• Domestic price is weighted average of import
and export prices:td= (M tm +X tx )/(M+X)
• Consumer price is weighted average of import and domestic prices:tc= (M tm +S td )/D
• Producer price is weighted average of import and domestic prices plus domestic support:ts = (Xtx +Sdtd )/S + td
Domestic support
• What are the production effects of changes in domestic support?
• Decoupling of domestic support• Complex issue: method of administration,
effects of direct payments, …• Assumption here: AMS support is included
(most of the domestic support is decoupled)
Welfare
• Consumer surplus• Producer surplus (inc. quota rent)• Net government revenue
- Tariff revenue- Domestic support expenditure- Export subsidy expenditure- Quota rent
M
PW
Price
t1 Tariff revenue
Welfare
PD
Supply
Demand
Dead weight losses
Consumer surplus
Producer surplus
W=CS+PS+TR(-DS-ES)
QuantityS D
Data Sources
• Applied tariffs: UNCTAD TRAINS• Production, elasticities, prices: FAO• Trade flows: UN Comtrade• Bound tariff rates, export subsidies: WTO • Bound tariff rates, quotas, within-quota tarrifs: AMAD
(Agricultural Market Access Database)
• Domestic support: Country notifications to WTO
Operating the ATPSM• Installation
- A self installing .exe-file is downloadable- Manual installation possible
• Programme comes with documentation • Graphical user interface• Running a scenario• Change the data• Enlarge the possibilities
- The equations- Read data from outside
Installing ATPSM
• Computer requirement– PC with + 64MB RAM– Any operating system– Free disk space of at least 40MB
• Program installs itself (Administrator rights necessary!)
• Introduction available on how to install it manually
Documentation andgraphical user interface
• Documents delivered with the programme:- Introduction on the ATPSM (Installation, interface)- Handbook on ATPSM (Economic backgroud)- 4 Papers about simulating agriculture policy reformswith ATPSM
• A context-specific online help is available• Running a scenario using the menue driven interface
Change the Data
• Data file:C: Program Files / UNCTAD / ATPSM / atpsm.mdb
• Which data are in which sub-file is documented in theHandbook, Part E
• Open atpsm.mdb with MS Access and change the data while ATPSM is closed
• Next ATPSM session uses the new data
Likely Data Changes
• Policies • Volumes• Prices• Elasticities• Updates from UNCTAD• Model recalibrates itself (so M=X, S=D)
Enlarge the possibilities• Problem: Negotiators are faster than model development• Harbinson proposal: Reduction depends on initial tariff rates
(bands)• Cancun proposal: Combination of linear cut and Swiss formula• Select different types of formulas under
“Formula”• Users can specify their own formulas using parameters P1, P2,
P3 which will be taken from the interface• Write formula with any text editor in
C: Program Files / UNCTAD / ATPSM / script / formulaclass.ods
Application of ATPSM: Analysing WTO
negotiations on agriculture
Ralf Peters and David VanzettiUnited Nations
Conference on Trade and Development
United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUnited Nations Conference on Trade and Development
State of Play: Doha Negotiations on Agriculture
… have been a difficult & complex process:
Agriculture is a politically sensitive sector in both developed & developing countries.
Countries (developed or developing) have widely divergent views on the optimal speed and/or the extent of agricultural liberalization.
Deadlines to agree on “modalities” were already missed twice (March 2003 and at the Cancun Ministerial Conference, September 2003).
The Framework Agreement brought the negotiation back on track, but the “modalities” are still left for further negotiations.
Three pillars of the Agreement on Agriculture
• Market AccessReduction of tariffs
• Export competitionReduction / elimination of export subsidies
• Domestic SupportCapping and reducing
• (Non-trade issuesFood security, Rural development)
Alliances and interests
EUEU
JapanJapanSwitzerlandSwitzerland
Norway Norway KoreaKorea
Level of ambition
Eliminateexport
subsidies
“Multi-functionality”
Cuts in domestic support
Reduceexport credits
Developing Developing countriescountries
Deg
ree
of sp
ecia
l and
diff
eren
tial t
reat
men
t
USAUSA
Special and differential treatment
Substantial tariff cutsModerate, flexible
tariff cuts andflexible domestic support
Four proposalsEU US
•From bound rate •average cut 36% (24%) •minimum cut 15% (10)%
•From applied rate •Swissformula [max = 25]
AMS reduced to 5% of GVPTotal elimination
AMS cut by 55%Cut by 45%
Cancun (1st rev) Harbinson• From bound rate • 40%: average cut (36%, 15%)• 40%: Swiss 25 • 20%: duty free• DC: Special P.linear cut (24,10)
• From bound rate• average cut 40-
60% (25-40%) • minimum cut 25-
45% (15-30%)• Special products?
AMS cut by 60% (20%)
AMS cut by 60% (20%)
Cut by 80% (70%), eventual elimination
Cut by 80% (70%), eventual elimination
Exp
ort
Subs
idie
sD
omes
ticSu
ppor
tM
arke
tA
cces
s
Comparison of Proposals
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Old Rate (%)
New
Rat
e (%
)
EU Harbinson
USA
Change in world prices Cancun and Harbinson
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
%
Cancun Harbinson
Change in world prices of temperate goods, Harbinson proposal
02468
1012141618
%
Bov
ine
mea
t
Shee
pmea
t
Pigm
eat
Poul
try
Milk
, con
c.
But
ter
Che
ese
Whe
at
Ric
e
Bar
ley
Mai
ze
Sorg
hum
Puls
es
Tom
atoe
s
Roo
ts &
tube
rs
App
les
Citr
us fr
uits
Change in world prices of tropical goods, Harbinson proposal
012345678
%
Ban
anas
Oth
er tr
opic
al fr
uits
Suga
rC
offe
e gr
een
Cof
fee
roas
ted
Cof
fee
extr
acts
Coc
oa b
eans
Coc
oa p
owde
rC
ocoa
but
ter
Cho
cola
teT
eaT
obac
co le
aves
Cig
ars
Cig
aret
tes
Oth
er m
fr to
bacc
o
Oils
eeds
Cot
ton
linte
rsV
eget
able
oils
Change in producer surplusCancun and Harbinson
-25'000-20'000-15'000-10'000
-5'0000
5'00010'00015'00020'000
$m
Develo
ped
Develo
pingLDC
Wor
ldSSA
CancunHarbinson
Change in consumer surplusCancun and Harbinson
-20'000
-10'000
0
10'000
20'000
30'000
40'000
$m
Develo
ped
Develo
pingLDC
Wor
ldSSA
CancunHarbinson
Change in welfare: Cancun and Harbinson
-2'0000
2'0004'0006'0008'000
10'00012'00014'000
$m
Develo
ped
Develo
pingLDC
Wor
ldSSA
CancunHarbinson
Cancun and Harbinson proposal• Average tariff cuts smaller with EC-US formula• Price increase: Cancun scenario 2.2%
Harbinson scenario 3.1%• Higher for temperate products than for tropical
products• Distributional effects:
between countries: exporters gain, importers loseamong different groups: producers gain, consumers lose
Preference Erosion:Quota rents before and after liberalization
in selected SSA countries
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
$m
Mauritius
Zimbabwe
Botswan
aNamibia
Ivory C
oast
South Africa
Cameroon
Swaziland
MalawiCongo
Tanza
nia
InitialFinal
Change in welfare relative to base
-5000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
$m
Welfare World Welfare DC Prod.S. DC
EUCancunHarbinsonUS
Special and differential tratment
Developing countries' benefits
-60-40-20
0204060
1 2 3 4
Level of ambition in developing countries
Producer Surplus
Consumer Surplus
Welfare
Developed countries' benefits
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1 2 3 4
Level of ambition in developing countries
Producer Surplus
Consumer Surplus
Welfare
Developing countries' benefits
-60-40-20
0204060
1 2 3 4
Level of ambition in developed countries
Producer Surplus
Consumer Surplus
Welfare
Developed countries' benefits
-30-20-10
010203040
1 2 3 4
Level of ambition in developed countries
Producer Surplus
Consumer Surplus
Welfare
Developing countries' benefits
-30000-20000
-100000
10000
2000030000
1 2 3 4
Conservative, Cancun, Harbinson, Ambitious
Producer Surplus
Consumer Surplus
Welfare
Developed countries' benefits
-40'000
-20'000
0
20'000
40'000
60'000
1 2 3 4
Conservative, Cancun, Harbinson, Ambitious
Producer Surplus
Consumer Surplus
Welfare
Limitations
• Complex proposals• Based on assumptions• Initial allocation of quota rents• Aggregated to the 4 digit level• Data quality
The graphical user interface
• Title (note version, link to website)
• Scenarios (arbitrary)
• Country groups (user defined, for scenario definition and reporting)
• Commodity groups (user defined, for scenario definition and reporting)
• Results • Help (context specific)
Scenarios
• Load (load previous simulation)
• Save (save current simulation)
• Name (arbitrary)
• Insert (new row)
• Coverage (countries, commodities)
• Parameters (See next slide)
Parameters
• Outquota (outquota bound tariff, on which negotiations are based)
• Inquota (inquota bound tariff)
• Export subsidy (export subsidy equivalent)
• Domestic support (amber box)
• Import quota (imports attracting inquota tariff)
• Swiss cut {t1=t0*a/(t0+a)}
• Applied/bound (option. Generally, use bound)
• Capture rate (share of quota rent to exporters)
Country/Commodity Groups
• User defined• Code (3 letters)
• Name (arbitrary)
• Insert (new group)
• Delete (old group)
• Countries (select/deselect members)
• Commodities (select/deselect members)
Results (1)
• Scenario (name)• Description (as previously defined)• Report (variable)• Formula (of variable)• Commodities (by row, column, summed or individual)• Countries (by row, column, summed or individual)• Decimal places (default=2)• Export As (specify arbitrary filename)• Full screen (expand table)
Results (2)
• Group commodities (check box)
• Group countries (check box)
• Can alter formula, e.g. divide by 1000000.0
Warning
• Don’t aggregate across groups, not mutually exclusive
• Don’t aggregate percentage changes• Don’t aggregate prices• Red is negative (be careful when pasting to
Excel)