united~ · 4 jurisdiction and venue 5 7. this court has federal-question jurisdiction over this...

1 BRIGGS LAW CORPORATION [FILE: 1924.00] Cory J. Briggs (State Bar no. 176284)

2 [email protected] 99 East "C" Street, Suite 111

3 Upland, CA 91786 Telephone: 909-949-7115

4 Attorneys for Plaintiff Public Watchdogs

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

10

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 PUBLIC WATCHDOGS, )

l 12 Plaintiff,

13 vs.

14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED~ STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; JAMES l

15 MATTIS, in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

16 THE NAVY; RICHARD V. SPENCER, in his) official capacity as Secretary of the Navy;

17 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY; SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY;

18 and DOES 1 through 100,

19 Defendants.

20

CASE NO. 17-CV-2323 JLS(BGS)

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

** JURY REQUESTED **

21 Plaintiff PUBLIC WATCHDOGS ("Plaintiff') alleges as follows:

22 1. Plaintiffbrings this lawsuit to prevent Defendants from storing highly dangerous spent

23 nuclear fuel containers at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station ("SONGS"). The deadly

24 radioactive material is being stored on ocean-front public land that was leased from the federal

25 government for electricity-generating purposes but never intended to be used for post-closure storage

26 of such containers. In 1963, Congress authorized the lease of approximately 90 acres on the military

27 base commonly known as Camp Pendleton to Defendants SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON

28 COMPANY ("SCE") and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY ("SDGE") so they could

Case 3:17-cv-02323-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/28/18 PageID.172 of 9

1 construct, operate, maintain, and use the land for nuclear electric generating station. Slightly more than

2 four years ago, SCE and SDGE notified the federal government that they had permanently terminated

3 power operations at SONGS. With the affirmative assistance and tacit approval of military officials,

4 SCE and SDGE have embarked on a course of conduct that now involves permanent storage of spent

5 fuel on the leased property and converting the site into a de facto radioactive dump - well beyond, and

6 in violation of, the authorization Congress gave in 1963.

7 Parties

8 2. Plaintiff is a California non-profit corporation that serves as a public "watchdog" to

9 ensure that government agencies and special interests comply with all applicable laws including public-

I 0 safety and environmental-protection laws, especially in the public-utilities industry. Plaintiff has at

II least one member who lives within the zone of exposure to a catastrophic release of radioactive material

I2 from SONGS.

13 3. Defendants UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

14 DEFENSE, and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY are agencies and

I5 instrumentalities of the federal government. Defendant JAMES MATTIS is the Secretary ofDefense

I6 and is being sued in his official capacity. Defendant RICHARD V. SPENCER is the Secretary of the

I7 Navy and is being sued in his official capacity. These Defendants are collectively labeled the "Federal

I8 Defendants."

I9 4. Defendants SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS

20 & ELECTRIC COMPANY are corporations doing business in the State of California.

21 5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that, at all times stated in this

22 pleading, each Defendant was the agent, servant, or employee of every other Defendant and was, in

23 doing the things alleged in this pleading, acting within the scope of said agency, servitude, or

24 employment and with the full knowledge or subsequent ratification of his principals, masters, and

25 employers. Alternatively, in doing the things alleged in this pleading, each Defendant was acting alone

26 and solely to further his own interests.

27 6. The true names and capacities of the Defendants identified as DOES 1 through 100 are

28 unknown to Plaintiff, who will seek the Court's permission to amend this pleading in order to allege

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page2


the true names and capacities as soon as they are ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes and

2 on that basis alleges that each of the fictitiously named Defendants 1 through 100 has some degree of

3 liability to Plaintiff or has some other cognizable interest in this lawsuit.

4 Jurisdiction and Venue

5 7. This Court has federal-question jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to Section 1983

6 ofTitle 42 of the United States Code, among others provisions of law.

7 8. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to Section 1391 ofTitle 28 of the United States

8 Code because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the

9 County of San Diego.

10 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Violation of Public Law 88-82

11 (Against All Defendants)

12 9. On or about July 30, 1963, Congress enacted Public Law 88-82. Among other things,

13 Public Law 88-82 authorized and empowered the Secretary ofthe Navy "to grant to Southern California

14 Edison Company, a California corporation, and to San Diego Gas and Electric Company, a California

15 corporation, and to each of them, their respective successors and assigns, upon such terms and

16 conditions as the Secretary deems necessary to protect the interests of the United States, an easement

17 in, over, under and upon lands of the United States of America, approximately ninety acres in area,

18 within the Camp Joseph H. Pendleton Naval Reservation, California, for the construction, operation,

19 maintenance, and use of a nuclear electric generating station, consisting of one or more generating

20 units, and appurtenances thereto; and easements in, under, over, and upon such additional lands of the

21 United States of America within the Camp Joseph H. Pendleton Naval Reservation, California, as are

22 necessary or desirable for the purpose of constructing, operating, maintaining, and using electric

23 transmission and communication lines, switch yards and substations, cooling water conduits, pipelines

24 for water, gas and sewage, railroad spur tracks, access roads and other appurtenances to said facilities

25 and to said nuclear electric generating station." A true and correct copy of Public Law 88-82 is

26 attached to this pleading as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.

27

28



1 10. After Public Law 88-82 was enacted, the Federal Defendants (including the Secretaries'

2 predecessors) granted the easement described therein to SCE and SDGE. The grant is memorialized

3 in writing, but Plaintiffhas not been provided with a copy of it.

4 11. Pursuant to the written grant for the easement described in Public Law 88-82, over the

5 years SCE and SDGE operated three nuclear electric generating units at SONGS.

6 12. According to a website maintained by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

7 ("NRC"), SCE and SDGE shut down Unit 1 at SONGS in 1992. A true and correct copy of the website

8 is attached to this pleading as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference.

9 13. On or about June 12,2013, SCE and SDGEnotified the NRC in a written letter that they

10 had "permanently ceased power operation" ofUnits 2 and 3 at SONGS. A true and correct copy ofthe

11 letter is attached to this pleading as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference.

12 14. The NRC's website (Exhibit "B") also provides information about the future plans for

13 the storage of spent nuclear fuel at SONGS: "The fuel from Unit 1 was transferred to Phase 1 ofthe

14 ISFSI [i.e., Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation]. The ISFSI is being expanded onto the area

15 previously occupied by Unit 1 in order to store all Unit 2 and Unit 3 spent fuel."

16 15. The storage of spent nuclear fuel was not contemplated or authorized by Public Law 88-

17 82. Storing spent fuel at SONGS would pose a threat to the interests of the United States of America.

18 Any agreement or action by the Federal Defendants to allow the storage of spent fuel at SONGS under

19 the grant authorized by Public Law 88-82, as well as any and all actions taken by SCE and SDGE to

20 store the spent fuel at SONGS, is illegal. To the extent the written grant from the Federal Defendants

21 to SCE and SDGE purports to allow such storage, the grant is ultra vires.

22 16. Plaintiff, its members, and members of the public generally are being harmed by

23 Defendants' conduct in authorizing the storage of spent nuclear fuel at SONGS and by their actual

24 storage of spent fuel. By way of example and not limitation:

25 A. If a container storing spent fuel were to break open due to mishandling or due

26 to corrosion caused by the proximity to salt-heavy ocean air and moisture, tens of thousands of people

27 within 50 miles of SONGS could be exposed to levels of radiation that would cause imminent death.

28



B. By the graceofG-d, onoraboutAugust3, 2018, amajorcatastrophewasaverted

2 when a container of spent nuclear fuel was being lowered into a storage vault. Safety personnel did not

3 notice that the container had been caught up on a flange inside the vault; the personnel cannot actually

4 see into the vault during the lowering process. There was substantial slack in the equipment lowering

5 the container, which could have fallen nearly 20 feet if the flange had not held. Even though a major

6 catastrophe was averted, radiation was released into the environment while the container was caught

7 on the flange. In fact, radiation is released into the environment each time spent nuclear fuel is moved

8 from the cooling pool to a storage vault; the risk of exposure causes members of the public to avoid

9 beaches and other recreational resources near SONGS for fear of being harmed. The loading and

10 transfer of each container poses a separate and distinct threat to public health and safety. Moreover,

11 no event notification report, which ordinarily must be filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

12 Commission ("NRC") within 24 hours if any potentially dangerous event occurs at SONGS, was filed

13 for this event until more than six weeks after it occurred; meanwhile, event notification reports have

14 been promptly filed for events such as the death of an employee near SONGS due to natural causes and

15 another employee testing positive for alcohol during a test while on duty at SONGS. Lack of prompt

16 notice of potentially dangerous events contributes to the public's avoidance of beaches and other

17 recreational resources near SONGS for fear of being harmed.

18 c. On or about August 17,2018, the NRC chartered a team to conduct a special

19 inspection in September 2018 of"licensee's follow-up investigation, causal evaluation, and planned

20 corrective actions regarding the near-miss drop event involving a loaded spent fuel storage canister at"

21 SONGS. A true and correct copy ofthememorandumconfmning the team's charter is attached to this

22 pleading as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by reference.

23 D. On or about August 21, 2018, the San Diego Union-Tribune reported on the

24 "near-miss drop event" described by the NRC. The report also described a design flaw in March 2018

25 that resulted in a defective shim being used inside the storage canister. A true and correct copy of the

26 report is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference. The shim was intended

27 to stabilize hot fuel assemblies by creating a space that allows cooling helium gas to flow throughout

28 the canister so that the spent nuclear fuel does not get so hot that it compromises the structural integrity


Case 3:17-cv-02323-JLS-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/28/18 PageID.176 Page 5 of 9

1 of the canister; left uncooled, spent nuclear fuel will heat up to the point of a critical - and deadly -

2 nuclear reaction. Prior to discovery of the defective shim, four other canisters were filled with spent

3 nuclear fuel using the same make and model of shim. There is no mechanism to promptly and

4 accurately detect whether a shim has failed once the spent nuclear fuel is lowered into the canister. The

5 way in which the canister and shims were designed and manufactured, and the way in which the spent

6 nuclear fuel is lowered into the canister and secured, is identical for each of the canisters with defective

7 shims. The defective shim failed inside an empty canister even before it was placed under any storage

8 load. To a high degree of statistical confidence, the failure of the shim in one canister guarantees the

9 failure of at least one shim in each of the canisters loaded previously. Consequently, there is a very

10 high probability that the other canisters are in the process of being internally damaged such that a

11 release of deadly radioactive material is imminent.

12 E. The "near-miss drop event" was the only such event at SONGS that has been

13 publicly reported. However, it is not the only such event. One month earlier -in July 2018 - a similar

14 near-miss drop event occurred. Even though SCE participated in a public meeting in August 2018 at

15 which the August 3 "near-miss drop event" was revealed by a safety officer, no representative ofSCE

16 disclosed the July event prior to the safety officer's public disclosure. Plaintiff learned about the July

17 event only recently from whistle-blowers working at SONGS.

18 F. The storage canisters being used at SONGS, manufactured by a company known

19 as "Holtec International," are substantially inferior to storage canisters that are standard in the industry.

20 The canisters being used at SONGS have walls that are 5/8-inch thick; in contrast, standard industry

21 canisters have walls that are 18 to 24 inches thick. The canisters at SONGS are also built using internal

22 parts made from different metals, allowing for galvanic corrosion to occur because different metals are

23 in contact with each other, thereby compromising the structural integrity of the canisters. In addition,

24 the canisters used at SONGS have welded lids that make it impossible to inspect the inner integrity of

25 the canisters, safely retrieve their contents, or make any necessary repairs, whereas standard industry

26 canisters have a removable lid that allows for inspections, retrieval, and repairs. True and correct

27 photographs of a Holtec International canister like the ones being used at SONGS and a standard

28 industry canister are attached to this pleading as Exhibit "F" and incorporated herein by reference.



G. The activities to store spent nuclear fuel at SONGS have resulted in the

2 extraction and theft of the remains of members ofthe Juanefio Band ofMission Indians. At least one

3 of the Band's members is also a member of Plaintiff. A true and correct copy of a recent letter from

4 the Band's representatives to the Court is attached to this pleading as Exhibit "G" and incorporated

5 herein by reference.

6 H. Clinical psychologist Diane Ray, Ph.D., has written a letter in which she

7 describes the anxiety that members of the public suffer as a result of the severe threat to public health

8 and safety stemming from the storage of spent nuclear fuel at SONGS. At lest one such member of the

9 public is a member of Plaintiff, as is Dr. Ray. A true and correct copy ofher letter is attached to this

10 pleading as Exhibit "H" and incorporated herein by reference.

11 I. At this time, there is no technology that allows any of the Defendants to

12 adequately monitor spent nuclear fuel inside canisters buried in the ground to ensure that no leak of

13 radioactive material and/or no internal damage to the canister is occurring. Such technology is not

14 expected to be developed until2024 at the earliest.

15 J. Dr. Tom English, who has served as an advisor to President Jimmy Carter's

16 administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the California Energy Commission,

17 and the Swedish government on nuclear waste, has written a white paper concerning the August 2018

18 "near miss." He has reported that NRC studies show canisters that are slightly thinner than the ones

19 used at SONGS have a 28% chance of failure - better than one in four - if dropped from a similar

20 height as the canister involved in the "near-miss drop event." He concluded: "Continuation ofthe

21 loading of the fuel is clearly a very dangerous threat to the lives and livelihood of over 8.4 million

22 people." A true and correct copy of Dr. English's white paper is attached hereto as Exhibit "I" and

23 incorporated herein by reference.

24 K. NBC San Diego recently ran a television story about the "near miss" at SONGS.

25 A true and correct video copy of the story is available for viewing at https://publicwatchdogs.org/

26 wp-content/uploads/2018/09/NBC Near-Miss-Accident Broadcast 09-24-2018.mp4 and is

27 incorporated herein by reference.

28



L. On or about August 28, 2018, the NRC determined that there had been a

2 violation of their safety requirements between June 2017 and June 2018. The violation was related to

3 the design control of field changes made to important safety equipment used to load spent nuclear fuel

4 into storage canisters. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that the violation

5 involved the lack of industry-standard training for in-field personnel responsible for conducting the

6 loading activities at SONGS.

7 M. The storage canisters being used at SONGS are, literally and figuratively, ticking

8 time-bombs on account ofthe canisters' defective shims, the unsafe way in which the spent nuclear fuel

9 is being placed in the canisters, the general lack of manufacturing quality of the canisters, the lack of

10 monitoring technology, and the lack of adequate on-site training for the responsible personnel.

11 N. The NRC has adopted the "Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture" manual

12 as a guidance document for the operators of nuclear facilities. Defendants do not abide by the manual

13 in their handling of spent nuclear fuel at SONGS. A true and correct copy ofthe manual is attached

14 hereto as Exhibit "J" and incorporated herein by reference.

15 0. Based on industry standards, the transfer of spent nuclear fuel at SONGS is

16 required to have at least 11 "Cask Load Supervisors." The standard practice at SONGS has been for

17 there to be no more than seven such supervisors, with the number infrequently reaching nine such

18 supervisors. Deviation from the proper industry practice on such an important safety practice

19 contributes to the public's avoidance ofbeaches and other recreational resources near SONGS for fear

20 ofbeing harmed.

21 P. According to at least one on-site manager at SONGS, if the canister involved in

22 the "near-miss drop event" had dropped, it would have cracked and the helium inside (for cooling

23 purposes) would have leaked out. That leak would have caused the spent fuel rods inside to overheat,

24 which would have further compromised the integrity of the canister. That in tum would have created

25 so much decay heat that the concrete and steel in the ISFSI pad would have melted. At that point, if

26 the heat were to reach an adjacent canister, there would be a chain reaction that could be controlled only

27 by pumping a lot of sea water onto the canisters. The sea water would become contaminated in the

28 process, eventually draining back to the open ocean and causing widespread contamination that would



render the exposed waters unsafe for human and non-human life for generations. Such risks further

2 reduce the public's willingness to take advantage of recreational opportunities near SONGS.

3 Q. The storage canisters being used at SONGS have only a 25-year warranty, even

4 though spent nuclear fuel will be stored in them for decades longer. The containers are not guaranteed

5 to last for the duration of the storage process. This risk will further impair the public's willingness to

6 engage in recreational activities near SONGS.

7 Prayer

8 FOR ALL THESE REASONS, Plaintiff respectfully prays for the following relief against

9 Defendants:

10 A. An order or judgment declaring that the storage of spent nuclear fuel at SONGS is not

11 authorized by, and is outside the scope of the authority granted to the Federal Defendants under, Public

12 Law 88-82;

13 B. An order or judgment enjoining Federal Defendants from authorizing SCE and SDGE

14 from storing spent nuclear fuel at SONGS and further enjoining SCE and SDGE from storing spent fuel

15 at SONGS;

16 C. Any and all legal fees and other expenses incurred by Plaintiff in connection with this

17 lawsuit, including but not limited to reasonable attorney fees and costs; and

18 D. Any and all further reliefthat this Court may deem appropriate.

19 Date: September 28, 2018. Respectfully submitted,

20 BRIGGS LAW CORPORATION

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

By: s/ Cory J. Briggs

Attorneys for Plaintiff Public Watchdogs




Exhibit "A"

Case 3:17-cv-02323-JLS-BGS Document 25-1 Filed 09/28/18 PageID.181 Page 1 of 51

77 STAT.] PUBLIC LAW 88-83-AUG. 5,1963 115

Public Law f18..82

. Be i8 flltUUJtetl by tke SMJ~Lte a'IUllJuuae of B ~~at£• oj tke Umtei, States of A~ m Oongresa fJa~; .. at the Secretary eamom.~a. of the Navy be a.nd he he~ is au.th~~ .. and em~wered to srant to ~ P•'":tt~. Southern California Ed.istm.Qun:pany, a Califol'lll& corpol'l!l.tion, and 11111

- '

to San Di~ Gas and Electric Company, a California corpq.m.tion, and to ea.~h of them, their respective successors and &$Signs, up:m such terms and conditions as the Secretary d~ necesary to protect the interests of the United St e&~ ~over under and upon lands of the United States of · .. · ica., approxlDlateiy ninety acres in area, within the Camp Joseph H.. Pendleton Naval Reservation, California, for· the construction, operation,. maintenan~ and 'llSe of tt nuclear electric generating station, consisting of one or more generating units, and appurtenane$2 thereto; mid easements in under~ over, and upon s. uch additional lands. of. the United States of ~erica within the Camp J ose)lh H. Pendleton N avw Reservation, California, u are necessary or ·deSirable for the purpose Qf.c.onstruet;inJ, operating, maintaining, and using electric traT!$IDission and oommumetlJ:.Ion lines, switchyardS and subSta.tions~ eoo1,i'mg water oonduits, P-ipelines for water,~ &lld sewage, J)illroad spur tracks, access roaus &lld other nppurlelmtlces to said facilities n.nd to said nuclear electric generating station.

SEC. 2. U{X>n such terms and condition$ a' 'he deems necessary to comt1t1o041.

prate~ the ~terests of t.he United St~es and with!-» ~e scope set forth m SecttQ:n 1, the $ooretttry or hts successors m m~erest, may amend any such easement by mutua] agreement of the pries. thereto, or their successors in interestl. in such :mann. . er II$ to chanse the lands affected thereby, either by suostitution, ~diidon or deletion, as weU as to change the terms and conditions of the grant.

SEC. 3. A reaso.ble ~ which m&Y: be paid in installments or CI'III.Jtlea. in a lump sum or in a comhma.tion thereof, as determined by the Sec-retary, or his successor in interest, based UJ>!>n the fair v~Jue 'of each easement granted pursuant to the authority herein contained, shall be payable by the grantee or grantees thereof, their respective successors and assigns.

Approved July 3.0, 1963.

Public Law 88-83 AN ACT

To pruTide for the free entry of an orthk'On Image 8iilhJllbly tor the uAe of the Medk'fll Oollegc> uf Oeorgia. Au~ Georgia.

AUK\lllt S. 1963 [H. a. 32721

Be it tnw.ctetl by the lle1Ulte om4 HOWle of Reyre.'le'ff.tativu of tlw Umted l!ttatu of A1M'i'lca in 0~ IMSeri?JJ·kd· .·, ~That {a) the Sec- OrttUcon!mage retary of the.Tre~ is autho~ and di~ed to admit~ of ••;~;;:,ir,.. duty one orth1co.n una\ge assembly unported fflr fhe use of the Medical C-ollege of Georgia Augusf;a, GeOrgia.

(b) If the liquj~tion of the entry of the article described in subsection (a) has become final, such entry shall be reliquida.tQd and the approprJate re:fnnd of duty shan be made.

A-pproved August 5. 1963.

AUTHENTICATE~ U.S. GOVERNMENT

INFORMATION

GPO



Exhibit "B"


United States Nudear Reguia.wry Commission

Prottcling People aud tile Euvironment

Home> Facility Locator> Sites Undergoing Decommissioning> Power Reactors> San Onofre - Unit 1

San Onofre- Unit 1

1.0 Site Identification Type ofSite: Location: License No.: Docket No.:

Power Reactor Facility San Clemente, CA DPR-I3 50-206

License Status: SAFSIDR Project Manager:Marlayna Vaaler 2.0 Site Status Sum mary The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), operated by Southern CalifOrnia Edison (SCE) is approximately I 00 km ( 60 rrn) south ofLos Angeles, 6.5 km ( 4 rrn) south of San Clemente, CA. It is located between 1-5 and the Pacific Ocean, within the boundary ofthe Camp Pendleton military reserve. The site originally comprised three nuclear power plants. Unit 1 commenced operation in 1968, and shut down in 1992. Units 2 and 3 permanently ceased operations in June 2013. Dismantlement ofUnit 1 is essentially complete. The turbine building was removed and the licensee completed reactor pressure vessel internal segmentation and cutup; however, the licensee was Lmable to make arrangements fur shipping the reactor pressure vessel to a disposal fucility because of the size and weight ofthe vessel and shipping package. The licensee plans to store the vessel onsite until the decommissioning activities for Units 2 and 3 allow for its removal.

SONGS-I was a Westinghouse 3-loop pressurized water reactor constructed by Bechtel and rated at 1347 MWthermal. It began commercial operation on January I, 1968, and ceased operation on November 30, 1992. Defueling was completed on March 6, 1993. On December 28, I993, NRC approved the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications. On November 3, 1994, SCE submitted a Proposed Decommissioning Plan to place SONGS-1 in SAFSTOR until the shutdown ofUnits 2 and 3. On December I5, I998, :fOllowing a change in NRC decommissioning regulations, SCE submitted a post shutdown decommissioning activities report (PSDAR) fur SONGS-I, to commence DECON in 2000. SCE actively decommissioned the fucility, and most of the structures and equipment have been removed and sent to a disposal fuility. Water control is active, and is processed through the Unit 2 and 3 wastewater treatment system NRC issued a license amendment in February 2010 releasing the off-shore portions of the Unit 1 cooling intake and outlet pipes in place, under the Pacific Ocean seabed, fur unrestricted use. The fuel from Unit 1 was transferred to Phase 1 of the ISFSI. The ISFSI is being expanded onto the area previously occupied by Unit 1 in order to store all Unit 2 and Unit 3 spent fuel.

3.0 Major Technical or Regulatory Issues The PSDAR states all equipment and structures from Unit 1 will be removed from the site at the time oflicense termination, but SCE has stated it may reconsider this later, and possibly leave some ofthe below-grade structures in place. For now, SCE has elected to leave the below-grade portions ofthe turbine building in place after grouting expansion joints and embedded pipes. Because SCE has not submitted an LTP fur this unit, there is not an NRC-approved survey plan or residual concentration limits. Therefore, it is not known if the surveys done on these areas prior to grouting will meet NRC requirements for final status surveys at the time of request fur license termination. Current survey data may not support this option, in which case additional surveys, e.g. of the embedded piping, may be necessary.

4.0 Estimated Date For Closure


12/30/2030

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, July 08, 2016



Exhibit "C"


SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

EDISON® June 12, 2013 An EDISON INTERNATIONAL® Company

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362

Peter T. Dietrich Senior Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer

10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i)

Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82 (a) (1) (i), Southern California Edison (SCE) hereby certifies that it has p~rmanently ceased power operation of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 effective June 7, 2013.

On that d.ate, SCE publicly announced its decision to permanently shut down both Unit 2 and Unit 3 and filed its announcement with Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 8-K, pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

There are no new commitments contained in this letter.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact Mr. Mark E. Morgan, Licensing Lead, at 949-368-6745.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on "'Si~ 17- J 20 I> . (Date)

cc: A. T. Howell Ill, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV R. Hall, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 B. Benney, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 G. G. Warnick, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 and 3

P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92672 (949) 368-6255 PAX 86255 Fax: (949) 368-6183 [email protected]



Exhibit "D"


MEMORANDUM TO:

THROUGH:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV 1600 EAST LAMAR BOULEVARD ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511

August 17, 2018

Eric J. Simpson, CHP, Health Physicist Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

W. Chris Smith, Reactor Inspector Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Marlene X. Davis, Transportation & Storage Safety Inspector Inspections & Operations Branch Division of Spent Fuel Management

Janine F. Katanic, PhD, CHP, Chief /RAJ LLH for Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Troy W. Pruett, Director /RAJ Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

INSPECTION CHARTER TO EVALUATE THE NEAR-MISS LOAD DROP EVENT AT SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

A special inspection has been chartered to review the licensee's follow-up investigation, causal evaluation, and planned corrective actions regarding the near-miss drop event involving a loaded spent fuel storage canister at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) on Friday, August 3, 2018. (License Nos. NPF-1 0 and NPF-15, Docket Nos. 50-361, 50-362 and 72-41 ).

CONTACT: Janine F. Katanic, PhD, CHP, FCDB/DNMS (817) 200-1151


E. Simpson 2

BACKGROUND AND BASIS

On Friday, August 3, 2018, at approximately 1 :30 pm (PST), SONGS was engaged in operations involving movement of a loaded spent fuel storage canister into its underground ISFSI storage vault (HI-STORM UMAX storage system). As the loaded spent fuel canister was being lowered into the storage vault using lifting and rigging equipment, the licensee's personnel failed to notice that the canister was misaligned and was not being properly lowered. The licensee continued to lower the rigging and lifting equipment until it believed that the canister had been fully lowered to the bottom of the storage vault. However, a radiation protection technician identified elevated radiation readings that were not consistent with a fully lowered canister. The licensee then identified that the loaded spent fuel canister was hung up on a metal flange near the top of the storage vault, preventing it from being lowered, and that the rigging and lifting equipment was slack and no longer bearing the load of the canister.

In this circumstance, with the important to safety (ITS) rigging and lifting equipment completely down in the lowest position, the ITS equipment was disabled from performing its designed safety function of holding and controlling the loaded canister from a potential canister drop condition. The licensee reported that the canister was resting on a metal flange within the storage vault. It was estimated that the canister could have experienced an approximately 17-18 foot drop into the storage vault if the canister had slipped off the metal flange or if the metal flange failed. This load drop accident is not a condition analyzed in the dry fuel storage system's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

In response to the discovery that the canister was not fully lowered, the licensee took immediate actions to restore control of the load to the rigging and lifting devices. The estimated time the canister was in an unanalyzed credible drop condition was approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour in duration. The licensee regained control of the load, repositioned the canister, and lowered the canister into the storage vault. The licensee halted all dry fuel storage movement operations in order to fully investigate the incident and develop corrective actions to prevent a recurrence. In addition, the licensee has shared the operational experience with another site with a similar dry fuel storage system.

Region IV became aware of the SONGS "near-miss" incident on Monday, August 6, 2018, when the licensee provided a courtesy notification and described it as a "near-miss" or "near-hit" event. The reporting requirements of the incident are still being evaluated by the Region and discussed with the licensee.

On August 7 and 16, 2018, Region IV and NMSS representatives participated in conference calls with licensee representatives in order to gather additional facts regarding the circumstances of the incident and the licensee's investigation. Region IV is evaluating the information provided by the licensee and is coordinating with the Division of Spent Fuel Management, NMSS.

The NRC is chartering this special inspection pursuant to Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program," and NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0309, "Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors."

The purpose of the inspection is to investigate the occurrence; interview personnel; observe equipment; and review relevant documentation, including the results of the licensee's investigation and causal analysis, and development and implementation of actions to prevent


E. Simpson 3

recurrence. The licensee has committed to not resume fuel loading operations until after this special inspection and associated reviews are complete. Once the licensee has confirmed its plans to resume fuel loading operations, inspectors will also observe the loading operations to ensure that the corrective actions are adequate. These observations may be conducted as part of this special inspection or as an independent inspection activity, as directed by regional management.

SCOPE

The inspection should seek to address the following items at a minimum:

1. Identify and review all pertinent records, documents, and procedures related to the licensee's downloading operations at the ISFSI pad including but not limited to: worker training and qualifications; rigging equipment qualification, testing, and preventative maintenance; and lifting equipment qualification, testing, and preventative maintenance. Evaluate the adequacy of the above noted procedures, worker training and equipment testing and preparation.

2. Evaluate the adequacy of the loading procedure(s) with respect to verification of MPC movement, centering the MPC over the ISFSI vault, lowering the MPC, and positioning the MPC within the ISFSI vault. Interviews with personnel involved in the ISFSIIoading operations should be conducted to evaluate licensee and contractor communications between craneNCT operators, rigging and spotting staff, cask loading supervisors, radiation protection staff, and licensee oversight personnel. Evaluate the adequacy of pre-job briefings that may have taken place prior to fuel loading operations.

3. Review and evaluate the licensee's immediate corrective actions taken after the event for adequacy of notifications to the licensee and safety assessments performed immediately following the event. Review the licensee's inspection documentation and/or analysis to determine whether the vault's divider shell experienced any damage that would inhibit the component from performing its designed safety function.

4. Based on the review of procedures and interviews of personnel involved with loading operations, evaluate the adequacy of procedure adherence.

5. Interview personnel associated with the event to develop a timeline to ensure the licensee's investigation contained all necessary information to identify all contributing factors and develop adequate corrective actions.

6. Review the licensee's root cause investigation results, to determine whether the review thoroughly identified all contributing factors and that final corrective actions will be adequate to prevent reoccurrence. Evaluate whether prior operational experience relating to complications or issues associated with canister downloading operations was identified and considered as part of the licensee's root cause investigation and corrective action development.

7. Review the licensee's planned actions that will address the point loading condition that was experienced by the affected canister. If applicable, review the licensee's analysis that demonstrated the canister will continue to perform as designed for continued storage OR review licensee's inspection plan to safely remove or lift the canister from the vault to support inspection of the bottom of the canister to demonstrate the canister did not


E. Simpson 4

receive any damage that would inhibit the component from continuing to perform as designed.

8. Investigate the licensee's procedures for reportability to the NRC and determine if the licensee made the correct decision regarding notifications made to the NRC for this event.

9. As directed by regional management, observe resumption of fuel loading operations to verify that corrective actions were effective in addressing deficiencies that contributed to the event. This should include evaluation of procedure and/or equipment enhancements; review or observation of training and briefings provided to riggers, crane operators, spotters and observers, supervisors and other personnel involved in fuel loading operations.

10. Determine if the inspection should be elevated to an AIT and promptly notify regional management of any recommendation to escalate the special inspection to an AlT.

GUIDANCE

The NRC is chartering this special inspection pursuant to Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program," and NRC Manual Chapter 0309, "Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors." The Manual Chapter and Management Directive identify Inspection Procedure 93812, "Special Inspection," for specific use in reviewing events. Planned Dates of Inspection are September 10-14, 2018.

This inspection should emphasize fact-finding in its review of the circumstances surrounding the near-miss canister drop event. Safety concerns identified that are not directly related to nearmiss drop event should be reported to NRC management for appropriate action.

Daily briefings with NRC management should occur to discuss the team's progress and preliminary observations.

In accordance with Manual Chapter 0610, a report documenting the results of the inspection should be issued within 30-45 days of the completion of the inspection.

This Charter may be modified should NRC inspectors find significant new information that warrants review. Should you have any questions concerning this charter, please contact Janine F. Katanic at 817-200-1151.


--------------

INSPECTION CHARTER TO EVALUATE THE NEAR-MISS LOAD DROP EVENT AT SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION- DATED AUGUST 17,2018

DISTRIBUTION: KKennedy, ORA SMorris, ORA TPruett, DNMS LHowell, DNMS JKatanic, DNMS LBrookhart, DNMS MLayton, NMSS ARivera-Varona, NMSS VDricks, ORA BMaier, ORA Clipa, DNMS/RIII JTrapp, DNMS/RI Tlnverso, OEDO AMoreno, OCA JWeil, OCA

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML 18229A203 •suNSI Review ADAMS: D Non-Publicly Available By: LLH •Yes D No • Publicly Available OFFICE DNMS:FCDB DNMS:DD NAME JFKatanic LLHowell SIGNATURE /RAILLH for /RAJ DATE 8/17/18 8/17/18

OFFICAL RECORD COPY

•Non-Sensitive Keyword: D s ensitive N 2 RC-00

DNMS:D TWPruett /RAJ 8/17/18


FffiST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Exhibit "E"


ihc .San l!lit9o

nion~~ribunc sandlegounlont.dbune.c:am TUESDAY • AU OUST 21,2818

EXPERT: PLANT M ISSTEPI:.ARE 'JROUBCfNG'

------------------~

STUDY SAYS S.D. HOMEBUYERS NEED $131,000 INCOME BT PHIUIP MOLNAR

&m Diego \\'88 one Of t.he least·flf· fordable U.s. m~~ro area.s forbt.tyhlg a home in the secon(!qua.rter,Wds L"':l· cently n>Jt>.ascd study frOm mortga.ge websl~..eHSH.

Potential buyers needed to ma.ke $130.9&1 a year to alford the tnetUan· prleedsinglc·trunilyhoU.!le.

Only two other metro areas were tess atrordabl.e - san Jose and san Francisco - aald the study, wbieh crunehed numbers for 50 regions atJ,l"()SStheUnited$tates.

HSHdetennfned rank!ngsby look· tng at quarterly home prtoodata.local property taxes, hOmeownerinsuta:nce

costs and lneome needed to Qtmli1Y for a Joan. It alao assumed Lba~ prospec· ttw homebuyers l1Ulde a 20 percent down payment.

The most affordable metropoltt.Qn area was Pittsburgh, where tb& re.. qu1rec1 annual sais.ryto a!Iotd a medl· an-priccdbomewas$38.253. Two other atrordabte C1t.1eaforbo~n;were ~ ($30.2&31 cn<l Oklahoma Cif.y($40.180).

Keith Gumbini&. HSH.com\1 vtee ptesldent. said rising mortgage rates areontv as::mall part.o!\.hedilllctdty.lklr _..,...._

.. Onfortunat.ely, even If rates don't goupverymueb,"heaald. ~ofthe iSSUe we run Into Is thai. home prices

3 San Otego's

rank as least· allordabla

metro market lli!!tloni'l!lyin tMsecttnd

quartar, &~;CWdingto

m<>rtgage webslteHSH.

arerlslngsoquieltly.~

san Diego has been lOCked at Uta No. 3 spot since HSH expanded the studytoi'IOroettostbroeyears ago. Los Angeles was No.4, wbtchusually Is seen as less affordabl~ t.hs.n America's Ftnesf.Cicy-butOu.mblngersald the lnrgerpoo!OfhOine$1nLos~Jesredueed the median cost. In comparlson toSonDlegO.

H8H saki the salary needed to at'· ront a SingJe-ftunlly hOme tn Los Angeleswas$U4.00'1.ab0Ut$16,000Jesathan Sanl>fego.

The mortgage website saki that. the salar)' neeclal: to buy a San Dlegobome had tncreasecll2l percent tnayear. So.

StE HOM!'BU'fiRS • AS

POPE: 'NO EFFORT MUST BE SPARED' TO FIGHT ABUSES

WOMAN FILES COMPLAINT AGAINST S.D. LAWMAKER

fn NlCOLE WfNf'IEl.D

VATICAN OlTY Pope Ftsnc1a vowed Monday

that •no effort: must be spared" to root out priestly sex abuse and oover·up from the ca.thotlc Churt'h. but gave no lndleatlon that be would t.ake action to 8WlC· tlon rompllclt bishops or end the Vntk.aneultureo!se(!recythathas allowedthecrlsistofezt~.

1n u letter to Cn1.hollcs wortd·

wide tonowtng dtmmlng new te"i'eIatlons ornmeonctuer. 1n the u .B., Frnnela sought. to projeet a get· tough response to the. perpetra· tors and a compas&onate sbctUl~ der tor v1et1ms alwad ora t'raught trtptolrelandth!sweekend.

Fmne1s beggl.!d forgiveness tor t.be paJn sulfered by vletlma and snJ.d 1ay catholiCS must. be Jn. eluded ln Lhe effort to root out abuse and cover· up. He b1Mt«l

S££P0P£•A1

CAREGIVER SD + BBA.LTB

EXPANDING A WORLD UC San Diego study helps Allileimar's disease caregwers rope with physital, psychological toa El

BY MELANIE MASON

state sen. Joel Anderoon 1B faelngalegtslathlelnvest1gation at\.er a rentale lobbytst. aceused him of tbreat.enlng to "bitch l\l.np"ht'randhlu"ntl8!nghe:rata cap1tol·area bar laSt week.

"""""'""· Stephanie Roberson,. a Job. byist with the caHfomla Nurses Aa::IQclatJon, Oled a complaln1. with the ~nate RuMs Commft..

Comics

Crossword Dear Abby

teeonFrlday. Anderson. an

El {J$rtRepub)l· can whO Is termed oul this year. ts running for a seat on the Board of

sen. Joel Equallzatloll. the Anderson state's tax board.

Anderson eould not lmmedlately be reached for eomment.

SEE AND£RSON • A2

11·T INDEX

RUSSIAN HACKERS BROADEN ATTACKS Targets are conservative think tanks at odds with Trump on Russia policy

BY DAVID E. SANGER & SHEERA FR£NKEL

BOSTON The R.usalan milltacy bltolll·

geneeunlt that sought tolnfluenee the 2016 elect!on appears to have a new l.atget: oonserva!Jve Am.eri· eon think tanks that have broken wlthPresident.DonaldTrwnpand are SEl8ldng continued sanctlons agaln8f. Moscow. expoa~ng otigareba or pressing tor ht1ITUl1l rights.

In a report scheduled for release today, Microsoft said thut It detected alld. selzed websites that were ereated in re<:ent weekS by baeken;llnked to the Ru.s&8n unit Cormerlyknownast!wGRU.

The sites appeared meant to trlek people Into thinking Lhey were ellcklng thrOugh 1lnk8 man· aged by the Hudson In.sl..lt.ute and llie Intematkmal Republlean In· stltu1.c, but were secwtJy rcdi· rect.ed to webpages created by !;he baeJters to srea~ pa.sswt)T'(!s anct othereremmtJals.

Mlero&oft also found website& lmlt.at.lng the U.S. &tnate. but. not. speelfle Senateoft'lces or poH.ti~ cam-Theshifttoatt.acldngconsenra-tlve thtnk tanks 1l!lderseores the Russian tntelllgence a.gency·s goats: to d1Bnlpt any Institutions challenging Moseo\V and Russian President Vladlmlr Putfn.

The Hudson tnaUtute bas pro. rnoted programs examtn1ng the rise ofkleptoeracy In governments around tbeworld, Wlt.h'RU&:Siaasa prime t.arg&t. The Internat1onal RepublU:an lnst.lt\l:te. Wh1eb re-o celvessometund.lngJl"otnl:hei'St.ate Department and the U.S, Agency ror Intemat.iona.l I>evelopmettt, haS worked forclecadesfnpn>motUtgdcmoc.raeyaround the wotid.

"We are now seeing another uptick fn attacks. What 1$ pnrt!CU· tar In th1s .InstanCe is the broad· enlng or th<t type ofwcblll.tcs they are going atter, • Mieroson. Preal.· dent Brad Smtth said Monday in .. -. SEE HACKING • All

SAN DIEGO COVEREDCA CUSTOMERS FACE RANGE OF RATE CHANGES Some premium increases in 2019 will be far below or above 8.7% average BY PAUL SJSSON

ThoughtheOYeroll~is up, Covered cantornta prerntums ror the 116.149 COvered callfornla pollcyholderslnBan.DlegoCount.y willboutlee all owrtbtl place next )'eQr. aoeor<Ung to a new rate book recently releaSed by the state's health tnsuraneeexchange.

After announcing in July that thestate\l.ll.deavetagepremhnn fn. crease fetr 2019 will be 8.'1 peroont. tba plan purveyor followed up late tast week With a more speclfle breakdown. publi&hingdetaned intonnatlonetnwblcbC811'1imJwllltncrease their premiums the moat during open enrollmenL. whleh runa rrom oet. 15 throUgh Jan. 15 forthf!l4mlllloncat11'ornlanswho areeowred.

Health InsUrance ~ serarnbledthlsswnmertoacoount !'ora bJgchangebrewlngtn the Individual health lnsura.rme marlt&t next year. For the first Ume s:1ru!e Al!ordable care Act plans becamcava.Dabialn2014.Amerlcanawillno lOnger face flnanelal penaltieS In 2019 It they go without c:ove.ra&t'" d.uetotheTrUmpadminl.stra.tlon\1 sctllppl!ucofUle ACA'5 ~Individual

SEE PREMIUMS • A6


A8 THE SAN DIEGO IJ'NJON•TIUBUNE J 'rUESJM.Y • AUGUST 2I, 2018

PLANT FROMAl andaaletyrelatedtonuelear

"""""· Baclt Ia March, the tuet tran&l'erwasdela,yed IOdaJs after workers dlscoVered a pteceorshlm-essenttany,a pln4l!tehesbyaball'.fnebcameloosewbileac:atllster, de&lgned by New Jeraaybased Holtec International, was being loaded at San onotte. Edlaon received as. aurance from Holtec and an Independent engineering ttrm that the eanlster's In· tegrlty was sound. J1'Ully loaded, a can1ater we1gba about45tons.

Tom Palmlsano, vice presldent er decommlaalon· Ing and chief auclear op. erstor at the plant. eaJJed the Aug. 3 lat:ldent "t1llae. ceptable• and bas sus.. pendedalltranarersotspent fuel until "'the balldllng practtces, the human.perronntng practteea, the pro. eedures are autficlent and are deJilOMtrated to lD1 sat. - .. · Loebbaum sa1d Edison,

Holtec and the NRC •need to ensure that whatever ts causing the string ot problema stopa before lt pta wonoe.•

Atter studying the Aug. 3 lncldent, Locbbaum conclUded lt was uniik&ly the wedged cantater ot ltTadlated fUel could have dropped 18 feet but. "' keep asylng, tbeiJl()l'et!mesyoUim1tedlsaster, at some point, dtaaateraceeptstbeinvttatfon. ..

A worbr speaks eut The lncldent came to

Ugbt after a man ldentlt)lng hlmseltaaaninduatnaJaatetyworkerat the plant stood up during the publlc comment period at the quarterly Commun.ltf Engagement Panel meetlng earlier thla month and described what happened Aug. 3.

DavidFritchsatdacantater betng lowered Into what Is caJlud a "ca91ty encloaure container" gat stuck but two workers guiding the descent dfdnotrealizelt..

-&.whatwelumtiaacanlster that could bavu ranen 18 reet,• Frtteb satd. -:rt's a bad day. That bappened and

you lumta't heard aboUt lt and that's not right. •Fritcb saJdtbeeanfsterwas"hang. tag by about a quarter inch. •

Fritch aald he's been Worltlngon tbeattetoraboUt three months and aa1d some workara are "undertrained.· some supervisors don't tberougbly understand the transfer process and "we don't haW the proper ,.......,.... to ... tblng:adeneaafely!

The unton-Tribune baa lettmultlplevotcemanawitb Friteh but baanotrecelVed a muncoll.

Palmisano said Frlteh 1a an lnapector tor a subcontractor who works for Holtec. Palmisano aald •tt's not ror me to di&elose• the name ottbe companJ Fritch works ror but aald he had spoken to the presfdeat ot Pritch's company and the prealdent ot Holtec .,and told them both that I comlllend Mr. Fr1teh rorvolc1ng "" ..........

In a report to the Comnnmtty Engagement Panel. Paimtsano aald "there ts a wry snug m• aa the eanJa. tel'S are tawred tntothecav-

ltyenelosureeontalnersand It's not unusual tor the lead· lnlfteam tomake•atewadjustments• to get the eanls· terlnplace preper!y.

Theenelosurecoatalnera are about 20 feet high and tbecanlatergotlodgedenan lnnerrtngtbat helps guide It into place.

But the Holtec erew was unaware the canlster was wedged. About 20 minutes later, an overalght team rec· ognlZed the m1atake and the eanlsterwasrvad,Juatedand suecessMJy lowered to the bottom. once Inserted, the ca.nfstel'arest]arpJyUilderground In the cavity enclosuresatthedeystorageracn. lty.

The incident happened on a Friday and Paitn1aano sa1d the tollowlng Mond!IS' Edison'S stan' at the plant notlfted the NRC, and Pahn.laano dee1ded to SUS· pend subsequent tnmarera.

"'t'S an unaeceptableln· eldent, • Palmi.Bane told the Union-Tribune but said the "'very rebust deatgn• of the canJater would have prevented aey ra.dlologlcalleak -wenltlthadtanen18teet.

LocbbatUn agreed, say· lng safety anaJyaea er the canJater showed it "would haveremafnedlntaetsotbat there would not have been a reteaae or radtoaetlvtty to hann workers orthe publle. •

But combined W1th the March incldent InVOlving a broken pin, the Aug. 3 lncl·

dent ls problematie for Loohbaum.

"'!I lived In the area, I wouldn't pack up the ear andheadtorthehfilaoraey· thing Uke that,. Loehbaum sald."butlt'strotfullng.•

Keeping mum Pabntaano deaerlbed the

wedged canJater lssue as a "slgnUlcant lssue,- but he dfdaotment!onltdwinghls presentation at the start or the Community Engagement Panel, whleh occurred slxdaysattertheAug.3lncl· dent.Wbynot?

"'Becausethec:antsterdld not ran or drop, beeauae It was reeogn1zed qUlekly and remedtated and beeauae J bad stopped the aetlv1tJes (relatedtotuturetransfers), I bad thought It didn't war· rant an explicit d.lscusslon, • Palm1aano said "'n retrospect, I wlah I had. ... Hind· &lgbt Is always 20/20, but yeah, It J could de It again, I would have addreased It up· ttont llke I did wltb the shim Issue In theftrstquarter.•

Wll1Jam A1l87 er San Dl· ego. whe with his wife, Rosemarie, baa written a book aboUt handling nuclear waste, said he was not reaa""""-

"They did not take tb1s serteusenougb.• Alley said. "They seem to be In a mode or, 'don'twereyabouttt.'•

Rosemarie Alley e:rltl· clzed PalmlBano for nat bringing up the ISSUe at the

start or the Community Engagement Panel.

"This baa been a pattern with (Edison) throughout: It's 'trUst us• when the evi· dence lsjustnot there. • she oald.

Whylnw!etnudear-.? Used-up fUel at nuclear

power plants Is tbennaiiy bet, and ln enter to cool It, operators plaee the tuelln a metal raek that Is submersecllntoa deep, wet storagapooL

Once cooled, the spent tuel Is commonly transferred toadcy"storage!nstal· latlon.Onedeystoragetacll· tty at San onetre already holdaOO canisters, and Edt· sonlstntheprocessortransrer11ng ?3 others tram wet storage to a newll constructed dey storage faelllty.

The Aug. 3 transfer markedthe29thcan.tsterto be plaeed at the new dey atoragealte.

PalJn1aal:te said there Is no specltlc target date when thetrsnsterswlllreaumebut said lt was •en the order et weeks. • adding. "We wm take wbe.tevertlmeftlstogettbis right till we're satlstled so thlsdoesn'toccuragatn.~

Palmisano said he still hepes to have the transter completed by the middle or --rob~.com (619)293·1251 Twiltl!t:@nlbni~

EPA ROLLBACK OF COAL POLLUTION RULES TAKES MAJOR STEP FORWARD THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON

IITCBlN BlMDDlUNB • CABIRlT BliACIIIB • BUABTl a BIIA!IITl CQDNnBTOPS

Andrew Wheeler, the acting admln1strator or the Environmental Protection Agency, on Monday signed a plan to weaken regulation or coal-fired power plants, advancing a preposal that theeoallndustrybashanect as an end to burdensome regulation and environ· mentalists have crtt.lelzed aaaretreatln tbebattleto addre&a c:llmate change.

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Wheeler's algnatute om· clalb' sets In motloa one ot the 'n'tlmp adtn1:nistra· tlon's most slgnfflcant roll· backs yet of termer Pr88l· dent Baraek Obama's ell· mate change legacy, along· aida an earlier declalon to let automobnes ponute more. A aenierEPA omcial eonftnned the signing late MoadB3.

CALL NOW 858.427.6263

The agency Is expected to discuss the detaiJ4 or tt.s preposal today, wb1Qb It ls ealllngthe Atrordable Clean Energy rule, to replace the Obama-era Clean Power Plan, Whlch was designed to mntan greenhouse-gas

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GETTYIIoiAGES PD.es ot coal sit ln tront etPacUlcorp's 1440 megawatt coal-tf:red power plant In castle Dale, treah.

emlsatens from power plants. The long-anttcl· pated TrUmp admlnlsf.ra· tion overhaul at those rules 1s llkell to set the stage ror $'e&l'8oflegalclashes.

Prealdent Donald TrUmp ls expected to head today to West Vlrgln1aeoal country, where In May 2016 he denned a coal miner's helmet and vowed to strip away regulations ea the In· dUat.ry, and ls llkely to uae the momeat to ten support• ers that be Ia tollowlng thrOUgh on that promlse.

The new plan would an but erase Obama's etrorts to Impose pollution controls en ptanet-warmtng earbon dlex:lde pollutlon trom eoal·tlred power piantslnanetrort.totransl· tlon toward cleaner energy sources Uke wind and solar powar. One or the propos. al'S most stgnUlcant ehanges would giVe author· lty to states to dec! de bow much to cut em.lsB1ons, whlls restrlct!ng what states can do to encourage lll'8ater em.elency and other modltteatlona at coal ·-When the rule ls submit· tedtntothetederalregtster toda)r, the public wm have

60 days to submit comments beforo It Is tlnallzed.

Trump administration omcta1s have long said that the Clean Power Pien ex· eeeded the federal govemment'aauthority. Tbeybave said that the new plan operates within the bounds or the 19'10 Clean Air Act. which ohUges the govern. ment to design a way to cut carbonemlssl.ens.

coal-Industry leaders agreed, and have otrered -· "The preposed rule ap· pears to provide elect.r1c CO· operatives With a more achievable plan, • said Jim Matheson, chief executive otthe Natlenal Rural Elee· trlc Cooperative Aasocl· ation, a powertul utruty trade group whose r:nm:n· bers get more than 4.0 per. eent or their energy trom eoal·ttred generation.

Stm, Matheson said, his member eo-cps are already moving away trom coal In response to economic reali· ty: Otbertuets have become more cost-etreetlve. "The electric eooperatlve fUel mtx ror provldlng electricity Ia changing, with Increased lnvestmeats In natural gas and renewables: he said.

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Exhibit "F"


This is a typical dry cask.

Most dry casks have walls 18 to 24" thick. It can be opened and inspected, and even repaired in

the event of damage.

This is a Holtec canister

This canister has a wall that is only 5/8" thick. It is welded shut. It cannot be opened, inspected, or repaired.



Exhibit "G"


April 2, 2018

JUANENO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

ACJACHEMEN NATION Teresa M. Romero- Chairwoman

Anthony Vaughn -Vice Chair Joseph R. Lopez- Member at Large

Ruthie Ann "Cookie" Stoffel- Member at Large

The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Court, Southern District

Courtroom 4D, Suite 4194

221 West Broadway

San Diego, CA 92101

Re: Case No.: 3:17-cv- 02323-JLS- BGS

Dear Justice,

We the undersigned, Tribal Council ofJuaneft.o Band ofMission Indians, Acjachemen Nation, assert

the following regarding Southern California Edison's claim that Public Watchdogs lacks Article III

standing because it cannot demonstrate "hypothetical and conjectural harm."

We, the Acjachemen, are the indigenous first peoples ofOrange County, Northern San Diego County

and Southern Los Angeles County. We have lived here for over 10,000 years. The San Onofre

Nuclear Generating Station is located on our Traditional Cultural Property (TCP) and sacred burial

grounds. As members and supporters ofPublic Watchdogs, we are included in Public Watchdogs'

representation in this Case No.: 3: 17-cv- 02323-JLS- BGS.

Our tribe has been, is being, and will be harmed by Southern California Edison's past disruptive

construction activities, current unsafe engineering projects, and questionable future

decommissioning at San Onofre.

Prior to Public Watchdogs' November 2017 filing, we learned that a contracted Southern California

Edison archaeologist covertly, therefore mostly likely illegally, removed the remains of our

unearthed Ancestors, in violation of Federal and State law.

31411-A LA MATANZA STREET, SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO, CA 92675

www.juaneno.com ~ P: 949-488-3484 ~ F: 488-3294


Our Ancestors' remains, extracted and stolen from their sacred burial grounds, were sent back to our

Tribe per the post-mortem directions of the said archaeologist. These harmful and incredibly

disrespectful actions were neither "hypothetical" or "conjectural."

It is our belief that Southern California Edison will, throughout the course of its planned 20-year

decommissioning process, continue to desecrate our Traditional Cultural Property.

We therefore urge the Court to reject Southern California Edison's motion to dismiss Public

Watchdog as a plaintiff.

Respectfully,

Ruthie A. (Cookie) Stoffel, Member at Large

31411-A LA MATANZA STREET, SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO, CA 92675 www.juaneno.com ~ P: 949-488-3484 ~ F: 488-3294



Exhibit "H"


Diane Ray, Ph.D.

6413 Corliss Avenue North

Seattle, WA 98103

April 2, 2018

To Whom It May Concern:

My name is Diane Ray. I am a resident of Seattle Washington and a concerned and worried

grandmother whose daughter lives with her family, including a baby girl, in San Clemente

about five miles from where Southern Edison is presently burying nuclear waste in dime-thin

containers arguably vulnerable to corrosion from water and salt air, only warranted to last 10-

25 years, on a fragile bluff, on an earthquake fault, in a seismically active area, in a tsunami risk

zone, one hundred eight feet from the sea and only feet above potential rising sea levels. Such

an exposed waste burial site cannot be protected from terrorism with any assurance. It is

furthermore not clear that there is the technology to deal with a leak, should one of the

cannisters fail. Furthermore, I have read that the structure into which the cannisters are being

placed is built on top of an older, flimsy structure and existing lower level nuclear waste, saving

Edison the bill for cleaning up this site and, perhaps, the very reason they have sited the waste

burial site so poorly from every other safety and risk perspective. My daughter has developed

anxiety over this issue but has signed a lease and does not have the economic wherewithal to

pick up and move at the present time, nor would she and the baby's father wish to leave their

home in San Clemente, otherwise. If they were to purchase a home there and a nuclear

accident occurred, they and potentially everyone within fifty miles would lose their full

investment and possibly all their worldly goods, which nobody will insure from nuclear peril.

I, too, have developed anxiety and impaired sleep thinking about this issue and the eight and a

half million lives in Orange County that are at stake if there were a serious accident at this site,

not to count the thousands of additional tourist lives. California is the eighth largest economy

on the planet. Our nation and world would be devastated by a nuclear accident here.

Contamination of the Pacific Ocean would affect the whole western United States, including the

Pacific Northwest where I reside.

Edison has been fined for egregious breach of public trust before, such as a back room, illegal

deal with regulators when they met secretly in Eastern Europe. According to Charles Langley of

Public Watchdogs, Southern Edison continues to release low level radiation into the sea on

undisclosed days, near a surfing break and swimming area at San Onofre State Park. Their rush

to bury this waste onto federal land transfers the lions' share of future liability to the public.


I have become a member of Public Watchdogs to work towards a better solution for the

storage of the waste at SONGS, which, until a national solution presents itself in years to come,

could be storing the waste in a safer region at Camp Pendleton, where the US Marines could

provide heightened security.

As a doctoral level clinical psychologist, I am well acquainted with the concept of cognitive

dissonance. Strolling around San Clemente and Dana Point on Easter, yesterday, I experienced

how difficult it is to think about a nuclear accident from SONGS here in this glorious American

Eden of coastal Orange County. In the greatest of paradoxes, SONGS is arguably more of a

threat to the public threat now than it was when it was in operation, because as a

decommissioned nuclear power plant it only has to meet the standards of a medical waste site:

no legal need to inform the local public of an accident, no monitoring of radiation levels in

nearby towns, no evacuation plan or FEMA involvement. But the threat from the beachfront

burial of the waste is real, and it needs to be addressed or we could be looking at the worst

ecological disaster in the history of humankind.

On a personal historic note, I would like to add that in the late 1970's I was a young

psychologist working at Little Flower Children's Services, a residential facility that was very

close to the site where the Long Island Lighting Company was building the nuclear plant,

Shoreham, New York, seventy four miles from Manhattan towards the tip of Long Island. On a

good day, the Long Island Expressway is known as the longest parking lot in the world on

densely populated Long Island. I became part of Safe and Sound a group of citizens concerned

about siting a nuclear plant at Shoreham, but speaking to citizen groups at the time, the

attitude people expressed to me was: God would not let anything bad happen to us. Then

Three Mile Island happened in a plant of similar design, and in a blinding rain storm, fifteen

thousand people turned out to protest the opening of Shoreham. Suffolk County, a Republican

government at the time, then ruled against Shoreham ever opening, on the legal grounds that

no evacuation of Long Island was possible. Shoreham never opened but the hulk still sits on a

bluff above Long Island Sound, a cautionary tale. Here we are in 2018 and we have the

decommissioned SONGS with the largest private amount of nuclear waste in our nation,

arguably going into an ill advised, exponentially high risk burial site. Planning an evacuation of

Orange County is unrealistic.

All of these aspects of the beachfront nuclear waste burial at SONGS are a great cause for

anxiety for American citizens nationwide due to our interdependence on one another and the

lives, natural world, and economy hanging in the balance.

Is/ Diane Ray, Ph.D.

Diane Ray, Ph.D.

Telephone: (206) 522-5775

E-mail: [email protected]



Exhibit "I"


Implications of Basic Physics to the San Onofre "Near Miss" Incident

Dr. Tom English*

There was a "near miss" at the San Onofre nuclear power plant on August 3, 2018. The lives and economic well-being of 8.4 million people within a 50-mile radius of the plant have been put at risk. As workers were lowering a 49-ton thin-walled, 17-foot tall canister packed with high-burnup spent nuclear fuel, the canister got caught on the lip of a guiding ring, "hanging by about a quarter inch," as OSHA inspector and whistleblower, David Fritch, told a stunned crowd at the end of a community meeting on August 9th. "It's a bad day. That happened, and you haven't heard about it, and that's not right. What we have is a canister that could have fallen 18 feet."

What would have happened if it had fallen? My colleagues at UCSD and the Samuel Lawrence Foundation have been examining the basic physics of this question. By examining the dropping of the canister in free fall, we can estimate the upper energy involved in the initial impact. For example, the falling canister could hit the concrete floor of the nuclear waste facility with the explosive energy larger than that of 2 large sticks of dynamite. The resultant damage to the canister could cause a large radiation release.

The NRC has previously done an analysis of a similar dropped nuclear waste canister with slightly thinner

walls. 1 This computer simulation included a 19-foot drop of the canister from the transfer cask onto a storage overpack pedestal. The canister failure probability was above 0.28. Similar calculations need to be preformed for San Onofre to determine if the currently used system has such a catastrophically high probability of canister failure. The entire system may have to be completely redesigned to reduce the probability of canister

failure to levels that are considered acceptable in such a high population area.

The damage to the concrete and metal structure at the bottom of the hole could ruin the canister's cooling system. The damage to the concrete would be like that of a fully loaded 18-wheeler truck with a gross weight of 80,000 pounds crashing into reinforced concrete at 23 miles per hour.

These nuclear canisters contain 37 spent fuel assemblies which generate an enormous amount of heat. They are cooled by a simple airduct system, whose pathway could be blocked by the damage caused by the canister's fall. If this happens, large quantities of water would have to be poured into the hole to cool the reaction and prevent or control a meltdown. Similarly, as at Japan's Fukushima nuclear power facility, the enveloping water would instantly become radioactive steam and require the evacuation of millions of people. Since both the canister and the surrounding structure could be badly damaged, there may be no available way to pull the damaged canister from the hole and repair it.

The analysis that we have done alerts the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and others that a more substantial analysis needs to be done of the damage caused by a falling 49-ton nuclear storage canister. Continuation of the loading of the fuel is clearly a very dangerous threat to the lives and livelihood of over 8.4 million people. Software and computer resources are available by which estimates can be made of the impacts of this drop on both the reinforced concrete, and the deformation of the walls on the canister.

Our preliminary calculations have already revealed that the combination of the weight and velocity of the canister exceeds the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), "design criteria for tornado missiles," by a factor of 4. It shall be important to also perform drop tests of the canisters with non-radioactive loads to experimentally determine what will happen to actual canisters.

*Dr. Tom English is a former advisor on high-level nuclear waste disposal to President Carter's Office of Science and Technology Policy, NASA, the Ministry of Industry of the Government of Sweden, and the California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission. (760-918-9963)

1 Pg. 4-24 Table 12, NUREG-1864- A Pilot Probabilistic Risk Assessment of a Dry Cask Storage System at a Nuclear Power Plant, March 2007, A. Malliakos, NRC Project Manager

L_ _________________________________________________________________________________ __



Exhibit "J"


January 31, 2013

IN PO

Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture


INPO 12-012 December 2012

Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture

OPEN DISTRIBUTION

Document


OPEN DISTRIBUTION: Copyright© 2012 by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Not for sale or commercial use. All other rights reserved.

NOTICE: This information was prepared in connection with work sponsored by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Neither INPO, INPO members, INPO participants, nor any person acting on behalf of them (a) makes any wanranty or representation, expressed or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this document, or that the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this document may not infringe on privately owned rights, or (b) assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this document.


INPO 12-012

INTRODUCTION

Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture builds on the knowledge and experience developed since the publication of Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture in 2004. The change in the title reflects the commercial nuclear industry's alignment of its own terminology with that used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This document was developed through a collaborative effort by U.S. industry personnel and the staff of the Institute ofNuclear Power Operations (INPO), with input from representatives of various regulatory agencies, the public, and the nuclear industry worldwide. Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture reflects an alignment in two sets of terms that have been used to describe nuclear safety culture: INPO and the industry defined safety culture in leadership terms of principles and attributes, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission defined safety culture in regulatory terms of components and aspects. Whereas each set of terms served its special function, the result created confusion within operating organizations as to the essential elements of a healthy safety culture.

Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture describes the essential traits and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture, with the goal of creating a framework for open discussion and continuing evolution of safety culture throughout the commercial nuclear energy industry. For the purposes of this document, a trait is defined as a pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving such that safety is emphasized over competing priorities. Experience has shown that the personal and organizational traits described in this document are present in a positive safety culture and that shortfalls in these traits and attributes contribute significantly to plant events.

Rather than prescribing a specific program or implementation method, this document describes the basic traits. These traits and attributes, when embraced, will be reflected in the values, assumptions, behaviors, beliefs, and norms of an organization and its members. Ideally, the traits will describe what it is like to work at a nuclear facility and how things are done there. Traits appear in boldface. The attributes clarify the intent of the traits.

Utility managers are encouraged to make in-depth comparisons between these traits and their day-to-day policies and practices and to use any differences as a basis for improvements.

In addition to the traits and attributes, two addendums are available. Addendum I: Behaviors and Actions That Support a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, describes executive, senior manager, manager, supervisor, and individual contributor behaviors that contribute to a healthy safety culture. An additional table is provided to describe detailed behaviors and actions for each attribute. Addendum II: Cross-References, provides cross-references from INPO 12-012, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, to the previous Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission operating reactor assessment program cross-cutting area components, and the International Atomic Energy Agency safety culture attributes. This cross-reference can help individuals understand how the common language was developed and can be useful in change management efforts in this important area.


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BACKGROUND

Watershed events over the years have influenced the safety culture at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The industry had its first significant wake-up call in 1979 as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station. Many fundamental problems involving hardware, procedures, training, and attitudes toward safety and regulation contributed to the event.

In 1986, the Chernobyl accident was a stark reminder of the hazards of nuclear technology. This accident resulted from many of the same weaknesses that led to the Three Mile Island accident. In addition, it highlighted the importance of maintaining design configuration, plant status control, line authority for reactor safety, and cultural attributes related to safety.

Response from industry and regulatory organizations to both these events was sweeping. Improvements were made in standards, hardware, emergency procedures, processes, training (including simulators), emergency preparedness, design and configuration control, testing, human performance, and attitudes toward safety.

The 2002 discovery of degradation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station reactor vessel head highlighted problems that develop when the safety environment at a plant receives insufficient attention.

Most recently, the 2011 nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant illustrates the importance of thoroughly assessing possible nuclear safety impacts of a hypothetical, yet credible, extreme external event. It also illustrates the importance of emergency response command and control, training, and resource availability for such an event.

A theme common in these events is that, over time, problems crept in, often related to or a direct result of the plant culture. Had these problems been recognized, challenged, and resolved, the events could have been prevented or their severity lessened. The series of decisions and actions that resulted in these events can usually be traced to the shared assumptions, values, and beliefs ofthe organization.

These events and the notion that culture is a key ingredient in the overall success of the plant form the basis for this document.

Organizational culture is the shared basic assumptions that are developed in an organization as it learns and copes with problems. The basic assumptions that have worked well enough to be considered valid are taught to new members of the organization as the correct way to perceive, think, act, and feel. Culture is the sum total of a group's learning. Culture is for the group what character and personality are for the individual.

In addition to a healthy organizational culture, each nuclear station, because of the special characteristics and unique hazards of the technology-radioactive byproducts, concentration of energy in the reactor core, and decay heat-needs a healthy safety culture.

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Nuclear safety culture is defined as the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.

This updated definition was developed to apply broadly across all industries that use nuclear technologies. For the commercial nuclear power industry, nuclear safety remains the overriding priority. Although the same traits apply to radiological safety, industrial safety, security, and environmental safety, nuclear safety is the first value adopted at a nuclear station and is never abandoned.

Nuclear safety is a collective responsibility. The concept of nuclear safety culture applies to every employee in the nuclear organization, from the board of directors to the individual contributor. No one in the organization is exempt from the obligation to ensure safety first.

The performance of individuals and organizations can be monitored and trended and, therefore, may serve as an indicator of the health of an organization's safety culture. However, the health of a facility's safety culture could lie anywhere along a broad continuum, depending on the degree to which the attributes of safety culture are embraced. Even though safety culture is somewhat of an intangible concept, it is possible to determine whether a station tends toward one end of the continuum or the other.

Commercial nuclear power plants are designed, built, and operated to produce electricity. Safety, production, and cost control are necessary goals for the operation of such a plant. These outcomes are quite complementary, and most plants today achieve high levels of safety, impressive production records, and competitive costs, reinforced by decisions and actions made with a long-term view. This perspective keeps safety as the overriding priority for each plant and for each individual associated with it.

Nuclear safety culture is a leadership responsibility. Experience has shown that leaders in organizations with a healthy safety culture foster safety culture through activities such as the following:

• Leaders reinforce safety culture at every opportunity. The health of safety culture is not taken for granted.

• Leaders frequently measure the health of safety culture with a focus on trends rather than absolute values.

• Leaders communicate what constitutes a healthy safety culture and ensure everyone understands his or her role in its promotion.

• Leaders recognize that safety culture is not all or nothing but is, rather, constantly moving along a continuum. As a result, there is a comfort in discussing safety culture within the organization as well as with outside groups, such as regulatory agencies.

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The traits described in this document are divided into three categories that are similar to the three categories of safety culture in International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG)-4, Safety Culture. The categories and their primary traits are as follows:

• Individual Commitment to Safety

- Personal Accountability

- Questioning Attitude

- Safety Communication

• Management Commitment to Safety

- Leadership Accountability

- Decision-Making

- Respectful Work Environment

• Management Systems

- Continuous Learning

- Problem Identification and Resolution

- Environment for Raising Concerns

- Work Processes

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... i

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... iii

THE TRAITS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES ...................................................................... 1

Individual Commitment to Safety ....................................................................................... 1

Personal Accountability .............................................................................................. 1

Questioning Attitude ................................................................................................... 1

Safety Communication ................................................................................................ 2

Management Commitment to Safety .................................................................................. 3

Leadership Accountability .......................................................................................... 3

Decision-Making ......................................................................................................... 4

Respectful Work Environment ................................................................................... 4

Management Systems ......................................................................................................... 5

Continuous Learning ................................................................................................... 5

Problem Identification and Resolution ....................................................................... 5

Environment for Raising Concerns ............................................................................. 6

Work Processes ........................................................................................................... 6

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 9

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THE TRAITS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES

Individual Commitment to Safetv

P A. Personal Accountability

All individuals take personal responsibility for safety. Responsibility and authority for nuclear safety are well defined and clearly understood. Reporting relationships, positional authority, and team responsibilities emphasize the overriding importance of nuclear safety.

Attributes:

P A.1 Standards: Individuals understand the importance of adherence to nuclear standards. All levels of the organization exercise accountability for shortfalls in meeting standards.

PA.2 Job Ownership: Individuals understand and demonstrate personal responsibility for the behaviors .and work practices that support nuclear safety.

P A.3 Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained.

QA. Questioning Attitude

Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions, assumptions, anomalies, and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action. All employees are watchful for assumptions, values, conditions, or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant safety.

Attributes:

QA.l Nuclear is Recognized as Special and Unique: Individuals understand that complex technologies can fail in unpredictable ways.

QA.2 Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before work proceeds.

QA.3 Challenge Assumptions: Individuals challenge assumptions and offer opposing views when they believe something is not correct.

QA.4 Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes.

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CO. Safety Communication

Communications maintain a focus on safety. Safety communication is broad and includes plant-level communication, job-related communication, worker-level communication, equipment labeling, operating experience, and documentation. Leaders use formal and informal communication to convey the importance of safety. The flow of information up the organization is seen as important as the flow of information down the organization.

Attributes:

CO.l Work Process Communications: Individuals incorporate safety communications in work activities.

C0.2 Bases for Decisions: Leaders ensure that the bases for operational and organizational decisions are communicated in a timely manner.

C0.3 Free Flow oflnformation: Individuals communicate openly and candidly, both up, down, and across the organization and with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.

C0.4 Expectations: Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that nuclear safety is the organization's overriding priority.

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Management Commitment to Safety

LA. Leadership Accountability

Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors. Executive and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and demonstrate their commitment both in word and action. The nuclear safety message is communicated frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders throughout the nuclear organization set an example for safety. Corporate policies emphasize the overriding importance of nuclear safety.

Attributes

LA.l Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.

LA.2 Field Presence: Leaders are commonly seen in working areas of the plant observing, coaching, and reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations from standards and expectations are corrected promptly.

LA.3 Incentives, Sanctions, and Rewards: Leaders ensure incentives, sanctions, and rewards are aligned with nuclear safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

LA.4 Strategic Commitment to Safety: Leaders ensure plant priorities are aligned to reflect nuclear safety as the overriding priority.

LA.5 Change Management: Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.

LA.6 Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities: Leaders clearly define roles, responsibilities, and authorities to ensure nuclear safety.

LA. 7 Constant Examination: Leaders ensure that nuclear safety is constantly scrutinized through a variety of monitoring techniques, including assessments of nuclear safety culture.

LA.8 Leader Behaviors: Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for safety.

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DM. Decision-Making

Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and thorough. Operators are vested with the authority and understand the expectation, when faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the plant in a safe condition. Senior leaders support and reinforce conservative decisions.

Attributes:

DM.l Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate.

DM.2 Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop.

DM.3 Accountability for Decisions: Single-point accountability is maintained for nuclear safety decisions.

WE. Respectful Work Environment

Trust and respect permeate the organization, creating a respectful work environment. A high level oftrust is established in the organization, fostered, in part, through timely and accurate communication. Differing professional opinions are encouraged, discussed, and resolved in a timely manner. Employees are informed of steps taken in response to their concerns.

Attributes:

WE.l Respect is Evident: Everyone is treated with dignity and respect.

WE.2 Opinions are Valued: Individuals are encouraged to voice concerns, provide suggestions, and raise questions. Differing opinions are respected.

WE.3 High Level ofTrust: Trust is fostered among individuals and work groups throughout the organization.

WE.4 Conflict Resolution: Fair and objective methods are used to resolve conflicts.

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Management Systems

CL. Continuous Learning

Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought out, and implemented. Operating experience is highly valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well developed. Training, self-assessments, and benchmarking are used to stimulate learning and improve performance. Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a variety of monitoring techniques, some of which provide an independent "fresh look."

Attributes:

CL.1 Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements lessons from relevant internal and external operating experience information in a timely manner.

CL.2 Self-Assessment: The organization routinely conducts self-critical and objective assessments of its programs, practices, and performance.

CL.3 Benchmarking: The organization learns from other organizations to continuously improve knowledge, skills, and safety performance.

CL.4 Training: High-quality training maintains a knowledgeable workforce and reinforces high standards for maintaining nuclear safety.

Pl. Problem Identification and Resolution

Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance. Identification and resolution of a broad spectrum of problems, including organizational issues, are used to strengthen safety and improve performance.

Attributes:

PI.1 Identification: The organization implements a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program.

PI.2 Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that problem resolutions and solutions address causes and extents of conditions commensurate with their safety significance.

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INPO 12-012

PI.3 Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance.

Pl.4 Trending: The organization periodically analyzes information from the corrective action program and other assessments in the aggregate to identify adverse trends or conditions.

RC. Environment for Raising Concerns

A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination. The station creates, maintains, and evaluates policies and processes that allow personnel to freely raise concerns.

Attributes:

RC.l SCWE Policy: The organization implements a policy that supports individual rights and responsibilities to raise safety concerns and does not tolerate harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination for doing so.

RC.2 Alternate Process for Raising Concerns: The organization implements a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line management influence. Safety issues may be raised in confidence and are resolved in a timely and effective manner.

WP. WorkProcesses

The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is maintained. Work management is a deliberate process in which work is identified, selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed, and critiqued. The entire organization is involved in and fully supports the process.

Attributes:

WP.1 Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work.

WP .2 Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains equipment within design margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth, and safety-related equipment.

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INPO 12-012

WP .3 Documentation: The organization creates and maintains complete, accurate, and up-to-date documentation.

WP .4 Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

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INPO 12-012

Acknowledgements

The following individuals participated in advisory groups that developed the traits and attributes in this document.

J ef:frey B. Archie Senior Vice President and ChiefNuclear Officer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company

Ronald A. Barnes Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Arizona Public Service Company

Elizabeth Beswick Nuclear Professionalism Consultant Nuclear Generation EDF Energy

Susan Brissette Manager, Management System Department Bruce Power

Annick Camino Director Energy Strategists Consultancy Limited

Conrad Dube Project Manager W ANO Paris Center

Randall K. Edington Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Arizona Public Service Company

Edwin J. Eilola Director, Nuclear Oversight PSEG Nuclear LLC

Jose Manuel Diaz Francisco Communication and Safety Coordinator Electronuclear

9

David F. Garchow Vice President, Plant Technical Support Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Ronald Gaston Licensing Manager Exelon Corporation

Billie Garde, Esq. Partner Clifford & Garde, LLP

Pierre Francois Gest Senior Safety Officer Operational Safety Section International Atomic Energy Agency

Edward D. Halpin Senior Vice President and ChiefNuclear Officer Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Jun Hamada General Manager & Group Leader Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

Lori Hayes Manager, Corporate Nuclear Oversight Progress Energy, Inc.

Albert R. Hochevar Deputy Director, OR Team Leaders Institute ofNuclear Power Operations

Tom Houghton Senior Director, Safety Focused Regulation Nuclear Energy Institute

William R. Illing Senior Program Manager Institute ofNuclear Power Operations


Bernard Jeannin Safety Standards Advisor Safety and Security Coordination International Atomic Energy Agency

Molly Keefe Human Factors Analyst Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Anne Kerhoas Senior Safety Specialist Division ofNuclear Installation Safety Department ofNuclear Safety and Security International Atomic Energy Agency

G. Kenneth Koves, Ph.D. Principal Program Manager Institute ofNuclear Power Operations

Johann Kritzinger Corporate Consultant: Human Performance Nuclear Operating Unit Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd

Valerie Lagrange Safety Management & Human Factors Advisor Nuclear Operation Division Electricite de France

James E. Lynch Vice President, Assistance Institute ofNuclear Power Operations

Kamishan Martin Human Factors Engineer Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Stephanie Morrow, Ph.D. Human Factors Analyst Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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INPO 12-012

Kevin J. Mulligan Vice President, Operations Support Entergy Nuclear

Michael J. Pacilio President and ChiefNuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Corporation

Ray Powell Chief, Technical Support and Assessment Branch Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Gregory Rolina Researcher Mines ParisTech

Philip K. Russell Team Leader Institute ofNuclear Power Operations

Jack Rutkowski Reactor Inspector Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Eric Ruesch Senior Reactor Inspector Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Diane Sieracki Senior Safety Culture Program Manager Office ofEnforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Undine Shoop Chief, Health Physics and Human Performance Branch Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission


Preston D. Swafford Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Tennessee Valley Authority

Carin Sylvander Human Performance, RQH and Safety Culture Vattenfall AB; Ringhals NPP

Alexandra Tudor Engineer, Performance Monitoring Section Safety and Compliance Department CNE Cernavoda, S.N. Nuclearelectrica

Eduard Volkov Director Prognoz - Obninsk Science Research Center

Andrew J. Vomastek Fleet Manager, Dominion Nuclear Employee Concerns Programs Dominion Generation

INPO 12-012

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110·644·81100

fAX 110·64·HS49


1 BRIGGS LAW CORPORATION [FILE: 1924.00] Cory J. Briggs (State Bar no. 176284)

2 [email protected] 99 East "C" Street, Suite Ill

3 Upland, CA 91786 Telephone: 909-949-7115

Attorneys for PlaintiffPublic Watchdogs 4

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 PUBLIC WATCHDOGS, )

12 Plaintiff, ~ )

13 vs. ~

14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED) STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; JAMES)

15 MATTIS, in his official capacity as Secretary of l Defense; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

16 THE NAVY; RICHARD V. SPENCER, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Navy; l

17 SOUTHERNCALIFORNIAEDISONCOMPANY; SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY;

18 and DOES 1 through 100,

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Defendants. ~

CASE NO. 3: 17-cv-02323-JLS-BGS

PROOF OF SERVICE

Action Filed: November 15, 2017 Judge: Hon. Janis L. Sammartino Courtroom: 4D (Schwartz)


1 I, Cory J. Briggs, am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action. My business address

2 is Briggs Law Corporation, 99 East "C" Street, Suite 111, Upland, CA 91786.

3 On September 28, 2018, I served a copy of (1) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

4 DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF on each party to this proceeding and/or the

5 party's attomey(s) of record (if any) registered to use the Court's Case Management/Electronic

6 Case Filing System (CM/ECF) via the CM/ECF system.

7 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing

8 is true and correct.

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10 Date: September 28, 2018. s/ Cory J. Briggs

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PROOF OF SERVICE Page2


united~ · 4 jurisdiction and venue 5 7. this court has federal-question jurisdiction over this...

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