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Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System

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17. COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on revenre if necessary and identify by block number)FIELD GROUP SUB.GROUP Prussian-German General Staff; Bundeswehr;

German army; NATO

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)This is a study of the Prussian-German General Staff system and its influence on the

Bundeswehr. In addition to being a solid contemporary analysis of this key characteristic

of successive German military structures, it contributes to the understanding of a little

known aspect of an important ally's military. Professor Donald Abenheim, a well-respected

expert on the Bundeswehr, has provided a foreword explaining the importance of theGeneral Staff in the German Army, as well as its strong historical influence in U.S.

military thinking.

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22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 22c. OFFICE SYMBOLMarianne P. Cowling (717) 245-3001 AWCI.

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UNCLASSIFIED

UNDERSTANDING THE PRUSSIAN-GERMAN

GENERAL STAFF SYSTEM

Aco oola oro

NTIS Ga

C

Oberst i.G. Christian O.E. Millntot! _l A,, rGerman Army oDre I.

March 20, 1992

041

I-

24 24 118

The views in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarilyreflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, theDepartment of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This publication isapproved for public release; distribution unlimited.

S * .wl4x-"!r tents pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwardedw , II Rt l= dr, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle

- Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed by callingco.mmerqii (717) 245-3911 or DSN 242-3911.

,Olo 01# V:

', - .Colonel Jerome J. Comello of the Department of Military Strategy,Pladning and Operations advised in the preparation of this essay. Dr.Thomas-Durell Young of the Strategic Studies Institute edited the draftmanuscript and prepared if for publication.

i II~lII

CONTENTS

From the Director ................................. v

Forew ord ....................................... vii

Chapter 1. Introduction ............................ 1

Chapter 2. The Prussian-GermanGeneral Staff System .............................. 5

Chapter 3. Developmentof the General Staff Concept ....................... 25

Chapter 4. Effects and Ways,Deficits and Demands ............................. 51

Chapter 5. Observations and Conclusion ............ 59

Endnotes ....................................... 65

Biographical Sketches ............................ 75

iii

ma N R mlllm lllll i l - m 4

FROM THE DIRECTOR

From time to time, an extraordinary manuscript comes tothe attention of the Strategic Studies Institute which warrantsconsideration for publication. In addition to writing analyses ofcurrent international security developments, we also arecharged with writing and publishing works which contribute toa greater understanding of military issues.

While a student here at the Army War College, ColonelChristian Millotat, of the German Army, wrote an excellentstudy of the Prussian-German General Staff system and itsinfluence on the Bundeswehr. In addition to being a solidcontemporary analysis of this key characteristic of successiveGerman military structures, it was judged also to fit the criteriaof contributing to the understanding of a little known aspect ofan important ally's military. Professor Donald Abenheim, awell-respected expert on the Bundeswehr, has provided aforeword explaining the importance of the General Staff in theGerman Army, as well as its strong historical influence in U.S.military thinking.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer ColonelMillotat's essay as a contribution to an improved understandingof the Bundeswehr.

KARL W. ROBINSONColonel, U.S. ArmyDirector, Strategic Studies Institute

v

r -

FOREWORD

The Prussian-German General Staff has aroused strongemotions among Americans concerned with Germany andcontemporary military affairs during this century and before.The men in their Prussian blue or field-gray uniforms with thecrimson facings have earned such epithets as "brilliantmilitarists," "the brains of armies," "geniuses of war," "criminalsagainst peace," "foes of democracy," and "technocrats oforganized violence." This variety of generalizations suggestswide confusion in this country about an institution that hasalternately fascinated and repelled Americans; such interesthas, if anything, intensified since German unification in1989-90 and subsequent fears about a rebirth of German worldpower. Such emotional phrases, however, tell little of thequalities that set the Prussian-German command apart fromthose of other armies in Europe and beyond, nor of its leadingpersonalities, its political successes, and failures; neither dothese generalizations say much about the specificcharacteristics of the Prussian-German General Staff that haveendured into the strategic world of today. These latter aspectsof the past and present are the subject of this study by ChristianMillotat, a colonel of the Bundeswehr, a graduate of the U.S.Army War College and a brigade commander in easternGermany. His education and his service in NATO and nationalstaffs and line positions well equip him to describe the essenceof the Prussian-German General Staff and interpret its legacyin the German military of the present. His pages treat thesematters with more insight and brevity than can be found in thework of others; previous accounts are either now outdated orthe product of those unfamiliar with the evolution of thePrussian-German staff and its legacy in the Bundeswehr.

The U.S. Army has long nurtured those concerned with thecharacter of German military institutions; from its verybeginnings, there existed in the U.S. Army those links to theEuropean military experience that led to an exchange ofAmerican and European practices and customs in the 19th and

vii

20th centuries. This generalization holds especially true forthe era after 1870, when the Prussian-Germans emerged fromthe wars of unification as exemplars of professionalism andskill for those dissatisfied with the peacetime lot of the post-CivilWar army. From Emory Upton in the 1870s until such figuresas Truman Smith and Albert Wedemeyer in the epoch of theWorld Wars, U.S. Army officers gained first hand knowledgeof German military institutions that had a profound impact onthe U.S. Army in war and peace. The Second World War ledto what today seems like a kind of permanent community offate between the U.S. and German armies. The first phase inthis development occurred with the cataclysmic antagonism of1941-45 that has left its mark until today. The second, andperhaps most important alliance phase, began in the era of theBerlin Blockade in 1948-50 and the Korean War and extendsinto the post-1989 present. The allied decision during theKorean War to arm the Federal Republic of Germany and tostation a large peace-time contingent of U.S. ground forces inthe new Federal Republic of Germany ushered in four decadesof cooperation between American and German soldiers for thedefense of Europe.

The dynamic, yet poorly understood relationship betweenallies in NATO awaits its full scholarly interpretation forstudents of contemporary strategy. The interaction betweenGerman and American military experience since 1945 hasbeen a major feature of the Alliance, but this interaction isgenerally unknown to those Americans who have notexperienced it first-hand. Thankfully, Colonel Millotat's studycasts light on past and present dimensions of German idealsof command, issues that impinge on our understanding ofstrategic and operational questions of alliance cohesion. Heemphasizes the importance of the neglected historical roots ofwhat one might call a German philosophy of command in warthat had its genesis in the Prussian reform movement of theearly 19th century; the following pages describe theinstitutional setting where these ideals of command flourishedas well as how contemporary descendants of Scharnhorst,Clausewitz, and Moltke interpret this legacy in today'sBundeswehr. These issues deeply affect the cohesion of theAlliance and the blending of national styles of war that bulk

viii

large in the NATO of 1992 and beyond with its emphasis uponmultinational corps. The dynamics of coalition warfare andalliance cohesion require that those officers who serve with theU.S. Army in Europe better comprehend German ideas ofcommand and control as they evolved over the past 200 years.One might also suggest, in conclusion, that as the nations ofthe vanished Warsaw Pact reorient their ideals of militaryprofessionalism and the institutions of command, the officersof the U.S. Army must deepen their knowledge of therespective national experience of command. Key to thisprocess is an appreciation of the institutional dynamics ofstrategy and operations in those armies coping with the traumaof national upheaval and recovery. The German experiencein this connection, as described by Colonel Millotat, hasextraordinary relevance to the present and future dimensionsof strategy in Europe and beyond.

DONALD ABENHEIMNaval Postgraduate School

ix

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Military Staff Systems Today-A Result of HistoricalProcesses.

In 1887 the British military writer Spenser Wilkinsonpublished his essay The Brain of an Army, A Popular Accountof the German General Staff. In the introduction to the secondedition of 1895, we find the following remarkable statement:

It may well be doubted whether this feature of the Prussian(General Staff) System is suitable for imitation elsewhere. TheGermans themselves regard it as accidental rather than essential,for in organizing their Navy they have, after much experiment anddeliberation, adopted a different plan.'

If one compares the allied armed forces in NATOsuperficially, it seems as if there was a complete consensusabout the axioms of staff work and military leadership. In thecenter, there are the individual leaders at the different levelsof command, internally independent men, who take decisions,commit themselves, and, by means of their example, lead theirmen in peace and war. The higher the levels of command, thegreater the responsibility, and, in consequence, the bigger thestaffs. These staffs relieve the military leaders of the load ofadmiristrative details of everyday business. They work up thefacts for their decisions, then implement their orders andsupervise the execution. However, if officers assigned toNATO take a closer look, they recognize that the views ofmilitary leadership and the roles and functions of staff officersand their relationship with their commanders differconsiderably. These differences, as well as the stafforganizations of the allied armed forces and their role as aninstrument of military leadership, are the result of historicalprocesses that took different courses. The correlation ofleaders and staffs in armed forces can be assessed with

certainty only if one knows the roots of the different staffsystems. These systems have developed for generations inthe respective military political environment of the individualnations and, adapted to our times, continue to have an effectinto the present.

When I was a student at the Canadian Forces Commandand Staff College and later during my assignment toHeadquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe, I was often askedabout the Prussian-German General Staff System by alliedcomrades-in-arms. They wanted to know if it still had an effecton the Bundeswehr today. At the U.S. Army War College, Iwas asked the same questions. I realized that my fellowsoldiers admired the efficiency of the Prussian-GermanGeneral Staff as demonstrated in the German Unification Warsof the 19th cenury and in the two World Wars, even withoutknowing its peculiarities. The reason for this lack of knowledgeobviously results from the following phenomenon.

In the introduction to his book, The Imperial and RoyalAustrian Army 1848-1914, The Lost Wehrmacht. ChristophAllmeyer Beck, a famous Austrian military author, writes thatit is an Austrian phenomenon that something that has beendeclared de jure nonexistent, simply continues to existelsewhere in his country.2 He further states that many thingsthat came into being out of a fine tissue of historical events,intellectual trends and emotional attitudes, would often lead astrange underground existence, trickling up to the surface timeand again, thus continuing to exist even into the present.Anyone who attempts to describe the characteristics of thePrussian-German General Staff System, its influence oneveryday business and the way that Bundeswehr GeneralStaff officers see themselves, will be reminded of thisobservation of Austrian reality.

The functions and responsibilities of the German GeneralStaff officer were last compiled and issued as an order in theclassified Manual for General Staff Service in Wartime(Handbuch fuer den Generalstabsdienst im Kriege) in 1939.3

The methods and tasks described within were applied almostunchanged in the Bundeswehr until the publication of thesecond revised edition of the Army Regulation TF/G 7?, HDv

2

100/100 "Command and Control of Armed Forces"(Truppenfuehrung) in September 1987. There appears in thisregulation, for the first time, a concise paragraph whichexplains the functions and responsibilities of the BundeswehrGeneral Staff officer. Paragraph 615 states:

The commander must be supported by obedient, independent andcritical advising General Staff officers ("Fuehrergehilfen"). Theyprovide him with information and advice, prepare decisions, turnthem into orders and measures and supervise their execution. Ifnecessary, they urge the commander to decide and act. Theirthinking and actions must be guided by his will and intentions andmust be determined by his decisions and orders.4

Past authors who wrote about the Prussian-GermanGeneral Staff System mostly concentrated on the macrocosmof the organization of the former German General Staffs, theirleading figurE!s, and their relationship with the highest militaryand political leadership. Analyses of the microcosm of thePrussian-German General Staff officers were not neglected,but never given the depth of research and attention as to itsmicro aspects. To date, there is no publication that analyzesthe characteristics of the General. Staff officers of theBundeswehr in light of history, their work within NATO staffsand the current challenges which were initiated by therevolutionary developments in Eastern Europe and inGermany since 1989. 5 Many authors terminated theirresearch with the unconditional surrender of the Wehrmachtin 1945.

This essay is designed to help remedy this unsatisfactorysituation and to stimulate discussion. This seems to benecessary for two important reasons. First, Germany will stayin NATO. German General Staff officers will continue to workfor allied superiors. Consequently, allied officers should havean understanding of the peculiarities of their Germansubordinates. This will become increasingly important sinceallied forces in Europe will consist overwhelmingly ofmultinational corps made up of national units.6 This meansthat the degree of cooperation among German General Staffofficers, their allied superiors, subordinates, and their fellowsoldiers will increase. Second, in the Bundeswehra diminution

3

in the education of young officers about German history canbe observed. At the present time, Ernst Moritz Arndt'sstatement in his Catechism for the German Warrior(Katechismus fuer den deutschen Kriegs-und Wehrmann) of1813 is therefore especially true for the German General Staffofficer who exercises considerable power in the armed forcesof today. "Where history is not available, man faces his presentempty-handed. Thus, he hardly recognizes a way into thefuture because he has lost sight of where he came from."'

Fundamentally, a professional group is only able to develop aconcept of itself, introduce its peculiarities into everyday workand to act proactively, if it is aware of its roots and foundations,and recognizes how these influence the present. One whoknows the foundations of his profession and is able to articulatethem is invulnerable to misinterpretation and professionalcriticism.

These statements provide a guideline for the structure ofthis evaluation. After some reflections on the phenomenon ofthe Prussian-German General Staff System, the General Staffofficers of the Bundeswehr will be portrayed. Theorganizational roots of these peculiarities will be pointed outby discussing their history. This discussion will include onlyexamples of how the activities of former General Staff officersaffect the Bundeswehr General Staff officers and how they seethemselves and their working methods. In doing so there is arisk of "open flanks," as historical developments will only beshown insofar as they have had impact on the German GeneralStaff officers of today. For example, this means that theWehrmachtAir Force General Staff and German Admiral Staffofficers will not be discussed in depth because the cradle ofGeneral Staff officer was in the German Armies of the past. Inthe concluding section a discussion of problem areasconcerning deficits and demands which face the GermanGeneral Staff officer today, and in the future, will be presented.A summary and some recommendations on a better use of thePrussian-German General Staff system to the benefit of atransformed NATO will conclude this evaluation.

4

CHAPTER 2

THE PRUSSIAN-GERMANGENERAL STAFF SYSTEM

Between Condemnation and Admiration.

In the epilogue to his book A Short History of the GermanGeneral Staff (Kleine Geschichte des deutschenGeneralstabs) of 1967, Walter Goerlitz pointed out that thePrussian-German General Staff has remained a sociologicaland political phenomenon, despite the German loss in WorldWar I1. He is certainly right; there is hardly another militaryinstitution or group that has been looked upon with so muchcontroversy.8 For Germany's former enemies, thePrussian-German General Staff was an object of fear andrevulsion, an organization which was considered to representthe kernel of professional militarism in which a selected groupof officers worked in monkish isolation on the preparation ofwar plans.9 They suspected the German General Staff to beone of those "dark forces," which was weaving the threads ofthe destiny of nations behind the scenes. Above all, manyAmericans viewed it as a "conspiracy" which is a crime withinthe common law legal system. 10 After 1945, noted Europeansspread similar interpretations. It may remain an open questionwhether these were uttered on the basis of conviction or weremere propaganda. Winston Churchill wrote in his memoirsafter World War II: "If we arrest and shoot every General Staffofficer, we will have peace for the next 50 years." Stalin wentone step further; he wanted to liquidate every German Staffofficer after the war."

In the Treaty of Versailles, the victors of World War Ibanned the Great General Staff (Grosser Generalstab). Thevictors of World War II accused the German General Staff, theArmed Forces High Command (Oberkommando derWehrmacht) of being criminal organizations and the leading

5

Wehrmacht generals of being criminals at the NuernbergTrials. Thanks to the defense by Dr. Laternser, assisted byField Marshal von Manstein, the General Staff and its officerswere acquitted of this charge. The defense succeeded inproving that the German General Staff of World War II wasonly one of several operations staffs of the Wehrmacht andnever had the immense power that had been ascribed to it inthe indictment. The Soviets protested this acquittal.12

In East German military literature the Prussian-GermanGeneral Staff was assessed unfavorably:

In the system of modern German militarism there is no institutionsince the end of the 19th Century which has played so disastrousa role as the General Staff. . . . The General Staff of thePrussian-German type represents in a most obvious way theanti-democratic and inhuman character of German militarism; thisboth in the past and in the Federal Republic of today. 13

General Staff training was not excluded from thecontroversial discussion on the reorientation of Bundeswehrofficer training in the 1970s. Officers and education reformersof entirely different intellectual and political backgroundsargued that a democratic state's army no longer neededGeneral Staff officers. They said that training a small group ofofficers with special competencies within the officers corpswas inconsistent with the principle of equality, promoted thedevelopment of a caste spirit, was elitist, and no longertolerable in modern times. 14

Authors of English military literature overwhelminglyadmire the Prussian-German General Staff. They drawattention to the phenomenon that after Field Marshal CountHelmuth von Moltke's victories over Austria in 1866 andFrance in 1870-71, other countries tried to adopt thePrussian-German General Staff system for their armed forces.For example, Secretary of War Elihu Root failed to achieve thisend in the United States of America from 1899 to 1904,because the American public opposed the establishment of aspecially trained, small group of officers in the armed forces.However, Root was not completely unsuccessful; we findnumerous elements of Prussian-German origin in the

6

American staff system of today. At the beginning of the 1980sa second year of training was introduced at the United StatesArmy Command and General Staff College in FortLeavenworth for selected staff officers, which indicates that theU.S. Army is currently testing a 2-year training program for itsfuture leadership. Elihu Root's plan has been revived. TheBritish studied the Prussian-German organization carefully butwent different ways. After the war of 1870-71, GeneralMarie-Joseph Miribel established a new General Staff inFrance which was based to a certain extent on thePrussian-German organization and some of its command andcontrol principles.

Walter Goerlitz pointed out that after World War II, theAmericans were the first to use the methods of thePrussian-German General Staff for the benefit of theireconomy. Many elements that have become integral parts ofmanagerial economics and organizing sciences can be tracedback to the Prussian-German General Staff system. 15 In thislight, the working method of the Prussian-German GeneralStaff has been adopted in the German language as an idiom.A very accurately prepared and successfully executed projectis frequently rated "general staff-like" (generalstabsmaessig).

General Staff Officers in the Bundeswehr.

When the Bundeswehr was formed in the 1950s, theGerman military tradition had a negative connotation. TheNational Socialists had abused the traditional German militaryvalues, and, as a result, leading Bundeswehr officers wantedto distance themselves from past traditions. Thus, only certainperiods of history considered to be "tradition-worthy" wereselected. This approach has been called untenable byhistorians.16 In light of this approach, it is astonishing that thewhole tradition of the Prussian-German General Staff wasdeclared to be binding for Bundeswehr General Staff officers.On May 15, 1957, the first Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr,General Heusinger, delivered his opening speech at the newlyfounded Army Academy (Heeresakademie). In the presenceof the Federal Minister of Defense he said:

7

Tradition obliges... when I am to reopen today.. .the recreatedHeeresakademie .... We (the General Staff officers) are only linksin the long chain of the development of German military history...This chain goes back 147 years into the past... You, particularly,are in a most dedicated manner the defenders and guardians ofthe values of German military tradition. Thanks to these values itwas held in high esteem in the past; slowly but constantly thepostwar veils are being lifted from these values .... "

After years of controversy surrounding BundeswehrGeneral Staff officer training, another Chief of Staff, GeneralBrandt, summarized the tradition and the way BundeswehrGeneral Staff officers see themselves in his farewell speechto the General and Admiral Staff Course of 1977. Just asGeneral Heusinger had done in 1957, General Brandtestablished a direct link between the present and the past:

Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz created the General Staffand gave this instrument its objective and direction; the great Chiefsof Staff, Moltke and Schlieffen, developed the General Staff to highperfection; their successors Seeckt, Beck and Halder preservedtheir heritage. They personified the typical General Staff officerwho is the first adviser of his commander, the 'Fuehrergehilfe.' Inthis respect they are still exemplary for us today. 8

There are General Staff officers in the Bundeswehr, butthere is no General Staff officer branch or corps. And there isno General Staff division within the Federal Ministry of Defensethat is in charge of the strategic operational planning of theBundeswehr. The Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces,the Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, is not a Chief of theGeneral Staff vested with the classical General Staff functionsof contingency operations, campaign planning and the conductof operations in time of war.

The German Federal Ministry of Defense exercises thefunction of a technical department for military national defenseand executes with its military staffs the roles of a supremeheadquarters of the Federal Armed Forces. It comprises fivemilitary staffs-the Armed Forces Staff, the Army, Air Force andNavy staffs, and the Office of the Surgeon General-and sixministerial divisions-the Budget Division, the PersonnelManagement Division, the Quartering, Real Estate and

8

Construction Division and the Social Services Division. TheChief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces is the suprememilitary representative of the Bundeswehr and the militaryadviser to the Federal Government. He represents theBundeswehr in international bodies in the position of a jointservices Chief of Staff. Although he is not included in the chainof command between the Minister and the armed forces, hehas been delegated by the Minister special responsibility forthe overall concept of the Bundeswehr. His planningresponsibility commits him to develop the structure,organization, command and control, education, training, andequipment within the scope of given political parameters.

In NATO staffs where the operational defense planning forthe Federal Republic of Germany is developed, there are nodivisions consisting exclusively of German General Staffofficers. The Federal Republic of Germany is the only NATOcountry which in the event of war, relinquishes operationalcommand over all combat units of her armed forces and anumber of major formations of the Territorial Army to NATOcommanders. This means that the Generalinspekteur, theArmed Forces Staff and the Army, Air Force and Navy servicestaffs of the Bundeswehr are not involved in operationaldefense planning, which was the classic task of formerGerman General Staffs. As far as strategic-operationalplanning is concerned, they are involved in the coordinationand approval processes of the NATO commanders' plans forthe defense of German territory. This is again classic GeneralStaff work. At present, the Bundeswehr forces on the territoryof the former German Democratic Republic cannot beassigned to NATO in time of peace as long as Soviet forcesare stationed there. Their operational planning must beexecuted by the Bundeswehr alone as a national endeavor.This does not exclude close cooperation with NATOauthorities. It will be done within the established divisions ofthe Federal Ministry of Defense. There appears to be no needfor a special General Staff planning agency. 19

The General Staff officer service (Generalstabsdienst) wasdefined in the so-called Heusinger-Directive of September 8,1959. According to this directive, General Staff officer service

9

is duty in a General or Admiral Staff officer position. Thesepositions are specifically designated in the Tables ofOrganization and Equipment.2" Most General Staff officerpositions will be filled with graduates of the Federal ArmedForces Command and General Staff Academy(Fuehrungsakademie) in Hamburg. It is also possible,however, that officers without General Staff officer trainingobtain temporary assignments to such positions. GeneralStaff officers are frequently given line commands in order tokeep them familiar with everyday unit problems. General Staffofficers are entitled to add "in the General Staff Service" (imGeneralstabsdienst) or "in the General Staff" (im Generalstab,or simply, i.G.) after their rank. In the German language bothterms are used synonymously.

Ranks of General Staff Officers and Size of the Service.

The lowest "i.G." rank is that of a captain, while the highestis colonel. Generals holding General Staff positions, e.g., theChief of Staff of a Corps, do not bear the "i.G." after the rank.The German Army and Air Force General Staff officers havespecial insignia: in the respective German manual thedescription of General Staff officer insignia reads, "Dull greyembroidery, stitched by hand, on a crimson underground, 2 x11 small prongs on either side. The angles of the V-shapedembroidery point downwards. The epaulettes have a crimsonunderlay."2 General Staff officers who hold positions whichare not designated as General Staff positions wear the collarinsignia of their branch of service and do not add the "i.G." totheir rank. Admiral Staff officers do not have special insigniain the Bundeswehr, and they never had any in the Germannavies of the past.

German General and Admiral Staff officers form a smallgroup within the Bundeswehr. According to an unclassifiedsource of the Personnel Management Division, 39,242 officersserved in the Bundeswehr during the first half of the 1970s:26,102 regular line officers (Truppenoffiziere), 1,615 medicalofficers and 11,525 officer specialists (Offiziere desmilitaerfachlichen Dienstes).22 Only 1,453 of these officerpositions were designated as General Staff or Admiral Staff

10

posts. Two hundred seventy-eight officers temporarilyassigned to General Staff and Admiral Staff posts had not beentrained as General Staff officers. Thus, only 3.8 percent of allofficer posts were General Staff and Admiral Staff positions.A subdivision into the branches resulted in the followingfigures, which have not changed very much over time: with its20,167 officers, the Army had available a total of 820 GeneralStaff posts. The Navy has 3,337 officers, with 188 posts forAdmiral Staff officers. Twelve thousand two hundredtwenty-seven officers served in the Air Force. Four hundredand forty-five of the posts were designated as General Staffpositions.

In the middle of the 1980s there were 1,523 trained GeneralStaff and Admiral Staff officers in the Bundeswehr. Twentypercent of them were assigned to posts that were not markedas General Staff or Admiral Staff posts. They were mainlyemployed as commanding officers. Bundeswehr General andAdmiral Staff officers are found throughout in the Ministry ofDefense, in high-level aide-de-camp positions, in NATO, asattach6s, in major formations of the Army and the Air Force,as well as in the Navy staffs.

Examples of General Staff assignments in the GermanArmy and in NATO are as follows:

* The brigade is the first level where General Staffofficers can be found. The G3, who is the firstGeneral Staff officer of a brigade, has the position ofChief of Staff. He may be compared to theWehrmacht's division la officer, who was the firstGeneral Staff officer, functioning as the Chief of Staff.The Bundeswehr brigade is, as was the Wehrmachtdivision, the lowest unit level that can fight thecombined arms battle. The brigade's 2nd GeneralStaff officer is the G4. In contrast to other westernarmies conducting General Staff officer training, theremaining heads of staff sections of a brigade are nottrained as General Staff officers.

* In a Bundeswehr division there are five General Staffofficers; the Chief of Staff, the G1, G2, G3, and G4.

11

Divisions with special tasks have an additionalGeneral Staff officer, a G3 Operation's Officer (Ops)who deals with operational matters. In a GermanArmy corps, the Chief of Staff, holding BrigadierGeneral rank, oversees nine General Staff officers:the G1, G2, G2 Ops, the G3, G3 Planning andExercises, the G3 Ops 1 and Ops 2, the G4 and theG4 Ops. Currently, the employment of a G6 officer atdivision and corps level is being evaluated in trooptests. This General Staff officer is envisaged to heada newly formed command, control, andcommunications section.

* At HQ AFCENT (Allied Forces, Central Europe) inBrunssum, Netherlands, for example, there are about100 German officers. Only 17 of them are GeneralStaff officers.

In contrast to the situation in many other armies, theBundeswehr does not grant rapid career advancements onlyto General Staff officers. At the beginning of the 1980s, forexample, 40 of the 202 German generals and admirals werenot specifically trained as General Staff officers; thatrepresents nearly 20 percent of the general officer corps.Additionally, 52.2 percent of the 1,087 Bundeswehr colonelsand navy captains were not trained as General or Admiral Staffofficers.

Selection and Training.

After selection, Bundeswehr General and Admiral Staffofficers are trained separately. Since the establishment of theBundeswehr, the selection methods and the curricula ofGeneral and Admiral Staff officer training have changedseveral times. Despite criticism, the selection procedures andthe special training have never been abandoned.23

The training of the Federal Armed Forces officers isconducted in three steps (see Figure 1). The first step includesstudies at one of the two Federal Armed Forces Universities(Universitaetder Bundeswehr) in Hamburg or Munich. This isfollowed by several years of troop duty. When the officer has

12

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6113

that status, his training for employment in field gradeappointments begins at the Federal Armed Forces Commandand General Staff Academy (Fuehrungsakademie derBundesweh) at Hamburg. His subsequent staff training isconducted at this institution. The Federal Armed ForcesCommand and General Staff Academy was established at BadEms in 1957 as the Army Academy (Heeresakademie) andwas moved to Hamburg in 1958 where it became the FederalArmed Forces institution for future general and admiral staffduty in the Army, Air Force and Navy. In 1974, the Academywas given the task of training all regular officers of the threeservices for employment in field grade appointments as wellas conducting advanced training for field grade officers andGeneral Staff and Admiral Staff officers.24 This is the secondstep of the Federal Armed Forces officer training. To date, theadvanced training is conducted within a specific systemconsisting of three phases.

First, the German Armed Forces Command and GeneralStaff Academy is required to train senior captains and Navylieutenants of the three services normally during their eighthyear of commissioned service in the 3 1/2-month Field GradeOfficer Selection and Qualification Course (see Figure 2).According to regulations, every career officer mustsuccessfully complete this course before he can be promotedto the rank of major or lieutenant commander. The Field GradeOfficer Selection and Qualification Course is a joint course forthe three services. There, the students receive basicinstruction common to all three services, in the areas of generalcommand and leadership doctrine, security policy, the armedforces, and social sciences. In a fourth area, singleservice-oriented aspects are dealt with separately for army, airforce and navy students. Each subject concludes with anexamination. The results are summarized in a final grade.

Second, the Staff Officer Courses are the next phase ofAdvanced Officer training and education. All career officerswho have graduated from the Field Grade Officer Selection andQualification Course must attend one of the Staff OfficerCourses. About 10 percent of a career officer age group areselected by a commission for the 24-month General and

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Admiral Staff training. The most important selection criteria areexcellent performance in line service, outstanding results in theField Grade Officer Selection and Qualification Course, andrelevant assignment recommendations by seniorcommanders. Army officers, for example, must havecommanded a company for 2 years and have achieved goodratings in the Tactical Professional Training Program whichthey have to undertake as a 1 year self-study course in theirunit in the seventh year as a commissioned officer. It iscontrolled and administered by the division Chief of Staff andcapped by a 2-week examination.25 Ninety percent of a careerofficer age group are to attend a Special Staff Officer Courseof 8 weeks duration. The course starts with fundamentals ofsta;; work and then focuses on the specific staff work with whichthe officer has to be familiar later, when working in his particularstaff area. After being promoted to the rank of major, theofficer's training will be completed by a 3-week AdvancedEducation fr Field Grade Officers in Security Policy.

The third training phase is designed to prepare field gradeofficers for special tasks and functions within the FederalArmed Forces and NATO. A number of these special postgraduate courses are attended also by civil servants from boththe Federal Ministry of Defense and Federal and stategovernmental agencies. At present, a number of differentcourses, with a duration up to 10 weeks, are offered.

The German Armed Forces Command and General StaffAcademy is the central institution responsible for the trainingof field grade, and General and Admiral Staff officers of theBundeswehr. An essential element of its task is the convictionthat modern armed forces must be led in the field with scientificknowledge and by military leaders who know how to applyreasoning and methods. Thus, the philosophy of today'sFuehrungsakademie is governed by three elements: jointservice training, alliance-oriented doctrinal instruction,character and open-mindedness. In order to illustrate thesegoals, every year since 1962 the Academy has also conducteda 10-month Army General Staff Officer Course for officers fromncn-NATO countries. In 1986, the Academy started to conducta similar course for air force officers. The objective of the Army

16

Course is to familiarize non-NATO officers with General Staffofficer duties, primarily at brigade and division levels ofcommand in the Bundeswehr and the respective levels ofcommand in the Air Force and Navy. About 600 foreign officersfrom 60 nations have completed this training.26

There is no doubt, however, that the 24-month General andAdmiral Staff Courses form the nucleus of the GermanCommand and General Staff Academy. The Army, Air Forceand Navy General Staff Course is composed as follows:

" Army: Forty-five German and 12-15 allied NATOstudents organized in four syndicates or sections;

" Air Force: Twenty-four German and two-to-five alliedNATO students;

* Navy: Fourteen German and four-to-six allied NATOstudents. The sy, dicates are the most importantinstructional group and remain unchanged throughoutthe entire course. They are supervised by a seniorlieutenant colonel i.G., who is a faculty class adviser,and a lecturer for the major subject of the respectivesingle service-oriented instruction. He prepares anevaluation of his syndicate students at the end of thecourse. All syndicates are subordinate to one coursedirector of colonel or navy captain's rank. An Army,Air Force and Navy General Staff Course starts everyyear at the beginning of October. It is preceded by a6-month intensive language course at the FederalOffice of Languages (Bundessprachenamt) at Huerth.A junior and one senior course is in progresssimultaneously at the Ac3demy at he same time.

Those fields of knowledge which are important for Generaland Admiral Staff officers of all three services are provided toall students, mostly in mixed working groups. Subjects dealingwith the concept, organization, command and control andoperations of the Army, Air Force and Navy are imparted onlyto the students of relevant individual services. This subdivisioninto two categories comes at the specific goal level: of the2,200 broad-aim-oriented instructional hours, 1,000 (i.e., 45percent), serve for joint-service-oriented training; 1 200 (i.e.,

17

.... _ ...... .. .....

55 percent), for single service-oriented training. During theentire course, the two categories continuously alternate interms of conduct of instruction. The faculty is responsible forplanning, conducting and evaluating of the instructionalprograms conducted at the Academy. There are about 130military and 20 civilian lecturers.

The Army, Air Force and Navy General and Admiral StaffOfficer Course is designed to enable Academy graduates tofulfill tasks in General and Admiral Staff duty in peacetime,crisis and war, independently and responsibly. This must bedone within and outside their individual services, on nationaland integrated NATO staffs, at levels of command from brigadeto army group, and in all staff functional areas.27 The degreeof desired ability is primarily oriented on the requiredqualifications for future assignments. The results of theinstructional process are established by examinations and aretaken into consideration in the assessment of contributions inthe final evaluation by the faculty class adviser. Additionally,some young General and Admiral Staff officers will receive stafftraining abroad at staff colleges of a variety of NATO andnon-NATO countries. Bundeswehr officers may take part inGeneral and Admiral Staff officer qualification only once, andreserve officers are excluded from this type of career.Voluntary participation :n General and Admiral Staff training isnot possible.

The General and Admiral Staff Training at the GermanForces Command and General Staff Academy imparts torelatively young officers a level of knowledge which their alliedcomrades-in-arms cannot acquire until a later stage of theircareer, usualiy as senior lieutenant colonels or colonels.British and Canadian officers, for example, do not receivetraining equivalent to that of the German General and AdmiralStaff officers before they attend a senior service college.28

When French officers start their higher staff training, they are.on the average, 6 to 7 years older than their Germancontemporaries. As a result, young German General andAdmiral Staff officers in their early thirties already are trainedto think and act at the operational and strategic military-politicolevels.

18

Following completion of studies, Fuehrungsakademiegraduates pass through three ab initio assignments. Thesenormally include General Staff posts at brigade, division orcorps level, the respective levels of command in the air forceand navy, in the Federal Ministry of Defense, or in a NATOheadquarters. After an assignment as a battalion commanderor in a similar position, the General Staff officer is supposed towork mainly in the staff functional area for which he isespecially suited. This principle, however, is not rigidlyapplied. During these initial assignments, the young GeneralStaff officer is controlled and managed by the same section ofthe Personnel Management Division that is responsible forgenerals and admirals. A field grade officer without Generaland Admiral Staff training normally retires holding the rank oflieutenant colonel. Career expectations for General andAdmiral Staff officers include promotion to colonel or navycaptain; however, this is not guaranteed.

The General Staff Officer as the Commander's Adviser.

A former director of doctrine and research at theBundeswehr Command and General Staff Academy statedthat General Staff officer training should be aimed at producingofficers who are capable of occupying the position of Chief ofStaff of a major formation or command agency, as theresponsibilities for this assignment are representative ofGeneral Staff requirements. Therefore, General Staff trainingshould be directed towards this objective.29 This statementsheds light on the decisive peculiarity of the German GeneralStaff officer, which distinguishes him from his colleagues of allother armed forces. He has a dual responsibility; specifically,as is the case in other armies, the General Staff officer relieveshis commander from the technical details of staff work.However, in the German system, his main task is to advise hiscommander in all matters, and he is entitled to thecommander's attention. The General Staff officer bears theshared responsibility for the relevance of his advice. Thus theGeneral Staff officer has a position that makes him stand outfrom the rest of the staff officers. While all staff officers giveadvice to their senior officers, the General Staff officer

19

additionally provides advice to his commander in all relevantmatters. He has the right to urge the commander to make adecision, and the commander must listen to him. The GeneralStaff officer is entitled to articulate diverging opinions. He isthe "alter ego" of his commander; moreover, he bears jointresponsibility because he is accountable for the relevance ofhis advice.3"

The first General Staff officer of a major unit or commandhas an especially elevated position. He actively participates inall stages of command and control. Together with hiscommander, he evaluates the mission, estimates the situationand develops the decision. After this process it is no longerpossible to say who made the individual contributions. Thecommander alone, however, has the authority to makedecisions on his own. Once a decision has been made, theGeneral Staff officer loyally carries out his orders.

The following two examples from German military historyare intended to underline this particularly close cooperationbetween commanders and their first General Staff officers. Inhis memoirs, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg rendered adescription of his relationship with his first General Staff officer,General of the Infantry Erich Ludendorff, during World War I.He said:

I myself have often described my relationship with GeneralLudendorff as a happy marriage. How can an outside observerclearly differentiate the merits of the individual man within such arelationship. Thoughts and actions merge, and the words of oneman are often just the expression of the thoughts and feelings ofthe other one.3'

Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, one of the "big Chiefsof Staff" of World War I, elaborated on the same subjectpointing out that before the commander made a decision, hehad to first listen to the advice of an assistant, his Chief of Staff:

The decision is taken in private, and when the two men come out,there is only one decision. They have amalgamated it; they shareone mind with each other. Should the opinions have differed, in theevening of this happy day in a military marriage the two halves willno longer know who gave in. The outside world and military history

20

will not have knowledge of a domestic quarrel. The competenceof command and control is based on this fusion of the twopersonalities. It does not matter if the order bears the commander'ssignature, or if the Chief of Staff has signed it for the High Command(today 'For the commander') according to our old custom. Thecommander always issues his orders through his Chief of Staff, andeven the most senior subordinate leader must submit himself to hisorders without objection, because his orders will always be givenon behalf of the supreme commander.3 2

At higher command levels only the first General Staffofficer, the G3 of the brigade or the Chief of Staff, has thisparticularly close relationship with his commander. YoungerGeneral Staff officers, however, cooperate with their respectivesuperiors in just the same way. They have the right and theobligation to advise them. Theoretically, every General Staffofficer is authorized to approach his commander and offer himadvice.

The increasing trend within the Bundeswehr is that allsubordinates are supposed to give advice to their superiors.The superior officer should listen to the advice of hissubordinates-when it seems appropriate.33 Up to now,however, it is only the German General Staff officer who hashad the institutionalized right to press his advice upon hissuperior, who, in turn, is obligated to listen prior to making hisdecision. This is not always very easy for commanders. Thus,the German General Staff system bears the inherent potentialfor strong Chiefs of Staff to dominate weak superiors.34 Thisinherent danger is one of the reasons why it is almostimpossible to explain the peculiarities of the German GeneralStaff system to foreigners. Allied commanders would nottolerate an officer at their side who has the institutionalized rightto give advice, even when not solicited. This would bedetrimental to their understanding of authority. Therefore,German General Staff officers serving in NATO staffs oftenmeet with a total lack of understanding when they try to forcetheir advice on their allied commanders. Such behavior isoften interpreted as insubordination.

Even the French General Staff system does not provide for

a jointly responsible adviser. In his Reflexions sur I'art de la

21

guerre, General de Serrigny, who was General Petain's chiefof cabinet during the battle for Verdun, describes therelationship between the commander and the Chief of Staff asfollows:

The general devises and directs his operations with his cosastadvisers including one or several tactically trained officers who takeup his thoughts and cooperate in the closest way. (In France, theseofficers are called 'adjoints'.) The Chief of Staff is responsible forfeeding resources to the battle. He immediately directs all supplyoperations and issues orders to the respective agencies.3

The adjoints in the French staff system are integrated in theorganization of the French commander's Cabinet. They workexclusively for him. They are personal staff officers who supplyoriginal ideas to their commanders and fulfill functions whichare done within the Prussian-German General Staff System bythe General Staff officers. They are, however, not advisers totheir commanders in the German sense.36

Esprit de Corps of German General Staff Officers.

The traits fostered by the German and Admiral Staff trainingare valor and veracity, critical judgment, objectivity andintellectual versatility, personal force, self control, and soundesteem.37 Although there is no General and Admiral Staffcorps in the Bundeswehr, selection, special status and ethicalvalues within this small group of officers result in a strong espritde corps. Former students of the Fuehrungsakademie classesfrequently meet in class reunions. Former and active Generaland Admiral Staff officers are often members of the ClausewitzSociety, an association that cultivates the General Staff officertradition. General Staff officers of major units regularly holdmeetings. It is a normal practice for a division's Chief of Staffto call together the General Staff officers of the brigades for thediscussion of particular problems. The responsiblecommanders are informed later. The Chiefs of German corpsstaffs and service staffs work in a similar way. These meetingsensure that the German General and Admiral Staff officerspossess great unity of thought. This makes them guardians of

22

the German leadership philosophy throughout the FederalArmed Forces.

Mission-Oriented Command and Control.

The cornerstone of the German leadership philosophy inpeace and war is mission-oriented command and control(Auftragstaktik). It was developed by the Prussian-GermanGeneral Staff System and has long been a command methodin the German Armed Forces. In the German Army Commandand Control Regulation HDv 100/100, this principle ischaracterized as follows:

Mission-oriented command and control is the first and foremostcommand and control principle in the Army of relevance in war evenmore than in peace. It affords the subordinate commander freedomof action in the execution of his mission, the extent depending onthe type of mission to be accomplished. The superior commanderinforms his subordinates of his intentions, designates clearobjectives and provides the assets required. He gives ordersconcerning the details of mission execution only for the purpose ofcoordinating actions serving the same objective. Apart from that,he only intervenes if failure to execute the mission endangers therealization of his intentions. The subordinate commanders canthus act on their own in accordance with the superior commander'sintentions; they can immediately react to developments in thesituation and exploit favorable opportunities.38

The principle of mission-oriented command and controlgrants commanders at all levels a maximum of freedom ofaction. In the armed forces of German's allies, the beginningsof mission-oriented command and control are recognizable.Many other armed forces have adopted mission-orientedcommand and control based on the German experience.

Function Overrides Rank.

In the Bundeswehr, the position weighs heavier than therank. In both the Air Force and the Army, lower-rank officersare frequently superiors of higher-rank officers. Thisphenomenon has long been the practice with General Staffofficers. In German staffs, captains i.G. are often direct

23

superiors of higher-ranking officers. This would be unthinkablein other armed forces, where function and rank must coincide.Therefore, a soldier in the American and British armed forceswho is assigned to a higher position may be given an "actingrank" until he is properly installed in the higher-paid slot, or aslong as he occupies the elevated position.39 This procedure isnot applied in the Bundeswehr. Senior non-General Staffofficers often must accept working for General Staff officerswho are junior in rank to them.

24

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENTOF THE GENERAL STAFF CONCEPT

Thus far, the Bundeswehr's General Staff system has beenpresented descriptively and within functional categories. Atthe center of this exposition was the illustration of thepeculiarities of the German General Staff officer as thecommander's adviser. This chapter is intended to illustrate theway the Bundeswehr General Staff officers see themselvesand their working methods through the discussion of historicalmilestones.

The term General Staff has gone through various changesof meaning. In the 16th century, it described a group oftop-ranking generals. King Frederick the Great was his ownChief of Staff because officers functioning as advisers did notexist in his Army. He formed a corps of orderlies whoreconnoitered the terrain and conveyed his personal orders tosubordinate commanders. This corps was called theQuartermaster General Staff (General-quartiermeisterstab).In Frederick's major formations, brigadier majors served asstaff officers. They wrote reports and gathered information forthe battle.40 Napoleon's General Staff can be described as amilitary office directed by the Chief of the General Staff.Napoleon did not tolerate officers who interfered with mattersof command and control. Marshal Berthier, his Chief of theGeneral Staff for many years, was only tasked to pass on hisorders. Thus, he did not participate in command and controlactivities. Therefore, the historic roots of the Prussian-German General Staff system do not go back to Frederick theGreat or Napoleon, as has often been falsely assumed.41

The man who created the Prussian-German General Staffwas David Gerhard von Scharnhorst from Hannover. The sonof a former noncommissioned officer of Schaumburg-Lippe

25

and tenant farmer, he was born in 1755 in Bordenau nearHannover at the lake Steini-ider Meer. He received hismilitary education and training in the school of the Count vonSchaumburg-Lippe, located in Castle Wilhelmstein at theSteinhuder Meer. In 1801 he applied to the King of Prussia,Frederick Wilhelm Ill, for employment in the Prussian service.He received the rank of lieutenant colonel and was raised tonobility.

Scharnhorst and a group of young Prussian officers hadrecognized early the sweeping changes in military affairs thathad taken place in the course of the French Revolution andrefined by Napoleon. They wanted to use them to goodadvantage for the renewal of Prussia as a military power. Thiswas deemed necessary because the mass armies of the warsof the French Revolution and the demands for generalconscription terminated the era of cabinet wars of KingFrederick the Great's time. Initially soldiers driven by patrioticenthusiasm fought in the French revolutionary armies, thusdiffering greatly from the armies of mercenaries of the era ofFrederick the Great. Consequently, the Prussiancommanders around 1800 were no match for Napoleon'smilitary genius. The new era called for scientifically trainedofficers, who were supposed to support the commanders asadvisers. In Prussia, however, there were not very many ofthem 42

The General Staff dating back to the times of the PrussianKing, Frederick the Great, was reorganized in 1803. Generalvon Geusau established three brigades, each commanded bya lieutenant colonel. These lieutenant colonels were calledquartermaster lieutenants (Quartiermeisterleutnants) andwere supported by 18 officers holding major's or captain's rank.The new Quartermaster Staff did not have an effect on theBattle of Jena and Auerstaedt in 1806. By then, the staff'spowers and methods of working had not been developedsufficiently. We can say, however, that the roots of today'sGeneral Staff officer go back to the Prussian QuartermasterGeneral Staff of 1803.

In the fighting following the Battle of Jena and Auerstaedt,the relationship between the commander and the scientifically

26

trained General Staff officer typically found in later Germanarmies came into being. When General von Bluecherwithdrew from the pursuing French over the Harz mountainrange, Scharnhorst assisted him as an adviser. Bluecher hada very high opinion of his educated adviser and accepted hisadvice regarding operations and command and control. It isjustified to consider this as the birth of the "commander'sadviser" (Fuehrergehilfe) of the Prussian-German GeneralStaff System.

In 1808 the Prussian War Ministry was newly created. Itwas headed by Scharnhorst, who was at the same time theChief of the General Staff. French protests forced Scharnhorstto give up his position as a War Minister. However, heremained the Quartermaster General, which was the Prussiantitle of the Chief of the General Staff. In 1807 King FrederickWilhelm Ill appointed him to head the Military ReorganizationCommission to reestablish Prussia's Army and to clear it of theofficers who had failed in the 1806 campaign. He was assistedby 2 or 3 Quartermasters of major general or colonel rank, 3to 5 Quartermaster lieutenants holding major rank and 12adjutants of captain rank. On the whole the QuartermasterGeneral Staff consisted of 21 officers. The staff was assignedto prepare the Prussian Army for wartime operations, as wellas train the Prussian King's operations staff for wartime andsupport him in his capacity as the Commander in Chief.43

In 1804 Scharnhorst founded an academy for youngofficers who had emerged from a voluntary association ofyoung, studious officers that had surrounded him. Among themwas Carl von Clausewitz, a lieutenant at that time. After thelost Battle of Jena and Auerstaedt, the Academy wasdissolved. In 1810 Scharnhorst laid the foundation for theGeneral War School (AIlIgemeine Kriegsschule), which wassupposed to be the counterpart of Humboldt University thatopened the same year. First, this school was intended toprepare two classes of officer candidates for their officer'sexamination and to offer young officers an opportunity toreceive higher, scientific training. Later King FrederickWilhelm III founded three war schools for officer candidatesand the General War School was reserved for senior officers.

27

From this time onwards, the school was to be an "educationalestablishment for all branches and was to replace thoseinstitutions that concentrate on the training of an officer for justone field of knowledge." The training objective of the GeneralWar School was stated in old fashioned language:

Although the training is tailored to teach the student the specialknowledge and skills corresponding to his future assignments,great store is set by combining the studies with extended use ofthinking in order to make the training of the mind the main subjectof training."

Training at the General War School lasted 3 years. Theschool's capacity permitted the training of 50 officers who firsthad to pass an entrance examination. From 1819 theInspector General for Military Training and Education wasplaced in charge of the General War School. Henceforth, itwas reserved for those officers who, after having acquiredprofound knowledge, wanted "to prepare themselves forhigher and extraordinary tasks in the service," i.e., mainly forfuture General Staff officers. The number of officers registeredfor training every year was reduced to 40, and the subjectswere taught in the form of lectures as in a university. For 3years, the lectures were held from October 15 to July 15 of therespective year of training. In the interim, the students servedin other branches of service

On October 1, 1859, the General War School was renamedthe War Academy (Kriegsakademie). The War Academy wassupervised by the Chief of the General Staff. Themanagement of the Academy was split into a militarydirectorate responsible for disciplinary affairs, and a studiesdirectorate responsible for the scientific portion of thecurriculum. General von Clausewitz, who was one of itsmilitary directors for many years, wrote his monumental workOn War (Vom Kriege) during this assignment. Being themilitary director, he did not exert any influence on thecurriculum of the Academy.45 The War Academy was theprecursor to the Bundeswehr's Command and General StaffAcademy.

28

The far-reaching congruence of objectives of the Humboldt

University and the training at the General War School showsthat Scharnhorst and his fellow reformers wanted much morethan military reforms. Their activities must always beconsidered within the framework of the overall Prussianreforms. Scharnhorst, who had advanced due to his brilliant

abilities, wanted to open up all positions within the renewedPrussian Army for scientifically trained officers, without regardto their social background. The group of noble leaders whodominated the Prussian Army overwhelmingly disapproved ofthe necessity of scientific education for the officer.Scharnhorst wanted to force them to compete for theirqualifications with a new academic elite. However, he wasrealistic enough to realize that it was not possible in Prussia todo away with a system that continued to select military leadersaccording to class and birth.4 6

He was right in his assessment. In the Prussian Army, andthe federal contingents attached to the Imperial Army(Reichsheer) after 1870, soldiers of the higher nobilitycommanded armies up to the end of World War I without beingproperly trained for this task. There were, however, somenotable exceptions such as the Bavarian Crown Prince duringWorld War I. Scharnhorst wanted to diminish the weaknessof this system by providing these army commanders withGeneral Staff officers as their advisers. This, then, served asthe decisive root to support the need for a "commander's firstadviser," a concept whose effects are felt to this day. The needfor a trained body of General Staff officers was the result of theincrease in the size of the 19th century armies and theirorganization into separate divisions and corps. For bothlogistical and strategic reasons these formations usuallymarched separately and united only to do battle. The complexmanagement of these forces required professionally trainedGeneral Staff officers. The founders of the Prussian-GermanGeneral Staff pursued aims that went beyond militaryprofessional matters. The reformers' political and educationalobjective was to create a constitutional monarchy in which thebest should have access to all functions and positions in thearmy. These new, basically middle-class qualification featureswere to be effective in the Prussian-German General Staff from

29

that day on. During the 19th century, conservative Prussianofficers fought against the goal of the reformers that officercandidates should be high school or even college graduatesand pass an officers' examination before graduation. Theybelieved that by these requests, officer candidates from noblefamilies would not be competitive with better academicallytrained candidates, from educated commoners' families, andthat the nobility would lose influence in the officers' corps. Thisdispute never affected the General Staff officers and theirrecruitment and selection by means of examinations. Thus,qualification requirements based on merit alone were acceptedin the General Staff earlier than in other social strata.47 Thisphenomenon must certainly be considered a further importanthistoric milestone for the Bundeswehr's General Staff officer.

In 1813 after Scharnhorst died from a septic wound, hisfellow reformer, General Neidhardt August Wilhelm vonGneisenau, was assigned as the Quartermaster General, i.e.,the chief of the General Staff. Gneisenau has been recognizedas the first "great Chief of Staff" in the history of thePrussian-German General Stdff. He institutionalized the rightof the commander's adviser to take part in command andcontrol by advising the commander until he makes a decision.He conceded to General Staff officers of major formations theright to contact directly the Chief of the General Staff in allmatters of 'heir functional areas. Not all of the Prussian militaryleaders agreed with the concept. General von York, forexample, never wanted to accept Gneisenau's position as thefirst adviser to General von Bluecher. Nevertheless, the goodharmony mentioned earlier between Bluecher andScharnhorst during the withdrawal from the French Army,henceforth became the institutionalized right ofPrussian-German General Staff officers; namely, to advisetheir commanders and assume joint responsibility for theiractions. This resulted in joint responsibility for commanders'decisions and the exercise of command and control of GeneralStaff chiefs from army corps level upwards. Up to 1938, it wasan unwritten law that army corps Chiefs of General Staffs werepermitted to enter in the war diaries their opinions when theydiffered from the responsible commander's decision. From1938 the Chief of the General Staff of Army, General of the

30

Artillery Franz Halder, restricted this right in a sensible way, aswill be argued later in this essay. The responsibility for therelevance of his advice has remained with the General Staffofficer of the Bundeswehr.

Gneisenau also became the founder of Auftragstaktik. Hewas the first to develop command and control by directives,thus giving latitude to the subordinate commanders for theexecution of operations.48 Subordinate commanders were forthe first time issued directives expressing the intent of theRoyal headquarters in terms of clear objectives, but giving onlygeneral indications of the methods of their achievement. Thisenabled commanders and their General Staff officers tc useinitiative in taking advantage of unforeseen opportunities,provided that their actions were consistent with the mainobjective. Thus, Gneisenau laid the correrstone of theGerman leadership philosophy: mission-oriented commandand control.

Consolidation of the Prussian General Staff System.

In the period between Napoleon's defeat in 1815 and theyear 1857, when General Helmut von Moltke became Chief ofthe Prussian General Staff, the following historic milestonesare of importance. In 1821 the Quartermaster General Staffwas renamed the General Staff (Generalstab). Since the Chiefof the General Staff, Lieutenant General von Mueffling, hadmore years in service than the Prussian War Minister, MajorGeneral Ruehle von Lilienstern, the Prussian King separatedthe General Staff from the Ministry of War. 49 The Chief of theGeneral Staff, however, remained subordinate to the WarMinister and continued to be his adviser in operational matters.This separation of the General Staff from the Ministry of Warwas the first step to the complete independence of thePrussian General Staff.

Starting in 1817, 16 General Staff officers served in thePrussian Ministry of War and 6 General Staff officers workedin the main embassies. Each army co-rps had one Chief ofGeneral Staff and two other General Staff officers. The Chiefof the General Staff was the immediate superior of all General

31

Staff officers of the Prussian Army. The General Staff officersposted to the Ministry of War served in the "Great GeneralStaff," (Grosser Generalstab), the General Staff officers of unitstaffs were called "Line General Staff Officers,"(Truppengeneralstab). In 1821 the General Staff officersreceived special uniform insignia which have been retained tothe present day. s°

Scharnhorst's aim to open up the top army careers to allscientifically trained officers without regard to their socialbackground was initiated in the General Staff of the PrussianArmy at a time when the concept of selection based on merithad not gained general acceptance in the Prussian officercorps and other state agencies. This opportunity allowed theinduction of a number of outstanding officers. For instance,General von Clausewitz's nobility was based on a falsificationby his step-grandfather. King Frederick Wilhelm III lateracknowledged his nobility when the general and his brothershad attained great achievements. The nobility of Field MarshalCount von Gneisenau also was a falsification. The Kingnevertheless promoted him to Field Marshal and bestowedcountship upon him. General von Krauseneck, who was theChief of the General Staff from 1829 to 1848, was the son ofa Brandenburg organ player and had been promoted from theranks. General von Rheyer, Chief of the Prussian GeneralStaff from 1848 to 1857 was a shepherd in his youth. Owingto his brilliant military achievements he became an officer andwas later given a title of nobility."s

This phenomenon is also one of the historical roots oftoday's General Staff officer for, within the Federal Republic ofGermany, academic titles take the place of the higher statusinherited by noble birth in former times. In the Bundeswehr,where the Officers Corps is heterogeneous as far as origin andeducation are concerned, all regular officers have to passthrough the same selective procedure to become a GeneralStaff officer. Academic education and titles do not grant anyvisible advantages.

32

Prussian-German General Staff Under Moltke andSchlieffen.

Under the command of Field Marshals Count Helmut vonMoltke and Count Alfred von Schlieffen, the Prussian-GermanGeneral Staff developed into the highest strategic authority inPrussia and, after 1871, in the German Empire. In the end,the political forces in Germany hardly participated in itsstrategic planning; rather, they were informed about them.5 2 It

is interesting to posit how this development came about.Owing to his personal merits in the campaigns againstDenmark in 1864, Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-1871,Field Marshal Count Helmut von Moltke succeeded inemancipating the General Staff completely from the PrussianWar Ministry.53 As had been the case with Scharnhorst, whocame from the Army of Hannover 20 years before, Helmut vonMoltke changed from Danish into Prussian service, becausehe hoped to find better career chances there. In 1857, themonarch appointed him as Chief of the Prussian General Staff.

When the war against Denmark broke out in 1864, Generalvon Moltke first remained in Berlin. According to regulationsdating back to 1821, he had to submit his operationalsuggestions through the War Minister to the monarch. Thecommander in chief of the Prussian troops, Field Marshal vonWrangel, first had similar acceptance problems as had beenthe case with Gneisenau and General von York. Wrangelconsidered it beneath a Prussian Field Marshal's dignity toaccept the advice of a Chief of the General Staff.' The FieldMarshal changed his views only when Moltke was appointedas his Chief of the General Staff in the course of the campaignand directly cooperated with Wrangel. The separatedeployment and advancement of four Prussian armies and thenearly successful envelopment of the Austrians nearKonigsgraetz in the 1866 campaign were Moltke's personalachievement. The victory over Austria built up his reputationas a strategist. There he achieved Clausewitz's ideal of adecisive victory by means of a battle of annihilation. Therailway network gave Moltke the means he needed to mobilizeswiftly and concentrate the Prussian conscript army. Inappreciation of Moltke's success, on June 2, 1866, King

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Wilhelm elevated the importance of the Chief of the GeneralStaff's position. In times of war he was granted the right toissue operational orders on behalf of the King. However, thesovereign had to be consulted before vital decisions weretaken. Up to that time the Chief of the General Staff had onlybeen the planner of operations, but this step entrusted him withtheir execution as well.5 5 Henceforth he only had to inform theWar Minister about his activities.

As early as the end of the 1864 War, the strength of theGeneral Staff had to be increased because the wartimeestablishment of only 83 officers was simply insufficient.There were also plans for "raising a special budget for purelyscientific purposes." Financial constraints and the War of 1866prevented this reform. Resulting from the conclusion of the1866 war, the following budget for the General Staff wasdecided upon on January 31, 1867: The "main budget"provided for 88 General Staff officers. Besides the Chief of theGeneral Staff of the army, it included three division chiefs ofthe Great General Staff, officers in the Great General Staff,and the General Staff chiefs and General Staff officers of majorformations. The "additional budget for scientific purposes"comprised 21 officers. Of the 109 General Staff officers, 46were assigned to the Great General Staff and 53 were postedto the Line General Staff. The outbreak of the 1870 warshowed that the wartime requirements of 161 General Staffofficers were contrasted by a peacetime budget, whichprovided for 109 General Staff officers. At the beginning of thecampaign of 1870, about 200 General Staff officers wereposted to the mobile German armies. Their number wasincreased in the course of the war.

The phenomenon of the General Staff officers being onlyfew in numbers already existed at the time of Moltke. The"Office of the Chief of the General Staff" was responsible forpersonnel management of General Staff officers and allorganizational and economic affairs. The "main budget"formed three divisions which were tasked to keep track of allmatters of military interest at home and abroad, plus a divisionfor railroad matters. The first division was responsible forSweden, Norway, Turkey and Austria. The second division's

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responsibility was Germany, Italy and Switzerland. The thirddivision was taskad to observe developments in France,England, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal andAmerica. Finally, the fourth division worked on any issuesrelated to military rail transport. The "additional budget forscientific purposes" also allowed for the organization of a warhistory department, geographical-statistical studies, and aGeneral Staff survey division.

Upon declaration of war against France in 1870, Moltkeadvanced to the battlefield with the Great Headquarters. Theoperations division was headed by Lieutenant ColonelBronsart von Schellendorf, the political division by LieutenantColonel von Verdy du Vernois, and the railroad division byLieutenant Colonel von Brandenstein. Moltke conducted theoperations in France with only 13 General Staff officers.Owing to their wartime success they were called Moltke's"demigods" within the Prussian Army.56 He repeated hisoutstanding performance of 1866 by annihilating the Army ofthe French Emperor Napoleon III at Sedan and by breakingthe French armies which tried to bring the war to an end to theadvantage of the French Republic.57

The complete emancipation of the General Staff from theWar Ministry took place in 1883. A cabinet order dated May24, 1883 placed the position of the Chief of the General Staffon a level with that of the War Ministry and the Military Cabinet.He was granted the right to contact the sovereign directly andto present his statements.5 8 Moltke never had strived for thiselevation of the General Staff. After the 1870-71 UnificationWar, in the course of a popular-nationalist heroizing of war,many Germans came to consider the General Staff as analmost mystic powerhouse. Numerous war memorials andartist's impressions depicted the Chief of the General Stafftogether with the "Architect of the Reich," Otto von Bismarck,Emperor Wilhelm I, the War Minister, Albrecht von Roon andthe monarch and ruler of the German Empire. Field MarshalCount Helmut von Moltke had headed the General Staff for 31years. When he stepped down from his post at the age of 88,239 General Staff officers were serving in the Prussian Armyand the Federal contingents of the German Imperial Army.

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This included 197 Prussians, 25 members of the BavarianArmy, 15 of the Saxonian Army and 7 from the Wuerttembergcontingent. The Prussian Army and the Federal contingentsincluded 21,981 officers, of which only 1 percent were GeneralStaff officers.

The successor to Field Marshal Count von Moltke as theChief of the General Staff was General Count von Waldersee.He occupied the post for only 3 years and had to resign dueto disagreements with Emperor Wilhelm II. Emperor WilhelmII appointed the General of the Cavalry, Count Alfred vonSchlieffen as his successor, who held the post of Chief of theGeneral Staff from 1891 to 1906. Under his command, thePrussian-German General Staff system reached its highestefficiency before the First World War.59 Up to the present daySchlieffen's ideas and techniques of command and controlhave influenced various facets of the Bundeswehr and itsGeneral Staff training. This fact is hardly known or recognizedtoday, as will be discussed later.

Towards Professional General Staff Training in Prussia:The Bavarian Approach.

Prior to 1870, training at the War Academy was conductedin university-like lectures. The artillery general and militarywriter General Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen attendedthe War Academy from 1851 to 1853. In his records heassessed the General Staff training at that time as follows:

Everything was dealt with in a theoretical and scientific way. Someof the lecturers did it brilliantly and in a fascinatingly ingeniousmanner, others, however, in as dry as dust, sometimes evensickening fashion. Besides a few exceptions the training was of nopractical use for life and service at all. Everything remained meretheory and the blossoming life tree remained a secret to us. Theteachers were not to be blamed for that, because they themselvesdid not know it any better.6

The students had to attend 20 hours of lectures per week.Lecturers were professors of Berlin University and GeneralStaff officers. Nonmilitary subjects predominated. Thus the

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War Academy training had more the character of studies in theclassical academic disciplines than that of a preparatorycourse for General Staff officers.

In 1872 the War Academy was taken from the Inspector ofMilitary Education and placed under the Chief of the GeneralStaff. Its organization remained unchanged. The teachers atthe Academy became mostly General Staff officers from theGreat General Staff who had to teach in addition to their normalduties. Those young officers who wanted to become GeneralStaff officers prepared voluntarily for the entranceexamination. From hundreds, about 100 were accepted peryear and went through a 3-year course at the Academy. Atthe end of the course they took their second examination. Onlyabout 30 students passed this extremely difficult test. Thesewere then ordered (kommandiert) into the Great General Staff.After 2 years they had to take their third and final examination.After that, between five to eight were permanently posted tothe General Staff. Most of the former "ordered" foundjobs-according to their qualifications-in the higher staff service(Hoehere Adjutantu), the G1 Branch of today, which did notbelong to the General Staff at that time, or perhaps as teachersin an officers school; others simply in regular line service. Theextremely small number of those who were finally posted tothe General Staff is also due to the advanced retirement ageduring these decades.

The goal of the General Staff training was not to producea genius, but to concentrate on the training of ordinary menwho could display efficiency and common sense. EveryGeneral Staff officer had to be able, at any time, to take overthe work of another and apply to it the same body of basic ideasand the same principles of operational and tactical thought.Today this is still a major goal of the General and Admiral Staffofficer training at the German Command and General StaffAcademy. The long and demanding training led to a greathomogeneity of General Staff officers. At the time of theiracceptance into the General Staff, most of them were holdingthe rank of a captain; first lieutenants were the exception andrequired 3 years of commissioned service with the troops.Then, as is the case today, the General Staff career began

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generally in the Line General Staff, at division and army corpslevel. After a line command as a company commander, theGeneral Staff officer was usually posted back to the army corpslevel. Afterwards, line commands alternated with assignmentsin the Great General Staff and the Line General Staff.

Refusal of entrance into General Staff training at the WarAcademy did not rule out a later call to the General Staff. Itwas possible for line officers without academy training to beordered to the General Staff due to extraordinaryachievements in a line command. Officers such as FieldMarshal von Mackensen, and General Colonel von Einem,among others, became General Staff officers without thistraining. They were, however, rare exceptions. Here we seethe origins of the Heusinger Directive of 1959 which offers thesame opportunities for officers who have not been givenGeneral Staff officer training. In the old system, however,officers without academy training had to take the finalexamination after 2 years. This procedure was increasinglywaived after the turn of the century because a sufficientnumber of War Academy graduates was available.61

The reorganization of General Staff training into a moretechnically oriented training scheme under Moltke andSchlieffen has been criticized by some historians. Critics oftenreproached Schlieffen's General Staff training for not havingbeen sufficiently training-oriented. In addition, Schlieffen wascriticized for involving young, future General Staff officers inmap exercises at a very high level for which they were notsenior enough due to age and experience. It was claimed thatoperational aspects had been stressed too much and technicaldetails were totally neglected. It is simply the nature of GeneralStaff training to be the subject of continuous criticism. It is quiteinteresting in this context to note how the qualification profilesof General Staff officers of the times of Schlieffen resemblethose of the Bundeswehr as far as the military-technicalknowledge is concerned.

After its defeat in the war against Prussia of 1866, Bavariaestablished its own War Academy and retained General Stafftraining of its own after the foundation of the German Empirein 1870. The number of general knowledge subjects in the

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Bavarian General Staff training was greater than was the caseat the Prussian War Academy in Berlin. The lectures weregiven by Munich University professors and General Staffofficers, for whom teaching was the main profession. Incontrast to the situation in Prussia, the chief of the GeneralStaff and the War Academy were subordinate to the BavarianMinistry of War, which set great store by foreign languageinstruction. While graduates of the Berlin War Academy wereordered to the Great General Staff and were immediatelytasked with finding solutions to practical problems, theirBavarian counterparts first passed through a further 2 years ofcentralized training which provided them with anunderstanding of theory in the sciences of war.

A comparison of both academies' curricula shows thatBavarian General Staff training was oriented more stronglytoward producing General Staff officers educated on a broad,scientific basis. The speculation of high level Bavarian officersand some Bavaria-loving historians after World War Ilsupporting the claim that War Academy training in Munich hadbeen generally superior to that of Prussia must be consideredwith caution.62 Munich did not deal with tasks associated withthe defense of the German Empire, and the Berlin WarAcademy graduate working in the Great General Staff gaineda faster insight into the general context of war planning thanhis Bavarian counterpart. Furthermore, some young futureBavarian General Staff officers were ordered to the GreatGeneral Staff in Berlin after they too had successfullygraduated from the Munich War Academy. In spite of all theBavarian attempts for independence, in the end there was anunderlying orientation of the Bavarian General Staff officerstowards Prussian conditions due to the emperor's command,which was not to be misunderstood. Seen in this light, theemphasis on fundamental differences between the twosystems appears artificial. The great number of able BavarianGeneral Staff officers who held high-level positions in the armyafter the First World War and in the Wehrmacht showed thatthe Bavarian General Staff officers were highly qualified.63

Before the outbreak of World War I, 625 officers served on

the General Staff of the German Army which included 270

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officers who were commanded or detached to the GeneralStaff. Out of a total of 352 General Staff officers with a normalpeacetime career, 295 came from the Prussian, 34 from theBavarian and 23 from the Saxonian Armies. Only the BavarianGeneral Staff officers had been trained in Munich; all the otherswere instructed in the Berlin War Academy. The officers corpsof the army of the German Empire had a peacetime strengthof 36,693 officers, with 625 being General Staff officers, whichamounted to 1.7 percent of the total officer corps. Onehundred thirteen General Staff officers were employed in theGreat General Staff. In 1914, France had available 950graduates from the Ecole Sup6rieure de Guerre, the FrenchGeneral Staff Officers' School. The Austrian Army included500 General Staff officers while the Russian Army had 1,000;but their function and independence were not comparable tothose of their German opponents.64 Under Schlieffen and hissuccessor, Colonel General von Moltke, who was a nephew ofthe Field Marshal and later became Chief of the General Staffin 1906, General Staff officers already showed a great manyof the characteristics still evident in the Bundeswehr of today:selection and special training; small number; main function asthe commander's adviser; work according to themission-oriented command and control principle; and specialuniform insignia. The General Staff officer of the year 1914wore on his 1910 field uniform crimson pipings or trouserstripes and a crimson stripe at the collar. In 1915 the crimsoncollar patches for General Staff officers' field uniforms werereintroduced as well. Generals, however, stopped wearing theGeneral Staff officer collar patches, and have worn the goldembroidery on a flaming red background up to the presentday.65

The emancipation from the War Ministry of the GeneralStaff and the right to consult the monarch directly, which hadbeen granted de facto to Moltke as early as 1883, however,led to an uneasy coexistence between military planning andpolitical activities. This caused friction between Moltke and thePrussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the wars of 1866and 1870-71 and required the intervention of the monarch.When Field Marshal Count von Schlieffen planned to employthe bulk of German forces at the outbreak of war first in the

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west, politicians reluctantly-if at all-participated in the planningprocess. By accepting this, the German Emperor, Wilhelm II,and the political leadership de facto invested in the Chief of theGeneral Staff the power of a military dictator. This wascontradictory to General von Clausewitz's axioms on therelationship of political and military powers in the process ofpolicymaking and command and control in times of war. In hiswork, On War, Clausewitz had stated in this context:

.. war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with theaddition of other means .... war in itself does not suspend politicalintercourse or change it into something entirely different .... warcannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs inour thinking about war, the many links that connect the twoelements are destroyed and we are left with something pointlessand devoid of sense .... if war is to be fully consonant with politicalobjectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, thenunless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the onlysound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief (ie. 'he Chiefof the General Staff in the German system) a member of theCabinet, so that the Cabinet can share in the major aspects of hisactivities.

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Emperor Wilhelm II, unlike his grandfather Wilhelm I, thelast German monarch, was not strong enough in leadership togive his Chief of the General Staff a position in theClausewitzian sense, that is to say, under political control. Thisfailure would result in fatal consequences for Germany inWorld War I.

The General Staff in World War I.

The study of historical milestones reveals two strikingcharacteristics of General Staff in the First World War that havenot been repeated. First, in the course of the First World War,the General Staff became the strongest political power inGermany. The 3rd Supreme Army Command (ObersteHeereleitung) under Field Marshal von Hindenburg and his firstQuartermaster General, i.e., his first General Staff officer,General of the Infantry Ludendorff, not only directed theoperations at all fronts, but also increasingly determined thepolitical destiny of the German Empire. This phenomenon

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does not represent a remarkable historic milestone forBundeswehr officers, since it is contradictory to therelationship of the political and military powers as described byClausewitz.67 Sheer military virtuosity cannot compensate forthe lack of political direction and national strategic objectives.The second characteristic lies in the fact that the Chief of theGeneral Staff of the 2nd Supreme Army Command, Generalof the Infantry von Falkenhayn, and after him GeneralLudendorff, the 1st Quartermaster General of the 3rd SupremeArmy Command, went too far with the concept of thecommander's adviser by putting him above the responsiblemilitary leader. In the literature this process is called the "ChiefSystem."

As has already been discussed, the Prussian GermanGeneral Staff system encourages a powerful adviser to theresponsible superior. It was necessary to appoint strongpersonalities as Chiefs of the General Staff of World War I armycommanders of high nobility. They in fact commanded thearmies of the princes. This had been the expressed wish ofEmperor Wilhelm 11.68 In the course of World War I, Generalsvon Falkenhayn and Ludendorff extended the powers of theChiefs of General Staffs and increasingly dealt directly withthem, and not with their responsible commanders. TheSupreme Army Command increasingly called the first advisersto account for mistakes in the command and control of majorformations, and not the commanders in chief of the armygroups and armies. So-called "super chiefs" like Colonel vonLossberg, Colonel Bauer or Colonel von Seeckt wereemployed in every theater of war in critical situations. Theirpredecessors were simply removed from their posts and theSupreme Army Command did not always inform the respectivecommanders of this move in advance. The rank of the "superchief" was not important at all. The memoirs of ColonelGeneral von Einem contain pertinent examples of the "ChiefSystem." For instance, the former Prussian War Ministercommanded the 3rd Army from the end of the 1st Marne battlein September 1914 to the armistice of 1918. During this timethe Supreme Army Command replaced five of his chiefs of theGeneral Staff. The commander in chief had never beenconsulted beforehand. The ranks of the Chiefs of General

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Staff varied from lieutenant general to major.6 9 GeneralColonel von Einem wrote in his memoirs that he had beenupset, deeply hurt and angered about this behavior of theSupreme Army Command. Any other consequences of thearmy commander in chief are not known. It is quite obviousthat the World War I army commanders accepted the "ChiefSystem," even though it was detrimental to their authority.

Another case in point is that army commanders acceptedorders of General Staff officers holding considerably lowerranks: Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, who had been sent to theGerman armies in the 1st Marne battle by the Supreme ArmyCommand, gave the order to break off the battle in September1914. Consequently, the "Chief System" paralyzed theindivisible responsibility of high-ranking military commanders.Here we have another historic root of today's General Staffofficers: function overrides rank. Orders issued by juniorGeneral Staff officers "for the commander" must be executed.In the revolutionary confusion of 1918, the General Staff andthe Prussian Ministry of War remained the only organizationsable to bring back the armed forces and to reestablish order inthe German Empire. On November 9, the chairman of theCouncil of People's Representatives (Rat derVolksbeauftragten), Friedrich Ebert, called on the GeneralStaff to assist in the fight against Bolshevism and to bring thearmy back home."0 This alliance between the SocialDemocrats around Friedrich Ebert and the General Staffaccounts for the fact that its reputation remained untouched inspite of the military defeat in the First World War.

The General Staff After the Treaty of Versailles, 1920-33.

The Treaty of Versailles banned the Great General Staffand the War Academy, but not the Line General Staff. Thearmy of the German Empire called the "Reichswehr,"comprising 100,000 soldiers and 4,000 officers, wassubordinate to the Reichswehr Minister, who, in turn, wasresponsible to the Parliament. It was by his order that the Chiefof the Army Command (Chef der Heeresleitung) exercisedcommand and control. Thus the Minister wore two hats: hewas commander in chief and Chief of the General Staff rolled

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in one. The first Chief of the Army Command, General-Colonelvon Seeckt, succeeded in retaining largely unnoticed by thevictorious powers the Great General Staff in the Armed ForcesOffice of the Reichswehr Ministry. The Armed Forces Office(Truppenamt) looked after the classical tasks of a GeneralStaff. From 1919 to 1920 it was headed by Seeckt, before heassumed the position of Chief of the Army Command. Sixtyofficers, mostly General Staff officers, served in the ArmedForces Office. Line General Staff officers were employed inthe major formations. For purposes of deception, they werecalled "Commander's staff officers" (Fuehrerstabsoffiziere).The special uniform insignia of the General Staff officers weremaintained. Several sections of the Great General Staff itselfwere dispersed among the civil ministries. The TopographicalSection, for example, went to the Ministry of the Interior, theRailway Section to the Ministry of Transport, and the MilitaryHistory Section disappeared into the new Imperial Archives(Reichsarchiv).7 In a directive signed on October 18, 1919,General von Seeckt showed that the General Staff Corps ofthe Reichswehr would uphold old traditions and set newstandards of efficiency. He stated:

I expect every General Staff officer to ensure that by unremittingeffort he acquires the highest possible degree of military ability andexerts upon the entire army an exemplary, inspiring and stimulatinginfluence. Steadfast in concern for the troops. . .it will be his aimto make of them not only a reliable pillar of the state, but also aschool for the teachers and leaders. (The General Staff officer)...must stand above parties and factions. Only then we shall haveour hands and our hearts free for work embracing the wholepeople.72

General von Seeckt broke new ground for the training ofnew generation officers: Every Reichwehr officer had to takepart in military district examinations. The best 10 candidatesthen underwent a 2-year training course for "commander'sstaff officers" (Fuehrerstabsoffiziere) in the group commands.In this way General von Seeckt successfully tried tocompensate for the lost centralized training facility of the WarAcademy. In the third ysar of training, the officers attended anobligatory training course in Berlin. Applied tactics wasregarded as the most important subject of the military district

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examination. It also included papers on tactical theory,weapons, field craft, engineering and eight general subjectsincluding a foreign language. Three or four problems had tobe answered in a period of 6 to 10 hours. They were usuallybased on the tactics of an infantry regiment reinforced withelements of other arms, and involved the presentation of theregimental commander's estimate of the situation and hisorders to follow. Together with his examination results, thecharacter of each candidate was assessed from the annualreports of his superiors.

The process of selection extended throughout the 3 yearsof training. Of approximately 70, only some 15 went to the thirdyear's course. It ended with a 2-week tactical field exercisewhich was passed finally by 8 to 10 students. The objectiveof the program was to train assistants for the senior fieldcommanders and the central command structure, and toproduce officers to be advisers, assistants and executors ofleaders' decisions.73 The curriculum was much broader inscope than in the prewar War Academy. The Bundeswehrtoday maintains obligatory participation by all officers in aselective training course. Since that time, one cannot applydirectly for general and admiral staff training in Germany.

The General Staff in the Third Reich, 1933-45.

When Adolf Hitler came into power, many General Staffofficers hoped he would reestablish the Great General Staffwith its former powers. General of the Artillery Ludwig Beck,who was the chief of the Armed Forces Office from 1935,wanted to reintroduce the right of direct consultation of thehead of state. This wish turned out to be an illusion in the Hitlerstate. In the Reichswehr, the chief of the Armed Forces Officeranked only fourth in the hierarchy after the ReichswehrMinister, the Ministry Office and the chief of the Armycommand. From 1935 there were four top-level staffs of theWehrmacht which tended to General Staff tasks: TheWehrmacht Operations Staff-Hitler's personal working staff;and second, the Army General Staff under General Beck.(Coming from the Armed Forces Office, he personified theheritage of the old General Staff.) Third, the Air Force General

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Staff was newly formed. And finally, the Navy High Commandwith its chief Admiral of Warfare formed the Wehrmacht'sfourth operations staff. The divisions of the newly formed ArmyGeneral Staff were headed by five Senior Quartermasters. In1939 the German officer corps comprised 25,000 men, 500 ofwhom were General Staff officers. 4

General Beck transformed the Armed Forces Office(Truppenamt) into the Army General Staff. He had thequestion of joint responsibility painstakingly and criticallyexamined. The excesses cf Ludendorff's "chief system" andthe times of the princely commanders in chief were goneforever. The results of the examination showed that the rightto joint command and control responsibility of chiefs of staff ofhigh level commands had never been laid down in written form,but had been passed on orally, as had been the case with manyinstitutions and working procedures of the General Staff. Itwas proposed to the Chief of the Army General Staff to statein the "Manual for the General Staff in Wartime" that the militarycommander alone was accountable for his area ofresponsibility.

The traditionalist Beck declined this proposal, because hedid not want to give up an institution which had provedsuccessful for so many years and had been used repeatedlyby Moltke. His successor, General of the Artillery FranzHalder, explicitly dropped the joint responsibility of GeneralStaff officers for command and control when the new manualfor the General Staff in Wartime was written, for he consideredit outdated. He decreed that the commander alone wasresponsible externally and internally, and that the GeneralStaff officer had to take a share in everything and deal with theproblems as if he had to bear the responsibility himself.However, the General Staff officer would only be internallyresponsible.75 This resulted in the Bundeswehr General Staffofficer of today having joint responsibility and accountability forthe relevance of his advice. The former "General Staffchannel" was thus reasonably restricted and took intoconsideration that most of the top-level military leaders of theWehrmacht before World War II were General Staff officers.Army General Staff officers retained their special insignia.

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Officers of the Armed Forces High Command(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) received golden collarpatches. Air Force General Staff officers wore the Air Forcecollar patches on crimson cloth. The Navy did not introducespecial insignia for Admiral Staff officers.76

From the beginning of his work as the Chief of the GeneralStaff of the Army, General Beck had to deal with many officerswho were enthusiastic about National Socialism anddemanded the "political soldier." The later chief of theWehrmacht operations staff, General Alfred Jodl, demandedthe abolition of the advising and jointly responsible GeneralStaff officer. He and other officers took the view that, in themodern "Fuehrer State," the General Staff could only play thetraditionally prominent role as a planning and training staff inpeacetime, but would not be required as a leadership body inwartime. Furthermore, they claimed that in wartime the"Fuehrer Principle" had to take full effect and the General Staffofficers' work was merely to assist the leaders in the planningand execution of operations, and independence had to beruled out.

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On October 15, 1935, the 125th anniversary ofScharnhorst's General War School, the War Academy wasreopened in Hitler's presence. The major address was givenby War Minister, General Colonel von Blomberg. He praisedScharnhorst as the founder of the German General Staff andof the War Academy, and as a revolutionary who hadestablished "the unity of the people, the state and the armedforces." The parallels between the revival of Prussia after itshumiliating defeat at the hands of Napoleon in 1806 and therevival of Germany after the defeat of 1918 wereenthusiastically stressed throughout Blomberg's speech.General of the Artillery Beck, the next speaker, also drew fromhistory for his theme when he outlined the objectives ofGeneral Staff training. Some people were of the opinion thathe wanted to point out the main differences between theGeneral Staff officer as developed by Scharnhorst and Hitler'sidea of the soldier within the "Fuehrer State" in the presenceof the Fuehrer himself. Beck said, among other things:

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. . .As the recognition of a correct thought does not alwaysautomatically mean the adherence to it, I would like to point out onthe occasion of today's anniversary, too, that the transition fromknowledge to skills, to the free, creative activity on a scientific basis,which is the case with a high level military leader, necessitates asits foremost prerequisite the education and training of the mind bymeans of the sciences of war. To grasp and deal with theconnections of military problems profoundly by applying systematicbrain work, step by step .... required careful studying and practice.Nothing would be more dangerous than to follow erratic, incompleteideas, however prudent and ingenious they may appear, or carryon the basis of wishful thinking, however fervent it may be. We arein need of officers who systematically proceed on the way of logicalreasoning to the end, whose character and nerves are strongenough to do what their reason dictates .... .

In 1938 General Beck resigned from his office in protest ofHitler's political activities against Czechoslovakia. Later on hewas one of the leaders of the uprising against Hitler on July 20,1944. Beck committed suicide on the evening of theunsuccessful revolt. For all time he exemplarily represents theresponsible and intellectual General Staff officer who followedhis conscience and sacrificed his life in the revolt against thecriminal dictator Hitler when he had recognized that only thedictator's death would save Germany from total destruction.

In 1936 about 1,000 officers assembled at the militarydistrict headquarters to take the compulsory examination forfuture field grade officers. Out of these, about 150 entered theWar Academy. In order to increase the output of the Academybetween 1933 and 1937 the course was reduced to 2 years.The primary aim of the newly structured General Staff coursewas to train General Staff officers as advisers and assistantsto major unit commanders or as members of the centralcommand apparatus of the General Staff of the Army. Thenew course was not designated to train future seniorcommanders, nor to provide staff officers for Wehrmachtinterservice or ministerial appointments.

Students were assessed by their tactics instructorsthroughout the course. There was no final examination.Borderline cases were, however, closely watched by theirsenior instructors. Candidates who did not qualify for General

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Staff appointments were usually sent to the War Ministry orbecame senior adjutants or tactics instructors in militaryschools. Those who qualified went to a "probationary period"(Probezeit) of up to 18 months in a General Staff appointment.When this was successfully completed the candidates wereentitled to add the "i.G." to their military rank and to wear theinsignia of the General Staff officers. The qualities sought, inaddition to military competence and knowledge, included quickmental perception, the ability to think logically, swiftness indecision making; insight for essentials and for coherence, theability to be creative and not to cling to regulations.

In the battles of World War II, the German General Staffofficer proved once again his exceptional skills and knowledge.During the campaigns in Poland and France, the chief of theArmy General Staff still directed the successful operations toa great extent independently. This changed when Hitlerincreasingly interfered in the command and control of theoperations. In the course of the war the Army General Staffremained responsible for the campaign in Russia under Hitler'sdirect command; the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht wasresponsible for the war theaters and occupied territories ofNorway, Finland, Africa, France, Belgium, and the Netherlandsand for the replacement army. Throughout World War I theGerman High Command suffered from the serious rivalrybetween the Wehrmacht High Command and the ArmyGeneral Staff. Both staffs were drawn from the ranks of theGeneral Staff Corps, and the rivalry between them was notinitially over the question of support of Hitler's policies, but overthe problem of the control of the Wehrmacht in war. TheWehrmacht High Command never assumed the role of a jointcommand over the services. Hitler failed to develop theWehrmacht High Command into a functioning WehrmachtGeneral and Admiral Staff.

Many General Staff officers participated in the attemptedassassination against Hitler on July 20, 1944, and took thebitter consequences which included penal liability of theirwhole families or executions by shooting or hanging, whichwere inflicted on them by the sentences of the People's Court(Volksgerichtshof). The aftermath of July 20, 1944 shattered

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- II

the General Staff officers as over 60 were arrested. The lossof many General Staff officers, including 24 hanged and 16suicides, added to the heavy casualties suffered by theGeneral Staff, which by the end of 1944 reached 166 killed inaction, 10 from illness and 143 missing.79 Unlike many otherprofessional groups in Hitler Germany, many of the bestGeneral Staff officers participated in the "revolt of conscience"against the dictator and followed their code of ethics whichruled out tyranny and crimes. The German General andAdmiral Staff officers can be proud of this heritage.

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CHAPTER 4

EFFECTS AND WAYS,DEFICITS AND DEMANDS

In his farewell speech before the graduates of the Generaland Admiral Staff course in 1982 the Generalinspekteur derBundeswehr, General Brandt, by referring to his 1980 speechsaid:

The importance of General Staff training derives from therequirements of General Staff service with its multifaceted tasks,which, in principle, have not changed since it was established 200years ago.8°

Thus, General von Seeckt's maxim, which he hadcommunicated to the General Staff officers in 1919 after takingover the post as the Chief of the General Staff when thestipulations of the Treaty of Versailles were not yet in effect, isstill valid today:

The form changes, the spirit remains the same. It is the spirit ofsilent, unselfish performance of duty in the service of the armedforces. General Staff officers have no name.81

It is hardly possible to describe the past and contemporaryhistory of German General Staff officers in a more precise way.

The far-reaching political and educational approach ofGeneral von Scharnhorst and the timelessly valid statementsof General von Clausewitz on the interrelationship of politicaland military power rule out the politically insensitive GeneralStaff officer. A high degree of professionalism and theperformance-oriented selection procedures for General Staffofficers were effective from the beginning of the 19th century,at a time when the leading positions in the armed forces andthe civil service were mainly filled according to criteria of classand birth. In Prussia, and after the foundation of the German

51

Empire in 1870, it was a small group of officers who developedat the beginning of the industrialization working methods andoperational-tactical views that are still valid in today'sBundeswehr, which has just crossed the threshold to thecomputer age.

Since the days of Field Marshal Count Helmut von Moltke,the German axioms of military leadership have always beenimplemented in directives and later on in regulations. Theirdevelopment can be traced to their antecedents, whichcontinued without interruption. Fortunately, the Chiefs ofGener& Staffs of Prussian-German armed forces were veryoften masters of the German language. An analysis ofGerman command-and-control regulations shows that theviews and formulations of the Field Marshals Count von Moltkeand Count von Schlieffen, General Ludendorff, and of theColonel Generals von Seeckt and Beck, continue to have atremendous effect on the aforementioned September 1987Army Regulation HDv 100/100, "Command and Control ofArmed Forces." The references to past experience are clearlyperceptible in many passages.82 The chapters "MilitaryCommand and Control" and "The Operation," as well asfundamentals in the chapters on "Types of Combat" havemany passages taken almost directly from the tactical andoperational views of these officers. The following examplesillustrate this phenomenon:

0 The nature of command and control of the armedforces as developed in German military history wasfirst formulated by Moltke and is described inParagraph 601 as follows: "Command and Control ofarmed forces is an art, a creative activity based oncharacter, ability and mental power."83

* Paragraph 609 contains another credo of Moltke andhis successors:

Resolute action is a must in war.... Commanders who merelywait for orders cannot seize favorable opportunities. Theymust always keep in mind that indecision and the failure to actmight be just as fatal as action based on a wrong decision.

52

" The requirements of modern leadership based on theexperience of German military tradition are describedin Paragraphs 616-625. Matter of course obedience,discipline and courage, mutual confidence ofcommanders and subordinates and the necessarycomradeship between the soldiers of all ranks arepostulated as the bonds of soldierly togetherness.Great emphasis is placed on the commander'sunwavering care for his men. As was discussedabove, mission-oriented command and control is thefundamental operating principle and rules out routineand bureaucratic command in the military community.

* Numerous expositions of the HDv 100/100 on theallocation of forces in the enemy's flanks and rear, ondeployment and reconnaissance, that is to say onoperations, reflect Field Marshal Count vonSchlieffen's operational concepts. They can be read inhis writings which include the concise "CannaeEssay.

84

" The German tactical principles of the types of combatgo back to the regulations of the Supreme ArmyCommand of 1917-18, which were elaborated onGeneral Ludendorff's order. Examples are the"Defense in Position Warfare" and the "Attack inPosition Warfare." 85

* The Army Command Regulation of 1933 HDv300/1,"Command and Control of Armed Forces" showsmany parallels to the operational and tactical viewsthat are still valid today.86

All this illustrates that the German views of militaryleadership are deeply rooted in the past. They were developedby generations of General Staff officers and tested inGermany's wars. Bundeswehr General Staff officers havemade sure that the experience of past wars has been put in anup-to-date mold for our time. They continue to have an effecton the present. Against this background, the Bundeswehr'sGeneral Staff officer can look back on a tradition and heritagehe can be proud of, and which affects his everyday military life

53

in a multitude of forms. His mission is to preserve this heritageand to make sure that it is permanently adapted to thechanging environmental conditions of our time through hisrespective superiors.

Attempts to Abolish the Bundeswehr General StaffOfficer Training.

From today's point of view, it is understandable that thevictors of both World Wars banned the Great General Staff andthe War Academy and accused the German General Staff,together with the Armed Forces High Command, of criminalbehavior at the Nuernberg Trials. During the World Wars, theyhad a bitter firsthand experience of the quality of GermanGeneral Staff officers. Against this background anotherphenomenon can be understood. In the book, The GeneralStaff in the Process of Change (Generalstab im Wandel),Brigadier General Hans-Georg Model and Lieutenant ColonelJens Prause described how the "Education Commission of theMinister of Defense" created in 1969 by the then Minister ofDefense, Helmut Schmidt, had tried to reduce BundeswehrGeneral and Admiral Staff officer training to 5-12 months. TheCommission was supported by politicians of that period whohad been committed to the equal opportunities of Line andGeneral Staff officers and had fought the traditional GeneralStaff training overwhelmingly for that reason. This move, whichwas unsuccessful, would have virtually eliminated the GermanGeneral Staff officer.

From today's perspective, it appears incomprehensible thatthe principle of equal opportunity and the neo-Marxist crusadeagainst any "elite" would have almost been successful.87

Obviously, it hardly played any role in the discussion that thereduced quality of the training of young German General andAdmiral Staff officers would have possibly caused a loss ofGerman influence in NATO staffs. There, as was shown, theoperational planning for the German armed forces is executed.

Generations of German officers in General Staff and Lineappointments have in NATO staffs gathered experience asequal partners and superiors, have been shaped in their

54

characters and have in turn influenced their alliedcomrades-in-arms. Up to now, no scientific study has beenavailable on how professional unity of German and alliedsoldiers in everyday duty and exercises has contributed to theconsolidation of the security-political infrastructure of the NorthAtlantic Alliance; nor has the effect of this unity beenestablished on the Federal Armed Forces. It can be assumed,however, that the shaping by NATO had, and is having, aprofound effect on the Federal Armed Forces. Thecooperation with fellow soldiers of different armed forces hasgiven many Bundeswehr officers stability in times ofuncertainty and crisis of their self-image. Above all, it hascontributed to the fact that the Bundeswehr General andAdmiral Staff officers of today are cosmopolitan and move lessin the narrow national paths than their predecessors.

Many German General and Admiral Staff officers haveintroduced original German approaches and ideas into theNATO Alliance. Thus, they have influenced considerably thetactical-operational opinions as well as the leadership trainingof their allies. In NATO they have learned that tolerance andmutual respect determine the working climate within aninternational environment. This network of relations wouldhave been jeopardized by less qualified German General Staffofficers in the NATO headquarters. 88 Fortunately, thediscussion about justification and future of BundeswehrGeneral and Admiral Staff officer training has not resurfaced.

Challenges.

Today, more than ever before, it is a necessity for Generaland Admiral Staff officers to deal with both technical mattersand their own special position within the German officer corpsand the Atlantic Alliance. The revolutionary developments inthe former "German Democratic Republic" and the easterncountries since autumn 1989 have created a volatilesecurity-political situation. They have questioned everythingthat has been valid up to now in the East-West confrontationand the present security structures. Even hitherto it has beendifficult enough for the "commander's adviser" in the FederalArmed Forces to comprehend and put in its proper place

55

security policy as a complex array of diverging, continuouslyshifting forces and factors within the overall framework.

Many questions are rising today which require the Generaland Admiral Staff officer's innovative participation. The former"National People's Army" is being integrated into the FederalArmed Forces. A new European-North American securityarchitecture is being developed. Many of its parameters arestill uncertain. The NATO heads of state and government havetasked the military to implement its New Strategic Concept8 9

which is to reflect force reductions which were agreed upon atthe Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ofNovember 1990 and the ever deminishing threat in the CentralRegion. In view of these developments, the challenges totoday's General and Admiral Staff officers have increasedconsiderably and will continue to do so in the future. Besidescoping with his everyday tasks, the "commander's adviser"must take pains to analyze and actively reevaluate the shiftingsecurity-political phenomena of our time.

This touches upon the problem of the education andtraining of young General and Admiral Staff officers to beadvisers of their commanders. The ignorance of manyBundeswehr officers about the peculiarities of the GermanGeneral Staff service frequently causes friction where GeneralStaff officers are employed as superiors of older staff officers.One often meets with the opinion that young General Staffofficers have the moral duty to greater diligence in the officethan other staff officers due to their better career prospects. Itis often overlooked, however, that the junior General Staffofficers must first be educated and trained as their"commander's advisers." This can only be successful if theyare not only employed as particularly hard-working staffofficers, but rather frequently get the opportunity to practiceadvising their superiors. Acting as deputies for theircommanders, they learn the interaction of the staff functionalareas.

Many a young General Staff officer, however, is not alwayssufficiently conscious of the fact that the Fuehrungsakademiecan only teach him how to train and educate himself in hispreparatory assignments to become a "commander's adviser."

56

e graduate of the assignment-oriented General and Admiralaff course has not yet concluded his training and education.is only in his following assignments in units, staffs andmmands, the Federal Ministry of Defense and NATO that hemolded according to his professional image. This requires

own initiative. He has to go through a demandingIf-educational process.

Critical observers of the Federal Armed Forces increasinglyint out the fact that quite a few young General and Admiralaft officers strive to follow certain career patterns which aresigned to present as little offense as possible and to agree:h their superiors' opinions in order to receive the besticiency reports, thus proceeding easily up the career ladder.treamlined" and adaptable General Staff officers, however,9 inappropriate, for they are unable to fulfill their main taskadvising their commanders and urging them to make

cisions. Here, senior General Staff officers are required toercise an influence on the molding and education of junior.neral Staff officers. In doing so they must also explain therticularities of a "commander's adviser" to other staff officersd support the junior General Staff officers. It would beacceptable if they did not tend to this task, for otherwise3re may be unnecessary disagreements or unrest in theIff s.

It is uncontested at present that the 2-year General andImiral Staff training is indispensable. It was discussed that3neral and Admiral Staff assignments in the Federal Armed)rces and in NATO are becoming increasingly complex, and, beyond the classic areas of responsibility in the tactical andierational fields. The curriculum at the Command and3neral Staff Academy must take this into consideration.re than ever before it is influenced by the rapidly changing

litary-political surroundings, by the developments within theunited Germany, and by the daily practical cooperation in,TO staffs as well as by joint exercises with Germany's allies.

All this and the fact that an increasing number of studentsthe General and Admiral Staff training courses have a

iiversity education and are holding master's degrees-morean 90 percent of the course that ended in October

57

1989-makes the old dispute, whether General Staff trainingshould be more technically or rather broadly, scientificallyoriented, unnecessary. 90

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CHAPTER 5

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION

When talking with allied officers one very often hears theargument that the Prussian-German Staff system weakens theauthority of the commanding officers because of the strongposition of the German General and Admiral Staff officers.Others believe that the cohesion of an officer corps is lessenedwhen most of the high staff jobs and commanding officers'positions are reserved for a specially trained group of officers.

The founders of the Prussian-German General Staffsystem wanted to increase thi quality of command and controlskills of commanding officers from the higher nobility withinsufficient military training by providing them with GeneralStaff officers as their advisers. Before the outbreak of WorldWar II, the Chief of the Army General Staff, General of theArtillery Franz Halder, explicitly dropped the joint responsibilityof General Staff officers for command and control. However,they were responsible and accountable for the relevance oftheir advice. This restriction was justified because most of thetop-level military leaders of the Wehrmacht were General Staffofficers. Neither in the Wehrmacht nor in the Bundeswehrhave high-ranking leaders ever felt thc ° authority to be limitedby their General Staff officers. They have always consideredthe General Staff system as a tool to increase their commandand control authority. The few General and Admiral Staffofficers who work within their formations make sure that theirdecisions are executed in the best way possible and areprofessionally tailored to the requirements of the respectivelevels of command and control. Their qualified staff workmakes it possible for commanding officers to concentrate ontheir main efforts in the fields of military education, training andcomMand and control in battle. Qualified advice during thewhole decision-making process by General and Admiral Staffofficers improves the quality of their final decisions. The

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commanding officers are to listen to their General Staff officers'advice. Since most of them are former General Staff officersthemselves, they have no problems with this procedure andexpect their General Staff officers to advise them. Thiscooperation, which was characterized as "military marriage,"ensures that decisions are not based on wishful thinking buton qualified reasoning and thought. German commandingofficers without General Staff officer training learn very quicklyhow the system works and use it to their benefit.

It is stressed again that no General and Admiral Staff officeris entitled to relieve his commanding officer from making adecision on his own and to develop the concept of operations.For both of these, he is alone responsible. Perhaps it can besaid that the German-Prussian General Staff system permitsthe commanding general to make decisions more effectively.This is his most important task. It is felt that many allied armedforces still overestimate the role and function of commandingofficers who make decisions without any advice, olily basedon their operational and strategic genius. Every insider knowsthat this is pure fiction. Commanding officers of today relymore than ever before on advice and proposals made by theirsubordinates. Military planning and command and controlhave become too complex to be handled by the leader on thetop alone. In this Ilght it seems to be an archaic facade if onemaintains this fiction at all costs. It is therefore recommendedthat other armed forces find out how they can benefit byintroducing the "commander's adviser" into their systems.

Another future development supports thisrecommendation. When German General and Admiral Staffofficers come into the NATO headquarters, they areconfronted by the following situation: The working methodsare well-established and are more or less a copy of the staffprocedures of those partners who dominate the respectiveheadquarters. Still today, the SHAPE and CENTAGheadquarters follow staff procedures of the United StatesArmed Forces, whereas NORTHAG headquarters is Britishdominated. In AFCENT Headquarters in Brunssum, theNetherlands, a mixture of American and British staffprocedures are observable as well as some relics from the

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period when the commander-in-chief of the Central Regionwas a French general. The German newcomers willinglyaccepted the working methods in the respective headquarters.Although the German General and Admiral Staff officers havegained and exercised influence within the NATO headquarters,they have never tried to introduce their elements of thePrussan-German General Staff system. This has never beenconsidered to be a major problem, because their number wassmall, and since they always found ways to come to terms withthe staff system they had to work in. The requirement forNATO to develop multinational corps for the future defense ofthe Alliance has changed this situation. In future multinationalformations, more German General Staff officers will work withtheir allied comrades-in-arms than ever existed in NATOheadquarters. They will work together in all military sectors atthe tactical and operational levels. It should, therefore, be alegitimate request from the German Armed Forces to considerelements of the Prussian-German General Staff system forinclusion in future staff organizations of these multinationalcorps. This approach is considered to avoid friction betweenallied and German officers who will have to work closertogether in these new formations. Itis therefore recommendedthat this request be considered as early as possible beforeimplementation begins.

It was shown that 52.2 percent of the German 1,087colonels and Navy captains, and 20 percent of the 202generals and admirals of the Bundeswehr, have no Generaland Admiral Staff officer training. In this context, it is alsointeresting that most of the German battalions and regimentsare commanded by officers without General Staff officertraining. Those who criticize that most of the higher staff andcommanding officers' jobs in the Bundeswehrare reserved forGeneral and Admiral Staff officers are not aware of thesurprisingly high number of senior officers in the Bundeswehrwithout General and Admiral Staff officer training.

In addition they have no understanding of another majoradvantage of the German system. Many allied armed forcesare trying hard to select their future commanding officers andhigh staff officers with operational and strategic vision. For the

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selection of these officers, the Prussian-German General Staffsystem offers ways which have been effective for manygenerations. The selection for General and Admiral Staffofficer training favors those officers who show talents early inthese fields. The Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswen(training gives them the tools for their future educationaldevelopment. The most talented of them are given jobs earlyin their careers to provide exposure to the operational andstrategic levels. These officers are about 10 years youngerthan many of their allied comrades-in-arms before these aretrained to think and work at the operational and strategic levels.The future German generals and admirals are selected fromthis group. The 202 generals and admirals of the Bundeswehrare recruited from the best trained out of the 1,200 Generaland Admiral Staff officers. About 40 come from the group ofthe best officers without that training.

The Germans believe that this early selection process andthe subsequent training of the future leading general officerswho need operational and strategic vision are indispensableand have proved their value. The system ensures thattalented practitioners" without General and Admiral Staff

officer training are given a fair chance to reach high positionsof leadership as well. Personal positive experience withgraduates of the "second year" at the Command and GeneralStaff College at Fort Leavenworth shows that the U.S. Armyhas obviously adopted similar ways for some of its futuregeneral officers.

At the end of this evaluation the question is asked, as sooften before, whether the Prussian-German General Staffsystem can be introduced in other armed forces. This questionleads back to Spenser Wilkinson's statement of 1887 whichwas quoted at the beginning of this paper: "It may well bedoubted whether this feature of the Prussian (General Staff)System is suitable for imitation elsewhere." It was shown thatattempts to imitate the system were often doomed to failurebecause the staff organizations of armed forces and their roleas an instrument of military leadership are the result ofhistorical processes that took different courses. However, ina period when the military strategy of NATO is being redefined

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and new challenges must be tackled, it is considered

worthwhile to reflect on the elements of the Prussian-German

General Staff system which could be used by Germany's allies

to the benefit of all.

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ENDNOTES

1. Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army, A Popular Account of theGerman General Staff System, Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co.,1895, reprint by the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA,November 1983, p. 1f.

2. See Christoph Allmeyer Beck, Die K (u.) K-Armee 1848-1914, Dieversunkene Wehrmacht, Prisma Verlag 1975, Introduction.

3. H. Dv.g 92, Handbuch fur den Generalstabsdienst im Kriege,Geheim, Berlin 1939, Teil I und II.

4. Army Regulation 100/100, "Command and Control of ArmedForces," Second Revised Edition of TF/G73, Army Staff 1112, September1987, translated by Bundessprachenamt, Huerth, No. 615.

5. For a history of the Prussian-German General Staff, the two mostimportant works in English language are Walter Goerlitz's History of theGerman General Staff, 1657-1945, translated by Brian Battershaw, NewYork: Praeger, 1985; and Colonel T. N. Dupuy's, A Genius for War.- TheGerman Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, Ingelwood Cliffs, N J:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977. Colonel Bradley H. Petersen's Military StudiesProgram Paper, "Should the United States Army have a ProfessionalGeneral Staff?", Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1987, givessome insight of the Bundeswehr General Staff officers peculiarities, butdoes not discuss in sufficient detail the main characteristics of this officersgroup within the German Armed Forces. Barry Leach gives some detailsof the German General Staff officers' working methods in his book, GermanGeneral Staff, New York: Balantine Books, Inc., August 1973. His analysisends at 1945. From my point of view, the Prussian-German GermanGeneral Staff System and its peculiarities were most clearly depicted by theobviously forgotten German World War II emigrant Herbert Rosinski, TheGerman Army, New York: 1962, Chapter IX. It is in his writings that theterm "General Staff System" appears for the first time. It even remainedunchanged in the German translation of 1970.

6. See NATO Press Service, Press Communique M-PC/NPG-1(91)38, "Final Communique," May 29, 1991. At this meeting the DefensePlanning Committee announced the specifics concerning the creation ofmultinationals in the AFCENT region.

7. Ernst Moritz Arndt, Katechismus fuer den deutschen Kriegs-und

Wehrmann, Berlin, 1813, p. 265.

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8. See Walter Goerlitz, Kleine Geschichte des deutschenGeneralstabs, in the following quoted as Goerlitz, Generalstab, Berlin 1967,p. 441f.

9. See Walter Millis, "Preface" to History of the German General Staff,V-X.

10. On conspiratorial theory see Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing,Charakterwaesche, Stuttgart: 1965, p. 54. See also, Christian Millotat, DieOberste Heeresleitung vom Ende des Weltkrieges bis zur Aufloesung desKaiserichen Heeres, Schriftenreihe Innere Fuehrung, Heft 7,1969/1970,p. 43.

11. Winston Churchill, Memoiren, Volume 2, Stuttgart - Hamburg:1953, p. 47.

12. On the verdict of the Nuernberg Trial see, Das Urteil von Nuernberg1946, published by Herbert Kraus; concerning the Defense of the GeneralStaff by Dr. Laternser, refer to, Verteidigung deutscher Soldaten,Plaedoyers vor alliierten Soldaten, Bonn: 1950. On Field Marshal vonManstein's contribution see, Siegfried Westphal, Der DeutscheGeneralstab auf der Anklagebank, Mainz: 1978, Chapter 5.

13. Foerster-Otto-Schnitter, Der preussisch-deutsche Generalstab1870-1963, Berlin: (East) 1956, p. 5f.

14. On the criticism of General Staff training of the Bundeswehr see,Klaus Reinhardt, Generalstabsausbildung in der Bundeswehr, Herford, pp.9-12. See also Hansgeorg Model, Jens Prause, Generalstab im Wandel,in the following quoted as Model/Prause, Muenchen 1982, pp. 87-120. Onthe neo-Marxist understanding of "Elites" and its effects on Germany in the1960s and 1970s see Alfred Heuss, Versagen und Verhaengnis, SiedlerVerlag, 1984.

15. On the influence of the Prussian-German General Staff abroad seeGoerlitz, Generalstab, p. 97. See also Russell F. Weigley, History of theUnited States Army, New York: 1967, pp. 314-330.

16. On the attempt of early Bundeswehr leaders to continue thetradition of the Prussian reforms of the times of Scharnhorst, see ManfredMesserschmidt's introduction to the Handbuch zur deutschenMilitaergeschichte, Munchen: 1979, Volume I, p. vi: "Those parts of thefledgeling Bundeswehr of the fifties who were interested in history, had thePrussian reforms in mind as the historical symbol of its new beginning. Yetthis very manual has to prove that the reforms, despite the up-to-datenessof their inspirations, did not usher in a new era, but only remained a phase."See also the differentiated assessment of the Prussian reforms by ThomasNipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866, Muenchen: 1983, Chapter I.

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17. Text of the opening speech of General Heusinger on the occasionof the opening of the Heeresakademie in: Model/Prause, pp. 11-16.

18. General Juergen Brandt, Abschiedsrede fuer den Genst-AdmStltgam 18 Juni 1979, published by the Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr,Bonn: 1980.

19. On the organization of the Federal Ministry of Defense see theDefense White Paper 1985, The Situation and the Development of theFederal Armed Forces, published by the Federal Minister of Defense onbehalf of the Federal Government, Bonn, 1985, pp. 165-171. A stillinteresting, if outdated description of structure and function of the FederalMinistry of Defense is Siegfried Mann's Das Bundesministerium derVerteidigung, Bonn: 1971. In the Treaty on the Final Settlement withRegard to Germany, the "Two-plus-Four Treaty" of September 12, 1990,Germany has agreed not to deploy foreign troops on former "GermanDemocratic Republic" terrain.

20. See "Der Generalinspekteur," FueB / 1, Az. 10-20-12 dated 8September 1959. General Heusinger was the first Chief of Staff, FederalArmed Forces.

21. "Anzugsordnung fuer die Bundeswehr," Bonn, 1972, No. 2307.See ZDv37/1 0, (German Joint Services Regulation).

22. All figures are from the "Report by the Personnel ManagementDivision 1982," Bonn, 1982.

23. See Model/Prause.

24. See Unpublished Briefing, "Organization and Tasks of theFuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," Fuehrungsakademie derBundeswehr, Stab Ausbildung und Lehre, Arbeitsbereich 1, dated August21,1989.

25. See Petersen, "Should the United States have a ProfessionalGeneral Staff?" pp. 16-26.

26. All figures are based on an interview which I had with the

Fuehrungsakademie Chief of Staff on November 12, 1990.

27. See Endnote 24.

28. On high level leadership training of NATO countries see GottfriedGreiner, Das Verhaeltnis von Politik und Militaer in der Ausbildung derhoeheren Fuehrungskrafte im NA TO-Bereich, in, Freiheitohne Krieg,published by the Clausewitzgesellschaft, Bonn, 1980, pp. 301-312.

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29. Brigadegeneral Dr. Greiner, quoted from Model/Prause, p. 137.

30. See Endnote 5 with my remarks on Herbert Rosinski.

31. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, Leipzig:1920, pp. 77-79.

32. General-Colonel Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten,Berlin: 1929, pp. 163-167.

33. ZDv 10/5, Chapter 3, Leitsatz, No. 2.

34. On potential conflict between allied superiors and German GeneralStaff officers subordinate to them see Christian Millotat, "Spannungsfelderim NATO-Stabsdienst," Europaeische Wehrkunde, February 1985.

35. On the French Staff System see General de Serrigny, Reflexionssur I'art de la guerre, p. 3, quoted according to Herbert Rosinski, DieDeutsche Armee, Duesseldorf and Wien, 1970, pp. 274-278.

36. On the position of the French "adjoints" see Correli Barnett, TheSwordbearers, Reprint of the 1964 ed., New York: Morrow, 1975, pp.196-198. Correli Barnett describes the relationship between GeneralPetain and his Chief of Cabinet, General Serrigny in World War I.

37. See Petersen, p. 25.

38. Army Regulation 100/100, "Command and Control of ArmedForces," No. 604. Colonel T.N. Dupuy wrote a brilliant interpretation ofAuftragstaktik from the American point of view in his book A Genius for War,pp. 116-117. John T, Nelson II also wrote a good analyses on Auftragstaktikin his analyses "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle,"Parameters, September 1987, pp. 21-34.

39. On the practice of use of "acting ranks" see numerous examples,Weigley, and Walter Millis, Arms and Men, A Study of American History,New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1981. In this connection see also the partlyexaggerated but accurate analysis of the American Armed Forces and theway they see themselves, written by Robert de Herte-Hans Juergen Nigra,Die USA, Europas missratenes Kind, Muenchen-Berlin, 1979, pp. 45-49.

40. See Handbuch zurdeutschen Militaergeschichte, Volume II, p. 168and Volume IX, p. 227. See also Goerlitz, General Staff p. 5.

41. On the position of Marshal Berthier see Handbuch zur deutschenMilitaergeschichte, Volume II, p. 155 and Volume IX, p. 228. In Bronsartvon Schellendorf's writing Der Dienst des Generalstabs of 1875, he tried to

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describe King Frederick the Great as the founder of the Prussian GeneralStaff. The reasons are anyone's guess.

42. On General von Scharnhorst's objectives and reforms seeReinhard Hoehn, Scharnhorst's Vermaechtnis, Bonn, 1952. See alsoHandbuch zur deutschen Militaergeschichte, Volume II, p. 168; Dupuy,Genius for War, pp. 24-36; Carl Hermann, Deutsche Militaergeschichte,Frankfurt, 1968, pp. 142 and 162; and, Goerlitz, General Staff, pp. 33-36.

43. See Endnote 42.

44. On the following quotations and information on the PrussianGeneral Staff up to 1815 see Bronsart von Schellendorf, Der Dienst desGeneralstabs, Berlin, 1875. Obviously, this was the first treatise todescribe the special working methods of the Prussian-German GeneralStaff.

45. On Clausewitz's position at the War Academy see Leach, GermanGeneral Staff, pp. 14-15.

46. See Endnote 42.

47. On the development of the German "educated middle class"(gebildetes Buergertum) in the 19th century see Nipperdey, DeutscheGeschichte 1800-1860.

48. See Hans Delbrijeck, Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen von

Gneisenau, Berlin, 1920; Goerlitz, General Staff, pp. 40-49.

49. See Hans Carl Hermann, Deutsche Militaergeschichte, p. 201ff.

50. See Goerlitz, General Staff, pp. 58-60; and, Dupuy, Genius for War,pp. 48-53.

51. See Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm, Clausewitz Leben und Werk,Esslingen, 1976, pp. 43-53. On Gneisenau's falsification of nobility seeDeutsche Fuehrungsschichten der Neuzeit, Das deutsche Offizierkorps1860-1960, edited by Hans Hubert Hofmann, Boppart am Rhein, 1980(Buedinger Gespraeche), p. 203.

52. See Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, FourVolumes, Muenchen, 1970.

53. See Goerlitz, General Staff, pp. 68-102; and, Dupuy, Genius forWar, pp. 48-53.

54. See Dupuy, Genius for War, pp. 72-75; and, Leach, GermanGeneral Staff, pp. 15-18.

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55. Wording of the "Ordre," see Goerlitz, Generalstab, pp. 83-85.

56. See Bronsart von Schellendorf, Der Dienst des Generalstabs, pp.40-43.

57. See Goerlitz, General Staff, p. 90; and, Dupuy, Genius for War, pp.95-103. On General Field Marshal Count von Moltke's own assessment ofthe War of 1870-71 see his Geschichte des deutsch-franzoesischenKrieges 1870-71, Berlin, 1891. On the personality of Moltke see FranzHerre, Moltke, der Mann und sein Jahrhundert, Stuttgart: 1984.

58. Text of the "Ordre" see Wiegand Schmidt-Richberg, DieGeneralstaebe in Deutschland 1871-1945, Stuttgart, 1962, p. 16.

59. On Field Marshal Count von Schlieffen's influence on the WorldWar I generation of commanders and their advisers see Jehuda L. Wallach,The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation, London, 1986, Chapter 2, "AlfredCount von Schlieffen: Prophet of Annihilation."

60. For a critical appreciation of the university-like General Stafftraining before 1870, see General der Artillerie Prinz Kraft zuHohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Aus meinem Leben, Volume I, pp. 155-158.

61. See Herbert Rosinski, The German Army, Chapter IX. For theGeneral Staff training after 1870 and the first assignments as a youngGeneral Staff officer see also General Ludendorff, Mein militaerischerWerdegang, Muenchen: 1942, pp. 27-35.

62. See Herbert Rosinski, The German Army, p. 261.

63. For the training of Bavarian General Staff Officers see H. GraefinSchall-Riaucour, Aufstand und Gehorsam, Offiziertum und Generalstab imUmbruch, Leben und Wirken von Generaloberst Franz Halder,Generalstabschef 1938-1942 (in the following quoted as Schall Riaucour,Halder), Wiesbaden, 1972, pp. 88-105.

64. For the number of General Staff officers in the Imperial GermanArmy (Reichsheer) at the beginning of World War I see WiegandSchmidt-Richberg, Die Generalstaebe in Deutschland 1875-1945, p. 18.For the position of the General Staff officer, especially of the Chiefs of theGeneral Staffs in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey see Generaloberstvon Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten, pp. 159-163. The relatively fewcompetences of Russian General Staff officers may be extracted from thesketch on General Alexejew by Theobald Schaefer in Heerfuehrer desWeltkrieges, Berlin, 1939, pp. 120-141.

65. See Knoetel-Sieg, Handbuch der Uniformkunde, Hamburg: 1971,p. 46.

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66. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by MichaelHoward and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984,p. 605.

67. See Wiegand Schmidt-Richberg, Die Generalstaebe inDeutschland 1871-1945, p. 18ff. See also Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst undKriegshandwerk, Volume 4; and, Christian Millotat, Die ObersteHeeresleitung vom Ende des Weltkrieges bis zur Aufloesung deskaiserichen Heeres, pp. 44-51.

68. On the relationship of the Chief of the General Staff of the 5th (GE)Army, Lieutenant General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, to hiscommander-in-chief, Lieutenant General Crown Prince Wilhelm, seeHermann Wendt, Verdun, Berlin, 1931.

69. See Generaloberst von Einem, Ein Armeefuehrer erlebt den Krieg,Leipzig, 1938, pp. 95-153 and many other passages.

70. On the position of the Prussian-German General Staff in 1918 seeBenoist Mechin, Geschichte der deutschen Militaermacht 1918-1945,Volume 1, Das Kaiserreich zerbricht, Oldenburg und Hamburg, 1965.

71. See Leach, German General Staff, pp. 27-29.

72. General von Seeckt, quoted from Leach, German General Staff,p. 24.

73. On the training of the Imperial Army's (Reichswehr) General Staffofficers see Wiegand Schmidt-Richberg, Die Generalstaebe inDeutschland 1871-1945, pp. 55-72; Goerlitz, General Staff, pp. 227-228;Dupuy, A Genius for War, p. 216; and, Leach, German General Staff, p. 27.

74. Figures taken from Wiegard Schmidt-Richberg, DieGeneralstaebe in Deutschland 1871-1945, p. 250.

75. On the problem of shared responsibility of Wehrmacht GeneralStaff officers see Schall Riaucour, Halder, p. 119ff.

76. For the General Staff uniform of the Wehrmacht see EberhardHettler, Uniformen der Deutschen Wehrmacht, Hamburg: 1979, Tables 9and 25.

77. On General Colonel Jodi's opinion on the position of the GeneralStaff officer in the "Third Reich" see Goerlitz, General Staff, pp. 420-421.

78. General Ludwig Beck, speech on the occasion of the 125thanniversary of the Kriegsakademie, quoted hereafter: Die grossen Meisterder Kriegskunst, published by Dr. Inho Krumpelt, Berlin-Frankfurt o.J., pp.

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321-325; and Rosinski, The German Army, p. 294ff; on General ColonelBeck's opinions see Ludwig Beck, Studien, Stuttgart, 1955; and, Leach,German General Staff, p. 12.

79. See Leach, German General Staff, pp. 154-158; and, Goerlitz,General Staff, pp. 462-477.

80. General Juergen Brandt, "Abschiedsrede fuer den Generalstabsund Admiralstabslehrgang 1980," published by the FuehrungsakademiederBundeswehr, Bonn: 1982.

81. General der Artillerie Friedrich von Rabenau, Seeckt, Aus meinemLeben 1918-1936, Leipzig, 1940, p. 193. In this work, details are containedabout the ideas of General Colonel von Seeckt on the future role of GeneralStaff officers in the new Imperial Army (Reichswehr). See also Goerlitz,Generalstab, p. 244.

82. See Army Regulation 100/100, "Command and Control of ArmedForces," Chapter 6.

83. See excerpts of Moltke's military writings, published by the GreatGeneral Staff, in Dr. Inho Krumpelt, Die grossen Meister der Kriegskunst,Chapter "Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Moltke."

84. See Field Marshal Graf Alfred von Schlieffen, GesammelteSchriften, Volume 1, Berlin, 1913. An extract of the "Cannae Essay" canbe found in Krumpelt, pp. 211-252.

85. For the regulations Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg and Die Abwehrim Stellungskrieg see, The Documents of the Supreme Army Command onits Activities 1916-1918 (Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung ueber ihreTaetigkeit 1916-1918), published by General of the Infantry ErichLudendorff, Berlin 1920, p. 604ff. They also contain further regulationselaborated on General Ludendorff's order in 1917 and 1918.

86. German Army Regulation HDv 300/1, "Truppenfuehrung," Part I,dated October 17, 1933, Berlin, 1936.

87. For the Work of the "Educational Commission in the FederalMinistry of Defense" and the Struggle for the General Staff Training in theBundeswehr see Model Prause, pp. 109-128.

88. On the different staff systems meeting in NATO staffs and on thedifficulties of German General Staff officers in NATO assignments, seeChristian Millotat, "Spannungsfelder im NA TO-Stabsdienst.Jeder faengtvon vorne an," Europaeische Wehrkunde 2/85, Herford: 1985, p. 91 ff.

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89. See, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Press CommuniqueS-1(91)85, Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991.

90. For the number of academically educated officers in the Generaland Admiral Staff course of 1987 and the farewell speech of theBundeswehr Fuehrungsakademie commandant on the occasion of thefarewell ceremony of that course, see "Festschrift zur Entlassung derAbsolventen des Jahrgangs 1987 Verwendun gelehrgangGeneralstabs-/Admiralstabsdienst 1989," published by the Federal Ministryof Defense, Fue S 17, Bonn 1989.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

OBERST I.G. CHRISTIAN E. 0. MILLOTAT is currentlyCommander of the Heimatschutzbrigade 38 in Halle easternGermany. He is a 1977 graduate of the Fuehrungsakademieder Budeswehr, a 1978 graduate of the Canadian ForcesCommand and Staff College, and a .991 graduate of the U.S.Army War College. His previous assignments include G3 andDeputy Chief of Staff, II Korps in Ulm and Commander. Panzergrenadierbataillon 362 in Walldurn.

DONALD ABENHEIM is an Associate Professor of NationalSecurity Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,California. He is the author of the book, Reforging the ft )nCross: The Search for Tradition in the German Armed Forces,Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.

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I-nm -rnnnnm nnm ~ I•m

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Karl W. Robinson

Director of ResearchDr. Gary L. Guertner

AuthorOberst i.G. Christian O.E. Millotat

EditorMrs. Marianne P. Cowling

CompositionDaniel B. Barnett