unclassified january 2000 history and evolution of io 1 history and evolution of io history and...
TRANSCRIPT
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 1
History andEvolution of IO
History andEvolution of IOPrepared by the Joint IO Center
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 2
Learning ObjectivesLearning Objectives
Why is it important?
What is different?
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 3
Information OperationsFocus
Information OperationsFocus
Actions taken to affectActions taken to affectadversary adversary informationinformation and andinformation systemsinformation systems. . .. . .
Systems, people, & facilities Systems, people, & facilities supporting information-supporting information-dependent functionsdependent functions
Attacks take many forms: physical, Attacks take many forms: physical, cyber, psychological, etc.cyber, psychological, etc.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 4
The IO Battlefield
Info systems critical to military operations
“Our present theory is to destroy personnel, our new theory should be to destroycommand. Not after the enemy’s personnel has been disorganized, but before it has been attacked, so that it may be found in a state of disorganization whenattacked.”
J.F.C. Fuller Memorandum: Strategic Paralysis as the Objective of the Decisive Attack, 1918
Info technologies used - secondary to “real” weapons
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 5
History
Supporting and secondary
Primary and fully integrated
Desert Storm
Civil War
World War I
World War II
VietnamSomalia
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 6
American Civil War
Use of telegraph (30 wpm)
Picket riders for battlefield awareness Attacks on lines of
communications
Spies, codes, deception
Perception management
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 7
World War I
Massive battlefield attrition
Use of air forces for battlefield awareness
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 8
World War II
Strategic attacks against infrastructure
Double-edged sword of “Enigma”
Communications jamming
C2 targets - John Wayne’s radioman
Deception critical to success of first fully integrated plan - 1940’s technology
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 9
Vietnam-Tet OffensiveVietnam-Tet Offensive
Who won the Tet Offensive?
North Vietnam victorious in the long run
US decision makers crippled by public opinion
Public opinion shifted
North Vietnam won the media war (“body bag effect”)
US won the ground war
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 10
The Cold War
One of which was the US’s demonstrated technological superiority and ability to conduct a coherent information campaign (PSYOP and deception).
Can be viewed as a technologycontest won by the West for many reasons. . .
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 11
Desert Storm
The first “Information” War
Coordinated planning for EW, OPSEC, deception, PSYOP, destruction
Targeting against leadership and military C2
Integration of spaceborne, airborne and land based communications and intelligence
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 12
Somalia
Intelligence deficiencies
Communications countermeasures
Psychological Operations - Manipulation of mass media
““Turning around your high-powered, Turning around your high-powered, fully wired expeditionary forcefully wired expeditionary forcein Somalia with a single, 30-secondin Somalia with a single, 30-secondvideoclipvideoclip. - Weaponry by CNN”. - Weaponry by CNN”
““Turning around your high-powered, Turning around your high-powered, fully wired expeditionary forcefully wired expeditionary forcein Somalia with a single, 30-secondin Somalia with a single, 30-secondvideoclipvideoclip. - Weaponry by CNN”. - Weaponry by CNN”
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 13
Desert Storm
Strong evidence to support Desert Storm as first US offensive info war
Less evidence exists that defensive IO wasgiven much consideration by either side
Post-war analysis highlighted numerous serious exploitable IO deficiencies with coalition forces
OSD, JCS, and service IO functions were created
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 14
Desert Storm
“Iraq lost the war before it even began. This was a war of intelligence,EW, command and control, and counterintelligence. Iraqi troops wereblinded and deafened. . .Modern war can be won by informatika and that is now vital for both the US and the USSR.”
LtG Bogdanov, Chief of the General Staff, Center for Operational and Strategic Studies, Oct 1991
Patriot missile hits SCUD
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 15
AfghanistanAfghanistan
Joint/Special Operations
Lethal/Non-Lethal Targeting
Area of Operations/Influence
““The mission of destroying missile sites and The mission of destroying missile sites and arms depots is almost the easy part. The arms depots is almost the easy part. The critical task … is to continue to reshape the critical task … is to continue to reshape the information environment and target points of information environment and target points of fracture in the opposition.” fracture in the opposition.” P.W Singer, P.W Singer, Foreign Policy StudiesForeign Policy Studies
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 16
Is IO THAT Important?Is IO THAT Important?
Revolution in Military Affairsor
Buzzword du jour?
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 17
Information Technology Revolution
Information Technology Revolution
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY,
specifically the use of
COMPUTERS and NETWORKING,
is a worldwide revolution affecting every aspect of human life from industry to government to entertainment.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 18
Information TechnologiesWhat is Different?
Information TechnologiesWhat is Different?
Target access points are changingand may not be in geographical proximity to the target.
There are few geographical boundariesin the information infrastructure.
is changing.
The military can no longer createand control the battlespace
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 19
Information TechnologiesWhat is Different?
Information TechnologiesWhat is Different?
is changing.
Technology leadership shifting from military to civilian sector
Info technology inexpensiveand readily available
Impact of computers and networking
Electromagnetic spectrum(including satellites) andlandline
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 20
Information TechnologiesWhat is Different?
Information TechnologiesWhat is Different?
is changing.
Changing geographic, political, spatial, & time boundaries
Selective targeting/critical nodes
Rules of engagementand legal issues
Changing military mission(more targets)
New threat (state/politicallysponsored, others)
Minimal forces in “harms way,” Precision targeting Conservation of resources
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 21
Information TechnologiesWhat is Different?
Information TechnologiesWhat is Different?
is a major factor.
Technology is rapidly moving - outpacing controls
Demand for real time, highly reliable, manageable information
Must anticipate the future to stay ahead (18 month life cycle - or less)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 22
New Age
Industrial Information
Legacy support institutions are becoming less relevant
All support is under examination for relevancy
Military organizations and other existing institutions under scrutiny (NSA, CIA, etc...)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 23
IO - Lucrative ToolIO - Lucrative Tool
AnonymousAdversaries
Simple Technology
AmbiguousLaw
Many Targets
UncertainResponsibilities
Poorly DefinedRemedies
No Quick Fixes
Deterrence = Infrastructure Resiliency
(“Takes a licking andkeeps on ticking”)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 24
Challenges ImmediateChallenges Immediate
No common vocabulary
Defense ignored or focused on classified systems
Intelligence system challenged
Issues extend beyond DoD
Responsibilities are widely scattered
I&W: traditional methods are ineffective
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 25
Challenges Long TermChallenges Long Term
Technologies are revolutionizing. . .Information collection, processing, dissemination
Command & control
Conduct of operations
Requires development of. . .Expanded collection means
New doctrine (supported by training & education)
Must make correct decisions about investments Must make correct decisions about investments in information technologies and human capabilitiesin information technologies and human capabilities
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 26
Potential ThreatsPotential Threats
Information technologies are available to all (and many are interested)
No “rear area” in IO
As US reliance on information grows the threat becomes more complex, sophisticated, clandestine
Rapid introduction of advanced technologies brings increased capability to adversaries
Information can be our vulnerability as well as our strength.Information can be our vulnerability as well as our strength.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 27
That’s What’s NewHow Does All This Impact JIOC?
That’s What’s NewHow Does All This Impact JIOC?
is key.
has a new role.
Rapidly emerging technologies
Growing dependence on computers - by both weapons and C2
The Information Age is creating a new world.
The effectiveness of IO increases.
Our vulnerability to IO increases.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
January 2000
History and Evolution of IO 28
SummaryKey PointsSummary
Key Points
Not a new concept (origins in writings of Sun Tzucirca 300 BC). However the Information Age elevates it to a new level.
Information Age technologies are revolutionizing military operations. However legacy information systems remain and must be considered in mission planning.
Dependence on Information Age technologies creates new vulnerabilities.(Use leads to dependence which creates vulnerabilities.)